Friday, March 28, 2008

When is a warning a warning?

“Hays seems to be adopting the errant assumption that the warning of God must have 'failed' if it does not have a deterrant effect on the redeemed. Not so, warnings are not strictly deterrants, if the warning is not heeded, it is still quite effective in that the consequence it warns against will surely be carried out…Hays' displays some terrible all-or-nothing thinking of the same variety as Greg Elmquist. The old 'if a ever fails to cause b, then a can have nothing to do with b' canard. For a warning to deter someone, it must be both received and heeded, so whether it deters the agent or not is contingent upon both the warning being given and being obeyed. If the person warned does not obey it, it's not due to the warning 'failing,' but to the person disregarding it, which I address further below.”

http://www.junkyard.indeathorlife.org/

This interpretation poses quite a problem for Arminian theology. If God knows the future, then God knows who will be deterred by his warnings, and who will not be deterred by his warnings. In that event, he never intended to deter those who would disregard his warnings. And in that event, J.C. will have to admit that a divine warning can be meaningful even though it was never meant to deter a particular set of people.

Of course, if a Calvinist were to say that, he’d be accused of turning the warnings into a charade. They are *apparently* intended to discourage people from doing x, but in reality, their ulterior purpose is…what, exactly? What is J.C’s alternative?

He says the offender will suffer the consequences. So is that the purpose of the warning? To make the offender suffer the consequences?

So, on that interpretation, God warns some people, not to deter them, but to make them suffer the consequences. That’s the intent of the warning. And that’s the effect of the warning. That’s what makes the warning effective—in those cases.

So, for that subset of humanity, God’s intention is that those individuals suffer dire consequences, and the deliberate function of the warning is to facilitate that dire outcome. The warning instrumental in effecting their sorry fate.

So, on this interpretation, God has benign intentions for one subset of humanity, and malign intentions for the other subset of humanity. He eternally intended to save one subset of humanity from the consequences while he eternally intended to make the other subset of humanity suffer the eschatological consequences.

J.C. has a remarkably supralapsarian version of Arminian theology.

“A warning can be a very effective deterrant (i.e. suitable to, and capable of performing its task) but still be presented to people who choose to disregard it.”

If they choose to disregard it, then it proved to be a very ineffective deterrent.

“If a fully capable driver ignores it and speeds on ahead to his death anyway, would we conclude that it was the sign's fault for not being an effective enough deterrent because it didn't end up saving the driver's life? Of course not.”

If the “task” of the sign is to “be a very effective deterent [sic],” and the driver ignores it, then, by J.C’s own definition, it didn’t “perform its task”—in which case it failed. If its task is to deter the driver, and it doesn’t deter the driver, then it didn’t effect the outcome which it was tasked to perform. How can a warning be a very effective deterrent if the driver is undeterred by the warning?

The only way that J.C. can salvage any semblance of consistency is to redefine the purpose of a warning so that he either (i) eliminates the deterrent intent, or he (ii) restricts the deterrent intent.

The problem with (i) is that this would be at odds with the standard definition of the word: “Advice to beware of a person or thing as being dangerous,” “Deterrent counsel: cautionary advice against imprudent action,” “An experience, sight, etc. that serves as a caution: a deterrent example” (OED).

And if he opts for (i), then he forfeits the right to accuse the Calvinist of tampering with the “plain sense” or “obvious meaning” of what a “real” or “genuine” warning amounts to.

The problem with (ii) is that this would involve him in a denial of divine omnibenevolence. God would now have a benevolent intent for one subset of humanity, but a malevolent intent for the other subset of humanity. How is that consistent with Arminian commitments to the universal love of God, including his universal salvific intent?

“The warnings need not be irresistible to be fully capable deterrants, and as stated above, they do not fail as warnings if they are ignored, for their consequences will be fulfilled.”

i) If a deterrent is resistible, then it’s incapable of fully deterring the offender.

ii) If he defines the efficacy of the warning, not in terms of its deterrent value, but in terms of the divinely foreseen consequences, then the purpose of the warning would be inculpate or aggravate the guilt of the offender.

Sounds remarkably like the Reformed doctrine of reprobation.

“Which of course explains why it talks about their part in New Jerusalem and the tree of life being taken away. There's no doubt from the context as to whom this warning and its consequence are specifically directed.”

To the contrary, it doesn’t say that anyone is in danger of losing his salvation. Rather, it threatens damnation for anyone who tampers with the prophecy.

That would include nominal believers. Indeed, the letters to the seven churches are concerned with nominal believers.

“I guess Steve didn't realize he'd lost on this point several posts back. Let's see, God's knowledge transcends the boundaries of time, therefore, no matter what choice will be made, God already knows what it will be.”

That’s an assertion, not an argument.

“Steve tried to dance around this, but was never able to explain how if the omniscient God's knowledge was not bound by time, why He would be unable to know a libertarian choice (speaking from our temporal perspective) before it is made.”

Because divine knowledge of the future commits J.C. to epistemic determinism.

5 comments:

  1. J.C. said,

    "...if the warning is not heeded, it is still quite effective in that the consequence it warns against will surely be carried out..."


    Classic, appealing to the same argument from hypotheticals I made.

    Yes, as I said, the warnings are meaningful because *if* any believer transgressed them, the consequent would follow. I pointed out that the antecedant does not have to be fulfilled for the conditional to have a tru truth-value.

    J.C. tacitly admits I answered his 'challenege' way back when.

    (I also did more, pointing out that all those who fall away are described as being of a different *nature* than those who persevere. They were not "once-fruit-bearers", they were "never-fruit-bearers."

    Anyway, J.C.'s appealing to hypotheticals is all too funny considering the source - anti-hypotheticalist. Ben once said, "is there a post Manata doesn't appeal to hypotheticals in?"

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  2. This whole deterent definition of a warning reminds me of what Schaeffer said (I think it was him)
    He said something along the lines of

    - The Bible isn't true because it works, it works because it is true -

    in the same was, a warning is a warning because it is true, not because it works (deters).

    I wonder if those who are defining warning with "effective deterent" aren't also believing the Bible because they haven't found something else that works better.
    Not saying they are, just wondering.

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  3. Daryl said:
    This whole deterent definition of a warning reminds me of what Schaeffer said (I think it was him)
    He said something along the lines of

    - The Bible isn't true because it works, it works because it is true -

    in the same was, a warning is a warning because it is true, not because it works (deters).

    I wonder if those who are defining warning with "effective deterent" aren't also believing the Bible because they haven't found something else that works better.
    Not saying they are, just wondering.

    3/28/2008 10:28 AM

    ***********

    Right, logically, a conditional statement has a true truth-value regardless of whether the antcedent is instantiated.

    This this statement is true:

    S = If I flip this coin, then it will fall to the ground."

    S is *true,* regardless of whether or not I do *in fact* flip that coin.

    Same with the warnings.

    So, we see J.C. appeal to this very same logic (the logic Steve, Gene,and myself (and others) have pointed out).

    But J.C. will come back and say:

    "But, for the warning to have meaning, one must really be able to actually fall away. Genuine transgression."

    Okay, now he runs smakc dab into Steve's counter to this point.

    He's really caught himself in a bind this time.

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  4. “I guess Steve didn't realize he'd lost on this point several posts back. Let's see, God's knowledge transcends the boundaries of time, therefore, no matter what choice will be made, God already knows what it will be.”

    Actually, we went over this and JCT never, ever answered except to continue saying "Because God is timeless." JCT's answer to this was "God knows because God is timeless." He just kept repeating this as if it answers the question. But it doesn't say anything about how a libertarian choice's outcome can be known by God if it is only unable in the mind of the acting agent up to and until the time the outcome is made into an effect.

    Let's see if we can craft an outliine that JCT might just understand:

    JCT first argued that God knows these choices *before* the agent makes them.

    But JCT is committed to LFW.

    In LFW, the outcome is CONTRAcausal in nature.

    So the Acting Agent (Agent A) is the only one who can have any certain idea of the outcome.

    And it can only be certain due to the act of Agent A.

    Until Agent A enacts the choice, the outcome can change.

    So anything God might know *before* Agent A acts is just a really good guess.

    God can only know the outcome of Agent A's act *as a result of the act.*

    So the first thing we know now is that God is *dependent* on Agent A for His own knowledge. This, by the way directly attacks the Independence of God. God is made to depend on the acts of free agents for His knowledge.

    This poses a particular problem for Advocates of Middle Knowledge since God chooses to instaniate this universe and only this universe and He does so in way in which He knows all the libertarian choices in it and decrees that universe so that they all occur with certainty. Remember, God does this from *many* possible universes? So, what grounds His foreknowledge of those choices if these are only *possible* universes?

    A similar objection obtains for the Simple Foreknowledge view of which JCT seems to be an advocate. The outcome is already *determined* if it's *certain.* Which gets us here:

    “Steve tried to dance around this, but was never able to explain how if the omniscient God's knowledge was not bound by time, why He would be unable to know a libertarian choice (speaking from our temporal perspective) before it is made.”

    Uh, we actually answered this, and JCT ignored the answer. JCT is such a liar.

    1. How is that object knowable *before* the Agent acts? Saying "because God is timeless" is no answer, *because God depends on the agent's action.* God only knows the act *as a result of the action.*

    This means God only knows it *after* the agent acts, not *before.* It's JCT who chose to use these spatial and temporal metaphors (before and after), so now he needs to actually deal with them.

    2. He's confusing the ontology of God with an epistemological category related to how things are known. The issue isn't the timeless nature of God (ontology - God's nature)) but *epistemological question* related to the knowability of the object (Outcome A, which is an instance of Agent A, a human being).

    It begs the question that the object (Outcome A) is a knowable object of knowledge to argue that it is knowable due to God's timeless nature. That's just an assertion. How many times do we have to repeat ourselves?

    We know God is timeless, but He understands relational sequence, eg. that A comes before B and so on. Why, JCT, or more properly, How?

    Is it because He is "timeless?" That has been your answer so far. Okay, if so then how do we get from God's timelessness - an ontological category related to an agent other than Agent A (a human being) to questions of logical, relational sequence with respect to the actions of other agents than God - an epistemological category?

    In Reformed theology, we answer this easily: God knows them because He knows His decree. He therefore knows these things because He knows Himself. God's knowledge is a species of His self-knowledge.

    While you're at it, will you please show us where LFW is taught by Scripture. You have yet to successfully do so. Until you do, everything else is just so much bluster. Please demonstrate from Scripture that our choices are contracausal in nature.

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  5. Edit:

    My first paragraph above should read

    Actually, we went over this and JCT never, ever answered except to continue saying "Because God is timeless." JCT's answer to this was "God knows because God is timeless." He just kept repeating this as if it answers the question. But it doesn't say anything about how a libertarian choice's outcome can be known by God if it is only knowable (not "unable") in the mind of the acting agent up to and until the time the outcome is made into an effect.

    ReplyDelete