Does ice cream melt in hell?

Randall Rauser is currently on a tirade against Calvinism. I’ll quote and comment on what I take to be his primary arguments. I’ll also comment on a remark of JD’s.

And that young ordinand, if he’s worth his salt as a Calvinist, will appreciate this fact and embrace his own damnation as a possible means to the end of God being more fully glorified.

Well, that’s simpleminded.

i) To be a creature is to be a needy, dependent being. To some degree we naturally act in our own self-interest. That’s how we were made. We are not self-sufficient, physically or emotionally.

ii) Apropos (i), there’s a difference between what you deserve and what you desire. And that’s not inconsistent. I can sincerely believe I deserve my licks even though I also find the prospect personally repellant. The punishment, to be punitive, will be unpleasant. So the fact that I sincerely think I merit my comeuppance doesn’t mean I seek my comeuppance. I’m not a pain-freak. I’m not a masochist. So even if I think I deserve to suffer, that doesn’t mean I volunteer to suffer. Indeed, that's why I'm grateful that God spared me from such a fate. 

ii) And, of course, the damned don’t view things from God’s perspective. They don’t value justice. So Randall’s hypothetical is implicitly incoherent. Asking a Christian to assume the viewpoint of the damned. But if he in hell, he wouldn’t have a Christian viewpoint. Rather, he’s share the morally skewed outlook of the damned.

Think about the following two scenarios and ask yourself which would seem to be more glorifying to God:

Scenario 1: God wills that some of his creatures continue to reject his rule eternally. As a result they are subjected eternally to the most unimaginable tortures throughout which they either (a) continue to curse and spit at God or (b) will experience unimaginable remorse for their decisions but will be faced with the futility of their state.

Scenario 2: God wills that all his creatures repent and submit to his will. From this point on all follow God’s will perfectly and there is no more sin or suffering. Instead, everyone continues to grow in their knowledge and love of God and one another in perfect harmony.

Now why would anybody think the first scenario is more glorifying of God than the second? That is, why would someone think that God is somehow obliged to damn some people to unspeakable torment eternally in order to receive maximum glory?

Of course, Randall isn’t raising a serious question. He lacks the critical detachment to do so.

i) To begin with, why assume that damnation entails “unimaginable torture”?

ii) Does Calvinism state or imply, that God is “obligated” to damn anyone?

Unless and until Randall can have an adult conversation on these issues, there’s not much to talk about. He’s too pleased with himself, trying too hard to be a spiritual showoff, to honestly expound or evaluate the opposing position.

The standard answer is that the first outcome is on the whole preferable and more glorifying because it allows God to manifest the full range of his attributes in a deeper way than would otherwise be possible. This is because God can exercise his sovereign wrath at the same time that he manifests his merciful love by damning some and saving others. In this way those who are saved have a fuller apprehension of God’s goodness than would otherwise be possible.

This strikes me as bizarre and indefensible.

Of course, that’s not an argument. Rather, it’s his tendentious opinion.

But I’ll hold those comments for now and simply note that this interestingly makes God look like the ultimate utilitarian, that is as one for whom the end justifies the means.

That’s another simpleminded objection. Is it Randal’s position that the ends never justify the means? Instead of presenting a serious analysis, he resorts to catchy little slogans.

Of course there is one important deviation from previous utilitarian theories. Instead of the units of utilitarian exchange suggested in the past (e.g. pleasure or love) let’s think of the summum bonum as being units of divine glory. To parallel classic utilitarian terminology we can call units of God’s glory hedons and units of God’s unglory (for wont of a better term) dolors. All God has to do then is run the numbers and damn the right number required to maximize the greatest balance of hedons over dolors (thereby maximizing the divine glory). If that means damning all or none then he’d do it, but as it turns out the optimal number to manifest God’s glory is somewhere in the middle. And so that’s where we are.

Why think God has to strike a numerically precise balance? Doesn’t that miss the point? Miss the gratuity of grace?

A Calvinist can argue this way. Apparently many do. But let us not miss the irony, for if there is any ethical theory that is maligned among contemporary evangelical Christians it is utilitarianism. And yet God, we are to believe, is the ultimate utilitarian? Go figure.

I’m not a utilitarian, but even if his comparison held up (which is not the case), the irony only goes through if he presents a solid argument against utilitarianism. All he’s doing is to play to the prejudice of his readers.

Imagine an ice cream man who pulls up into the cul-de-sac on a hot summer day. Since we all believe God’s offer of salvation is a matter of grace rather than works, this ice cream man offers free ice cream cones. There are eight kids and, as it turns out, eight scoops of ice cream left in the truck.

i) Does Randal believe God’s offer of salvation is a matter of grace rather than works? But by Randal’s definition, doesn’t that render the transaction arbitrary? If God doesn’t love a sinner for something in themselves, then that “decimates” the love of God.

ii) Suppose we vary his illustration. Imagine an ice cream man who pulls up into the cul-de-sac where a rape-gang hangs out. There are eight members of the rape-gang and, as it turns out, eight scoops of ice cream left in the truck…

Does Randal’s illustration have the same lump-throated appeal when we swap out the cute little kids, and swap in the rape-gang?

To begin with, some argue that while God loves all people and thus “God loves you” is true for all, nonetheless God loves some people more than others and those he especially loves are those he saves. Meanwhile those he does not especially love he damns. Now this position raises some obvious questions including this: how can God love a person at all if God chooses to subject to unimaginable torture for eternity that person when he could save them with less effort than it takes me to wiggle my pinky finger?

i) Which is not my own position. That said, why does Randal find the idea that God loves some more than others outrageous? After all, he takes the position that unless God loves some more than others because some are more lovable than others, then that “decimates” the love of God. So, unless Randal imagines that everyone is equally lovable, why does he take exception to this version of Calvinism?

ii) I’d also add that if we were just judging by appearances, God sure seems to love some folks more than others. Even in this life, why do some folks draw the short straw while others draw the long straw? Why do some folks enjoy every conceivable advantage while others suffer every conceivable deprivation?

Of course, appearances can be deceptive, especially from our sublunary perspective. But since Randal isn’t arguing from Scripture, since Randal is resorting to sentimental appeals, then, at that level there’s no presumption that God loves everyone, or that he loves everyone equally.

The second view is that God loves the elect and hates the reprobate. This is a much more consistent position and it might seem to be a pretty good deal if you happen to be among the elect (but not so great if you’re one of the hated reprobate).

Traditionally, the love/hate language derives from Malachi. But let’s keep in mind that that’s a literary device: antithetical parallelism. The language is rhetorical and hyperbolic, not literal or emotive.

But it actually isn’t that great for the elect after all. Here’s why: the love God has for the elect is wholly arbitrary. And indeed it must be. If God chose to love the elect because there is something more loveable in them than the reprobate then the Calvinist would have become a Pelagian or at least a semi-Pelagian. And that is intolerable. To try to sell Pelagianism to a Calvinist is like trying to sell Kenny G T-shirts at a Metallica concert.

So it follows that those that God loves (the elect) are loved not for anything in themselves. God simply chooses to love them as an arbitrary expression of his will.

Several problems with that statement:

i) Randal did a sympathetic post on universalism. But isn’t indiscriminate love pretty indifferent? If you love everyone, love everyone equally, love everyone the same way, do you really love anyone in particular? At best, isn’t that a very superficial love? It isn’t personal.

ii) What makes Randal think election is purely arbitrary? Because mercy is arbitrary? Well, in a fundamental sense, that’s true. Mercy is shown to the undeserving.

What is Randal’s alternative? Does he think God is obligated to be merciful to the wicked?

Likewise, if God can only be loving if he loves you because you are so lovable, then Randal’s objection to Calvinism isn’t confined to Calvinism. He h’s repudiated most Christian traditions at that point.

iii) Is election purely “arbitrary”?

a) Election is unconditional in certain respects. God doesn’t elect someone because they merit election. He doesn’t elect them because he needs them. He doesn’t elect them because they are favorably disposed to his overtures.

b) On the other hand, if we’re going to speculate, God can have other reasons for choosing one person over another. He may choose George over John because he chooses one timeline over another. A reprobate George had a different life than his elect counterpart. Each life-story is unique. Moreover, the life of reprobate George has different consequences down the line.

Take the Joseph cycle. There’s a dialectical interplay between what one agent does, and what another agent does, or has happen to him. Cause and effect. If Joseph’s brothers hadn’t sold him into slavery, you’d have a different timeline.

Changing one variable can fan out in many different directions. It has a branching effect. The future may take a very different turn of events.

So one reason God may elect George rather than John is because George has a certain role to play in God’s story of the world. If George had a different role to play, if George didn’t exist, that would result in a different story. But that’s not the story that God has chosen to tell.

c) Moreover, this doesn’t mean that God can’t love the elect as individuals. After all, he made them. He made them in all their unique individuality.

d) Furthermore, does Randal think there’s something essentially defective about disinterested love?

JD says:

Sunday, February 20, 2011 at 12:10am

Calvinists often object that God is not obligated to love all people equally, and give as an illustration the fact that a man who loves his wife is not thereby obligated to love all women in the same way.

But of course there is a world of difference between having intense romantic love for one individual and a fairly dispassionate benevolence for others, and passionately loving some while damning the rest to hell. The appropriate analogy would be a man loving one woman as his wife and abusing the rest locked up in his basement.

That’s a dishonest depiction of Calvinism:

i) It disregards the issue of just desserts.

ii) It disregards the difference between retribution and sadism.

Is this really the best that JD can do?