Thursday, August 27, 2009

The Arminian lifeboat

BOSSMANHAM SAID:

“Gee Steve, that seems awful obtuse. Is the scientist responsible for what the monster does with its own free will? Just because the scientist knew what would happen doesn't mean he is responsible for decisions the monster made.”

If the consequences are foreseeable, then he shares responsibility with the monster.

Once again, you keep acting as though, if one party to a transaction is responsible, then that automatically absolves the other party.

Is it your position that if a mobster hires a hitman, only the hitman is responsible, and not the mobster?

“Perhaps the scientist knows the only way to have a real relationship with said monster is to grant it free will so that it can choose or choose otherwise.”

Yeah, I can just hear the defendant use that at trial: “Yes, I knew that if I made Frankenstein, he would go on a rampage, killing 50 innocent men, women, and children. But I wanted to have a relationship with Frankenstein, and that’s the unfortunate consequence which others had to pay for my relationship.”

“Upon doing this, the creator scientist abdicates any reponsibility of that monster's will when he gives it over to its own will.”

So you think people can knowingly set a chain-reaction in motion, then wash their hands of the consequences. Is that what Arminian morality amounts to? Do you think our social obligations are something we can abdicate whenever we please?

If our cruise ship ever hits an iceberg, remind me not to hop into the same lifeboat you occupy. You might slit my throat while I’m sleep and toss me overboard to make the rations go further.

“It seems like you're also stuck in the thinking that God had to have a temporal thought process before creation.”

Show where my argument depends on that assumption.

“Yet not responsible for the action, because the monster is the one who formulated and performed the action.”

False dichotomy. The mad scientist was a collaborator. He aided and abetted the crime when he knowingly created the monster.

“I never said there was, however, in the creation of volitional wills He created beings that could perform evil.”

To say they “could” perform evil doesn’t mean they “will” perform evil. If they truly have the freedom to do otherwise, then there’s a possible world in which they choose good over evil. So explain, on libertarian grounds, why God didn’t instantiate that world instead. God could have prevented evil without “violating” their libertarian freewill.

By the same token, if agents enjoy libertarian freedom, then having a genuine “relationship” with his creatures doesn’t require God to create sinners.

“Your two points don't change the fact that he uses the same argument as I do.”

Your selective appeal to Craig backfires since he takes other positions which undermine yours. You’d have to argue him down on those other points.

“That's not an accurate description of Molinism. It is the free wills of the agents that determine the way each possible world acts. God does choose which world to initiate, but that doesn't change the fact that it is still the human agent that has free will. To say their free will is taken away because God chooses only one possible world is ridiculous.”

They lack the freedom to do otherwise in the actual world. For an actual world actualizes one possibility to the exclusion of other possibilities. To say that’s “ridiculous” merely betrays your deficient powers of analysis.

“Like in Arminianism, God knows the actions of free agents because he foresees the action, not because Him foreseeing determines the action.”

If he foresees the outcome, then the outcome is inevitable.

“WLC certainly affirms free-will, although he may not be a full fledged LWF-er.”

But he doesn’t define freewill as the freedom to do otherwise, which is the definition that Arminians typically deploy against Calvinism. Indeed, that’s the definition you yourself continue to use.

“I never said God created sinners. In fact I specifically spoke against that notion.”

Once again, you’re being obtuse. If God creates a world containing sinners, he creates sinners in the process of making that world. Absent his creative fiat, sinners wouldn’t exist. They are the end-result of his creative fiat.

“That is determinism, Steve! If He creates agents who choose good over evil then those choices have been determined. He has created agents who only choose good. That isn't volition.”

I see that you have problems following the logic of your own position. So let’s walk you through it.

If you believe in libertarian freedom, and you define that freedom as the power to do otherwise (alternate possibilities), then there’s a possible world corresponding to each hypothetical outcome. There’s a possible world in which Brennon makes the right choice, and a possible world in which Brennon makes the wrong choice.

God can select which possible world to instantiate without “violating” your freewill. If you think the mere act of creating a world determines the outcome, and you reject that outcome, then you must deny that God was the Creator of the world.

Try to be logical, even if it hurts.

“God is good. His nature is what defines good. He is the objective good. He necessarily does good because He is good.”

If you think freewill is consistent with doing the right thing every time, then there’s a possible world in which human agents freely and invariably do the right thing. So God could prevent evil by instantiating that possible world without “violating” their freewill.

In fact, you’ve staked out an even stronger position. You’ve now said freewill is consistent with necessarily doing the right thing. In that case, freedom is consistent with determinism.

“This question is also loaded, since doing good or evil is not what makes us free, but the ability to do or do otherwise.”

Which would involve the ability to either do good or evil. If you can only do good, then you lack the freedom to do other than good, right?

“And I said knowing something will happen and allowing it to take place do not make you the cause of the actions of free creatures.”

God didn’t merely allow the outcome to happen, as if the world is self-existent.

“God is not the cause because He foresaw and created anyway. He is only the cause of the free agent.”

Which makes him a cofactor.

“So this makes God culpable for the acts of free agents how? God is the first cause of everything. Therefore He did create the potentiality for evil, in that without anything there would be no evil.”

In Arminian theology, God does more that merely create the potentiality for evil. He creates a world in which evil occurs. By creating a world with that foreseeable outcome, he makes the outcome inevitable.

“But God is not culpable for that evil because it originates outside of Him. It was not present at creation, it entered through the volitional wills of His creatures.”

Which he foresaw. But rather than prevent it, although he was free to do so, he brought it to pass.

“I never argued sin was inevitable. That's part of volitional will. Nothing made the Devil's sin inevitable. Nothing made Adam's sin inevitable. I haven't decided whether Adam's sin makes ours inevitable.”

If God sees a possible world containing evil, and he creates a possible world containing evil, then it’s inevitable that everything will happen in that world exactly as God saw (or foresaw) it happening. By actualizing that timeline, it’s certain to occur.

“In the very sentence you are responding to I specifically say God created things good. That means He created a world without a curse and cursed it because of the actions of Adam and Eve.”

God didn’t have to create an accursed world. Appealing to the curse fails to explain why God ever made such a world in the first place. Given the fall, God curses the fallen world. But the fall is not a given unless God chooses to create a world in which that takes place. The curse is contingent on the fall. The fall is a contingent event. Arminian theology doesn’t require God to make a world in which the fall occurs. So your explanation has no explanatory power. Try again.

“No I just think there are objectively good and bad things and how you feel about it when you do it doesn't matter.”

Motives are not synonymous with feelings. I take it that you’ve never studied ethics.

“But I stated two different actions. The similarity of a knife makes no difference. One action is healing, one is killing. One brings restored life, the other death. Healing is an action, killing is another action. I'm surprised at you, Steve, really. I never took you for a moral relativist before.”

You yourself distinguish the morality of the actions based on the motives of the agents. One intends to do good while the other intends to do harm. Try to be logical, even if it hurts.

“Nice attempt to put words in my mouth. I cited the reasoning Hitler used. Getting imperfections out of the gene pool is a good motive. The action of killing Jews is bad.”

So you think Jews are genetically defective?

“Your interpretation was maladroit. Just because you post on something doesn't mean the final infallible interpretation has been reached.”

Since you haven’t even dealt with the exegesis I posted, you’re blowing hot air.

“They weren't determined beforehand to be damned. God allowed them the choice.”

How is it more loving to allow them to damn themselves? According to the Bible, it’s better to never be born than to wind up in hell. And since, according to Arminianism, God didn’t need to create any hellbound sinners, why would a loving God produce that avoidable outcome?

“Just because God allows something doesn't mean He wants it to happen.”

How far are you prepared to take that principle? Are you saying that God didn’t want to make the world, but his hands were tied? He had no choice?

“Puppets give the appearance of animate objects when a puppeteer sticks their hand in it. Similar to what Calvinism has God doing with us. My point is this world is a farce if determinism is true.”

So, if determinism is true, then human beings are inanimate objects? That’s a very idiosyncratic definition of “inanimate.”

“You can't seem to get it into your head that God foreknows things because they will happen.”

Show where my argument depends on that assumption.

31 comments:

  1. "creates just the potential for evil?"

    Why did Arminians bother to tell Calvinists to go read Olson so that we didn't argue against Arminian myths anymore? When we run to Olson here's what we find:

    According to Olsen, God doesn't ordain sins, but "every human act, including sin, is impossible without God's cooperation" (Arminian Theology, 121).

    According to Olson: “God is the first cause of whatever happens; even a sinful act cannot occur without God as its first cause…” (122)

    Olson also says:

    "In other words, whatever happens, including sin, is at least allowed by God, but if it is positively evil, and not only evil to a mistaken understanding, it is not authored or authorized by God. God permits [sin and evil] 'designedly and willingly', but not efficaciously" (Olson 121).

    "Rather, God not only allows evil designedly and willingly, ... but [God] also cooperates [with evil and sinful acts] without being stained by the guilt of sin" (olson 122).

    "For someone to lift his or her hand requires God's concurrance, God loans, as it were, the power sufficient to lift a hand, and without God's cooperation even such a trivial act would be impossible." (Olson, 117). [switch out hand for a rapist's erect penis]

    "sin requires the divine concurrance, which is necessary to produce every act; because nothing whatever can have any entity except from the First and Cheif Being, who immediately produces that entity. The concurrance of God is not his immediate inful into a second inferior cause, but it is an action of God immediately flowing into the effect of the creature, so that the same effects in one and the same entire action may be produced simultaneously by God and creature." - Jacob Arminius in Arminian Theology, Olson, p.122

    "However, in the case of sinful or evil acts, whereas the same event is produced by both God and the human being, the guilt is not transferred to God, because God is the effecter of the act but only the permitter of the sin itself." (122).

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  2. I almost responded to this on the last post, so I figure I will respond to it here.

    BSman said:
    ---
    You can't seem to get it into your head that God foreknows things because they will happen.
    ---

    This kind of foreknowledge is pointless. If I put "The Matrix" DVD on right now, I know the ending to the movie so I foreknow how it will play out. But that foreknowledge affects exactly nothing that goes on in the film.

    Furthermore, I'd like to point out that if God ordains only that which He foreknows, then the Arminian is stuck with God's ordaining being as relevant as, well, Zeus ordaining anything. If God foreknows X will occur, it will occur regardless of whether God ordains anything--therefore, God's ordaining is like adding a zero to the equation. Instead of 2 + 2 = 4 we have 2 + 2 + 0 = 4. But that's the same 0 that you, me, and Zeus add in to the equation. So really, there's no difference between an Arminian God's ordaining something and the atheist's view of what God ordains.

    On the other hand, if one is to argue that God does have some kind of impact because of His ordaining, then you can no longer say that God's foreknowledge precedes His ordaining. For in that case, what God foresees is contingent upon what He ordains will come to pass, and not the other way around. In other words, if God foresees X, but X cannot occur unless God ordains X, then God must first ordain X before He can foresee X. Actually, the very existence of X in such a scenario presupposes that God has already ordained it to come to pass.

    So the Arminian can either have a God with non-existent ordaining power (no different than under atheism), or else the Arminian must admit that Calvinists are right when they say God's foreknowledge is based on His ordaining what will come to pass.

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  3. "You can't seem to get it into your head that God foreknows things because they will happen."

    How? Can't the creature always "do otherwise" right up until he makes the choice?

    Also, if, as Olson teaches us, nothing can happen unless God causes it and cooperates with it, then the thing that "happened" was a thing God caused prior to it happening and cooperated with it so that it could happen? Whatever he knew would happen he caused it to happen so why would the thing cause his knowledge when he caused the thing in the first place? Did he cause it in ignorance? That's a problem of evil.

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  4. Moreover, if the Arminian God's ordaining is dependent upon what he foreknows, then he couldn't ordain anything and the world would never have been created.

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  5. If the consequences are foreseeable, then he shares responsibility with the monster.

    Once again, you keep acting as though, if one party to a transaction is responsible, then that automatically absolves the other party.


    Steve, we have to assume that there is a difference between our interpersonal relationships with each other and God's relationship with us as creator. Since God has sovereign rights over His creation, He can create free agents, allow them to sin (while not causing them to sin), and hold them accountable for their actions. He can also intervene at times if He so pleases. He has rights over His creation that we do not have over each other (i.e. it is not wrong for God to take a life, since He gave life, while it is wrong for us to take a life, etc.). So I think the analogy breaks down at this point.

    It is wrong for us to allow a murder if we know about it. But it is not wrong for God as creator to allow it. God has these rights as creator.

    But there is also a marked difference between God allowing the sin of His creatures and causing the sin of His creatures.

    So you think people can knowingly set a chain-reaction in motion, then wash their hands of the consequences

    I think this fails in paralleling what God did. If everything in this world were simply a "chain reaction" then you are correct and determinism is true. There is nothing you can do to prevent a chain reaction once started.

    The Bible shows us that our actions as creatures can change our destinies. There are countless examples. God was going to destroy Israel, then Moses interceded and God relented. God would have destroyed Nineveh if they had not responded to Jonah's teaching.

    Do you think our social obligations are something we can abdicate whenever we please?

    No we don't. God, as creator, has the right to do with His creation as He pleases. In determinism, we have to blame God for making us want to abdicate social obligations when we do.

    If our cruise ship ever hits an iceberg, remind me not to hop into the same lifeboat you occupy. You might slit my throat while I’m sleep and toss me overboard to make the rations go further.

    Yes that's right, Steve. What a wonderful and logical deduction you have made from the evidence.

    The mad scientist was a collaborator. He aided and abetted the crime when he knowingly created the monster.

    The scientist in your example isn't the creator of the universe, either. If this scientist were all powerful and all knowing and had created everything else as well, then he has the right to do what He wills with His creation.

    So explain, on libertarian grounds, why God didn’t instantiate that world instead.

    You're acting like I'm a Molinist. But, to answer like a Molinist would, there may not have been a possible world where that would happen. Furthermore, you are again assuming determinism since you are suggesting that God could create this world where people could not sin, therefore this world was determined to be sinless.

    God could have prevented evil without “violating” their libertarian freewill.

    You're assuming that. There very well could have been no possible way for that to happen.

    By the same token, if agents enjoy libertarian freedom, then having a genuine “relationship” with his creatures doesn’t require God to create sinners.

    Again, Steve, you assume your determinism every step of the way, and again I will say that God did not create Adam and Eve in a state of sin.

    Your selective appeal to Craig backfires since he takes other positions which undermine yours.

    I dunno, I've been listening to Craig a lot lately and don't hear much we disagree on.

    If he foresees the outcome, then the outcome is inevitable.

    You again assume your determinism. It doesn't happen because He foresees it, He foresees it because it will happen.

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  6. then there’s a possible world corresponding to each hypothetical outcome

    That's philosophical gobbledy goop. This world isn't based on hypotheticals, it's based on reality. People have real choices that lead to real actions. These "hypothetical worlds" you speak of don't exist.

    And again, even if there were, there may be no possible world where volition exists and there is no sin.

    God can select which possible world to instantiate without “violating” your freewill.

    In selecting one world or another, God has in effect determined the choice you have made, making this just another form of your determinism.

    Try to be logical, even if it hurts.

    You aren't representing my view in any of these examples, so your logic doesn't begin to follow mine (even if it weren't so flawed to begin with) so it doesn't hurt in the least.

    then there’s a possible world in which human agents freely and invariably do the right thing

    Again, there is no logical necessity that is true. There quite possibly is no "possible world" that could happen in. But again we're not dealing with the "possible worlds." We're dealing with the real one.

    You’ve now said freewill is consistent with necessarily doing the right thing

    No I actually didn't. You're now just putting words in my mouth, which in essence makes this debate useless, since you're now just debating yourself.

    Free-will isn't the ability to do whatever you want. God doesn't act contrary to His nature. Man, in our fallen state, cannot come to God of our own volition. That doesn't keep either party from choosing or choosing otherwise. There are simply things we can't choose because they aren't possible.

    Which would involve the ability to either do good or evil. If you can only do good, then you lack the freedom to do other than good, right?

    Not every choice is between good and evil. So no, only doing good doesn't makes you lack the ability to do evil. Babies who die early never had the chance to perform or think evil deeds, for instance. Those babies could choose to cry or choose to drink milk or choose to sleep.

    How far are you prepared to take that principle? Are you saying that God didn’t want to make the world, but his hands were tied? He had no choice?

    That conclusion doesn't become necessary.

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  7. Bossmanham: "He can create free agents, allow them to sin (while not causing them to sin)"

    Roger Olson: “God is the first cause of whatever happens; even a sinful act cannot occur without God as its first cause…” (122)

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  8. Bossmanham,

    I was hoping that you could interact more with your view of foreknowledge.

    If God foreknows because something will happen would this not restrict His knowledge of said event/choice? It appears that this view makes God dependent on man when it comes to this knowledge of event/choice, but it also would have God learn.

    It makes God dependent on man in that the event/choice could not be foreseen before it actually happened and once it happened then all God could do is try to work with it or around it. Another way to say it, there would be nothing for God to foreknow if nothing has happened and in this way you limit what God foreknows until after the fact. I’m struggling to see how this is not a shadow of Open Theism.

    Grace & Peace,

    Mitch

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  9. Brennon said:
    ---
    Steve, we have to assume that there is a difference between our interpersonal relationships with each other and God's relationship with us as creator. Since God has sovereign rights over His creation, He can create free agents, allow them to sin (while not causing them to sin), and hold them accountable for their actions. He can also intervene at times if He so pleases. He has rights over His creation that we do not have over each other (i.e. it is not wrong for God to take a life, since He gave life, while it is wrong for us to take a life, etc.). So I think the analogy breaks down at this point.
    ---

    This argument gives away the farm without you even realizing it. On the one hand you recognize that there's a difference between what God can do and what man can do (something we Calvinists have been arguing for quite some time). On the other hand, you have no reason to assert that that difference extends only to allowing sin and not to causing sin (to use your terms).

    If God can allow sin without being culpable while we, doing the same thing, would be culpable, then what reason do you have to say that God cannot CAUSE sin just because we cannot cause sin without being culpable ourselves? (Since you have a problem with comprehension, I am not arguing that God does cause sin; I am asking for the non-arbitrary reason you have to rule it out given your above statements.)

    Because basically what's happened so far is that you, being an Arminian, have argued that God cannot predestine sins because if we, being human, did so then we'd be held accountable for it. Steve shows a counter example of things that God does that we would be held accountable for if we did it, and you say that there is a difference between God and man. Do you not see how that response destroys your original argument?

    Put bluntly, if I said "God causes sins in the worst possible definition that Arminians can apply to those words, yet He is not culpable because there is a difference between God and man that means He can do so while we cannot" then how can you possibly argue against that when it is exactly the argument you've put forth just now?

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  10. Peter, you're missing the point. Allowing us to sin and not preventing it is obviously (to most) far different than causing us to sin in a way we can't avoid it and holding us culpable for that sin.

    If you want to say that God allowing His free creatures to sin "in some way" make Him the author of sin, then I can live with that. That certainly doesn't do justice to the Biblical account, however, and certainly is not the
    "same", in any sense, as the "authorship" involved in Calvinism.

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  11. bossmanham,

    "It is wrong for us to allow a murder if we know about it. But it is not wrong for God as creator to allow it. God has these rights as creator."

    Wasn't the monster analogy about showing that God is responsible for what he knowingly sets into motion and allows to happen? Not that God is wrong to do it?

    You're saying here that it's not wrong for God to do, because he has that right. (Similarly, he has the right to strike someone dead directly.) But he's still responsible.

    He's responsible for striking someone dead with lightning, but not wrong to do it.

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  12. Mitch,

    If God foreknows because something will happen would this not restrict His knowledge of said event/choice? It appears that this view makes God dependent on man when it comes to this knowledge of event/choice, but it also would have God learn.

    In a sense, God's knowledge of the event is contingent that the event is actually going to happen. Otherwise God would know the event is not going to happen. It's also inaccurate to say that God "learns" of the event, since all knowledge is eternally in God's possession. He has known all events from eternity, so there is no way He learns of an event He knows of.

    I also hope that shows how this is not Open Theism.

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  13. Bill Manata,

    Wonderful quote mining. Olson also says, "Arminius argued that when God has permitted an act, God never denies concurrence to a rational and free creature. for that would be contradictory. In other words, once God decides to permit an act, even a sinful one, he cannot consistently withhold the power to commit it. However, in the case of sinful or evil acts, whereas the same event is produced by both God and the human being, the guilt of the sin is not transferred to God, because God is the effecter of the act but only the permitter of the sin itself."

    It's part of Arminius' view on divine concurrence that I'm not sure I agree with. Not all Arminians agree with each other 100%, similar to Calvinists.

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  14. Bossmanham: "Allowing us to sin and not preventing it is obviously (to most) far different than causing us to sin in a way we can't avoid it and holding us culpable for that sin."

    Roger Olson: "every human act, including sin, is impossible without God's cooperation" (Arminian Theology, 121).

    “God is the first cause of whatever happens; even a sinful act cannot occur without God as its first cause…” (122)

    "Rather, God not only allows evil designedly and willingly, ... but [God] also cooperates [with evil and sinful acts] without being stained by the guilt of sin" (olson 122).

    "For someone to lift his or her hand requires God's concurrance, God loans, as it were, the power sufficient to lift a hand, and without God's cooperation even such a trivial act would be impossible." (Olson, 117). [switch out hand for a rapist's erect penis]

    "sin requires the divine concurrance, which is necessary to produce every act; because nothing whatever can have any entity except from the First and Cheif Being, who immediately produces that entity. The concurrance of God is not his immediate inful into a second inferior cause, but it is an action of God immediately flowing into the effect of the creature, so that the same effects in one and the same entire action may be produced simultaneously by God and creature." - Jacob Arminius in Arminian Theology, Olson, p.122

    "However, in the case of sinful or evil acts, whereas the same event is produced by both God and the human being, the guilt is not transferred to God, because God is the effecter of the act but only the permitter of the sin itself." (122).

    ////////////

    Bill: If we switched out "God" with "Brennen" would not this be considered "to most" morally reprehensible?

    You also missed Peter's point. If what would be sinful for man to do is not when God does it for the Arminian, why does he all of a sudden reason the opposite way when it comes to Calvinism? What possible argument can he give that shows that God's ordaining whatsoever comes to pass makes God immoral?

    Can Brennen meat this argument instead of dodging it and saying.

    Brennan has also been given defeaters for his timelessness view of foreknowledge yet refuses to address them. Undefeated defeaters means he doesn't know that timelessness can reconcile freedom and foreknowledge. As it currently stands, Brennan view lacks sufficient positive epistemic status for him, for him to ascribe the honorific title 'knowledge' to his position.

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  15. Jug,

    He's responsible for striking someone dead with lightning, but not wrong to do it.

    I agree. But He's not culpable for the sin of creatures He has created, just as the parents of a child are not responsible for the sins of the child. As Greg Koukl writes, "the parallel between you and God is precise. You do know that your child is going to do some things wrong. The only difference between you and God in this case is that God knows the particular things that every one of His children is going to do wrong. You don't know the particulars, but you know it's inevitable. If it is true that God is morally responsible for what His children do because He knows in advance, then it is also true that you're morally responsible. But if it's true that you're not morally responsible because you know in advance, then it's also true that God is not responsible. That's why I argue that neither is morally responsible because the wild card, in a sense, in this discussion is free moral agency."

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  16. bossmanham said...

    Bill Manata,

    Wonderful quote mining. Olson also says, "Arminius argued that when God has permitted an act, God never denies concurrence to a rational and free creature. for that would be contradictory. In other words, once God decides to permit an act, even a sinful one, he cannot consistently withhold the power to commit it. However, in the case of sinful or evil acts, whereas the same event is produced by both God and the human being, the guilt of the sin is not transferred to God, because God is the effecter of the act but only the permitter of the sin itself."

    It's part of Arminius' view on divine concurrence that I'm not sure I agree with. Not all Arminians agree with each other 100%, similar to Calvinists.

    8/27/2009 12:58 PM


    I know what Olson says, I read the book, unlike you. In fact, I've read it more than once.

    Calvinists never deny concurrance to the creature either, Brennan.

    Furthermore, that is incidental to my point. My point is that almost everyone would consider a human who did that to be immoral.

    I also know that Olson says that the guilt is not transferred. I quoted that. The point is that Olson had to make a caveat. Why? Because to most people this seems immoral if a human were to do it.. So, when a sui generous being engages in a sui generous act, we shouldn't judge it by normal standards.

    Well, likewise the Calvinist God. You have no non-arbitrary argument in terms of which you can critique the Calvinist God. For although he ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and willingly permits evil acts, the guilt does not transfer.

    Moreoever, if you disagree with Olson and Arminius then you need to present a positive case whereby we can see how you get around the problems. it is clear you sense the problems given your hesitence to back Olson and Arminius. Same with Open Theists. So, I never said you had to agree, but then you need to present your views on concurrance and providence.

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  17. "you know it's inevitable?"

    And since God knows all the particulars, then everything you do "is inevitable". Enter Arminian fatalism.

    Furthermore, the situation is different. God knows that you will do an evil act unless he intervenes, and he also has the power to interve and not let it occur.

    If you knew your child would sin in a particular way unless you intervened, and you failed to intervene, then YOU would have some moral responsibility.

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  18. Bossmanham,

    I fear that really doesn’t answer my question, but it could be that I’m not understanding you correctly.

    You say that it is inaccurate to say that God “learns” of the event/choice because He knows all events/choices from eternity, but doesn’t that mean that before there ever was a murderer or rapist that it was first in the mind of God?

    I thought you tried to get around this by saying that God foreknows what will happen. Yet before mankind existed God knew all events/choices.

    The point that I labor to make is that before You, mankind, existed there was nothing for God to know. So when you say that God foreknows an event/choice it is because He saw it happen. I took that to mean that there was a point where God did not know the event/choice until He “saw” it. Now it seems that you are saying that God has known all events/choices before mankind was created, so could it not be reasonable to say that God is responsible for all events/choices? After all with that view all events/choices originated in God.

    Forgive my hurried typing and thoughts, I’m trying to multitask and fear that I am not very good at it.

    Grace & Peace

    Mitch

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  19. Manata,

    I know what Olson says, I read the book, unlike you. In fact, I've read it more than once.

    I will never understand the hubris you display. I have read the book, and I read that chapter through a couple of times in order to understand the implications of Arminius' idea. I think you allow your preconceived deterministic ideas to taint your reading.

    Calvinists never deny concurrance to the creature either, Brennan.

    I never said you did, Puppet.

    I also know that Olson says that the guilt is not transferred. I quoted that. The point is that Olson had to make a caveat

    Actually, Olson is describing Arminius' idea. The caveat would be Arminius'. If you'd really read the book instead of quote mining you would know that.

    For although he ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and willingly permits evil acts, the guilt does not transfer.

    I think it does. If the act originated in the mind of God (as it does in determinism) instead of the mind of the creature (in Arminianism) then the one who initiates the act is at fault. Arminius' concurrence is God has already decided to permit the act that originates in the mind of the creature. Therefore, He provides the creature the ability to commit the act. The act still originates in the will of the creature.

    I won't interact with you beyond this, due to your vulgar and un-Christian like statements.

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  20. Mitch,

    but doesn’t that mean that before there ever was a murderer or rapist that it was first in the mind of God?

    This is the problem with thinking of God in a temporal state. If you mean that God knows of the event, then it is in the mind of God. If we mean the idea originates there, I would have to disagree. The idea of sin originates in the mind of the creature. God knows of it because of that.

    I thought you tried to get around this by saying that God foreknows what will happen. Yet before mankind existed God knew all events/choices.

    And knowing about an event is dependent on the event happening. If an event isn't going to happen, how could someone know about it?

    The point that I labor to make is that before You, mankind, existed there was nothing for God to know.

    I think you're misunderstanding what is being said. God knows about everything that will ever happen. Since God decided to create, even before creation (which we can't talk about in temporal terms because time didn't exist before the universe existed) God knew about everything that ever would happen in the creation He would create.

    So when you say that God foreknows an event/choice it is because He saw it happen

    Since God stands outside of time, He is not constrained by the natural flow of the time in this world.

    I hope that clears things up.

    God bless.

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  21. This is the problem with thinking of God in a temporal state.

    The only ones thinking of God in a temporal state are you and your fellow Arminians. We're talking about logical, not temporal order.

    If you mean that God knows of the event, then it is in the mind of God. If we mean the idea originates there, I would have to disagree. The idea of sin originates in the mind of the creature. God knows of it because of that.

    If it is in the mind of the creature AND it is an indeterminate object of knowledge, then it can't be known by God. It can't even be known by the creature until it becomes a determinate object of knowledge.

    Tell, us BSman, how does God know all counterfactuals if all such counterfactuals of freedom are (a) grounded in the minds of the agents and (b) indeterminate objects of knowledge?

    Appealing to the timelessness of God does not help you, for God knowing them still depends on their instantiation, but that would mean they are determinate, not indeterminate objects of knowledge. Nobody denies God knows determinate objects of knowledge...the question is related to indeterminate objects of knowledge...objects of knowledge that have not been instantitated and are, by nature, indeterminate.

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  22. In a sense, God's knowledge of the event is contingent that the event is actually going to happen. Otherwise God would know the event is not going to happen. It's also inaccurate to say that God "learns" of the event, since all knowledge is eternally in God's possession. He has known all events from eternity, so there is no way He learns of an event He knows of.

    This directly attacks the independence of God.

    1. God knows of all events...CONTINGENT that they actually occur.

    ...so God is dependent on these events coming to pass to have His knowledge.

    2. So, God does learn of them, insofar as His knowledge depends on them.

    3. And if contingent on these events occurring...He is dependent on determinate objects of knowledge for his knowledge.

    4. So, we're back to the question...how does God know the outcomes of indeterminate objects of knowledge without them coming to pass?

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  23. This directly attacks the independence of God.

    1. God knows of all events...CONTINGENT that they actually occur.

    ...so God is dependent on these events coming to pass to have His knowledge.


    If they aren't going to come to pass, then God would know they aren't going to come to pass. I don't see the problem with the knowledge of an actual event being predicated on that event happening. Otherwise there is no event to know!

    So, God does learn of them, insofar as His knowledge depends on them.

    No, He never lacked the knowledge of the actual event. So He can't gain knowledge He already has. I feel like I'm repeating myself...a lot.

    how does God know the outcomes of indeterminate objects of knowledge without them coming to pass?

    Knowledge of an event does not equal determination of that event.

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  24. Brennon,

    You are not even reading what I write before you respond. It is quite frustrating trying to dialogue with you when you don't even bother to read what someone says before you spout off your talking points.

    As it stands, "Bill" understood my point, so I'll just quote him:
    ---
    If what would be sinful for man to do is not when God does it for the Arminian, why does he all of a sudden reason the opposite way when it comes to Calvinism?
    ---

    In other words, here's the flow of what's happened.

    1. Calvinists say "God can do X and not be culpable for it even though if humans did X humans WOULD be culpable for it."

    For this, X = "ordain sin."

    2. You respond: "That's not right. If we would be guilty for doing it, then so too must God be guilty for doing it."

    3. Steve then points out a bunch of things that God has done which, if you had done, would make you culpable. (For that matter, I listed some of them too in my previous post on evil.)

    4. Then you say: "God can do X and not be culpable for it even though if humans did X humans WOULD be culpable for it."

    X = "allows sin."

    But the structure of 4 is IDENTICAL to the structure of 1, the very point you originally argued against with 2.

    Now if you really don't see why this would be problematic, then I don't see much point in a continued discussion.

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  25. Bossmanham,

    The point that I'm not making clearly is that in order for
    God to know an event/choice that is instatiated by someone/something other than Him then that someone/something has to exist.

    Yet you say that God knew all events/choices before that someone/something existed. The question is how do you justify this?

    Trying to be clear, when you say that the event/choice originates in the mind of the creature first, I do not understand how that would work since God's knowledge is prior logiczlly to the creature being real.

    So in a way you not only make God dependent on His creation, but you also make Him "learn" after the fact.

    Grace & Peace,

    Mitch

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  26. Brennan,

    I don't believe you've read the book and if you did I don't think you read it well. This isn't hubris, it is my opinion based on how well you read these commentgs and the reasoning ability you display here. I know you disagree, so let's leave it at that.

    "Actually, Olson is describing Arminius' idea. The caveat would be Arminius'. If you'd really read the book instead of quote mining you would know that.

    It's also Olson's idea, Brennan. Olson is offering his position as well, Brennan. This would be clear to you if you read other works by Olson, Brennan. Like his contribution to the Perspectives on the Doctrine of God, for example, Brennan.

    I said: For although he ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and willingly permits evil acts, the guilt does not transfer.

    Brennan said: I think it does.

    So?

    " If the act originated in the mind of God (as it does in determinism) instead of the mind of the creature (in Arminianism) then the one who initiates the act is at fault. Arminius' concurrence is God has already decided to permit the act that originates in the mind of the creature."

    This is sloppy, Brennan. The *act* didn't "originate in any mind."

    Try and spell this out better.

    Furthermore, Arminius goes further that just "deciding to permit the act that originated in the mind of the creature" (sloppy language aside). For example, Arminius says that God CAUSED and PRODUCED the thought in the mind. Furthermore, the act could not take place unless God COOPERATED with the sinner.

    I see you ignored my argument. If we took God out of all that Arminius and Olson says and replaced it with Brennan, would Brennan be responsible according to any human understanding of moral responsibility?" Yes. But the "guilt doesn't transfer." So, you have yet to show how you can non arbitrarilly call the Calvinist God evil or immoral when you yourself have to admit that on any conception of moral responsibility, if you participated and cooperated and caused and evil act, that you foreknew would happen unless you intervened, and you had the power to intervene and stop it, you would be held responsible and morally blameworthy. You have yet to answer this to the satisfaction of anyone here. You are simply digging in your heels and saying that your conception of God somehow makes him not morally blameworthy but this doesn't work for the Calvinist.

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  27. If they aren't going to come to pass, then God would know they aren't going to come to pass. I don't see the problem with the knowledge of an actual event being predicated on that event happening. Otherwise there is no event to know!

    The problem here is that you are saying, in effect, that God's knowledge of the world is dependent on the events in this world coming to pass.

    That means, Brennon, that God's knowledge of the world, namely what we would call "the future" is dependent on determinate objects of knowledge.

    So, how can God know counterfactual possibilities if the objects of knowledge in question are both (a)indeterminate and (b) never come to pass.

    You've painted yourself into a corner...on the one hand God has all knowledge...on the other His knowledge depends on determinate objects of knowledge. How can God know the alternative outcomes in toto? Merely saying "because they didn't come to pass and x event did" doesn't help you, because you've got to account for the indeterminate nature of the objects of knowledge. How can God know indeterminate objects of knowledge w/o them coming to pass?

    I don't see the problem with the knowledge of an actual event being predicated on that event happening. Otherwise there is no event to know!


    There isn't...for determinate objects of knowledge. But that's not what I'm inquiring about.

    No, He never lacked the knowledge of the actual event. So He can't gain knowledge He already has. I feel like I'm repeating myself...a lot.

    Really? So, what about alternate possibilities...possible worlds, etc.? These are all indeterminate objects of knowledge.

    Telling us that God knows events because they come to pass expresses a truism. Big deal..so what...we already know that. But we're talking about God's knowledge of indeterminate objects of knowledge...WITHOUT them coming to pass.

    Further, if you deny foreordination...which you certainly deny...then you have God not only knowing these determinate objects of knowledge, but dependent on these objects of knowledge...and that, Brennon, directly attacks the independence of God...God would have no knowledge of these events w/o them occurrring, and you attribute their occurrence not to God's decree, but to man's action. Ergo, God depends on man.

    That's the logical outcome of your position.

    Knowledge of an event does not equal determination of that event.

    Try to understand what we are saying...if you say that God depends on the actualization of an object of knowledge then that requires the determination of that event. Once it has been actualized, Brennon, that is what we call a determinate object of knowledge...whether by God or byt the creature, the action has been determined, and you have right here stated that God's knowledge depends on the those events having come to pass, ergo, knowledge depends on determination.

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  28. Besides that Gene, Brennan's Ockhamist solution doesn't do the work he thinks it does.

    If we grant that "if God created a world where we really have libertarian free will and yet he foreknows every event that happens in that world, then while he foreknows that we will do X we could have done otherwise than X. If we had done otherwise than X and done Y instead then God would have foreknown that," this doesn't show that S can do otherwise (quote taken from Arminian Robert/henry/Sockpuppet). So, even granting that if S did otherwise than A, say, A*, then God would have believed instead that S would A*, this does nothing to show that S can do otherwise than A.

    Suppose I fail to refute Brennan because I instead am rendered paralyzed from drinking anti-freeze. Then it is true that had I refuted Brennan, I wouldn't have been rendered paralyzed from drinking anti-freeze. But none of this changes the fact that given the ways things stand (i.e., God's belief, the actual world, the current state of affairs) I could not refute Brennan.

    It is considerations like this that render the Ockhamist solution implausible. Of course the above can be fleshed out more and I can pull from the arguments contained in the journals, but the basic point made is sound enough, I trust. This is why top-notch libertarian thinkers like Widerkere, Hunt, Zagbeski, Hasker,. Rhoda, etc., find the Ockhamist solution implausible at best.

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  29. Is Dave Hunt a top-notch libertarian thinker?

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  30. Bill was referring to a philosopher, not the hack who debated James White.

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  31. Bossmanham:

    In a sense, God's knowledge of the event is contingent that the event is actually going to happen. Otherwise God would know the event is not going to happen.

    So God's knowledge is causally dependent on events actually obtaining? Is that an orthodox Arminian view? And God has no knowledge of counterfactuals, since they don't actually obtain? Is that an orthodox Arminian view? And God has contingent parts (the parts of his knowledge which are causally dependent on events in creation)? Is that also an orthodox Arminian view?

    It's also inaccurate to say that God "learns" of the event, since all knowledge is eternally in God's possession. He has known all events from eternity, so there is no way He learns of an event He knows of.

    Well, if God doesn't learn, in your view, then you appear to be committed to an even more outrageous notion:

    1. God does not gain knowledge (from bossmanham; assumed for the sake of argument).

    2. Some of God's knowledge is causally dependent on created events (from bossmanham; assumed for the sake of argument).

    3. Therefore, some of God's knowledge is gained by him causally consequent to created events obtaining (restatement of (2); note: not chronologically consequent).

    4. But God does not gain knowledge (from (1)).

    5. Therefore, all of God's knowledge is gained by him causally consequent to created events obtaining.

    6. But God does not gain knowledge.

    7. Therefore, either God exists eternally causally consequent to created events obtaining; or

    8. God does not exist.

    Since God stands outside of time, He is not constrained by the natural flow of the time in this world.

    Time is not at issue here; only causality. Causality does not require time at all.

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