Some apologists have made the claim that an apologetic argument(s) that only demonstrates the existence of God with probability, albeit a high probability, are deficient in a major way: the unbeliever still has an excuse.
This inexcusability, of course, is taken from Romans 1.
It is alleged that if the apologist only shows the probability of God's existence, albeit a high probability, the unbeliever can go before God on judgment day and claim he had an excuse for not believing.
It seems that those who argue thus grant Bertrand Russell's argument before the throne:
God: Why didn't you believe, Bertie.
Bertie: Not enough evidence God, not enough evidence.
There was some evidence, just not enough. God's existence was only probable.
Of course Bertie didn't think God's existence probable, let alone highly probable, but I trust my general point about apologists granting his claim stands.
By why think this?
First off, the text isn't even discussing apologetics in general and arguments for God's existence in particular.
Secondly, isn't the fact that God's general revelation to man is clear, exceedingly clear, what grounds the inexcusability? Even if every apologetic argument in the world failed to show that God's existence had a probability of .1, wouldn’t man still be without excuse?
Third, is it even true that probability can't ground inexcusability or moral culpability? Ignorance of the law is not an excuse?
Furthermore, suppose that a man had an argument presented to him by an auto mechanic to the effect that his brakes would probably fail the next time he stepped on them. The man asks how sure the mechanic is. The mechanic says that he's pretty sure. "How sure?", says the man. The mechanic says, "You have a 90% chance the brakes will fail the next time you press the pedal." Now, say this man ignored the mechanic, took his children, and got in his car to go home. Unfortunately, the mechanic was right, the car failed to stop at the intersection, and the car was t-boned, landing the man's children in county hospital in critical condition. Now say you go to visit this man, who's a friend of yours, while he's waiting for news on his children at the hospital. Say the mechanic was also a friend of yours and he called you and told you what he told the man who crashed. Wouldn't you rightly, and with indignation, storm up to the man and say something like, "What were you thinking Mike! Didn't Moe at the auto shop warn you about your brakes? What's your excuse!?" You obviously mean the last line rhetorically as there is no excuse. But the man, Mike, looks at you and says, "But I had an excuse, the argument Moe gave only yielded a 90% probability that the brakes would fail. One can't be held inexcusable for failing to form a belief that is only probable, albeit highly probable."
Mike's reasoning seems self-evidently false to me. Especially considered morally rather than epistemologically (and Paul is making primarily an ethical point).
That's at least my rough thoughts on the matter.
As a Van Tillian, I've come to similar conclusions. I think the sensus divinitatis/deitatis is primarily an existential apprehension, not purely and primarily a rational one. Gordon Clark's criticism of General Revelation as not providing any propositional content hits the mark there. That's why he rejected inductive and empirically based arguments. However, it seems to me that Van Til was right in saying that all of creation is proof positive that God exists and is Creator, creative, wise, powerful, good, just, and that we are accountable to Him.
ReplyDeleteWhat I think Van Til was addressing when it comes to probability is that from the perspective of epistemology and PURE reason, we as finite beings (who are not assuredly made in God's image as non-Christians assume a priori) cannot have any certainty over anything via induction. Therefore probability is meaningless since nature might be contingent (not having fixed properties). However, even if nature were uniform induction cannot tell us with certainty what those properties are since we don't universal inductive experience. Hence, the properties of car brakes may change from our usual experience of metal hardness to the softness of cheese for no apparent reasons. If that's the case, how could anyone be guilty for not getting one's brakes fixed. Why even put on seatbelts?
Clark wrote that one could never disprove the existence of God since no one has universal inductive experience. By analogy, he showed how it's more difficult to say that there is no naturally buried gold in the ground of Alaska than to say that there is. Since, to find gold, one may only need to search one square feet. But to prove there is NO gold, would require one to search ALL of the vast Alaskan territory for one to confidently say there isn't.
In the same way, no one can prove there is no God. God might be hiding behind pluto, or planet Z or Alpha Centari. Van Til rightly criticized Clark here when he said that if Clark's statement was right, then it actually DISproves the existence of the Christian God because the Biblical description of God is such that He's inexcapably known to all sentient beings (man, angel, or extra-terrestrial (grin) ). THAT's why Van Til rejected probability. For Van Til, to reject certainty in favor of probability would be to make the ultimate concession. Namely, that the Christian God does not exist.
But again, I think he's confusing/confounding 1. "rationally certain proof" for 2. what (I believe) the Bible is speaking about. An existential knowledge and apprehension of God that all men have regardless of their exposure to the positive or negative arguments for God's existence. This is why a seven year old child can be justified in her belief in God (A la Plantinga' properly basic belief), and why a 70 year old is inexcusable even after having reviewed all arguments thus far put forth and rejecting them.
This is another reason why I think Van Til doesn't much address what Steve has often mentioned. There was little place in Van Til for the doctrine of Divine Hiddenness (DH). I understand DH as having various components.
1. The fact that in God's Holiness, he doesn't make his manifest loving presence "felt" to sinful creatures. In fact (apart from redemption) He distances Himself from sinners (Hab. 1:13; Ps. 5:4). Just as we as sinners have distanced ourself from God (Isa. 59:1-2ff). Just as Adam hide from God's presence when guilty. R.C. sproul's book "If There's a God, Why Are There Atheists?" (also titled "The Psychology of Atheism") hits a home run on this.
2. DH is also due to God's judgement on us as sinners. Shunning the light already given, we are not entitled to more light. He can withdraw the light that's already shining, or can keep more light from shining through.
3. DH gives place for the exaltation of grace as well as allowing for meritorious damnation. Pascal, being a Catholic rejected Jansenism. Nevertheless he had a strong view of sovereign grace.
Quoting Pascal's "Pensées":
563
The prophecies, the very miracles and proofs of our religion, are not of
such a nature that they can be said to be absolutely convincing. But
they are also of such a kind that it cannot be said that it is
unreasonable to believe them. Thus there is both evidence and obscurity
to enlighten some and confuse others. But the evidence is such that it
surpasses, or at least equals, the evidence to the contrary; so that it
is not reason which can determine men not to follow it, and thus it can
only be lust or malice of heart. And by this means there is sufficient
evidence to condemn, and insufficient to convince; so that it appears in
those who follow it, that it is grace, and not reason, which makes them
follow it; and in those who shun it, that it is lust, not reason, which
makes them shun it.
4. DH makes room for the exercise of "active faith" (for lack of a better term). Though God is omnipresent, there are times in the Christian life when God's loving *manifest* presence can be so strong that it can keep one faithful and far from sin. But when "it" leaves (along with the subjective feelings), that's when the Christian gets to exercise his faith muscles. To act faithfully under the seeming absence (yes, even seeming abandonment) of God. In fact, sometimes it takes more faith (and stretches one faith) to believe God is with one (i.e. God on one's side) when God seems to have abandoned them, than merely trying to believe that there is a God who exists at all. Especially when one still is fully convinced that God does exist. That's what made Job's trial that much for trying.
5. Along the lines of #4, DH makes room for Christian activity. If God's Kingdom were fully realized now, then all sin would immediately be punished. All lack would be immediately be supplied. All sickness would immediately be healed. Judgement day would have arrived and there would be no place for evangelism, missions, feeding and clothing the poor, healing and ministering to the sick, and the exercise of Christian sacrifice (along with many other things). Then there would be no basis for Christian rewards for faithfulness in the hereafter.
Btw, the brief list of reasons for the importance of acknowledging the doctrine of Divine Hiddenness obviously doesn't include one of the main reasons for why men often don't acknowledge the existence of God. Something which Van Til excelled in emphasizing. Namely, that men as sinners, distort and twist the unavoidable, clear and inescapable evidence of their Creator, providential Benefactor and Judge. It's not included since this doesn't have to do with the obscurity of God, but rather of men's willful suppression of the evidence.
ReplyDeleteWhen it comes to #5, ironically, I could have included the fact that the denial and falsity of the doctrine of DH would also make another Christian activity unnecessary. It would make Christian apologetics obsolete (heh).
While Van Til's poorly nuanced affirmation of the perspecuity of General Revelation that leads to all men being without excuse results in a virtual denial or de-emphasis of Divine Hiddenness; Clarkian Scripturalism leads to the opposite result. It leads to the unintentioned result in affirming Divine Hiddenness (or should I say Disappearance).
The extreme rationalism of Clarkian Scripturalists in principle LOWERS man's accountability before God since it limits knowledge to the explicit propositions of Scripture, or those that can be necessarily deduced from Scripture. In which case, by pure "Biblical rationalism", one can claim to be guiltless after commiting adultery since one's sense perceptions aren't reliable. For all Terry knows, the woman people call her lesbian lover is actually her husband. While Scripture is the highest authority over human beings, even General Revelation has an authority over men that they cannot deny. Van Til is right in affirming that all things are revelational of God. From our internal conscience and inate ideas/concepts (having been made in God's rational image) that Clarkians emphasize, to the external world of creation, history, providence and human society that Van Til also emphasized. Man is through and through revelational by constitution and by environment.
Sorry for speaking so dogmatically. I'm just expressing the way I see things. If anything seem wrong in what I've said, I'm open for correction or clarification. Thanks Paul and all. :-)
brakes
ReplyDeleteIf probability isn't good enough then only the impossibility of the contrary will suffice right? The transcendental argument becomes the only weapon. I would rather make use of all of them in whatever situation they seem appropriate.
ReplyDeleteTo me this parallels the old "what about those who have never heard" argument. What about those who haven't heard all the apologetic arguments, or perhaps the apologetic argument if you're a TAG onlyist.
God: Why didn't you believe, David?
David: I just couldn't figure out this epistemology stuff. Is your existence really the pre-condition for intelligibility?
God: Probably
David: What?
God: Just kidding
ha, funny David. Btw, it is highly doubtful that TAG proves impossibility of the contrary.
ReplyDeleteCaleb,
ReplyDeleteJust for fun, could you make me doubtful?
David,
ReplyDeleteCaleb and I were in Africa this last summer and spoke to a man there who had a holy book and it taught that god created the world, man fell, god sent a redeemer, the redemmer was fully god and man, man is saved by grace through faith in this god-man, etc. Oh, by the way, he said his god was a quadrinity. Maybe you know what's so special about three-in-one that it accounts the pre-conditions while four-in-one can't.
Hmm interesting. I guess a Bahnsenesque approach would be to argue that the social trinity is the only means of having unity/diversity and a perfectly balanced relationship within the Godhead. Somehow it would have to be established that 3 is the magic number, haha.
ReplyDeleteYea thats a good point, because TAG is supposed to strictly be an argument for the Christian God so if another variation works just as well then there is a problem.
A quadrinity obviously crosses the line into polytheism, and all of the irreconcilable contradiction of Hinduism's divine pantheon ensues. Three "grains" of sand does not make a "heap," but four obviously does. Three's company, and four's a crowd, you know.
ReplyDeleteSeriously, though, a good point raised against Bahnsen's particular transcendentalism.
Paul,
ReplyDeleteAfter some more thinking, this seems to be what it boils down to:
If it is possible for the quad-God worldview to be internally coherent and provide the preconditions for intelligibility, then TAG fails.
I guess you really can't demand that only actual worldviews be under question. Dang it!
Ironically, it was your debate with Barker that first started getting me into TAG.
"Quad-God"? I guess this is why a defense of God's special revelation through the scriptures are so important.
ReplyDeleteIt's interesting that the probability argument is made against Christ where a doctrine of the indwelling of God's Holy Spirit is able to be conveyed. The evidential probability for God is exceptional, but when one has the Holy Spirit, He is undeniable. Those without the Holy Spirit have no argument. Evidential apologetics as evangelism resonates within the elect. It does not resonate with those who are not. Nevertheless, we must be tireless in making the case in the event the Spirit brings them to life.
David & lock the deadbolt,
ReplyDeleteThose points I made above are not unique to me. For a more robust treatment, cf. Sean Choi's article on TAG in Reasons for Faith, eds. Meister & Gesiler.
Re: Barker debate - That was right about the time I was seriously questioning the strong version of TAG. I could make all the same points and just remove "impossibility" from my argument. I certainly don't have problems with scaled-down transcendental arguments. Also, one can make a cumulative case transcendental arguments, cf. James Anderson's If Knowledge, Then God.
Perhaps I misunderstood or simply missed the implications/statements of Van Til, Bahnsen, et. al. but I don't recall them actually granting that the non-TAs were "highly probably." Though, they may have said something like "even if they were very probable..." (with emphasis on "even if"). Again, maybe they did and I just don't know about it. Even so, the way I understood Van Til et. al. I took them to mean that you can't even begin to assess probability unless you presuppose God.
ReplyDeleteWouldn't that be the logical conclusion of Van Tilian Presup. claims? If God is the nec. precon. to logic and logic is a precon. to assessing probability then one cannot put God in the dock and assess the probability of His existence.
Furthermore, for a Christian to reject the strong modal version of TAG it seems to me that one's primary grounds for doing so is exegetical rather than philosophical. After all, Van Til admited that the arg. for God's existence may be poorly stated and may never be adequately stated. "But" he said, "in itself the argument is absolutely sound." How could he say this after just admitting that it may never be adequately stated? I always thought his grounds for saying so was the belief that the biblical picture of God was precon. to Intel. T hus, it was because the Bible portrays God as PI that he believed in strong modal TAG and not because he had all the answers.
So, even if I meet a Fristian and don't know how the Fristian God destroyes intelligibility this may simply be evidence of my stupidity rather than the falsity of the strong modal version of TAG. For the Christian then, they should just simply deny that Scripture presents to us such a god.
Even if God didn't exist we could still be here knowing things and using logic etc. Right?
I could be wrong.
Jonathon,
ReplyDeleteNothing in my agrument depends on the idea that Bahnsen and Van Til admitted that the non-TAG arguments wrere "highly probable."
But to argue that that have a probability less than .5 seems to take the force out of their main objection. Why even bother objecting if you can show or if non-TAG apologists admit that they have a probability less than .5? Then it's not a good argument...period.
And they did claim that you couldn't assess probability without presupposing God. But that's also besides the point. They did claim that a probable argument leaves an excuse. Why even claim that when you're not going to allow probability.
Also, if I'm a Christian and I presuppose God then apparently I can make sense of probability, right? So, I now say my apologetic argument shows God probably exists. You can't tell *me* that I can't account for probability. But Bahnsen &co. would tell me that my argument leaves the unbeliever an excuse. To which my above post attempts a reply.
I' unsure the relevance of your claim that Van Til didn't have all the answers. My arguments don't rest on the idea that he does. But if you can't answer the defeaters, why expect me to trust the mere *announcing* that "if you were smarter" you could do what you *assert* you could do? This is why many people have had problems with Tagsters. They make claims they can't back up.
And of course to claim that "TAG" is *exegetically* derived from the Bible is quite a stretch. It would seem to be quite anachronistic to claim that the usual proof texts had contemporary post-Kantian categories in mind. Had contemporary analysis of 'knowledge' as their referent.
And, yeah, TAG *could* be right. But once we walk through that door you have to admit it *could* be wrong. So your claim is a wash. But the point I'm raising is that there's no *reason* for me to believe that it is since it seems like another worldview does the job TAGsters claim only Christianity could do and the exegetical base claimed for it is suspect, at best.
Paol,
ReplyDeleteYou state, "Nothing in my agrument depends on the idea that Bahnsen and Van Til admitted that the non-TAG arguments wrere 'highly probable.'
But to argue that that have a probability less than .5 seems to take the force out of their main objection. Why even bother objecting if you can show or if non-TAG apologists admit that they have a probability less than .5? Then it's not a good argument...period."
I wasn't trying to defeat your argument. I was simply pointing out what may have been the issue for Van Til et al.
It was not that an unbeliever who came upon a non-TAGer would actually have an excuse but, rather, that the unbeliever would *think* he had one.
But even this was not the main or sole issue to Van Til et al. As you know, it was primarily an issue of neutrality. The problem of probability arguments for non-TAGsters to Van Til et al stemmed from the issue of neutrality and "brute fact," as Van Til would say. He would claim, you cannot start with brute fact and very probably prove God's existence. But I'm sure you know all this.
You state, "And they did claim that you couldn't assess probability without presupposing God. But that's also besides the point. They did claim that a probable argument leaves an excuse. Why even claim that when you're not going to allow probability."
Perhaps they meant something like "You cannot even have probability without presupposing God. But when you say that your evidence (or whatever) is only probable then you leave the unbeliever thinking he has an excuse." Maybe this is what they meant, maybe it isn't. My point is only that they can disallow for the possibility of probability outside of a Xian worldview and still criticize a Xian who claims God probably exists. Internal critique.
You state, "Also, if I'm a Christian and I presuppose God then apparently I can make sense of probability, right? So, I now say my apologetic argument shows God probably exists. You can't tell *me* that I can't account for probability. But Bahnsen &co. would tell me that my argument leaves the unbeliever an excuse. To which my above post attempts a reply."
I hate to keep hypothesizing what they may have said but perhaps Van Til and Bahnsen would have said "On the Xian worldview you can have probability. Given the Xian worldview, you can construct an argument to show that God probably exists. However, outside of the Xian worldview, the probability of your argument's soundness becomes negligible. Ergo, the argument itself still leaves the believer thinking he has an excuse."
Thus, it seems to me, that they could grant you your probability on your Xian worldview but deny its value to an unbeliever.
You state, "I' unsure the relevance of your claim that Van Til didn't have all the answers. My arguments don't rest on the idea that he does."
My comments regarding Van Til not having the answers etc. was in regards to you mentioning the Fristian objection in the comment box.
You state, "But if you can't answer the defeaters, why expect me to trust the mere *announcing* that "if you were smarter" you could do what you *assert* you could do? This is why many people have had problems with Tagsters. They make claims they can't back up."
I don't know. Are you playing devil's advocate as a non-believer or are you saying why you, as a Xian, should be persuaded as to my assertion?
If you are playing devil's advocate then I would merely point out that I don't expect you "trust the mere announcing blah blah blah" Wouldn't that be ridiculous?
However, if you are asking as a Christian why you should be persuaded etc. then I would merely point out that the purpose of my initial comment was not to persuade you of the strong modal TAG (smTAG) but to put the intramural debate of smTAG in a context that is often missed, in my experience.
From what I have seen, these conversations about the validity of smTAG are often addressed from a point of view that Van Til would have found rather odd: "do you know the answer to this objection to TAG?" "No? Me either. It must be false then." Van Til didn't purport his brand of Presuppositionalism outside of a theological context, as far as I know. So, it seems to me, to attack it on purely rational grounds of how well *you* or some other person can defend it is misguided.
Van Til did not set forth TAG in perfect form (or much of any form) and say "you see, now that I have set it forth perfectly and ruled out all possible rejoinders you must all become TAGers. Rather, Van Til set forth a theology which he believed lead to TAG and asked people to accept it on those grounds: the line of reasoning he drew from what he believed was Reformed theology to TAG. Of course, I'm simply repeating myself at this point.
You state, "And of course to claim that "TAG" is *exegetically* derived from the Bible is quite a stretch. It would seem to be quite anachronistic to claim that the usual proof texts had contemporary post-Kantian categories in mind. Had contemporary analysis of 'knowledge' as their referent."
I don't know. You would have to draw this out further. But I'm sure that is getting away from your intentions in the post and your initial comments in the combox. My point is only that this is what needs to be done to get rid of smTAG as Van Til et al defended it, as far as I can tell.
You state, "And, yeah, TAG *could* be right. But once we walk through that door you have to admit it *could* be wrong. So your claim is a wash."
I'm not sure what claim you're referring to.
You state, "But the point I'm raising is that there's no *reason* for me to believe that it is since it seems like another worldview does the job TAGsters claim only Christianity could do and the exegetical base claimed for it is suspect, at best."
See above.
Sorry if I got the whole thing off topic. Toodle pip.
Jonathan,
ReplyDelete"I wasn't trying to defeat your argument. I was simply pointing out what may have been the issue for Van Til et al.
Well, they said, "probability leaves an excuse." I assume that means any probability.
It was not that an unbeliever who came upon a non-TAGer would actually have an excuse but, rather, that the unbeliever would *think* he had one.
Well then on that score, TAG doesn't fare any better. It may even fare worse. Unbelievers certainly *think* they have excuses when coming upon a TAGsters argument. TAG receives close to zero respect from unbelieveing philosophers. They in fact "think" they have *more* of an excuse to give God if TAG was the only argument they heard.
"But even this was not the main or sole issue to Van Til et al. As you know, it was primarily an issue of neutrality. The problem of probability arguments for non-TAGsters to Van Til et al stemmed from the issue of neutrality and "brute fact," as Van Til would say."
And I can quote multiply non-TAGsters arguing against neutrality. Frome Aquinas to Moreland and Craig. I can also quote many non-TAGsters appealing to the idea of theory-laden perception, denying "brute" facts. TAGsters have mainly attacked caricatures of their opponent rather than offer proper characterizations.
But at any rate, my main argument had to d with questioning this claim. Call it the Probability Leaves Excusability claim:
[PLE] If an apologetic argument is only probable, then the unbeliever has an excuse before God on judgment day.
([PLE] is almost a direct quote from more than one of my vast collection of Bahnsen tapes).
"Perhaps they meant something like "You cannot even have probability without presupposing God. But when you say that your evidence (or whatever) is only probable then you leave the unbeliever thinking he has an excuse." Maybe this is what they meant, maybe it isn't."
That's not what they meant. And, the other can't be what they meant because to leave it in the subjectivity of the unbeliever also implicates the TAGster.
"I hate to keep hypothesizing what they may have said but perhaps Van Til and Bahnsen would have said "On the Xian worldview you can have probability. Given the Xian worldview, you can construct an argument to show that God probably exists. However, outside of the Xian worldview, the probability of your argument's soundness becomes negligible. Ergo, the argument itself still leaves the believer thinking he has an excuse."
Well, they left enough writings and tapes hat it shouldn't be too hard to make educated guesses at what they'd say.
Anyway, Bahnen would not say that if I've read him right. Bahnsen would say that "on the Christian worldview the only acceptable argument" (i.e., "the only argument that holds water" :-)) " is a transcendental argument." Bahnsen said probability leaves excuses. Period. Now, I'd be willing to grant that this was just more TAGster rhetoric on his end. Similar to vilifying your apologetic opponent as an "evil autonomous sinner" because he won't use TAG.
"Thus, it seems to me, that they could grant you your probability on your Xian worldview but deny its value to an unbeliever."
Same with TAG, then.
"I don't know. Are you playing devil's advocate as a non-believer or are you saying why you, as a Xian, should be persuaded as to my assertion?
If you are playing devil's advocate then I would merely point out that I don't expect you "trust the mere announcing blah blah blah" Wouldn't that be ridiculous?
However, if you are asking as a Christian why you should be persuaded etc. then I would merely point out that the purpose of my initial comment was not to persuade you of the strong modal TAG (smTAG) but to put the intramural debate of smTAG in a context that is often missed, in my experience."
I was not arguing devil's advocate. I also believe this part of the argument is not missed. I also believe that even if you can show that the Bible teaches that God is the PCI, etc., that does *nothing* to say you can/have to *show* that in *apologetic* dialog. The Bible makes many claims that I can't *show* to the unbeliever. The Bible claims God is three-in-one. Can I show how that is? So you have two hurdles. Exegete the relevant passages. Then actually *do* what the Bible says you can do. Oh, btw, the Fristian Bible says the same thing about Frist. He's the PCI. So you have to do an internal critique. So I guess you have three hurdles.
"From what I have seen, these conversations about the validity of smTAG are often addressed from a point of view that Van Til would have found rather odd: "do you know the answer to this objection to TAG?" "No? Me either. It must be false then." Van Til didn't purport his brand of Presuppositionalism outside of a theological context, as far as I know. So, it seems to me, to attack it on purely rational grounds of how well *you* or some other person can defend it is misguided."
Then if the argument boils down to a mere *annoucement* that God is the PCI, yet we can't *show* it in an apologetic dialogue, it appears fairly apologeticaly useless. I mean, I give it points for piety. Paul might say somehting like, "He has zeal, no doubt about that, but it's zeal wihtout knowledge."
"I don't know. You would have to draw this out further. But I'm sure that is getting away from your intentions in the post and your initial comments in the combox. My point is only that this is what needs to be done to get rid of smTAG as Van Til et al defended it, as far as I can tell."
I have to make the exegetical case for TAG?
And, putting up another worldview that can do what TAG does is also enough to get rid of TAG.
It's not me who is saying, "The IMPOSSIBILITY of the contrary." Perhaps if TAGsters aren't prepared to back up this kind of talk, then they shouldn't say it?
"You state, "But the point I'm raising is that there's no *reason* for me to believe that it is since it seems like another worldview does the job TAGsters claim only Christianity could do and the exegetical base claimed for it is suspect, at best."
See above."
I don't see what above answers anything. Even granting the Bible says God is the PCI and that TAG is sound etc., that's a far cry from you *showing* it. So, when someone claims to have *shown* it, and I do what they did with another worldview that they can't "internally critique," what reason do I have to believe that they've offered us a successful TAG? So what do I do in the meantime, apologetically? Keep my mouth shut at questions until I or someone else finally figure out the magic recipe? or continue using a bad argument? So the exegetical point, *even granted*, doesn't do the work you want it to do.
You state, "Well then on that score, TAG doesn't fare any better. It may even fare worse. Unbelievers certainly *think* they have excuses when coming upon a TAGsters argument. TAG receives close to zero respect from unbelieveing philosophers. They in fact "think" they have *more* of an excuse to give God if TAG was the only argument they heard."
ReplyDeleteI agree. It seems to be the case that Bahnsen thought he could answer all objections (Fristian, conceptual necessity/necessary existence, etc) and he didn't believe that a non-presupper could defend "evidentialist" arguments (cosmo, teleo, etc.) against some of the rejoinders an unbeliever may throw at them.Thus, at his time he would have denied that claim. Of course, I'm not sure them showing respect for something and them not being able to give a rejoinder are the same thing. I also don't see how the Fristian objection leaves an unbeliever thinking he has more an excuse against God then, say, the cosmological argument... (but okay, I'd like to see how you hash that out).
But it isn't my purpose to defend Bahnsen's certainty here. If one doesn't know how to defend TAG then they may fare better using a non-TAG argument they can defend. I still believe the bigger issue, for Van Til at least, would have been how you used that non-TAG argument at a presup. level. He would not have said it was sinful to do non-TAG arguments, he said it was necessary (if I remember correctly). Perhaps this would have been the case for Bahnsen too, but his writings/recordings do seem to lack any respect for non-TAG arguments. Admitting Bahnsen was wrong on this issue and siding with Van Til doesn't seem like it would be a major road block to any "TAGsters" I know. Perhaps you're just attacking a caricature at this point or maybe you know some Bahnsenites somewhere (but then we may have to afford Bahnsen the same possibility later about the issue of non-neutrality).
You state, "And I can quote multiply non-TAGsters arguing against neutrality. Frome Aquinas to Moreland and Craig. I can also quote many non-TAGsters appealing to the idea of theory-laden perception, denying "brute" facts. TAGsters have mainly attacked caricatures of their opponent rather than offer proper characterizations."
I'm glad Morland, Graig, and Aquinas agree with this. Maybe TAGsters know people who don't, maybe Bahnsen knew people who didn't (Sproul, at the time), I recall Van Til giving specific examples too (though he often painted with a broad brush). I know I was one of those person's who believed in neutrality etc. prior to reading Van Til and Bahnsen. You seem to be painting with a broad brush too.
You state, "But at any rate, my main argument had to d with questioning this claim. Call it the Probability Leaves Excusability claim:
[PLE] If an apologetic argument is only probable, then the unbeliever has an excuse before God on judgment day.
([PLE] is almost a direct quote from more than one of my vast collection of Bahnsen tapes)."
If the probability arguments can be objectively weighed and shown to be more likely true than not true, to a high degree (i.e., your mechanic analogy), then I agree with you on this point. However, I'm skeptical that any such calculations *for the arguments offered by "evidentialists"* could be done to show that they are so probable that a person who rejects them is still morally culpable. I'm not saying that anyone is actually with an excuse, but that their lack of excuse does not actually stem from a cosmological or EAAN etc.
I don't know that Bahnsen meant what I think you're implying in [PLE]. Bahnsen maintained that man's knowledge of God, which left him without excuse, was immediate rather than mediate (as he put it to Sproul). Thus, even if an unbeliever only had presented to him probability arguments, he would still not be with an excuse. So [PLE] would be false by his own view of man's knowledge of God. But maybe Bahnsen just contradicted himself on this point.
You state, "That's not what they meant. And, the other can't be what they meant because to leave it in the subjectivity of the unbeliever also implicates the TAGster."
You say this in reference to a group of sentences that I stated in my last reply: "Perhaps they meant something like 'You cannot even have probability without presupposing God. But when you say that your evidence (or whatever) is only probable then you leave the unbeliever thinking he has an excuse.' Maybe this is what they meant, maybe it isn't."
Since you granted that they affirmed "you cannot even have probability without presupposing God" in your last reply, I assume you reject that they would go on to say "When you say that your evidence is only probable then you leave the unbeliever thinking he has an excuse." But this seems to be the most reasonable way to interpret them given the whole of their position: non-TAG arguments can always have possible objections raised against them (thus, the unbeliever raising always being able to say "but maybe..." leaves them thinking they have an excuse) but TAG arguments work from the impossibility of the contrary (IoC) (thus, no unbeliever can say "but maybe..."). Now, I know you don't agree that TAG proves IoC and I'm not sure if I agree that anyone can pull this off either, but I believe this is in fact what Bahnsen meant. However, as I've already explained, I don't think Van Til intended for people to be "TAGsters" because they could pull it off (obviously, since he said as much) but because he believed Scripture supported TAG.
You state, "Anyway, Bahnen would not say that if I've read him right. Bahnsen would say that "on the Christian worldview the only acceptable argument" (i.e., "the only argument that holds water" :-)) " is a transcendental argument." Bahnsen said probability leaves excuses. Period. Now, I'd be willing to grant that this was just more TAGster rhetoric on his end. Similar to vilifying your apologetic opponent as an "evil autonomous sinner" because he won't use TAG."
As you know, Bahnsen attempted to recast teleological, cosmo...etc. into forms that were more TAG friendly. I don't think he did a real bang up job with it, but it does evidence the fact that he did not see TAG in such a restricted manner. It seems obvious to me that some evidence is more valuable than others based on presuppositions etc. For example, some Christians see the fact that Christ is named Immanuel as evidence for his deity. If you already believe in the trinity, this fact does have some epistemic value. But you won't be winning any JW converts with it. Isn't this exactly what Bahnsen was getting at in restating the cosmo, teleo, etc? So I think my hypothetical statement has some credence from Bahnsen's statements. But, again, maybe Bahnsen just didn't have all his loose ends tied up and was inconsistent.
You state, "Same with TAG, then."
Yep. Bahnsen admitted as much with the modus tollens didn't he?
You state, "I was not arguing devil's advocate. I also believe this part of the argument is not missed. I also believe that even if you can show that the Bible teaches that God is the PCI, etc., that does *nothing* to say you can/have to *show* that in *apologetic* dialog. The Bible makes many claims that I can't *show* to the unbeliever. The Bible claims God is three-in-one. Can I show how that is? So you have two hurdles."
Since I already quoted where Van Til said the same thing ("may never be stated adequately...") and I never claimed anything to the contrary, it's not clear to me why you think I have to start jumping hurdles.
You state, "Exegete the relevant passages. Then actually *do* what the Bible says you can do. Oh, btw, the Fristian Bible says the same thing about Frist. He's the PCI. So you have to do an internal critique. So I guess you have three hurdles."
I don't recall making the assertion that the Bible does in fact claim TAG, so I'm not sure why you're asking me to exegete, etc. I don't recall Van Til or Bahnsen claiming you can actually *do* TAG adequately.
You state, "Then if the argument boils down to a mere *annoucement* that God is the PCI, yet we can't *show* it in an apologetic dialogue, it appears fairly apologeticaly useless. I mean, I give it points for piety. Paul might say somehting like, "He has zeal, no doubt about that, but it's zeal wihtout knowledge."
I agree, it may not have any apologetic value to simply assert God is PCI but wouldn't you agree that we can show how God operates as our precon. to such things as ethics etc. to some degree? Thus, it has some apologetic value and, if the Bible does teach as much, then God may always use His truths as a means of persuasion. As Bahnsen said, it is often the case that people are persuaded by bad arguments or arguments that may be inadequately stated.
You state, "I have to make the exegetical case for TAG?"
No, no... You said that presup. exegesis sounds like a stretch and seems to be anachronistic due to post-kantian categories. I said you would have to draw *this* out further, obviously referring to the claim of stretching exegesis and anachronisms. And the only sense in which I meant you "have to" is for me to be persuaded... I said I don't know if I agree with that or not.
You state, "And, putting up another worldview that can do what TAG does is also enough to get rid of TAG."
I've already addressed this. If a Christian is persuaded that the Bible asserts TAG then showing that Christian that they can't answer every objection to TAG is not enough to get rid of it, assuming the Bible is their ultimate authority. After all, you showing me that I can't explain everything about the Trinity is not enough to get me to drop that doctrine.
You state, "It's not me who is saying, "The IMPOSSIBILITY of the contrary." Perhaps if TAGsters aren't prepared to back up this kind of talk, then they shouldn't say it? "
If you follow my comments above you should know how I would respond to this... It depends on the grounds for their assertion. If it's biblical, then I don't think you can dismiss them on the grounds that they don't have all the answeres. If it's not, then feel free to shrug them off. But before you shrug them off wouldn't you have to demonstrate it's not biblical? Apparently, you already have something to work with: anachronisms and stretches.
You state, "I don't see what above answers anything. Even granting the Bible says God is the PCI and that TAG is sound etc., that's a far cry from you *showing* it. So, when someone claims to have *shown* it, and I do what they did with another worldview that they can't "internally critique," what reason do I have to believe that they've offered us a successful TAG? So what do I do in the meantime, apologetically? Keep my mouth shut at questions until I or someone else finally figure out the magic recipe? or continue using a bad argument? So the exegetical point, *even granted*, doesn't do the work you want it to do."
I haven't claimed it did any work. As I've said on several occasions, I'm just trying to correct the focus as I see it. Since Van Til and, to a lesser degree from my readings, Bahnsen both admitted the value of non-TAG arguments, I doubt they would say "keep your mouth shut until you have all the answers..." Thus, while your criticisms above may be true of some fringe TAGers (or a large group I haven't run across?) it seems to be a caricature of Van Til's actual position. Maybe your old TAGster roots of caricaturing haven't fully been rooted out. (Just kidding, don't get pissy.)
Thanks for your time,
Jonathan,
ReplyDeleteBy "more excuse" it is meant that if we place the focus on what the unbeliever *thinks*, then all's fair. For all we know the unbeliever might *think* that the TAG leaves more of an excuse than the "other" arguments. He might *think* it is blatantly circular and he might *think* that your rejoinders to this claim are bogus.
Yes, VT &co. spoke of the "traditional" arguments (what you call "non-TA" arguments), but he said they need to be "re-formulated" along presuppositionalist lines. The problem is that this has only been asserted. And, again, we must question your assumption about "non-TA" arguments to make sure that you are not contradicting VT and Bahnsen. Recall they said, "The only argument that holds water is a transcendental argument." So we must account for that if we're going to be good TAGsters. Surely you think these "non-TA" arguments "hold water," right? And, Bahnsen tells us that these re-formulated "traditional" arguments will involve "comparing worldviews." But of course the Fristian objection rears its head here. So it's not clear that the "re-formed" traditional proofs do the work a TAGster wants.
These claims of "reformulating" is symptomatic of *both* Bahnsen and van Til. Recall it was Va Til who claimed, "I don't object to the traditional arguments, I object to their traditional formulation." Of course we've been waiting for these "reformulated" arguments to appear. So the dichotomy you're trying to make is unfounded. This is standard TAGtillianism.
If we are to believe Bahnsen, the "reformed" cosmological argument is just another way to express the TAG. He claimed that we argue that "only the Christian worldview provides the intelligibility for causality and thinking causally." But of course Fristian objections show up and crash the party again in the annoying way they do.
When you say you'd agree with my point about probability, you diverge, again, from Bahnsen and Van Til. Bahnsen pointed out that he could even *grant* that the apologist shows the high probability and the unbeliever could still "speak" and not be "forced" to accept the argument (cf. 646-648, VT:R&A).
Van Til *grants* that God could be shown to be highly probable and claims that this is unbiblical apologetics because "the psalmist doesn't declare that the heaves *probably* declare the glory of God."
So it is clear that Bahnsen and Van Til would not have agreed with you in granting my claim. They *grant* the probability was shown and *still* have a problem.
I know that Bahnsen claimed that General Revelation held man responsible -- but here he has to make the suspect and questionable claim regarding in what sense Paul means that men knew God -- but he *also* claimed that on judgment day men could stand before God and say they have an excuse because his existence was only *probable.* Again, I'm being charitable and claiming this was hyperbolic rhetoric. But rhetoric must be answered nonetheless.
Your claim about the unbeliever being able to say "but maybe" is problematic in multiply ways. The guy in my story could say "but maybe," yet you grant he's without excuse. An unbeliever can *say* "but maybe" to TAG. Now, perhaps you mean "but if TAG is true, his but maybe is false." Okay, but if "God is the designer is *true*, then his "but maybe" is likewise false.
You admit, "As you know, Bahnsen attempted to recast teleological, cosmo...etc. into forms that were more TAG friendly," which of course vitiates against your claim that they advocated "non-TA" arguments. They were simply different ways to *make* the same TA point.
You claim, "Since I already quoted where Van Til said the same thing ("may never be stated adequately...") and I never claimed anything to the contrary, it's not clear to me why you think I have to start jumping hurdles."
But you seem to be missing the Fristian point. It is a defeater for Van Til's claim. Of course your santly Van Til gets to have his TAG assertion but he doesn;t have to eat it too. It was Van Til who claimed that Christianity was true by the IMPOSSIBILITY of the CONTRARY. But the Fristian argument *shows* that one can provide "preconditions for intelligibility" while not presupposing "the ontological trinity" or being "reduced to absurdity." To sit back and say, "Well, if Van Til were smarter, he culd reduce it to absurdity," is nothing more than circling the wagons. There's also quite a bit of debate about what VT meant by the "adaquately stated" comment. Your interpretation is by no means obvious.
As I said "way up top", I agree with and have no problems with scaled-down, cumulative case TAs, my objection is simply against the "impossibility of the contrary" claim. I agree with the ethic claim, but then again, given the Fristian worldview, it "accounts" for ethics too.
You write, "I've already addressed this. If a Christian is persuaded that the Bible asserts TAG then showing that Christian that they can't answer every objection to TAG is not enough to get rid of it, assuming the Bible is their ultimate authority."
I've already answered this. Even if the Bile says God is the PCI, that doesn't mean anyone can *show* it. TAG is an *apologetic* argument. It is meant to be *used* in the *apologetic* context. So, merely showing that the Bible affirms God is the PCI doesn't help for purposes TAg was invoked -- *apologetic* purposes.
More than that, one way we can decise if a text teaches such and such are by looking at defeaters against a certain reading. Reason is minister, as Turretin would say. Certainly extra-biblical evidence can help us in our exegesis. So, I'd say the Fristian objection is just one reason to not exegete said passages in a TAG way.
Furthermore, if they can't answer a defeater then they have an undefeated defeater. If so, then they lose knowledge. That's a basic point of epistemology. See Plantinga, Sudduth, and James Anderson on this last point.
You ask, "But before you shrug them off wouldn't you have to demonstrate it's not biblical?" No, they need to show me how it's Biblical. I'm not the one making the bold assertions. I shrug because I don't think they can show it. If they can, I'm waiting.
Paul,
ReplyDeleteYou reply, "By "more excuse" it is meant that if we place the focus on what the unbeliever *thinks*, then all's fair. For all we know the unbeliever might *think* that the TAG leaves more of an excuse than the "other" arguments. He might *think* it is blatantly circular and he might *think* that your rejoinders to this claim are bogus."
Of course. However, taking the issue from the way Bahnsen would have seen it, I don't believe he would have merely made the claim that the unbeliever thinks he can rebute traditional arguments that are set forth on the unbeliever's worldview, but that he can actually escape their force. If I stated in a previous comment that what they *think* would have been the *sole* issue, I was mistaken. Van Til and Bahnsen made clear that they didn't believe one could play ball on the unbeliever's field, regardless of what one thinks.
You reply, "Yes, VT &co. spoke of the "traditional" arguments (what you call "non-TA" arguments), but he said they need to be "re-formulated" along presuppositionalist lines. The problem is that this has only been asserted. And, again, we must question your assumption about "non-TA" arguments to make sure that you are not contradicting VT and Bahnsen. Recall they said, "The only argument that holds water is a transcendental argument." So we must account for that if we're going to be good TAGsters. Surely you think these "non-TA" arguments "hold water," right? And, Bahnsen tells us that these re-formulated "traditional" arguments will involve "comparing worldviews." But of course the Fristian objection rears its head here. So it's not clear that the "re-formed" traditional proofs do the work a TAGster wants."
First of all, my use of the term non-TA arguments (or whatever I said) was just an ad hoc attempt to distinguish between TAG and what was often called "evidentialist" arguments or something of the like. If I contradict Bahnsen or Van Til at some point then that is no concern of mine, as should have been clear to you from my very first comment. However, I do want to make sure I'm accurately representing what their position was, this is the only concern I have at the moment. If I say "they held such and such" when they did not then feel free to call me out on it. But merely pointing out that what I believe may not be what they believed of some issue is really pointless as far as I'm concerned.
Secondly, both Bahnsen and Van Til are dead, so don't hold your breath on their assertion (and Bahnsen's small attempt in his Philosophy of Christianity series) becoming much more than that. I don't see how you can fault them for not meeting your demands at this point.
Thirdly, I don't see why someone who uses TAG (perhaps you mean to specify smTAG), what you call a TAGster, needs to defend the notion that only TAG "holds water" (whatever that means). Unless you're simply using "TAGster" as a pejorative term to refer to people who in the Bahnsen/Van Til personality cult.
Fourthly, for my own part, I don't see that "non-TAs" need any special TAG reformulation, but I would say that the person brandishing them should do so in an epistemologically self-conscious manner (cf. my comments leading up to the Immanuel example in the last reply).
You reply, "These claims of "reformulating" is symptomatic of *both* Bahnsen and van Til. Recall it was Va Til who claimed, "I don't object to the traditional arguments, I object to their traditional formulation." Of course we've been waiting for these "reformulated" arguments to appear. So the dichotomy you're trying to make is unfounded. This is standard TAGtillianism."
Van Til's statement you quote is kinda vague but, in general, I didn't find him to be the best communicator/writer. What is it about the traditional arguments that he doesn't object to? Aren't teleological arguments forms of arguments? So how can he not object to teleological arguments but to the formulations? In fact, I'm not even sure where he said that (perhaps an audio lecture? Could you provide the source?). The closest thing I can find is this: "The argument for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity is objectively valid. We should not tone down the validity of this argument to the probability level. The argument may be poorly stated, and may never be adequately stated. But in itself the argument is absolutely sound. Christianity is the only reasonable position to hold. It is not merely as reasonable as other positions, or a bit more reasonable than other positions; it alone is the natural and reasonable position for man to take. By stating the argument as clearly as we can, we may be the agents of the Holy Spirit in pressing the claims of God upon men. If we drop to the level of the merely probable truthfulness of Christian theism, we, to that extent, lower the claims of God upon men."107 [***]Accordingly I do not reject 'the theistic proofs' but merely insist on formulating them in such a way as not to compromise the doctrines of Scripture.[***] "That is to say, if the theistic proof is constructed as it ought to be constructed, it is objectively valid, whatever the attitude of those to whom it comes may be" (see end for reference).
It seems clear from the context that what Van Til means by their misguided formulation is that they are said to be probably true. Van Til believed that Christians should be absolutely certain of the truth of theism and claim as much. It would seem Bahnsen agreed with this judging by his example of the disjunctive syllogism in the Christian Philosophy series. While I can't quote Bahnsen, I understood him to also have a problem with the "formulation" in the sense that they were presented as being neutral (cf. Sproul debate) when in fact they were not. In either one of these senses, presenting a "reformulated" traditional argument is really very simply, right? Although, you may disagree with Van Til that one should claim they are more than probable. Question: do you think that one must be able to justify all their beliefs before they claim them to be true? Some Christians, in fact many Christians, cannot "justify" their belief in God in any objective or logical manner. Should they not claim God true?
But all this aside, I don't see how my distinction is unfounded. Do you disagree that there is a special category of argument we call "transcendental" where we look at the preconditions to a thing? If you don't disagree that there is such a thing as transcendental argumentation then I fail to see how you think my distinguishing between TAs and non-TAs is unfounded. But I think I was more specific and talked about arguments that were non-TAG. TAs are not synonymous with TAG and surely you would agree that there is such a thing as a TAG and arguments which are ~TAG. Perhaps you mean that Bahnsen's particular understanding of reformulating traditional arguments into TA type arguments does not allow for my distinction. But, as I said, it was merely an ad hoc term to distinguish between TAG and non-TAG arguments and I don't agree with Bahnsen on the idea that the teleological argument must be made into a TA in the way he attempted in the Christian Philosophy series.
You reply, "If we are to believe Bahnsen, the "reformed" cosmological argument is just another way to express the TAG. He claimed that we argue that "only the Christian worldview provides the intelligibility for causality and thinking causally." But of course Fristian objections show up and crash the party again in the annoying way they do."
Again, I fail to see how the Fristian objection prohibits one from believing and claiming that to be the case. We believe a lot of propositions that we cannot necessarily justify. Should Christians only proclaim the gospel when they can answer every objection to the Christian faith? I agree, such a person may not be of much use apologetically; likewise, Bahnsen's smTAG may not be of much use against a Fristian, but does that mean he should deny its validity? I won't bother repeating myself on the importance of the *grounds* of such a claim. A person may be justified in believing in God and yet be unable to justify the proposition "God exists."
You reply, "When you say you'd agree with my point about probability, you diverge, again, from Bahnsen and Van Til. Bahnsen pointed out that he could even *grant* that the apologist shows the high probability and the unbeliever could still "speak" and not be "forced" to accept the argument (cf. 646-648, VT:R&A)."
Hmmm, but what was it that Bahnsen (and Van Til) said was "proven" with high probability in your referenced section? Bahnsen and Van Til did *not* say Christianity was shown to be true with high probability but the mere fact that Jesus body rose from the grave. What I agree with you on is that if one shows *Christianity* to be very likely true then a person is without excuse. But Bahnsen and Van Til aren't speaking of *Christianity* being shown very likely true on pp. 646-648 of VT: R&A.
You reply, "Van Til *grants* that God could be shown to be highly probable and claims that this is unbiblical apologetics because "the psalmist doesn't declare that the heaves *probably* declare the glory of God.""
I'd like to see the references for this just to make sure that it is not similar to the case above. However, I will give you the benefit of the doubt over Van Til on this point and simply say that I disagree with him here. Please don't bother to point out in your next reply that my saying I disagree with them here is a divergence from them.
You reply, "I know that Bahnsen claimed that General Revelation held man responsible -- but here he has to make the suspect and questionable claim regarding in what sense Paul means that men knew God -- but he *also* claimed that on judgment day men could stand before God and say they have an excuse because his existence was only *probable.* Again, I'm being charitable and claiming this was hyperbolic rhetoric. But rhetoric must be answered nonetheless."
I don't know how "suspect and questionable" his claim was. Perhaps Paul didn't mean "all" (with a universal intension and extension) men "know" (have true belief) God. Perhaps Paul meant *some* men deduce that God very probably exists. Perhaps Paul meant some men have *information* available to them. Pehaps Paul meant all men have information available to them. etc. But if Paul ment all men, without exception know God from general revelation, which seems likely to me, then it also seems likely that this knowledge is immediate (though note exclusively so).
You reply, "Your claim about the unbeliever being able to say "but maybe" is problematic in multiply ways. The guy in my story could say "but maybe," yet you grant he's without excuse. An unbeliever can *say* "but maybe" to TAG. Now, perhaps you mean "but if TAG is true, his but maybe is false." Okay, but if "God is the designer is *true*, then his "but maybe" is likewise false."
I think you must be referring to my section where I say "...this seems to be the most reasonable way to interpret them... I believe this is in fact what Bahnsen ment..." You seem to be saying that *I* have problems here, which would indicate that you missed the fact that this was simply a representation of what *Bahnsen* may say. Your rejoinder that "if 'God is the designer is *true*...'" doesn't present a problem for Van Til since he said as much himself (see my earlier quote of him). Van Til would just say "Yeah. That's right."
You reply, "You admit, "As you know, Bahnsen attempted to recast teleological, cosmo...etc. into forms that were more TAG friendly," which of course vitiates against your claim that they advocated "non-TA" arguments. They were simply different ways to *make* the same TA point."
But as I've shown above, there was more than one sense of "reformulation" that Van Til (and Bahnse?) had in mind. One sense merely had to do with claiming it was probable. Another sense merely had to do with how it was presented to the unbeliever (as just looking at brute facts to see where they lead). And another sense (Bahnsen's) had to do more with a complete doing away with the forms of argument. If I'm correct in my understanding of Van Til at this point, I don't vitiate my claim that Van Til if not Bahnsen advocated non-TA arguments. I would assume Bahnsen agreed with Van Til at this point, but maybe he didn't.
You reply, "But you seem to be missing the Fristian point. It is a defeater for Van Til's claim. Of course your santly Van Til gets to have his TAG assertion but he doesn;t have to eat it too. It was Van Til who claimed that Christianity was true by the IMPOSSIBILITY of the CONTRARY. But the Fristian argument *shows* that one can provide "preconditions for intelligibility" while not presupposing "the ontological trinity" or being "reduced to absurdity." To sit back and say, "Well, if Van Til were smarter, he culd reduce it to absurdity," is nothing more than circling the wagons. There's also quite a bit of debate about what VT meant by the "adaquately stated" comment. Your interpretation is by no means obvious."
I don't even know that if Van Til were smarter he could answer the objection. Perhaps it is impossible for us as finite beings to show the impossibility of the contrary of such a proposition. But I still don't get why one must be capable of justifying a proposition against all objections before believing it. I could be way off base here.
What are some alternative interpretations for "adequately stated"?
You reply, "I've already answered this. Even if the Bile says God is the PCI, that doesn't mean anyone can *show* it. TAG is an *apologetic* argument. It is meant to be *used* in the *apologetic* context. So, merely showing that the Bible affirms God is the PCI doesn't help for purposes TAg was invoked -- *apologetic* purposes."
Allow me to clarify my statement: by "get rid of it" I mean deny that the strong modal claim is true, I didn't mean to say that they should still use smTAG.
You reply, "More than that, one way we can decise if a text teaches such and such are by looking at defeaters against a certain reading. Reason is minister, as Turretin would say. Certainly extra-biblical evidence can help us in our exegesis. So, I'd say the Fristian objection is just one reason to not exegete said passages in a TAG way."
Fair enough.
You reply, "Furthermore, if they can't answer a defeater then they have an undefeated defeater. If so, then they lose knowledge. That's a basic point of epistemology. See Plantinga, Sudduth, and James Anderson on this last point."
Why couldn't their defeater of the defeater be the authority of Scripture, assuming it teaches such and assuming the clairty of Scripture's teaching such is greater than your certainty that the Fristian defeater is a true defeater.
You reply, "You ask, "But before you shrug them off wouldn't you have to demonstrate it's not biblical?" No, they need to show me how it's Biblical. I'm not the one making the bold assertions. I shrug because I don't think they can show it. If they can, I'm waiting. "
But they have already made that attempt. You have merely said, in response, that it is a stretch and seems to be anachronistic... this isn't much of an argument. They offered a theological interpretation of scriptures that they believed flushed out their view. I stand by my statement, if you want to prove them wrong, which would seem to be your intent in appealing to the Fristian, then you should "demonstrate it's not biblical."
(107 The writer, Common Grace, Phila., 1964, p. 62.
Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge. (The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Phillipsburg, NJ, 1969).)
Yay for the exponential growth of blog rejoinders.
ReplyDeleteJonathan,
ReplyDeleteI must admit that I am at a loss as t what it is, exactly, you're trying to do here...
"but that he can actually escape their force."
And of course the purpose of my post is to point out that this idea is false.
However, I guess the unbeliever can "escape the force" of TAG with "fristian" objections.
I do not see a response in your comment to my quoting of VT and Bahnsen that "the only argument that holds water is a transcendetal argument." This undercuts your claim about "non-TA" arguments and also serves to bolster my claim that the apologist, apparently, must keep his mouth shut until he can provide a sm)TAG that isn't defeated.
As to reformulation, I already told you that this was meant as "reformulate as a TA." That's why Bahnsen said that a reformulated "cosmological argument" was one that "asked the preconditions of causality."
"But all this aside, I don't see how my distinction is unfounded. Do you disagree that there is a special category of argument we call "transcendental" where we look at the preconditions to a thing? If you don't disagree that there is such a thing as transcendental argumentation then I fail to see how you think my distinguishing between TAs and non-TAs is unfounded."
Well, besides the fact that it is debated whether TAs are unique, my point was rather than the "non-TA" arguments you said Bahnsen and Van Til would alllow one to use while he has to remain silent in using smTAG -- due to the unable-to-answer-as-of-yet-because-of-at-the-moment-stupidity -- has been shown to be false. They did not allow "non-TA" argument but said that the "non-TA" arguments needed to be "reformulated" as "TA arguments."
"Again, I fail to see how the Fristian objection prohibits one from believing and claiming that to be the case. We believe a lot of propositions that we cannot necessarily justify."
This is due to your unfamiliarity, apparently, with how a defeater-defeater functions. I'm also not talking about "believing things we can't justify." But it is the highest of ironies when smTAG has been turned into a "belief we cannot justify." I dare say that no one who things smTAG to be the case thinks they believe it and are unable to justify it. Anyway...
"Should Christians only proclaim the gospel when they can answer every objection to the Christian faith?"
This kind of rhetoric meant to function as some kind of a relevant response to anything I've sad shows we're having a devil of a time communicating. As I said above, I am now at a loss as to what it is you think you're trying to achieve here. That you would even ask this question of me is simply sophistic. Pretending this is a relevant response to anything I've said is either dishonest - implying to readers that anything I've said even hints at an affirmative answer, or it demonstrates you are not grasping the points I'm making.
"Bahnsen's smTAG may not be of much use against a Fristian, but does that mean he should deny its validity?"
Yes, though *deny* may be too strong. He needs to at least *withhold* his positive assessment of smTAG. Indeed, to admit that smTAG is "not much use" against a Fristian, is simply to admit, almost by definition, that smTAG is dead. It seems you don't appreciate the weight of what the Fristian objection does to TAG.
"A person may be justified in believing in God and yet be unable to justify the proposition "God exists."
Well, though I'd phrase things differently; of course! That you're reduced to saying things like this shows that you're not grasping anything I'm saying. In fact, these sound like pat answers to objections I'm not making. Something to "throw" out there as if it was relevant to some objection. But it's a pat answer to pat objections. I'm not offering pat objections.
"Hmmm, but what was it that Bahnsen (and Van Til) said was "proven" with high probability in your referenced section? Bahnsen and Van Til did *not* say Christianity was shown to be true with high probability but the mere fact that Jesus body rose from the grave. What I agree with you on is that if one shows *Christianity* to be very likely true then a person is without excuse. But Bahnsen and Van Til aren't speaking of *Christianity* being shown very likely true on pp. 646-648 of VT: R&A."
I disagree with you here. If one shows *any* proposition to be "highly probable" it is foolish to disbelieve it.
Furthermore, the outs Bahnsen lets the unbeliever have are ridiculous. "Well, I guess we live in a strange universe where resurrections happen every once and a while."
There's also the attendant arguments that go along with what admitting Jesus' resurrection entail. But TAGsters don't appreciate this because they don't bother to digest the relevant resurrection apologetic literature. They don't have to. Anytime someone has a question about the Bible, tell 'em they can't make sense of questions and drinking a glass of water. Who need to read anything with an apologetic like that? This hyperbolic point helps one to see why TAGsters are total irrelevant apologetically and why there's a tremendous, ironic, anti-intellectualism rampant among TAG circles.
"But if Paul ment all men, without exception know God from general revelation, which seems likely to me, then it also seems likely that this knowledge is immediate (though note exclusively so)."
Well, first you'd need to deal with the no-conscious-defeater objection. Then you'd need to give a plausible account as to how 1 minute old concepti have warranted true beliefs -- let alone beliefs of any kind! -- 'cause you said "without exception," then you’d need to show that Paul had in mind something like "true belief" and then post-Gettier analysis of what turns true belief into knowledge in mind. Why think Paul mean *that* by knowledge rather than "true belief" or "awareness" or "faculty"? Then there's diachronic and synchronic questions. The whole thing turns out to be rather hard to justify. And there's simpler positions that can account for the main ethical point Paul is making about moral culpability as well as the non-universality of the knowledge given the above heavy-hitting considerations.
"But I still don't get why one must be capable of justifying a proposition against all objections before believing it. I could be way off base here."
Yes, you're off base here.
"What are some alternative interpretations for "adequately stated"?"
You keep thinking that's a relevant rejoinder. The problem is that a CONTRARY was shown to be POSSIBLE. No matter how "inadequately the argument has been stated," VT *NEVER* meant to say that "the CONTRARY was POSSIBLE." So, one can either DEFEAT that argument or WITHHOLD or GIVE UP his belief that TAG does it.
"Allow me to clarify my statement: by "get rid of it" I mean deny that the strong modal claim is true, I didn't mean to say that they should still use smTAG."
One doesn't have knowledge if one has undefeated defeaters.
"Why couldn't their defeater of the defeater be the authority of Scripture, assuming it teaches such and assuming the clairty of Scripture's teaching such is greater than your certainty that the Fristian defeater is a true defeater."
First off, I find it ludicrous that someone thinks the Bible *teaches* that "God provides the preconditions of intelligibility such that one must presuppose the Christian worldview in order to know anything whatever." Is there ANYONE that has EVER *exegeted* this? No. Van Til himself admitted that he didn't back up his claims with Scripture. Bahnsen simply PROOF TEXTED TAG, he never *exegeted* any relevant passage.
Secondly, the defeater is a reason not to hold to what you thought the exegesis was. I mean, if you *thought* the Bible said, "No one can jump 5 feet high," and then I jumped 5 feet high, would you say, "Well, my interpretation of that verse is correct and so you really didn't jump 5 feet high."??
No, you've probably misunderstood the verse. As Hart has said, "...Simple appeal to 'what the Bible says' are always a sign of (no doubt unconscious!) subservience to an interpretive tradition, not liberation from it."
As R.S. Clark has pointed out, "All heretics quote Scripture."
So, I'd say that your fictional "believer" is simply operating with a naive view of both sola Scripture and hermeneutics.
Third, it's almost a *truism* to claim that "if the Bible teaches such and such" then it's true. Yeah, if the Bible does teach x, then that defeats any proposed defeater of x. But of course whether the Bible teaches it is just the question, isn't it.
Fourth, you may think there's a parity with this and something like, say, what one does when he believes the Bible teaches 6/24 day creation. But of course people who believe that have *some kind* of answer to the alleged defeaters from science. So, one might go the route of Byl and approach the question from an anti-realist stance. Or one might go the way of a Wise and present positive scientific evidence of a young earth and defeat the old earth arguments. So there's disparity. It appears you're advocating for a naive kind of fundamentalism.
Fifth, even Bahnsen denied this kind of argument in his debate with Stein. "The Bible says TAG is true, the Bible is the word of God, therefore TAG is true."
Sixth, this "out" does nothing to defend the *apologetic* value of TAG. So the TAG fundy has effectively bee rendered silent. he has to take his marbles and go home.
"But they have already made that attempt. You have merely said, in response, that it is a stretch and seems to be anachronistic... this isn't much of an argument."
Where? I don't grant Bahnsen PROOF TEXTING as an EXEGETICAL argument. Either you are unaware of what constitutes an exegetical argument, or you're unfamiliar with what Bahnsen tried to do. And let's not forget that VT himself admitted that his main weakness was "lack of Scripture" in his writings.
Furthermore, in all the proof texting, they have ASSUMED that Scripture writers were speaking in contemporary epistemological terms. No attempt was made to EXEGETE any of THAT. Bahnsen's proof texts TAKE FOR GRANTED that the writers were speaking in 21st century language. That's not EXEGESIS.
But, to go along with my comments on Romans 1 above, we can look at Col. 2. Why think the contextual setting of a specific response to Gnosticism search for *saving knowledge* is properly contextualized to a claim about, as Bahnsen says, "the war of 1812"???
Why think the poetic claim that "the beginning of knowledge is fear of the Lord" means "one must presuppose the Christian worldview win order to know anything?" Does David mean "presuppose" (which all the philosophical baggage associated with that term) when he says "beginning"???
Where does one get the idea that the proverb giver is offering "a two-step apologetic method?" Bahnsen says that the Bible gives us out "two-step" method by citing the proverb "answer a fool and don't answer a fool." This supposedly means, in the ANE context, that, "One assumes, for arguments sake, his opponents worldview, and one also does not assume his opponents worldview neutrally."
As I said, PROOF TEXTING.
"I stand by my statement, if you want to prove them wrong, which would seem to be your intent in appealing to the Fristian, then you should "demonstrate it's not biblical."
I disagree for reasons stated above. The Fristian example is a sufficient defeater.
Furthermore, I'm offering reasons why *I* don't think the argument works. If *they* want to believe it, be my guest. But I am saying why *I* am not a TAGster. Ad with that bit of revelation, you should see right away that t is *they* that need to demonstrate ~Fristianity and +Bible to me.
If not, then I'm fully warranted and justified in my rejection of TAG and all their comments about how I am a filthy sinner who just loves my autonomy has become pious rhetoric intended to keep the TAG faithful in the fold.
I wish I knew how to do italics... Oh, well.
ReplyDeleteYou state, "And of course the purpose of my post is to point out that this idea is false."
Perhaps this turns on how you are understanding my use of the term "force." You're probably more qualified than me to speak on the purpose of your post, but I gathered from it that you were demonstrating that a person can be morally culpable in a situation where his/her information only yeilds probabilities (to put it roughly). To be more precise, you said:
(1) Romans 1 (the standard text) isn't even adressing apologetics or arguments.
(2) Man would be without excuse even if there were no highly probable arguments for God's existence.
(3) High probability can render one morally culpable.
When you say "...this idea is false." you say it in response to my comment, "However, taking the issue from the way Bahnsen would have seen it, I don't believe he would have merely made the claim that the unbeliever thinks he can rebute traditional arguments that are set forth on the unbeliever's worldview, but that he can actually escape their force."
If my above summary is an acurate representation of your post and its intent, then it seems to not be the case that the purpose of your post was to demonstrate the falsity of the claim that an unbeliever, on his own worldview, can defeat traditional arguments. Perhaps it is my fault for using the term "escape their force." Perhaps you thought I meant something like "can actually not be morally culpable." But even if this was what understood me to say TAGsters would say (and they might actually say that), I still don't see that your post addresses this topic. Where do you show that even grounding probable arguments in the unbeliever's framework the argument can be shown so highly probable that the unbeliever is morally culpable because of that argument?
You state, "However, I guess the unbeliever can "escape the force" of TAG with "fristian" objections."
Yeah, I guess he can, in a sense. I mean he can say that smTAG is false, but the Fristian objection doesn't really provide him total escape unless he plans on converting to Fristianity.
You state, "I do not see a response in your comment to my quoting of VT and Bahnsen that "the only argument that holds water is a transcendetal argument." This undercuts your claim about "non-TA" arguments and also serves to bolster my claim that the apologist, apparently, must keep his mouth shut until he can provide a sm)TAG that isn't defeated."
I believe Van Til meant by "holds water" that only with TAG can no rejoinder be given. For instance, he goes on to say in that paragraph, "But if it be said to such opponents of Christianity that, unless there were an absolute God their own questions and doubts would have no meaning at all, there is no argument in return." Obviously, we would both say Van Til is mistaken here. How does this undercut my claim about non-TA? Was it *my* claim or was it my claim of what *Van Til or Bahnsen* may have said? If Van Til said "only with TAG can no rejoinder be given" (if this is what he meant by "holds water") then there is no inconsistency if he were to claim non-TAs are still of value.
You state, "As to reformulation, I already told you that this was meant as "reformulate as a TA." That's why Bahnsen said that a reformulated "cosmological argument" was one that "asked the preconditions of causality... Well, besides the fact that it is debated whether TAs are unique, my point was rather than the "non-TA" arguments you said Bahnsen and Van Til would alllow one to use while he has to remain silent in using smTAG -- due to the unable-to-answer-as-of-yet-because-of-at-the-moment-stupidity -- has been shown to be false. They did not allow "non-TA" argument but said that the "non-TA" arguments needed to be "reformulated" as "TA arguments.""
I agree with you that this is what Bahnsen meant in the Christian Philosophy series (or whatever it is called). But I attempted to show in my last comment that Van Til could have another sense of "reformulate" in mind. He may be using it, in the paragraph I quoted, to mean that the apologist should not state the traditional arguments for Christianity as probably true. Anyway, while I want to make sure we are properly representing the persons under discussion, this is getting kind of boring and I don't want overkill it. Obviously, one way Bahnsen saw fit to reformulate traditional arguments was by making them TA. It seems to me that Van Til had something else in mind in the aformentioned paragraph.
You state, "This is due to your unfamiliarity, apparently, with how a defeater-defeater functions."
I'm not sure what you're talking about here. Do you mean a person's more basic belief that Scripture teaches smTAG cannot function as a defeater-defeater because it doesn't actually overcome the objection, it just ignores it?
You state, "I'm also not talking about "believing things we can't justify.""
Well I retract my statement of "we all believe a lot of things we cannot justify..." as it doesn't make much sense to me now. I said it within the context of someone maintaining smTAG in light of a defeater. I had in mind that their more basic belief, that Scripture teaches smTAG would cause them to maintain the proposition--God is PCI--despite not knowing how to defeat the Fristian objection. But I don't know why I said "we all believe a lot of things..." However, as I said later on in that comment, some Christians do maintain belief in Xianity despite having undefeated defeaters.
You state, "This kind of rhetoric meant to function as some kind of a relevant response to anything I've sad shows we're having a devil of a time communicating. As I said above, I am now at a loss as to what it is you think you're trying to achieve here. That you would even ask this question of me is simply sophistic. Pretending this is a relevant response to anything I've said is either dishonest - implying to readers that anything I've said even hints at an affirmative answer, or it demonstrates you are not grasping the points I'm making."
Craig summarizes one of Plantinga's points as follows: "A person who accepts belief in God as properly basic may be open to arguments against that belief. For someone may present him with arguments against theism which are based on propositions and argument forms he also accepts as basic. These counter- arguments constitute defeaters for his basic belief in God, and if that belief is to remain rational for him, he must find some defeater of the defeater. Otherwise he will be forced to abandon some of his basic beliefs in order to restore consistency in his noetic structure, and theism may well be the belief that he chooses to jettison." (http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth01.html)
In light of this, and your belief that Christians should not claim smTAG since they have an undefeated-defeater, I don't see why you're getting so excited over whether I would ask you if you believed that a Christian who cannot answer the POE or one of Drange's arguments of contradictory attributes of God, should still claim the gospel. I'm not trying to say you agree with Plantinga on everything, and I don't know what your thoughts are on this aspect, but that's why I was asking.
You reply, "Well, though I'd phrase things differently; of course! That you're reduced to saying things like this shows that you're not grasping anything I'm saying.
I guess this means you don't see the relevance of my comment. In light of its context, my statement meant that it is possible, as far as I can see, for one to be justified in holding to God as PCI (i.e., if Scripture teaches it) and yet be unable to justify how this is the case.
You state, "In fact, these sound like pat answers to objections I'm not making. Something to "throw" out there as if it was relevant to some objection. But it's a pat answer to pat objections. I'm not offering pat objections."
Blah, blah, blah... Are you trying to meet a word-count quota?
You state, "I disagree with you here."
But my statement that you say you "disagree with" was simply that Bahnsen and Van Til in that section you referenced are speaking of an isolated fact (a body being resurrected, Jesus')--not the over all framework of Christianity--as being verly probably true. Furthermore, if I remember correctly, they are giving it as a hypothetical, not necessarily granting that the resurrection can be shown very probably true. You say you disagree with this, but you don't show from the text how my interpretation of them is wrong.
You state, "If one shows *any* proposition to be "highly probable" it is foolish to disbelieve it."
I agree. In the comment I made that you are replying to I said that I agree with you that if you show Christianity to be very likely true (or "highly probable") that a person is without excuse. Naturally, I agree with this in regard to other things too.
You state, "Furthermore, the outs Bahnsen lets the unbeliever have are ridiculous. "Well, I guess we live in a strange universe where resurrections happen every once and a while.""
Bahnsen would probably say "what's ridiculous is determined by one's worldview. If the unbeliever believes in a chance universe, a body resuscitating isn't so ridiculous."
You state, "There's also the attendant arguments that go along with what admitting Jesus' resurrection entail."
True. But even some non-presuppers argue that if you put one leaky bucket into another one that it still won't hold water. I guess it all depends on how the holes are aligned.
You state, "But TAGsters don't appreciate this because they don't bother to digest the relevant resurrection apologetic literature. They don't have to. Anytime someone has a question about the Bible, tell 'em they can't make sense of questions and drinking a glass of water. Who need to read anything with an apologetic like that? This hyperbolic point helps one to see why TAGsters are total irrelevant apologetically and why there's a tremendous, ironic, anti-intellectualism rampant among TAG circles."
Sounds like someone needs a hug.
You sate, "Well, first you'd need to deal with the no-conscious-defeater objection. Then you'd need to give a plausible account as to how 1 minute old concepti have warranted true beliefs -- let alone beliefs of any kind! -- 'cause you said "without exception," then you'd need to show that Paul had in mind something like "true belief" and then post-Gettier analysis of what turns true belief into knowledge in mind. Why think Paul mean *that* by knowledge rather than "true belief" or "awareness" or "faculty"? Then there's diachronic and synchronic questions. The whole thing turns out to be rather hard to justify. And there's simpler positions that can account for the main ethical point Paul is making about moral culpability as well as the non-universality of the knowledge given the above heavy-hitting considerations."
Word. Well, I could do all that if I wanted to, but I have to wash my hair tonight... (I'm trying to make a quota.)
You state, "You keep thinking that's a relevant rejoinder. The problem is that a CONTRARY was shown to be POSSIBLE. No matter how "inadequately the argument has been stated," VT *NEVER* meant to say that "the CONTRARY was POSSIBLE." So, one can either DEFEAT that argument or WITHHOLD or GIVE UP his belief that TAG does it."
Actually, in the portion you are replying to, I just asked a question: what are the other wasy "adequately stated" is interpreted... You seem to be reading more than I'm writing. I don't recall every quoting the "adequately stated" thing as a rejoinder to anything other than the idea that Van Til believed the impossibility of the contrary could be done. If I'm interpreting him correctly, then it does serve as a rejoinder to *that*. But you said there are other interpretations, so I asked what they were because I'm curious like that...
You state, "First off, I find it ludicrous that someone thinks the Bible *teaches* that "God provides the preconditions of intelligibility such that one must presuppose the Christian worldview in order to know anything whatever." Is there ANYONE that has EVER *exegeted* this? No. Van Til himself admitted that he didn't back up his claims with Scripture. Bahnsen simply PROOF TEXTED TAG, he never *exegeted* any relevant passage."
Well, I agree that Bahnsen and Van Til didn't do exegesis for their position. But that something is proof-texted doesn't make it wrong, even on a prima facie level. So I'm not sure why you are putting that in capitals. For my own part, I would be interested to see if a presupper could do the exegesis. Van Til's exposition of the position from a theological context does not strike me as "ludicrous," but to each his own.
You state, "Secondly, the defeater is a reason not to hold to what you thought the exegesis was. I mean, if you *thought* the Bible said, "No one can jump 5 feet high," and then I jumped 5 feet high, would you say, "Well, my interpretation of that verse is correct and so you really didn't jump 5 feet high."??"
I know. I remember from when you said as much in your last comment. I don't disagree with you, ceteris paribus. But several other things must be weighed first: how probable are the other readings of the text, etc. Scripture is the ultimate authority and, thus, should be our starting grounds for interpreting such data.
You state, "But of course whether the Bible teaches it is just the question, isn't it."
Yes. Which is why I said this is where the focus should be in overturning smTAG, since "TAGsters" hold it on theological grounds, from my experience.
You state, "Fifth, even Bahnsen denied this kind of argument in his debate with Stein. "The Bible says TAG is true, the Bible is the word of God, therefore TAG is true.""
Yeah, he said something similar in the Sproul debate. I remember a student questioning him on that when Bahnsen made another comment that contradicted it. Bahnsen said something about how we know TAG because of God's Word and the student asked why he said something contrary in the Stein debate. Bahnsen said something like "Well, because I felt that I had made my case clear enough by that point that I could say that..." It sounded like a fib to me.
You state, "Where? I don't grant Bahnsen PROOF TEXTING as an EXEGETICAL argument. Either you are unaware of what constitutes an exegetical argument, or you're unfamiliar with what Bahnsen tried to do. And let's not forget that VT himself admitted that his main weakness was "lack of Scripture" in his writings. [etc..]"
First, when I said "But they already made that attempt." it was in response to you saying "they need to show me how it's Biblical." One way of showing you how something is biblical can be quoting scripture and drawing theological inference, or simply taking the immediate inference. For example, if I said "what makes you think God sent Christ as savior?" and you said, "Well, John 3:16 says God sent Christ to save those who believe" wouldn't it be a little obtuse for me to say "No! EXEGETE it! Do you even know what EXEGESIS is?"?
Secondly, from your examples, you imply that the only way a thing can be truly derived from the Bible is if that was the subject under consideration when the author wrote the passage. For example, a Reformed Epistemologist laughed at John Frame once because "the Bible isn't a text book on epistemology." As Frame said, no, but it does contain information relevant to it. I'm sure you don't mean to imply that a thing cannot be derived from Scripture if it is not the subject under consideration, but simply scoffing, "Where does one get the idea that the proverb giver is offering "a two-step apologetic method?" don't impress me much (as Shania Twain would put it).
Laterz.
Jonathan wonders if I have a word limit and wishes I'd say more at times. Perhaps write things like, "sounds like somebody needs a hug,' as well as not only quote Twain lyrics, but mention that you're doing so as well. Anyway, let's go back to the beginning:
ReplyDelete"Perhaps I misunderstood or simply missed the implications/statements of Van Til, Bahnsen, et. al. but I don't recall them actually granting that the non-TAs were "highly probably."
Now we see Jonathan's wrong. What's more, Jonathan is defending Van Til's approval of our being able to use non-TAs. He's also defending the idea that Van Til didn't think non-TAs needed to be "reformulated" as "TAs". So, putting two and two together (so to speak), Jonathan is arguing that Van Til (not Bahnsen, we've dismissed him apparently) would approve using arguments that don't have a high probability. Say .5 or less. And somehow Jonathan thinks he's defending ole Tilly.
Moving on...
"Wouldn't that be the logical conclusion of Van Tilian Presup. claims? If God is the nec. precon. to logic and logic is a precon. to assessing probability then one cannot put God in the dock and assess the probability of His existence."
Yeah, a Fristian would say the same...anyway: so Van Til doesn't approve of non-TA claims? Or perhaps ole Jonathan thinks Van Til thought one could offer certain arguments for God that were non-TA arguments? Where and what are these "non-TA" arguments that are not probabilistic that Van Til had in mind? Thus the cost of your ad hoc defense of all things 'Til.
Continuing...
"Furthermore, for a Christian to reject the strong modal version of TAG it seems to me that one's primary grounds for doing so is exegetical rather than philosophical."
But now Jonathan has admitted that no exegetical case has been made.
These problems, as well as other ones, stem from Jonathan reacting rather than interacting. But, I remember when I needed to hold on to the certainty security blanket my TAGGY provided me.
Moving on to a couple of his statements in his last post:
He says,
"Yeah, I guess he can, in a sense. I mean he can say that smTAG is false, but the Fristian objection doesn't really provide him total escape unless he plans on converting to Fristianity."
Thus showing he simply fails to grasp the force of the Fristian argument. Let's recap for Jonathan,
Bahnsen/Til claim: The proof of Christianity is that without it, you couldn't prove anything.
Stated another way: Christianity is proved true by the impossibility of the contrary.
And we now see that "the proof" for "the truth of Christianity has been avoided. We see that the apologist doesn’t have a “proof.” And without a “proof” or a “reason,” what you got? Remember Bahnsen said, “If I didn’t have any rational reason to believe in God I wouldn’t believe in him?” And apparently since all arguments for God besides the TAG suck, then Bahnsen meant TAG. Good thing he went on to glory early, then, huh?
And, it doesn't need to stop there. He need not grant Fristianity. Why should he believe it? Because of "the impossibility of the contrary," no? So, why? And why Christianity too? Are we going to invoke probabilistic arguments?
Are we going to say, "But they only work if one presupposes Christianity."? But we've seen this is false...for now.
Indeed, hopefully Jonathan sees that even his defense of ole Til defends on the smTAG. Otherwise the rhetoric about probability is simply that. Rhetoric.
More than that, though, hasn't the unbeliever "escaped." Don't Van Til and Bahnsen say that belief in any other god is worthless? Seems to me that one "escapes," so long as one resists (shows how he doesn't need to accept it) the Christian argument. I mean, isn't that all rather the point you and Van Til and Greg engage in apologetics for? Well, that and "shutting the mouth," but apparently the invoking of Fristianity leaves a rather wide, gaping crater-sized mouth still yapping on the "basket ball court."
"He may be using it, in the paragraph I quoted, to mean that the apologist should not state the traditional arguments for Christianity as probably true."
Wow, traditional arguments that probe God exists with certainty! You're not helping Van Til here, Jonathan.
"I don't see why you're getting so excited over whether I would ask you if you believed that a Christian who cannot answer the POE or one of Drange's arguments of contradictory attributes of God, should still claim the gospel. I'm not trying to say you agree with Plantinga on everything, and I don't know what your thoughts are on this aspect, but that's why I was asking."
Apparently you unfamiliar with Plantinga too. There's a reason he engages in defeater-defeaters. There's a reason he devoted an entire section in WCB to this project. There's a reason why he and Bergmann &co. have included the "no-defeater" condition in their account of warrant.
Sudduth defines the NDC as:
[ND] Given any person S, S’s theistic belief T has positive epistemic status only if S does not have an undefeated defeater for T.
He goes on:
"This sort of formulation is suggested by several Reformed epistemologists. See Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, 82-87; Warranted Christian Belief, chapter 11; Nicholas Wolterstorff "Can belief in God be rational if it has no foundations?’ 164-172; William Alston Perceiving God, 79, 159, 189-194; C. Stephen Evans The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 267-268, 293-295, 306. For a more detailed consideration of [ND] in Reformed epistemology, see my ‘The internalist character and evidentialist implications of Plantingian defeaters’ and ‘proper basicality and the evidential significance of internalist defeat.’"
Add to this that you've all but admitted he doesn't hold on to TAG for any exegetical reasons. In fact, your "believer" is entirely fictitious.
And is your grand response to Drange’s arguments: “But, but, but, God has to be compatible with time c-c-c-c cause the good book says so. I don’t have an answer, but God said it, that settles it.” Apparently we’ve left the ideals of Old Princeton in the dust! Machen’s Ostrich Children!
But, as we've agreed, this still doesn't ensure that the apologist can speak. He has to keep his mouth shut. No more going out and giving TAG. Maybe there's a TAGster monastery somewhere? Perhaps somewhere nice, like the south of France?
"Bahnsen would probably say "what's ridiculous is determined by one's worldview. If the unbeliever believes in a chance universe, a body resuscitating isn't so ridiculous."
And this is evidence of the general ignorance of the resurrection argument and the attending arguments which show exactly that this claim, even on the unbelievers terms, don't hold much water. Of course you can take all of this up with Hays and Engwer if you wish. They're really the resurrection specialists 'round here.
"Word. Well, I could do all that if I wanted to, but I have to wash my hair tonight... (I'm trying to make a quota.)"
So you challenge me to present more developed responses to the, ahem, "exegetical" case for smTAG, and this is your response. Got it.
"I don't recall every quoting the "adequately stated" thing as a rejoinder to anything other than the idea that Van Til believed the impossibility of the contrary could be done."
But I'm not even denying "it can't be done." I all for the project. My claim: no one's done it.
"Well, I agree that Bahnsen and Van Til didn't do exegesis for their position."
They didn't but Joe layman did? Who are these Christians that you've defended that "believe smTAg based on their exegetical homework?" Apparently your "defeater-defeater" point is defeated?
"Yes. Which is why I said this is where the focus should be in overturning smTAG, since "TAGsters" hold it on theological grounds, from my experience."
Good, I'm glad you disagree with yourself now.
"Secondly, from your examples, you imply that the only way a thing can be truly derived from the Bible is if that was the subject under consideration when the author wrote the passage."
No I didn't imply that.
But there's rules for contextualization, Jonathan.
I once remember a graduation speak I heard by Rick Warren. He argued that the students needed to "lay down their rod before God so that it could be living." The "rod" was their work (shepherd's rod). Moses "laid down his work" before God and God turned it into a snake (i.e., made it living.). But, when Moses "picked it back up, it ceased to live and became a lifeless stick in his hand." So, the grads need to always be laying down their work before God so he can make it living.
Now, that may be true as far as it goes...BUT THAT WASN'T EXEGESIS!!!
And that was my point with Proverbs 26. Shoot, it may be a good apologetic method 'n all. I sure appreciate it. I have no problems with it, as I am a presuppositionalist! But, let's not pretend, not even for a moment Jonathan, that the apologetic method was exegeted from the text.
Now, you don't want me thinking you went to the Rick Warren school of hermeneutics, now do you?
"but simply scoffing, "Where does one get the idea that the proverb giver is offering "a two-step apologetic method?" don't impress me much (as Shania Twain would put it)."
Well, since we're quoting our heroes, now that you've seen my explanation, and we've seen your response here for the piece of sophistry it is, let me quote Vader: "Impressive. Most impressive."
Audi 5000, G-unit.
P.S.
ReplyDelete""He may be using it, in the paragraph I quoted, to mean that the apologist should not state the traditional arguments for Christianity as probably true."
Wow, if you had "non-TA" that proved God with "certainty", then why even need the TAG?
Jonathan's ad hoc defense of Til has rendered TAG thus superfluous.
Ole Paul,
ReplyDelete---"Jonathan wonders if I have a word limit and wishes I'd say more at times. Perhaps write things like, "sounds like somebody needs a hug,' as well as not only quote Twain lyrics, but mention that you're doing so as well."
Well I for one thought it was very funny.
---"Now we see Jonathan's wrong."
Could you expound on this? My 2nd comment clarified what I meant by "I don't recall them actually granting that the non-TAs were 'highly probably'." [sic]: "...perhaps Van Til and Bahnsen would have said 'On the Xian worldview you can have probability. Given the Xian worldview, you can construct an argument to show that God probably exists. However, outside of the Xian worldview, the probability of your argument's soundness becomes negligible. Ergo, the argument itself still leaves the believer thinking he has an excuse.' Thus, it seems to me, that they could grant you your probability on your Xian worldview but deny its value to an unbeliever."
Thus, they wouldn't believe they are probable in the non-Xian sense but, given Xianity, they have probability... However, upon reflecting on this during our conversation I really don't see any grounds to maintain this. The fact seems to be that they just didn't like probability arguments. Anyway, I have no problem disagreeing with them here either.
---"What's more, Jonathan is defending Van Til's approval of our being able to use non-TAs. He's also defending the idea that Van Til didn't think non-TAs needed to be "reformulated" as "TAs". So, putting two and two together (so to speak), Jonathan is arguing that Van Til (not Bahnsen, we've dismissed him apparently) would approve using arguments that don't have a high probability. Say .5 or less. And somehow Jonathan thinks he's defending ole Tilly."
The only sense in which I have "defended" "ole Tilly" or Bahnseywansey has been by trying to uncover their position and flush out my own understanding of them, in light of your opening post. This should have been clear from comments I have made throughout the dialogue. My opening comment was simply a statement of what I understood Van Til et al's position to be in light of your post. After that I tried to make it very clear:
"I was simply pointing out what may have been the issue for Van Til et al.
"the purpose of my initial comment was not to persuade you of the strong modal TAG (smTAG) but to put the intramural debate of smTAG in a context that is often missed, in my experience."
"My point is only that this is what needs to be done to get rid of smTAG as Van Til et al defended it, as far as I can tell."
"But it isn't my purpose to defend Bahnsen's certainty here."
"I don't recall making the assertion that the Bible does in fact claim TAG, so I'm not sure why you're asking me to exegete, etc."
"I haven't claimed [TAG] did any work. As I've said on several occasions, I'm just trying to correct the focus as I see it."
"If I contradict Bahnsen or Van Til at some point then that is no concern of mine, as should have been clear to you from my very first comment. However, I do want to make sure I'm accurately representing what their position was, this is the only concern I have at the moment."
So, in what sense am I "defending Van Til's approval of our being able to use non-TAs"? All I've said is that I think Van Til taught non-TA's were acceptable. However, I do happen to think using non-TAs are acceptable and, if Van Til taught the same, then I guess me and him agree on this.
I concede that I am "defending the idea that Van Til didn't think non-TAs needed to be "reformulated" as 'TAs'." You think this leads to a problem because you have taken my "not highly probable" thing I said in my first comment and ignored where I tried to draw out how I understood it in my 2nd comment. However, I do have a problem here, but I don't think it's the one you point out. I think the problem is that stating an argument like the cosmological arg. or teleological arg. in way that is "absolute" and not deductive is ridiculous.
So, in light of Van Til's remarks that I quoted where he said traditional arguments should not be put in a probable framework, I'm most likely wrong in my understanding that this framework was not a TA.
---"Moving on..."
Oh, good. Because at first I was like "What? Is that it?" Then I read "moving on..." and I was like "Oh, good. There's more."
---"so Van Til doesn't approve of non-TA claims?"
I believe that they saw a difference between what I said was "putting God in the dock" and figuring out the ways in which creation testifies to his existence. For example, Bahnsen said that saying "I prove God by the impossibility of the contrary" was not "putting him in the dock" but simply applying the truths of Scripture. So, given that understanding, it is not inconsistent to say "If God is the nec. precon. to logic and logic is a precon. to assessing probability then one cannot put God in the dock and assess the probability of His existence."
---"Or perhaps ole Jonathan thinks Van Til thought one could offer certain arguments for God that were non-TA arguments?"
Or perhaps our chum Jonathan thinks Van Til thought one should be certain about the non-TA arguments for God... But I won't go there.
---"Where and what are these "non-TA" arguments that are not probabilistic that Van Til had in mind?"
Would you believe me if I said I came to this same conclusion all by my ole self up above? I wish you said this three comments ago, could have saved us some time.
So, uh, is like, that it? Oh wait, there's more:
---"Continuing..."
Okay, good. I wish more writers would notify their readers of when to keep going. Moving on...
---"But now Jonathan has admitted that no exegetical case has been made."
Right. I admit, I used the term sloppily there. I really didn't have in mind an ole TAGster sitting there, in his ole chair next to his ole dog, with his exegesis worked out in the technical sense of the term. I had in mind what I mentioned in my follow up comment, "a theological context." So me admitting that no exegetical case has been made isn't some last ditch effort to save whatever it would be that I'd be saving by saying that. Since I had no problem admitting it early on (it should be clear I'm no "flag waver" for ole tagsters), I'm not sure why you point it out like it's a great conundrum.
---"These problems, as well as other ones, stem from Jonathan reacting rather than interacting. But, I remember when I needed to hold on to the certainty security blanket my TAGGY provided me."
If that's how we're going to play it then it seems to me that your vitriolic rants aganst TAGsters and confusion of my position, despite numerous clarifications, evidences your reacting. Perhaps your vitriol is due to some tagster stealing your blanky when you were young? Or maybe a TAGster kicked your dog... I'm just messing with you, calm down.
Most of your rant... er, remarks regarding smTAG and Fristianity isn't saying anything new here. I never claimed smTAG worked in the face of Fristianity so you're ranting... er, preaching to the choir.
---"Apparently you unfamiliar with Plantinga too. There's a reason he engages in defeater-defeaters. There's a reason he devoted an entire section in WCB to this project. There's a reason why he and Bergmann &co. have included the "no-defeater" condition in their account of warrant.Apparently you unfamiliar with Plantinga too. There's a reason he engages in defeater-defeaters. There's a reason he devoted an entire section in WCB to this project. There's a reason why he and Bergmann &co. have included the "no-defeater" condition in their account of warrant. Sudduth defines the NDC as: [ND] Given any person S, S’s theistic belief T has positive epistemic status only if S does not have an undefeated defeater for T. He goes on:"This sort of formulation is suggested by several Reformed epistemologists. See Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, 82-87; Warranted Christian Belief, chapter 11; Nicholas Wolterstorff "Can belief in God be rational if it has no foundations?’ 164-172; William Alston Perceiving God, 79, 159, 189-194; C. Stephen Evans The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 267-268, 293-295, 306. For a more detailed consideration of [ND] in Reformed epistemology, see my ‘The internalist character and evidentialist implications of Plantingian defeaters’ and ‘proper basicality and the evidential significance of internalist defeat.’"
But in the example I gave, which you quote as the subject of your response, the Christian did have an undefeated defeater. And Suddeth says, "only if S does not have an undefeated defeater for T." So I don't see how this answers my question at all. Maybe, like you said, I just need to read more Plantinga. But do you feel like spelling out how exactly my example fails since my "S" does have an undefeated defeater for T.
---"And is your grand response to Drange’s arguments: “But, but, but, God has to be compatible with time c-c-c-c cause the good book says so. I don’t have an answer, but God said it, that settles it.” Apparently we’ve left the ideals of Old Princeton in the dust! Machen’s Ostrich Children!"
How is that relevant to anything. Still trying to make that quota?
---"And this is evidence of the general ignorance of the resurrection argument and the attending arguments which show exactly that this claim, even on the unbelievers terms, don't hold much water. Of course you can take all of this up with Hays and Engwer if you wish. They're really the resurrection specialists 'round here."
I haven't seen this done, but then I haven't read much Hays or Engwer either.
---"So you challenge me to present more developed responses to the, ahem, "exegetical" case for smTAG, and this is your response. Got it."
Honestly, this is getting kinda funny. Like I said "I hereby issue bold challenge to Paul Manata to defeat the smTAG exegetical strong hold. Put up your dukes, Paul!"
In fact I said, "I don't know. You would have to draw this out further. But I'm sure that is getting away from your intentions in the post and your initial comments in the combox. My point is only that this is what needs to be done to get rid of smTAG as Van Til et al defended it, as far as I can tell."
And, in the following comment, clarified, "And the only sense in which I meant you "have to" is for me to be persuaded... I said I don't know if I agree with that or not."
But I really shouldn't have to spell this out. This should be obvious to anyone who's read the dialogue, that is without their "anyone-who-tries-to-say-the-main-issue-for-TAGsters-is-theological/exegetical-must-be-a-closet-TAGster-who-likes-to-hurt-bunnies-and-snub-rainbows" spectacles.
---"They didn't but Joe layman did? Who are these Christians that you've defended that "believe smTAg based on their exegetical homework?" Apparently your "defeater-defeater" point is defeated?"
That's not a quote from me. See my above response to the exegetical thing.
---"Good, I'm glad you disagree with yourself now."
No. Same as it ever was.
---"No I didn't imply that."
I'm sure you didn't mean to imply that, but all your examples turned on the intent of author or what the author would have had in mind (21st cent. epistemology).
---"Now, you don't want me thinking you went to the Rick Warren school of hermeneutics, now do you?"
You've found me out!
---"Well, since we're quoting our heroes, now that you've seen my explanation, and we've seen your response here for the piece of sophistry it is, let me quote Vader: "Impressive. Most impressive."
The Joker: "Why so serious?"
---"P.S. ... Wow, if you had "non-TA" that proved God with "certainty", then why even need the TAG?"
I think you made the same point on two other occasions above, so I'm not sure why you put it in post script too, but I've come to agree with you here too. See above, around the beginning of this comment.
Sign,
Ole Jonathan
However, upon reflecting on this during our conversation I really don't see any grounds to maintain this. The fact seems to be that they just didn't like probability arguments. Anyway, I have no problem disagreeing with them here either.
ReplyDeleteRight. Hence my post.
"My opening comment was simply a statement of what I understood Van Til et al's position to be in light of your post. After that I tried to make it very clear:
"I was simply pointing out what may have been the issue for Van Til et al.
Right. And you've also pointed out how you hate hypothesizing about what they would say too: "I hate to keep hypothesizing what they may have said..."
You've been trying to defend, but you've also tried to cover your bases.
"I concede that I am "defending the idea that Van Til didn't think non-TAs needed to be "reformulated" as 'TAs'." You think this leads to a problem because you have taken my "not highly probable" thing I said in my first comment and ignored where I tried to draw out how I understood it in my 2nd comment.
I don't think I have, but...it's a wash because,
"So, in light of Van Til's remarks that I quoted where he said traditional arguments should not be put in a probable framework, I'm most likely wrong in my understanding that this framework was not a TA."
I'm not anti-pragmatist. Whatever works. If you don't think I showed this, okay. I'm not here for glory.
"I believe that they saw a difference between what I said was "putting God in the dock" and figuring out the ways in which creation testifies to his existence. For example, Bahnsen said that saying "I prove God by the impossibility of the contrary" was not "putting him in the dock" but simply applying the truths of Scripture. So, given that understanding, it is not inconsistent to say "If God is the nec. precon. to logic and logic is a precon. to assessing probability then one cannot put God in the dock and assess the probability of His existence."
And offering probabilistic arguments isn't "putting God in the docks." In fact, it's just "applying the truths of creation." So they really have no defense for what they claimed about probabilistic arguments (btw, Van Til and Bahnsen weren't even the target of my post. A more contemporary, non-TAGster apologist was, FWIW) other than you're noting "they just didn't like probabilistic arguments."
"Or perhaps our chum Jonathan thinks Van Til thought one should be certain about the non-TA arguments for God... But I won't go there.
Good, you've already made enough trouble for our friend Til.
Btw, this paper would be relevant if you did decide to "go there."
http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/CertaintyandIrrevisability.htm
"Would you believe me if I said I came to this same conclusion all by my ole self up above? I wish you said this three comments ago, could have saved us some time.
Yes, I would; because I don't believe you've yet to "faithfully represent Van Til."
"Right. I admit, I used the term sloppily there. I really didn't have in mind an ole TAGster sitting there, in his ole chair next to his ole dog, with his exegesis worked out in the technical sense of the term. I had in mind what I mentioned in my follow up comment, "a theological context."
Wow, a "theological context." I guess that gains the "defeater-defeating" force for our "ole TAGster" by its Kilimanjaro level of vagueness!
"If that's how we're going to play it then it seems to me that your vitriolic rants aganst TAGsters
"Vitriolic rants"? Lol.
"and confusion of my position, despite numerous clarifications, evidences your reacting."
As I think I've made clear, your "position" has been quite sloppy. I also indicated "way up there" that I was "confused" about what you were even trying to accomplish. But I'll take all the blame, Jonathan. It's all my fault.
"Perhaps your vitriol is due to some tagster stealing your blanky when you were young?"
No, nothing like that. I did have a TAgster once who couldn't defeat the Fristian counter claim that I denied TAG 'cause I "love my sin and autonomy" right before he took his marbles and left the playground.
"I'm just messing with you, calm down."
Perhaps I'm just messing with YOU?
When you use sarcasm and smarm you're just "messing with me" and when I use it, it's "vitriol."
Is that like when you write you're tha paradigm of clarity and when I read I'm the paradigm of muddle-headedness?
"I never claimed smTAG worked in the face of Fristianity so you're ranting"
Good, so you admit their main argument against probabilistic arguments is a non-starter.
"But in the example I gave, which you quote as the subject of your response, the Christian did have an undefeated defeater."
Oh, maybe I missed it. What was the defeater? To RE-ASSERT that "the Bible teaches it?" Oh, and he doesn't even have an exegetical argument for his "defeater-defeater" he has a "theological context."
"I haven't seen this done, but then I haven't read much Hays or Engwer either."
You can start here:
http://www.triapologia.com/hays/ThisJoyfulEastertide.pdf
"Honestly, this is getting kinda funny. Like I said "I hereby issue bold challenge to Paul Manata to defeat the smTAG exegetical strong hold. Put up your dukes, Paul!"
In fact I said, "I don't know. You would have to draw this out further.
Of course, this is what I said:
"So you challenge me to present more developed responses to the, ahem, "exegetical" case for smTAG, and this is your response. Got it."
Sounds like I said ewhat you said.
At any rate, you also said *you* believed that Rom. 1 taught the universal knowledge thesis.
I assume you think you have "exegetical reasons" for this? I assume you think they're the same as those the TAGsters would say?
"I'm sure you didn't mean to imply that, but all your examples turned on the intent of author or what the author would have had in mind (21st cent. epistemology)."
The intent of the author is failry key - see Vanhoozer, Thiselton, Green, Stein, Brown, Silva, etc. I do not, and did not imply, anything about what he "had in mind" as this is to commit the "intentional fallacy." My theory of authorial intent is grounded in the communication model of hermeneutics of the like of a Vanhoozer or a Brown. So, as I said, I did not "imply" it. It may have seemed that way to you, but that's because of the presuppositional baggage you (obviously) brought to my remarks.
I see that you also didn't want to respond to my Rick Warren story. That story was analogous to the sense I meant Bahnsen eisogeted the "two-step" method from Prov. 26. It was also analogous to the claim that I do not accept just any ole "contextualization" from the text without the exegetical leg work done to demonstrate that contextualization.
But we don't have to "go here" either as I can see you're not concerned to actually interact with my response to Bahnsen's, ahem, "exegesis" of his "two-step" method from Prov. 26.
Sign,
The Vitrioler
Well, before I go further, Mr. Vitrioler, I will say that at this point I'm willing to just call it quits. My primary reason for doing this is so that I can appear as graciously backing out, leaving you looking like a last-word freak. So here is my closing sophistry... I mean statement.
ReplyDelete---"Right. Hence my post."
Well, I don't see how your post had to do with Bahnsen and Van Til not liking probability arguments, especially since you said "Van Til and Bahnsen weren't even the target of my post," but okay. I'll take your word for it here and then cover my bases and take your later word for it there also.
---"Right. And you've also pointed out how you hate hypothesizing about what they would say too: "I hate to keep hypothesizing what they may have said..."
When I said "I hate hypothesizing..." it was in reference to going beyond what they actually said. When you quote me as saying "I was simply pointing out what may have been the issue for Van Til et al." it was in reference to how I interpreted what they actually said. But I give you an 'A' for effort.
---"You've been trying to defend, but you've also tried to cover your bases."
When you're as ad hoc as ole Jonathan, you have to do these things.
---"I'm not anti-pragmatist. Whatever works. If you don't think I showed this, okay. I'm not here for glory."
Being the ad hoc fellow I am, I was responding to your remark prior to reading your later remark where you said something similar. So, when I said, "I do have a problem here, but I don't think it's the one you point out." I was referencing the "problem" you pointed out in the immediately above quoted section of my response. Communication is such hard work.
---"And offering probabilistic arguments isn't "putting God in the docks." In fact, it's just "applying the truths of creation."..."
This is exactly the point I was making in the section you quote as the subject of your response. Actually, I was trying to say probabililstic arguments aren't *necessarily* putting God in the dock. The reason I quoted Bahnsen there was to show that he *may* have agreed.
---"Good, you've already made enough trouble for our friend Til.
Btw, this paper would be relevant if you did decide to "go there."
http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/CertaintyandIrrevisability.htm"
Thanks for the link. I haven't been to his page for about two years... but it doesn't look like he has updated it much.
---"Wow, a "theological context." I guess that gains the "defeater-defeating" force for our "ole TAGster" by its Kilimanjaro level of vagueness!"
It seems clear enough for our discussion, especially since we're both aware of how Van Til conducts his development of presuppositionalism.
---"As I think I've made clear, your "position" has been quite sloppy. I also indicated "way up there" that I was "confused" about what you were even trying to accomplish."
I don't think it was sloppy. Reread my initial post and tell me what was so sloppy? I initially mentioned Van Til and Bahnsen because their names came up in the com. box. My points were simply that (1) they wouldn't have granted probability on the unbeliever's worldview and (2) that if "a Christian [is] to reject the strong modal version of TAG it seems to me that one's primary grounds for doing so is exegetical rather than philosophical."
In fact, upon reflecting on our conversation, I'm really not sure why you disagree with either of these claims... It certainly isn't clear to me why you found it confusing. Perhaps we got off track in the whole thing about what was meant by "without/with excuse" and my interpretation of the way they viewed non-TAs.
---"But I'll take all the blame, Jonathan. It's all my fault."
Great, that's one less thing for us to argue about.
---"Perhaps I'm just messing with YOU?
When you use sarcasm and smarm you're just "messing with me" and when I use it, it's "vitriol.""
I didn't mean to imply that *you *weren't* messing with me... I was simply stating what *I* was doing. Still reading more than I write, I see. "Messing with" someone can be vitriolic or caustic and being vitriolic (or caustic) can be a way of messing with someone.
---"Is that like when you write you're tha paradigm of clarity and when I read I'm the paradigm of muddle-headedness?"
Pretty much. For example,
---"Oh, maybe I missed it. What was the defeater? To RE-ASSERT that "the Bible teaches it?" Oh, and he doesn't even have an exegetical argument for his "defeater-defeater" he has a "theological context.""
No, when I said the Christian "had an undefeated defeater" I mean they had an objection (like one of Drange's or the POE, for random example) that they could not answer. (A theological context, in the sense that Van Til expounded presup., isn't as shallow as you make it sound.)
---"You can start here:
http://www.triapologia.com/hays/ThisJoyfulEastertide.pdf"
Thanks.
---"At any rate, you also said *you* believed that Rom. 1 taught the universal knowledge thesis.
I assume you think you have "exegetical reasons" for this? I assume you think they're the same as those the TAGsters would say?"
Actually I said it "seems likely." I do have reasons for thinking it seems likely, I'm not sure if it's the same as a TAGster has, but I really didn't feel like getting into that. Besides, I have to wash my dog tonight.
---"The intent of the author is failry key - see Vanhoozer, Thiselton, Green, Stein, Brown, Silva, etc. I do not, and did not imply, anything about what he "had in mind" as this is to commit the "intentional fallacy." My theory of authorial intent is grounded in the communication model of hermeneutics of the like of a Vanhoozer or a Brown. So, as I said, I did not "imply" it. It may have seemed that way to you, but that's because of the presuppositional baggage you (obviously) brought to my remarks."
Right. I never said authorial intent wasn't key.
---"I see that you also didn't want to respond to my Rick Warren story. That story was analogous to the sense I meant Bahnsen eisogeted the "two-step" method from Prov. 26. It was also analogous to the claim that I do not accept just any ole "contextualization" from the text without the exegetical leg work done to demonstrate that contextualization."
Sorry I disappointed you in my passing over your story. What would you like me to say about it? You're point was that it wasn't "EXEGESIS!!!" right? But look, ole Paul, I only used the word "exeget" (outside of quoting you or once in an analogy as response to you) ONE time and that one time I said that if we are to *reject* smTAG it should be for exegetical reasons. Virtually every time the issue came up, I said they defended it on "theological" "biblical" or "scriptural" grounds. And YOU used the term "biblical" (as opposed to exegetical) too. So all that time, I had no problem with it, since I figured you understood by "theological," etc that I didn't mean technical exegesis. *Then,* later in the discussion, you started hammering the exegetical rout, to which I immediately agreed no *exegetical* case had been made. But it seems like you've created this fictitious history of our dialogue in which I proclaimed "Van Tillians have EXEGETED (arrrg!!!) their system and hold to it on EXEGETICAL (arrrg!!!!) grounds. Furthermore, I can exegete it too!" (That's hyperbole, of course.)
---"But we don't have to "go here" either as I can see you're not concerned to actually interact with my response to Bahnsen's, ahem, "exegesis" of his "two-step" method from Prov. 26."
I'm glad you're finally getting it.
This has been fun. Thanks,
King Ad Hoc.
Jonathan,
ReplyDelete"In our great concern to win men we have allowed that the evidence for God’s existence is only probably compelling. And from that fatal confession we have gone one step further down to the point where we have admitted or virtually admitted that it is not really compelling at all. And so we fall back on testimony instead of argument. After all, we say, God is not found at the end of an argument; He is found in our hearts. So we simply testify to men that once we were dead, and now we are alive, and that one we were blind and that now we see, and give up all intellectual argument. Do you suppose that our God approves of this attitude of His followers? I do not think so. [...] A testimony that is not an argument is not a testimony either, just as an argument that is not a testimony is not even an argument.”
(Why I Believe in God, p. 16, emphasis original)
Signed,
Sufferer of lastworditus
:-)
Jonathan,
ReplyDeleteFYI,
Michael Sudduth discusses this "probability thing" (his words) in his upcoming book on Natural Theology. It should be out sometime in '09, staytuned!