Unitarians typically reject the Trinity because they claim it’s illogical. However, one can turn this objection around. If God is a Trinity, then that’s a necessary truth. That’s as much a necessary truth as modus ponens.
The Trinity is not a contingent truth, but a necessary truth–just like other divine attributes. Take the unicity of God. If there is only one true God, that’s a necessary truth. There is one and the same God in every possible world. A truth of reason rather than a truth of fact.
But the same holds true for the Trinity. If the ontological Trinity is real, then that’s the case in every possible world.
You could only attack the Trinity on logical grounds if you beg the question by assuming in advance that logical truths are necessary truths, while the Trinity is not a necessary truth.
Brother Steve,
ReplyDeleteIt has become obvious to anyone who has been following your discussions with Dale Tuggy that Tuggy is not only disinterested in the sound exegesis of the Scriptures, but he is actually incapable of engaging you on the level of Scriptural exegesis, which is why he constantly retreats to philosophy. It is apparent (at least to me) that his fallen, imperfect human reasoning is his god, or idol to be more exact, which he imposes on the God-breathed Scriptures. The following passages come to mind when I think of Tuggy's idolatrous fascination with and pursuit of human rationale at the expense of the exegesis of the text of Scripture - 1 Cor. 1:18-29; 3:18-20; Colossians 2:8-10.
Tuggy has said that Scripture can correct strong human intuitions. His position is that in exegeting a text we cannot assume that it means that the logically impossible is true. This is fine as far as it goes, by definition the logically impossible cannot be true. So if the Bible is the inspired and thus inerrant word of God, it cannot affirm a logical impossibility. However, and I'm speaking for my own view here, Tuggy sidesteps the issue of whether Scripture can ever *merely appear* to conflict with a necessary truth while not *in fact* doing so (thus it merely appears to violate a necessary truth). It is at this juncture, not the former, that his reasoning becomes more rationalist than it would initially seem. There's a good argument that we can never exegete a passage of Scripture in ways that actually violate necessary truths. The questionable argument is whether a passage can be exegeted which only merely appears to violate a necessary truth. The latter position (that Scripture can so merely appear) is defended by James Anderson in his book and articles on the subject of mystery. Tuggy has responded to this in the literature. I'm not persuaded by Tuggy's response, and so I'm not persuaded by his argument that lets him evade trinitarian exegesis which appears to violate a necessary truth. God reveals this weighty matter to us, and it looks something like numerical identity and relative identity, much like spacelanders revealing the nature of a cone to two-dimensional beings as an object that is circular and triangular.
ReplyDeleteI completely agree: If it is true that there is a trinitarian God, then it must be necessarily true. Any necessary truth, of course, is as much a necessary truth as any other; necessity doesn't come in degrees.
ReplyDeleteAnd you should agree as well: if there's a unitarian God, this would have to be a necessary truth.
And whichever is false, it would seem, would need to be necessarily false.
"Unitarians typically reject the Trinity because they claim it’s illogical."
This is a common but unfortunate misunderstanding. Unitarians are nearly always motivated by the idea, I think discovery, that Trinity theories really aren't well supported by the Bible. Are they concerned with consistency? Sure - but no more than others; we all want to avoid self-refutation. Some pour scorn on all appeal to paradox. Others, like me, say rather than we should take care not to put our trust in paradoxes (apparent contradictions) that our own confused theorizing has generated.
"It is apparent (at least to me) that his fallen, imperfect human reasoning is his god"
Sam, you should be embarrassed to slander a Christian like this. I worship the one true God, and have since I was born again in 1978. I can't fathom where you get the idea that I'm uninterested in exegesis (prejudice based on my being a philosopher?); in point of fact, I've spent many years sweating through the texts, reading trinitarian and unitarian arguments with constant recourse to them. The very point of the logic is to find some fixed points to reason about what the authors are and are not saying, on the assumption that they are self-consistent.
"Tuggy sidesteps the issue of whether Scripture can ever *merely appear* to conflict with a necessary truth while not *in fact* doing so"
Hardly, as you know. I address this on the level of epistemology, as does James. The difficulty is that if something strongly appears to be a contradiction, we normally take that as very strong evidence that it really is one. If you look at my On Positive Mysterianism, it is clear that I admit in principle that there could be a case where we ought to believe what strongly appears contradictory. But given the actual state of evidence, it seems that accepting these sorts of "mysteries" is not rational. Call it "rationalist" if you like, but some Reformed trinitarians agree. There's nothing about the view which ties it to unitarianism per se. I respect James' position; really he and I agree on quite a lot, when it comes to philosophy. We part ways on what we think the best reading of the Bible is.
This is to Dale. I don't consider you a Christian and you should be embarrassed and ashamed of yourself for pretending to be one. Humanitarian unitarianism is a perversion of Scripture since it posits another God, another Jesus, a different Spirit, and a different Gospel. According to Paul, this makes you a false Christian (cf. 2 Corinthians 11:2-4, 13-15; Galatians 1:6-9).
ReplyDeleteMoreover, if you are interested in exegesis then your posts don't show it. What I, and others, see is your idolatrous fascination with human philosophy which you elevate above the plain testimony of the God-breathed Scriptures.
Now, you can easily prove me wrong by starting to actually engage the text of Scripture and providing Biblical proofs for your humanitarian unitarianism. Until you do, I stand by my assessment.
Dale,
ReplyDeleteIn your view, aren't trinitarians guilty of idolatry since they worship Jesus as God?
Yet it seems you don't think this disqualifies trinitarians from being "Christian." Nevertheless, clearly idolatry qualifies one for being a heretic in serious sin. Agree?
I wrote: "Tuggy sidesteps the issue of whether Scripture can ever *merely appear* to conflict with a necessary truth while not *in fact* doing so"
ReplyDeleteDale wrote: "Hardly, as you know."
Me: Sorry, I meant in this current discussion. I have only seen where you have made the obvious point that Scripture can never in fact violate a necessary truth (assuming they're realists about logic). But I would think all sides agree with that. But can it appear to? I haven't seen *that* discussed in the current dialectic.
I address this on the level of epistemology, as does James. The difficulty is that if something strongly appears to be a contradiction, we normally take that as very strong evidence that it really is one.
We do. You're right. Where this falls apart is that the trinity is, if anything is, hardly "normal." In one very salient sense, God isn't "normal."
If you look at my On Positive Mysterianism, it is clear that I admit in principle that there could be a case where we ought to believe what strongly appears contradictory.
Yes, this is a good concession to make. :-)
But given the actual state of evidence, it seems that accepting these sorts of "mysteries" is not rational.
What evidence? The evidence is given and you reply, "No, that can't be right; for if that were right, I would have to believe something that strongly appears contradictory."
Call it "rationalist" if you like, but some Reformed trinitarians agree.
Oh believe me, I know this all too well. :-)
There's nothing about the view which ties it to unitarianism per se. I respect James' position; really he and I agree on quite a lot, when it comes to philosophy. We part ways on what we think the best reading of the Bible is.
Well look, that's fine. You read the Bible differently and come to a different conclusion. That's a worthy discussion to have. Here's my issue. It appears to me that the response to the standard proof texts and exegetical arguments is that they can't be right since they would ultimately conflict with a necessary truth (or truths). But then we're caught in this loop.
If you're just going to make the exegetical case and see who's comes out better, that's a discussion worth having. if you're going to say that the Bible can never merely appear to conflict with a necessary truth, that's a discussion worth having too. But it seems to me that when the exegetical argument is given you fall back on the argument that it ultimately conflicts with LL, transitivity, etc. You say, "And we can never exegete a passage that violates a necessary truth. God would never reveal the logically impossible." But when I respond that your exegetical rule doesn't work for passages that *merely appear* to violate a necessary truth, and that it doesn't follow that God would reveal something that *merely appears* logically impossible, you then say that's fine but the exegetical debate doesn't lead us to a trinitarian conclusion. So the exegetical evidence is given, and you say, "No, that's can't be right, for it would violate LL etc."
So can you see why my head spins?
DALE SAID:
ReplyDelete"I completely agree: If it is true that there is a trinitarian God, then it must be necessarily true. Any necessary truth, of course, is as much a necessary truth as any other; necessity doesn't come in degrees."
So in cases where there seems to be a contradiction between two necessary truths, why would we opt for one rather than the other?
Moreover, in case of such (alleged) contradiction, a contradiction doesn't point you in any particular direction regarding the possible resolution.
"In your view, aren't trinitarians guilty of idolatry since they worship Jesus as God?"
ReplyDeleteNo, only guilty of confusion. God wants us to worship Jesus - compare the heavenly worship scene in Rev 5. This topic of worship and idolatry is a fascinating topic, and one unitarians have spent a lot of time on - can't go into it all here though. (Yes, there have been some unitarians like Priestley who enthusiastically wielded charges of idolatry against trinatiarins.)
The sequence of Rev 4 & 5 is interesting. Rev 4 is all a vision of God (the Father), like in Isaiah or Ezekiel.
Jesus makes his entry in ch. 5 looking very much like a creature entering God's court, and is declared worthy because of his obedience (9-10) to God, accomplishing the mission God gave him. On this basis, he's worthy to receive the things in v. 12 - things which if he were God, he would not need to be given. Consequently, he is worshiped alongside God, as if sharing God's throne. (13-4)
This is all parallel to Phil 2:1-11. Unitarians see these as about the exaltation of Jesus for the first time, not a restoration of former glory temporarily laid aside.
Interestingly, Socinus himself cited texts like this, and Heb 1:6 against another unitarian leader who thought it idolatrous to worship or pray to Jesus.
Paul, thanks for your comments. I can tell that you've put some good thought into this, and your most recent one helps me see that I wasn't saying enough to be clear.
ReplyDeleteSpecifically, my concern is that apparent contradictions disrupt the mysterian project (of showing that it's reasonable to accept paradoxes) at the level of exegesis. See the end of On Pos Myst for this, but here's a crack at a less formal version:
One has a reading of a text which appears inconsistent (either with itself, or with itself + one or more obvious truths). Why can't we just declare "mystery" and go home happy? Because when we stop re-assuring ourselves with "that's just what it SAYS" and honestly look around at what other smart, spiritual Christian readers have come up with, we see there are other possible readings (one's not compatible with my preferred one). This by itself is no bigee - most would agree that it is often reasonable to hold a firm opinion in the face of disagreement, even by what philosophers call our "epistemic peers". But the problem is that some of the competing readings are apparently consistent.
About our own apparent inconsistencies - we usually shove these out of our minds; they hurt too much, in a sense. But when we look them in the eye, so to speak, they all the more clearly seem contradictory. (To take an example James gives, consider these claims: Jesus is all-knowing and Jesus doesn't know the day or hour.) Responsible attention to them often makes them "solidify" - so the seeming is firm and constant, not weak, wavering, fleeting.
Now by seeming contradictory, they seem false - in the cases like I'm describing, very strongly so.
But no problem, because they *also* seem true, right? These are after all what the Bible *obviously* says, and we're *sure* that whatever it says is true.
In theory, no problem. In fact, problem.
Your encounter with those peers of yours - guys just as smart and just as spiritual as you - has slightly lessened how strongly it seems to you that your reading is the correct one.
And now, the seemings roughly balance out - it seems to you, with about the same degree of strength, that (1) this passage asserts a falsehood, and (2) this passage asserts a truth. In the teeth of this sort of evidence, the only reasonable thing is to withhold belief about whether the claims (your interpretation) are true or false.
But you'd like to understand the passage in way so it seems (on balance) true! So, you take the other interpretations more seriously, and end up changing your mind.
Alternately, with effort, you could restore yourself to the original position simply by forcefully ignoring the paradoxes - but it looks like this would require deliberately ignoring and going against evidence (how things seem), rather than being properly led by it. This would appear to be a mis-use of the abilities God gave us, and holds us accountable to use well.
That's a hasty sketch of my claim that a mysterian stance is typically fragile - something that ceases to be reasonable the more you apply your mind to it.
Take make it less abstract, here's an apparently contradictory set of claims like the type I have in mind.
f = g
s = g
not-(f=s)
(Or you could just make it one compound, paradoxical claim: f=g ^ s=g ^ -(f=s).)
Does that reduce or increase the head spin?
Dale,
ReplyDeleteYou said: "No, only guilty of confusion. God wants us to worship Jesus..."
Right, but I said "they worship Jesus as God"
You're claiming Jesus is worthy of worship, but does Unitarianism claim he is worthy of worship as God?
And doesn't that make trinitarians idolaters since they worship Jesus *as God*?
ReplyDeleteI don't see that saying "Jesus is worthy of worship" gets you around that unless you say Jesus is worthy of worship *as God*.
I really had to laugh at Tuggy's appeal to and distortion of Rev. 5:
ReplyDeleteJesus makes his entry in ch. 5 looking very much like a creature entering God's court, and is declared worthy because of his obedience (9-10) to God, accomplishing the mission God gave him. On this basis, he's worthy to receive the things in v. 12 - things which if he were God, he would not need to be given. Consequently, he is worshiped alongside God, as if sharing God's throne. (13-4)
This shows why you have no business doing exegesis. It also explains why you don't do much exegesis at all. In the first place, vv. 13-14 proves that Jesus IS NOT A CREATURE!
Then I heard EVERY CREATURE IN HEAVEN AND ON EARTH AND UNDER THE EARTH AND ON THE SEA, AND ALL THAT IS IN THEM, saying: “To him who sits on the throne AND TO THE LAMB be praise and honor and glory and power, for ever and ever!” The four living creatures said, “Amen,” and the elders fell down and worshiped.
If every created thing from everywhere worships God AND THE LAMB then this means that the Lamb is not a creature. After all, if he was a creature then John would be mistaken since not EVERY CREATURE is worshiping God. This clearly places Jesus on the side of the Creator, not on the side of creation.
Moreover, if your logic is to be sustained then God himself cannot be God since he too is counted worthy of receiving the same things that the Lamb does. Let us compare:
"You are worthy, our Lord and God, TO RECEIVE GLORY AND HONOR AND POWER, for you created all things, and by your will they were created and have their being.” Rev. 4:11
Here, God is worthy to receive the things he does because he is the Creator.
In a loud voice they were saying: “Worthy is the Lamb, who was slain, TO RECEIVE POWER AND WEALTH AND WISDOM AND STRENGTH AND HONOR AND GLORY AND PRAISE!” Rev. 5:12
Jesus is worthy to receive the things he does by virtue of being the Savior.
Since both God (the Father) and Jesus are receiving the same honor for what they have done, this means that God the Father cannot be God per your reasoning.
This also means that according to your view it wasn't the Creator who actually redeemed and saved people, but a finite creature who did, thereby making him worthy to receive the same exact honor and glory that God does for doing so!
I can see why you don't bother spending much time quoting texts and exegeting them. You are clearly out of your league when it comes to doing exegesis.
Hi Dale, late getting back to the party. But I brought the beer, so we're good.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure I "go home happy" with the mystery, but your ordering of events confuses me. It seems to me that it is after I study the text, after I grasp what the orthodox "givens" are, and after I read what others say, then I think about it all and say, "Well, I guess the best option is mystery. I sure hope it gets resolved, and I won't ignore any attempts to do that, but now that position is the best of the available options."
As far as the disagreements with my epistemic peers (which I'll assume doesn't count for our disagreement! :-), I notice that they basically seem to agree on what the texts say, the problems come when we try to interpret the texts and put them together into a coherent story. I then note that there are some interpretations of the data that are *consistent*, but I also note this: they went astray from the text and our orthodox givens. It's not *just* a consistent story I'm after. And believe me, when I find a story that is both consistent *and* orthodox, I'm all on board ;-)
So I have a view of the text and what an interpretation must satisfy. I don't make any strong claims about "it's just OBVIOUS" and "I'm just so SURE" that my readings are correct. But consider yourself. When you came out of the closet, you said that you had to go with the reading of Scripture and the interpretation of the data that seemed right to you. You don't want to go against Jesus. So here you stand, you can do no other.
So I say, "Sure, it's POSSIBLE that I'm wrong here, but my considered opinion is that I'm not." Okay, so now what do I do? I notice that the overwhelming majority of the church, a social group I am a member of and who God promised to lead into doctrinal truth (Eph. 4), basically interprets the text in the same ways and all agree with orthodox givens. Where the disagreement really lies is in how these various groups attempt to piece the data together. I then say, "Hmmm, boy, that looks good, but it goes against what we both believe the Scriptures teach and the orthodox givens we both hold to." Or, I say, "Well, that looks good, but it doesn't get rid of the mystery, in fact, it introduces even more!"
So people disagree with me. Won't be the first or last time. But how does this mean there's some kind of substantive problem for mysterianism? How do you get from this to idea that i shouldn't be a mysterian? Do you think your reply should cause Graham Priest to drop dialetheism? People disagree with him and offer "consistent" interpretations of alleged dialethia? What about your epistemic peers or betters? Your arguments seem to rely on realism about logics. But consider intuitionists. They just wouldn't buy your use of logic in these debates. And, they offer "consistent" accounts of logic. They also can avoid several nasty problems realists have. Do these guys "slightly lessen how strong" your view of logic seems to you? They say, "Look, with an intuitionist approach, you can avoid x, y, and z problems." You say, yeah, but then there's other problems it seems to me your view has. They say, "But we can handle those within our system." What does this situation mean for the rationality of your position?
CONT . . .
CONT . . .
ReplyDeleteI also don't think the mysterian position entails that one think that a passage asserts (1) a falsehood and (2) and truth. Rather, it's like this: the passage asserts ∂, and so ∂ is true. But another passage (or some tenant of orthodoxy) asserts ¥, and so ¥ is also true. But, given some seemingly solid metaphysical truth or principle of logic φ, I can't see how ∂ and ¥ could both be true together given φ, but I know that both are true. Mysterianism doesn't require me to believe any of the conjuncts that form a paradox are false, it just means I can't see how they could all be true.
How is any of this a misuse of reason? It seems I used reason to get to this predicament. Not only reason, but doxastic loyalty. Loyalty and reason lead me to the mysterian position, and those two things would allow me to drop mysterianism once an interpretation comes along that satisfies reason and loyalty.
Given this, what's the problem with my going with the standard exegesis and creedal givens, and then denying the extrabiblical attempts to tell a story about them?
Lastly, this isn't exactly right:
f = g
s = g
not-(f=s)
I say, currently, = looks like the best way to represent the data and keep orthodoxy, however, we don't actually have numerical identity, for at the end of the day it may be its own kind of identity, an identity that is best explained to us theological flatlanders as somewhere in the neighborhood of numerical and relative-sameness (another mysteriousl view!). So maybe it's
f =* g
s =* g
f≠*s
Now, to us, =* identity sure looks a lot like = identity, and it looks like the best way to view the matter. But there's no actual contradiction, for at a minimum, God knows the rules for =* identity, and know the above contains no actual contradiction. I'm not saying this is exactly how it is, but it in the neighborhood of how I see it.
Now, is your head spinning!?
So in cases where there seems to be a contradiction between two necessary truths, why would we opt for one rather than the other?
ReplyDeleteMoreover, in case of such (alleged) contradiction, a contradiction doesn't point you in any particular direction regarding the possible resolution
Yes, Steve. That's exactly right. And your first question is the million dollar one. There are a couple of things to say. First, one proposition can seem more strongly true to you than another. In such cases, where there's enough "separation" between the two, reason requires believing the stronger, and disbelieving the weaker. If it's too close, it seems one must withhold, believing neither. Second, there can be cases where a claim/proposition is "defeated" by further evidence. See Anderson's or my paper on this. The hard thing is to find some evidence which defeats one side without special pleading. (James would agree with this.)
Hi Jonathan,
ReplyDeletebut does Unitarianism claim he is worthy of worship as God?
No, he's worshiped *as* the Son of God, not as God himself.
It's an interesting question what make of this "as". Unitarians like Clarke and Emlyn have interesting things to say. But the most basic point is that "worship" in the Bible can mean relations we properly bear to either God or to creatures such as kings, etc. It just means: honoring. It seems, it could kind in kinds and/or degrees. Yes, God demands exclusive worship. Analogy: my wife demands my exclusive love. But, this doesn't exclude my loving our sons and daughter.
after I grasp what the orthodox "givens" are
ReplyDeletePaul, I assume you too are a Protestant. How, then, can we assume going in that the catholic/orthodox take is right, or just on the right track? (Consider the egregious errors in their track record.) The various unitarian readings are in direct competition with those, and claim to better explain them, and more simply. Unitarians are only using the methodology other Protestants *claim* to, which is exegeting by scripture and reason, not making (small-c) catholic tradition normative. In practice, catholic tradition (not necessarily patristic, mind you) has a huge hand in how people read the texts. It always did for me.
I notice that they basically seem to agree on what the texts say, the problems come when we try to interpret the texts and put them together into a coherent story.
I can see why you say that. The reason, I think, is that you've pretty much heard one side of the story, all catholic. If you look at unitarian books, you'll see that many are by godly men of good reputation, who've devoted their lives to investigating all the scriptures on this, in some cases at considerable personal cost. And you also realize that many of them know the trinitarian arguments better than the trinatians - John Wilson, Samuel Clarke, Theophilus Lindsey, Hopton Haynes, John Biddle, Anthony Buzzard, Noah Worcester, Burnap - they all fit this mold I just described. Some of those are subordinationists, some humanitarians. And pre-Trinity tradition, we have to remember Origen, surely the greatest pre-Nicene catholic thinker and Bible scholar - he and the other logos theologians were subordinationists.
basically interprets the text in the same ways and all agree with orthodox givens.
Not true, beyond a verbal level. When I talk to ordinary evangelicals, and to other catholics, they always ping-pong between tritheism, modalism, and who-knows-what. (I used to do that as well.) That is not a settled interpretation, I'm afraid - the first two butcher the NT, and the last seems to be (I'm talking about the common person here) obfuscation. As far as I can tell, it's always been this way, post-Nicea. What you'll generally find agreement about is the sentence that "Jesus is God" or affirmation of "the deity of Christ" - both of these being evangelical shibboleths (before, they were Catholic ones).
So I say, "Sure, it's POSSIBLE that I'm wrong here, but my considered opinion is that I'm not." Okay, so now what do I do?
ReplyDeleteNothing! Just, keep attending to the evidence, at least, when new things you haven't fully considered come to your attention.
Do these guys "slightly lessen how strong" your view of logic seems to you?
"My view of logic"? It's hard to consider that all at once... that'd include many disparate things. In general, it lowers my confidence a little, yes, just as with my metaphysical judgments. But remember that what I've been insisting on is very thin - that there is such a thing as =. This includes adherence to L's Law, which basically says that a thing can't at one time differ from itself! It's really hard to doubt that... Things are what they are.
In my previous roll call of unitarians who've carefully considered the whole of the scriptures, I should add William Christie, who was first a subordinationist, then a humanitarian.
But, given some seemingly solid metaphysical truth or principle of logic φ, I can't see how ∂ and ¥ could both be true together given φ, but I know that both are true.
ReplyDeleteTo properly describe the case, you must say that it strong seems that not-(∂ and ¥), because it seems that φ, and it seems that if φ then either -∂ or -¥.
To put it as you did, I think, puts the problem under the carpet. It's not that we can THAT P but not see HOW it is that P - there are plenty of unproblematic cases like that. (e.g. I see that Bob is better at math than Sally, but have no idea why or how.) The problem is that something seems so, and also seems not to be so.
No, Paul, I see no misuse of reason in the general procedure.
Now, is your head spinning!?
Yes, and not because of the beer! ;-)
f =* g
s =* g
f≠*s
Now, to us, =* identity sure looks a lot like = identity, and it looks like the best way to view the matter. But there's no actual contradiction, for at a minimum, God knows the rules for =* identity, and know the above contains no actual contradiction. I'm not saying this is exactly how it is, but it in the neighborhood of how I see it.
We could label this relation schmidentity. So, f is schidentical to g, and s is schmidentical to g, and yet f is not schm. to s.
Yes, this makes the apparent contradiction go away! Do we want to say that the apparent cont. dissolves into a negative mystery, or do we want to say like Anderson that the app. cont. stays the whole time?
Let's explore the first strategy. The paradox is gone - But at what cost? You want to say this relation looks like = to us, but not to God. I think if to us it is indistinguishable from =, then the problem is there as bad as ever. Normally, we bust a theory if it's inconsistent like this (implying that something is and isn't = to something). If our present theory seems to say this - Why think there's such thing as schmidentity here?
So, one worry is that this is arbitrary special pleading.
But another is that this is objectionable negative mysterianism. It looks like we don't know enough about schmidentity to believe claims that involve it. Does x =* y just mean x is "something somehow like" = to y? Or just that x appears to be = to y? (This latter would be believable.)
I think you mean to suggest that a trinitarian can look at things this way: f bears some close relation or other to g, as does s. But f & s don't bear that same relation to one another.
Is this seriously the important, crucial to salvation claim which is *the* doctrine of the Trinity? What inferences could we draw from this? How will this foil the modalist? The tritheist? Even, the unitarian? It seems to me that we could just stipulate that schmidentity does all of that, but I don't see how we could have grounds for thinking it actually does.
Paul - I just wanted to add that your comments are excellent. I think your last post shows how easy it is to move from positive to negative mysterianism. I think it can be consistent to combine them... or at least, I can't see how it is inconsistent, as long as different claims are involved (we either do or don't have a decent grasp of any given claim).
ReplyDelete1 of x
ReplyDeleteHi Dale,
Thanks for your kind remarks about my (at times sloppy) comments! think this is moving in a good direction, unfortunately it's now getting into more complicated areas that would need to be spelled out. So I'll probably just hint at directions I'd go and see if you'd want elaboration.
Here's how I see things in this discussion:
My comments were motivated by some of your criticisms of the traditional exegesis of standard proof texts. You claimed with Steve and others that the exegesis couldn't be right since they violate some necessary truth, like L's Law, or run afoul of logical inferences, like transitivity. My response has been this: "Okay, I'll grant that we cannot exegete a text in ways that *actually* violate necessary truths or violate solid rules of inference, because God would never reveal *as true* something that *is* false." So that's one thing to keep in mind when doing exegesis. However, I've then said, "Okay, granting the above, what's the argument that God would never reveal something to us which *merely appears* to violate a necessary truth or etc., while *in fact* not doing so?" To my mind, that puts those exegetical arguments on the table and bypasses the quick refutation of those readings. At this point, it seems your response is: "Okay, granted. But why go with those readings when there's others that don't seem to have those problems? Your epistemic peers have offered some non-apparently-contradictory ways to piece the data together, so, *ceteris paribus*, you should go with them." I then say, "Ah, but *ceteris paribus* I shouldn't go with them, for they don't run afoul of consistency constraints but they do of orthodoxy constraints; and I'm after both. So show me the one who does both, in the meantime I'm warranted to hold my paradoxical view." That's a summary, and it leads into your response, which I'll comment on in themes:
CONT . . .
CONT (2 of x)
ReplyDeleteAren't chew a Proudestant? Yes, and proud of it! :-) However, things here will get messy. I don't share your view of how we should read the Bible and do exegesis. I don't know if you've read James' article on Perspectivalism, but in that vein I think proper exegesis, biblical theology, systematic theology, is done within a situational context of tradition (and it's hierarchical, with sub-traditions nested within larger traditions). I don't see the role the church and the Christian community play in your exegesis and theologizing. Again, I'd make recourse here to the various "church and teacher" passages (e.g., Eph 4, etc). I don't think any one really does a "me and my bible" approach to these issues. I also think much can be gained from social epistemology and think too much epistemology has been focused on the individual, when in reality it seems questions of knowledge are indexed to *groups of knowers*. Epistemic logics have been making big moves in this area. I also find myself quite comfortably within virtue epistemology approaches, and as you may know, guys like W. Jay Wood make much of our knowledge within a community. In fact, I'm not even sure I understand what a community-less knowledge would look like (which gets into some trinitarian issues, but I digress!). Anyway, though this guy's a Catholic, word his this book
http://www.amazon.com/Bible-Made-Impossible-Biblicism-Evangelical/dp/1587433036/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_6
will make some important points. I suspect he's gunning down sola Scriptura, but I suspect he's really attacking a contemporary caricature of sola Scriptura, which is better said as solo Scriptura. I just don't think it's the case that the Bible is the *only* norm, it's the norming norm. I actually think the above is the historical protestant position, a position which has been corrupted by a more individualistic approach to theology popular in contemporary times. To show otherwise, one could read, say, Richard Muller and see just what the original protestors thought on these matters.
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CONT (3 of x)
ReplyDeleteGodly men with good reps who say otherwise: No doubt there, Dale. But I'm not sure I'm catching the nature of this response. Yeah, there's really sharp guys, sharper than me, who see things differently. Why, I'm writing to one of them right now! But let me place this next to something else you wrote in another thread:
I view this is a desperate defense, Steve. What you're saying is that somebody out there, somebody smart, believes something which, somehow, would keep my argument from going through. Sure the odd logician like Quine, or your common confused postmodernist, may deny that any truths are necessary. Well, some have denied that sense-perception is basically reliable, or that there is a real physical cosmos. But the existence of such doesn't much diminish your confidence in e.g. sight, or that there is a real cosmos. And rightly so!
And more than that, the field of logics is more dire than you present. I suppose you wrote what you did because most philosophers are realists about logic, but outside philosophers and especially theistic philosophers, many *logicians* are constructivists. Some of the most well-known *logicians* today are constructivists. My buddy at Stanford tells me virtually all the logicians there are constructivists, intuitions of some sort. My friend gave them same arguments for realism and one of von Bentham's PhD student said, "Oh, that's so cute." Many of the computer science guys, esp. A.I. guys, are constructivists. Yeah, they have concepts of necessity within constructed systems, but they don't think there's like some mind-independent truth they're talking about.
Anyway, all that to say, I'm not sure what (a) disagreement is supposed to do, and (b) what effect some "odd theologian's" views, like Clarke's, is supposed to show. Why can't it be to me like Quine is to you?
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CONT (4 of x)
ReplyDeleteAgreement, verbal or substantive: I think it goes beyond the verbal level. Take the set of passages for Christ's divinity, C. I believe most claim that those passages teach that Jesus is God. Now, when you subsequently ask how this can be, they offer *interpretations* or *stories* that often sound heretical. For example, switch to the set of trinity texts T, they might give the water/ice/gas analogy to explain how this can be. It's then that you say, "Aha, you're a modalist!" I suspect that if you explained things to them, they'd say, "Oh, I don't mean that." In any case, the main deal here is that the various "stories" tend toward modalism, polytheism, [insert Christological heresy], capitulation to irrationality, or mystery. I stay at the latter, which allows me to keep orthodoxy (allows me to say what all the c-theologians want say at a surface level, but doesn't fall into unorthodoxy or irrationality) Nevertheless, the vast amount of trinitarian/Christological literature shows me that there's quite a lot of agreement as far as what the texts teach and what we want to affirm, things get messy at the level of story.
Keep attending to the evidence Yes, I will do so. That's James's view too, no? Mysterianism isn't about throwing one's hands up and not trying anymore. It's about saying it's the best option at the moment. But if something comes along and does the job, we're on board. Indeed, we're part of the search party! If not, oh well, big deal. Maybe we'll find out in heaven, maybe never.
It must seem ¬(P & Q): Confused here. You initially wrote that, "it seems to you, with about the same degree of strength, that (1) this passage asserts a falsehood, and (2) this passage asserts a truth." This seems to say that it must seem to me that (P & ¬P).
But I gave a conjunction of different premises, which means it must seem ¬P v ¬Q. I have strong reasons to believe that both P & Q, but given φ, I can't see how (P & Q) are both true. Granting that the paradox puts me in a position where it *seems* that one of the disjuncts should be false, it doesn't commit me to seeing which one of them is. Thus, I say, I don't understand how the entire conjunction can be true together. This strikes me as different from merely saying, "I don't know how Bob is better at math than Sally." Rather, it'd be more like this:
[1] Bob is better at math than Sally.
[2] Bob is below-average at math.
[3] Sally is a mathematical genius.
Given this information, I don't see how [1] - [3] can all be true. Suppose I heard [1] - [3] uttered by Stewart Shapiro. Suppose I know that Shapiro is not sick, on drugs, or in a joking mood. Given his status as stud mathematical philosopher, I'm inclined to believe [1] - [3], though I can't see how they are all *true* given what being a mathematical genius and below-average mean; it's not *just* that I can't see *how* or *why* Bob is better.
Cont (5 of 5)
ReplyDeletePostive/Negative mysterianism:
"Yes, this makes the apparent contradiction go away! Do we want to say that the apparent cont. dissolves into a negative mystery, or do we want to say like Anderson that the app. cont. stays the whole time?
I didn't like some of your characterization of NM in your SEP article, so I'll want to back away from NM. But I do think:
(a) Since I'm not sure this is where any equivocation lies (and the last identity between f and s could be numeric and not scmidenity), then paradox remains.
(b) Since Anderson's position is that there's no *actual* contradiction, and if he believes that: a = b; b = c; a ≠ c, is an actual contradiction, he'd have to say something like this. He couldn't think it's actually numerical identity across the board, unless the equivocation lie somewhere else. Indeed, doesn't he in ch. 6? He offers possible MACRUE readings, each of which show the contradiction is removed.
"Let's explore the first strategy. The paradox is gone - But at what cost? You want to say this relation looks like = to us, but not to God. I think if to us it is indistinguishable from =, then the problem is there as bad as ever. Normally, we bust a theory if it's inconsistent like this (implying that something is and isn't = to something)."
I just don't see that. How's the problem there as bad as ever? We have the warranted belief in the individual propositions and the warranted belief that Scripture cannot err. So I say, "Boy, the best way to express this is =, but I know it's *actually* not = (but it's something in the neighborhood)." I don't see the problem. It's like the flatlander/spacelander thing.
• The object O is triangular.
• The object O is circular.
• φ = No object O can both be triangular and circular.
Suppose spacelander warned flatlanders of an impending 2D asteroid, saving them. He also foretold the future numerous times and were right. He also became 2D and walked among them and worked 2-D miracles in their presence. Etc. Why shouldn't flatlander believe he first two conjuncts?
"Is this seriously the important, crucial to salvation claim which is *the* doctrine of the Trinity? What inferences could we draw from this? How will this foil the modalist? The tritheist? Even, the unitarian? It seems to me that we could just stipulate that schmidentity does all of that, but I don't see how we could have grounds for thinking it actually does."
Well, we do know *some* things about scmidentity, it's pretty close to = and relative-sameness. But here's what it does, it allows this:
[1] The father is God.
[2] The son is God.
[3] The spirit is God.
[4] The father is not the son.
[5] The father is not the spirit.
[6] The son is not the spirit.
and
[7] There is exactly one God.
Now, you note that all the other trinity views can't keep [1] - [7] without either capitulating to irrationality or in some way denying one of the above.
The tritheism is foiled at [7]. The modalist falls by [1] - [6], especially after some very minor fleshing out, i.e., I could add
[8] f & s & hs are not modes of the exactly one God.
I'm trying to keep [1] - [7] while maintaining orthodoxy and rationality. If my view is orthodox, that leaves its rationality. I'm not sure you've argued that my view is irrational (in fact, it looks like you've conceded that it is). Now, since I believe the trinity is *true*, then the benefit of my view is that it allows me to believe the truth, while also not compromising the truth or our God-given rational faculties (either by unorthodoxy or irrationality). If you recall the claims made under the "Proudestant" section, then I find this is currently the best all-things-considered position.
Yikes, sorry for the length!