Jerry Walls is arguably the top Arminian philosopher of his generation. He's been making some striking concessions on Facebook. Dogmatic Arminians often refuse to acknowledge the tension between libertarian freedom and divine foreknowledge, but Walls is more candid about the dilemma:
Jerry Walls Well, that's a complex issue of course, but in brief, I find it utterly mysterious how it is possible to know far off future choices of people who do not yet exist. Even more perplexing is how it is possible to know every choice that would be made by an infinite number of persons in every possible state of affairs, who will NEVER actually exist. Again, not just possible choices, but the actual choices they would make if they were created. And simple foreknowledge I find as perplexing. Calvinism and open theism are both far more intelligible. In fact, I would not be surprised when the smoke clears and the dust settles if those were the two positions left standing as the viable options. But Calvinism is morally intolerable when it is consistent. That leaves open theism. Hard to say how far I lean that way, but I've leaned that way for a while.
Jerry Walls Yes, God has foreknowledge of many things, just not infallible foreknowledge of undetermined choices.
Here he touches on a point I don't generally see discussed. It's not just a question of whether God can know discrete libertarian choices. Rather, when dealing with choices in the distant future, that involves knowledge of nested choices. A long chain of choices, not only within the life of an individual, but over generations of individuals, where one thing leads to another, leading up to that decision point in the far-off future. Contingencies contingent on other contingencies.
Let's assume libertarian freedom. The choices of the older generation create the situation from which the younger generation makes its choices. Even if the situation doesn't determine their choices, it determines their range of choices. To the extent that past choices create future circumstances, that's the pool from which a future generation makes its selection.
If the choices are truly free, then it's not just a question of how God can know an inherently unpredictable choice, but it's compounded by how God can know every link in a chain of contingencies, where each depends on the prior.
Ironically, Walls cuts the Gordian knot by appealing to divine determinism!
Jerry Walls God can determine many things, including human choices in order to accomplish his purposes. What he cannot determine is a free choice to love him, worship him, etc.
Jerry Walls I do not think dispositions allow precise predictions, but more general ones, like the one in Matthew. Dispositions do not allow you to predict the exact people who will repent, the exact date and time of day, the exact words they will use and so on. According to Molinism, God know all those details and more.
And as for open theism, God is never surprised in the sense that he knows all potentialities and possibilities, so none emerge he did not know were possible. And indeed, I think Cyrus and John are explicable in terms of divine orchestration or even determinism. While God can determine actions, he cannot determine the essentially personal choices to love, to worship, to trust, etc. So open theism has a lot of options, as I said before.
So he labors to relieve the dilemma by resorting to an ad hoc alternation between determinism and indeterminism, even though those are intertwined.
>>"And as for open theism, God is never surprised in the sense that he knows all potentialities and possibilities, so none emerge he did not know were possible."
ReplyDeleteI don't see how it follows, from this, that God isn't surprised. I know it's *possible* that I win the lottery, but I'd still be surprised if I did. Factoring in probabilities wouldn't help. Sometimes imporbable things happen. Things God knows are extremely improbable happen. Why wouldn't God be surprised by that?
>>"While God can determine actions, he cannot determine the essentially personal choices to love, to worship, to trust, etc. So open theism has a lot of options, as I said before."
Choices to love God aren't isolated decisions. They occur within an entire matrix of life choices and events. If you listen to a lot of testimonies, sometimes you'll hear how little, seemingly insignificant events lead people to God.
That isn't problematic for Jerry per se. He would probably be fine with God orchestrating such events or determining such events so long as the outcome is sufficiently undetermined. And if it doesn't occur for people in this life, Jerry still has post-mortem evangelism and purgatory to fall back on. But if it's hard to see how God can have the sort of foreknowledge discussed in the first quote, then it's hard to see how God could have the necessary insight to orchestrate such events.
Let's name generations: g1, g2, etc. Now, if God knows the free choices of g1, then I don't see how it is more problematic to know the free choices of g2. The only way this compounding effect can become compounded is if God doesn't know the free choices of the generations. While that is true under open theism, it isn't under simple foreknowledge or molinism.
ReplyDeleteAs to God knowing free choices, I don't see how that is problematic.
If a free choice could turn out either way, then it's inherently unpredictable.
DeleteHello brettlunn,
DeleteI'm glad that you don't see how that is problematic! Perhaps you can explain to us how God can know free choices before the choices are made. I'm sure that will benefit everyone here far more than your statement that you don't see it as being problematic. Thanks! :-)
Steve,
DeleteIn all honesty, I'm a bit unclear on your terms. First, "could turn out either way". Are you using this in a modal, epistemic, or some different sense? The only interesting one seems to be a modal sense so I will assume that (correct me if I'm wrong). Now, I find this part problematic because it doesn't draw a distinction between possible and feasible worlds. Suppose molinism is true. Then, although it is the case that different choices are made in different worlds, some of those worlds aren't feasible and so only one of the two worlds (assuming a two choice situation) is feasible. That seems to solve any problem.
As to "unpredictable". I'm not sure how this follows at all. It tends to remind me of people who argue against libertarian free will by saying that if it isn't deterministic, then it's random. The only sense I can make of this definition of "random" is that it is synonymous with indeterministic and that's exactly what the libertarian wants to affirm! In a similar way, I fail to understand how your consequent follows so instead of trying to reconstruct it, I will ask for elucidation. Thanks!
Peter,
Hello to you too. Here I think I will answer in a roundabout way, so I hope you don't mind. Now, the simple foreknowledge proponent and the molinist think there are facts about future events: unlike the open theist, they don't think the future is open. They also believe that God is omniscient. From those two points they deduce that God knows future free choices (and counterfactuals under molinism). So let me take the easy route and say that those proponents do not need to give an account of how God knows them (although that would be nice), they only need to have a warranted belief that God does know them. In a similar vein, I really think I do have knowledge about causation, but causation is also this very mysterious thing and I'm not sure how it works exactly. So this question of "how" might be interesting, but it's not an objection properly speaking (or at least not a forceful one in any sense). Now, there are plenty of accounts out there about how God knows future free choices, but I set those aside to make this larger point.
Brett Lunn
brettlunn.wordpress.com
Brett,
DeleteThanks for your response. I will stick just with the parts that you're interacting with me on.
You said: "So let me take the easy route and say that those proponents do not need to give an account of how God knows them (although that would be nice), they only need to have a warranted belief that God does know them."
But A) I don't think you have warranted belief here (in fact, I'd say free will, as typically defined by libertarians, requires the impossibility of warranted belief here) and B) the Reformed view provides an actual explanation for how God has foreknowledge of future events, meaning that you're pitting a "I dunno how but it must be so if you grant our assumptions" argument against a "here's exactly why it works if you grant our [different from the first] assumptions" argument. Forgive me if I point out how utterly unpersuasive that is, even if I didn't already have reason to deny the warrant in the first place.
So not only is this question interesting, but I think it's somewhat necessary for you to have a way to explain it.
Oh, and if you're wondering how the Reformed view explains God's foreknowledge: God ordains all that comes to pass, and since He knows what He's going to ordain, He foreknows all that will occur. You may not like or believe this explanation is true, but I think you would acknowledge that it's more of an explanation than "I don't know how but it is so" is.
brettlunn5/09/2014 12:55 PM
Delete"Let's name generations: g1, g2, etc. Now, if God knows the free choices of g1, then I don't see how it is more problematic to know the free choices of g2. The only way this compounding effect can become compounded is if God doesn't know the free choices of the generations. While that is true under open theism…"
Which is precisely the point I was making in reference to Jerry Walls. Thanks for your unwitting confirmation of my argument.
"…it isn't under simple foreknowledge or monism."
A red herring inasmuch as Jerry Walls was the point of reference.
brettlunn
Delete"In all honesty, I'm a bit unclear on your terms."
That's because you're disregarding the context of the post, which concerns the position of Jerry Walls.
"First, 'could turn out either way'. Are you using this in a modal, epistemic, or some different sense? The only interesting one seems to be a modal sense so I will assume that (correct me if I'm wrong)."
Here's how Walls defines libertarian freedom in his “What’s Wrong with Calvinism?” lecture at HBU:
"A free action is one that is not determined by prior causes or conditions. As he makes the choice, the agent has the power to choose A and the power to choose not-A, and it is up to him how he will choose."
That's the frame of reference.
"Now, I find this part problematic because it doesn't draw a distinction between possible and feasible worlds. Suppose molinism is true. Then, although it is the case that different choices are made in different worlds, some of those worlds aren't feasible and so only one of the two worlds (assuming a two choice situation) is feasible. That seems to solve any problem."
i) Since Walls regards Molinism as incompatible with libertarian freedom, your Molinist alternative is irrelevant to this post.
ii) Moreover, the distinction between possible and feasible worlds, even if we grant that distinction for the sake of argument, does nothing to relieve the tension between divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom.
"As to 'unpredictable'. I'm not sure how this follows at all. It tends to remind me of people who argue against libertarian free will by saying that if it isn't deterministic, then it's random. The only sense I can make of this definition of "random" is that it is synonymous with indeterministic and that's exactly what the libertarian wants to affirm! In a similar way, I fail to understand how your consequent follows so instead of trying to reconstruct it, I will ask for elucidation. Thanks!
Since I didn't use "random," your attempt to make sense of my nonexistent definition of my nonexistent use of "random" is a tangent.
Rather, as I already explained, it is unpredictable because it could turn out either way (as Walls defines libertarian freedom).
"First argument: I see no reason to accept (4). This premise seems reminiscent of what Steve said above, so my response there seems applicable. (Incidentally, I also don't hold to PAP due to Frankfurt counterexamples.)"
The fact that you reject PAP is a red herring. You are not the frame of reference. The post is about the position taken by Jerry Walls. Your beef is with him, not me. Why don't you mouse over to his Facebook page and debate him instead?
Peter,
ReplyDeleteWhy don't they have a warranted belief here? I must be missing something. I think they would have a warranted belief that God is omniscient; moreover, I think they would have a warranted belief that there are facts about the future; I think they are warranted in logical deduction; so why aren't they warranted in the conclusion?
As to your point about comparing the views, I completely agree that if the Reformed view has an explanation for how while the simple foreknowledge or molinist views don't, then this gives a slight degree of evidence in favor of the Reformed view. However, my point is that it only gives a slight degree of evidence, it doesn't in anyway whatsoever show that simple foreknowledge or molinism is untenable. So how might those proponents respond? First, they can give an account for how and thus neutralize this evidence in favor of the Reformed view. Second, they could provide an argument that shows that the Reformed view is untenable and thus those views are the only games in town. As to the first, people have attempted to do this, but it's a pretty long discussion so that's why I was taking the easy route. :) As to the second, those proponents claim to do that with arguments against compatibilism or by showing that God is the author of evil under calvinism or whatever. You might find those arguments lacking (and I think some of them are!), but that's a different question.
As to the Reformed view, thanks for the explanation. Fun fact: I used to be Reformed myself and I still have strong affinities for the tradition and thus I have read quite a bit on the topic. All of that is mostly due to the fact that I can't stand arguments that stem from people's ignorance of what the other side believes (and this happens all too often on both sides).
To summarize: (i) I would be interested in hearing why you don't think the simple foreknowledge or molinist is warranted in the beliefs and inferences I outlined above and (ii) I would be interested in hearing what you think about my outline above about slight evidential edge and possible responses (note: I am not defending either response here, I am simply saying those are possible routes).
Hello Brett,
DeleteIs someone warranted in believing a logical contradiction? I say no.
Here's the LFW view in Arminianism.
1. God eternally knows the future (definition of omniscience).
2. Suppose that at time T, Person A freely decides to do X.
3. Under PAP, A could have done other than X until A actually does X.
4. If A could have done other, then before A does X it is impossible to know that A actually will do X.
5. 4 contradicts 1.
Or, given another definition of freedom that I was given recently (i.e., freedom is when A self-determines an action).
1. God eternally knows the future (definition of omniscience).
2. Suppose that at time T, Person A freely decides to do X.
3. A has self-determined to do X at time T, meaning A is the determining factor that X occurs at T.
4. If A is the determining factor of X occurring at T, then A must exist in order to determine X will occur at T.
5. Logically, A's existence must precede the act of knowing that X will occur at T (even if we stipulate a hypothetical existence of A) or else A is not the actual determiner of X.
6. A is not God and therefore is not eternal.
7. Therefore, there was a time when A did not exist in order for God to know what A would determine to do.
8. 7 contradicts 1.
So there are plenty of reasons to reject the claim that holding to LFW one still has warrant to believe God is omniscient and immutable (i.e., if God learns something then He has changed and is not immutable).
First argument: I see no reason to accept (4). This premise seems reminiscent of what Steve said above, so my response there seems applicable. (Incidentally, I also don't hold to PAP due to Frankfurt counterexamples.)
DeleteSecond argument: (4) again seems problematic. (4) should say "A must exist in order to determine X [i]occurs[/i] at T. There is a temporal confusion here. While it is the case that for A to do X at T, A must exist at T, it is not the case for the truth of "A will do X at T", that A must exist at the moment of knowing that truth. Also, a better word to use is "performs" as this is common in the literature (see O'Connor).
Also, notice that you aren't objecting to the simple foreknowledge or molinism proponent being warranted simpliciter with regards to the premises or the conclusion I outlined above, but you are trying to provide a defeater for those beliefs held in tandem with other beliefs. However, that is a completely different question than the one I was addressing with regards to having the belief that God knows future free actions without knowing how God knows future free actions. Hence, while your arguments may be interesting, they actually miss the point as my simple point was that the person can be warranted in believing that God knows future free choices even though they don't know how God knows those things (that is, I was barring other questions). So do you agree on that point then?
Hello Brett,
DeleteI don't have a lot of time to respond at the moment, but I'll just point out one thing. You mentioned: "While it is the case that for A to do X at T, A must exist at T, it is not the case for the truth of 'A will do X at T', that A must exist at the moment of knowing that truth."
This is only the case if A is not the determiner of X. Otherwise, A must in fact exist before one can know what A will do. Naturally, A need not have *physical* existence--in fact, most people would argue that A exists as a hypothetical. E.g., God thinks, "If A exists in such and so manner, then X would result."
But notice again the sequence of events: the A must exist, even hypothetically, PRIOR TO God being able to know what A would or would not do. This is a huge problem. Since A determines X, then God cannot know X prior to knowing 1) that A exists and 2) exactly what A has determined in regards to X. It's not enough just for God to know that A will exist, He must also know *what A will determine to do*. I maintain this is impossible without A existing in some fashion.
Suppose the opposite, that A does not exist at all, yet God is able to know what A will do. Then there are only two options: either a non-existent A is still able to determine X, or A is not necessary to knowing if X will occur. But if A is not necessary to know if X will occur, then A is not the determiner of X. Therefore, a non-existent A must be the determiner of X. Yet how can a non-existent A determine anything?
So A must exist, if it is the determiner of X, in order for God to know whether X happens at T. Yet, if A must exist before God can know whether or not X occurs, then God's knowledge of X is dependent upon the prior existence of A, which necessitates that God *LEARNS* what will happen. Thus, God is not omniscient.
This seems to me to be a very bad dilemma.
You are using a lot of terms in really odd fashion it seems to me. Terms like "determines" is leading you astray (hence my proposal) and I don't know what hypothetical existence is. So let me provide an account and hopefully we can proceed from there.
DeleteThe proposition "A will do X in S" is true whether A has not yet begun to exist, A exists, or A already existed. That is, the truth of the proposition is not dependent upon whether A exists currently, has already existed, has not yet begun to exist, or whatever. So God knows the truth of that proposition from eternity past. A good way to think about it is by supposing platonism about propositions is true. So both God and propositions exist from eternity past. Now, does God know those propositions? Yes, because he is omniscient. In fact, by thinking about it this way it makes it irrelevant of whether libertarian free will or compatibilism is true since we have now moved the discussion to propositions. This will show that your objection doesn't have any force.
Hello Brett,
DeleteYou said: "The proposition 'A will do X in S' is true whether A has not yet begun to exist, A exists, or A already existed."
No, the proposition "A will do X in S" is true only if A actually does X in S.
See, one of the problems you run into by resorting to the Platonic view is that there is no way to differentiate between true and false propositions. So you say "'A will do X in S' is true" and that's a proposition, but so too is the proposition that "'A will not do X in S' is true." We'll label the first A and the second ~A. There is no way to differentiate as to whether A or ~A is true until A either does X or does not X in S.
Or maybe you stipulate there must exist another proposition, "'A' is true". (And yet, I could maintain yet another proposition that "'~A' is true" and we can just wash, rinse, and repeat.)
In no case have you actually established how it's possible for God to know which propositions are true before the events that demonstrate which are true actually occur, even if it's just in His hypothetical running of the events through His mind (or whatever) before instantiating them in reality. It doesn't matter if God knows every single proposition that exists if it's logically impossible to know which are true and which are false, and the fact that God moves from not knowing which is true to knowing which is true is, once again, God learning something (i.e., a refutation of omniscience).
One final note: I am not the one who came up with the "determines" language. It's not my fault Arminians aren't consistent and don't use terms correctly. ;-)
Sure, that's the truthmaker, but the truth of the proposition is irrelevant of the time frame. That's my simple point.
DeleteNote that I'm not actually endorsing a Platonic view of propositions, I'm simply using it as a way to work through the question. And of course there is a way to differentiate between true and false propositions, God simply needs to see which one He believes since He only believes true propositions!
Here you are shifting the burden because I don't have to show it's possible to conclude that it is possible irrelevant of me knowing how it is (the deduction I provided way above). Instead, you are saying that it is impossible and it doesn't seem like you have yet to do that. Moreover, I will repeat what I said above about how God can know which propositions are true: He merely sees which propositions He believes since He only believes true propositions.
Lastly, I did notice your explanation of where you got the terminology, I just happen to think it is poor terminology to use. Those darn Arminians! Anyway, cheers.
Hello Peter,
DeleteThe conclusion of your logic and premises is that there is no real knowledge of the future but only the present as decided by something. In the case of God, you are saying that God determines the future therefore he knows it because he determined it before it took place in his own present when he determined it. Therefore God is not actually looking into the future or learning it or studying it as something independent and open. You are in other words saying the only way God can know it is because he sets it before, thus eliminating variables.
The other way is to leave variables open and you are saying there is no way to know those in advance purely, if they are true variables. I am only trying to summaruze your views and simplify them to myself and then comment on them, so please correct me if i misinterpret them. I think this is the logic and the premises underlying them.
The question then is what does God know and how does he know it before we assume that God must do it one way or another according to human logic. Is that limitation a real and true limitation of God? Based on what? What we know of Gods mind and its powers and the fabric of reality? Or is it simply based on puny severely limited human logic thought processes. Sure that makes sense according to logic built upon human premises of knowing but it seems puny when compared to God.
I think it is deeply puzzling how God knows our future free choices. But it is no more puzzling than the deeply puzzling question of how God knows our past free choices. The problem in both cases is this: How can our actions affect the beliefs of a transcendent being? Whether our actions are in the past or in the future makes no difference here.
ReplyDelete(Now, granted, on growing block theories there is a difference, in that past actions and past persons (if there are any persons who don't exist forever) are real and future ones aren't. But on both presentism and eternalism there is ontological symmetry between past actions/persons and future actions/persons. And growing block is false. :-) )