We believe in one God, Creator of all things, infinitely perfect, and eternally existing in three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who possesses perfect and exhaustive knowledge of the past, present, and future, and who preserves, regulates, governs and directs all things so that nothing in the world happens without either his causation or permission. God is the author of good but not of evil. Yet even evil is governed by God in that God limits it and directs it to an end fitting with his overall plan and purpose.
So evil is a part of God’s plan. For instance, the Arminian God planned the Holocaust. It serves a purpose in his overall plan. He intended that to happen.
To plan or purpose something is more than merely allowing it to happen.
Saying that God permits evil and limits it is certainly not the same as planning evil. I think you are misreading the Arminian point of view.
ReplyDeleteEvil might be used by the Arminian God's plan, but he didn't plan it. The Holocaust, in this theology, was the result of mans free will and sin. Arminian theology suggests God permits our sin.
The other side of the fence (Calvinism) has a much more difficult time explaining how God is perfectly good when belief dictates man had no other choice but the evil they committed.
Noted Calvinist theologian, Wayne Grudem, writes in his book 'Bible Doctrine': "We have to come to the point where we confess that we do not understand how it is that God can ordain that we carry out evil deeds and yet hold us accountable for them and not be blamed himself.(Pg. 151)"
This is where the "mystery" of Calvanism comes into play.
Tim Edwards
ReplyDelete"Saying that God permits evil and limits it is certainly not the same as planning evil."
I'm quoting the SEA statement of faith.
"I think you are misreading the Arminian point of view."
I'm reading the SEA statement of faith.
"Evil might be used by the Arminian God's plan, but he didn't plan it."
Well, the SEA statement says God is omniscient, as well as telling us that he directs evil to an end fitting with his overall plan and purpose.
If evil is "within his overall plan," how did he not plan it? Was the Holocaust an unplanned event, even though God is both omniscient and directs evil to an end fitting within his overall plan and purpose?
"The Holocaust, in this theology, was the result of mans free will and sin. Arminian theology suggests God permits our sin."
The SEA statement goes well beyond "permission" to God's "direction, overall plan, and purpose."
"The other side of the fence (Calvinism) has a much more difficult time explaining how God is perfectly good when belief dictates man had no other choice but the evil they committed."
Since I've explained that on multiple occasions, your assertion is lame.
"Noted Calvinist theologian, Wayne Grudem, writes..."
Grudem is not a philosopher.
"I'm quoting the SEA statement of faith."
DeleteUndeniably.
"I'm reading the SEA statement of faith. "
You're not understanding the SEA statement of faith.
"Well, the SEA statement says God is omniscient, as well as telling us that he directs evil to an end fitting with his overall plan and purpose."
"If evil is "within his overall plan," how did he not plan it? Was the Holocaust an unplanned event, even though God is both omniscient and directs evil to an end fitting within his overall plan and purpose?"
"The SEA statement goes well beyond "permission" to God's "direction, overall plan, and purpose.""
You not only have misread, you are adding meaning to suit your own purpose. The SEA statement is perfectly balanced between permission and cause by saying "causation or permission." Directing the aftermath of free will to fit into your overall plan is not equal to causing a plan. Your assertion that God using an action of free will is the same as causing it is a very weak claim.
"Since I've explained that on multiple occasions, your assertion is lame."
Interestingly enough, it isn't just "my assertion". The views you stick to Arminianism are actually Calvinist viewpoints.
I already quoted Grudem as saying God ordains evil deeds. Here is John Piper:
'But when a person settles it Biblically, intellectually and emotionally, that God has ultimate control of all things, including evil, and that this is gracious and precious beyond words, then a marvelous stability and depth come into that person’s life and they develop a “God-entranced world view.”'
Let's take it further into Calvinism, John Calvin himself:
"Creatures are so governed by the secret counsel of God, that nothing happens
but what he has knowingly and willingly decreed."
–John Calvin
"God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his posterity; but also at his own pleasure arranged it."
–John Calvin
"Grudem is not a philosopher."
I never asserted that he was. I think, as this is a theological matter, it would make Grudem all the more helpful in determining the actual Calvinist position.
The particular reason I decided to comment is that you seem to have the Calvinist and Arminian theology completely backwards in regards to free will. This isn't my opinion, this is just the differences in the two theologies.
Tim Edwards
Delete“You're not understanding the SEA statement of faith.”
According to your self-serving assertion.
“You not only have misread, you are adding meaning to suit your own purpose.”
I didn’t add anything substantive to the SEA statement. I merely plugged a specific example into that framework.
“The SEA statement is perfectly balanced between permission and cause by saying ‘causation or permission.’”
I said nothing about divine causality. Rather, I quoted the language about God’s “plan” and “purpose” in connection with evil.
“Directing the aftermath of free will to fit into your overall plan is not equal to causing a plan. Your assertion that God using an action of free will is the same as causing it is a very weak claim.”
i) You need to put your cue cards down and pay attention to what was actually said. I didn’t use the term “cause.”
ii) Mind you, it would be easy for me to quote Arminian writers who do use the term “cause” regarding God’s providential relation to evil.
iii) “Directing the aftermath” is inadequate to what the SEA statement says about God’s knowledge of the future.
“I already quoted Grudem as saying God ordains evil deeds.”
No only do you lack the literacy to scan my own statements, or the SEA statement, but you also lack the literacy to scan your own statement.
I was responding to your claim about “mystery.” Try to keep track of your own argument.
“I never asserted that he was. I think, as this is a theological matter, it would make Grudem all the more helpful in determining the actual Calvinist position.”
Since you miss the point, I’ll spell it out for you. The problem of evil is an issue in philosophical theology. If you want to know how Calvinism fields the problem of evil, it would be logical to consult Reformed philosophers, since they are more likely to have the training and aptitude to address philosophical issues.
“The particular reason I decided to comment is that you seem to have the Calvinist and Arminian theology completely backwards in regards to free will. This isn't my opinion, this is just the differences in the two theologies.”
Thanks for illustrating your own confusions.
Tim is right and then some. You are not only misreading the Arminian point of view, but also SEA's statement of faith. What Tim stated is the intent of SEA's statement and you are making illegitimate inferences.
ReplyDeleteDemonstrate the illegitimate inferences.
DeleteBTW, how do you know the intent of the SEA statement? Did you draft it?
SEA: Yet even evil is *GOVERNED* by God in that God limits it and directs it to an end *FITTING* with his overall plan and purpose.
ReplyDeleteSteve: "So evil is a part of God’s plan. For instance, the Arminian God *PLANNED* the Holocaust. It serves a purpose in his overall plan. He *INTENDED* that to happen."
To read the term *governed* and *fitting* and filter it to mean *planned* and *intended* shows that either Steve has no basic command of the English language, or, per his own presuppositions, he's predetermined to display such sneer-prone gaffes.
Worse, his "plugg[ing] a specific example" assumes, without argument that, for any future-tense proposition x, it is impossible both that God knows x and that x is contingent (PX).
Can you try not to beg the question? Or would you say you're predetermined to do so?
"To plan or purpose something is more than merely allowing it to happen."
I guess you can't help beg the question. An assertion and an argument are not synonymous.
"If evil is "within his overall plan," how did he not plan it? Was the Holocaust an unplanned event, even though God is both omniscient and directs evil to an end fitting within his overall plan and purpose?"
He's still smuggling (PX) through the back door. Again (sigh!), no bear question is a substitute for an argument.
If Steve's assumption (not argument) is that mere omniscience entails ontological necessity, then, his responses are not immune to a predetermine reality. It's just too bad that they are predetermined to be displayed with cheap tu quoque shots.
There is a reason why the following distinction, as Jerry Walls put it, is meaningful: "Whereas libertarians face the puzzle of explaining why God *ALLOWS* the sort of moral evil...compatibilists have the more difficult challenge of explaining why he *CAUSES* and *DETERMINES8 it to happenand in so doing, they seem to be endorsing moral consequentialism."
In the phrase, "fitting with his overall plan and purpose," the Arminian has options; evil can be construed as a necessity that follows from God's knowledge as logical and *CONSEQUENT* necessity.
But Steve is content with "plugg[ing]" strawmen, and with good reason. He can't defend his Calvinism on its own terms, but with maladroit tu quoque shots.
Sarin
ReplyDelete“To read the term *governed* and *fitting* and filter it to mean *planned* and *intended* shows that either Steve has no basic command of the English language, or, per his own presuppositions, he's predetermined to display such sneer-prone gaffes.”
Sarin’s reading comprehension is just as bad as Tim’s. I didn’t suggest “fitting” and “governed” mean “planned.” I didn’t base my argument on “fitting,” and “governed.” Rather, I based my argument on the relation of “evil” to God’s “overall plan and purpose.”
Nice to see Sarin illustrate his illiteracy.
“Worse, his ‘plugg[ing] a specific example’ assumes, without argument that, for any future-tense proposition x, it is impossible both that God knows x and that x is contingent (PX). Can you try not to beg the question?”
Once again, that bears no resemblance to the actual argument I presented. Sarin’s imagination is disconnected from reality.
“I guess you can't help beg the question. An assertion and an argument are not synonymous.”
If you’re so dense as to think planning or purposing something is equivalent to mere permission, then be my guest. At the risk of stating the obvious, which is necessary for someone like you, allowing something to happen doesn’t require any plan or purpose. If that’s too difficult for you to grasp, I can cite real or hypothetical examples.
“He's still smuggling (PX) through the back door. Again (sigh!), no bear question is a substitute for an argument. If Steve's assumption (not argument) is that mere omniscience entails ontological necessity, then, his responses are not immune to a predetermine reality. It's just too bad that they are predetermined to be displayed with cheap tu quoque shots.”
Did I say omniscience entails ontological necessity? No. Sarin is like a child conversing with an imaginary friend.
“There is a reason why the following distinction, as Jerry Walls put it, is meaningful: ‘Whereas libertarians face the puzzle of explaining why God *ALLOWS* the sort of moral evil...compatibilists have the more difficult challenge of explaining why he *CAUSES* and *DETERMINES8 it to happenand in so doing, they seem to be endorsing moral consequentialism.’”
Except that Walls gives no reason to think that’s a “more difficult challenge.”
“In the phrase, ‘fitting with his overall plan and purpose,’ the Arminian has options; evil can be construed as a necessity that follows from God's knowledge as logical and *CONSEQUENT* necessity.”
Irrelevant to my actual argument. But I don’t wish to interrupt Sarin’s conversation with his imaginary friend.
“But Steve is content with ‘plugg[ing]’ strawmen, and with good reason. He can't defend his Calvinism on its own terms, but with maladroit tu quoque shots.”
I’ve defended Calvinism on its own terms for many years. However, I scarcely need to defend it when Sarin does such a poor job of defending the SEA statement.
"Sarin’s reading comprehension is just as bad as Tim’s. I didn’t suggest “fitting” and “governed” mean “planned.” I didn’t base my argument on “fitting,” and “governed.” Rather, I based my argument on the relation of “evil” to God’s “overall plan and purpose.”
ReplyDeleteThose are the terms chosen by the drafters. Do you have any elementary concept of what exegesis mean?
“Worse, his ‘plugg[ing] a specific example’ assumes, without argument that, for any future-tense proposition x, it is impossible both that God knows x and that x is contingent (PX). Can you try not to beg the question?”
"Once again, that bears no resemblance to the actual argument I presented. Sarin’s imagination is disconnected from reality."
"Well, the SEA statement says God is omniscient, as well as telling us that he directs evil to an end fitting with his overall plan and purpose.
If evil is "within his overall plan," how did he not plan it? Was the Holocaust an unplanned event, even though God is both omniscient and directs evil to an end fitting within his overall plan and purpose?"
"Did I say omniscience entails ontological necessity? No. Sarin is like a child" conversing with an imaginary friend.
You "resemble" here clearly that "omnscience" entails necessity of some sort. Why don't you spell out its relevant relation here, if it's not (PX)? Let's have it.
Why do you have difficulty grasping something can be a "part" of an overall plan as a consequent without having intended it originally? You're inability to answer this question will have to do with your inability to think otherwise.
“There is a reason why the following distinction, as Jerry Walls put it, is meaningful: ‘Whereas libertarians face the puzzle of explaining why God *ALLOWS* the sort of moral evil...compatibilists have the more difficult challenge of explaining why he *CAUSES* and *DETERMINES8 it to happenand in so doing, they seem to be endorsing moral consequentialism.’”
"Except that Walls gives no reason to think that’s a “more difficult challenge.”
He does so in the whole article read by the likes of Michael Rea, Kevin Timpe, Tom Flint, etc. "Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compatibilist" Philosophia Christ 13(2011): 75-104.
What your counterargument?
“But Steve is content with ‘plugg[ing]’ strawmen, and with good reason. He can't defend his Calvinism on its own terms, but with maladroit tu quoque shots.”
"I’ve defended Calvinism on its own terms for many years. However, I scarcely need to defend it when Sarin does such a poor job of defending the SEA statement."
Since you cannot read the SEA on its face, you *must* "plug" in self-serving assumptions to get your alleged "connection" here going.
"If you’re so dense as to think planning or purposing something is equivalent to mere permission, then be my guest."
A sneer is not an argument.
Why not show, rather than nakedly assume, the impossibility that evil can be planned or purpose as a *consequent* rather than its converse. The Calvinist god has the dispositional essence to conjure up such events.
Sarin:
Delete“Those are the terms chosen by the drafters. Do you have any elementary concept of what exegesis mean?”
i) To begin with, you act as if I was arguing from “fitting” and “governed.” So you swapped out the terms that formed the actual and explicit basis of my argument. Which shows your inability to exegete my argument.
ii) In addition, I was arguing from terms chosen by the drafters, to whit: “overall plan and purpose.” You keep deflecting attention away from those terms. Another example of your poor exegetical skills.
“You 'resemble' here clearly that 'omnscience' entails necessity of some sort. Why don't you spell out its relevant relation here, if it's not (PX)? Let's have it.”
Well, for one thing, omniscience is clearly germane to planning.
“Why do you have difficulty grasping something can be a ‘part’ of an overall plan as a consequent without having intended it originally?”
i) You don’t adhere to the actual terminology of the SEA statement. Instead, you substitute your preferred categories and distinctions (e.g. “logical and *CONSEQUENT* necessity”). So your remarks are irrelevant to my argument, inasmuch as my argument was pegged to the SEA statement, and not your extraneous interpolations.
ii) If the Arminian God knows the future, then you can’t treat his overall plan and purpose as an afterthought, in contrast to what was “originally intended.”
“He does so in the whole article.”
Since you don’t quote his supporting argument, your citation does no work.
Moreover, I have it on good authority that Walls is an open theist, contrary to the SEA statement. So the SEA statement has different assumptions and implications.
“Since you cannot read the SEA on its face, you *must* ‘plug’ in self-serving assumptions to get your alleged "connection" here going.”
To the contrary, I stuck to the wording of the text whereas you’re the one who’s interjecting assumptions not contained in the SEA statement.
“Why not show, rather than nakedly assume, the impossibility that evil can be planned or purpose as a *consequent* rather than its converse.”
i) I don’t have to show that since that’s not how the SEA statement frames its own position.
ii) Moreover, that doesn’t make permission equivalent to purpose or planning.