Friday, April 27, 2012

Is evil privative?


I’m going to comment on some statements by Roger Olson on this thread:


rogereolson says:
April 18, 2012 at 1:00 pm

What are you saying? That the Bible teaches that God caused the holocaust?

Several issues:

i) Of course the Bible doesn’t directly or specifically answer that question. The issue is whether the Bible has a general teaching on divine providence that implicitly answers that question.

ii) It isn’t just a question of what the Bible teaches. It’s also a question of what theological traditions like Arminianism teach. How does Olson define causation? Here’s an attempt to capture our intuitive sense of causation:

“We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it. Had it been absent, its effects — some of them, at least, and usually all — would have been absent as well.” D. Lewis, “Causation,” Journal of Philosophy (1973) 70: 556–67.

That seems like a good working definition to me. On that definition, the Arminian God caused the Holocaust. For divine creation and providence makes a difference from what would have happened without it. Absent divine creation and providence, the Holocaust would not have happened.

Olson can propose a different definition, but it mustn’t be an ad hoc definition. 

iii) Of course, even this definition doesn’t mean God solely caused the Holocaust. There were human agents as well.

 I find it helpful to jump right to the most extreme conclusion and then back up from there to test what a verse might mean. In my opinion, for whatever it’s worth, no interpretation of Scripture can stand up that can’t be preached standing in front of the gates of Auschwitz.

i) That’s just grandstanding. Scripture means whatever it means.

Olson’s objection is an emotional bluff. He draws a line in the sand, then dares us to cross it. But that’s a tacit admission that his own position is indefensible, so he must to resort to these last-ditch tactics.

His objection is a first strike to bar any interpretation that conflicts with his prior commitments, even before we crack open the pages of Scripture and see what it says. That shows contempt for the word of God. We can’t preemptively eliminate certain interpretations before we even read what the Bible has to say.

ii) What’s so special about Auschwitz? History is littered with atrocities, large and small. Scripture itself chronicles a number of atrocities. The Holocaust doesn’t mark a turning point in hermeneutics. This is not a uniquely evil event.

rogereolson says:
April 18, 2012 at 1:05 pm

I disagree that Job says God used Satan as his instrument to bring all those things upon Job. The narrative does not say God wanted those things to happen to Job and therefore brought in Satan and ordered him to go and do those things. To be sure, God allowed it. We’ve been over that so many times here it’s getting tiresome. To me, perhaps not to you, “permitting” and “ordaining” are not the same.

i) If God didn’t want those things to happen to Job, then why did he allow it? Did he allow it against his will? Didn’t he want to allow it? Did Satan put the squeeze on God?

ii) According to the prologue, God has a reason for allowing Satan to afflict Job. He was calling Satan’s bluff. Rising to the challenge.

iii) Olson keeps trotting out the distinction between “permitting” and “ordaining” as if that’s ipso facto exculpatory. Sometimes that’s morally relevant, but in other cases it’s not.

iv) Let’s take a step back. The Arminian God is the creator of the world. The Arminian God knows the future. Olson’s God knew that by making Lucifer, Lucifer would fall. He foreknew that Satan was going to propose this wager. Olson’s God knew ahead of time that by making Lucifer and Job, this day would come. So it’s more than merely allowing it. It’s setting the events in motion, with this foreseen result.

Assuming the principle of alternate possibilities, God was free to choose a different timeline in which that didn’t happen.

I think God’s role in evil has to be understood from a canonical and narrative perspective. As I read the whole of Scripture and the earliest church fathers, I see the world and its history (since the fall at least) as a battleground, not a stage.

But that doesn’t solve the problem. Olson’s God has overwhelming force. There’s no contest.

It brings me no comfort to think that the merciful and good God of creation and redemption plans, ordains and renders certain things like the holocaust or my mother’s death at age 32.

i) Olson isn’t the first man or last man to suffer a family tragedy. Charles Wesley lost siblings and children to infant mortality. Yet Charles Wesley had a far more robust doctrine of divine providence than Olson.

ii) The Arminian God ensures events like the Holocaust or his mother’s premature death certain by making and sustaining a world with those foreseeable events.

These are results of the fall and of the fact that Satan is the “god of this present age” yet to be defeated. I find Greg Boyd’s explanation in Satan and the Problem of Evil the most convincing (and it does not depend on open theism).

Notice the Manichaean quality of Olson’s argument, as if this is an even match between God and Satan. Surely Satan is no match for God. Does Olson think God is struggling to gain the upper hand?

rogereolson says:
April 20, 2012 at 12:47 pm

I would remind Job that it was “the Accuser’s” doing, not God’s. Now, please answer this for me: What would you say to comfort a father and mother whose four year old daughter was kidnapped, brutally raped and murdered and thrown in a river (a real incident)?

That she didn’t die in vain. Her little life wasn’t a tragic waste of human potential. Her life was meaningful. Her death was meaningful. That we can hope and pray.

rogereolson says:
April 21, 2012 at 1:14 pm

So, nothing you wrote there (in answer to my question about how you would comfort the parents of a child who was murdered) stands in contradiction to what I (or any good Arminian) would say. But the difference, I suspect, would appear in what we would say in response to parents who asked “Where was God when the murderer kidnapped, raped and killed my child?” and they MEAN “What was God’s role in bringing it about–if any?” I teach that pastors ought to preach and teach their doctrine of divine providence so that when such things happen the congregants don’t for the first time cry out “Where was God?” because they will already know what God’s role was.

Well, according to Olson, God let it happen because God had too much respect for the freedom of the murderous child-rapist. Olson’s God couldn’t bring himself to trammel the freedom of the rapist and child-killer, even though the assailant was violating the freedom of the child. Olson’s God allows those who are bigger and stronger to abuse the weak, helpless, and defenseless.

Olson’s answer to the question “Where was God?” is that God was right there, watching the assailant rape and kill the little girl.

rogereolson says:
April 24, 2012 at 12:27 pm

Of course, that’s just another way of asking about God’s role in the whole sorry state of affairs humanity finds itself in. Is this really “the best of all possible world?” A consistent Calvinist would seem to have to say so.

i) A Calvinist doesn’t have to say this is the best possible world. For that assumes there is a best possible world. But different possible worlds encapsulate incommensurable goods. No one possible world can exhaust all possible permutations

ii) And what about Olson? Is he saying there was a better possible world than this one, but God refused to make it? Assuming the principle of alternate possibilities, there’s another possible would in which the little girl wasn’t raped and murdered. So why didn’t Olson’s God made that world instead? That wouldn’t even infringe on anybody’s libertarian freedom, for it’s simply actualizing a different set of free choices. 

rogereolson says:
April 19, 2012 at 12:15 pm

And I’ll take a God who permits evil and innocent suffering, for reasons he alone knows and fully understands, over a God who intentionally wants children to be murdered most cruelly, foreordains it and renders it certain and then sends those who commit such heinous acts (even though they could not have done otherwise) to hell “for his glory.”

i) Doesn’t Olson’s God want what he permits? Doesn’t Olson’s God intend what he permits? Doesn’t Olson’s God ensure that event when he finalizes one possible scenario by making that the real world?

ii) It’s dishonest for Olson to say the Calvinist God wants children to be murdered. The Calvinist God doesn’t will evil for evil’s sake.

iii) Keep in mind that there are tradeoffs. For instance, if a young child is murdered, the parents are more likely to have another child to offset the loss of the murdered child. If the first child hadn’t been murdered, the second child would not exist. There’s the evil of the murdered child, but there’s the compensatory good of the second child. Which world is a better world–the world with the first child, or the world with the second child?

iv) This isn’t just hypothetical. When Cain murdered his brother, Adam and Eve had Seth to offset the loss of Abel.

If Adam and Eve, Seth and Abel all went to heaven when they died, then Adam, Eve, and Seth gained something from Abel’s death without ultimately losing Abel in the process. So that’s better in the long term, even though that’s worse in the short term.

I’m not suggesting that every murder has a happy ending in the sweet by-and-by. But theodicy is about the overall balance. The question is not whether any particular outcome might be better, but whether it’s a better world.

These are tough answers to tough questions. But they are real answers, unlike Olson’s petulant dismissals.

rogereolson says:
April 23, 2012 at 4:30 pm

With Augustine and most of Christian tradition I think of evil as the absence of the good. Creatures with free will can bring it about, but it’s not a substance (like a germ or a virus). It’s like a broken bone–not a substance but a deformation.

i) A broken bone is not a substance?

ii) Moral evil isn’t simply non-good, but anti-good. Not simply privation of good, but replacing something good with something bad. Not the absence of something good, but the presence of something bad.

17 comments:

  1. Roger Olson said:

    "It’s like a broken bone–not a substance but a deformation."

    1. Technically, there's a difference between broken bone and deformed bone. Broken bone might not be deformed and deformed bone might not be broken.

    2. Moreover, broken or deformed bone could indicate the positive presence of disease. For example, fractured bone could be the result of osteomyelitis, Paget's disease of bone might be caused by a viral infection, etc.

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  2. Your confusion arises from the fact that "deformed" is frequently used in the sense of "malformed" when it comes to body parts. That's not what he means. He means "deformation" in the more usual sense that includes elastic, plastic, and destructive deformations. Breaks fall in the last category.

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  3. Turretinfan said:

    "Your confusion arises from the fact that 'deformed' is frequently used in the sense of 'malformed' when it comes to body parts. That's not what he means."

    1. Sorry, but I think you might be the one who's confused. I believe what I said above does take into consideration this clarification.

    2. On the other hand, if what you say is indeed the case, it's not my confusion, but Olson's. He should've been clearer.

    I suppose I could've tried to interpret Olson's comment more along a layperson's line of thinking. Although I didn't in part because I found his analogy imprecise.

    Also, Olson left enough ambiguity for me to do otherwise.

    3. As such, and as I originally said, I was speaking in technical terms.

    "He means 'deformation' in the more usual sense that includes elastic, plastic, and destructive deformations. Breaks fall in the last category."

    I think my point still stands in light of your clarification. As I said above, fractured bone (I guess "destructive deformations" in your parlance) could be the result of osteomyelitis, which is a positive presence of disease (e.g. the Staph aureus bacteria). Likewise Paget's disease of bone would be (I guess in your view, depending on what you mean specifically) "elastic" or "plastic" "deformation," which also can indicate the positive presence of disease.

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  4. Of course, my broader point is simply that Olson's analogy isn't analogous.

    Although I grant I was being a bit snarky in my comment as well.

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  5. Steve,

    I'm glad that you've been fisking Roger Olson's recent posts. It's a service to Christendom.

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  6. "2. On the other hand, if what you say is indeed the case, it's not my confusion, but Olson's. He should've been clearer."

    LOL

    In context, his point is that what distinguishes an unbroken bone from a broken bone is not that a substance called "breakage" has been added to it, but that it has undergone a privation of its prior unity.

    The idea that evil (both moral evil and physical evil) is privation is pretty standard and widely accepted, to my knowledge. There may be some that object, but it's not like this position is something off the wall.

    -Turretin

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  7. i) First of all, I gave a reason for why I think the privative theory of evil is inadequate

    ii) In addition, I think the privative theory of evil tends to confuse ethics with ontology, morality with metaphysics.

    iii) Historically, I believe the privative theory of evil (propounded by Augustine and Aquinas) was an attempt to decouple God from evil. If evil has no positive reality, if evil is a kind of nonbeing (i.e. absence of good), then evil is uncaused–in which case, God didn't cause evil. God only causes good, for only goodness has being. God creates what is, not what isn't. Evil isn't something, but the privation of something.

    And that's probably why an Arminian like Olson favors the privative theory of evil.

    But that's clearly not an option for a Calvinist. Even if we accept the privative definition, God created a world with privations of goodness. So lack of good still traces back to God.

    For that matter, I don't think it salvages the Arminian God.

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  8. Turretinfan said:

    "In context, his point is that what distinguishes an unbroken bone from a broken bone is not that a substance called 'breakage' has been added to it, but that it has undergone a privation of its prior unity."

    Sorry, Turretinfan, and I say this with the utmost respect, but once again it sounds like you've missed my point. I understood what Olson meant. Hence my response above which points out how Olson's analogy doesn't quite work. That is, even in broken bone or deformed bone it's not the absence or privation alone which makes the bone "broken" but rather it's the positive presence of disease as well. As I said, for example, the positive presence of bacteria can result in broken or deformed bone too.

    Of course, in a traumatic injury, like maybe a sports injury or something like that, bone is fractured. But even in this case, it's not merely the "privation of its prior unity" which is definitive of the fracture. Rather it's the positive presence of other pathology as well (e.g. necrotic tissue, hematoma, inflammation, coagulation, immune response).

    "The idea that evil (both moral evil and physical evil) is privation is pretty standard and widely accepted, to my knowledge. There may be some that object, but it's not like this position is something off the wall."

    Well, I never characterized the position as "off the wall."

    Instead I took issue with Olson's analogy.

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  9. Let me try to simplify this for you, rwh:

    1) Imagine a bone that is not yet broken.

    2) Imagine that same bone, now broken.

    Whether bone is diseased or healthy, the difference between the broken and unbroken bone is not that a substance called "breakage" has been added to the bone. Instead, something that was previously present has been destroyed.

    If you want to get down to a cellular or molecular level, bonds that previously united the bone have been broken.

    From a metaphysical level, we would say it has been deprived of unity.

    There may be some physical evils, like an infection, in which a substance is added to the thing being damaged. But, of course, that's not the kind of case that Olson had in mind in his example.

    Steve:

    You state: "i) First of all, I gave a reason for why I think the privative theory of evil is inadequate"

    Yes, you stated: "Moral evil isn’t simply non-good, but anti-good. Not simply privation of good, but replacing something good with something bad. Not the absence of something good, but the presence of something bad." I read that. I'm not sure why you are reminding me of it, but yes, I saw it.

    "In addition, I think the privative theory of evil tends to confuse ethics with ontology, morality with metaphysics."

    Not sure why you are telling me this, but ok.

    "Historically, I believe the privative theory of evil (propounded by Augustine and Aquinas) was an attempt to decouple God from evil."

    That may be the case. Do you view that as an illicit motivation?

    "If evil has no positive reality, if evil is a kind of nonbeing (i.e. absence of good), then evil is uncaused–in which case, God didn't cause evil. God only causes good, for only goodness has being. God creates what is, not what isn't. Evil isn't something, but the privation of something. "

    That does seem to be it in a nutshell.

    It fits very nicely with the Biblical analogy of evil as "darkness," which itself is not a thing, but rather a privation of light.

    -TurretinFan

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  10. TURRETINFAN SAID:

    "Yes, you stated: 'Moral evil isn’t simply non-good, but anti-good. Not simply privation of good, but replacing something good with something bad. Not the absence of something good, but the presence of something bad.' I read that. I'm not sure why you are reminding me of it, but yes, I saw it."

    Because you ignored it in your response to me. There's a difference between the absence of something and the antithesis of something. There's a difference between the absence of Christ and the Antichrist.

    "Not sure why you are telling me this, but ok."

    Because it suggests that degrees of good and evil are equivalent to degrees of being or nonbeing. Do you think that's true?

    "That may be the case. Do you view that as an illicit motivation?"

    Because, as a Calvinist, you believe that God decrees sin and evil (though not for their own sake). Therefore, you can't simply decouple God from evil.

    "It fits very nicely with the Biblical analogy of evil as 'darkness,' which itself is not a thing, but rather a privation of light."

    i) Is darkness the absence of light, or is light the absence of darkness?

    ii) Does Scripture use the darkness metaphor to signify the privative nature of evil, or to signify opposites? For instance:

    Woe to those who call evil good
    and good evil,
    who put darkness for light
    and light for darkness,
    who put bitter for sweet
    and sweet for bitter!

    (Isa 5:20).

    Isn't that just a series of paired opposites for emphasis? Is "bitter" a privative concept?

    iii) Do you think darkness is uncaused? Is darkness uncaused in Gen 1? Is darkness eternally preexistent and coeternal with God? Does Gen 1 teach manichean dualism?

    iv) What about Isa 45:7:

    I form light and create darkness,
    I make well-being and create calamity,
    I am the Lord, who does all these things.

    Is that privative or positive? Is that caused or uncaused?

    v) Do you think evil is uncaused? Do you think sin is uncaused? Isn't that the position of freewill theism? And isn't that the point of the privative theory of evil?

    vi) A shadow is a type of darkness. Is a shadow uncaused? Isn't a shadow caused by light in combination with some obstruction?

    vii) Continuing with the light/shade metaphor, if God is immutable or shadowless (Jas 1:17), does that mean mutability (i.e. flickering shadows) is evil?

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  11. Turretinfan said:

    "Let me try to simplify this for you, rwh:"

    By the way, please keep in mind my original comment indicated I was speaking technically.

    "Whether bone is diseased or healthy, the difference between the broken and unbroken bone is not that a substance called 'breakage' has been added to the bone."

    1. I haven't couched my criticism of Olson in language like "a substance called 'breakage' has been added to the bone."

    Rather I gave specific examples of the presence of injury and/or disease in broken or fractured bone.

    2. It's fine if you prefer to focus on traumatic fractures at this point. However, keep in mind Olson incorporated "deformation" into his broken bone analogy. "Deformation" could be reasonably associated with pathological fractures.

    Indeed, my original response to Olson was in reference to pathological fractures, not traumatic ones.

    3. As such, let's say I agree you're correct about traumatic fractures. Nevertheless, it wouldn't undercut my original criticism of Olson which was based on pathological fractures.

    "Instead, something that was previously present has been destroyed. If you want to get down to a cellular or molecular level, bonds that previously united the bone have been broken."

    1. Again, this is an incomplete picture of what a fracture involves. There's likewise the presence of other signs or marks of a fracture. I've already given a few examples above.

    2. Maybe a picture is worth a thousand words? Check out this picture of a fracture. I can fill in the details if need be but for the moment what's important is the different colors indicate different changes directly due to fracture, changes which can't necessarily be divorced from the fracture process in a living organism with bone.

    3. So far I've been talking about fractures in living bone. After all, bone is normally alive. However, it's possible to fracture dead bone too. Take a dog munching on a bone.

    At the risk of oversimplification, bone can fracture if the ability of the bone to dissipate energy applied to it is compromised or overwhelmed. Say the dog bites down real hard to crunch the bone.

    But, of course, this would assume the presence of energy in the fracture process leading to a fracture. (Maybe it's a bit tough to draw a fine line between fracture the verb and fracture the noun.)

    Or, as you said, bonds have to be broken, right? Bonds could be broken with the application of enough energy.

    Furthermore, to use your phraseology, perhaps energy in this context is something akin to "a substance called 'breakage'" as well?

    Anyway, I'm just floating an idea here. Not sure how persuasive I myself find it.

    "There may be some physical evils, like an infection, in which a substance is added to the thing being damaged. But, of course, that's not the kind of case that Olson had in mind in his example."

    On the contrary, as I said above, Olson's analogy included "deformation" as a descriptor. At the risk of oversimplification, bone deformations are generally the result of pathology as opposed to trauma. (Unless he's talking about bone deformity secondary to the healing of a prior fracture. But that'd seem to ask too much of Olson's analogy.) So, in fact, it's quite reasonable and germane to take Olson's comment to include pathological fractures, which is what I did.

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  12. Steve:

    "Because you ignored it in your response to me. There's a difference between the absence of something and the antithesis of something. There's a difference between the absence of Christ and the Antichrist."

    a) I understand what you mean. (Tangent alert!) Since it's one of my pet peeves, I'd like to point out that "antichrist" has a Greek root, not a Latin one. So, it's not "anti-" in the sense of opposite but "anti-" in the sense of substitute. A false Christ - not simply one who opposes Christ (though an amazing number of theologians, familiar with Latin, seem to have taken the latter view).

    b) But take light and darkness. In that case, the antithesis of the thing is the absence of the thing. So, just because moral evil is the antithesis of moral good does not necessarily mean that it must not be an absence.

    "Because it suggests that degrees of good and evil are equivalent to degrees of being or nonbeing. Do you think that's true?"

    If the equivalence you have in mind is analogical, sure. Some shadows are darker than others.

    "Because, as a Calvinist, you believe that God decrees sin and evil (though not for their own sake). Therefore, you can't simply decouple God from evil."

    a) I can't decouple God from evil as to God's decrees. So, to that point I certainly agree.

    b) But I do decouple God from evil as to act and moral responsibility. When men do evil, God is not morally responsible, and it cannot be said in a moral context that when man sins it is God acting.

    c) In the case of good, God does act and is morally responsible for the good that we do, for it is by grace that we do good.

    "i) Is darkness the absence of light, or is light the absence of darkness?"

    The former.

    "ii) Does Scripture use the darkness metaphor to signify the privative nature of evil, or to signify opposites?"

    a) This seems like a false dichotomy. Can't it be both?

    b) It's one thing to say that the Scriptures teach privation theory using the darkness metaphor/analogy and another thing to say that the darkness metaphor/analogy fits nicely with privation theory. I was just saying the latter.

    "For instance:

    Woe to those who call evil good
    and good evil,
    who put darkness for light
    and light for darkness,
    who put bitter for sweet
    and sweet for bitter!

    (Isa 5:20).

    Isn't that just a series of paired opposites for emphasis? Is "bitter" a privative concept?"

    a) It is a series of paired opposites, surely.
    b) I'm not sure whether "bitter" in ANE understanding was a privative concept, but let's suppose it was not. I'm not sure where you hope to go from there. That would be an example of a Biblical metaphor for evil that does not then fit well with privation theory. Right? Or is there something more?

    "iii) Do you think darkness is uncaused? Is darkness uncaused in Gen 1? Is darkness eternally preexistent and coeternal with God? Does Gen 1 teach manichean dualism?"

    a) I don't think darkness is a thing with existence - it's a privation of light, so no to all three questions.

    b) There is a reason and explanation for why things that are dark, are dark.

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  13. "iv) What about Isa 45:7:

    I form light and create darkness,
    I make well-being and create calamity,
    I am the Lord, who does all these things.

    Is that privative or positive? Is that caused or uncaused?"

    a) I prefer the translation of "evil" rather than "calamity," there.

    b) Just because something is a privation does not mean it has no reason for being. The darkness we experience in an eclipse has a reason, even though the darkness itself is not a thing.

    c) Moreover, while God is not an actor of (or morally responsible for) evil, God can ordain it (crucifixion, bondage of Joseph, sufferings of Job, etc.).

    d) One of the problems with our opponents' thinking is the assumption that the issue of "caused or uncaused" automatically implies "morally responsible or not." We should deny this.


    "v) Do you think evil is uncaused? Do you think sin is uncaused? Isn't that the position of freewill theism? And isn't that the point of the privative theory of evil?"

    a) I agree that evil is caused.
    b) I think freewill theists allege agent causation of evil.
    c) I think the point of the privative theory of evil is to deny evil positive existential status in general, not to allege that evil is not caused at all.

    "vi) A shadow is a type of darkness. Is a shadow uncaused? Isn't a shadow caused by light in combination with some obstruction?"

    It is caused in the sense that there is a reason and explanation for it. But, of course, the difference between shadow and bare darkness is defined by the light source. The obstruction produces the privation of light in a particular area, though not in other areas. So, there is a cause for the privation, even though the privation itself is not a thing.

    "vii) Continuing with the light/shade metaphor, if God is immutable or shadowless (Jas 1:17), does that mean mutability (i.e. flickering shadows) is evil?"

    Not everything that is not God is inherently evil, so - no - I don't think that follows.

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  14. rwh: Thanks for your comments. I'm not sure I can add further clarity by providing further comments, but thanks for the interaction.

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  15. “For instance, if a young child is murdered, the parents are *more likely* to have another child to offset the loss of the murdered child. If the first child hadn’t been murdered, the second child would not exist.” [emphasis added]

    Why would you say something is “more likely,” as if there were probabilities involved in the decree of God?

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  16. tegmen said...

    "Why would you say something is 'more likely,' as if there were probabilities involved in the decree of God?"

    I'm not using "more likely" probabilistically, but percentagewise–to distinguish between more parents who do and fewer who don't.

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  17. Turretinfan said:

    "rwh: Thanks for your comments. I'm not sure I can add further clarity by providing further comments, but thanks for the interaction."

    Thanks to you as well for the kind interaction, Turretinfan.

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