tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post2491790199838960780..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: The Arminian lifeboatRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger31125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-65482540174448736772009-08-27T23:26:17.983-04:002009-08-27T23:26:17.983-04:00Bossmanham:
In a sense, God's knowledge of th...Bossmanham:<br /><br /><em>In a sense, God's knowledge of the event is contingent that the event is actually going to happen. Otherwise God would know the event is not going to happen. </em><br /><br />So God's knowledge is causally dependent on events actually obtaining? Is that an orthodox Arminian view? And God has no knowledge of counterfactuals, since they don't actually obtain? Is that an orthodox Arminian view? And God has contingent parts (the parts of his knowledge which are causally dependent on events in creation)? Is that also an orthodox Arminian view?<br /><br /><em>It's also inaccurate to say that God "learns" of the event, since all knowledge is eternally in God's possession. He has known all events from eternity, so there is no way He learns of an event He knows of.</em><br /><br />Well, if God doesn't learn, in your view, then you appear to be committed to an even more outrageous notion:<br /><br />1. God does not gain knowledge (from bossmanham; assumed for the sake of argument).<br /><br />2. Some of God's knowledge is causally dependent on created events (from bossmanham; assumed for the sake of argument).<br /><br />3. Therefore, some of God's knowledge is gained by him causally consequent to created events obtaining (restatement of (2); note: not <em>chronologically</em> consequent).<br /><br />4. But God does not gain knowledge (from (1)).<br /><br />5. Therefore, all of God's knowledge is gained by him causally consequent to created events obtaining.<br /><br />6. But God does not gain knowledge.<br /><br />7. Therefore, either God exists eternally causally consequent to created events obtaining; or<br /><br />8. God does not exist.<br /><br /><em>Since God stands outside of time, He is not constrained by the natural flow of the time in this world.</em><br /><br />Time is not at issue here; only causality. Causality does not require time at all.Dominic Bnonn Tennanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103838704540924679noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-88516683695134900042009-08-27T22:16:57.232-04:002009-08-27T22:16:57.232-04:00Bill was referring to a philosopher, not the hack ...Bill was referring to a philosopher, not the hack who debated James White.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-36880170968178105452009-08-27T21:57:02.574-04:002009-08-27T21:57:02.574-04:00Is Dave Hunt a top-notch libertarian thinker?Is Dave Hunt a top-notch libertarian thinker?Vytautashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10563655929016752682noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-80044326457222717022009-08-27T21:45:18.769-04:002009-08-27T21:45:18.769-04:00Besides that Gene, Brennan's Ockhamist solutio...Besides that Gene, Brennan's Ockhamist solution doesn't do the work he thinks it does.<br /><br />If we grant that "if God created a world where we really have libertarian free will and yet he foreknows every event that happens in that world, then while he foreknows that we will do X we could have done otherwise than X. If we had done otherwise than X and done Y instead then God would have foreknown that," this doesn't show that S can do otherwise (quote taken from Arminian Robert/henry/Sockpuppet). So, even granting that if S did otherwise than A, say, A*, then God would have believed instead that S would A*, this does nothing to show that S can do otherwise than A.<br /><br />Suppose I fail to refute Brennan because I instead am rendered paralyzed from drinking anti-freeze. Then it is true that had I refuted Brennan, I wouldn't have been rendered paralyzed from drinking anti-freeze. But none of this changes the fact that given the ways things stand (i.e., God's belief, the actual world, the current state of affairs) I could not refute Brennan.<br /><br />It is considerations like this that render the Ockhamist solution implausible. Of course the above can be fleshed out more and I can pull from the arguments contained in the journals, but the basic point made is sound enough, I trust. This is why top-notch libertarian thinkers like Widerkere, Hunt, Zagbeski, Hasker,. Rhoda, etc., find the Ockhamist solution implausible at best.Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-18505235123009911742009-08-27T21:14:51.580-04:002009-08-27T21:14:51.580-04:00If they aren't going to come to pass, then God...<i>If they aren't going to come to pass, then God would know they aren't going to come to pass. I don't see the problem with the knowledge of an actual event being predicated on that event happening. Otherwise there is no event to know!</i><br /><br />The problem here is that you are saying, in effect, that God's knowledge of the world is dependent on the events in this world coming to pass.<br /><br />That means, Brennon, that God's knowledge of the world, namely what we would call "the future" is dependent on determinate objects of knowledge.<br /><br />So, how can God know counterfactual possibilities if the objects of knowledge in question are both (a)indeterminate and (b) never come to pass.<br /><br />You've painted yourself into a corner...on the one hand God has all knowledge...on the other His knowledge depends on determinate objects of knowledge. How can God know the alternative outcomes in toto? Merely saying "because they didn't come to pass and x event did" doesn't help you, because you've got to account for the indeterminate nature of the objects of knowledge. How can God know indeterminate objects of knowledge w/o them coming to pass?<br /><br /><i>I don't see the problem with the knowledge of an actual event being predicated on that event happening. Otherwise there is no event to know!<br /></i><br /><br />There isn't...for determinate objects of knowledge. But that's not what I'm inquiring about.<br /><br /><i>No, He never lacked the knowledge of the actual event. So He can't gain knowledge He already has. I feel like I'm repeating myself...a lot.</i><br /><br />Really? So, what about alternate possibilities...possible worlds, etc.? These are all indeterminate objects of knowledge.<br /><br />Telling us that God knows events because they come to pass expresses a truism. Big deal..so what...we already know that. But we're talking about God's knowledge of indeterminate objects of knowledge...WITHOUT them coming to pass.<br /><br />Further, if you deny foreordination...which you certainly deny...then you have God not only knowing these determinate objects of knowledge, but dependent on these objects of knowledge...and that, Brennon, directly attacks the independence of God...God would have no knowledge of these events w/o them occurrring, and you attribute their occurrence not to God's decree, but to man's action. Ergo, God depends on man.<br /><br />That's the logical outcome of your position. <br /><br /><i>Knowledge of an event does not equal determination of that event.</i><br /><br />Try to understand what we are saying...if you say that God depends on the actualization of an object of knowledge then that requires the determination of that event. Once it has been actualized, Brennon, that is what we call a determinate object of knowledge...whether by God or byt the creature, the action has been determined, and you have right here stated that God's knowledge depends on the those events having come to pass, ergo, knowledge depends on determination.GeneMBridgeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10504383610477532374noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-32951526715404990782009-08-27T21:00:24.975-04:002009-08-27T21:00:24.975-04:00Brennan,
I don't believe you've read the ...Brennan,<br /><br />I don't believe you've read the book and if you did I don't think you read it well. This isn't hubris, it is my opinion based on how well you read these commentgs and the reasoning ability you display here. I know you disagree, so let's leave it at that.<br /><br /><i>"Actually, Olson is describing Arminius' idea. The caveat would be Arminius'. If you'd really read the book instead of quote mining you would know that.</i><br /><br />It's also Olson's idea, Brennan. Olson is offering his position as well, Brennan. This would be clear to you if you read other works by Olson, Brennan. Like his contribution to the Perspectives on the Doctrine of God, for example, Brennan.<br /><br />I said: For although he ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and willingly permits evil acts, the guilt does not transfer.<br /><br />Brennan said: I think it does.<br /><br />So?<br /><br /><i>" If the act originated in the mind of God (as it does in determinism) instead of the mind of the creature (in Arminianism) then the one who initiates the act is at fault. Arminius' concurrence is God has already decided to permit the act that originates in the mind of the creature."</i><br /><br />This is sloppy, Brennan. The *act* didn't "originate in any mind."<br /><br />Try and spell this out better.<br /><br />Furthermore, Arminius goes further that just "deciding to permit the act that originated in the mind of the creature" (sloppy language aside). For example, Arminius says that God CAUSED and PRODUCED the thought in the mind. Furthermore, the act could not take place unless God COOPERATED with the sinner.<br /><br />I see you ignored my argument. <b>If we took God out of all that Arminius and Olson says and replaced it with Brennan, would Brennan be responsible according to any human understanding of moral responsibility?"</b> Yes. But the "guilt doesn't transfer." So, you have yet <i>to show</i> how you can <i>non arbitrarilly</i> call the Calvinist God evil or immoral <i>when you yourself have to admit that on any conception of moral responsibility, if <b>you</b> participated and cooperated and caused and evil act, that you foreknew would happen unless you intervened, and you had the power to intervene and stop it, you would be held responsible and morally blameworthy</i>. You have yet to answer this to the satisfaction of anyone here. You are simply digging in your heels and saying that your conception of God somehow makes him not morally blameworthy but this doesn't work for the Calvinist.Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-9227671469285542692009-08-27T20:57:49.125-04:002009-08-27T20:57:49.125-04:00Bossmanham,
The point that I'm not making cle...Bossmanham,<br /><br />The point that I'm not making clearly is that in order for <br />God to know an event/choice that is instatiated by someone/something other than Him then that someone/something has to exist. <br /><br />Yet you say that God knew all events/choices before that someone/something existed. The question is how do you justify this?<br /><br />Trying to be clear, when you say that the event/choice originates in the mind of the creature first, I do not understand how that would work since God's knowledge is prior logiczlly to the creature being real. <br /><br />So in a way you not only make God dependent on His creation, but you also make Him "learn" after the fact. <br /><br />Grace & Peace,<br /><br />MitchMitchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02362366468793301910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-21636467320257726412009-08-27T20:42:39.580-04:002009-08-27T20:42:39.580-04:00Brennon,
You are not even reading what I write be...Brennon,<br /><br />You are not even reading what I write before you respond. It is quite frustrating trying to dialogue with you when you don't even bother to read what someone says before you spout off your talking points.<br /><br />As it stands, "Bill" understood my point, so I'll just quote him:<br />---<br />If what would be sinful for man to do is not when God does it for the Arminian, why does he all of a sudden reason the opposite way when it comes to Calvinism? <br />---<br /><br />In other words, here's the flow of what's happened.<br /><br />1. Calvinists say "God can do X and not be culpable for it even though if humans did X humans WOULD be culpable for it."<br /><br />For this, X = "ordain sin."<br /><br />2. You respond: "That's not right. If we would be guilty for doing it, then so too must God be guilty for doing it."<br /><br />3. Steve then points out a bunch of things that God has done which, if you had done, would make you culpable. (For that matter, I listed some of them too in my previous post on evil.)<br /><br />4. Then you say: "God can do X and not be culpable for it even though if humans did X humans WOULD be culpable for it."<br /><br />X = "allows sin."<br /><br />But the structure of 4 is <i>IDENTICAL</i> to the structure of 1, the very point you originally argued against with 2.<br /><br />Now if you really don't see why this would be problematic, then I don't see much point in a continued discussion.Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-35169975195412238212009-08-27T20:31:00.884-04:002009-08-27T20:31:00.884-04:00This directly attacks the independence of God.
1....<i>This directly attacks the independence of God.<br /><br />1. God knows of all events...CONTINGENT that they actually occur.<br /><br />...so God is dependent on these events coming to pass to have His knowledge.</i><br /><br />If they aren't going to come to pass, then God would know they aren't going to come to pass. I don't see the problem with the knowledge of an actual event being predicated on that event happening. Otherwise there is no event to know!<br /><br /><i>So, God does learn of them, insofar as His knowledge depends on them.</i><br /><br />No, He never lacked the knowledge of the actual event. So He can't gain knowledge He already has. I feel like I'm repeating myself...a lot.<br /><br /><i>how does God know the outcomes of indeterminate objects of knowledge without them coming to pass?</i><br /><br />Knowledge of an event does not equal determination of that event.bossmanhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14787721955360743058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1302204863977284472009-08-27T19:24:59.078-04:002009-08-27T19:24:59.078-04:00In a sense, God's knowledge of the event is co...<i>In a sense, God's knowledge of the event is contingent that the event is actually going to happen. Otherwise God would know the event is not going to happen. It's also inaccurate to say that God "learns" of the event, since all knowledge is eternally in God's possession. He has known all events from eternity, so there is no way He learns of an event He knows of.</i><br /><br />This directly attacks the independence of God.<br /><br />1. God knows of all events...CONTINGENT that they actually occur.<br /><br />...so God is dependent on these events coming to pass to have His knowledge.<br /><br />2. So, God does learn of them, insofar as His knowledge depends on them.<br /><br />3. And if contingent on these events occurring...He is dependent on determinate objects of knowledge for his knowledge.<br /><br />4. So, we're back to the question...how does God know the outcomes of indeterminate objects of knowledge without them coming to pass?GeneMBridgeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10504383610477532374noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-50463323916581317452009-08-27T19:20:35.558-04:002009-08-27T19:20:35.558-04:00This is the problem with thinking of God in a temp...<i>This is the problem with thinking of God in a temporal state. </i><br /><br />The only ones thinking of God in a temporal state are you and your fellow Arminians. We're talking about logical, not temporal order.<br /><br /><i>If you mean that God knows of the event, then it is in the mind of God. If we mean the idea originates there, I would have to disagree. The idea of sin originates in the mind of the creature. God knows of it because of that.</i><br /><br />If it is in the mind of the creature AND it is an <b>indeterminate</b> object of knowledge, then it can't be known by God. It can't even be known by the creature until it becomes a determinate object of knowledge.<br /><br />Tell, us BSman, how does God know all counterfactuals if all such counterfactuals of freedom are (a) grounded in the minds of the agents and (b) indeterminate objects of knowledge?<br /><br />Appealing to the timelessness of God does not help you, for God knowing them still depends on their instantiation, but that would mean they are determinate, not indeterminate objects of knowledge. Nobody denies God knows determinate objects of knowledge...the question is related to indeterminate objects of knowledge...objects of knowledge that have not been instantitated and are, by nature, indeterminate.GeneMBridgeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10504383610477532374noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-71079040049187097252009-08-27T18:28:54.971-04:002009-08-27T18:28:54.971-04:00Mitch,
but doesn’t that mean that before there ev...Mitch,<br /><br /><i>but doesn’t that mean that before there ever was a murderer or rapist that it was first in the mind of God?</i><br /><br />This is the problem with thinking of God in a temporal state. If you mean that God knows of the event, then it is in the mind of God. If we mean the idea originates there, I would have to disagree. The idea of sin originates in the mind of the creature. God knows of it because of that.<br /><br /><i>I thought you tried to get around this by saying that God foreknows what will happen. Yet before mankind existed God knew all events/choices.</i><br /><br />And knowing about an event is dependent on the event happening. If an event isn't going to happen, how could someone know about it?<br /><br /><i>The point that I labor to make is that before You, mankind, existed there was nothing for God to know.</i><br /><br />I think you're misunderstanding what is being said. God knows about everything that will ever happen. Since God decided to create, even before creation (which we can't talk about in temporal terms because time didn't exist before the universe existed) God knew about everything that ever would happen in the creation He would create.<br /><br /><i>So when you say that God foreknows an event/choice it is because He saw it happen</i><br /><br />Since God stands outside of time, He is not constrained by the natural flow of the time in this world.<br /><br />I hope that clears things up.<br /><br />God bless.bossmanhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14787721955360743058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-62203416274514802912009-08-27T18:19:09.692-04:002009-08-27T18:19:09.692-04:00Manata,
I know what Olson says, I read the book, ...Manata,<br /><br /><i>I know what Olson says, I read the book, unlike you. In fact, I've read it more than once.</i><br /><br />I will never understand the hubris you display. I have read the book, and I read that chapter through a couple of times in order to understand the implications of Arminius' idea. I think you allow your preconceived deterministic ideas to taint your reading. <br /><br /><i>Calvinists never deny concurrance to the creature either, Brennan.</i><br /><br />I never said you did, Puppet.<br /><br /><i>I also know that Olson says that the guilt is not transferred. I quoted that. The point is that Olson had to make a caveat</i><br /><br />Actually, Olson is describing Arminius' idea. The caveat would be Arminius'. If you'd really read the book instead of quote mining you would know that.<br /><br /><i>For although he ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and willingly permits evil acts, the guilt does not transfer.</i><br /><br />I think it does. If the act originated in the mind of God (as it does in determinism) instead of the mind of the creature (in Arminianism) then the one who initiates the act is at fault. Arminius' concurrence is God has already decided to permit the act that originates in the mind of the creature. Therefore, He provides the creature the ability to commit the act. The act still originates in the will of the creature.<br /><br />I won't interact with you beyond this, due to your vulgar and un-Christian like statements.bossmanhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14787721955360743058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-4179286389561597362009-08-27T15:18:38.711-04:002009-08-27T15:18:38.711-04:00Bossmanham,
I fear that really doesn’t answer my ...Bossmanham,<br /><br />I fear that really doesn’t answer my question, but it could be that I’m not understanding you correctly.<br /><br />You say that it is inaccurate to say that God “learns” of the event/choice because He knows all events/choices from eternity, but doesn’t that mean that before there ever was a murderer or rapist that it was first in the mind of God?<br /><br />I thought you tried to get around this by saying that God foreknows what will happen. Yet before mankind existed God knew all events/choices. <br /><br />The point that I labor to make is that before You, mankind, existed there was nothing for God to know. So when you say that God foreknows an event/choice it is because He saw it happen. I took that to mean that there was a point where God did not know the event/choice until He “saw” it. Now it seems that you are saying that God has known all events/choices before mankind was created, so could it not be reasonable to say that God is responsible for all events/choices? After all with that view all events/choices originated in God. <br /><br />Forgive my hurried typing and thoughts, I’m trying to multitask and fear that I am not very good at it.<br /><br />Grace & Peace<br /><br />MitchMitchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02362366468793301910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-85171322429786129972009-08-27T15:11:26.285-04:002009-08-27T15:11:26.285-04:00"you know it's inevitable?"
And sin..."you know it's inevitable?"<br /><br />And since God knows all the particulars, then everything you do "is inevitable". Enter Arminian fatalism.<br /><br />Furthermore, the situation is different. God knows that you will do an evil act <i>unless he intervenes</i>, and he also has the power to interve and not let it occur. <br /><br />If you knew your child would sin in a particular way unless you intervened, and you failed to intervene, then YOU would have some moral responsibility.Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-47531459153690636242009-08-27T15:08:38.807-04:002009-08-27T15:08:38.807-04:00bossmanham said...
Bill Manata,
Wonderful quote ...bossmanham said...<br /><br />Bill Manata,<br /><br />Wonderful quote mining. Olson also says, "Arminius argued that when God has permitted an act, God never denies concurrence to a rational and free creature. for that would be contradictory. In other words, once God decides to permit an act, even a sinful one, he cannot consistently withhold the power to commit it. However, in the case of sinful or evil acts, whereas the same event is produced by both God and the human being, the guilt of the sin is not transferred to God, because God is the effecter of the act but only the permitter of the sin itself."<br /><br />It's part of Arminius' view on divine concurrence that I'm not sure I agree with. Not all Arminians agree with each other 100%, similar to Calvinists.<br /><br />8/27/2009 12:58 PM<br /><br /><br />I know what Olson says, I read the book, unlike you. In fact, I've read it more than once.<br /><br />Calvinists never deny concurrance to the creature either, Brennan.<br /><br />Furthermore, that is incidental to my point. My point is that <i>almost everyone</i> would consider <i>a human</i> who did that to be immoral.<br /><br />I also know that Olson says that the guilt is not transferred. I quoted that. The point is that Olson <i>had to make a caveat</i>. Why? <i>Because to most people this seems immoral if a human were to do it</i>.. So, when a sui generous being engages in a sui generous act, we shouldn't judge it by <i>normal</i> standards.<br /><br />Well, <i>likewise</i> the Calvinist God. You have no non-arbitrary argument in terms of which you can critique the Calvinist God. For although he ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and willingly permits evil acts, <i>the guilt does not transfer</i>.<br /><br />Moreoever, if you disagree with Olson and Arminius then <i>you need to present a positive case whereby we can see how you get around the problems</i>. it is clear you sense the problems given your hesitence to back Olson and Arminius. Same with Open Theists. So, I never said you had to agree, but then you need to present your views on concurrance and providence.Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-86526784757555305872009-08-27T15:02:07.186-04:002009-08-27T15:02:07.186-04:00Jug,
He's responsible for striking someone de...Jug,<br /><br /><i>He's responsible for striking someone dead with lightning, but not wrong to do it.</i><br /><br />I agree. But He's not culpable for the sin of creatures He has created, just as the parents of a child are not responsible for the sins of the child. As Greg Koukl writes, "the parallel between you and God is precise. You do know that your child is going to do some things wrong. The only difference between you and God in this case is that God knows the particular things that every one of His children is going to do wrong. You don't know the particulars, but you know it's inevitable. If it is true that God is morally responsible for what His children do because He knows in advance, then it is also true that you're morally responsible. But if it's true that you're not morally responsible because you know in advance, then it's also true that God is not responsible. That's why I argue that neither is morally responsible because the wild card, in a sense, in this discussion is free moral agency."bossmanhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14787721955360743058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-33239082107006278212009-08-27T14:59:57.785-04:002009-08-27T14:59:57.785-04:00Bossmanham: "Allowing us to sin and not preve...Bossmanham: "Allowing us to sin and not preventing it is obviously (to most) far different than causing us to sin in a way we can't avoid it and holding us culpable for that sin."<br /><br />Roger Olson: "every human act, including <b>sin, is impossible without God's cooperation</b>" (Arminian Theology, 121).<br /><br />“God is the first cause of whatever happens; even <b>a sinful act cannot occur without God as its first cause</b>…” (122)<br /><br />"Rather, God not only allows evil designedly and willingly, ... but <b>[God] also cooperates [with evil and sinful acts]</b> without being stained by the guilt of sin" (olson 122).<br /><br />"For someone to lift his or her hand requires God's concurrance, God loans, as it were, the power sufficient to lift a hand, and without God's cooperation even such a trivial act would be impossible." (Olson, 117). <b>[switch out hand for a rapist's erect penis]</b><br /><br />"<b>sin requires the divine concurrance, which is necessary to produce every act</b>; because nothing whatever can have any entity except from the First and Cheif Being, who immediately <b>produces</b> that entity. The concurrance of God is not his immediate inful into a second inferior cause, but it is an action of God immediately flowing into the effect of the creature, so that the same effects in one and the <b>same entire action may be produced simultaneously by God</b> and creature." - Jacob Arminius in Arminian Theology, Olson, p.122<br /><br />"However, in the case of <b>sinful or evil acts</b>, whereas the same event <b>is produced by</b> both <b>God</b> and the human being, the guilt is not transferred to God, because God is the effecter of the act but only the permitter of the sin itself." (122).<br /><br />////////////<br /><br />Bill: If we switched out "God" with "Brennen" would not this be considered "to most" morally reprehensible? <br /><br />You also missed Peter's point. If <b>what would be sinful for man to do is not when God does it for the Arminian, why does he all of a sudden reason the opposite way when it comes to Calvinism? What possible argument can he give that shows that God's ordaining whatsoever comes to pass makes God immoral?</b><br /><br />Can Brennen meat this argument instead of dodging it and saying.<br /><br />Brennan has also been given defeaters for his timelessness view of foreknowledge yet refuses to address them. Undefeated defeaters means he doesn't know that timelessness can reconcile freedom and foreknowledge. As it currently stands, Brennan view lacks sufficient positive epistemic status for him, for him to ascribe the honorific title 'knowledge' to his position.Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-41536825649112641522009-08-27T14:58:42.428-04:002009-08-27T14:58:42.428-04:00Bill Manata,
Wonderful quote mining. Olson also s...Bill Manata,<br /><br />Wonderful quote mining. Olson also says, "Arminius argued that when God has permitted an act, God never denies concurrence to a rational and free creature. for that would be contradictory. In other words, once God decides to permit an act, even a sinful one, he cannot consistently withhold the power to commit it. However, in the case of sinful or evil acts, whereas the same event is produced by both God and the human being, the guilt of the sin is not transferred to God, because God is the effecter of the act but only the permitter of the sin itself."<br /><br />It's part of Arminius' view on divine concurrence that I'm not sure I agree with. Not all Arminians agree with each other 100%, similar to Calvinists.bossmanhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14787721955360743058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-24850828305651656072009-08-27T14:46:20.599-04:002009-08-27T14:46:20.599-04:00Mitch,
If God foreknows because something will ha...Mitch,<br /><br /><i>If God foreknows because something will happen would this not restrict His knowledge of said event/choice? It appears that this view makes God dependent on man when it comes to this knowledge of event/choice, but it also would have God learn.</i><br /><br />In a sense, God's knowledge of the event is contingent that the event is actually going to happen. Otherwise God would know the event is not going to happen. It's also inaccurate to say that God "learns" of the event, since all knowledge is eternally in God's possession. He has known all events from eternity, so there is no way He learns of an event He knows of.<br /><br />I also hope that shows how this is not Open Theism.bossmanhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14787721955360743058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-38162880367897334012009-08-27T14:46:10.652-04:002009-08-27T14:46:10.652-04:00bossmanham,
"It is wrong for us to allow a m...bossmanham,<br /><br />"<i>It is wrong for us to allow a murder if we know about it. But it is not wrong for God as creator to allow it. God has these rights as creator.</i>"<br /><br />Wasn't the monster analogy about showing that God is <i>responsible</i> for what he knowingly sets into motion and allows to happen? Not that God is <i>wrong</i> to do it?<br /><br />You're saying here that it's not <i>wrong</i> for God to do, because he has that right. (Similarly, he has the right to strike someone dead directly.) But he's still responsible.<br /><br />He's responsible for striking someone dead with lightning, but not wrong to do it.Jugulumhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09932658890162312549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-32917442692448642822009-08-27T14:36:45.944-04:002009-08-27T14:36:45.944-04:00Peter, you're missing the point. Allowing us t...Peter, you're missing the point. Allowing us to sin and not preventing it is obviously (to most) far different than causing us to sin in a way we can't avoid it and holding us culpable for that sin.<br /><br />If you want to say that God allowing His free creatures to sin "in some way" make Him the author of sin, then I can live with that. That certainly doesn't do justice to the Biblical account, however, and certainly is not the <br />"same", in any sense, as the "authorship" involved in Calvinism.bossmanhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14787721955360743058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-29722217852672827182009-08-27T14:25:08.292-04:002009-08-27T14:25:08.292-04:00Brennon said:
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Steve, we have to assume that th...Brennon said:<br />---<br />Steve, we have to assume that there is a difference between our interpersonal relationships with each other and God's relationship with us as creator. Since God has sovereign rights over His creation, He can create free agents, allow them to sin (while not causing them to sin), and hold them accountable for their actions. He can also intervene at times if He so pleases. He has rights over His creation that we do not have over each other (i.e. it is not wrong for God to take a life, since He gave life, while it is wrong for us to take a life, etc.). So I think the analogy breaks down at this point.<br />---<br /><br />This argument gives away the farm without you even realizing it. On the one hand you recognize that there's a difference between what God can do and what man can do (something we Calvinists have been arguing for quite some time). On the other hand, you have no reason to assert that that difference extends only to allowing sin and not to causing sin (to use your terms).<br /><br />If God can allow sin without being culpable while we, doing the same thing, would be culpable, then what reason do you have to say that God cannot <i>CAUSE</i> sin just because we cannot cause sin without being culpable ourselves? (Since you have a problem with comprehension, I am not arguing that God does cause sin; I am asking for the non-arbitrary reason you have to rule it out given your above statements.)<br /><br />Because basically what's happened so far is that you, being an Arminian, have argued that God cannot predestine sins because if we, being human, did so then we'd be held accountable for it. Steve shows a counter example of things that God does that we would be held accountable for if we did it, and you say that there is a difference between God and man. Do you not see how that response destroys your original argument?<br /><br />Put bluntly, if I said "God causes sins in the worst possible definition that Arminians can apply to those words, yet He is not culpable because there is a difference between God and man that means He can do so while we cannot" then how can you possibly argue against that when it is <i>exactly</i> the argument you've put forth just now?Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-22133579249014826492009-08-27T14:19:36.925-04:002009-08-27T14:19:36.925-04:00Bossmanham,
I was hoping that you could interact ...Bossmanham,<br /><br />I was hoping that you could interact more with your view of foreknowledge.<br /><br />If God foreknows because something will happen would this not restrict His knowledge of said event/choice? It appears that this view makes God dependent on man when it comes to this knowledge of event/choice, but it also would have God learn. <br /><br />It makes God dependent on man in that the event/choice could not be foreseen before it actually happened and once it happened then all God could do is try to work with it or around it. Another way to say it, there would be nothing for God to foreknow if nothing has happened and in this way you limit what God foreknows until after the fact. I’m struggling to see how this is not a shadow of Open Theism.<br /><br />Grace & Peace,<br /><br />MitchMitchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02362366468793301910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-42052269473111546172009-08-27T13:49:36.193-04:002009-08-27T13:49:36.193-04:00Bossmanham: "He can create free agents, allow...Bossmanham: "He can create free agents, allow them to sin (while not causing them to sin)"<br /><br />Roger Olson: “God is the first cause of whatever happens; even a sinful act cannot occur without God as its first cause…” (122)Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.com