“I will now turn my attention to theological noncognitivism. This is the view that theological terms (such as ‘God’ and ‘the supernatural’) are non-sensical, and cannot even be entertained as concepts. I will focus here on the term ‘God’ as defined and used by Steve Hays, one of the Triabloggers….But what is mind? By taking the human mind to be aspatial, Steve is refusing to locate it in the human brain. Yet, Steve says that neuroscientists, by studying the brain, can study ‘manifestations’ of the human mind. This implies that the human mind is at least in some way spatial.”
http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2009/01/argument-for-theological-noncognitivism.html
i) It implies nothing of the kind. Abstract objects like numbers can be manifested in time and space. This doesn’t imply that numbers are spatial or temporal.
ii) Keep in mind that this isn’t a dividing point between theist and atheist. For example, Platonic realism is a live option in mathematics. Many mathematicians, even if they reject Platonic realism, would never say that Platonic realism is nonsensical. That abstract objects can’t even be entertained as concepts.
A number of secular philosophers have argued for the existence of abstract objects. Can these philosophers not even form a concept of their own position?
Streitfeld’s argument is not simply with me, the Christian, at this point, but with any thinker, theistic or atheistic, who believes in timeless and/or spaceless entities.
iii) Incidentally, there’s nothing extraordinary about the experience of remote awareness. By Streitfeld’s logic, if I stub my big toe, then my consciousness must reside in my toe since I feel pain in my toe.
iv) Apropos (iii), case studies in parapsychology furnish more dramatic examples of remote awareness.
“Generally, when we think of the mind, we think of thought. Minds are thinking things. But thought takes time. That is presumably why Steve says that the human mind is temporal.”
No, I say the human mind is temporal because successive mental states are a feature of human cognition.
“Yet, this would preclude the possibility of there being an atemporal mind.”
That begs the question of whether temporal succession is an essential feature of mentality, rather than an incidental feature of finite minds.
“Steve also says that God does not interact with or respond to the physical world, which is both spatial and temporal. (We may pause to note that the Bible offers many examples of God interacting with spatio-temporal events; e.g., God is depicted as engaging Job in conversation. This runs contrary to Steve’s usage.)”
Of course, I’ve already discussed this issue in relation to open theism. The fact that God effects a conversation with Job doesn’t mean the divine agent must enter into time to cause a temporal effect.
If you play computer chess, you are, in a roundabout sense, playing chess with the computer programmer. Yet you’re not directly interacting with the computer programmer when you play computer chess. He doesn’t occupy your time and space at the time you play chess. He’s not sitting across the table from you. He’s not waiting for you to make a move before he makes a countermove. Indeed, he may be dead by the time you play computer chess.
Streitfeld has such a simpleminded grasp of elementary issues.
“Steve also says that God ‘can instantiate any compossible state of affairs.’ Steve is here coupling the term ‘God’ with the verb ‘instantiate.’ Like all dynamic verbs (as opposed to stative verbs), ‘instantiate’ denotes an action. To instantiate something is to do something. Actions are events. Thus, God cannot instantiate anything. This is a contradiction in Steve’s usage.”
i) Streitfeld fails to distinguish between cause and effect. The fact that the effect is temporal doesn’t entail the temporality of the cause. A cause is not necessarily an event. Rather, the cause is a cause of an event. Some causes are prior events, but it doesn’t follow that every cause is, itself, an event.
ii) For one thing, that depends on your theory of causation. A counterfactual theory of causation doesn’t require temporal precedence.
iii) The secular philosopher and physicist Quentin Smith has argued that time itself is the temporal effect of a timeless cause. Ironically, Streitfeld won’t even allow a fellow atheist like Smith to present an atheistic cosmology. That would be “nonsensical.”
“For example, the sentence ‘God loves mankind’ indicates that God maintains some feelings about mankind. The maintaining of feelings requires time. God thus cannot maintain any feelings, or any state of affairs whatsoever.”
Streitfeld fails to distinguish between popular usage and technical usage. In ordinary language we use tensed verbs to express God’s attitude towards humanity.
However, if we wish to express ourselves with greater theological or philosophical precision, we can eliminate tense from our description. For a timeless God, there was never a time when he didn’t love the elect. But this isn’t synonymous with the claim that God loves the elect at all the times or all of the time. Rather, time is not a factor. God’s love is literally timeless.
"I will now turn my attention to theological noncognitivism. This is the view that theological terms (such as ‘God’ and ‘the supernatural’) are non-sensical, and cannot even be entertained as concepts."
ReplyDeleteDoes he give his theory of meaning anywhere?
Good question!
ReplyDeleteUnlike Steve, I try to notify people when I respond to their arguments.
ReplyDeleteHere's my response:
Steve says, “there’s nothing extraordinary about the experience of remote awareness. By Streitfeld’s logic, if I stub my big toe, then my consciousness must reside in my toe since I feel pain in my toe.”
Remote awareness has nothing to do with my argument.
Steve also says, ““Abstract objects like numbers can be manifested in time and space.”
The issue here is in what you mean by the term “manifestation.” “Manifestation” is another word for “materialization.” If something materializes, it comes into physical existence. Thus, if there are manifestations of some X, then X has come into physical existence.
Now, Steve says there are physical manifestations of numbers and minds. That means there are physical materializations of numbers and minds. In other words, there are physical things—events, processes, what have you—which we can call “numbers” and “minds.”
So, Steve, please point us to a physical mind. Is it in the brain?
Steve says I have “begged the question of whether temporal succession is an essential feature of mentality, rather than an incidental feature of finite minds.”
My point was that, as the term “mind” is commonly understood (as thinking thing), it implies temporality. Thought implies temporality. Now Steve wants to suggest that temporality may be only an incidental feature of finite minds. If we dispense with temporality, we dispense with thinking. What notion of mind do we have left?
Steve? What is the definition of a mind, stripped of incidentals?
Now, let’s get to the real meat here. The mind stuff has nothing to do with the argument for theological noncognitivism, after all.
Steve says, “The fact that God effects a conversation with Job doesn’t mean the divine agent must enter into time to cause a temporal effect.”
A conversation occurs between two or more entities over time. It requires that all involved parties produce speech and respond to the speech of others. By putting the word “effects” in italics, Steve is hoping to convince us that God’s conversation with Job was somehow special. God was not actually responding to any of Job’s words. God simply made the conversation happen. But, if God wasn’t an active part of the conversation, why does the Bible make it look like He was? Why call it a conversation at all, since a conversation involves interaction?
Steve mentions playing chess with a computer, suggesting that we should think of Job’s conversation with God as a conversation with a computer. So, the God as depicted in the Bible was actually a computer that the real God created so that it could effect interactions with people without having to be there. Is that what Steve is suggesting?
The Bible depicts God, not a computer, talking to Job. So this computer analogy is not persuasive.
When God spoke to Job, was God not responding to Job's words? Or was God just talking, and any appearance of there being a conversation was purely accidental?
Steve says, “A cause is not necessarily an event.”
Steve is here responding to a passage where the verb “instantiate” was used. Now he is replacing that verb with the noun, “cause.” Obviously these words don’t mean the same thing. This is a non sequitor on Steve’s part, and it thus has no relevance at all to my argument.
Steve also says, “A counterfactual theory of causation doesn’t require temporal precedence.”
Who said anything about temporal precedence? What is the relevance of this? It looks like another non sequitor.
Then Steve says, “The secular philosopher and physicist Quentin Smith has argued that time itself is the temporal effect of a timeless cause.”
Who cares? Another non sequitor.
Finally, Steve tries to salvage theism by aiming to dispense with verbs altogether. He says, “if we wish to express ourselves with greater theological or philosophical precision, we can eliminate tense from our description.”
Steve, are you suggesting a language without verbs? That would be interesting.
Steve offers this, I can only assume by way of example: “For a timeless God, there was never a time when he didn’t love the elect.”
I see verbs there. I see the Past Simple tense.
Steve continues, “But this isn’t synonymous with the claim that God loves the elect at all the times or all of the time. Rather, time is not a factor. God’s love is literally timeless.”
So, it is not that God’s love is in time. Rather, God’s love is out of time. Ah, but we have a verb: “is.” And it is in the Present Simple tense. I thought Steve wanted to avoid tenses. Looks like he’ll have to try harder.
Now, Paul Manata has a question.
He asks if I have presented a theory of meaning. Perhaps Manata would like to provide us with an argument as to why he thinks a theory of meaning will determine the validity of my argument for theological noncognitivism. By what theory of meaning do you dismiss my argument, Manata?
To sum up: Steve has tried to dismiss my argument for theological noncognitivism by, first, defending a most bizarre interpretation of the Book of Job, then by offering a series of non sequitors which do nothing to undermine my logic, and finally by trying and failing to talk about God without using tenses. It would thus appear that the argument for theological noncognitivism remains unscathed.
PS. It shows how much integrity you have that you would respond to my arguments in a new post without notifying me of the fact, Steve.
It shows how much integrity you have that you would respond to my arguments in a new post without notifying me of the fact, Steve.
ReplyDeleteIt's understandable how such might be taken as disrespectful or nasty from someone who blogs twice a month or so, but from a guy who's posting 30+ times a month, it's not so bad.
Of course, integrity isn't good or bad when your worldview is taken in its totality. Why even bother? You just can't keep your hand out of the Moral Statements Cookie Jar.
"Now, Paul Manata has a question.
ReplyDeleteHe asks if I have presented a theory of meaning. Perhaps Manata would like to provide us with an argument as to why he thinks a theory of meaning will determine the validity of my argument for theological noncognitivism. By what theory of meaning do you dismiss my argument, Manata?"
Go brush up on the history of the verification principle, smart guy.
Besides, you can't talk about meaning if you don;t have a theory of one. What sense does it make to say that terms are "meaningless?" On what system of meaning? And, if your system of meaning reders itself meaningless, then so much the worse for your complaint about the meaning of theological terms.
I'm failry in-step with Vanhoozer's theory of meaning.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Unlike Steve, I try to notify people when I respond to their arguments…PS. It shows how much integrity you have that you would respond to my arguments in a new post without notifying me of the fact, Steve.”
What makes you think I’m under some sort of obligation to notify you?
Anyway, I’m doing you a favor. By not notifying you, that forces you to check back on a regular basis and expose yourself to a lot of other edifying material which I (and others) post here, which you have to skim to see if I was responding to you. If I notified you, you would skip the intervening material, and thereby deny yourself the benefit of all the wonderful material we post here. Really, I should start charging you for the privilege of skimming so much edifying material for free.
“Remote awareness has nothing to do with my argument.”
Your argument was concerned with locality and mentality. The illocal nature of consciousness is quite germane.
“The issue here is in what you mean by the term ‘manifestation.’ ‘Manifestation’ is another word for ‘materialization’.”
Needless to say, “materialization” is not a synonym for “manifestation.” Something can be manifest to the eye or the mind, such as the manifest content of a dream.
If you’re that illiterate, you have no business teaching English for a living.
“If something materializes, it comes into physical existence.”
“Coming into existence,” much less “physical” existence, doesn’t figure in the definition of “manifestation.” In principle, something could always be manifest. Always be evident.
“Thus, if there are manifestations of some X, then X has come into physical existence.”
You lack the most elementary grasp of representation. A painter has a mental image. Call it X. He paints his mental image. Call it Y. Y is a manifestation of his mental image. In this case, Y happens to be a physical manifestation of X.
However, this doesn’t mean that X came into physical existence. No, Y came into physical existence. The tangible representation, and the intangible thing it represents, are two different entities.
A manifestation of X isn’t X. Rather, Y is the manifestation of X. It’s a relation between the mental image and the concrete representation (in my illustration). X is one thing, and its outward manifestation is another.
“Now, Steve says there are physical manifestations of numbers and minds. That means there are physical materializations of numbers and minds.”
No, it means there are physical exemplifications of numbers, as well as physical manifestations of mind.
“In other words, there are physical things—events, processes, what have you—which we can call ‘numbers’ and ‘minds’.”
Streitfeld is too mentally impaired by his atheism to think in terms of relations. He can only think in terms of identity.
Say it’s 2800 miles from NY to LA. Does that mean the number 2800 is a physical entity? No, the number 2800 is an abstract object.
The distance between NY and LA exemplifies and approximates the abstract number.
“So, Steve, please point us to a physical mind. Is it in the brain?”
There is no such thing as a physical mind. A mind can be manifested in the brain. That doesn’t make mentality physical.
“My point was that, as the term ‘mind’ is commonly understood (as thinking thing), it implies temporality.”
It only implies temporality when you use tensed language or tensed notions to describe it. Your claim is circular. And even then, your understanding of tensed language leaves much to be desired (see below).
“Thought implies temporality.”
That’s an assertion in search of an argument.
“If we dispense with temporality, we dispense with thinking.”
Notice how Streitfeld likes to repeat the same assertions over and over again. Where’s the argument?
Part of the problem is his illicit shift from the tenseless notion of thought to the tensed notion of thinking.
“What notion of mind do we have left?__Steve? What is the definition of a mind, stripped of incidentals?”
A mind is something with mental properties. And don’t ask me what mental properties are since I’ve already answered that question in a previous reply to you.
“Now, let’s get to the real meat here. The mind stuff has nothing to do with the argument for theological noncognitivism, after all.”
Mind isn’t made of “stuff.” There is no “mind stuff.”
Every time Streitfeld swings the bat, he misses.
“A conversation occurs between two or more entities over time.”
To the contrary, a conversation could be preprogrammed—especially if one of the conversation partners knew in advance what the other speaker would say.
“It requires that all involved parties produce speech and respond to the speech of others.”
A divine speaker can produce spoken words which occur at specified times without the divine speaker uttering them in time. Once again, Streitfeld confuses cause and effect. It’s not as if God is using a human vocal track to communicate with Job.
“By putting the word ‘effects’ in italics, Steve is hoping to convince us that God’s conversation with Job was somehow special.”
No, I’m distinguishing between cause and effect.
But since you raise the issue, of course there’s something special about how an omniscient, timeless, incorporeal being communicates with a human being. God employs a mode of communication suited to the divine mode of subsistence. God is a different kind of being than Job.
“God was not actually responding to any of Job’s words.”
Naturally. For one thing, God foreknows what Job will say. So it’s not as if he’s waiting to find out what Job will say next.
Indeed, God decreed what Job would say next.
“God simply made the conversation happen.”
He created speech. It may have been telepathic. Or it may have been audible.
“But, if God wasn’t an active part of the conversation.”
He was an active part of the conversation.
“Why does the Bible make it look like He was?”
The Bible doesn’t show us God talking to Job. And even in the case of a theophany or theophanic angelophany, that’s a mundane manifestation of the god, rather than God in himself.
“Why call it a conversation at all, since a conversation involves interaction?”
I didn’t call it a conversation, you did.
But, in any case, a conversation doesn’t require interaction. It only requires the effect of interaction.
“Steve mentions playing chess with a computer, suggesting that we should think of Job’s conversation with God as a conversation with a computer. So, the God as depicted in the Bible was actually a computer that the real God created so that it could effect interactions with people without having to be there. Is that what Steve is suggesting?__The Bible depicts God, not a computer, talking to Job. So this computer analogy is not persuasive.”
Is Streitfeld really that obtuse? I used the analogy of computer chess to show how it’s possible to have give and take without both parties reacting to each other in real time.
The chess player is indirectly playing chess with the computer programmer via the computer program. But the programmer isn’t waiting for the chess player to make a move before he makes the next move. Rather, a physical medium (the computer) is mediating this transaction. The computer programmer might even be dead by the time the chess player plays computer chess by using the program the programmer designed.
And suppose the computer programmer were omniscient. Suppose he foreknew what move the chess player would make in advance? He’d design the program to anticipate every move.
“When God spoke to Job, was God not responding to Job's words?”
You’re equivocating over the word “response.” You’re packing more than one idea into that word. To “respond” means to reply or answer.
Did God answer or reply to Job’s questions and complaints? Yes, in his own way. God produced words which were, in that sense, responsive to Job.
Yet you’re also trying to smuggle into this a temporal notion. God says something, then Job says something, then God says something, then Job says something.
But the divine speaker doesn’t have to insert himself into a temporal sequence with the human speaker. Rather, the divine speech has to be in a temporal sequence. The fact that the words alternate in time doesn’t mean both parties alternate in time.
“Steve is here responding to a passage where the verb ‘instantiate’ was used. Now he is replacing that verb with the noun, ‘cause.’ Obviously these words don’t mean the same thing. This is a non sequitor on Steve’s part, and it thus has no relevance at all to my argument.”
It’s only irrelevant to someone as dim as Streitfeld. Instantiation is a causal notion.
“Who said anything about temporal precedence? What is the relevance of this? It looks like another non sequitor.”
You said a timeless agent can’t “do” anything since that would be an “action,” and an action is an “event.”
If you admit that a divine action doesn’t implicate the divine agent in a temporal process, then your objection is nugatory.
“Who cares? Another non sequitor.”
A timeless cause “does” something. It effects an outcome.
If you have no problem with the notion of a timeless cause, then you negate your objection to divine agency.
“Steve, are you suggesting a language without verbs? That would be interesting.”
I realize that Streitfeld is an all-purpose ignoramus, but I’ll remind him, once again, that this is not a distinctively Christian issue. Philosophers and mathematicians talk about timeless objects. They even construct tenseless theories of time.
“I see verbs there. I see the Past Simple tense…And it is in the Present Simple tense. I thought Steve wanted to avoid tenses. Looks like he’ll have to try harder.”
Let’s see if I have a sturdy enough shovel to dig through all the layers of stupidity that Streitfeld piles up.
First of all, he disregards the key qualifier: “never a time.”
In addition, logicians and mathematicians use the copulative to express timeless relations. When they say five plus five “equals” ten, or tell us that if all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates “is” mortal, they are not using the copulative to express a temporal relation, but a logical relation.
Likewise, if a mathematician says that Pi “is” an irrational number, he’s not trying to make a statement about the temporality of Pi—as if he were claiming that Pi is an irrational number at t.
“To sum up: Steve has tried to dismiss my argument for theological noncognitivism by, first, defending a most bizarre interpretation of the Book of Job.”
I wasn’t offering an interpretation of Job. The Book of Job doesn’t attempt to describe the metaphysical machinery behind a dialogue between God and the person of Job. That is not its concern.
“Then by offering a series of non sequitors which do nothing to undermine my logic”
Only to someone like Streitfeld, who’s too dense to follow his own argument.
“And finally by trying and failing to talk about God without using tenses.”
By disregarding my key qualifier—not to mention betraying his ignorance of technical usage.
Manata,
ReplyDeleteYou haven't addressed my argument in the slightest. As I said, if you think you can reject my argument by appealing to any particular theory of meaning, make an argument. Otherwise you're just whining.
Stretfield,
ReplyDeleteUmmm, I refuse to believe you are this stupid.
YOU asserted that theological claims are meaningless.
Got it?
YOU DID.
Not me, YOU. That would be Jason Stretfield.
That is, Jason Stretfield asserted that theological claims are meaningless.
Got it? Are we clear? Can I move on? I'll assume so.
Now, what YOU, Jason Strefield, asserted DEPENDS upon a theory of meaning IN TERMS OF WHICH your claim can be made intelligible. God it?
If your theory of meaning RENDERS ITSELF MEANINGLESS then so much the worse for your objection to theism. It goes the way of the Dodo. Just like the verification principle did.
Got it? Are you following the bouncing ball?
So, I ASKED a QUESTION. Got it? I didn't make a positive remark or an argument. Got it? Are you still with me? Or have we exceeded your capacity for abstract thought and following logical connections? In the intrest of charity, I'll assume you're still able to follow...if only barely.
So, only a dummy would claim that I need to lay out an argument given that I asked a question that is logically prior to the intelligibility of your argument. And given that you're no dummy; no, why you're Jason Stretfield, theist slayer extrordinaire, then you mjust be stalling. Trying to come up with your own theory of meaning so you can answer my QUESTION. Get it? Do you have that hammster running at full speed up inside your noggin? I'll assume so.
Sorry to be so harsh, but you were being so dense and arrogant that (a) you deserve it and (b) it's the only way I know to get through to your type.
Got it?
Manata,
ReplyDeleteYou're not paying attention.
If you bothered to read my actual argument, you would find the following conclusion:
"the term “God” cannot be used in conjunction with any stative or dynamic verbs. This exhausts the possibilities of using the term “God” as the subject of a sentence. Therefore, “God exists,” “God instantiates compossible states of affairs,” and all other sentence about God's actions, states, or attributes, are meaningless."
This conclusion is not based on a theory of meaning, but on the rules of language. If you define a term so that it cannot be used as the subject of a sentence, then any attempt to use it as the subject of a sentence will be meaningless.
That is not so hard to understand. You don't need a theory of meaning to formulate or comprehend this argument. You simply need to know what the term "meaningless" means.
If you asked me to define the term "meaningless," I would have simply told you to look it up. It's not hard.
If a sentence is meaningless, it means it does not mean anything. It is devoid of content. It lacks informative value.
Again, this is pretty simple.
Now, once again, because this bears repeatine: If you think that some theory of meaning would invalidate my argument, let's have it. Otherwise you're just blowing hot air.
Rhology,
ReplyDelete"It's understandable how such might be taken as disrespectful or nasty from someone who blogs twice a month or so, but from a guy who's posting 30+ times a month, it's not so bad."
Ah, so Steve's just too busy to be bothered with such things.
Of course, you think everybody's wicked, we're all sinners. So, from your perspective, we shouldn't be surprised when people fail to act like decent, respectful human beings. We should just take it for granted that people lack integrity. Why expect any more from anybody, right?
In any case, I wouldn't call it nasty. Disrespectful, but not nasty. It indicates a lack of desire to engage in discourse. It suggests that Steve does not want me to read or respond to his arguments.
Sure, Steve says he didn't notify me because he wants me to keep checking his blog regularly. That's got to be a joke. Why would he think I would check his blog regularly? No, the most likely reason for Steve's behavior is that he gets off on being disrespectful to people who challenge his beliefs. It gratifies him to be insulting. He needs to feel superior, perhaps out of bitterness or maybe insecurity. You don't need a degree in psychology to see it. It's sad, though, wouldn't you say?
"Of course, integrity isn't good or bad when your worldview is taken in its totality. Why even bother?"
Rhology, you still haven't a clue what morality is about, do you?
If you're still waiting for me to explain it to you, keep waiting. I'm gonna post on it eventually.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“This conclusion is not based on a theory of meaning, but on the rules of language. If you define a term so that it cannot be used as the subject of a sentence, then any attempt to use it as the subject of a sentence will be meaningless.__That is not so hard to understand. You don't need a theory of meaning to formulate or comprehend this argument. You simply need to know what the term "meaningless" means.__If you asked me to define the term "meaningless," I would have simply told you to look it up. It's not hard.__If a sentence is meaningless, it means it does not mean anything. It is devoid of content. It lacks informative value.__Again, this is pretty simple.”
It’s pretty simple for someone as proudly simpleminded as you. However, you’re massively ignorant of the whole tenser/detenser debate in the philosophy of time.
i) Language doesn’t create reality. Language is an attempt to refer to realty. And ordinarily language is adapted to the practicalities of human existence. Ordinarily language is loose and imprecise.
ii) Even if ordinary language were too crude to capture timeless existents or timeless facts using tenseless language, that hardly means there are no timeless existents or timeless facts to capture. Rather, that would only reflect the limitations of human language. Words map imperfectly onto reality. There is never a perfect fit between word and object. Rather, it involves a one-to-many relation (i.e. one word, many referents).
iii) The tenseless copula is standard usage in logic and mathematics.
iv) It would behoove you to acquaint yourself with some of the scholarly literature on tenseless language, viz. Nathan Oaklander, The Ontology of Time, or Robin Le Poidevin, The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation.
Once again, this is not a distinctively Christian position. It’s not as if Oaklander or Le Poidevin is writing from a Christian perspective.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“The most likely reason for Steve's behavior is that he gets off on being disrespectful to people who challenge his beliefs. It gratifies him to be insulting. He needs to feel superior, perhaps out of bitterness or maybe insecurity. You don't need a degree in psychology to see it. It's sad, though, wouldn't you say?”
Actually, you don’t need a degree in psychology to see that Jason’s overwrought reaction (to not being notified) speaks volumes about his bitterness and insecurity. One would have to suffer from a massive inferiority complex to get that worked up over such a nonissue. He carries on like a schoolgirl who didn’t get invited to the Prom. Let’s hope he doesn’t harbor any latent pyrokinetic powers!
Steve says: “What makes you think I’m under some sort of obligation to notify you?”
ReplyDeleteWho said anything about an obligation?
I point out your lack of integrity, and you get all huffy, like we’re married or something. Get over it, man.
The following is going to be broken down into three sections. In the first, I’ll deal with the mind stuff. In the second, I’ll deal with the Job stuff. Then, I’ll deal with the stuff about theological noncognitivism.
First, the mind stuff . . .
Steve says: “Your argument was concerned with locality and mentality. The illocal nature of consciousness is quite germane.”
What is germane, Steve, is that your notion of “the illocal nature of consciousness” is a load of manure. (Refer to my arguments for physicalism which I’ve already posted links to for your convenience.)
Steve says: “A painter has a mental image. Call it X. He paints his mental image. Call it Y. Y is a manifestation of his mental image. In this case, Y happens to be a physical manifestation of X.”
Here Steve is using the term “manifestation” as a synonym for “representation.” Does this mean we should always interpret his usage of “manifestation” as being synonymous with “representation?”
Remember, he said that neuroscientists can study manifestations of the mind. Does that mean neuroscientists can stuffy representations of the mind? Does the brain contain representations of mind?
Steve?
Steve says: “The tangible representation, and the intangible thing it represents, are two different entities.”
So, the brain (tangible) represents the mind to neuroscientists. Is that right, Steve?
If that is not what Steve means, then why provide an example of “manifestation” in which it is used as a synonym for “representation?”
If Steve could find a moment, between all of his insults, to elucidate this point, I’m sure we would all be most humbly grateful.
Steve says: “Say it’s 2800 miles from NY to LA. Does that mean the number 2800 is a physical entity? No, the number 2800 is an abstract object.
The distance between NY and LA exemplifies and approximates the abstract number.”
Exemplifies and approximates . . . interesting. Approximations are the product of calculations. An approximation is a number. So, if the distance approximates the number 2800, that would mean that the distance is itself a number. That surely is not what Steve is saying, of course. So what is he saying? How does the distance from NY to LA approximate the number 2800?
And how does it exemplify the number? Is there something about the surface of the earth, about the contours and ridges that define the American landscape, that exemplifies the number 2800?
If not, then what is Steve talking about?
Again, when you’re not too busy throwing insults, try to clarify your thinking here.
Steve says: “[Mind] only implies temporality when you use tensed language or tensed notions to describe it. Your claim is circular. . . Part of the problem is his illicit shift from the tenseless notion of thought to the tensed notion of thinking.”
No, Steve. I didn’t shift from “thought” to “thinking.” I started off with “thinking,” and then used it synonymously with “thought.”
Frankly, your attempt to create a distinction here based on your notion of “tenseless notions” is unconvincing.
Steve says: “A mind is something with mental properties. And don’t ask me what mental properties are since I’ve already answered that question in a previous reply to you.”
Yes, Steve says mental properties are prepositional attitudes and representational states.
To present his understanding of prepositional attitudes, Steve quoted Lowe: “include beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes and fears, to name but a few. A common feature of such states is that we may ascribe them to subjects of experience by using…’verbs of propositional attitude’ because each of them is considered to express a particular attitude which a subject may have towards a proposition.”
Again, he quotes Lowe to explain his views on representational states: “Interpreting is itself a representational mental state (in fact, a kind of cognitive state). One way of putting this point is to say that human artifactual representations, such as pictures and maps, have only ‘derived,’ not ‘original,’ intentionality—intentionality being that property which a thing has if it represents, and thus is ‘about,’ something else (in the way in which a map can be 'about’ a piece of terrain or a diagram can be 'about’ the structure of a machine).”
Remember, I had asked Steve to give us his definition of “mind” without the incidentals. By referring to these quoted passages, he is telling us what he thinks of mind qua mind, and not simply the human mind.
So, according to Steve, mind (and for Steve that means God) is defined as that which has such things as hopes, desires, and fears. These are all attitudes towards the future. They are tensed, to use Steve’s terminology. Yet, God wants to talk about God without tenses.
Does God have hopes, fears, and beliefs, according to Steve?
And what about representational states? Lowe’s discussion of this focuses on intentionality, aka aboutness. So, minds possess aboutness. Thus, when we read a map, we know that it is about something other than itself. Minds connect things like maps to the landscape they represent. But, of course, it is the map that represents the landscape. We are the interpreters. Minds exhibit intentionality in so far as they interpret. Does Steve thus suggest that there is an atemporal interpreter?
If not, then what is Steve talking about? Again, when he’s not too busy trying to act superior, maybe he can clarify his thinking here.
Okay, that’s it for the mind stuff. Let’s move on to the Job stuff. I will just note that all this stuff about Job is irrelevant to my argument. My referencing the Book of Job was not a part of my argument for theological noncognitivism. It was only an observation made in passing.
I said: “A conversation occurs between two or more entities over time.”
Steve replied: “To the contrary, a conversation could be preprogrammed—especially if one of the conversation partners knew in advance what the other speaker would say.”
Steve thinks that a “conversation partner” is not an entity. Or is Steve not thinking?
Steve says: “A divine speaker can produce spoken words which occur at specified times without the divine speaker uttering them in time.”
When a speaker produces spoken words, we call it speaking. The utterance is the spoken words. The words are uttered in time. That is, the utterance is temporal.
Steve wants to say that God did not utter the words in time, but that God uttered the words, and that the words were uttered in time. Steve wants to disconnect a speaker from an utterance, as if an action can occur in time without the actor also occurring in time. It’s nonsense.
Steve says: “Naturally. For one thing, God foreknows what Job will say. So it’s not as if he’s waiting to find out what Job will say next.”
Right. So, God “preprogrammed” the conversation, carefully detailing what each party would say. The preprogramming didn’t occur in time, of course, despite the fact that any attempt to describe it makes it sound like it occurred in time. We should forget what our verbs mean here, because our tensed verbs betray our intentions. Right?
So, the Book Of Job describes the equivalent of a computer program, a simulation of reality, as it were. In fact, this entire conversation was programmed by God, and we are all but simulations in a computer program.
Is that Steve’s point?
So, nothing is real, except for God. Mind is all there is. But that would make Steve an idealist. Does Steve want to come out as an idealist for us now?
Okay, enough of the Job stuff. Let’s get back to theological noncognitivism. That was the whole point of this discussion, or so the title of Steve’s thread would have us think.
Steve is trying to defend his non sequitors.
I wrote: “Steve is here responding to a passage where the verb ‘instantiate’ was used. Now he is replacing that verb with the noun, ‘cause.’ Obviously these words don’t mean the same thing. This is a non sequitor on Steve’s part, and it thus has no relevance at all to my argument.”
Steve replied: “It’s only irrelevant to someone as dim as Streitfeld. Instantiation is a causal notion.”
Another non sequitor. Steve can’t help himself, can he?
Yes, instantiation is a causal notion. Yet, the verb “instantiate” is not a noun. So, again, this has no relevance to the argument.
Steve says: “You said a timeless agent can’t “do” anything since that would be an “action,” and an action is an “event.” If you admit that a divine action doesn’t implicate the divine agent in a temporal process, then your objection is nugatory.”
I do not admit that a “divine action doesn’t implicate the divine agent in a temporal process.”
Steve says: “If you have no problem with the notion of a timeless cause, then you negate your objection to divine agency.”
I do not accept the notion of a timeless cause. Why should I?
Steve says: “I realize that Streitfeld is an all-purpose ignoramus, but I’ll remind him, once again, that this is not a distinctively Christian issue.”
What makes Steve think I was under the impression that this was a distinctively Christian issue?
Steve says: “Philosophers and mathematicians talk about timeless objects. They even construct tenseless theories of time.”
I am not impressed.
Now, Steve’s discussion of copulas is a non sequitor. He points out the obvious, that we can use verbs to describe states of being and logical relationships, and that these functions have no temporal significance. Yet, he wants to use this fact to justify his God talk. The problem is, he is trying to shift our attention away from the language at issue here.
As I concluded in my argument, the term “God” as defined by Steve cannot be used in conjunction with any stative or dynamic verbs. The discussion of copulas is irrelevant to this fact, and does not rescue his God talk from meaninglessness.
Steve rejects the sentence: “God loves the elect at all the times or all of the time.”
He says the tensed language in that sentence is only there for convenience, and that this can be avoided if we want to be more precise. Thus, he says, “God’s love is timeless.”
So now we have a logical relationship between God’s love and timelessness. Yet, we do not have a relationship between God, love, and the object of that love. So we have no understanding of what God’s love is about, or what God is. The sentence is thus meaningless.
We are still left unable to find meaning in Steve’s God talk. It would seem the argument for theological noncognitivism has not been defeated.
So I take Steitfields third dodge as an indication that he's not going to answer my question. Noted.
ReplyDeleteJASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Who said anything about an obligation?__I point out your lack of integrity.”
Are you really that obtuse? If I’m under no obligation to notify you, then my “failure” to notify you would have no bearing on my integrity.
“And you get all huffy, like we’re married or something. Get over it, man.”
Streitfeld gets emotional because I didn’t notify him. When I point out that he got emotional, how does he react? By getting emotional.
“What is germane, Steve, is that your notion of ‘the illocal nature of consciousness’ is a load of manure.”
That’s a very impressive counterargument, even by your lofty standards. You’ve reached new heights of reasoning.
“(Refer to my arguments for physicalism which I’ve already posted links to for your convenience.)”
Both Manata and I have responded to your lame arguments for physicalism. Try something new.
“Here Steve is using the term “manifestation” as a synonym for ‘representation.’ Does this mean we should always interpret his usage of ‘manifestation’ as being synonymous with ‘representation’?”
Streitfeld is confusing words with concepts.
“Remember, he said that neuroscientists can study manifestations of the mind.”
I didn’t limit myself to neuroscientists.
“Does that mean neuroscientists can stuffy representations of the mind?”
Only if the patient is a stuffy patient.
“Does the brain contain representations of mind?”
The human mind manifests itself in the human brain. The brain is a medium by which (among other things) the human mind perceives the sensible world. It uses this three pound lump of matter do intelligent things.
“So, the brain (tangible) represents the mind to neuroscientists. Is that right, Steve?”
See above.
“If that is not what Steve means, then why provide an example of ‘manifestation’ in which it is used as a synonym for “representation?”
Confusing words with concepts again.
At the conceptual level, go back to my painter/painting illustration.
“Exemplifies and approximates . . . interesting. Approximations are the product of calculations. An approximation is a number. So, if the distance approximates the number 2800, that would mean that the distance is itself a number. That surely is not what Steve is saying, of course. So what is he saying? How does the distance from NY to LA approximate the number 2800?”
Distance is not a number. Distance is a physical length. We assign a numerical value to a physical length, but no physical object exactly corresponds to an abstract numerical universal. Physical objects have fuzzy boundaries, and they are unstable over time.
“And how does it exemplify the number? Is there something about the surface of the earth, about the contours and ridges that define the American landscape, that exemplifies the number 2800?”
Physical length is a property instance of an abstract universal.
“If not, then what is Steve talking about?__Again, when you’re not too busy throwing insults, try to clarify your thinking here.”
You’re the one who, in your ignorance of metaphysical realism, lacks clarity of thought. For an overview the subject, cf. M. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 3rd. ed.), chaps 1,4-5.
“No, Steve. I didn’t shift from “thought” to “thinking.” I started off with ‘thinking,’ and then used it synonymously with ‘thought’.”
They’re not synonymous. “Thinking” implies a process. “Thought” does not.
“Remember, I had asked Steve to give us his definition of “mind” without the incidentals. By referring to these quoted passages, he is telling us what he thinks of mind qua mind, and not simply the human mind.”
Wrong. You asked a generic question and I gave you a generic answer.
It doesn’t follow that every mind duplicates the very same mental properties. Rather, these are examples of various *kinds* of mental properties.
“So, according to Steve, mind (and for Steve that means God) is defined as that which has such things as hopes, desires, and fears. These are all attitudes towards the future. They are tensed, to use Steve’s terminology. Yet, God wants to talk about God without tenses.__Does God have hopes, fears, and beliefs, according to Steve?”
Streitfeld is now building on his straw man argument. Streitfeld is never dumber than when he thinks he’s being clever.
“And what about representational states? Lowe’s discussion of this focuses on intentionality, aka aboutness. So, minds possess aboutness. Thus, when we read a map, we know that it is about something other than itself. Minds connect things like maps to the landscape they represent. But, of course, it is the map that represents the landscape. We are the interpreters. Minds exhibit intentionality in so far as they interpret. Does Steve thus suggest that there is an atemporal interpreter?”
God has beliefs about the world. That’s an intentional state.
“If not, then what is Steve talking about? Again, when he’s not too busy trying to act superior, maybe he can clarify his thinking here.”
Streitfeld is like a man with dusty glasses who demands that you “clarify” things for him. Of course, when a man sees the word through a dusty pair of glasses, the image is bound to be unclear.
“Steve thinks that a ‘conversation partner’ is not an entity.”
Where does Steve say that?
“Or is Steve not thinking?”
Better question: is Streitfeld ever thinking?
“When a speaker produces spoken words, we call it speaking. The utterance is the spoken words. The words are uttered in time. That is, the utterance is temporal.”
As usual, Streitfeld is unable to distinguish between cause and effect.
“Steve wants to say that God did not utter the words in time, but that God uttered the words, and that the words were uttered in time. “
God doesn’t “utter” words, as if he had a human vocal track. Rather, God produces words. Causes words to occur.
“Steve wants to disconnect a speaker from an utterance.”
I distinguish between cause and effect.
“As if an action can occur in time without the actor also occurring in time. It’s nonsense.”
Notice, as usual, that Streitfeld substitutes a bare denial for an actual argument.
It would only be nonsense if you assume a particular theory of causation, where cause and effect must both be temporal. That’s why I mentioned the counterfactual theory of causation, and also cited Quentin Smith.
If Streitfeld is now going to deny that a timeless cause can produce a temporal effect, he needs to present and defend a theory of causation which supports his denial.
“Right. So, God ‘preprogrammed’ the conversation, carefully detailing what each party would say. The preprogramming didn’t occur in time, of course, despite the fact that any attempt to describe it makes it sound like it occurred in time. We should forget what our verbs mean here, because our tensed verbs betray our intentions. Right?”
One of Streitfeld’s problems is that he can only keep one idea in his mind (or should I say, brain?) at a time.
I used the example of preprogramming to disprove his claim that a real conservation must include both parties in the same timeframe—where one speaks, while the other listens, then the other speaks, &c.
And my verbs don’t betray my intentions since I operate with a more sophisticated philosophy of language than Streitfeld.
“So, the Book Of Job describes the equivalent of a computer program, a simulation of reality, as it were.”
As I said before, the Book of Job doesn’t attempt to present the metaphysics underlying divine speech. Rather, it describes the effect.
“In fact, this entire conversation was programmed by God, and we are all but simulations in a computer program.”
Streitfeld never misses an opportunity to advertise his stupidity. I used computer chess as an analogy to illustrate a particular point.
Can’t you just hear Streitfeld arguing with Robert Burns? “But, Mr. Burns, you said your love was like a red, red rose? Therefore you must believe that your love has leaves and thorns!”
“So, nothing is real, except for God. Mind is all there is. But that would make Steve an idealist. Does Steve want to come out as an idealist for us now?”
Of course, none of this follows from what I actually said, but like a mental patient, we’ll humor Streitfeld’s delusions.
“Yes, instantiation is a causal notion. Yet, the verb ‘instantiate’ is not a noun. So, again, this has no relevance to the argument.”
And verbs have no relevance to the argument either. Only if you operate with Streitfeld’s preschool philosophy of language.
“I do not admit that a ‘divine action doesn’t implicate the divine agent in a temporal process’.”
But you said temporal precedence is irrelevant. Do you admit temporal process while you deny the relevance of temporal precedence to the question of temporal process?
“I do not accept the notion of a timeless cause. Why should I?”
Go back to my comments on Quentin Smith and the counterfactual theory of causation.
And if you reject the notion, you need to defend your claim.
“What makes Steve think I was under the impression that this was a distinctively Christian issue?”
You’re attacking Christian theism by attacking metaphysical realism, tenseless theories of time, counterfactual theories of causation, and so on, even though these are not distinctively Christian positions.
“I am not impressed.”
The logicians and mathematicians I reference would be unimpressed by you, too. And unlike your empty dismissal, they carefully argue for their own position.
“Now, Steve’s discussion of copulas is a non sequitor. He points out the obvious, that we can use verbs to describe states of being and logical relationships, and that these functions have no temporal significance. Yet, he wants to use this fact to justify his God talk. The problem is, he is trying to shift our attention away from the language at issue here.”
To the contrary, Streitfeld is now trying to shift our attention away from his original objection, based on the linguistic conventions of English grammar.
“As I concluded in my argument, the term ‘God’ as defined by Steve cannot be used in conjunction with any stative or dynamic verbs. The discussion of copulas is irrelevant to this fact, and does not rescue his God talk from meaninglessness.”
Of course we can use verbs with God. We simply distinguish between popular usage and technical usage.
“So now we have a logical relationship between God’s love and timelessness.”
No, God has a timeless love for the elect, while the elect have a temporal love for God.
“Yet, we do not have a relationship between God, love, and the object of that love.”
The relationship is asymmetric. The elect are the timeless objects of God’s love, while God is the temporal object of their love.
“So we have no understanding of what God’s love is about, or what God is. The sentence is thus meaningless.”
Streitfeld is confusing the content of God’s love with the mode of God’s love. If you want to know the content, read Berkhof (to take one example).
“We are still left unable to find meaning in Steve’s God talk. It would seem the argument for theological noncognitivism has not been defeated.”
Streitfeld has the habit of using the first person plural, as if he’s speaking for every reader when, in fact, he’s only speaking for himself.
Steve: "You’re the one who, in your ignorance of metaphysical realism, lacks clarity of thought. For an overview the subject, cf. M. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 3rd. ed.), chaps 1,4-5."
ReplyDeleteWe can add Armstrong's Opinionated introduction to that list.
Streitfield: "“And what about representational states? Lowe’s discussion of this focuses on intentionality, aka aboutness. So, minds possess aboutness. Thus, when we read a map, we know that it is about something other than itself. Minds connect things like maps to the landscape they represent. But, of course, it is the map that represents the landscape. We are the interpreters. Minds exhibit intentionality in so far as they interpret. Does Steve thus suggest that there is an atemporal interpreter?”
Here Streitfield shows his ignorance; yet again. Minds have *intrisic* intentionality, maps do not. Follow that one out with Leibniz's indescernability of identicals argument.
Maps are also only 'of', never 'about.' We don't say, "What is this map about?" Get a clue, Streifeld.
Note to all,
ReplyDeleteMy version of Word changes "propositional" to "prepositional" every time I type it. That explains all the references to "prepositional attitudes" in my last post.
Manata,
You asked on what system of meaning my use of the term "meaningless" was based. Your question was based on this assumption: "you can't talk about meaning if you don;t have a theory of one."
I see no reason to accept that premise. It's like saying, "you can't talk about pizza if you don't have a theory of one."
So you ask, "on what system of meaning?" Like, "on what system of pizza?"
The question is absurd. The definition of "meaningless" is not in question here. I am not challenging the common definition, and so there is no need for me to defend my usage. If you want to question my usage, go ahead. That would require you actually engaging my argument, something you apparently do not want to do. Until you do that, you're just creating a distraction.
Steve,
ReplyDelete"Both Manata and I have responded to your lame arguments for physicalism."
As far as I know, that is not true. What responses are you talking about?
I'll respond to the rest of your post when I have more time. Should be some time this week.
Manata: "Minds have *intrisic* intentionality, maps do not."
ReplyDeleteI never said maps had any sort of intentionality. So what's your point?
Manata: "Maps are also only 'of', never 'about.' We don't say, "What is this map about?""
Is there a point buried in there somewhere, or are you just getting off on seeing your words in print?
Aboutness is a general term used to refer to intentional qualities. The fact that we don't always use the term "about" to signify intentional relationships is hardly germane.
Streifeld always the ignoramus says,
ReplyDelete"Manata,
You asked on what system of meaning my use of the term "meaningless" was based. Your question was based on this assumption: "you can't talk about meaning if you don't have a theory of one."
Not quite, this will become apparent below.
"I see no reason to accept that premise. It's like saying, "you can't talk about pizza if you don't have a theory of one."
So you ask, "on what system of meaning?" Like, "on what system of pizza?"
Wow. In asking 'what is your theory of meaning' I am asking 'what is meaning?' If you don't know what a pizza is, how can you talk about it? Furthermore, my question is logically prioer and bears out in this. If you have an improper theory of meaning, how can you meaningfully talk about pizza, **IF YOUR THEORY WERE TRUE**?
When you say that X is meaningless, then that is RELATIVE TOP SOME UNDERSTANDING OF MEANING. To say that X is pizza is relative to know what pizza is in the first place. If you said X is pizza, while X was a bowl ofv cereal, I'm sure you'd still strut around here and claim, "I can talk about pizzas. Who needs to know what pizza is to talk abotu pizzas." But, guess what, when you say X is pizzaless, you very well could be wrong BECAUSE YOU THINK PIZZA IS CERAL. So, you could call pizza pizzaless based on your faulty theory of pizza.
I really hope I don't have to continue this. How many posts are we at now? I asked a simple question and your running and ducking and stalling is damaging to your position and integrity and reputation.
"I am not challenging the common definition,
Yikes! "Common definition?" We have more ground work with you than I thought.
"Until you do that, you're just creating a distraction."
Hey, do what you want. Don't answer my question. Fine by me. I'm not going to keep begging.
Jason: "I never said maps had any sort of intentionality. So what's your point?"
ReplyDeleteJason: "And what about representational states? Lowe’s discussion of this focuses on intentionality, aka aboutness. So, minds possess aboutness. Thus, when we read a map, we know that it is about something other than itself. Minds connect things like maps to the landscape they represent. But, of course, it is the map that represents the landscape. We are the interpreters. Minds exhibit intentionality in so far as they interpret. Does Steve thus suggest that there is an atemporal interpreter?"
Me: That's how it appeared. You said a map was 'about' something. You then said, "[a]boutness is a general term used to refer to intentional qualities." So, that's why I said what I did.
Manata: "You said a map was 'about' something. You then said, "[a]boutness is a general term used to refer to intentional qualities." So, that's why I said what I did."
ReplyDeleteI think I was being clear when I said that "minds connect things like maps to the landscape they represent." The aboutness is through us, and not an intrinsic property of the map.
As for your question about a theory of meaning, I've already answered it. You accuse me of not answering it, because you don't like my answer.
Let me put this in a way that might be simper for you.
My argument for theological noncognitivism is not predicated upon any particular theory of meaning. I question your claim that one must have a theory of meaning in order to talk about meaning.
I have offered a definition of the word "meaning," and, as I said, I am not challenging common usage. If you think I am challenging what you consider to be the acceptable usage of the term "meaning," then let's have it.
But a theory is not a definition.
If you want to judge the validity of my argument according to some theory of meaning, you can choose whatever theory of meaning you want. I won't object, so long as your theory of meaning satisfies two conditions: first, it must be coherent and consistent; second, it cannot beg the question against atheism.
Since you've already indicated that you prefer a presuppositional theory of meaning, you are most likely going to beg the question against atheism. If that is the case, you must either claim that some valid arguments beg the question, or you must claim that your theory of meaning cannot form the basis of a valid argument against atheism.
In any case, I see no threat to my argument coming from this line of discussion.
1. Well, you weren't clear.
ReplyDelete2. I guess we'll have to leave it there then. I'm not going to beg you do answer this logically prior question. I understand why you're afraid too.
and example of why we don't take the outputs of your "mind" seriously, Jason:
ReplyDeletehttp://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/01/proof-that-streitfeldian-apologetics.html
Manata,
ReplyDelete"I guess we'll have to leave it there then."
As far as I can tell, I answered your question. If you still disagree, and wish to disengage, there's little I can do about it.
"Since you've already indicated that you prefer a presuppositional theory of meaning, you are most likely going to beg the question against atheism. If that is the case, you must either claim that some valid arguments beg the question, or you must claim that your theory of meaning cannot form the basis of a valid argument against atheism."
ReplyDeleteI indicated I appreciated Vanhoozer's. Please exaplain Vanhoozer to us. Or is flapping your gums all you have?
Furthermore, I pretty much shredded your above "question begging" argument.
How's that foot taste?
Paul,
ReplyDelete"I indicated I appreciated Vanhoozer's. Please exaplain Vanhoozer to us."
Why do you insist on acting like such a dope?
First of all, you didn't indicate an appreciation of Vanhoozer. You said your theory of meaning was "fairly in step" with Vanoozer's. Now you want me to explain Vanhoozer's theory of meaning to you?
You've got some nerve.
Let me explain this again for you, since your desire to act superior is so interfering with your ability to compose yourself as a dignified, rational human being.
You assert that one must have a theory of meaning before one can discuss whether or not something is meaningful.
I reject that assertion. Frankly, as far as assertions go, it's one of the more stupid ones I've seen in a while. But if you want to defend your stupid assertion, go ahead. So far, you've merely asserted it.
Now, as I have said more than once already, my argument is not predicated upon any particular theory of meaning. Therefore, the validity of my argument does not stand or fall with any particular theory of meaning.
Thus, I reject your implication that I must present and defend a theory of meaning in order to present and defend my argument.
Of course, you are free to challenge any and all of this. You can, for example, make an argument showing how my argument here does, in fact, depend upon a particular theory of meaning (or a particular type of theory of meaning), and then make a case against my argument on those grounds. I invited you to do so at the beginning of our exchange here; yet you still refuse to do that. Instead, you keep barking like a mad dog, like it's going to make you look better or something.
For a guy who clearly wants us all to believe that he has no respect at all for my mind or my arguments, you sure seem to be getting worked up over them. And you clearly have some investment in the process of proving me wrong . . . something that you have yet to do, by the way. But I'll explain that to you when I respond to you in the other thread.
With respect to that other thread, you said: "I pretty much shredded your above "question begging" argument."
Who are you trying to convince?
Your arguments in that other thread are laughable. Again, I'll explain this to you in that other thread when I have more time.
If you want to improve your image, Paul, why don't you start by showing a little respect for the process of discourse we're engaged in?
Like, for example, apologize for lying about me in your other thread. And stop acting like you can win an argument with personal insults.
If you at least did that, then your other shortcomings wouldn't look as bad.
But, hey, you don't have to do anything you don't want to do. You can keep acting like a dope, if you think it's good for you. Just don't think I'm impressed.
Streifeld,
ReplyDeleteResorting to pedantry isn't a valid defeater. I said I held to Vanhoozer's theory. To say "fairly in step" fairly commits me to the nuts and bolts. You then said that I held to "a presuppositionalist" theory of meaning. This implies that you know what Vanhoozer's theory is. Indeed, you must think that "fairly in step" with "Vanhoozer" = "presuppositionalist theory of meaning." So, I wanted you to explain that connection. Got it. It's getting tiring refuting you with one brain tied behind my back.
"You assert that one must have a theory of meaning before one can discuss whether or not something is meaningful."
Yeah, me and every other philosopher in the world, besides the maroon from Poland, or where ever you're from.
"I reject that assertion. Frankly, as far as assertions go, it's one of the more stupid ones I've seen in a while. But if you want to defend your stupid assertion, go ahead. So far, you've merely asserted it."
I'd be happy to repeat myself for you since you're having such a hard time:
***********
"Stretfield,
Ummm, I refuse to believe you are this stupid.
YOU asserted that theological claims are meaningless.
Got it?
YOU DID.
Not me, YOU. That would be Jason Stretfield.
That is, Jason Stretfield asserted that theological claims are meaningless.
Got it? Are we clear? Can I move on? I'll assume so.
Now, what YOU, Jason Strefield, asserted DEPENDS upon a theory of meaning IN TERMS OF WHICH your claim can be made intelligible. God it?
If your theory of meaning RENDERS ITSELF MEANINGLESS then so much the worse for your objection to theism. It goes the way of the Dodo. Just like the verification principle did.
Got it? Are you following the bouncing ball?
So, I ASKED a QUESTION. Got it? I didn't make a positive remark or an argument. Got it? Are you still with me? Or have we exceeded your capacity for abstract thought and following logical connections? In the intrest of charity, I'll assume you're still able to follow...if only barely.
So, only a dummy would claim that I need to lay out an argument given that I asked a question that is logically prior to the intelligibility of your argument. And given that you're no dummy; no, why you're Jason Stretfield, theist slayer extrordinaire, then you mjust be stalling. Trying to come up with your own theory of meaning so you can answer my QUESTION. Get it? Do you have that hammster running at full speed up inside your noggin? I'll assume so.
Sorry to be so harsh, but you were being so dense and arrogant that (a) you deserve it and (b) it's the only way I know to get through to your type.
************
"Now, as I have said more than once already, my argument is not predicated upon any particular theory of meaning."
So your grandy dope argument is that Christianity is meaningless indexed to no theory of what it is to be meaningless. Got it.
You're an idiot. And I don't need a theory of idoiocity to make that claim. You are 'cause I says so.
"With respect to that other thread, you said: "I pretty much shredded your above "question begging" argument."
Who are you trying to convince?"
I defeated your argument, the post is there, you ran from the debate. Your responses made you look dumb. You had the nerve to admit that you don't hold to an analysis of knowledge that assumes it is true belief with some extra post-Gettier condition. How embarrassing. You had the nerve to admit that knowledge doesn't exist. How embarrassing.
"Your arguments in that other thread are laughable. Again, I'll explain this to you in that other thread when I have more time."
I had grad students at San Francisco laughing at you and your argument. Even atheist.
The rest of your stuff was your hypocritical remarks about treating you with respect. Reading your posts and your vitriol is enough to render your statements self-refuting. Don't go away mad, just go away.
Manata,
ReplyDeleteI noticed the following errors in your last post:
"you must think that "fairly in step" with "Vanhoozer" = "presuppositionalist theory of meaning."
False. I think that you hold to a presuppositional theory of meaning. That is based on what I know of Vanhoozer and what I know of you. If you do not in fact hold to a presuppositional theory of meaning, you can say so. Asking me to explain Vanhoozer is absurd.
"me and every other philosopher in the world"
False.
"you ran from the debate."
False. You're confusing your dreams with reality, Paul.
"Your responses made you look dumb."
Maybe to you, but you think your responses to me are intelligent, so your opinion here is hard to take seriuosly.
"You had the nerve to admit that you don't hold to an analysis of knowledge that assumes it is true belief with some extra post-Gettier condition."
That's a flat out lie.
"You had the nerve to admit that knowledge doesn't exist."
Another lie.
You're still acting like a dope, Paul.
Oh, and let's not forget about this gem:
ReplyDelete"So your grandy dope argument is that Christianity is meaningless indexed to no theory of what it is to be meaningless."
Grandy dope?
Who talks like that?
Did you mean to type "grand, dope argument?" Or is "grandy dope" the kind of thing you actually say to people?
Anyway, your assertion here is false. I did not say Christianity is meaningless. I'm sure Christianity has a lot of meaning to offer people, despite the fact that it is built upon nonsense.
No, what I said is that theistic terms, such as "God" and "the supernatural," are meaningless. As in, they are incoherent, without signification, without reference. And I explained why and how this is the case in my argument.
Do you understand that?
In.
My.
Argument.
The argument that you keep avoiding.
So try to keep the facts straight, okay, Paul? It will save us all a lot of time.
Steitfeld,
ReplyDeleteTell me about Vanhoozer's theory of meaning and myself.
Also, it should be easy to switch the term "God" with "Christianity" and see my point still follows.
Thus you didn't avloid the argument, you've just bought yourself more stall time.
Streitfeld said: Grandy dope?
ReplyDeleteWho talks like that?
Streitfeld said:
"Maybe to you, but you think your responses to me are intelligent, so your opinion here is hard to take seriuosly."
'Seriuosly?' Who talks like that? Maybe you mean, "seriously?" Or is "seriuosly" is the kind of thing you actually say to people?
You're boring, Stretfeld.
Anyway, I can see you don't want to answer the theory of meaning question I had. I also see you didn't want to answer my argument in that other post. So, I think you just want to get the "last word" in because you have a superiority complex. Go ahead and have the last word. Just know that I'll still think you're a grandy dope.
Since Streitfeld isn't bright enough to figure it out for himself, let's walk him through the problem:
ReplyDeleteThe problem, of course, is that theological noncognitivism is just a warmed over version of logical positivism (a la Ayer, Nielsen, Martin), which commits him to some version of the verification principle.
So he's operating with a very specific and very controversial theory of meaning—one that's rejected by most secular epistemologists.
"As in, they are incoherent, without signification, without reference."
ReplyDelete'Unicorns are white' is without refernce. Is it meaningless?
So, we see your "theory of meaning" is faulty from the start.
Thanks for playing.
That was easy.
Doofus.
Wow, I'm impressed.
ReplyDeleteSteve, did you know that, according to Paul Manata, abstract objects are not referents?
We cannot talk about unicorns, because they are fictional creatures, and thus only exist in our minds?
Mental entities cannot be referents, according to Manata.
I suppose he's going to claim that MSWord also doesn't exist.
And he calls me a doofus.
Steve, one more thing.
You say that theological noncognitivism is "just a warmed over version of logical positivism (a la Ayer, Nielsen, Martin), which commits him to some version of the verification principle."
No, it doesn't. Yes, there is a historical connection between theolgoical noncognitivism and logical positivism, but one need not adhere to a verification principle to be a theological noncognitivist.
And finally, a word for the wonderous Paul Manata . . .
Manata: "I can see you don't want to answer the theory of meaning question I had."
I can see that your inability to comprehend my answer is astounding.
Manata: "I also see you didn't want to answer my argument in that other post."
Oh, I'm looking forward to responding to you in that other thread. I just haven't had the time yet.
Manata: "Tell me about Vanhoozer's theory of meaning and myself."
That's just sad.
Steve, did you know that, according to Paul Manata, abstract objects are not referents?
ReplyDeleteWe cannot talk about unicorns, because they are fictional creatures, and thus only exist in our minds?
Mental entities cannot be referents, according to Manata.
I suppose he's going to claim that MSWord also doesn't exist.
And he calls me a doofus.
As Steve has pointed out, Streitfeld confuses concepts and referents. He confuses sense and referents. A unicorn isn't a "mental entity." The concept OF a unicorn isn't a unicorn. That would mean that unicorns exist. Doofus.
Oh, by the way, where is the referent to the claim that to be meaningful a statement has to have a referent?
Now you see why I asked about meaning.
Thanks for playing.
"Manata: "Tell me about Vanhoozer's theory of meaning and myself."
That's just sad."
Again, Jason is afraid to back up his big talk.
Manata: "I also see you didn't want to answer my argument in that other post."
Oh, I'm looking forward to responding to you in that other thread. I just haven't had the time yet.
You've had the time, look at all your posts here! You're just scrambling to come up with a decent response. Jason, there's a reason why every single person, atheist and theist alike, said your post got refuted. That you refuse to admit it shows you have no desire to have an honest debate.
Edit: "The CONCEPT of a unicorn isn't a unicorn qua mythological horse."
ReplyDelete[1] Nobody runs faster than me.
ReplyDeleteWow, Streitfeld belives that "nobody" has a referent. Perhaps its a bundle of neurons in his noggin, a concept. hence, Jason thinks I mean,
[1*] The concepts located at point X in Streitfeld's noggin runs faster than me!
[2] Do it for the sake of the children.
What's the referent of 'sense' in [2]?
How about this:
[3] Jason is short and ugly.
What do the italicized words refer to? Properties? What are those and what does it mean on Jason's physicalism to say that they exist so they can be objects of reference.
At the very least, we need a highly developed and sophisticaed theory of meaning which Jason refuses to give!
Like I said, thanks for playing.
Your argument is bunk and can't even get off the ground. Should have just answered my question from the start instead of dragging out the inevitable slow and painful death.
Notice below that the only view that allows referents is a view incompatible with physicalism.
ReplyDelete***********
Consider the following sentence:
[26]Pegasus does not exist.
Surely this sentence is true. More precisely, its assertive utterance would express a true proposition. After all, we all know that Pegasus is a purely mythical creature. Yet, the truth of (26) would seem to imply that Pegasus in some sense is: that Pegasus has being of some sort. Otherwise, how could we refer to the mythical horse and say truly of it that it does not exist? Thus, Pegasus — as well as other things that don't exist — are; they have being; otherwise we could not coherently (and truly) deny that they exist. Or so claimed Meinong (1904). How do we avoid commitment to what Quine (1961) famously called Meinong's ‘bloated universe’?[11] One solution (Quine's) is to distinguish sharply between meaning and reference, and then claim that although ‘Pegasus’ has no reference, it does have a meaning. In particular, its meaning is given by a definite description which is to be interpreted a la Russell (1905). Thus, (26) gets analyzed as (something like):
[27] There does not exist a unique winged horse.
More precisely:
[28] It is false that there exists a unique winged horse.
And this sentence is clearly true — and we can say that it is true without being committed to the being of Pegasus. In effect, the solution claims that certain expressions that look like names are not names in the logical sense: their meaning (if any) is not their reference. Such expressions are instead abbreviated Russellian descriptions. Such descriptions do not have meaning in isolation — in particular, they do not mean what they denote — and they may in fact denote nothing. Rather, they have meaning only in the context of the sentence in which they occur, a sentence whose assertive utterance expresses a complex existential proposition to the effect that there exists a unique F and whatever is F is G. This is not the only way out of Meinong's universe of non-existent beings, however. Some philosophers have argued that names of fictional and mythical creatures refer to existent objects — abstract objects in particular. Nathan Salmon (1998) has recently advocated a version of this general view. Salmon claims that ‘Pegasus’ and the like refer to existent things — to abstract entities, man-made artifacts.[12] On such a view, (26) is actually false. Pegasus, a man-made artifact, does indeed exist and so can be referred to. Intuitions to the contrary are to be explained by a conflation of speaker meaning and word meaning, the former of which may involve a proposition to the effect that Pegasus does not exist as a physical object. This way of looking at the problem of non-being allows Salmon to salvage Millianism: the view that the meaning of a proper name is nothing more than its reference.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/#RefRea
******************
Thanks for playing Streifeld.
Manata,
ReplyDeleteConsidering how much incompetence you are demonstrating here, it's hard to believe you think you can speak for all philosophers.
Manata: "Streitfeld confuses concepts and referents. He confuses sense and referents."
No. Manata confuses his allegations with facts.
"A unicorn isn't a "mental entity." The concept OF a unicorn isn't a unicorn [qua mythological horse]. That would mean that unicorns exist."
Unicorns exist in the mind. Mythologies exist in the mind. Mythological horses exist in the mind. This is not so hard to understand, is it?
"Oh, by the way, where is the referent to the claim that to be meaningful a statement has to have a referent?"
The claim can be restated as follows: for all statements X, X has a referent. This statement refers to all statements.
"Now you see why I asked about meaning."
There was never any mystery about why you asked about meaning. The only mystery is why you still don't understand my answer.
Let me parse it out for you again.
None of your talk about theories of meaning has any relevance at all to my argument, and no conclusions you draw about any theory of meaning will have any implications for my argument, unless and until you make the connection between your arguments about meaning and some analysis of my argument.
Don't you get it, Paul?
The best you can do--the absolute best--is try to poke holes in my understanding of meaning. However, none of those holes will have any implications at all for the argument I put on the table.
What you're doing is called "well-poisoning." You are trying to dismiss my argument by finding something wrong with me. As if you could find something about me and the way I think that would prove a priori an inability to construct a valid argument. It's fallacious, Paul. You should know that already.
Now, I could go on and talk about how pathetic your attempts to dismiss physicalism are . . . maybe I'll get to that one day. Yet, unless you think you can show how my argument for theological noncognitivism depends on a physicalist theory of meaning, all your talk about physicalism and theories of meaning is irrelevant. So why should I humor your desire to distract us from the argument that's on the table?
After dismantling Streifeld, his pride gets the best of him and he just has to open his mouth some more to "save face."
ReplyDelete"No. Manata confuses his allegations with facts."
This is an assertion. As my links pointed out, hardly anyone thinks that 'unicorn' has a reference, though it has a sense.
"Unicorns exist in the mind. Mythologies exist in the mind. Mythological horses exist in the mind. This is not so hard to understand, is it? "
That's friggim sweet! I can't believe someone actually said this. I can die happy now.
I wrote: Oh, by the way, where is the referent to the claim that to be meaningful a statement has to have a referent?
Streitfeld responded:
The claim can be restated as follows: for all statements X, X has a referent. This statement refers to all statements.
Call the above [*], what is [*]'s referent? That all statements have a referent doesn't tell me what the referent is.
What's the referent of 'has,' 'a,' 'to,' 'for,' etc?
Oh, by the way, if you look above I refuted the claim that all statements have a referent.
Next: God can do anything.
That is a statement, and for any statement, X, X has a referent. On Stretfeld's terminology, to have a referent is to be meaningful, therefore, Streitfeld just proved the meaningfulness of God-talk.
Thanks for playing.
"None of your talk about theories of meaning has any relevance at all to my argument, and no conclusions you draw about any theory of meaning will have any implications for my argument, unless and until you make the connection between your arguments about meaning and some analysis of my argument."
What's the referent of 'meaning?' of 'at?' of 'any' of 'will' etc?
I've given that argument a few times now. Ignoring it doesn't make it go away.
"The best you can do--the absolute best--is try to poke holes in my understanding of meaning. However, none of those holes will have any implications at all for the argument I put on the table."
For any refutation, R, of X, if R is based on a certain understanding, U, of something else, and U is false, then R doesn't refute X.
An example of the above might be: the logical positivists said 'the term God has no meaning.'
The response was 'Why?'
Their response was, 'For something to have meaning it has to either be analytic or synthetic' (fill in the other details).
The response was, 'But that statement itself isn't analytic or synthetic, therefore it is meaningless.
Another example:
If a claim about meaninglessness presupposes a theory of meaning that is deficient, then that claim about meaninglessness is deficient.
I really hope you coll your neurons and take the time to soak these words into your synapses.
Streitfeld, just so you know how controversial a topic you broached when speaking about the existence of fictional entities, see this paper. Just so you know, of all the philosophers surveyed, the existence of fictional entities in brains didn't make the top 10 list. The author also did not confuse our concepts of the fictional entities with the entities qua entities - as you do. Again, we see why no one should take Streitfeld and his wannabe image as an atheologian seriously. It's actually rather sad that people actually admit to believing the kinds of things Streitfeld does.
ReplyDeleteSo, so much the worse for your "unobjectionable" theory of meaning. Your argument requires a highly specialized ontology and theory of meaning. Once you give it, assuming you even can, there's no guarantee that your non-cognitivism argument will even get off the ground.
Jason Streitfeld says he's a proud atheist.
ReplyDeleteBut that's meaningless.
He says the term 'God' is meaningless.
He says that even to say that 'No knowledge presupposes God' is to say something meaningless, so he denies it.
But, 'atheism' states that God does not exist, or that one lacks a belief in God.
Both those claims, according to Streitfeld, are meaningless. Hence, atheism is meaningless. He must reject the claim that he is an atheist.
Also, if he rejects the claim that 'No knowledge presupposes God' because 'God' is a meaningless term, then he must also reject the claim that 'God is a meaningless term.' Atheist Theodore Drange states, "[theological] noncognitivism declares atheism to be flat-out meaningless."
But a key premise of one of his "devastating" arguments against theism was this:
[The Devastator] "Atheism may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of the existence of God. Thus, if one presupposes the existence of God in an argument, one begs the question against atheism."
But he must deny these statements! All statements that say 'God' in any way (atheism or theism) are meaningless.
In fact, if Streitfeld is right, he should never have written his post. He should stop blogging. He can never mention the word 'God' again otherwise that means he will have to "reject that claim," because he told me that he "reject all claims that have the word God in them."
Manata: "hardly anyone thinks that 'unicorn' has a reference, though it has a sense."
ReplyDeleteAre you appealing to the masses, Paul?
Manata: "That all statements have a referent doesn't tell me what the referent is."
So what?
"What's the referent of 'has,' 'a,' 'to,' 'for,' etc?"
Those aren't statements, Paul.
Anyway, I never said all statements had a referent. Why are you acting like I did?
Manata: "What's the referent of 'meaning?' of 'at?' of 'any' of 'will' etc?
I've given that argument a few times now. Ignoring it doesn't make it go away."
What argument? Paul, are you stupid, or just insane?
I'm guessing insane, with a touch of stupidity thrown in.
Manata: "Streitfeld, just so you know how controversial a topic you broached when speaking about the existence of fictional entities, see this paper. Just so you know, of all the philosophers surveyed, the existence of fictional entities in brains didn't make the top 10 list."
Another appeal to the masses, Paul?
Since when was philosophical discourse a popularity contest?
Oh yeah, I forgot. You're insane and slightly stupid. That explains it.
You: "The author also did not confuse our concepts of the fictional entities with the entities qua entities - as you do."
Fictional entities are conceptual entities. They exist as mental constructs. You deny this, for some reason, and appeal to some philosophical survey to support your views.
The fact is, I can refer to Sherlock Holmes. I can refer to unicorns. I can, in fact, distinguish a drawing of a unicorn from a drawing of a horse. The word "unicorn" refers. This is obvious. The fact that other philosophers have differing views is inconsequential.
Manata: "your argument requires a highly specialized ontology and theory of meaning."
You have not supported that assertion with argument. If you want to say anything about my argument, you need to address the argument.
But you're still not going to admit that, are you?
You are stubbornly going to continue acting like an ignorant, insane fool.
You're hopeless.
Maybe one day you'll grow out of this stage in your intellectual development. One can only hope.
You say: "But, 'atheism' states that God does not exist, or that one lacks a belief in God.
Both those claims, according to Streitfeld, are meaningless. Hence, atheism is meaningless. He must reject the claim that he is an atheist."
I've explained your misunderstanding already in the other thread. No need to repeat it here.
I've finally found a little time to put together this response to Steve. I debated bothering to continue this discussion, because I have little hope that it will bear any fruit. More precisely, I have little reason to think that anybody here is interested in arguing in good faith.
ReplyDeleteConsidering how Paul Manata abruptly ended the discussion we were having in his thread (see here for an explanation of what happened, and here and here for elucidations of the relevant philosophical issues), I have little reason to expect much from Steve. Still, I'll give Steve the benefit of the doubt (don't ask me why) and think he is capable of showing a little more intellectual integrity. I guess we’ll see.
So . . .
Steve says, “If I’m under no obligation to notify you, then my ‘failure’ to notify you would have no bearing on my integrity.”
I suppose for a person who views integrity only in terms of obligations, Steve’s comment here makes sense. However, I don’t think of integrity in terms of obligations. I think of it in terms of principles.
A philosophical discussion must be principled, or it lacks integrity. When one is engaged in a philosophical discussion, there must be some degree of mutual respect. By repeatedly failing to notify me of his responses, Steve has indicated that he does not want to work together towards a mutual understanding; which means he does not want to engage me in a philosophical discussion at all.
This is even more obvious when we consider that all Steve’s posts are most easily interpreted as attempts to drive me away from the discussion, as opposed to concerted efforts to arrive at a mutual understanding of the issues.
So this is not quite philosophy, what Steve is doing. And yet, Steve wants to criticize me and my ideas on philosophical grounds. He wants to act like he is doing philosophy. Maybe he even wants to do philosophy. Perhaps we should give him the benefit of the doubt, since he is engaging me with philosophy.
But he is failing to live up to the principles of a philosophical discussion. That indicates a lack of integrity, and it has nothing to do with whether or not Steve owes me anything.
To sum up: it might be that Steve really has no interest in discussing philosophy here; in which case, all of his posts have been made under false pretenses. But rather than accuse him of systematic dishonesty, I accuse him of lacking the integrity to live up to the principles of a philosophical discussion.
But maybe he's just systematically disingenuous.
Whatever.
I'm going to continue now, only to point out how badly Steve has failed to make a case in this discussion.
I said: “What is germane, Steve, is that your notion of ‘the illocal nature of consciousness’ is a load of manure.”
Steve replied: “That’s a very impressive counterargument, even by your lofty standards. You’ve reached new heights of reasoning.”
Steve’s usage of the term “counterargument” implies there was an argument to begin with. There was not. Since Steve never presented an argument, I am under no obligation to explain why I think his notion is worthless.
Steve said: “Both Manata and I have responded to your lame arguments for physicalism. Try something new.”
As I noted already, this isn’t true. Steve repeats his lie here, perhaps hoping that eventually his readers will think they’re true.
Steve: “The human mind manifests itself in the human brain. The brain is a medium by which (among other things) the human mind perceives the sensible world. It uses this three pound lump of matter do intelligent things.”
That does not answer the question, which was an attempt to understand just what is meant by the claim that “the human mind manifests itself in the human brain.”
When I try to understand what Steve means, Steve responses by repeating the claim. That is not argument. It’s inundation.
Steve adds that the mind uses the brain and perceives through the brain. So we might think the brain is some kind of tool for the mind to use to its advantage, a medium through which the mind can interact with the world. Yet, this would make the brain and the mind two separate entities, the former used by the latter. It would not make the former a manifestation of the latter. So Steve’s use of the term “manifestation” is still without sense.
Steve says: “Distance is not a number. Distance is a physical length. We assign a numerical value to a physical length, but no physical object exactly corresponds to an abstract numerical universal. Physical objects have fuzzy boundaries, and they are unstable over time.”
Notice that Steve did not answer the question. He first said that distances approximate numbers, but he has not explained what it means for a distance to approximate a number. What he has written here is unintelligible.
We “assign” numerical values to physical lengths. Thus we talk about distances as having numerical values. Does this mean distances approximate those values? Steve says it does. But what does that mean?
Normally, when we say a distance is an approximation, we are talking about a particular measurement. The measurement is an approximation of the distance. The numbers we measure out are taken as approximations of the physical reality. So, numbers can approximate reality. Reality doesn’t approximate numbers. Steve, however, says that the physical distance itself is an approximation of some abstract numerical value. It looks like he has it backwards.
In Steve’s view, the length of any particular distance approximates abstract numerical universals, but the length itself is not a number. So, something other than a number, called “length,” is able to approximate a number. What can approximate a number, if not another number?
I asked: “And how does it exemplify the number? Is there something about the surface of the earth, about the contours and ridges that define the American landscape, that exemplifies the number 2800?”
Steve replied: “Physical length is a property instance of an abstract universal.”
So, in Steve’s view, the length (the distance) is both an approximation of an abstract numerical universal and a property instance of an abstract universal. Steve hasn’t said either way, but I wonder if he is supposing that the same abstract universal is both approximated and instantiated.
Is every instantiation of numerical values an approximation? I mean, if I count three iguanas in my living room, are these only approximations of some abstract numerical value? Or are there really three iguanas? Is three the number I am counting, or some abstract value which the iguanas only approximate?
By Steve’s logic, it would seem that there aren’t really three iguanas in my living room, but only some vague iguana situation which approximates the number three.
It sounds like Steve is denying the reality of the three iguanas. Is Steve an anti-realist when it comes to physical instantiations of numerical values? I don’t think so, because he says there really are property instances of abstract universals. So he must be contradicting himself.
In my view, the notions of “approximation” and “instantiation” here seem wholly unnecessary. It is much simpler to say that when I count three iguanas, I am using a symbol (represented as the number 3) to measure the repetitions in my perception of iguanas. That symbol is a procedural device, a functional tool, in my counting system, and it is functionally equivalent to any such device used by any counting system, because it is defined only via the process of counting.
When I count three iguanas, I am not approximating or instantiating anything. I am counting three iguanas. This, to me, is highly intuitive and it avoids all of the confusion and contradiction found in Steve’s vocabulary.
Steve says: ““Thinking” implies a process. “Thought” does not.”
That depends on how you understand thought. In my view, thought is a process. There is no thought without thinking. I have no conception of what unthinking thought might be.
I said: “Remember, I had asked Steve to give us his definition of ‘mind’ without the incidentals. By referring to these quoted passages, he is telling us what he thinks of mind qua mind, and not simply the human mind.”
Steve responded: “Wrong. You asked a generic question and I gave you a generic answer.”
There’s nothing wrong about what I said. Steve is in denial, and avoiding the question presented to him.
Steve says: “God has beliefs about the world. That’s an intentional state.”
I suppose Steve would also say that all of God’s beliefs are true. He might even say they’re all justified, but knowing how particular Paul Manata is about Gettier and all that, I won’t assume that Steve wants to attach himself to any particular notion of justification or some other constraint capable of distinguishing true beliefs from knowledge. Suffice it to say that, for Steve, God has beliefs about the world, and that these beliefs constitute knowledge in whatever sense of the word Steve imagines.
Beliefs are often thought of as propositional attitudes, which are behavioral dispositions towards propositions. We need not think of beliefs only in terms of propositions, however. When we talk about what a person believes, we are talking about how they are disposed to behave in general, though often with specific reference to linguistic behavior. The point is, when we say somebody has some belief, we are making predictions about their behavior.
Steve probably won’t agree with me here. And yet, whenever we talk about what a person believes, that talk can be interpreted and rephrased in terms of behavioral dispositions. Unless Steve can provide some case where the language of beliefs cannot be interpreted in terms of behavioral dispositions, I don’t think he has any grounds for disagreeing with me.
We can transform statements about beliefs into statements about behavior for a very good reason: because the language of belief has evolved as a tool to help us live together as social animals. While we have very little understanding of the complexities that determine our thoughts and actions, we have a makeshift language that allows us to simplify the complexities according to relatively stable and easily identifiable patterns of behavior. This is how the language of belief functions.
Steve is free to disagree with me here, but if he does, he should back up his disagreement with argument.
Now, how am I supposed to understand what Steve means when he says God—a being that does not behave in any sense of the word I can relate to, since behavior implies temporal existence—has beliefs?
Does God have behavioral dispositions? That means that God’s existence is such that God is disposed to act a certain way. Which means that God’s existence can be logically separated from God’s actions. This indicates a temporal existence.
Steve indicates temporality again when he said that God “can instatiate” any compossible state of affairs. If God “can” do something, it means God’s existence is not identical to God’s actions. It means that God has some condition, X, which makes some action, Y, possible. X and Y are not the same, and they do not occur together. They must be separated in space and time. Which means God is temporal.
But Steve defines God as being atemporal. This is a contradiction.
Steve wants to avoid such contradictions by embracing a “tenseless” theory of time. However, tenseless theories of time offer no help to him here. For tenseless theories of time only provide a way of describing events in time without implying that past and future tensions have some absolute meaning. Tenseless theories of time do not suggest that atemporal beings exist, or that causes occur outside of time. They do not suggest that we can make sense of an “atemporal mind” which exists independently of its actions.
Steve refers to counterfactual theories of causation as support of his assertion that a timeless cause can produce a temporal effect. Yet, counterfactual theories of causation only deal with temporal asymmetry. They don’t define “timeless causes.”
Furthermore, he refers to Quentin Smith to demonstrate the conceivability of a timeless cause. Yet, I don’t see Quentin Smith supporting anything like what Steve wants to argue here. Smith has put forward the notion that the singularity at the beginning of the universe was an instantaneous moment of lawlessness out of which the universe sprang. He has not argued that there was an timeless cause; rather, he argues that the singularity (defined as infinitely compressed spatio-temporal mass) was uncaused.
In any case, we can question the logic and importance of Smith’s case here, because the notion of a singularity at the beginning of the universe is problematic. We have no framework for discussing the nature of a singularity, and so can only speculate; and we should not forget that our capacity for speculation far exceeds our ability to make sense.
The point is, Steve’s appeals to tenseless theories of time, counterfactual theories of causality, and Quentin Smith are all wholly out of place. This leaves Steve’s entire position without support, and his argument against theological noncognitivism empty handed.
I wrote: “When a speaker produces spoken words, we call it speaking. The utterance is the spoken words. The words are uttered in time. That is, the utterance is temporal.”
Steve: “As usual, Streitfeld is unable to distinguish between cause and effect.”
Steve’s missed the whole point of my critique, which is that he is trying to insert a distinction between an action and the acting, between the doing and the being done. He is taking a logical distinction between nouns and verbs and inferring an ontological distinction between “the production of an event” and “the event itself.”
Me: “As if an action can occur in time without the actor also occurring in time. It’s nonsense.”
Steve: “It would only be nonsense if you assume a particular theory of causation, where cause and effect must both be temporal. That’s why I mentioned the counterfactual theory of causation, and also cited Quentin Smith.”
As I noted, Quentin Smith and counterfactual theories of causation offer no support for Steve here. They are irrelevant. What is relevant is that Steve is separating the doing with the deed, the noun from the verb. This isn’t a matter of cause and effect. It’s a matter of simple logic.
Steve boasts of his "sophisticated" language for dealing with the metaphysical issues here. Unfortunately, no evidence of any sophistication is on offer. You'd think Steve would have been careful to use his special language from the start, when he first presented his understanding of God for philosophical scrutiny.
He didn't, I suspect because all his talk of "sophistication" is bogus.
The only topic left to address is the Book of Job.
My question is simple: why does the Book of Job present it as God “answering” Job? Why does it indicate that God first spoke with Satan, allowed Satan to inflict harm on Job, and then had another conversation with Satan, and then allowed Satan to continue, and so on?
The character of God in this story is clearly acting in time, along with Job and Satan. Steve dismisses this aspect of the narrative, saying that the Book of Job does not present a metaphysical analysis of God. Perhaps the book wasn’t written to present a metaphysical analysis, but it tells a story nonetheless. Are we to ignore the obvious implications of story, simply because it doesn’t fit in with Steve’s nonsensical notions of atemporal mind?
Let it be known that I am fully aware of the several typos in my last post. I am sure you will all be happy to know that I am prepared to punish myself for this unwholesome behavior. For each typo that Steve decides to bring to everyone's attention, I will flog myself with 50 lashes of the whip.
ReplyDelete"I've explained your misunderstanding already in the other thread. No need to repeat it here."
ReplyDeleteNo, you simply *asserted* that "atheism is meaningful" even when professional atheistic philosophers like Michael Martin, Jeff Lowder, Theodore Drange &c. all disagree. Also, that atheism itself is meaningless if the term God is meaningless is an example logician Alex Fisher uses in his book on informal logic.
I wrote: "What's the referent of 'has,' 'a,' 'to,' 'for,' etc?"
Jason responded: Those aren't statements, Paul.
My response: Uhhh, neither is the term 'God' a statement, yet you think the term is meaningless.
Jason said: "Anyway, I never said all statements had a referent. Why are you acting like I did?"
My reply: It's unfortunate that Jason can't read and comprehend. This makes him post embarrassing things like this. He then strust around on his blog and here like a mad man, thumping his chest about how I "came off looking poorly."
But if Jason would bother to settle down and think he wouldn't make grandious claims like this.
He never saud all terms and statements had a referent. That's obvious. He thinks God has no referent. He did say that all MEANINGFUL terms had referents.
Whatta spaz.
Paul,
ReplyDeleteDon't you ever give up?
You say: "you simply *asserted* that "atheism is meaningful" even when professional atheistic philosophers like Michael Martin, Jeff Lowder, Theodore Drange &c. all disagree. Also, that atheism itself is meaningless if the term God is meaningless is an example logician Alex Fisher uses in his book on informal logic."
If you're going to ignore what I've written on the topic, why should I bother repeating myself?
You say: "He did say that all MEANINGFUL terms had referents."
No, I didn't.
Oh, and I didn't say you came off looking "poorly," Paul.
ReplyDeleteI said you came off looking pathetic--a slight but noteworthy difference.