I guess Steve didn't realize he'd lost on this point several posts back. Let's see, God's knowledge transcends the boundaries of time, therefore, no matter what choice will be made, God already knows what it will be.”I'm doing this because it strikes me that sometimes we here at Tblog can be like the students in a Geometry class who do the proof in "short form." Sometimes, however, it's helpful to do the proof in the longest form possible in order for a less able to student to see the inner logic that he might not otherwise understand. Hopefully, this will help JCT and other readers who may not yet "get it."
So with that said, actually, we went over this and JCT never, really, ever answered except to continue saying "Because God is timeless." JCT's answer to this was "God knows because God is timeless." He basically just kept repeating this as if it answers the question - bu it doesn't say anything about how a libertarian choice's outcome can be known by God if it is only knowable in the mind of the acting agent up to and until the time the outcome is made into an effect.
Allow me to explain in an outline that JCT might just understand. Please follow very carefully.
JCT is basically arguing that God knows these choices *before* the agent makes them (from our standpoint). Fine, no problem. How? He says, "Because God is timeless." I might put it differently by pointing to God's omnipresence, via a spatial metaphor, instead of a temporal one, to say "because He is already there." ("Before" and "After" are spatial as well as temporal metaphors). I think this captures the essence of JCT's answer. If I'm wrong, he can correct me.
JCT is committed to LFW (libertarian free will).
So, given these basic premises, let's take a look why we are responding the way we are, in hopes that JCT will understand us:
In LFW, the outcome is CONTRAcausal in nature. This makes it indeterminate in nature, until it is instantiated. This is definitional to LFW. We can call this question, the question of "determinability," eg. the quality that attaches to an object of knowledge that is contracausal in nature. If an object of knowledge may change until it comes to pass, it is, by definition, indeterminate in nature.
So the Acting Agent (Agent A) is the only one who can have any relatively certain idea of the outcome until that time, for it is only in that agent's mind.
And it can only be made certain (eg. made determinate) due to the act of Agent A, eg. Agent A must choose in order for the outcome to be made certain.
Why? Because until and unless Agent A enacts the choice, the outcome can change. At that time, it becomes fixed, therefore, certain.
So - anything God might know about this object of knowledge *before* or *apart from* the action of Agent A act of choosing it is just a really good guess until Agent A makes his/her choice.
Put another way, God can only know the outcome of Agent A's act *as a result of the Agent's act of choosing.*
Why? Because the object of knowledge (Outcome A instantiated by Agent A) is an *indeterminate* object of knowledge until the moment it is instantiated.
So - The question is not "How does God know after Outcome A is instantiated?"
The question is "How does God know before Outcome A is instantiated, since Outcome A would be indeterminate in nature until it was instantiated?"
If something is knowable after or as a result of it's instantiation, it is a determinate object of knowledge, because it has been instantiated/it's instantiation; it is then fixed. In short, certainty corresponds with a determinate, fixed object of knowledge, not an indeterminate, unfixed object of knowledge. Only uncertainty obtains with respect to the knowability of an indeterminate, unfixed object of knowledge. In other words, an unfixed, indeterminate object is a moving target. You can guess, and you might be able to predict with great accuracy, but you can't know with infallible certainty where it will be every time you pull the trigger or shoot your arrow.
So the first thing we know now is that, on JCT's framework, God is *dependent* on Agent A for His own knowledge and this knowledge is infallible and certain. Therefore, this makes the object of knowledge determinate, for it is certain, and fixed, not indeterminate. This is inconsistent with LFW, which deals with indeterminate, not determinate, objects of knowledge.
In short:
Certainty = determinate object of knowledge
Uncertainty = indeterminate object of knowledge
Uncertainty = indeterminate object of knowledge
Ergo this is why Steve writes,
Because divine knowledge of the future commits J.C. to epistemic determinism.The key word is "epistemic." Why are you committed to epistemic determinism? We're talking about the knowability of an object (Outcome A). You are committed to this because of the underlying reasons that the object is knowable/known by God - namely it must pass from an indeterminate object of knowledge (in the mind of Agent A) into being a determinate object of knowledge (instantiated by Agent A) in order for God to know it with certainty.
1. You affirm that God's foreknowledge of this object is certain and infallibly so.
2. You deny that God foreordained it, and
3. You stipulate to LFW and the instantiation of the object of knowledge by the agent, and
4. You argue "because God is timeless" this means He knows it.
Well, on those premises, JCT, God knows these objects of knowledge:
A. "After" the agent instantiates the choice, or, put another way,
B. "Because" the agent instantiates the choice.
Ergo, the choice (the object of knowledge in question) passes from being an indeterminate object of knowledge (in the mind of Agent A) to a determinate object of knowledge, instantiated by Agent A and thus fixed. Then it is known by God. This is the very definition of epistemic determinism. Why? Once we pass from the "determinability question" (eg. Is the object of knowledge indeterminate or determinate?), we then know it is determined if it is known with certainty by agents (in this case God and man).
Corollary: This, by the way directly attacks the Independence of God and thus ultimately runs counter to classical Christian theism, if consistently followed. God is made to depend on the acts of free agents for His knowledge. Our dispute with Arminians on this has always been that, if they were consistent, they'd be Socinians - and their own history is littered with alliances to Socinianism, so we have good historical reason to recognize this too.
This poses a particular problem for Advocates of Middle Knowledge since God chooses to instantiate this universe and only this universe and He does so in way in which He knows all the libertarian choices in it and decrees that universe so that they all occur with certainty, before He decrees any of it. Remember, God does this from *many* possible universes? So, what grounds His foreknowledge of those choices if these are only *possible* universes? That's what we call the "grounding objection."
A similar objection obtains for the Simple Foreknowledge View of which JCT seems to be an advocate. Why? The outcome is already *determined* if it's *certain.* Which gets us here:
“Steve tried to dance around this, but was never able to explain how if the omniscient God's knowledge was not bound by time, why He would be unable to know a libertarian choice (speaking from our temporal perspective) before it is made.
We actually answered this, and JCT ignored the answer. In my original comment I said "JCT is such a liar." I apologize. On second thought, I just think he doesn't understand the answer (thus this post).
1. How is that object knowable *before* the Agent acts? Saying "because God is timeless" is no answer, *because God depends on the agent's action.* God only knows the act *as a result of the action.*
This means God only knows it *after* the agent acts, not *before.* It's JCT who chose to use these spatial and temporal metaphors (before and after), so now he needs to actually deal with them.
2. He's confusing the ontology of God with an epistemological category related to how things are known by God. The issue isn't the timeless nature of God (ontology - God's nature)) but *epistemological question* related to the knowability of the object (Outcome A, which is an instance of Agent A, a human being, an agent other than God).
It begs the question that the object (Outcome A) is a knowable object of knowledge to argue that it is knowable due to God's timeless nature. That's just an assertion. How many times do we have to repeat ourselves?
By the way, these categories of indetermination and determination are standard, and the arguments employed by Steve and Manata are standard. If JCT wishes to vary with them, that's fine, but he'll need to make the argument.
Now - We know God is timeless, and we agree to that, but we also know that He understands relational sequence, eg. that A comes before B and so on. Why, JCT, or more properly, How is this so? We know He internally intuits everything in "eternal simultaneity" (to borrow a classical term), but what about the logical, orderly, and certain relations with that single intuition?
Is it because He is "timeless?" That has been your answer so far. We'll run with that. Our question to you is, "If so, then how do we get from God's timelessness - an ontological category related to an agent other than Agent A (a human being) to questions of logical, certain, relational sequence with respect to the actions of other agents than God - an epistemological category?" Saying that God is timeless or omnipresent begs the question. You need a supporting argument - that's what we've been waiting for.
In Reformed theology, we answer this easily: God knows them because He knows His decree. He therefore knows these things because He knows Himself. God's (fore)knowledge of our acts is a species of His self-knowledge.
While you're at it, will you please show us where LFW is taught by Scripture. You have yet to successfully do so. Until you do, everything else is just so much bluster. Please demonstrate from Scripture that our choices are contracausal in nature.
Thank You.
I've never understood why Harminians would insist that it is better and more biblical that they have the ability to make flawed decisions with their LFW rather than God rule with complete authority over everything. God is not afraid of the trite implications that might come about in the minds of those who don't see the big picture. I'm sure the blue faced folks at triablogue would rather be writing on something other than this all the time. Peter Pike might even squeeze out 10 more books.
ReplyDelete1. How is that object knowable *before* the Agent acts? Saying "because God is timeless" is no answer, *because God depends on the agent's action.* God only knows the act *as a result of the action.*
ReplyDeleteIf the actions of an agent would always be the same in the same situation, but you could not tell what the actions would be until you had observed them, could you say that that agent possesed LFW?
If so, an omnipotent God could observe creatures' actions and rewind reality (or run a 'simulation' with copies of the agents) and the effect would be the same as if he knew their actions beforehand.
If of course LFW means the agent could choose differently each time, rewinding would do no good.
ReplyDeleteIf of course LFW means the agent could choose differently each time, rewinding would do no good.
Correct, and that's the way a consistent Libertarian has to answer. We've been over this with them before.
If the outcome *is* the same *every time,* then why would it be the same? The question is "What lies behind those choices?" Eg. Given Outcomes A, B, and C (to make it easy), why does the agent choose A and not B or C or B and not A or C or C and not A or B?"
Our opponents, namely, Ben, have argued that we can't chalk the answer to that question up to "mystery." But that's precisely were LFW,if true,must lead. Atheists have recognized this themselves, and consequently rejected this, because it ultimately means our choices have no causes at all.
Here's the issue: Our Arminian opponents are constantly (and fallaciously) mistaking what we mean when we talk about determinism.
They are acting like God is the only agent we have in mind. I've said this before, that's not the only agent. There are TWO agents involved in theological determinism - or one if you want to talk about agent causation (the acting agent) alone.
In short, why does Agent A act the way Agent A acts? Does anybody act in way that is contracausal? Eg. do our choices have sufficient causes behind them or not? If not, then, yes, the choice would be, or at least could be, different every time - LFW. If not, then it could not.
Now, here's where, in talking about divine foreknowledge, the concept of certainty attaches. If the outcome is already known, and infallibly so, it is immutable. This isn't a question of God intuiting a number of possible outcomes, any one of which might obtain. Rather, the question involves the ACTUAL outcome, the one that DOES obtain,the one that He knows is the ONLY one that will obtain. How does God know them without the outcome obtaining, eg. BEFORE it is instantiated, if the outcome is indeterminate until it actually obtains?
TNH,
ReplyDelete"If so, an omnipotent God could observe creatures' actions and rewind reality (or run a 'simulation' with copies of the agents) and the effect would be the same as if he knew their actions beforehand.
If of course LFW means the agent could choose differently each time, rewinding would do no good."
Yeah, this is one of the major objections to LFW. I've dealt with it here:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/04/agent-causation.html
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/04/todays-your-lucky-day.html
Perhaps someone could tell me if all Arminians believe in LFW? If not all, then it is safe to say that the rest are Molinist? Or are any compatibilist in their camp?
ReplyDeleteThank you for any information and good post.
Praise be to God.
Yes, they do, and that includes Molinists. William Lane Craig, their leading proponent, is also an Arminian. He's very plainly stated he affirms LFW.
ReplyDeleteMolinistm,in a nutshell, is the belief that God chooses this universe from all possible universes and instantiates this one and only this one, out of all those universes.
Yet, we still have LFW. God has just chosen the universe in which a particular unified set of Libertarian choices will come to pass.
There are a number of problems with Molinism for that reason. Check our archives for Turretinfan's post on that. The discussion there was excellent.
There are some like Bruce Ware, who attempt to graft a theory of Middle Knowledge onto compatibilism. One them, Dr.Thiessen I believe, if I recall correctly participated in that discussion along with Greg Welty and Steve.
Gene,
ReplyDeleteThank you and I will check the archives for the Turretinfan post.
God bless
Dear Gene,
ReplyDeleteCall me slow if you need to, but I have a question. Are you requesting to know how God knows the future or are you asserting that if He knows it (however He knows it), it couldn't involve LFW?
It seems to me, He knows the future, because He can see it. In the future, even free choices (which are indeterminite today) will be determined.
Maybe timelessness can help us explain how God can see the future, but then again, maybe not. Perhaps it's just part of God's unique relationship with His creation.
The Calvinist viewpoint couldn't explain how God sees the future (if He sees it in their view). Perhaps God could calculate the future or deduce it, but Calvinism doesn't explain how He could see it. In Calvinism, what God sees today, is His plan today for tomorrow. He doesn't see tomorrow. Do you think God sees the future?
God be with you,
Dan
"It seems to me, He knows the future, because He can see it."
ReplyDeleteHow does He see it? Is there some magic crystal ball that He looks through? Is it some mechanism outside of His own Being?
This would mean that there is something that is co-eternal with God. Another god?
If you say that He knows it in Himself, then you are basically committed to saying that God knows the future because He consults His eternal decree.
Dear SinnerSaint,
ReplyDeleteYou asked: How does He see it?
I don't know. I am not sure how you got from God seeing the future to another god.
Do you think God sees the future?
God be with you,
Dan
Godismyjudge said:
ReplyDelete"It seems to me, He knows the future, because He can see it."
You mean, something like this?
http://www.lordotrings.com/tour/palantir.asp
Lol Steve... I think the sense of "I saw" in your Triablogue logo above is a bit closer.
ReplyDeleteDo you think God sees the future?
God be with you,
Dan
Godismyjudge said:
ReplyDeleteThe Calvinist viewpoint couldn't explain how God sees the future (if He sees it in their view). Perhaps God could calculate the future or deduce it, but Calvinism doesn't explain how He could see it. In Calvinism, what God sees today, is His plan today for tomorrow. He doesn't see tomorrow. Do you think God sees the future?
God be with you,
Dan
3/28/2008 9:47 PM
*************
First, the Calvinist takes "foreknow" as its scriptural definition is given, "intimate, knowledge of a person who is loved by the knower."
So, we don't take "foreknow" as in "peers into the future."
On the Calvinist scheme, God knows anything about his creation whatever, because he decreed it. He consults his decree, his plan. So, God's decree causes his knowledge rather than the creature causing God's knowledge.
Godismyjudge said:
ReplyDelete"Do you think God sees the future?"
Not literally. Divine "foresight" is just a picturesque and figurative synonym for divine foreknowledge or (more precisely) God's knowledge of the future.
Dear Steve & Paul,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your responses. I commented back on my blog,here.
God be with you,
Dan
Call me slow if you need to, but I have a question. Are you requesting to know how God knows the future or are you asserting that if He knows it (however He knows it), it couldn't involve LFW?
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me, He knows the future, because He can see it. In the future, even free choices (which are indeterminite today) will be determined.
Maybe timelessness can help us explain how God can see the future, but then again, maybe not. Perhaps it's just part of God's unique relationship with His creation.
The Calvinist viewpoint couldn't explain how God sees the future (if He sees it in their view). Perhaps God could calculate the future or deduce it, but Calvinism doesn't explain how He could see it. In Calvinism, what God sees today, is His plan today for tomorrow. He doesn't see tomorrow. Do you think God sees the future?
You're still missing the big picture, like JCT.
Nobody denies that "God sees the future." I've already anticipated that objection.
To say that God "sees the future" is a picturesque appeal to omnipresence, like saying "God knows the future because He is (already) there."
But that tells us nothing about *how* God knows the future. The question is, "How does God know indeterminate objects of knowledge *before* they are instantiated." That is what divine "foreknowledge" is really addressing.
Your view makes God depend on the determination of those objects by agents. As I pointed out, that move directly attacks the independent of God.
And the Molinist is a real pickle there, because God knows all the possible outcomes without them ever instantiating ever and then chooses to instantiate this and only this universe in order to ensure those outcomes obtain.
The question is, "What grounds God's foreknowledge?" To say that God knows the future "because He sees it," or "Because He is timeless" or "Because He is there" simply begs the question with respect to the knowability of the objects of knowledge *in their INDEETERMINATE state.* You guys are the ones employing these temporal and spatial metaphors, like "before" and "after." What they really are are causal metaphors, that mean, ultimate, "as a result of." God knows because agents act - and that is a direct attack on divine independence.
The Calvinist viewpoint couldn't explain how God sees the future (if He sees it in their view). Perhaps God could calculate the future or deduce it, but Calvinism doesn't explain how He could see it.
1. You're stipulating what is a "real" vision of the future, as if, if God knows because He foreordains, He sees His plan, but not the future. The implication is that if people don't have LFW then their choices are not "real."
Several problems. UPG is necessary in Arminianism in order to free the will into a Libertarian state in order for a person to be free to convert. It really says nothing about other choices.
Indeed, to agree, as Arminians do to "total depravity" and posit UPG to alleviate the bondage of the will is to agree with compatibilist freedom. You agree to it then remove it by UPG.
So, the stipulation about what is/is not a "real" vision of the future is tenuous at best.
In addition to that, Arminianism has it's own order of decrees. God seeing the future due to a decree is hardly a Calvinist conceit. At the very least a Molinist must answer the same thing. The future that actually obtains does so because God has decreed to instantiate this and only this universe. So the future God "foresaw" with respect to this universe obtains on two levels:
Potentially, one out of many.
Actually, this one that He chose to decree. So the one He actually sees "right now" so to speak, is the one He decreed to actually exist.
2. Where can we find LFW taught in Scripture. Where does Scripture state that our desires are not sufficient causes lying behind our choices. LFW is false, Dan, because the Bible simply denies it.It directly and unequivocally contradicts it. So, you don't have any exegetical rebuttal to our objections - not a single one.
3. God being only able to calculate or deduce the future is applicable to YOUR view, not ours. That's because YOUR view has to contend with the existence of INDETERMINATE objects of knowledge. That's definitional to affirming LFW.
4. Of course we believe God "sees" the future. He knows it because He decreed it. He "sees it" the way an author reads the book He chose to write. He sees the alternatives because, like an author, God has unwritten books. He knows counterfactuals because He knows what He chose not to write. God's foreknowledge is a species of His self-knowledge.
Hi Dan,
ReplyDeleteIn response to the post over at your blog:
1.As you have framed it, this is a question of how we define our terms. If you ask me whether God knows the future, I take that to mean, does God know what will happen, does God know the outcome, &c. In that sense, God knows the future.
If, however, you mean to ask, does God experience time, then I’d say that a timeless agent doesn’t know time by experience. This isn’t knowledge by acquaintance.
Rather, God knows time indirectly by knowing his plan for temporal events.
2.Once we get past the semantics, Calvinism has no difficulty grounding God’s knowledge of the future (i.e. his knowledge of what’s going to happen).
3.By contrast, Arminianism has withdrawn the obvious and Scriptural explanation. And it has offered no feasible alternative.
Always nice talking with you.
Dear Gene,
ReplyDeleteI still welcome a formal debate with you on which view is scriptural LFW or CFW. Something along the lines of turretinfan’s debate blog. Perhaps we could event get him to host it. But as I said before, I don’t want to take on that 1,000 lbs gorilla piecemeal.
Just let me know.
God be with you,
Dan
Dear Steve & Gene,
ReplyDeleteSetting aside A time theory vs. B time theory (which might well be in the middle of all this, but perhaps not) here’s my hang up. If what God knows can’t be anything but His own thoughts, then His knowledge can’t be of the future (the events that will happen), because the events that will happen are not just in God’s mind. God’s knowledge is not just of a plan about what will happen, nor is it just a thought in God’s mind.
The normal way we know about events is through experience and it’s the anthropomorphism used for God’s knowledge in scripture, but I agree with you that God’s knowledge isn’t literally through experience. God is way cooler than we are, He doesn’t learn, His knowledge is immediate.
God be with you,
Dan
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
ReplyDelete"If what God knows can’t be anything but His own thoughts, then His knowledge can’t be of the future (the events that will happen), because the events that will happen are not just in God’s mind. God’s knowledge is not just of a plan about what will happen, nor is it just a thought in God’s mind."
But that's true for God's knowledge of mundane things generally—and not only his knowledge of future events. God doesn't know the flavor of ice cream by tasting ice cream. Much less does he experience my experience of tasting ice cream, since he isn't me.
Now, since we can *imagine* sensory properties, such as how our dreams simulate the 5 senses, even though there is no external stimulus, and the dream doesn't occupy literal space, perhaps God can know sensory properties in that abstract respect.
But even that would merely be a mode of knowledge. It would not explain how, in this respect, God could see a future event if there was no event to be seen (since, according to LFW, there is not actual and/or singular future, but only an array of possible, unexemplified futures).
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteI do think the issues of LFW and A vs. B time theory are obscuring a more fundamental disagreement here. Let’s take today, and something that doesn’t have to do with LFW. The sun is in the sky but covered by some clouds. Does God have knowledge of this which is in some way related to the actual sun and actual clouds is it more like God only thinks about His plan for the day? If it’s the latter, I suggest that what God knows isn’t that the sun’s in the sky covered by clouds, but rather the He planned for the sun to be in the sky covered by clouds. If it’s the former, hopefully we agree that God’s knowledge is neither through experience or deduction, but rather it’s in a category all to itself.
In the context of knowing the future (or what will happen or foreknowledge, or foresight…) I suggest that (similar to the case above) if God only thinks about His plan, then God doesn’t know what will happen, rather He only knows His plan.
according to LFW, there is not actual and/or singular future, but only an array of possible, unexemplified futures
There is only one future in LFW; in fact it’s essential to LFW. LFW is the ability to do otherwise than what you will do. The counterfactual, can, but will not happen.
God be with you,
Dan
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
ReplyDelete“The sun is in the sky but covered by some clouds. Does God have knowledge of this which is in some way related to the actual sun and actual clouds is it more like God only thinks about His plan for the day?”
God’s knowledge of this state of affairs is related to it partly because God has a true belief about this state of affairs—true because it corresponds to this state of affairs. In addition, God’s plan is what ensures this state of affairs. God knows it indirectly by knowing his plan.
“If it’s the latter, I suggest that what God knows isn’t that the sun’s in the sky covered by clouds, but rather the He planned for the sun to be in the sky covered by clouds.”
That’s a very inadequate definition of what it means to know something. Apart from our self-knowledge of our own mental states, our knowledge of extramental objects always involves a subject/object relation. By definition, if the object of knowledge is something other than me, then my knowledge is indirect. You can’t define knowledge as *identity* between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge when the object of knowledge *differs* from the subject of knowledge.
This is not simply true with respect to God’s knowledge of the world, but with respect to my knowledge of the (external) world as well. I am not the sun which I perceive. I am metaphysically distinct from the sun which I perceive.
By the same token, my knowledge of the sun is mediated by a complex process of transmission. The immediate object of knowledge is my mental representation of the sun. If that corresponds (in some relevant respect) to the solar thing-in-itself, then that counts as knowledge.
“If it’s the former, hopefully we agree that God’s knowledge is neither through experience or deduction, but rather it’s in a category all to itself.”
The divine mode of knowledge is different from ours, but in both cases there remains a subject/object relation.
“In the context of knowing the future (or what will happen or foreknowledge, or foresight…) I suggest that (similar to the case above) if God only thinks about His plan, then God doesn’t know what will happen, rather He only knows His plan.”
If what will happen happens according to plan, then by knowing the plan, he knows what will happen.
“There is only one future in LFW.”
That’s equivocal. In libertarianism, that’s ultimately a tensed proposition, and whether it’s true or false depends on the time-frame. If we’re talking about the future qua future, then—in libertarianism—there is future A, B, C. D…
Looking at the future as future, from the standpoint of the present, there is more than one possible future—a la libertarianism.
Yes, only one possible future will eventuate, but this means that only one possible future will *become* the future, and—paradoxically—it only becomes the future that *will* be once it is *past*.
In *this* sense, there is only one future in libertarianism, but that’s s retrospectively rather than prospectively true. It’s incorrect for a libertarian to say there is only one future before one of many alternatives becomes the future. Until an agent realizes that possibility, there is no future—metaphysically speaking.
For, in libertarian terms, a future event is simply a description of an agent’s power to instantiate that possibility. It’s a potential event, and it’s potentiality lies in the ability of the agent.
We can say the future is whatever will be, but what *makes* it so isn’t in advance of the fact. The agent constitutes the future, and he does so from the position of the present. (In this regard, LFW and the A-theory are symbiotic.)
Won't the Arminian say this:
ReplyDelete1. God's knowledge of the future is not causally efficacious.
2. God's knowledge is something like knowledge of propositions - person S will do X at time T.
3. The truth of a proposition in the above form isn't dependent on when it is asserted. For example, tomorrow (where I am), it is either going to be raining or it isn't. One of the propositions "It will rain in Sydney on 1 April 2008" or "it will not rain in Sydney on 1 April 2008" is true now.
4. How God knows future propositions without causing their truth is not known - it is a divine mystery - but we ought not to expect we could conceive of an explanation because we are mere creatures.
Personally, I'm a Calvinist, but whatcha think?
AMC SAID:
ReplyDelete“Won't the Arminian say this: __1. God's knowledge of the future is not causally efficacious.”
The objection doesn’t turn on causal determinism. Epistemic determinism will suffice.
“2. God's knowledge is something like knowledge of propositions - person S will do X at time T.”
That begs the question of whether God can know person S will do X at time T—if S is a free agent in the libertarian sense.
“The truth of a proposition in the above form isn't dependent on when it is asserted. For example, tomorrow (where I am), it is either going to be raining or it isn't. One of the propositions ‘It will rain in Sydney on 1 April 2008’ or ‘it will not rain in Sydney on 1 April 2008’ is true now.”
i) You’ve disguised the tensed truth-value of the proposition by recasting it in non-indexical terms. But is there a truth to be known in advance of the outcome if the outcome could be otherwise? Which outcome is *the* outcome? When does it become the one and only outcome?
There are A-theories of time in which future propositions lack truth-value since the proposition has no corresponding metaphysical referent.
And, according to B-theories, the future is already a given. So that won’t work for LFW.
ii) And even if there’s a truth to be known, is it knowable if the outcome could be otherwise?
“How God knows future propositions without causing their truth is not known - it is a divine mystery - but we ought not to expect we could conceive of an explanation because we are mere creatures.”
i) God has not left us in the dark on this question. He knows the future because he determines the future (e.g. Isa 46:10-11).
ii) Arminianism attacks Calvinism on philosophical grounds. It attacks compatibilism as inadequate to ground moral responsibility.
Hence, Arminianism leaves itself open to philosophical attacks as well.
Conversely, if the Arminian can resort to mystery to defend the relation between divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom, then we can resort to mystery to defend the relation between divine foreordination and human responsibility.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your extremely thought provoking response. I think I follow what you are saying about subject/objects here… Perhaps if I put it this way it might help…
I see 4 possibilities here:
1) The subject is God’s mental representation of the sun and the object is the sun
2) The subject is God’s mental representation of His plan and the object is His plan
3) The subject is God’s mental representation of His plan and the object is the sun
4) The subject is God’s mental representation of the sun and the object is His plan
The first option is my view, but I can’t explain how God got a mental representation of the sun. But I don’t think God’s plan is an option, because all I think that gets to is #2. But even if God’s plan could somehow explain how God get’s a mental representation of the sun, I would still say that’s unnecessary. God’s knowledge of the sun is immediate and shouldn’t have to be mediated through His plan.
#3 seems like a break in the subject/object relationship. I only listed #4 to exhaust the options.
Regarding the future and LFW, I agreed with AMC.
But is there a truth to be known in advance of the outcome if the outcome could be otherwise? Which outcome is *the* outcome? When does it become the one and only outcome?
Yes, there are true propositions today about things that will happen tomorrow. The “when” question is interesting and I think I would have to distinguish “become”.
Propositions don’t become true, the proposition is omnitemporally true. But the basis of truth (the object) is a result of causation and it becomes (causally) the basis of truth at when (temporally) it happens. But again, causes don’t impact truth, they impact objects, which are the basis of truth. Truth simply corresponds to the objects. Truth about the future corresponds to the fact that there will be an object.
God be with you,
Dan
godismyjudge said...
ReplyDelete“I think I follow what you are saying about subject/objects here… Perhaps if I put it this way it might help…_I see 4 possibilities here: __1) The subject is God’s mental representation of the sun and the object is the sun_2) The subject is God’s mental representation of His plan and the object is His plan_3) The subject is God’s mental representation of His plan and the object is the sun_4) The subject is God’s mental representation of the sun and the object is His plan.”
i) No, that’s not what I was saying. In context, I was specifically using this with reference to *human* knowledge of the sun. Where that involves sensory perception (rather than, say, reading a scientific article about the sun), there’s a subject/object relation where the subject of knowledge is distinct from the object of knowledge. (The same applies if I were reading about it in a book.)
And I was using that example to counter your equation of knowledge with the object of knowledge.
I was not using that as a model for *God’s* knowledge of the sun. God doesn’t know the sun by having a mental representation of the sun, for I’m using that language with reference to sensory perception; specifically: indirect realism.
Here the external stimulus or sensible object causes the percipient to have a mental representation of the sensible object.
In the case of God, by contrast, the sun is a concrete representation of God’s idea of the sun, not vice versa. God’s idea of the sun is the exemplar. The actual sun is a property-instance of God’s abstract idea or complete concept.
ii) In addition, when I mention the “subject of knowledge,” that has reference to the cognitive subject, the knower himself—in contradistinction to what he knows (the object of knowledge).
In some cases, the object of knowledge is strictly mental (e.g. a dream), and in other cases it has an extramental referent.
iii) The decree (i.e. God’s plan for the world) is a subset of God’s knowledge or God’s mind.
“God’s knowledge of the sun is immediate.”
In what sense do you think that his knowledge of the sun is “immediate”?
“Propositions don’t become true, the proposition is omnitemporally true.”
Sure about that? Let’s take two different positions:
i) John Ruskin’s birthday is February 8.
ii) Tomorrow is John Ruskin’s birthday.
One of these propositions is tensed while the other is tenseless. And these are not convertible propositions, are they?
“Truth about the future corresponds to the fact that there will be an object.”
i) There *will be* is a tensed statement, using a temporal indexical marker to identify this as a *future* proposition, thereby taking the *present* state of the speaker as the frame of reference.
ii) And the question at issue, from a libertarian standpoint, is not the *general* truth that that there will be an object, but the *specific* question of which possible event in particular will become the object to which the future proposition corresponds.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDelete“God doesn’t know the sun by having a mental representation of the sun”
I think this idea removes any way of knowing the sun’s in the sky shining. Any knowledge God might have wouldn’t be of the sun out in the sky shining, but something else, like His plan, which is not the sun out in the sky shining. In other words, it looks as if Calvinism has resolved the mystery of how God can know the future, but in reality Calvinism doesn’t take on the challenge.
“In the case of God, by contrast, the sun is a concrete representation of God’s idea of the sun, not vice versa. God’s idea of the sun is the exemplar. The actual sun is a property-instance of God’s abstract idea or complete concept.”
God’s idea of the sun and God’s idea that the actual sun is out and shining aren’t the same thing. God knew what the sun would be [logically] before there was a sun, so He knew what the sun would be, without the object: the sun. I am not sure this addresses subject/object relationships.
In what sense do you think that his knowledge of the sun is “immediate”?
Our senses temporally “lag” that actual sun being out in the sky. The sun must be out there first, then we can know about it. But for God, there isn’t a moment in which He doesn’t know the suns out there.
i) John Ruskin’s birthday is February 8.
ii) Tomorrow is John Ruskin’s birthday.
One of these propositions is tensed while the other is tenseless. And these are not convertible propositions, are they?
I suggesting that it’s omnitemporally true that on Feb 7th, “ii” is true and other days it’s not. Does that count as being convertible?
And the question at issue, from a libertarian standpoint, is not the *general* truth that that there will be an object, but the *specific* question of which possible event in particular will become the object to which the future proposition corresponds.
Yep, statements about tomorrow are either true or false today, based on their correspondence to which possible event in particular will become the object.
God be with you,
Dan
godismyjudge said...
ReplyDelete“I think this idea removes any way of knowing the sun’s in the sky shining.”
As I’ve explained, I’m using “mental representation” with reference to the result of sensory perception. A mental representation is a mental copy of what the observer perceives.
i) Are you claiming that God’s knowledge of the sun is a copy of the sun? And how would that be?
Mustn’t God have an idea of the sun which is logically and causally prior to the sun? In order to create the sun, he must have an idea of what he’s going to create. And the actual sun will correspond to his idea.
ii) And if it were a copy, then it wouldn’t be the thing-in-itself, but a copy thereof. So how does your alternative escape the consequences of your own objection?
“Any knowledge God might have wouldn’t be of the sun out in the sky shining, but something else, like His plan, which is not the sun out in the sky shining.”
At this point you’re just repeating yourself without advancing your argument in the face of the counterargument.
Any knowledge of an extramental object will involve a subject/object distinction. If you deny that this counts as knowledge, then you’re left with epistemic solipsism.
“In other words, it looks as if Calvinism has resolved the mystery of how God can know the future, but in reality Calvinism doesn’t take on the challenge.”
i) No, it looks like you deny that anyone can have any knowledge of the external world.
ii) If God knows what is going to happen, then God knows the future.
“God’s idea of the sun and God’s idea that the actual sun is out and shining aren’t the same thing.”
You’re confounding the abstract mode of God’s knowledge with the content of what he knows. The fact that he has a timeless idea of the sun doesn’t mean he has an idea of a timeless sun. His idea of the sun is the complete concept of the sun throughout its lifecycle.
God knows *what* the sun is (according to the decree), and he knows *that* the sun is (according to his creative fiat).
iii)Even on your idiosyncratic definition of knowledge, Calvinism can explain how God knows what is going to happen in a way that Arminianism cannot.
“God knew what the sun would be [logically] before there was a sun, so He knew what the sun would be, without the object: the sun. I am not sure this addresses subject/object relationships.”
As I’ve explained before, my point is not that God knows things the same way we do. I’m presenting a counterexample to your definition of knowledge.
You keep acting as if something doesn’t count as knowledge unless what we know is identical with the object of knowledge.
i) If you mean ontological identity, then that would commit you to idealism.
ii) If you mean epistemic identity, then correspondence will suffice, which involves a subject/object distinction.
If you deny that correspondence is sufficient to “know” an extramental object, then you deny that human beings have any knowledge of the external world.
“Our senses temporally ‘lag’ that actual sun being out in the sky. The sun must be out there first, then we can know about it. But for God, there isn’t a moment in which He doesn’t know the suns out there.”
You’re using “immediate” in the sense of “instantaneous.” I’m using “immediate” in the sense of “unmediated.”
Do you think that God’s knowledge of the sun is direct or indirect?
If direct, how so?
If indirect, then what becomes of your objection?
“I suggesting that it’s omnitemporally true that on Feb 7th, ‘ii’ is true and other days it’s not. Does that count as being convertible?”
No, it doesn’t.
This proposition is timelessly true: John Ruskin’s birthday is February 8.
This proposition is not: “Tomorrow is John Ruskin’s birthday.”
The first proposition isn’t convertible to the second, for the first doesn’t say if today (or yesterday, or tomorrow) is Ruskin’s birthday.
It states what day his birthday falls on, but it doesn’t state if his birthday is past, present, or future.
Conversely, the time-indexed statement is only true one day out of the year.
Therefore, not all propositions are omnitemporally true, and not all time-indexed propositions can be translated into timeless propositions.
“Yep, statements about tomorrow are either true or false today, based on their correspondence to which possible event in particular will become the object.”
When does the statement come true? Is it true today to say that tomorrow a libertarian agent will do x even though, as of today, he could do either x or non-x?
To what does the proposition attach? To a possible world. There’s a possible world representing x, and another possible world representing non-x. At this juncture, the actual world doesn’t adjudicate between one possibility and another.