Saturday, April 19, 2008

Reppert's Latest Try at Undermining Calvinism

I consider the discussion Victor Reppert and I have been having to be an amicable one. I'm not aware of any personal attacks, poor behavior, or anything else that can be categorized as surly behavior that has went on. With that said, it is interesting to note the atheist feeding frenzy that has formed, by a small but vocal minority, I might add, in response to our discussion. I find their attempts to stir up trouble and bad blood to be childish, not to mention churlish. I find their comments that, for some unknown reason, it is a hoot to see two Christians debating interesting. For some reason that tells against Christianity I suppose. It is obvious that such objections stem from an embarrassing unfamiliarity with the Bible. In the Bible we find plenty of debate amongst the first century church. So, to point to something that has been going on since the New Testament, and then act as if we should re-think our Christian commitments in light of it, strikes me as showing how desperate some of the New Internet Atheists have become. This comment is particularly funny if you happen to know the first thing about any profession of field of inquiry. For example, I have 4 or 5 of the Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Philosophy Series. So, that some have pointed out that our discussion shows that we are both in error, and thus need to drop our theistic belief, strikes me as a ridiculous claim that has the unfortunate defect of being self-refuting since I disagree with the claim; hence, this shows the claim should not be held! I would hope that Victor would at least agree with me on this score.

There have been some that have said that my argument is problematic since I am appealing to my "historically conditioned interpretations of the text of Scripture." And therefore Victor's argument is much better. This objection overlooks the fact that Victor Reppert has also appealed to Scripture as a main pillar of his argument against me. Therefore, this objection must refrain from lauding Victor's position while jeering mine. This objection also has the problem of reading our discussion according to a "historically conditioned" mind frame; and therefore, if I can't get to the real meaning of the text of Scripture neither can the objector get to the real meaning of either Victor's or my post. Thus, the objector can't weigh in with any objective evaluation of our arguments. Finally, this objection faces a dilemma: My position is that we can get to the meaning of the text in spite of any historical conditioning we may have (especially considering that in the Calvinist system, God is the all-conditioner, so the one who wants me to understand his word is the one who has conditioned me). This is either true or false. If it is true, then the objection raises no problem. If my position is false, then I would need another argument besides the repeated chanting about historical conditioning, for it to take root.

Lastly, before I respond to Victor's latest post, I must point out that this discussion has left far behind the original arguments Reppert posed and that I responded to. It appears that now he is simply arguing that given the truth of Arminian interpretations of the Bible, as well as Universalist interpretations, as well as the truth of the Principle of Alternative Possibility, and the truth of libertarian free will, then Calvinism is problematic. But of course, I agree with that!

I'll now turn to Reppert's latest salvo:

Paul: Here's the trouble that I would like to focus on. It seems to me to be fairly clear, even if we were to grant an compatibilist view of free will, that the following principle is true, which I will call the Wrongful Cause Principle:
And just what is the Wrongful Cause Principle?

WCP: It is wrong to cause someone to do what it is wrong to do.
Reppert obviously has an argument like this in mind: (1) Given Calvinism, God causes all things to happen. (2) WCP. (3) People do wrong things. (4)Therefore, God does wrong things.

I will respond to his WCP argument by (i) taking something like a survey of some of the recent literature which addresses this issue, (ii) analyzing the WCP in order to see how it bears on Calvinism, (iii) offering a reversal of the WCP which, if Victor thinks the WCP works, then he will have to think my counter works against him, (iv) briefly offering a Reformed approach to the question, and (v) I'll close with some general remarks to a couple other comments he made.

I.

Now, it's important to know that this very question has received treatment over and over again in the literature. I could cite literally hundreds of books and articles spanning back over the centuries, but for our purposes I'll list 7 contemporary sources where Victor's very question is dealt with. John Frame, The Doctrine of God, P&R, 2002, pp. 152-159, 174-182, 274-288; Wayne Gruden, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, Zondervan, 1994, pp. 315-354; Paul Helm in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views (eds. James K. Beilby & Paul R. Eddy), IVP, 2001, pp. 176-182; Paul Helm, John Calvin's Ideas, Oxford, 2006, pp. 93-128; Paul Helm, The Providence of God, IVP, 1993, pp. 161-191; K. Scott Oliphint, Reasons For Faith: Philosophy in the Service of Theology, P&R, 2006, pp. 326-342; Robert Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, Nelson, 1998, pp. 343-381

I could continue with many more examples, both contemporary and classic (though those terms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, Frame's DG, for one!). My point here is simply to point out that these arguments Victor is using are nothing new. There are plenty of definitions, qualifications, and explications of the Reformed view on the matter. Victor hasn't taken the time to familiarize himself with the very issue he's debating. Thus, his objections to Calvinism come more from the "gut" than from any detailed study and serious thinking on the matter. I'm sure Victor would agree with me here.

II.

What does the WCP even mean?

i) To say that it is evil to cause someone to commit an evil is just to say that it is evil to cause evil. But this is just a restatement of the problem of evil. I have already offered a theodicy which has as of yet to be responded to.

ii) What is meant by "cause?"

a) Is it the same as the Reformed understanding of "decree?" How so? Strictly speaking, the decree doesn't "cause" anything. The decree is the plan. So what does Victor have in mind here and where is it found in the reformed literature?

b) Does it mean a necessary condition? A necessary condition for any human to commit an evil act is that they be here to do it. So, are all the parents to blame for the evil their children may commit simply because they brought them into existence? In this sense of "cause," we should lock up Jeffery Dahmer's parents for giving birth to Dahmer. If you traced the causes back far enough, you'd come to their causing him to exist. Might as well figure out a way to punish the grandparents too, if we could. Maybe God will . . .

c) Does it mean necessary and sufficient conditions? But what Calvinist (or Reformed theologian) takes this view? There are distinctions that have been made in the literature between primary and secondary causality, proximate and remote causes, etc.

d) There is a long theological tradition which speaks of concurrence. We find in theologians across the board that God is upholding all things by his very power, he sustains all things, in him we live and move and have our being. If he were to withdraw his hand, nothing would continue.

Winfred Corduan makes a similar point in his chapter on a Thomistic Cosmological Argument. On his view of causality presented in his chapter in Reasons for Faith: Making a Case for the Christian Faith, an effect is never free from its cause. If a contingent thing does not always retain its cause, then it will no longer exist (pp. 211-213).

No wrong act could take place if God were not there upholding all things. Take his hand away, the muscles that are required to pull a trigger won't work.

So in this sense, God causes all things, even wrong actions. Ephesians 1:11 refers to how God works his plan as "the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will." Proverbs 16:4-5 tells us about some of this "working out": "The LORD works out everything for his own ends—even the wicked for a day of disaster. The LORD detests all the proud of heart. Be sure of this: They will not go unpunished." God "works" the evil unto their disaster, but then clearly indicates that they are the ones punished for what he has "worked out." Is this a violation of the WCP?

e) Does Reppert view this like a billiard table? If the hit cue ball hits the racked balls and then they all bounce off each other, eventually going into the holes, one could say that hitting the cue ball was the cause of all the individual balls going into their holes. Likewise, God got our whole thing going by his own cue stick, "the word of his power." So in this sense, God caused people to do evil acts.

f) Is when God causes something the same as when we do? Victor is appealing to cases when humans have caused some person to do an evil act and then extrapolating that causation over to God as if they two were coterminous. How does he know this? God-causation is different that creature-causation. So is God's presence. God is fully present everywhere. But how can he and I be both "present" at every point in the same space? Reppert is treating God just like one more fact in the universe. If we don't have a full, or even partial, understanding of G-C, how does Reppert intend it to work in the WCP? When a human "causes" someone S to do some evil act E, is that the same as when God "causes" S to E? If not, then he has an equivocation in his argument.

iii) How am I to think about the WCP? What are instances of the WCP? Let's view some:

a) Say I put a gun to S's head and "cause" him to rob a bank. Is this how Victor is viewing the Calvinist picture?

b) Say I hire a hit man to off the guy who is starting over me at quarterback. The hit man kills "Chip." I "caused" the hit man to do an evil act, but he also did it willingly. Is this how Reppert views the Calvinist picture? God hiring us to knock people off or engage in illicit behavior?

c) Say Paul Sheldon writes a novel where he has some character kill off the heroine, Misery Chastaine. In one sense Sheldon "caused" Misery's death.

Now, Calvinism doesn't fit with III (a) or (b). In fact, given God's sui generous nature, there are no strict parallel we could draw (so I would argue). But I would say that (c) has a lot of parallels with God's relation to his creation, far more so than the other models (for a fuller explication of this Author-character model see John Frame, DG, pp. 156-159).

So, if we have a decent analogy here, what's the problem? Remember that it was the crazy former nurse Annie Wilkes who blamed Sheldon for the death of Misery! Is the Arminian the theological version of Annie Wilkes? (It is also interesting to pause and reflect on the fact that Misery was actually a story written by Stephen King. So neither Paul nor Annie were “real”. But that didn't affect your grasping the point. I think this point may lend credence to the conceivability of the Author-character model.)

iv) How would Reppert apply the WCP to the Bible? For example:

Isaiah 10:5-15

5 "Woe to the Assyrian, the rod of my anger,
in whose hand is the club of my wrath!
6 I send him against a godless nation,
I dispatch him against a people who anger me,
to seize loot and snatch plunder,
and to trample them down like mud in the streets.

7 But this is not what he intends,
this is not what he has in mind;
his purpose is to destroy,
to put an end to many nations.

8 'Are not my commanders all kings?' he says.

9 'Has not Calno fared like Carchemish?
Is not Hamath like Arpad,
and Samaria like Damascus?

10 As my hand seized the kingdoms of the idols,
kingdoms whose images excelled those of Jerusalem and Samaria-

11 shall I not deal with Jerusalem and her images
as I dealt with Samaria and her idols?' "

12 When the Lord has finished all his work against Mount Zion and Jerusalem, he will say, "I will punish the king of Assyria for the willful pride of his heart and the haughty look in his eyes. 13 For he says:
" 'By the strength of my hand I have done this,
and by my wisdom, because I have understanding.
I removed the boundaries of nations,
I plundered their treasures;
like a mighty one I subdued their kings.

14 As one reaches into a nest,
so my hand reached for the wealth of the nations;
as men gather abandoned eggs,
so I gathered all the countries;
not one flapped a wing,
or opened its mouth to chirp.' "

15 Does the ax raise itself above him who swings it,
or the saw boast against him who uses it?
As if a rod were to wield him who lifts it up,
or a club brandish him who is not wood!


Isaiah 14:24-27

24 The LORD Almighty has sworn,
"Surely, as I have planned, so it will be,
and as I have purposed, so it will stand.
25 I will crush the Assyrian in my land;
on my mountains I will trample him down.
His yoke will be taken from my people,
and his burden removed from their shoulders."

26 This is the plan determined for the whole world;
this is the hand stretched out over all nations.

27 For the LORD Almighty has purposed, and who can thwart him?
His hand is stretched out, and who can turn it back?

And still speaking of Assyria:

Isaiah 37:26

26 "Have you not heard?
Long ago I ordained it.
In days of old I planned it;
now I have brought it to pass,
that you have turned fortified cities
into piles of stone.

Here we have Jehovah clearly causing the Assyrian king to "to seize loot and snatch plunder, and to trample them down like mud in the streets." So is this an instance of WCP? Have we shown God to be immoral?

Another example can be found in Job. When Job heard that the Chaldeans had stolen his camels and killed his servants, Job said: The LORD gave and the LORD has taken away; may the name of the LORD be praised." Is this a violation of WCP? Or is this an instance of the different levels of God's involvement. The Chaldeans took and the Lord took. The Bible obviously ascribes different causal models to each.

One last example will do for the time being. Take Jesus' death. The Bible makes it clear that Jesus death was planned from before the creation. It was also known that he would be sinless. Thus to kill an innocent man is murder. Now, suppose God had not caused what would take place. He left it up to chance. How would Jesus pay for the sins of his people if no one instantiated the necessary requirment of murdering him? Would we read in the Bible about him going up to people and pleading for them to murder him? Perhaps he would commit a capital crime so that he could complete his task of getting mur... uh, er, not anymore. Perhaps he would kill himself? Of course all of this is absurd. So, God made sure, determined, planned, brought it about, caused, whatever floats your boat, that Jesus would be murdered. Thus, God caused other people to do a wrong act, thus a violation of the WCP! Let's look at the biblical witness:

Acts 2:22-23

22"Men of Israel, listen to this: Jesus of Nazareth was a man accredited by God to you by miracles, wonders and signs, which God did among you through him, as you yourselves know. 23This man was handed over to you by God's set purpose and foreknowledge; and you, with the help of wicked men, put him to death by nailing him to the cross.


Acts 4:27-29

27Indeed Herod and Pontius Pilate met together with the Gentiles and the people of Israel in this city to conspire against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed. 28They did what your power and will had decided beforehand should happen. 29Now, Lord, consider their threats and enable your servants to speak your word with great boldness.

And so here we see an unambiguous case where God "caused" people to do wrong things.

But if we want to remain orthodox, it is not open to us to say that this is a violation of WCP.

One reason is that God had a good reason, a morally sufficient reason, for the death of Jesus.

Thus Victor's WCP principle isn't a necessary one. If it were, it would contradict clear teaching in the Bible (even an essential of the faith). This option is not open to the Christain.

v) God also may cause someone to do a "wrong" act but the act serves as either punishment of discipline. If someone is worthy of punishment and discipline, then why is God using a gang member as his tool necessarily immoral?

III.

Does Victor’s argument open up the door to the Wrongful Permission principle?

WPP: It is wrong to permit or allow someone to do a wrong act if you could stop them through no loss of your own.

Indeed, this doesn't even have to affect free will. God could cause a knife blade to turn to rubber right when a killer attempts to cut a victim's throat. The person still had evil intentions, and would have killed the other person. This would be enough for a moral evaluation to be issued by God. The man still would have sinned. He would not have lost his free will. And the crime would have been stopped.

Say Victor loses his job at ASU. He gets a new job on a pit crew checking the breaks of NASCAR cars. Say Victor sees that the break line is leaking a massive amount of fluid. He knows an accident will result. If Victor doesn't stop this, if he permits the car to get back on the track, has he not done something immoral?

It seems to me that Victor falls by the WPP. Or, he could say that God has a good reason for the evil he permits. But if he can say this to undercut WPP, then I can use it to undercut WCP.

IV.

Jonathon Edwards writes,

“They who object, that this doctrine makes God the author of sin, ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, ‘the author of sin.’ I know the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something very ill. If by ‘the author of sin,’ be meant ‘the sinner, the agent,’ or ‘actor of sin,’ or ‘the doer of a wicked thing’; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the author of sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the author of sin.

But if, by ‘the author of sin,’ is mean the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin; and, at the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense).

And, I do not deny, that God being thus the author of sin, follows from what I have laid down; and, I assert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is maintained by most of the Arminian divines.

There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will it should come to pass, considering all the consequences.

Men do will sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it: they love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil; though it be his pleasure so to order things, that, he permitting, sin will come to pass, for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass, for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate evil, as evil,” Works (Banner of Truth 1984), 1:76,78,79.
This permission is no bare permission, though. It is his willing permission. Helm says for "For X willingly to permit action A is at least for this: for A to be the action of someone other than X; for X to foreknow the occurrence of A and to have been able to prevent A; and for A not to be against X's overall plan" (Helm, Four Views, pp.176-178). On this view then, God does not causally determine everything in the sense that he is the efficient cause of everything. But nothing that happens is something that God was unwilling to happen. So God positively governs all acts that occur and negatively governs all evil acts by knowingly willingly permitting them.

God's intentions are different from man's too. As Augustine says:

In a way unspeakably strange and wonderful, even what is done in opposition to his will does not defeat his will. For it would not be done did he not permit it (and of course his permission is not unwilling but willing); nor would a good being permit evil to be done only that in his omnipotence he can turn evil into good (cited in Helm, For Views, p. 176).
Calvin speaks to this intention also:

How may we attribute this same work to God, to Satan, and to man as author, without either excusing Satan as associated with God, or making God the author of evil? Easily, if we consider first the end, and then the manner of acting…So great is the diversity of purpose that already strongly marks the deed. There is no less difference in the manner…Therefore we see no inconsistency in assigning the same deed to God, Satan, and man; but the distinction in purpose and manner causes God’s righteousness to shine forth blameless there, while the wickedness of Satan and of man betrays itself by its own disgrace, Institutes 2.4.2.
Intent or virtue, end or goal, is a necessary condition for an ethical act. And I've already thrown a lot of doubt on the notion that Reppert's WCP is some necessary truth, besides the fact that we have no clue how it is supposed to apply to the Calvinist's conception of God.

V.

I will close out by commenting on a couple of other statements Reppert made in his post:

Even if you can make it out that if an omnipotent being pre-ordained the Holocaust before the foundation of the world, that Hitler can nevertheless be blamed for perpetrating it (after all he didn't do it against his will, he wanted to do it); in particular if the sin involved is so heinous as to deserve everlasting punishment, then an omnipotent being who is also perfectly good would not decree the Holocaust.
Perhaps Victor forgot that every sin is so heinous that it deserves everlasting punishment on the traditional, orthodox view (cf. Romans 6:23).

If Hitler deserves everlasting punishment how much more so do those that murdered an innocent man, Jesus Christ, the Lord of Glory? I have demonstrated that God decreed this. So Victor can deny that the Bible reported truth in Acts 2 and 4, or he can say that God is not perfectly "good" (whatever he means by that).


I would like to ask if there is any human context in which anyone could deny that this principle is true. Can we just dismiss this principle as "intuitions?" Isn't it an intuition that virtually all of us share, and would employ without hestitation unless one's theology was at stake?

Here's a context where one might be able to deny that the WCP is true. A Morally Acceptable Violation of the WCP:

MAVWCP: A terrorist tells you that he will nuke all the major cities of the world unless you force someone to lie to their grandmother about coming over for sunday dinner. (And you can tell no one about this, either.)

So, you happen to know that Ned goes to his grandma's for dinner every Sunday. Ned is about 120 pounds soaking wet. You're an ex-linebacker for the San Diego Chargers. Ned is obviously frightened of what you could do to him if you got angry. So, you go to Ned and put on a show of rage and anger. Tell him you hate grandmas, or something. So, you tell him to call his grandma, Gladis, and tell her that he is going out with his friends sunday and will not be coming over for sunday dinner.

So here we have a violation of WCP that seems to be morally exceptable. One reason was that there was a much greater good involved. Applying this to Calvinism we find that we're right back at my theodicy. And without any interaction with my theodicy (which is really just the theodicy of the majority of contemporary Christian philosophers), Victor's WCP is just a re-statement of the problem without advancing the discussion forward one bit.

I've already pointed out some problems in reasoning from human to divine here. I also pointed out problems with the principle in general as it is supposed to apply to the Calvinist. How doe he think we're denying this intuition? I also provided a principle, WPP, that I wonder "if there is any human context in which anyone could deny that this principle is true." Can Victor just dismiss WPP as "intuitions?" Isn't WPP an intuition that virtually all of us share and would employ without hesitation unless one's tradition was at stake? And I've also shown that the Bible asks us to, and can, overturn our moral "intuitions." I've shown that with the atonement. I've done that with the a general argument from inerrancy. That is, if the Bible is inerrant, if its teachings are infallible, then if it teaches some teaching T, and if our admittedly fallible moral intuitions teach ~T, then ~~T.

Lastly, the Bible tells us that the gospel is an offense. I wonder if thinkers like Victor keep "fixing" the Bible so as not to offend people's moral or theological "intuitions", what will happen to the gospel? If no one is offended by your gospel, have you got the right gospel? If they are, why ask them to give up their moral “intuitions?”

13 comments:

  1. Hi Paul,

    I suspect Vic and yourself are speaking at cross purposes, or lacking some essential level of communication.

    For instance Vic composed two posts that discussed the way Jesus & Paul both expressed sadness that many were nor listening to Jesus's words nor following the Lord. This disturbed both Paul and Jesus very deeply. It was as though both Jesus and Paul were treating those people as if they had a choice to make and that J&P were extremely sad that those people were making an incorrect choice.

    A Calvinist might say that is the way God the Author is portraying things for the sake of us, His characters, putting on a show of sadness at people's poor choices, but that didn't matter as much as the Calvinistic fact that Jesus, being God, knew full well that there is only election by God or non-election by God, so the ultimate "choosing" involved is God's, and neither God nor the elect in the next life need ever feel the least bit of sorrow for the non-elect whose names were never written in the book of life, and who were created just so God could be pleased by (not filled with sorrow over) their eternal damnation.

    So Vic and you don't see eye to eye on whether or not Jesus & Paul's sorrow over people's bad choices was genuine or not. Maybe that's something you need to make clearer to Vic.

    Personally, I suspect that Jesus & Paul may not have fully grasped nor fully worked out the apparent incongruity between their teachings on election, divine favor (grace) and foreknowledge, and taken that into account when it came to their sorrow and urgency over the need for everyone to choose to follow the Lord.

    As for alternative feelings there are a few places in the Bible that depict rejoicing over the sight of the "unrighteous" receiving judgment. But when exactly is one supposed to be sorrowful over people's bad choices, and when is one supposed to be rejoicing that God is being glorified by a person's damnation nearing completion?

    (Of course some theologians interpret passages on the "joy of seeing the unrighteous or non-elect suffer" as being more reflective of the human emotion known as schaedenfreud instead of reflecting a lesson in divine joy over the sorrows and damnation of others.)

    If I may propose my own view, it is that the mind is such an amazing juggler of concepts and ideas that both Arminians and Calvinists can play round with the Bible's many stories and different depictions of Yahweh and Jesus, juggling them in their minds until both Arminians and Calvinists can find ways to explain away whichever parts of Scripture don't fit their theologies. I've seen it done for instance with passages related to the creation and shape of the cosmos. (See my online piece, "Varieties of Scientific Creationism" Babinski)

    I also know that there are difficulties when attempting to take ancient stories told about Yahweh, Elohim, over the centuries, and transfer them to a strictly philosophical frame of understanding where "God" has certain unchanging philosophical attributes and by definition is so perfect and infinite in all ways that God needs nothing, not even to create, since by definition perfection needs nothing. And God is everywhere and doesn't have to "come down from heaven" to "see" what men are doing at the tower of Babel, etc.

    Philo of Alexandria is one such person who attempted to meld the stories of his ancient Jewish people with Greek philosophical definitions of the Theos/Logos. The early church father Origin also attempted such a melding of the Hebrew stories with the Greek philosophical mind, finding a host of "meanings" in the Hebrew stories that the original authors probably had never considered. Other early fathers who were Platonists, neo-Platonists, likewise played with such a mind-meld of ancient stories and Greek philosophical definitions of the Theos/Logos.

    Lastly, I wonder what J.P. Holding thinks of Calvinism and were his view would fit in between yours and Vic?

    And I wonder if Vic is willing to go so far in his Arminian view to consider that Open Theism might be true? That would place him quite far from your own view indeed.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Ed,

    I fear you're just, like always, trying to get off your "talking points." You are showing no familiarity with the discussion Victor and I our having.
    I suggest taking some time today, if you're interested in contributing, that is, and reading all of the posts in this entire dialogue.

    If you are not willing to do that, then don't bother trying to drag me into a side-debate that really has nothing to do with the conversation presently going on.

    But next time I want to debate an apostate who simply wants to psychologize the Bible, assume that it is error, interpret it naturalistically, I'll let you know.

    And the next time I want to see what an apostate thinks about the meaning of Bible passages by psychologizing them rather than exegeting them, I'll be sure to come find you.

    So, unless you have something relevant to say regarding *this* debate, then you're simply being an annoyance. No offense intended.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Could you supply the link to your theodicy?

    ReplyDelete
  4. "There have been some that have said that my argument is problematic since I am appealing to my "historically conditioned interpretations of the text of Scripture.""

    Isn't everything historically conditioned?

    Doesn't this argument like many post-Modernist arguments presuppose epistemic infallibilism?

    Didn't D.A. Carson deal with this in "The Gagging of God"?

    ReplyDelete
  5. II b) Does it mean a necessary condition? ... In this sense of "cause," we should lock up Jeffery Dahmer's parents for giving birth to Dahmer.

    I think there's morally significant necessary conditions & morally insignificant necessary conditions. So if I shoot someone, a MSNC would be my will to kill, but a MINC would be the fact that his skull is too weak and soft to resist the bullet. It seems that your point is that there are many necessary conditions that go into commission of a sin, so God's decree can't be singled out as the major cause, but it seems to be this is a morally significant factor, so God would be culpable, but Dahmer's parents would not.

    II d)There is a long theological tradition which speaks of concurrence.

    That's an appeal to authority. IIRC, William Lane Craig criticized Anthony Flew for believing in that in their debate. So Craig rejects it. He's certainly as authoritative as any other Christian philosopher.

    II iv) Isaiah 10, Acts 4, etc.

    This threatens to lead into minutiae about interpretation rather than the subject which I thought was "does calvinism offer an adequate response to the problem of evil." The arminian could pull out Molinism to interpret those passages (God placed certain people in certain places (like Pilate & Judas) that he knew would act in certain ways, but they had libertarian free will etc., etc.) Then this would become a discussion about the feasibility of Molinism, etc. I don't see why it's helpful then to bring in these texts. Just argue about whether WCP is a valid "moral axiom" or "intuition" or not.

    III. WPP
    I don't regard this as valid for the following reason- it seems the Biblical scenario is like God is a judge or prison guard and we are prisoners on death row. Let's say Jeffrey Dahmer, or John Geoghan is killed by a fellow inmate. I do not believe that even if the guard could have prevented this, it would be wrong for him *not* to. But it *would* be wrong if the guard had the capability of *decreeing* Dahmer's will to be evil and he did it years before Dahmer ended up in the pen. So the reason WPP is ok and WPC is *not* ok for God is because his prerogative in letting evil happen to us is because we already *are* sinful (Luke 13- except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish, etc.), but WPC is a different ballpark - that concerns the origin of the sin, not dealing with sinners once sin is a fact.

    For us humans, who are fellow criminals, we have a moral duty to behave ourselves towards each other therefore WPP is *not* an option for us. Your analogy fails because God stands in a different relation to us than we do to each other.

    BTW, I *do* agree that the Bible teaches compatibilism, which is another reason I'm glad I don't believe it. Victor, I read a link on your page "an arminian exegesis of Rom 9" and stopped at this point: "Those who die in their sin do so by the predetermined counsel and kind intention of God's will. Stop your blubbering, Paul." This isn't exegesis, this is an emotional reaction against what the chapter is saying. To go back to Jeffrey Dahmer, I'm sure that his family must have been broken hearted over him and wished he'd turned out different. Does that mean they thought he should be set free? That he did no wrong? Victor, if you do not like what Calvinism teaches, maybe you should consider atheism. "Join Us!" as the Evil Dead say.

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  6. btw, I've no problem with compatibilism to determine guilt (it is a sort of minimal requirement to determine guilt - if you know right from wrong and sin freely, you are guilty end of discussion - no need to appeal to "meta" causes of your will).

    But I do not think your greater good theodicy (redeemed humanity is a greater good than unfallen) is a justification for God's decree that reprobates exist (although God's decree of *reprobabtion* is reasonable since that deals with sinners as already existing things). An analogy I'd offer is that let's say we could induce some horrible medical condition in someone so our physicians could learn how to cure it. That knowledge of the cure is a greater good, but that doesn't justify bringing about that condition in the person without his will. And if God decrees a spiritual condition of a person by decreeing that person's will be a certain way, he has brought about a horrible condition *without* consulting that person's will. That may be problematic (how can one consult a non-existent will? If it exists - it has a nature, and what determines that nature?), but come on - you must have that same intuition, as I admit the "author" analogy is interesting.

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  7. I certainly don't endorse any attempt by atheists to get points for their own view based on our controversy here. Atheists disagree about all sorts of things. For example, evolutionists never tire of reminding critics of evolution that any controversy between advocates of gradualism and advocates of punctuated equalibilium provides any basis for calling evolution into question. Can't we say that same thing to atheists with respect to this debate?

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  8. Hi Luke,

    In the context of this debate, I have put forward these:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/04/reply-to-anti-calvinists.html

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/04/why-reppert-cant-unsolve-calvinists.html

    But I've also posted on it in numerous other instances. A couple examples would be:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/10/emotional-problem-of-evil_28.html

    and

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/02/if-evil-then-god.html

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  9. thnuhthnuh said:

    It seems that your point is that there are many necessary conditions that go into commission of a sin, so God's decree can't be singled out as the major cause, but it seems to be this is a morally significant factor, so God would be culpable, but Dahmer's parents would not.


    First, I asked a *question* so I could clear on what *Victor's* definition was. You can't critique me for asking a clarifying *question*.

    Second, all you've done is assert that God is morally culpable. And this assertion in light of the fact that I answered this charge both here and in my other posts.

    Thus, this comment is unhelpful.

    II d)There is a long theological tradition which speaks of concurrence.

    That's an appeal to authority. IIRC, William Lane Craig criticized Anthony Flew for believing in that in their debate. So Craig rejects it. He's certainly as authoritative as any other Christian philosopher.


    i) No, it's not an appeal to authority (and, not all appeals to authority are fallacious. See Douglas Walton's _Informal Fallacies_.)

    ii) I simply mentioned the view, and then showed that it makes God the cause of upholding all things.

    iii) Flew did not believe in what I presented.

    iv) If my mention of theologians was an appeal to authority, how was your name dropping of Craig not the same?

    "This threatens to lead into minutiae about interpretation rather than the subject which I thought was "does calvinism offer an adequate response to the problem of evil." The arminian could pull out Molinism to interpret those passages (God placed certain people in certain places (like Pilate & Judas) that he knew would act in certain ways, but they had libertarian free will etc., etc.) Then this would become a discussion about the feasibility of Molinism, etc. I don't see why it's helpful then to bring in these texts. Just argue about whether WCP is a valid "moral axiom" or "intuition" or not.

    The context of this discussion was the WCP.

    How would Molinist interpretations not be an instance of the WCP?

    Just *telling* me that there could be other interpretations does absolutely *nothing* to advance an argument or show a problem with my argument.

    The fact that there can be other interpretations does not mean mine is wrong. We have to get into the mud and wrestle. I have no problem getting dirty.

    "III. WPP
    I don't regard this as valid for the following reason- it seems the Biblical scenario is like God is a judge or prison guard and we are prisoners on death row. Let's say Jeffrey Dahmer, or John Geoghan is killed by a fellow inmate. I do not believe that even if the guard could have prevented this, it would be wrong for him *not* to. But it *would* be wrong if the guard had the capability of *decreeing* Dahmer's will to be evil and he did it years before Dahmer ended up in the pen. So the reason WPP is ok and WPC is *not* ok for God is because his prerogative in letting evil happen to us is because we already *are* sinful (Luke 13- except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish, etc.), but WPC is a different ballpark - that concerns the origin of the sin, not dealing with sinners once sin is a fact."


    i) Guard's can't let people murder other people in an *unlawful* way. You're just evincing ignorance of the system. That’s why they *stop* these sorts of things. That’s why they do cell checks for shanks. That’s why they put people in the hole who are in danger. That’s why Dahmer was on a special watch. They are supposed to uphold the *law* and that means upholding the *lawful* form of execution.

    ii) You've not shown how "decreeing" is problematic. You've just *asserting* that it is...again.

    iii) If we are guilty then on the WCP God can use a gang member to, say, kill another person since, as you grant, that person is guilty. So, at best, you've shown that there is no WPP principle and no WCP that affects either.

    iv) The WPP would apply to the fall too.

    v) I've discussed the fall before:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/10/dialogues-with-infidels.html

    vi) You've ignored *all* of the requests for specification on what you take the "decree" to be. You're showing *no* familiarity with the Calvinist position. You're *totally* ignoring the explanation I gave.

    "For us humans, who are fellow criminals, we have a moral duty to behave ourselves towards each other therefore WPP is *not* an option for us. Your analogy fails because God stands in a different relation to us than we do to each other."

    Same with the WCP, and I made this point. Totally different levels of causality. You're equivocation. You're leaving out the creator/creature distinction. You're treating God as *just one more fact of the universe*. You're begging the question. You're totally failing to interact with my argument and the developed, systematic approach I took.

    I also showed an exception to the WCP by my example of the MAVWCP.

    "BTW, I *do* agree that the Bible teaches compatibilism, which is another reason I'm glad I don't believe it."

    I don't get it, so you *don't* believe in compatibilism?

    You believe in libertarian free will?

    And that fits in with atheistic naturalism how, exactly?

    And your answer to the Luck Argument by fellow atheists is *what*, exactly?

    Your answer tio Dennett is *what* exactly?

    "Victor, I read a link on your page "an arminian exegesis of Rom 9" and stopped at this point: "Those who die in their sin do so by the predetermined counsel and kind intention of God's will. Stop your blubbering, Paul."

    Victor posted some dude's *blog*
    entry. Here's a *scholarly* exegesis of Romans 9 by NT Scholar Dr. Steve Baugh:

    http://www.glenwoodhills.org/etc/printer-friendly.asp?ID=423

    And here's another good entry by a trained exegete showing the individual nature of Romans 9:

    http://www.mslick.com/romans9c.htm

    And Reppert makes a false dichotomy when he views Rom. 9 has either individual *or* corporate.

    Please read and digest the argument before future interaction so as to save us both time. Thank you.

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  10. Thnuhthnuh: "BTW, I *do* agree that the Bible teaches compatibilism, which is another reason I'm glad I don't believe it."

    I'm rather unclear here. If the Bible teaches it, then why don't you believe it? Please clarify, if you will.

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  11. Pointing out disagreements is to simply point out the obvious: people have psychologies.

    There are *many* reasons why people disagree, and in the case of the Bible, the least of which is the belief that Scripture isn't clear enough.

    If disagreement meant that something could not be determined due to unclarity of the data, then all debate on everything would cease.

    To reinforce V.R.'s point above, there are several well-known biologists (and they aren't creationists or IDers) that believe that RM+NS (i.e. neo-Darwinism) is not a powerful enough factor to cause evolution. Instead, they are searching for an alternative [albeit, naturalistic] mechanism. Will our atheist interlocutors believe that this debate over something so fundamental to atheistic materialism destroys the validity of the biological sciences?

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  12. "I'm rather unclear here. If the Bible teaches it, then why don't you believe it? Please clarify, if you will."

    Thnuhthnuh is an atheist.

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  13. Thnuhthnuh,

    You're an atheist!? I thought you were a Christian because I've you post on other Christian blogs.

    You fooled me.

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