One of the stock themes in Scripture is the fact that God will judge men according to their deeds. However, the principle of divine judgment runs deeper than deeds. In Scripture, one of God’s qualifications to be the judge of all mankind is his omniscience. For instance:
10 "I the LORD search the heart and test the mind, to give every man according to his ways, according to the fruit of his deeds" (Jer 17:10).
12For the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and of spirit, of joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart. 13And no creature is hidden from his sight, but all are naked and exposed to the eyes of him to whom we must give account (Heb 4:12-13).
And all the churches will know that I am he who searches mind and heart, and I will give to each of you according to your works (Rev 2:23).
Divine omniscience is a precondition of divine judgment. And the judicial scope of God’s knowledge isn’t confined to what men do. It’s not just that God sees what we do in secret. What we do when there is no one to witness the crime. It’s not just that God remembers long forgotten deeds–or misdeeds.
No. It goes behind outward actions to the hidden realm of intent. Not just what we do, but what we meant to do. God’s omniscience is germane to his judicial role, not merely because that equips him to know everything we do, but everything we contemplate. Unspoken malice. Imaginary crimes.
Counterfactuals is a good tactic to use against 21st century atheists. Most of them believe in things like the "many worlds" interpretation of quantum physics so I they ridicule you you can throw that back at them.
ReplyDeleteI did not intend my proposed speculation to rule out others. Whatever you speculate it cannot go against scripture.
All it does for me though is boggle my mind. In regards to counterfactuals I cannot get beyond that they are contrary. to. fact.
They are contrary-to-fact in relation to *this* world.
ReplyDeleteAnd when the LORD smelled the pleasing aroma, the LORD said in his heart, "I will never again curse the ground because of man, for the intention of man's heart is evil from his youth. Neither will I ever again strike down every living creature as I have done.
ReplyDelete(Gen 8:21 ESV)
Given this state of our hearts, Is it not proper to say that *if* we were given the opportunity to sin, apart from the grace of God we would seize that opportunity with all our might?
"Given this state of our hearts, Is it not proper to say that *if* we were given the opportunity to sin, apart from the grace of God we would seize that opportunity with all our might?"
ReplyDeleteBut in the case of those who were saved from that fate it is contrary to fact to say that they weren't saved. Furthermore, we are all in that state, in a way. There is no one who escapes that impulse.
Again, what I am struck with in regards to counterfactuals is that they are contrary to fact. I am not able to understand what people are talking about when they talk about counterfactuals as if they were actuals. I'm sorry, I have tried and tried and I've just given up.
Doesn't your denial of counterfactuals reduce you to claiming that all conditionals are material conditionals?
ReplyDeleteSo you have:
* If Bush did not win the 2000 elections, then Michael Moore would have.
The antecedent is false (Bush did win), and on a material conditional analysis, this counterfactual has a true truth-value. But that doesn't seem right. if Bush didn't win, Gore most surely would have (with a very low probability of some other presidential candidate).
Counterfactual logics were developed to handle things like this, and recourse to possible worlds is important here.
And, who talks about counterfactuals as if they were actuals?
It is not that I deny counterfactuals but is precisely that I cannot understand treating them as actuals, which is what these arguments about God and judgment, election, etc seem to me to be doing.
ReplyDeleteIf God is omniscient enough to know what would have occurred in all "possible worlds" then darn it he's omniscient enough to know that this isn't one of those "possible worlds," that those things didn't happened.
Steve Polson said:
ReplyDeleteCounterfactuals is a good tactic to use against 21st century atheists.
Yeah, I think counterfactuals are important in our society from an apologetics as well as evangelistic standpoint. But not just with regard to atheists and atheism.
For one thing, we live in a pluralistic society. We have a diversity of religions and cultures. We have various races/ethnicites who speak a plethora of different languages or even dialects of those languages. There's a kaleidoscope of subcultures with which to interact. Although atheism is alive and well, much if not most of our society rather believes there are many equally valid paths to God. Much if not most of our society's beliefs about religion or spirituality are a syncretic mix of what they personally happen to think best suits them.
For another thing, we also live in a relativistic society. We can no longer assume similar enough let alone the same ethical presuppositions when we converse with others about what's right or wrong. Some of this is owing to the fact that Biblical illiteracy is at an all time high, even among professing Christians. But much of this is for other factors. Just as with their beliefs or worldviews, many if not most people in our society seem to pick and choose what they think or rather feel is right for them. Well, so long as it respects what other people think is right or wrong too. As is oft said, the only ethical duty is that no one is intolerant of others. Intolerance is the greatest sin in our society. Of course this itself makes for an absurd position. But that's another topic.
In any case, there seems to be little common ground between Christians and modern day pagans. (Actually, come to think about it, this isn't such a dissimilar situation to what the first century Christians living in the Roman Empire faced.) If so, counterfactuals are a possible means to engage in fruitful dialogue with modern day pagans. What if God does exist? What if we can know God? What if the Bible is God's revelation to humanity? What if God did create the universe and all it contains including us? What if miracles do occur? What if we do have souls? What if this life isn't all there is? What if science can't answer everything? I could be wrong about this one but can't we take what Paul did on the Areopagus or Mars Hill as possibly arguing counterfactually - what if this man Jesus did rise from the dead (Acts 17:22ff)?
Whatever you speculate it cannot go against scripture...
But just as well the apostle Paul uses counterfactuals in Scripture which, if true, would go against Scripture, for example, when he tries to knock some sense into some Corinthian Christians:
"Now if Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. For if the dead are not raised, not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied" (1 Cor 15:12-19).
SP,
ReplyDeleteNo one is saying they are actual. The suggestion is that God actually damns someone for what they would have done but actually didn't do. God knows they didn't *actually* commit the sin, but he knows that they *would* have committed it. So, what's your argument that God can't or shouldn't take into account what you *would* have done, even if you *in fact* didn't do it?
STEVE POLSON SAID:
ReplyDelete"Again, what I am struck with in regards to counterfactuals is that they are contrary to fact. I am not able to understand what people are talking about when they talk about counterfactuals as if they were actuals. I'm sorry, I have tried and tried and I've just given up."
That's not an argument. And repeating yourself doesn't add to your original disclaimer.
Why is it so bewildering for you to appreciate that if someone intended to commit a heinous crime, but was foiled because the bus was late, that he is culpable for a crime he never committed?
"Why is it so bewildering for you to appreciate that if someone intended to commit a heinous crime, but was foiled because the bus was late, that he is culpable for a crime he never committed?"
ReplyDeleteSo, then, Hell is a punishment upon man not for his deeds but for his nature.
What of those who resist their nature for any number of reasons? A man may resist his impulse to commit adultery because he loves his wife more. Must he be condemned for simply having that impulse when his actions reflect his own condemnation of that impulse through his denial of it?
James,
ReplyDeleteI wouldn't call that a counterfactual. The intent in the example you raise is actually present. A counterfactual it seems to me would be "in some other possible world in different circumstances he would intend to commit a heinous crime."
So if someone intends to commit a crime he is culpable (whether he goes through it or not). If someone would intend to commit a crime under different circumstances he is not culpable, since those circumstances didnt entail and there was no such intent. At least that how it seems to me.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteI agree that had Eve not eaten the fruit because she was tackled, her sin of intent would be the same.
Regarding counterfactual sins, what we would do is what God would have decreed we would do had he not decreed this world. Yet another world would not seem to be by any necessity the same world as that which contemplates there being no deterrents whatsoever. In other worlds the counterfactual world must not be the world in which we are without any deterrents whatsoever. So, are you positing that we're responsible for what we would have done had God decreed another world, or are you suggesting that we'll be judged for the worst things we would have done had God so decreed no deterrents? If the former, then we'll be judged according to sins that God did not choose to decree plus sins that we do commit. And if the latter, then we’ll be judged for all possible sins that God could have decreed we commit. Am I representing your position in either scenario?
Thanks,
Ron
Oops
ReplyDeleteI was responding to Steve's comment not James's.
To my way of thinking, an actually existing intent is not a counterfactual intent, and the culpability is not for the crime he never completed it is for the actual, real intent he did "commit" (really and actually intend). Does that help you to understand where my bewilderment lies?
SP,
ReplyDeleteHere's a counterfactual:
[C] John would have murdered the little girl, if he had turned down that alley on Franklin St. that day.
Now, John had no actual intent, and he didn't even know about the girl. So there's no confusing actual and counterfactual.
You are committed to claiming that it would be wrong of God to damn John for [C], or to appeal to [C] as part of an overall case fro damnation. Okay, so that's your claim, what's your argument for it.
Ron,
ReplyDeleteI’m responding to infidels who say God is evil if he damns infants. So I’m discussing the justice of infant damnation for the sake of argument.
And I’m pointing out that it’s ad hoc for an atheist to say God is evil if he damns Ted Bundy to hell if Bundy died at the age of 12 (before he began his killing spree).
To say salvation or damnation pivots on lucky or unlucky timing is ad hoc.
Now, some Christians have also been raising questions, although that wasn’t the original focus of my discussion. However, Christians also have to come to terms with those passages in which eschatological judgment is predicated, not merely on God’s omniscient knowledge of what we do, but on God’s omniscient knowledge of our motives and intentions. That goes beyond actual deeds to counterfactual deeds.
Of course, ultimately I think we’re judged on whether our sins were atoned for (in the case of the elect), or unatoned (in the case of the reprobate). So the question of counterfactual sin is secondary to that consideration.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteThanks, I see more clearly to what you were aiming. Professings atheists will also find it hard to believe that Adam's sin and our concupiscence also condemn us, as you know. Also, the intentions that are not acted upon are still factual sin, as again you appreciate.
Best,
Ron
Paul,
ReplyDeleteYes, I'd call that a counterfactual.
"You are committed to claiming that it would be wrong of God to damn John for [C]"
I am not so committed. What I am saying is that counterfactual arguments like that baffle me, I cannot see how he is culpable for that particular thing which he DID NOT DO (of course he is culpable for all the wicked things he actually did do, intend, etc.). All I see is that they are contrary to fact. I think you see something I don't see.
SP,
ReplyDeleteI wrote: "You are committed to claiming that it would be wrong of God to damn John for [C]"
You replied:
I am not so committed. What I am saying is that counterfactual arguments like that baffle me, I cannot see how he is culpable for that particular thing which he DID NOT DO (of course he is culpable for all the wicked things he actually did do, intend, etc.).
First, you started out saying: " In regards to counterfactuals I cannot get beyond that they are contrary. to. fact." You claimed this "boggled" your mind. Have I now unboggled it? I've cleary shown what bothered you, i.e., "treating them as actuals," isn't the case at all.
But now you're claiming what boggles your mind is that you can't see how God could hold John accountable for what he would have done. This is different than your first boggle, but you never indicated that that boggle was unboggled, you just jumped to a new boggle.
So on to the new boggle. You're not saying that God can't or shouldn't consider such counterfactuals in a case for damning. You're saying you "don't see how God could hold John responsible." But whay not? What's the problem you're having? It can't be that it would be wrong for God to do so (you just said that wasn't yuour complaint), so what's the boggle? What's so hard about seeing how God could hold John accountable for WHAT HE WOULD HAVE DONE HAD HE BEEN IN THAT SITUATION?
So perhaps you could take a stab at explaining yourself, because the set of posts is a jumbled mess of jumping from pillar to post. What's the problem? Or, are you just expressing your epistemological limitations? Okay, 10-4. But in that case, there's nothing to comment further on, you're just reporting your psychological or epistemological situation.
Guys,
ReplyDeleteIf God were to judge the lost according to what could have happened, then the lost would be judged for all feasible sins that would have taken place under the most feasibly gracious circumstances. In which case, it would seem that each person would receive pretty much the same maximum penalty. Sundry thoughts: (a) Doesn't Scripture suggest to us that judgment between men is not all the same, and that it would be better on the day of judgment had we not done X (and often times sinners don't do X). Yet if we are to be judged according to how we would behave with no deterrents, then we will be judged as if we always did X. (b) That we will be judged according to actual desires of the heart that are not always acted upon for various reasons does not imply that we will be judged according to counterfactuals. (c) Although there might not be a logical bind to the premise that we will be judged by a sovereign God for non-actual sins, we should consider whether revelation suggests otherwise. I have my thoughts on that matter that need not be put forth here. :)
Not all people need to be judged according to what they would have done. What they've done is more than sufficient. So it might be a subset of the damned that God pulls from counterfactual sins to include in the overall case against them. Also, others might have counterfactually sinned more egregiously than others, thus warranting harsher punishment. Mind you, I'm not committed to this idea. I'm following along with Steve's exploration of it.
ReplyDeletePaul,
ReplyDelete"Have I now unboggled it? I've cleary shown what bothered you, i.e., "treating them as actuals," isn't the case at all. "
Please forgive me, I still don't see it. It still seems to me that that kind of talk treats them as actuals. "John," for example, did not hurt the little girl, had no intention of hurting the little girl, etc. If someone were to say he is culpable for hurting the little girl (or intending to, etc.) just because he would have in other circumstances, he would be, as far as I can see, treating the counterfactual as if it were actual.
"But now you're claiming what boggles your mind is that you can't see how God could hold John accountable for what he would have done. "
No, I don't talk that way about God, it seems presumptuous to me. I was talking about a person, you or your friend Wittgenstein or whoever, understanding that it makes sense to think John is culpable for something he did not do but only "would have done" in other circumstances. You and Wittgenstein and whoever have an understanding that I don't and that baffles me.
"You're not saying that God can't or shouldn't consider such counterfactuals in a case for damning."
No, no. I don't talk about that way about God. He is infinite I am finite. He is the Almighty. His ways are beyond my comprehension.
"What's the problem you're having? "
Let me phrase it in terms of our hypothetical "John." He does not hurt the little girl, or intend to do so, or dream of doing so, or any other wicked thing. But we are informed somehow (perhaps God tells us) that in a different circumstance, he takes a different turn or whatever, he would kill the girl.
You say to me: "He is culpable, because he would do it in other circumstances." I reply to you "I don't understand how you can say he is culpable for something HE DID NOT DO!" What overwhelms my understanding in terms of counterfactuals is that they are contrary to fact. How can you think he's culpable when he didn't do it! My mind is boggled, Paul, boggled!
Do you begin to see why I am so boggled? I don't understand you! You are saying he is culpable for the murder of the little girl. You are treating that counterfactual in a way that seems to me like the way you would only treat an actual.
I am not saying you are wrong, I am saying that I don't get your logic. I don't see the culpability.
"What's so hard about seeing how God could hold John accountable for..."
A big part of the problem is that I'm too timid and fearful to psychoanalyze God in that way. In order for me to have the ability to respond at all you need to phrase your question in such a way that you are telling me that you personally have learned the truth of a counterfactual as a counterfactual and you are treating it as an actual. Even then I won't tell you that I understand you I'll say that you've boggled my mind--because, Paul, you have.
I do respect those who are intellectually better capable than I am of handling counterfactuals. They see something that I don't see, they are better able than I to get beyond the glaring fact that the counterfactual is contrary to fact.
"Or, are you just expressing your epistemological limitations?" Yeah that's a big part of it. All I can see is that John didn't hurt the little girl, he didn't intend to hurt her, he didn't fantasize about hurting her, etc.. So I don't see the culpability. Maybe if the possible universe were an actually existing universe (many worlds theory) and I lived in that universe I would see the culpability, because the corpse would be right there in front of me. But I don't live in that universe I'm right here and I don't think that other universe even really exists.
"Also, others might have counterfactually sinned more egregiously than others, thus warranting harsher punishment."
ReplyDeleteLet's try this from w/ my login name!
I appreciate that this is exploratory and the rest of what you said, Paul. I guess I question the general premise based upon what I think has been revealed in Scripture on judgement. As for the quote above, I would think that as soon as we entertain the idea of counterfactual sin, we end up with all sinning to the maximum degree feasible. However, as you say, the thesis might include God applying counterfactual sins only to a subset.
SP,
ReplyDelete"If someone were to say he is culpable for hurting the little girl (or intending to, etc.) just because he would have in other circumstances, he would be, as far as I can see, treating the counterfactual as if it were actual."
No one's saying that. I'm not sure if you can't understand, or just don't want to.
"He is culpable, because he would do it in other circumstances." I reply to you "I don't understand how you can say he is culpable for something HE DID NOT DO!"
I don't. Again, I said God would judge him for something HE WOULD HAVE DONE.
Then you continue on claiming it's treating it as an actual and pontificating about etc. There's no progress, so I'll leave you to yourself or to others.
Paul,
ReplyDeletePlease don't take it personally. You have an intellectual capability I don't have, you see something I don't see. To me "would have done" (but did not do) is "did not do." It's contrary to fact, its not true, it's nonexistent, etc. I don't have the intellectual capabilities to get beyond that.
SP,
ReplyDeleteGo try your passive-aggressive behavior on someone else.
BTW, to say "it's not true" exposes your ignorance. The counterfactual itself can have a true truth value, regardless of whether it happened or not.Take this: If SP paid attention, he would be a better interlocutor. Certainly that's true regardless of whether you in fact don't see fit to pay attention, and thus make for poor exchanges.
ReplyDeleteRONALD W. DI GIACOMO SAID:
ReplyDelete“Professings atheists will also find it hard to believe that Adam's sin and our concupiscence also condemn us, as you know.”
i) I’m not, in the first instance, discussing what infidels find plausible. Rather, infidels contend that infant damnation is unjust. I’m proposing a model under which infant damnation could be morally coherent.
I don’t expect infidels to believe it since they don’t believe in damnation generally. The question, though, is whether my proposal is incoherent.
ii) Apropos (i), secular thinkers usually accept counterfactuals. Indeed, ethicists constantly debates hypothetical scenarios (e.g. the ticking timebomb, the survival lottery, the trolley dilemma).
iii) I also think there’s something intuitively plausible in the suggestion that an agent can be morally responsible for some unexemplified crimes. I’ve given examples. So has Manata.
“In which case, it would seem that each person would receive pretty much the same maximum penalty.”
We’re dealing with the hypothetical case of infant damnation. That would be a special case since infants aren’t guilty of actual sin. But they could still be culpable for counterfactual sin (per my argument).
Since the same conditions don’t supervene in the case of adults (i.e. human agents above the age of discretion), they could be judged for actual sin.
iv) Scripture also suggests that God judges sinners, not merely for what they do, but what they imagine doing or intend to do. And that intersects with the counterfactual realm.
v) In addition, Scripture takes counterfactuals for granted, viz. conditional threats and promises.
Of course, a Calvinist will ground counterfactuals differently than a freewill theist, but that’s still a Scriptural resource.
Cont. “(b) That we will be judged according to actual desires of the heart that are not always acted upon for various reasons does not imply that we will be judged according to counterfactuals.”
ReplyDeleteYou need to explicate that claim. An unexemplified intention is directed at a counterfactual state of affairs. That’s the referent of the intention. If we’re judged for unexemplified fantasies or intentions, that strike me as equivalent to judgment for counterfactuals.
vi) A possible world could contain most of the same determents or lack of opportunities as the actual world in which a given agent resides. Indeed, counterfactual identity involves a fair amount of continuity between two or more possible worlds.
However, it could afford a specific opportunity, or the absence of a specific deterrent, for some action in particular.
Say in actual world A and possible world B, Josh and Jake both have a crush on the high school cheerleader. In both worlds, Josh suffers from asthma. In both worlds, Josh suffers an asthma attack while he and Jake are alone together.
In world A, Josh carries an inhalant with him. Jake administers the inhalant, thereby saving his life.
In world B, Josh inadvertently left the inhalant in his car. Jake lets him die of asphyxiation to eliminate the romantic competition.
Other than that, worlds A and B may contain the same opportunities and deterrents for Jake (making allowance for local adjustments).
Here's a counterfactual:
ReplyDelete[C] If Dr. Jones had gone to work on Monday, April 4, 2011, he would have sexually harassed the pharmaceutical rep.
Now, as it happens, Dr. Jones in fact stayed home, but God knows [C]. Now, here's the question: Can God employ [C] as part of an overall case against Dr. Jones? If not, why not? Is it:
* Because Jones cannot be held morally blameworthy for what he would have done? That is, it doesn't meet the criteria for ascriptions of blame.
* It would be immoral of God to do so?
* It would be logically impossible for God to do so?
* It would lead to an absurd conclusion?
* God could do so, and Dr. Jones would be blameworthy, but in fact has chosen to hold people blameworthy only for what they actually do?
What? The first one looks the most promising, but that would require a philosophical argument rather than a theological one, and it would be harder for a compatibilist to press than an incompatibilist. But the first one would be the best bet, i.e., laying down the necessary requirements for blame and showing counterfactual blame doesn't meet them. The last one is problematic because of the arbitrariness and relativism of it. I can see a successful argument for the middle three that would not rest on highly contentious premises.
I also think whatever Scripture passage might be pulled as a proof text against the possibility of counterfactual would be unerdetermined. It's usually difficult to argue straight from Scripture for claims like this. That's not the Bible's job, and so it doesn't make the precise qualifications with the required rigor needed to rule out all possible alternatives.
“Rather, infidels contend that infant damnation is unjust. I’m proposing a model under which infant damnation could be morally coherent.”
ReplyDeleteSteve,
Yes, although the paradigm could be coherent, it is not one that I find revealed to us in Scripture. If the professing atheist were to base his belief of the justice of infant damnation upon an unrevealed paradigm, he wouldn’t be basing it on God’s authority. He could actually be basing it upon something that isn’t even true. I don’t think it’s enough that the professing atheist believes in the justice of infant damnation. I think he is to believe it on God’s authority and the revealed premises of legal condemnation in Adam and that sin nature is sin.
“iv) Scripture also suggests that God judges sinners, not merely for what they do, but what they imagine doing or intend to do. And that intersects with the counterfactual realm.”
Whether the first notion intersects or implies the counterfactual notion I’ll try to interact with below. But for now, yes, Scripture speaks of sins of the heart and when it does it is speaking of actual sins of the heart being sin. On that we agree.
“v) In addition, Scripture takes counterfactuals for granted, viz. conditional threats and promises. ”
The presupposed “counterfactuals” to which I think you are referring to in Scripture go something like this: IF you actually do X, you will receive Y.” But I don’t believe that to be the same thing as: “If you were in circumstance P, God would decree that you do Q, therefore, you will be judged for the counterfactual sin of Q.”
Let's look at it this way together. At the very least, I think it is morally plausible that God takes an infant in infancy because he wants to spare the person increase of judgment, though being “pleased” to send such a one to hell. If that is true, then it would seem false that God judges according to counterfactuals. I don't know why I would accept one feasible scenario over the other. Also, there are counterfactuals in which the infant receives Christ, but I would not want to posit that one would receive saving grace based upon a counterfactual justifying faith any sooner than I would want to posit justice predicated upon counterfactual works. In other words, God reveals that men are saved by actual faith and judged according to their actual works, but if we can be judged according to counterfactual works, then why not saved by counterfactual faith? Maybe I'm missing something but I don't see how I can favor one position and not the other without avoiding arbitrariness.
Cont.
I said: (b) That we will be judged according to actual desires of the heart that are not always acted upon for various reasons does not imply that we will be judged according to counterfactuals.”
ReplyDeleteSteve responded: You need to explicate that claim.
What I’m trying to say is that Scripture explicitly teaches that we will be judged for actual (factual) matters of the heart that are never acted upon. I don’t find a necessary inference that we’ll be judged for things that we would have done if placed in a state of affairs, or if God’s restraint were lifted. We agree on the former and that it’s explicitly taught in Scripture.
“An unexemplified intention is directed at a counterfactual state of affairs.”
This might get to the nub of the matter. I see in Scripture warnings such as “If you (actually) do x, you will receive y”. I think you might be equating such warnings with something like this: “If you would do x in y state of affairs, then you will receive z.” I don’t find warnings for having to pay for sins we will not commit, but there are warning that if a sin is actually committed there will be penalty.
“If we’re judged for unexemplified fantasies or intentions, that strike me as equivalent to judgment for counterfactuals. ”
I don’t think that they are equivalent. The warnings are: “If you do this, you will receive that” which I don’t believe is equivalent to “we will be judged for intentions that we would have had but will not have.”
“A possible world could contain most of the same determents or lack of opportunities as the actual world in which a given agent resides. Indeed, counterfactual identity involves a fair amount of continuity between two or more possible worlds.”
Indeed
Paul wrote:
“Here's a counterfactual:
[C] If Dr. Jones had gone to work on Monday, April 4, 2011, he would have sexually harassed the pharmaceutical rep.
Now, as it happens, Dr. Jones in fact stayed home, but God knows [C]. Now, here's the question: Can God employ [C] as part of an overall case against Dr. Jones?”
I’m not sure whom Paul wrote that to, but I would want to reserve my answer until I think through the question of atonement as put forth above. I don’t think any of us would be comfortable with a counterfactual limited atonement and justifying faith – i.e. atonement for and faith granted to those in this world for whom Jesus did not die in this world. Actual atonement and actual faith are the only graces we consider, so how may we consider counterfactual sins without being arbitrary in that regard? Not sure about that…
RON DIGIACOMO SAID:
ReplyDelete“Yes, although the paradigm could be coherent, it is not one that I find revealed to us in Scripture. If the professing atheist were to base his belief of the justice of infant damnation upon an unrevealed paradigm, he wouldn’t be basing it on God’s authority. He could actually be basing it upon something that isn’t even true. I don’t think it’s enough that the professing atheist believes in the justice of infant damnation. I think he is to believe it on God’s authority and the revealed premises of legal condemnation in Adam and that sin nature is sin.”
You’re raising an issue of apologetic methodology:
i) An atheist doesn’t believe anything on God’s authority. Therefore, you seem to be suggesting that we should never engage an atheist on specific objections to the faith. Rather, every objection should be redirected to a debate over the inspiration of Scripture.
While there’s certainly a place for that, I see no compelling reason to confine ourselves to single-issue apologetics.
ii) Not all truths are contained in Scripture. There are extrascriptural truths as well as Scriptural truths. And if the only truths we knew were Scriptural truths, we wouldn’t even know Scriptural truths inasmuch as we need to know some extrascriptural truths to know, much of the time, what Scripture is talking about.
iii) Apropos (ii), Scripture itself takes various lines of extrascriptural knowledge for granted, such as sense knowledge, testimonial evidence, &c.
iv) Finally, there’s nothing wrong with arguing down an atheist on his own assumptions. Jesus himself employed tu quoque arguments when responding to some of his opponents.
“But for now, yes, Scripture speaks of sins of the heart and when it does it is speaking of actual sins of the heart being sin.”
Actual sins which frequently take inactual objects as their corresponding relatum.
“The presupposed ‘counterfactuals’ to which I think you are referring to in Scripture go something like this: ‘IF you actually do X, you will receive Y.’ But I don’t believe that to be the same thing as: ‘If you were in circumstance P, God would decree that you do Q, therefore, you will be judged for the counterfactual sin of Q.’”
You’re conflating two different issues. I didn’t cite conditional threats (and promises) to establish the basis of punishment; rather, I cited conditional threats (and promises) as a Biblical witness to truth-valued counterfactuals. Appeal to counterfactuals is not inherently extrascriptural.
(You repeat the same issue further down, so I’ll skip over that.)
The bearing of that on grounds for punishment is a separate argument.
“At the very least, I think it is morally plausible that God takes an infant in infancy because he wants to spare the person increase of judgment, though being ‘pleased’ to send such a one to hell.”
Offhand, I can’t say I find that plausible. I find it plausible that God sometimes takes elect infants in infancy to spare them undue suffering in this life. Suffering which might be detrimental to their faith and sanctification if they lived longer. But I don’t find it plausible that God takes reprobate infants in infancy to spare them harsher judgment. (BTW, I’m discussing infant damnation as a hypothetical.)
Cont. “Also, there are counterfactuals in which the infant receives Christ, but I would not want to posit that one would receive saving grace based upon a counterfactual justifying faith any sooner than I would want to posit justice predicated upon counterfactual works.”
ReplyDeletei) The question at issue is reward and punishment given salvation or damnation, and not what makes the given a given.
ii) Moreover, as I’ve already indicated, Calvinism and freewill theism ground counterfactuals differently. Calvinism ultimately grounds counterfactuals in God’s nature and will whereas freewill theism ultimately grounds them in man’s will.
“In other words, God reveals that men are saved by actual faith and judged according to their actual works, but if we can be judged according to counterfactual works, then why not saved by counterfactual faith?”
i) Surely that proves too much inasmuch as elect infants are incapable of exercising saving faith in this life. The most we can say is that God grants them the predisposition to believe the gospel (via regeneration), but that only takes effect in heaven.
ii) There’s a basic asymmetry between salvation and judgment. Our sinful works merit judgment, whereas we can do nothing to merit salvation.
iii) In addition, there’s a parallel between the emphasis on saving faith and the emphasis on credobaptism in the NT. But Presbyterians normally argue that the credobaptist emphasis is incidental to the audience. In the nature of the case, commands to be baptized are directed at adults. Only those above a certain age can understand the command. Commands are not directed at babies, even if babies fall under the scope of baptism. And the same thing can be said for the accent on faith.
“What I’m trying to say is that Scripture explicitly teaches that we will be judged for actual (factual) matters of the heart that are never acted upon.”
Which overlooks the fact that we’re dealing with a relation. It’s not just the intention or imagination, but the referent of the intention or imagination. A relation between an actual intention and (in many cases) an unexemplified referent. So the analysis is not reducible to one relatum of a two-term relation.
“I don’t find a necessary inference that we’ll be judged for things that we would have done if placed in a state of affairs, or if God’s restraint were lifted.”
Your position reduces guilt of innocence to an accident of logistics. Fortuitous timing. 5 minutes early and you go to heaven, 5 minutes late and you go to hell. I get lucky because I wasn’t in the wrong place at the right time. Good thing I missed the bus.
Let’s revisit an earlier objection:
“Doesn't Scripture suggest to us that judgment between men is not all the same, and that it would be better on the day of judgment had we not done X (and often times sinners don't do X). Yet if we are to be judged according to how we would behave with no deterrents, then we will be judged as if we always did X.”
One problem with this objection is the assumption that the severity of infernal punishment is frozen in place at the time of death by what the reprobate did in this life.
But that’s problematic since Calvinism typically takes the position that the damned are worse sinners in hell than they were on earth. Absent common grace, they are more sinful (generally far more sinful) in hell. If that’s the case, then we’d expect the damned to wrack up more sins and worse sins which justly merit (indeed, obligate) harsher punishment. Aggravated sin demands aggravated punishment.
True, that’s an example of actual transgression rather than counterfactual transgression. But my immediate point is that it goes above and beyond actual transgression in this life. So unless you reject that chain of reasoning, you can’t restrict the infernal sentence to sins committed in this life.
I wait until Steve makes all the good points and then come in and fire my peashooter.
ReplyDeleteSpeaking for myself, I do not have a problem with God applying "dispositional faith" to an infant who dies in infancy. This was also the position of several older Reformed and historic Christians (can dig up references if need be).
All those saved in this life are actually elect. Now, suppose we have an infant who dies in infancy and is saved, on my view God has elected them and regenerates them. He then counts their "dispositional faith" to their account, knowing that, given their election and regeneration, if allowed to continue to flourish, necessarily they'd profess faith. I don't see the problem here with counting their dispositional faith to their credit. Sure, the Bible makes claims about professing faith, but it doesn't make any strong modal claim to the effect that: necessarily, one must explicitly and consciously profess saving faith in Christ in order to be saved. The Bible frequently speaks in terms of normal operations, not extraordinary or mitigating circumstances. All this to say, Scriptural passages will be underdetermining here.
We can see this with adults who die in their sleep. While sleeping, they are not believing, trusting, and resting on Christ. They may have at some earlier point, but one must die having faith. Otherwise, we open the door to the view that "once saved always saved" where this means, as long as you professed faith at some point in your life, you don't need to keep that faith later. So, people who die in their sleep die without explicitly professing faith, but they have the disposition to believe in the right circumstances and with the properly functioning cognitive faculties.
"What I’m trying to say is that Scripture explicitly teaches that we will be judged for actual (factual) matters of the heart that are never acted upon.”
Which is true, but it doesn't say we will only be so judged.
"“I don’t find a necessary inference that we’ll be judged for things that we would have done if placed in a state of affairs, or if God’s restraint were lifted.”
I don't think I have any such "necessary inference." it's floated as epistemically possible, a possible standard God may use to judge some. it's not inconsistent with anything I know, and I see no argument to the effect that, necessarily, we will only be judged/damned for what we actually did, which is what would be needed to refute the possibility claim.
So at this point, I bring up [C] again, and ask what the objection could be to God using [C] in part of a cumulative case against a subset of reprobate?
I second Paul's comments.
ReplyDeleteI believe you reasoned from the existence of counterfactuals and actual moral intentions to judgment upon counterfactuals. You said: “Scripture also suggests that God judges sinners, not merely for what they do, but what they imagine doing or intend to do. And that intersects with the counterfactual realm.” You didn’t provide the link or implication of the intersection, or maybe I missed it. You just seemed to assume it exists as far as I can tell.
ReplyDelete“The bearing of that on grounds for punishment is a separate argument.
I haven’t seen it though.
I said: “At the very least, I think it is morally plausible that God takes an infant in infancy because he wants to spare the person increase of judgment, though being ‘pleased’ to send such a one to hell.”
You replied: Offhand, I can’t say I find that plausible… I don’t find it plausible that God takes reprobate infants in infancy to spare them harsher judgment.
Why is that not plausible? I’ll make it even more plausible though. Let’s say God doesn’t take a life early in order to keep it from harsher judgment but that he takes a life early for some other reason and the byproduct of the determination to take the life early is that it is spared harsher judgment. In other words, the motive is not to spare the person more suffering in hell but nevertheless the result is the same, which is how I intended to make the point. Why isn’t it plausible that God take the child’s life early without judging it for counterfactual sins? Your position precludes mine, but I find that arbitrary.
“ii) Moreover, as I’ve already indicated, Calvinism and freewill theism ground counterfactuals differently. Calvinism ultimately grounds counterfactuals in God’s nature and will whereas freewill theism ultimately grounds them in man’s will.”
So your position is a reductio only and not one you think is feasible in reality?
i) Surely that proves too much inasmuch as elect infants are incapable of exercising saving faith in this life.
The counterfactual would presuppose a prolonged life wherein faith is exercised, just as the counterfactual you are positing deals with a prolonged life in which sins are committed.
“There’s a basic asymmetry between salvation and judgment. Our sinful works merit judgment, whereas we can do nothing to merit salvation.”
You're positing counterfactual sins (in a prolonged life in a feasible world) for which a man is accountable in this world, so I am asking why then there can’t be counterfactual faith (in a prolonged life in a feasible world) for which a man is counted as righteous in this world. Please consider Steve, you wish to allow for judgment in this world due to sins that would be committed in a counterfactual decree, but not allow for grace and faith exercised within a counterfactual decree. That appears very arbitrary to me. Why can certain counterfactuals come into play in this world but not others? NOTE: You allow for sins not decreed in this world but committed in another feasible world to be judged in this world, so why not union with Christ from another feasible world that is not decreed in this world? Why must the decree of election and reprobation be a governing part of the decree if we can have counterfactual sins become introduced as relevant into the one decree of this world that doesn't include those sins?
As for Paul’s remarks, I think I am more in agreement with him. First, I have blogged on infant faith and men having faith while sleeping or becoming brain dead and remaining justified by faith. I distinguish between faith (as seed and habitus) and belief, the exercise of faith in propositions.
I'll let you have the last word if I don't believe I find anything substantially new in your rejoinder.
I appreciate the exchange.
RD
RON DIGIACOMO SAID:
ReplyDelete“I believe you reasoned from the existence of counterfactuals and actual moral intentions to judgment upon counterfactuals…You didn’t provide the link or implication of the intersection, or maybe I missed it. You just seemed to assume it exists as far as I can tell.”
Because I think it’s self-explanatory, I didn’t bother to explain it. I take certain passages of Scripture (which I’ve quoted) to indicate that God’s judgment extends to mental acts as well as physical acts. What we intend or imagine as well as what we do.
And what do mental acts cover? Well, they include intentions which eventuate in actions, but they also include intentions or fantasies which remain unexemplified.
Your objection would only go through if you restrict the scope of the verses to a subset of intentions that eventuate in actions. But there are basic problems with that move:
i) The verses don’t draw that distinction.
ii) And I don’t see any antecedent reason to so delimit their scope. Both Paul and I have given examples of what seem to be culpable (counterfactual) scenarios. And unless I missed something, I don’t see you directly rebut these examples. Rather, you use a blocking maneuver to deflect them by appealing to something else you take to be true (degrees of infernal punishment), which you deem to be incompatible with counterfactual judgment.
However:
a) I’ve responded to the limitations of your appeal to degrees of infernal punishment.
b) And I still don’t see why you and others balk at what seems to be pretty obvious examples of culpable counterfactuals.
Say a teenage boy, in the heat of the moment, plans to murder his dad. But he misses the bus by 5 minutes, so he must take a later bus. By the time he gets home, dad went out to go shopping. By the time dad returns home, the moment of murderous anger has passed.
A difference of 5 minutes would have made the difference between patricide and letting his father live.
But how is that a morally salient difference? That’s just an accident of timing. Is divine judgment so superficial that punishment is contingent on purely amoral factors like lucky timing?
“Why isn’t it plausible that God take the child’s life early without judging it for counterfactual sins?”
Seems to be you’ve bundled two issues into one. Take an adult reprobate. God might have non-punitive reasons to decree his death at 20 rather than 80. But even if God’s reasons for decreeing his death at a younger age are teleological rather than judicial, how the reprobate will be punished is a separate issue.
“So your position is a reductio only and not one you think is feasible in reality?”
I don’t know how you infer that from what I said. In Calvinism, counterfactuals are indexed to God’s omniscience and omnipotence. God’s ability to decree otherwise. God’s self-knowledge of what he can do, or refrain from doing.
“The counterfactual would presuppose a prolonged life wherein faith is exercised, just as the counterfactual you are positing deals with a prolonged life in which sins are committed.”
Since elect infants will exercise faith in heaven, counterfactual faith is superfluous in their case. So we don’t have to go there.
Cont. “You're positing counterfactual sins (in a prolonged life in a feasible world) for which a man is accountable in this world, so I am asking why then there can’t be counterfactual faith (in a prolonged life in a feasible world) for which a man is counted as righteous in this world. Please consider Steve, you wish to allow for judgment in this world due to sins that would be committed in a counterfactual decree, but not allow for grace and faith exercised within a counterfactual decree. That appears very arbitrary to me. Why can certain counterfactuals come into play in this world but not others? NOTE: You allow for sins not decreed in this world but committed in another feasible world to be judged in this world, so why not union with Christ from another feasible world that is not decreed in this world? Why must the decree of election and reprobation be a governing part of the decree if we can have counterfactual sins become introduced as relevant into the one decree of this world that doesn't include those sins?”
ReplyDeleteSeems to me you’re conflating two distinct issues:
i) In the actual world, counterfactual sins are the linear extension of what an actual reprobate baby would commit had he lived a normal lifespan, been presented with certain opportunities, &c.
Conversely, saving faith is the linear extension of an actual elect baby would exercise had he lived long enough in this world.
As a matter of fact, the elect baby will exercise actual faith in the afterlife.
So this involves an actual past, actual present, with an alternate future timeline that’s the logical outgrowth of the status quo ante.
ii) You seem to be shifting to possible worlds in which a dying reprobate baby in the real world has an elect counterpart in a possible world; conversely, a dying elect baby in the real world has a reprobate counterpart in a possible world.
But that’s a very different scenario. For that doesn’t take its inception with actual babies, but merely possible babies. An alternate history–past, present, and future. That’s not a logical extrapolation from a preexisting state.
“As for Paul’s remarks, I think I am more in agreement with him. First, I have blogged on infant faith and men having faith while sleeping or becoming brain dead and remaining justified by faith. I distinguish between faith (as seed and habitus) and belief, the exercise of faith in propositions.”
I agree with that distinction. However, your prooftexts aren’t commanding babies to exercise their habitus. Rather, that’s directed at adults.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteSteve,
ReplyDeleteAs I was considering this discussion at 3 a.m. while tossing and turning with the wind outside m window, I was thinking of this other matter below, which I didn't want to take time to unpack yesterday but will try to do so now.
I wrote: “Yes, although the paradigm could be coherent, it is not one that I find revealed to us in Scripture. If the professing atheist were to base his belief of the justice of infant damnation upon an unrevealed paradigm, he wouldn’t be basing it on God’s authority. He could actually be basing it upon something that isn’t even true. I don’t think it’s enough that the professing atheist believes in the justice of infant damnation. I think he is to believe it on God’s authority and the revealed premises of legal condemnation in Adam and that sin nature is sin.”
You responded with: "You’re raising an issue of apologetic methodology:
i) An atheist doesn’t believe anything on God’s authority. Therefore, you seem to be suggesting that we should never engage an atheist on specific objections to the faith. Rather, every objection should be redirected to a debate over the inspiration of Scripture."
It's not so much a matter of methodology. I'm fine with answering objections; it’s the solution you are willing to offer for the problem I take issue with. Let me try to explain. Aside from the authority issue, the actual conclusion by which the unbeliever would end up accepting infant damnation could be false. He could end up accepting infant damnation as being predicated upon counterfactual justice, and although that might work for him, he'd not only have no basis for accepting it (the authority issue, which I’m willing to table), it could be false. That is not to say that we ought not ever to believe as true those things that are not revealed to us. But, and here is the rub, when we do have revelation for something, like infant damnation, I don't think we should scratch behind the unbeliever's ears when we have revelational truth on the matter that can be definitively offered. In sum, I don't have an issue with handling objections by presupposing the unbeliever's presuppositions and reducing his position to absurdity. Nor, and this might surprise you, do I have an issue with trying to reconcile doctrines that are revealed to us, yet reconcile them according to reasoning that is not revealed to us. My issue is with offering unrevealed solutions when there are solutions that are revealed to us, though admittedly unpalatable for the unbeliever. It’s as if you’re saying we have a biblical basis for justice meted out on infants who die in infancy (that being concupiscence and Adam’s federal headship) but since it’s so unpalatable let’s allow for something that sounds more reasonable and could be true.
"Say a teenage boy, in the heat of the moment, plans to murder his dad. But he misses the bus by 5 minutes, so he must take a later bus. By the time he gets home, dad went out to go shopping. By the time dad returns home, the moment of murderous anger has passed.
ReplyDeleteA difference of 5 minutes would have made the difference between patricide and letting his father live.
But how is that a morally salient difference? That’s just an accident of timing. Is divine judgment so superficial that punishment is contingent on purely amoral factors like lucky timing?"
My simple answer to that is I believe the justice the person would get who was providentially hindered to commit the crime he fully intended to commit would be identical to the justice he would have received should he have been allowed to commit the murder. The justice for murder, however, would be predicated upon intent alone, (which is more than just a fantasy that he was not willing to carry out). Jesus took very seriously the intentions of the heart and if providence hinders acting out an intention, I don't see that the man would be less culpable for the sin he wanted to commit but couldn't. So, on that sort of scenario we agree on the degree of justice, or if you will the degree of penalty. We just don't seem to agree on the sin that would require the justice. I think the intent was enough for divine justice (as opposed to human justice) and that the carrying out of the actual intent is of no real consequence with respect to the degree of divine justice. (Obvioulsy magistrates must distinguish because they are not omniscient.)
Now of course that scenario is rather different than a baby who has not yet developed into having such intentions.
More later, maybe.
Ron