Monday, May 14, 2007

The Radical Skeptic

This post will consist of two parts in one post. The first part is directed toward T-Stone. The second part is for everyone else :-)

Part I

In comments on this post, I pointed out the irony that Touchstone would defend Cameron’s subjective testimony during his & Comfort’s “debate” (which isn’t really the correct word for what happened) with Brian Sapient and Kelli Whatshername (you know, from the Green Day song). The irony of T-Stone’s comment is due to the fact that T-Stone never misses a chance to bash the Triabloguers who, rather than presenting subjectivist “testimony,” actually produce arguments.

T-Stone took umbrage with my classification of his position. He said:
Peter,

The problem is that you offer arguments that are supremely subjective, yet suppose they are objective. Nothing wrong with subjective arguments, or objective arguments. But it's a problem when you try to claim the mantle of objectivity for your subjective assertions. A "truth in advertising" problem.

-Touchstone

(If you disagree, let's have a look at your "objective arguments", shall we and we'll see just how much subjective you tuck away in there...)


The problem is that T-Stone hypocritically applies a radical skepticism to anything I say in an attempt to turn everything into a subjective argument when he does not use the same radical skepticism against his own views. There is a reason for this. He isn’t a radical skeptic (no one is, for we all must actually live in this world).

When it comes to T-Stone, I could argue “2 + 2 = 4 in a Base-10 system is objectively true” and T-Stone would counter: "Have you considered quantum mechanics possibly making 2 + 2 both equal to and NOT equal to 4 at the same time and in the same relationship? No? Then you're being subjective while pretending to be objective!"

T-Stone's refuge is to hold onto pure skepticism as his weapon against the T-Bloggers. But his skepticism comes at a price. If T-Stone is to remain faithful to his skeptical position, he can never assert any positive claim. This includes his claim that I am being subjective instead of objective, as well as his claim that skepticism is a valid approach.

Perhaps the best argument is a demonstration. So, T-Stone can have it back now. He begins by saying: “The problem is that you offer arguments that are supremely subjective, yet suppose they are objective.” T-Stone: is this an objective statement? That is, can you objectively demonstrate that my arguments are “supremely subjective”? Can you even define “subjective” and “objective” (without doing another of your “trivial Google searches” that you are so fond of)? And if you do define those words, how do you know that you defined them correctly? Isn’t your use of the words themselves subjective rather than objective?

T-Stone continues: “Nothing wrong with subjective arguments, or objective arguments.” Really? Is THIS an objective statement, or a subjective statement? How do you know it is true that there is nothing wrong with either type of argument?

T-Stone charges: “But it's a problem when you try to claim the mantle of objectivity for your subjective assertions.” But A) how is it objectively a problem for me to lie (if, indeed, that is what I have done) and B) how do you KNOW that i) it actually is a problem for me too and ii) that I did violate this principal? What is your objective proof that I am engaged in such bad behavior here? Show me your objectivity, T-Stone.

You challenge me to show my arguments (as if I hadn’t already done this hundreds of times). I’m challenging you to back up your statements.

And since this began as a discussion in interpretation in the first place, I want you to objectively prove to me right now that you have objectively understood my statements (whether you agree or disagree with them). Keep in mind that no matter what you say, I’m going to respond with, “But how do you know this is true?” just as you do.

Dealing with the radical skeptic is oh-so-fun, isn’t it T-Stone? But if it’s good enough for you to behave this way, it’s good enough for me to respond in kind. When you’ve had enough of this nonsense, we can move on.

Part II

While my above challenge to T-Stone is a serious challenge (that is, T-Stone has to do it if he’s going to keep any sense of self-respect), it may also actually appear to some as a valid method of attacking someone’s point of view. It appears valid because A) the method employed is only asking questions and B) there is a level of “uncertainty” associated with knowledge. But in reality, the radical skeptic approach is self-contradictory and, as such, it is impossible for it to actually be true.

It is rather simple to demonstrate this if we take the radical skeptic view toward radical skepticism in the first place. “Is radical skepticism objective? How can we know? Have we understood radical skepticism correctly in order to know whether we’re using it right in the first place?”

The bottom line is, if radical skepticism is true we cannot know that it is true. If we know that radical skepticism is true, then we know that radical skepticism must be false for radical skepticism cannot know anything. This is the self-contradictory nature of radical skepticism. As such, even before we look at the questions in any attack against our position, we know that at the basic level skepticism can no longer be viable.

But there is another level where the radical skeptic approach becomes self-contradictory, and that is during its application. When we get into language (which is where this subject with T-Stone originated), this means that the radical skeptic who assumes that there can be no objective transfer of meaning in a text must, in the midst of attacking that text, make an objective statement about the very text he is criticizing. To illustrate this, consider the following:

I write out a concept C. Our radical skeptic reads concept C and applies his radical skepticism to it. His radical skepticism says, “I cannot know for certain anything about C.” But in order to make this claim, he must have universal knowledge of C! If he does not know the totality of C, he cannot say, “I cannot know anything about C” for there could remain a part of C that he is able to know, if he surveyed it. Thus, in order for the skeptic to say that he cannot know anything about a concept, he must first assert that he knows all there is to know about the concept!

In reality, the skeptic, in an attempt to remain consistent, can only say: “I cannot know that I cannot know anything about concept C.” But this, in turn, is yet another concept! This concept (“I cannot know that I cannot know anything about concept C”) we will call concept C'. C' falls to the same problem. The skeptic cannot say, “I cannot know C'” without knowing C' universally. This leads to C'': “I cannot know that I cannot know C'.” Ad infinitum.

Maintaining a radical skepticism is, therefore, inherently irrational. Skepticism must end somewhere. And in language this is ultimately demonstrated in the fact that the radical skeptics will write, talk, gesture, or use all other types of language in order to convey the meaning that you cannot know any meaning they are attempting to convey. This hypocrisy undoes their arguments, for it is obvious that if they convince someone to their position they have conveyed the meaning they wished to convey using the very means they say cannot do this.

As such, it cannot be “skepticism all the way down.” There must be some point where we have unquestionable positions, for to question them would be to commit ourselves to infinite regress.

T-Stone said he wanted examples of my arguments that were objective so he could see how much subjectivism was in them. Perhaps he can start with this one…

35 comments:

  1. T-stone never did respond to these quotes I took from him, illustrating Peter's point quite nicely.

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/04/touchstones-pickle.html

    ReplyDelete
  2. I'd be interested in hearing Touchstone's response, too, especially in light of previous comments he's made, such as, "and please note that I am answering your questions directly, off topic or no -- keep this in mind when you look at how T-Bloggers generally (don't) respond."

    ReplyDelete
  3. Peter,

    (For purposes of exacting clarity here, I'll annotate my statements with assessments of their subjective nature. It should be quite obvious why these assessment are usually just assumed, as it's exceedingly tiresome to write and read this stuff.)


    [I subjectively believe] You're projecting your own assumptions about knowledge and objectivity onto me. [I subjectively understand] objectivity is a myth -- a good myth, an ideal, something to be strived for but a myth, all the same. [I subjectively understand that] While there exists a real world independent of my perceptions, I do not have un-mediated access to it. [I subjectively hold that] My only interaction with the real world comes through sense-data and an associated interpretive framework. [I subjectively understand that] If "objectivity" is defined here as:

    expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations

    (Webster)

    then I cannot expect to assert my own objectivity, as I cannot rule out distortion/skewing by my feelings, prejudices, or interpretational faculties.

    However, [I subjectively understand that] subjective statements or arguments are not somehow *invalid* by virtue of being subjective, as you appear to suppose. [I subjectively think] Subjective statements and arguments can be and are routinely deployed to good effect in the real world; [I subjectively understand that] I cannot establish my own objectivity in understanding what you write, but I can, nevertheless, venture my interpretation which, while subjective, might possibly be quite accurate all the same (and then again, it might not).

    [I subjectively understand that] In this way, by basing my understandings, my knowledge, on my experience, I avoid "turtles all the way down", and the solipsistic abyss you worry about. [I subjectively hold that] If my wife says "Bring me my black purse, please", I don't know for certain if the one she is referring to is the one I'm actually bringing. [I subjective understand that] She has several purses, all of them black, blackish, or charcoal colored, but the one I have looks black to me, and this is the item my experience tells me is her "usual purse", and thus the best choice available.

    [I subjectively understand that] I can receive feedback from her when I deliver the purse in my hand that will either confirm my interpretation of her request or deny it. [I subjectively understand that] If she responds with a "That's it, thanks", I have yet *another* statement to subjectively parse and interpret, but this is just another of a great many inputs I have learned by experience to calibrate; [I subjectively understand that] When I have successfully interpreted the request, I can see a smile on my wife's face, and receive a "Thank You", which experience suggests is both a n affirmation and a conclusion in situations like this. [I subjectively understand that] When I have not interpreted the request correctly, my experience suggests my wife will make statements that I will subjectively interpret as both a rejection of my interpretation and a clarification of the intent of her request ("No, the little black purse I keep in the kitchen drawer by the telephone.")

    [I subjectively understand that] By matching up my subjective understandings with the feedback from my experience, over time (this started for me as a newborn infant) I can improve the performance of my interpretations and understandings, based on the reactions I experience from them. [I subjectively understand that] I don't have a means of proving or establishing that I don't have subjective distortions in my understanding, but I don't suppose I *can* be purely objective, or at least be purely objective in such a way that I can prove it objectively. [I subjectively recall saying] Objectivity is an mythic ideal for humans -- the real world exists, but we only interact with it in ways that are subject to distortion.

    [I subjectively understand that]This means that subjective understandings do not lead to "nihilism", or "chaos" or "cognitive futility" in practice. [I subjectively understand that] Many beliefs are likely to be exceedingly accurate, and match very closely to the way things are in the "real world, independent of my perceptions". Moreover, [I subjectively hold that] many of my understandings can be tested against experience, and compared with my subjective appraisal of the subjective understandings of others. [I subjectively understand that] To the extent these tests confirm a correspondence between what I believe and what my experience tells me, I have found these beliefs to be more reliable -- assigning trust to these beliefs tends to produce experiences that fit with my own goals. [I subjectively believe that] When these beliefs match my experience, and also tend to match the experiences reported (subjectively, of course) by others, my experience suggests that such beliefs can be trusted even more, to good practical effect.

    [I subjectively believe] I could go on, but this should be enough for now to get the basic point across. Contrary to your claim [I believe, subjectively], I can make positive claims, as objectivity isn't a requirement for making positive claims. [I subjectively believe that] If I make a claim, and that claim can perform against a test of the claim, then it's of no consequence to worry about being subjective -- our experience validates the claim.

    [I subjectively hold that] I don't know where you got the idea that I am somehow committed to offering *my* statements as objective claims; [I subjectively believe]I do not have a means to assert my own objectivity. [I subjectively believe that] In practice, though, this is not a problem, as my knowledge is founded on experience and testing against my environment and surroundings, not the provability of my own objectivity.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  4. (Here's a "cleaned up version" for those that aren't hung up on the "objectivity" thing. Peter, you can't read this version, please read the above, so that it's clear where I'm claiming to be objective and where I'm not. You're having trouble understanding where I'm coming from on that, and the above should make it perfectly plain.)


    You're projecting your own assumptions about knowledge and objectivity onto me. Objectivity is a myth -- a good myth, an ideal, something to be strived for but a myth, all the same. While there exists a real world independent of my perceptions, I do not have un-mediated access to it. My only interaction with the real world comes through sense-data and an associated interpretive framework. If "objectivity" is defined here as:

    expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations

    (Webster)

    then I cannot expect to assert my own objectivity, as I cannot rule out distortion/skewing by my feelings, prejudices, or interpretational faculties.

    However, subjective statements or arguments are not somehow *invalid* by virtue of being subjective, as you appear to suppose. Subjective statements and arguments can be and are routinely deployed to good effect in the real world; I cannot establish my own objectivity in understanding what you write, but I can, nevertheless, venture my interpretation which, while subjective, might possibly be quite accurate all the same (and then again, it might not).

    In this way, by basing my understandings, my knowledge, on my experience, I avoid "turtles all the way down", and the solipsistic abyss you worry about.


    If my wife says "Bring me my black purse, please", I don't know for certain if the one she is referring to is the one I'm actually bringing. She has several purses, all of them black, blackish, or charcoal colored, but the one I have looks black to me, and this is the item my experience tells me is her "usual purse", and thus the best choice available.

    I can receive feedback from her when I deliver the purse in my hand that will either confirm my interpretation of her request or deny it. If she responds with a "That's it, thanks", I have yet *another* statement to subjectively parse and interpret, but this is just another of a great many inputs I have learned by experience to calibrate; When I have successfully interpreted the request, I can see a smile on my wife's face, and receive a "Thank You", which experience suggests is both an affirmation and a conclusion in situations like this. When I have not interpreted the request correctly, my experience suggests my wife will make statements that I will subjectively interpret as both a rejection of my interpretation and a clarification of the intent of her request ("No, the little black purse I keep in the kitchen drawer by the telephone.")

    By matching up my subjective understandings with the feedback from my experience, over time (this started for me as a newborn infant) I can improve the performance of my interpretations and understandings, based on the reactions I experience from them. I don't have a means of proving or establishing that I don't have subjective distortions in my understanding, but I don't suppose I *can* be purely objective, or at least be purely objective in such a way that I can prove it objectively. Objectivity is an mythic ideal for humans -- the real world exists, but we only interact with it in ways that are subject to distortion.

    This means that subjective understandings do not lead to "nihilism", or "chaos" or "cognitive futility" in practice. Many beliefs are likely to be exceedingly accurate, and match very closely to the way things are in the "real world, independent of my perceptions". Moreover, many of my understandings can be tested against experience, and compared with my subjective appraisal of the subjective understandings of others. To the extent these tests confirm a correspondence between what I believe and what my experience tells me, I have found these beliefs to be more reliable -- assigning trust to these beliefs tends to produce experiences that fit with my own goals. When these beliefs match my experience, and also tend to match the experiences reported (subjectively, of course) by others, my experience suggests that such beliefs can be trusted even more, to good practical effect.

    I could go on, but this should be enough for now to get the basic point across. Contrary to your claim, I can make positive claims, as objectivity isn't a requirement for making positive claims. If I make a claim, and that claim can perform against a test of the claim, then it's of no consequence to worry about being subjective -- our experience validates the claim.

    I don't know where you got the idea that I am somehow committed to offering *my* statements as objective claims; I do not have a means to assert my own objectivity. In practice, though, this is not a problem, as my knowledge is founded on experience and testing against my environment and surroundings, not the provability of my own objectivity.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  5. Peter,

    Here's a quick example that will illustrate one escapes the "Humean defeater" and other forms of solipsistic progressions. Standard disclaimers of subjectivity on my part apply here.

    OK, so I've noticed a pattern now, over many years: the sun comes up on the eastern horizon, and goes down on the western horizon. As Hume demonstrated, there's a problem between induction and causation, namely that causation can't be justified inductively, as it relies on unsupportable premise that the future will resemble the past.

    So, here I am walking around with "knowledge" that the sun will come up tomorrow on the eastern horizon, to be followed once a again by a sunset in the west. But as quickly as I would claim to understand the sunrise/sunset cycle, it would be pointed out that I cannot *justify* this "knowledge". And I'd would have to agree; I have no formal justification for my anticipation of this evening's sunset.

    As a result of this, the implications of this should be clear: in a formal sense, the universe is fundamentally unintelligible. How did Hume react to this realization? We go on with our lives all the same, unimpeded from doing what we're doing by the "unintelligibility" of the universe at a fundamental level. We proceed on an unsubstantiated belief, that generally the future will resemble the past, and patterns of behavior we note from experience are often a good indication of what is coming.

    We don't have absolute certainty that the sun will come up tomorrow (and indeed it may not), but we don't need it. We place our bets anyway as we see fit, in defiance of the Humean defeater who says we are being irrational to use this kind of induction.

    So too, with your claims of objectivity. Sic a Humean defeater on you, and it chews you into little pieces if you try to make good on your claim. But try to sic a Humean defeater on my claims, and I simply neutralize the defeater by pointing out that I haven't asserted that my claims were objective. I seek to make claims that are as consistent with the "real world" -- the world that exists independent of my perception -- as I can, but like my anticipation of the coming sunset, I realize any claims to such objectivity are ultimately unjustified.

    But, like my anticipation of the sunset, I can and do make claims, all the same, and don't suppose I need to make an exhaustive claim of objectivity to say "this is the truth". I can make all efforts to try and identify/reduce/eliminate distortions in my understanding, but if I suppose I'm immune from distortions after all efforts, the Solipsist is there with the skeptical scythe ready to cut me down -- as he should.

    Just as an aside, this is a point considering with respect to TAG, and whatever variations on that theme you might play. Logic can and does exist as a pragmatic exercise, and doesn't need any ultimate justification to be of (enormous) practical use. Two caveman happen to notice that when you put one rock next to another rock, you have two rocks. Take away one rock from that set, and you have one rock remaining. Voila! The rudiments of mathematical logic. Do these cavemen suppose they need a philosophical justification for the "1+1=2" and "2-1=1" concepts they just produced?

    Hardly.

    The "logic" here just proceeds from the behavior of nature. A rock, as a matter of physics, is addressable by the cavemen as a separate, discrete object. With many discrete objects -- say, a handful of rocks -- that persist as distinct objects, cavemen (or modern man) can experiment with different configuration of these discrete objects, and by playing with rocks, a bunch of physical objects we can experience with our hands and eyes, man can develop increasingly structured ideas about objects: theorems. At length, very complex and sophisticated rules emerge, giving rise to a robust mathematics.

    Now, does mathematical logic exist as some abstract concept that has to be separately provisioned by an Eternal Mind? That's certainly possible, but here, with the caveman and their experiences with rocks, we can see mathematical logic as emergent from nature itself. So, when God created the universe, the "logic" was built-in to the physical world itself, an innate property of physical laws He established. The consistency and uniformity of the physical laws God ordained for the universe give rise to logic, mathematical and otherwise.

    That's an aside, but since we so closely bumped up against this in talking about objectivity and practical knowledge as a means of thwarting any Humean defeaters prowling around, it seems apropos to point this out as a convenience; the same mistake Bahnsen makes -- that knowledge (or logic) has to be fundamentally justified to avoid complete chaos -- is the one you are making here with your illusions about your own objectivity.

    We are not constrained by two polar extremes -- exhaustively justified knowledge, and utter confusion/cognitive paralysis. In between there is a happy, productive point where we make some (strictly speaking) unfounded assumptions, and work from them, to good effect. I don't *know* that I can be objective, but I don't need to. In practice, I can (often) come reasonably close to the ideal of objectivity, such that I can effectively communicate with others, and realize other practical goals.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  6. Should have concluded the above with:

    So, Peter, I've addressed your question as to how I support my claims to objectivity. In short, I don't make such claims, at least in the ultimate sense. As a practical term in science, for example, we can point at "objective evidence" as a practical term for evidence which can be attested to by a number of independent observers. But that's just a shorthand way of saying that we have an unjustifiable, yet extraordinarily useful assumption that agreement across a large number of observers tends to eliminate or cancel out interpretive distortions -- the same kind of "approach" to the ideal of transcendent objectivity I discussed above.

    But that's very different rendering of "objective" than I understand (subjectively!) you to be using. When you claim, just for yourself, to be offering an objective argument that you *know* in a positive sense to be objective, that's an ontological claim that isn't implied by the scientific use of "objective".

    If, on the other hand, you want to back off from that and say that you are simply "being as objective as I can", then I would say welcome to the world of subjectivity (aiming to be objective as an ideal). C'mon in, the water's fine.

    So maybe you will take the time now, having rejected my earlier request (at least until you could play the "you go first" card) to explain to me:

    a) How you define "objective" when you use it as a qualifier for your arguments.

    b) How you deal with the Humean defeater ravaging any claims to transcendent objectivity, if you do in fact make such claims.

    Thanks,

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  7. T-Stone opines:
    ---
    (For purposes of exacting clarity here, I'll annotate my statements with assessments of their subjective nature. It should be quite obvious why these assessment are usually just assumed, as it's exceedingly tiresome to write and read this stuff.)
    ---

    Oh, the irony!!! Yes, before rambling on and on about how everything is subjective, T-Stone doesn't even grasp his objective apeal to how "these assessment [sic] are usually just assumed"! Are these things really "just assumed"? If so, by whom? By everyone or just T-Stone? If by everyone, doesn't that make this an "objective" assumption? And if not, then isn't this merely T-Stone's subjective opinion? In which case, why SHOULD anyone assume what T-Stone subjectively assumes?

    See, this is the sort of thing that demonstrates T-Stone's hypocrisy and his inability to actually believe what he claims to believe. He wants to make everything subjective, but in the process he also wants to convince others that these things are subjective. When T-Stone makes an appeal to the subjective nature of something, he does so objectively, for he does not claim that it is only subjective for him. No, he criticizes me for disagreeing with his subjective view, which only makes sense if he believes this truth is true for me as well as for him!

    So T-Stone presents his subjective "case" but never bothers to inform us as to why anyone else should give a levitating Rattus rattus's gluteous about it.

    Now, I am more than willing to acknowledge that everything T-Stone says is just his mere opinion. I only ask that, in return, T-Stone acknowledges that he has no reason to criticize anyone who disagrees with his subjective opinions.

    ReplyDelete
  8. T-Stone said:
    ---
    So, Peter, I've addressed your question as to how I support my claims to objectivity. In short, I don't make such claims, at least in the ultimate sense.
    ---

    Except you do make objective claims. Every time you assert that I am wrong, you are "forcing" your subjective view on me, which can only be done if you really think it is objectively true.

    Take your Humean defeater concept. This is an objectivist claim. You claim that a Humean defeater would rip my position to shreds--but according to your subjectivity, you cannot know my position. How is it possible for you to know my position and know that it is succeptible to a Humean argument unless you are engaging this at an objective level--the very level you claim to not be addressing.

    Now, T-Stone, as soon as you object to my view, you are affirming that I've presented an objective claim. You have no basis to object otherwise (at most, your subjective complaint can only be: "I subjectively dislike what I subjectively perceived Peter's argument to be" but it cannot be "I actually object to Peter's actual argument." Subjectively, you cannot know my argument; and as such, you cannot refute it.

    Your very use of a Humean defeater would require you to abandon the necessary framework to enable you to use your Humean defeater. In short, your position "eats itself" (to use Colbert's phrase).

    If you don't believe your position, and if you cannot use it against my position, why should I be concerned with it?

    ReplyDelete
  9. Its really hard for T-bloggers to admit that they don't "know" things.

    Hilarious!

    (and, I don't "know" that I'm correct, just stating my semi-objective / subjective opinion!)

    HA HA HA!!!!

    such pride...

    ReplyDelete
  10. Anonymous said:
    ---
    Its really hard for T-bloggers to admit that they don't "know" things.
    ---

    Why should I admit to a lie? I do "'know' things." I don't know all things, but I know plenty of things.

    By the way, you can feel free to demonstrate how a radical skeptic position doesn't reduce to irrationality, but until you do I will continue to "know things."

    Anonymous said:
    ---
    (and, I don't "know" that I'm correct, just stating my semi-objective / subjective opinion!)
    ---

    Not only do you not "know" that you're correct, you DO "know" that you're wrong. You can't function as an actual radical skeptic. No one can. It is impossible to live that way, because it's not real.

    The bottom line is that God created the world and He created us with the ability to understand this world. Even if we don't know how this process works specifically, I've already demonstrated in my original post that at some level it must occur because radical skepticism refutes itself. If it's true, it must be false.

    Now, you can "haw haw haw" all you want...or you can deal with the philosophy like a grown-up.

    ReplyDelete
  11. Mr "I can't legally drive" said:

    "The bottom line is that God created the world and He created us with the ability to understand this world."

    Problem is, you don't "know" this. You believe it. You have faith in it. But, so sorry, you don't "know" this.

    Flying Spaghetti Monster could be running things, for all you know.

    ReplyDelete
  12. Anonymouse said:
    ---
    Problem is, you don't "know" this.
    ---

    Problem is, you don't know that I don't know this.

    ReplyDelete
  13. "the same mistake Bahnsen makes -- that knowledge (or logic) has to be fundamentally justified to avoid complete chaos"

    Touchstone: What does this mean?

    I think you may misunderstand Bahnsen.
    Read this.

    It clears up all the misperceptions people have about Van Til. I wish I'd read it before beclowning myself on Dustin's thread...:-(

    ReplyDelete
  14. It's understandable that T-stone doesn't want to comment on his blatent contradictions and hypocrisy listed in my above link (first post in the combox). Nevertheless,

    "As Hume demonstrated, there's a problem between induction and causation, namely that causation can't be justified inductively, as it relies on unsupportable premise that the future will resemble the past."

    That's not all. No one has ever *observed* necessary causation either. You onlu *observe* a "succession of events."

    "How did Hume react to this realization? We go on with our lives all the same, unimpeded from doing what we're doing by the "unintelligibility" of the universe at a fundamental level."

    As noted by Plantinga et al, this doesn't avoid a "Humean defeater." All your doing above is what proper function would require in dire epistemological situation in which you find yourself. This isn't an alethic process, though. It's an "optimistic overridder."

    The *Humean defeater* is a defeater which obtains *upon reflection.* Upon reflecting on our dire epistemic situation we have a defeater.

    So, you've not avoided a Humean defeater, you seem to not even understand it.

    All you're pointing out is that you work on the function of the optamistic overridder. Much like the climber who thinks he can jump a ravine at night, during a life threatening blizzard, but would never think so in the daylight, under normal episetmic situations, you believe for non-alethic reasons.

    So, to avoid the Humean defeater, you have to refuse to reflect on your situation.

    Furthermore, sic a Humean defeater on us. Saying so don't make it so. I don't hold to Hume's epistemology, or yours, so don't be jealouse because Hume beats you and himself, while I whistle dixie watching you guys drown in a sea of chance and subjectivity.

    ReplyDelete
  15. Just an observation. It seems that Touchstone wants to lay the source of subjectivity on the media of human understanding:

    "My only interaction with the real world comes through sense-data and an associated interpretive framework."

    ...while acknowledging that there is objective truth:

    "Objectivity is an mythic ideal for humans -- the real world exists, but we only interact with it in ways that are subject to distortion."

    He seems to acknowledge that the way he knows there is objective truth is a matter of experientially obtained likelihood:

    "By matching up my subjective understandings with the feedback from my experience, over time (this started for me as a newborn infant) I can improve the performance of my interpretations and understandings, based on the reactions I experience from them."

    I will acknowledge that he has a point. However, the observed fact that he often plays the subjective argument card to avoid acknowledging the exceptional likelihood that some observations are objectively true demonstrates his own bias against the impact such a truth would have on his life. Furthermore, he assumes that sensory perception is the only source of information for the believer. Indeed, it is required. However, the acknowledgment of exceptional likelihoods in a fallen world requires internalization that can only come through the activity of the Holy Spirit, of which believers can (and must) testify, but cannot prove, to nonbelievers.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Touchstone said: "[I subjectively understand] objectivity is a myth -- a good myth, an ideal, something to be strived for but a myth, all the same."

    First, how does Touchstone know objectivity is a myth?

    And second, if Touchstone is right and objectivity is indeed a myth, then what's the point in striving for it in the first place? What makes objectivity "worth" striving for if it's a myth?

    Touchstone said: "When these beliefs match my experience, and also tend to match the experiences reported (subjectively, of course) by others, my experience suggests that such beliefs can be trusted even more, to good practical effect."

    Of course, how does Touchstone know his subjective beliefs and experiences actually match one another? How does he know he's interpreting his subjective experiences correctly? Or those of others? How does he know he's interpreting the subjective beliefs of others correctly, and that his subjective beliefs thus match their subjective beliefs?

    Oddly enough, however, Touchstone correctly interprets enough of what Peter has written to respond to Peter. He understands at least some of what Peter is asking him. Or would Touchstone say he's only assuming he's interpreting Peter correctly when who really knows if that's what's happening?

    For that matter, how do any of us know we're interpreting Touchstone correctly? Maybe whenever Touchstone says theistic evolution (TE) is true, he really means Young Earth Creationism (YEC) is true? Maybe Touchstone has really been arguing for YEC? How does Touchstone know that what he subjectively believes to be TE is really not YEC?

    And how does Touchstone know the Bible is true? Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. How does Touchstone know Jesus is God in the flesh, Lord and Savior? Maybe he is, maybe he isn't. How does Touchstone know he is a Christian? Maybe he is, maybe he isn't. How does Touchstone know evolution is true? Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. How does Touchstone know YEC is false let alone, as he's claimed before, "God-dishonoring"? Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. And so on.

    In any case, Touchstone has admitted nothing less than, "I don't know whether anything I've ever said or currently say is true or not -- including God, the Bible, Christianity, and *gasp* evolution."

    The only claim Touchstone claims to know is that he doesn't know. But as Peter has more than sufficiently demonstrated, the claim that Touchstone doesn't know is an objective claim, and if Touchstone truly knows he doesn't know, then his argument is self-refuting. To deny the fact that objectivity exists is to make an objective statement and thus to affirm objectivity.

    Morever, if Touchstone is right, he can't be right simply for himself, but he must be universally right. That is, Touchstone's claim that objectivity is a myth is a universal claim. However, I wonder if Touchstone is of the type that will likewise claim, "Well, it might be true for you, but not for me" (or vice versa)? Obviously, though, truth can't be simultaneously true and false. Then again, knowing Touchstone, maybe the law of non-contradiction really is subjective, too!

    For a self-professed "touchstone," Touchstone is anything but. He's more like a stone tossed to and fro by the waves and carried about by every wind of doctrine, by human cunning, by craftiness in deceitful schemes. Actually, let me rephrase that. He doesn't simply take a passive role. No, Touchstone in fact takes an active role in all of this, since for one he often comments here and pushes his (subjective) beliefs onto others. Touchstone is one of the crafty deceivers, trying to cause others to be tossed to and fro. Fortunately, he's now unmasked -- not that he wasn't before, but now more than ever, and by his own words, too.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Peter,

    With regard to subjectivity, my experience says that strident Calvinists notwithstanding, I don't run into or offer significant problems if I assume that when people say "I know [this or that]" they asserting that within the epistemic constraints I described above. That is, there's a implicit [I subjectively believe] in every human assertion. If not, then we are back at someone making a claim that does claim to be epistemological exhaustive, and is destoryed by the very same exhaustive epistemology it appeals to (i.e. Hume's bulldogs tear it to shred on its own terms).

    You ask:
    And if not, then isn't this merely T-Stone's subjective opinion? In which case, why SHOULD anyone assume what T-Stone subjectively assumes?

    It *is* merely my subjective opinion, and I don't suppose it's more than that. I recommend it all the same, but I don't suppose it must be fundamentally, exhastively objective to be of use. Rather, It's offered a subjective model that I recommend to others, with the commendation that this model will prove effective as a framework for synthesizing belief, knowledge, and action.

    Later, you say:

    Now, I am more than willing to acknowledge that everything T-Stone says is just his mere opinion. I only ask that, in return, T-Stone acknowledges that he has no reason to criticize anyone who disagrees with his subjective opinions.

    I don't criticize people *because* they disagree. I wouldn't want people to be upset simply because I disagree with them, so in return I extend the same understanding I hope to receive (Golden Rule). My reasons for criticizing your opinions stems from my subjective understanding that those claims do not comport with our experience, or our evidentiary senses as a way to build and deploy a working model of the world.

    The criticisms I offer represent my understanding that the things I am criticizing are distorted models of the real world, whether its about the attributes of God, the meaning of a Bible verse, or the circumference of the earth. When I speak up, I try to identify what I see as the problems with that understanding.

    If you are acknowledging that my opinions are opinions, well enough. But I don't see how having an opinion disqualifies one from offering criticism. I think it works the other way around; my opinions are the basis and catalyst for offering criticism.

    Just noting here that you've not yet addressed the question of how you establish your objectivity, or whether you claim your arguments are objective. How about it, dude?


    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  18. Jim Pemberton,

    You said:


    I will acknowledge that he has a point. However, the observed fact that he often plays the subjective argument card to avoid acknowledging the exceptional likelihood that some observations are objectively true demonstrates his own bias against the impact such a truth would have on his life. Furthermore, he assumes that sensory perception is the only source of information for the believer. Indeed, it is required. However, the acknowledgment of exceptional likelihoods in a fallen world requires internalization that can only come through the activity of the Holy Spirit, of which believers can (and must) testify, but cannot prove, to nonbelievers.


    I concur with this last part. It's something given by the Holy Spirit, in a uniquely subjective fashion -- you can't show someone a copy of that experience, or diagram it as a schematic. And it incumbent on us to testify to this for all who will listen, even as acknowledge it cannot be objectively establish, we assert it all the same. That *is* the quintessentially subjective argument, which bears testimony from each believer.

    And as for exceptional likelihoods, I don't have any trouble with the idea that some observations are *true*, as in they match the objective reality to an arbitrarily close degree. Some times we hit the nail on the head, in other words, and when we suppose the earth goes around the sun, the case may well be that that claim is dead on.

    But that's an a posteriori distinction. I'm concerned with what are a priori claims to objectivity. Looking back (in the final sense), if we say "Yep, nailed that one!" I'd hardly be surprised. I expect as much. But up front, saying "I've got this objectively nailed and I objectively know I've got it nailed" is another matter entirely.

    One that, empirically, crumbles when subjected to epistemic reductions.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  19. Paul,

    So, the sun goes down, the sun comes up, over and over and over. After a while, and without epistemic justification, I start to suspect that sometime early tomorrow morning, the sun will come up on the eastern horizon.

    Am I warranted in orienting my plans and actions around this irrational bit of induction? Do you suppose I'm in trouble once I understand that I don't have final grounds for expecting the sun to come up tomorrow?

    What I don't understand from you is why reflection on this would scare me, like some kind of chasm I wouldn't jump in the day that I would if it was dark? I believe you are mistaken if I and others fail to see the futility of exhaustively applied logic, and epistemological criticism.

    So what? I have empirical input to process, and experience to rely on it. It's not perfect, yet it works. I *do* "jump the chasm", whether it's day or night, in a great number of cases. The pragmatic success of experiental refinements to our model don't make them defensible in the Humean sense, but it's a mistake to think that they need to. They just need to work in the real world.

    Or, again, how am I terrorized by the reflection that I don't have a good epistemic basis for expecting the sun to come up in the morning?

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  20. Hmmm.

    I feel I need to issue an apology now. This whole time I thought T-Stone was disagreeing with me. Then I realized that I might be wrong about that.

    Indeed, he is actually using irony to agree with me!

    Now that I realize this, I feel like an idiot for trying to take him seriously instead of according to his ironic disposition. For that I apologize. Not to T-Stone, but to my self-esteem.

    See, I took a few minutes and became one with my soft-chewy center, recorded the sound of one fist raging, and suddenly a light went on. It was not a real light, of course; it was made of iron. And I realized that this was a message. Or rather a sign of sorts, for (ironically) the chunk of iron did have "Sign of Sorts" carved in the side of it.

    Then the iron fell to Earth in the form of Golden Plates which I used the Urim and...no wait, wrong vision.

    Oh well. Now I truly feel at piece with my peace of the universe (see, even I can be ironic!). And since I feel this way, surely T-Stone must no longer be in disagreement with me. And then I realized that in reality, T-Stone never disagreed with me, for that would have been "bad" for my center. So he always agreed with me, and this is the reality that I like most.

    Tomorrow I plan on giving up blogging altogether, buying a sitar, and sitting under a tree in the middle of the street next to the magic dragon. Perhaps I shall see T-Stone and, hand in hand, we can sing Beatles songs.

    A person should not believe in an ism—he should believe in himself. I quote John Lennon: "I don't believe in Beatles—I just believe in me." Good point there. After all, he was the walrus. I could be the walrus. I'd still have to bum rides off people.

    ReplyDelete
  21. By the way, I should add that I've set up a "Save Ferris" fund on PayPal (you know, the monetary papacy). E-mail bill.gates@microsfot.com for details!

    ReplyDelete
  22. Touchstone said: "With regard to subjectivity, my experience says that strident Calvinists notwithstanding, I don't run into or offer significant problems if I assume that when people say 'I know [this or that]' they asserting that within the epistemic constraints I described above."

    Of course, the pivotal point is in fact "the epistemic constraints [Touchstone] described above." And, as Peter already went to pains to demonstrate, these "epistemic constraints" amount to Touchstone's radical skepticism. So what Touchstone is really saying here is, "I don't get why you guys think this is such a big deal! Why can't you just work with me here, even though I believe that no one can ever really fundamentally know anything?"

    Touchstone said: "That is, there's a implicit [I subjectively believe] in every human assertion. If not, then we are back at someone making a claim that does claim to be epistemological exhaustive, and is destoryed by the very same exhaustive epistemology it appeals to (i.e. Hume's bulldogs tear it to shred on its own terms)."

    Touchstone is saying that unless we can exhaustively and absolutely know truth, just as God exhaustively and absolutely knows truth, then we can't know truth. Unless we are God, we can't be 100% sure. It's all or nothing.

    But why do we need to be 100% sure to be sure? Why can't a truth be evident even if it is not 100% certain? Why can't we know beyond a reasonable shadow of doubt even if we can't know exhaustively and absolutely? Aren't there degrees to beliefs? Why can't we know "in part"?

    By the same token, do we have to be 100% unsure to know we're unsure?

    Also, is it a fair standard that we have to have God's perspective on truth in order to know truth? If so, then no one can know anything.

    Given that Touchstone is a professing Christian, I take it he believes in the existence of God. Likewise, I take it he believes God revealed himself in the natural world as well as, more significantly, in the Scriptures. Given that God is and has revealed himself -- his character, his reason, etc. -- in a manner which from God's standpoint is sufficient for us to know him, why isn't Touchstone satisfied with this revelation? If God has deemed the Scriptures sufficient for certain things, then isn't this a grounds for knowledge and truth?

    Touchstone said: "So what? I have empirical input to process, and experience to rely on it. It's not perfect, yet it works. I *do* 'jump the chasm', whether it's day or night, in a great number of cases. The pragmatic success of experiental refinements to our model don't make them defensible in the Humean sense, but it's a mistake to think that they need to. They just need to work in the real world."

    Touchstone is attempting to smooth over his radical skepticism. Perhaps to make it more palatable to himself or other readers? The point, though, is that his radical skepticism does *not* "work in the real world." He can't be a radical skeptic and assert the sorts of things he asserts. He can't assert anything. After all, at best, he doesn't know anything! So, according to Touchstonian logic, Touchstone should simply tell people to do their own thing. To do whatever makes them happy. Even if it's hurting other people, Touchstone has no basis by which to say people shouldn't hurt other people. Of course, Touchstone won't go so far as to conclude this -- no, he wants to maintain the form or shell of religion even as he denies its power -- but that's where his conclusions conclude.

    Touchstone said: "Just noting here that you've not yet addressed the question of how you establish your objectivity, or whether you claim your arguments are objective. How about it, dude?"

    Given that Touchstone is a radical skeptic and has admitted as much, I'll likewise do my best to "understand" him by looking at his question from his perspective. In short, I have decided to interpret his question as he might interpret other questions, and now answer accordingly.

    So here's my answer, Touchstone: Yes, I agree with you 90% (one can never be entirely sure about anything), I do believe theistic evolution is complete bunk. Utter nonsense. You're definitely right about that and won't get any argument from me. I especially appreciated your lengthy response above pointing out so many errors in theistic evolution. And, my, that was quite bold of you to label theistic evolutionists "God-dishonoring"! I don't know if I could quite go that far, personally, but then again, I'm not the trailblazer you are. Anyway, I'm glad that you're convinced that Christian theistic evolution is an incoherent, illogical system, and that you're now considering other systems such as OEC and YEC. Good on ya, mate!

    ReplyDelete
  23. Touchstone believes in objectivity. He just says he doesn't. He lives and breathes it. He just doesn't want to admit it.

    ReplyDelete
  24. Patrick,

    You said:


    Touchstone is saying that unless we can exhaustively and absolutely know truth, just as God exhaustively and absolutely knows truth, then we can't know truth. Unless we are God, we can't be 100% sure. It's all or nothing.


    Actually, I'm saying precisely the opposite of that. You're characterizing Bahnsen or CalvinDude, who suggest that if we don't have fundamentally justified knowledge, that we have utter futility and chaos (that's why the atheist model doesn't work in their view, because without 100% clarity on the transcendent truth, man is unable to do or expect to do anything).

    All or nothing, in other words.

    My position is that man has approximations of the truth, the real world that surrounds him (physical and metaphysical) independent of his perception. Some representations we maintain may be extremely accurate models of the real world. Others are less accurate. Whatever the case, it's anything *but* all or nothing epistemically, in my view.

    Don't know how you got that completely backwards, but there it is. Now you know.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  25. Patrick,

    This is probably worth a brief comment:


    And second, if Touchstone is right and objectivity is indeed a myth, then what's the point in striving for it in the first place? What makes objectivity "worth" striving for if it's a myth?


    It's the optimal case for perception of the real world that exists independent of my perception. The theoretical limit in terms of clarity in seeing the world as it is, distortion-free. If our goal is to see the world as it is, then this is our best case scenario.

    That seems like a worthy goal to strive for, but I guess it depends on one's aspirations for understanding the world around us.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  26. Patrick said:
    ---
    Touchstone is saying that unless we can exhaustively and absolutely know truth, just as God exhaustively and absolutely knows truth, then we can't know truth. Unless we are God, we can't be 100% sure. It's all or nothing.
    ---

    T-Stone responds:
    ---
    Actually, I'm saying precisely the opposite of that.
    ---

    But T-Stone earlier said:
    ---
    Instead, I'm asking Patrick about his epistemology:

    How does he know he's right?

    How does would he know if he's wrong?

    I'm interested in whether his answers can account for others who have contradictory interpretations to Patrick's but feel similarly convinced *they* are the ones doing "faithful exegesis" rather than Patrick.
    ---

    And:
    ---
    How does one decide what is "rightly exegeted" and what is not, Patric, so that we may understand what is "orthodox" in your view. Without a way to determine who has "rightly exegeted" and who has not, your definition is useless.
    ---

    And:
    ---
    I can know I have the correct interpretation of my boss's directives to me by requesting and receiving written confirmation of my correct understanding of his words. This is -- importantly -- not available with respect to clarifying questions about Bible interpretation.
    ---

    But don't worry...none of that is meant to imply that you need 100% certainty in order to actually be objective and to claim you know the truth. Despite the fact that this entire discussion has hinged on the fact that T-Stone doesn't think it's appropriate for anyone to claim to be objective without 100% certainty, he never meant it.

    ReplyDelete
  27. T-Stone said:
    ---
    It's the optimal case for perception of the real world that exists independent of my perception. The theoretical limit in terms of clarity in seeing the world as it is, distortion-free. If our goal is to see the world as it is, then this is our best case scenario.
    ---

    How is it possible for you to even determine that you have a filter that needs corrected in the first place? What if you are actually seeing the world unfiltered, but you assume you have a filter and you "correct" what didn't need to be corrected in the first place? How can your philosophy avoid this?

    What if God created you in a specific way so that you had the ability to view the world as it actually is, but because other people hated God and willfully distorted their own view and then claimed it was just as valid as your perspective, this caused you to doubt what you should never have doubted in the first place? How can you respond to this?

    You are assuming that you have a subjective filter. Why? Because "everyone" does? --But how could you possibly know that? Because "everyone" might have one? --But how do you know what "might" be possible in the first place? Don't you have to assume a lot about reality in order to consider what "might" happen? (For instance, you most likely don't think it "might" happen that Abraham Lincoln will be transported through time and show up on your doorstep tomorrow, but you do think it "might" happen that you are in a car accident tomorrow. What you think might happen, therefore, is tied to what you think reality actually is. As such, as soon as you think something might be true, you must be making an objectivist truth claim about reality. So, how do you know what might happen? How do you know what is possible?)

    ReplyDelete
  28. To clarify why I asked the above, the bottom line for T-Stone is this:

    Is it reasonable for you to couch all your truth claims in subjectivist language, or is it instead reasonable to assert dogmatically that reality is what you think it is because you have no reason to think otherwise?

    If a schizophrenic came up and said that his dog talked to him, is it reasonable for you to think that it might be possible the schizophrenic is right, or is it reasonable to forcefully move him to a mental institution so that he can be corrected from his objectively false belief?

    If you agree with me that it is more reasonable to put the schizophrenic in a mental institution against his will--violating his "rights"--than it is to doubt your own sanity by thinking he might be right, then why is it not reasonable to argue for the objective status of other truth claims too?

    ReplyDelete
  29. Peter,

    First, none of your quotes imply or require a 100% objective claim on my part. If you've read any of the answers asked for, this should be clear; I don't have a means to establish my own objectivity, as I must employ an interpretive framework that is prone to distortions to function in the world.

    Not sure how much more clear I can put it than that.

    You are free and welcome to profess your pristine objectivity. I don't have means to prevent it, and wouldn't want to if I could. I do think it's an extremely flawed model of the world around you and your relationship to it. And I think its worth pointing out when it gives rise to, say, claims for the *objective* proof of God existence.

    But the saving grace here is that, happily, you are one of the Objective Ones™. You see things As They Really Are™, not filtered through distortive layers like I do. A very comfortable position to be in, all things considered.

    Oh, while we're at it, just a quick reminder that after all the answering I've provided here about my own claims to objectivity, or lack thereof, you still haven't discussed yours. I've explained my position, can you now explain yours? How do you establish your own objectivity?

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  30. The funny bit about Touchstone's latest comment to Peter is that, while Touchstone asks for Peter to establish his own grounds for objectivity, he himself has no means by which to objectively measure Peter's response. So why should Peter need to state let alone prove his case to Touchstone?

    In other words, if at bottom Touchstone has no reason to believe anything himself, because for him nothing is certain, then why is Peter under any obligation to state or attempt to prove to Touchstone what Touchstone himself won't believe, given Touchstone's responses in this post? It's not like whatever Peter says will be certain to Touchstone anyway!

    Moreover, as Peter has already well noted, the burden of proof rests squarely on Touchstone's shoulders to prove to us why we should believe him given his radical skepticism rather than for us to prove to him our grounds for objectivity.

    And if Touchstone doesn't like this response, then he can re-interpret it to mean whatever he may like instead. After all, when you wish upon a Touchstone, makes no difference who you are, anything your heart desires will come to you!

    ReplyDelete
  31. Peter,

    How is it possible for you to even determine that you have a filter that needs corrected in the first place?

    If you are asking how can I determine *for certain* that I have such a filter, I can't. In practical terms though, my experience contains a number of cases where others report quite different understandings of an event or phenomenon we all witnessed ("His foot was out of bounds"... "It was not!"). Contradictory accounts of the same event suggest that a) either we weren't witnessing the same event in the first place, or b) one or more (or all) of us has an interpretation of the event that is at odds with what actually happened.

    Given the choices of a) and b), b) seems more plausible. A unified reality with various amounts of distortion in the perceptions of observers would explain the contradictions more naturally than some sort of "personal universes" or "multiple histories" view that maintains the perfection of the observer's perception, and instead messes with the underlying reality to resolve the contradictions.


    What if you are actually seeing the world unfiltered, but you assume you have a filter and you "correct" what didn't need to be corrected in the first place? How can your philosophy avoid this?

    It can't, for certain. My philosophy doesn't require that I eliminate this as a possibility. Which is fortuitous because it is a posssibility.

    In practice, this view implies that my perceptions are normative as objective reality, and any other observers' perceptions that don't agree with my perceptions are by definition inaccurate. I can't prove I'm not just a brain in a vat imagining all this either, but in both cases, I don't feel the need to disprove either, or categorically rule them out.


    What if God created you in a specific way so that you had the ability to view the world as it actually is, but because other people hated God and willfully distorted their own view and then claimed it was just as valid as your perspective, this caused you to doubt what you should never have doubted in the first place? How can you respond to this?


    If that was somehow revealed to be the case, my only response would be that I've had a catastrophically flawed model of the way the world around me works.

    I guess I would also respond to such a revelation with a question as to how this kind of perceptive perfection might be reconciled with other "blessed ones". Either I'm just the Special One Who Sees It Right™, or else all the others will have to have perceptions that exactly match mine. If I find any disagreement between our perceptions, then my reponse would be one of incredulity, as I now have several all observers who all see without distortion, but see the same thing differently.

    I would have to conclude, if that's the case, the world isn't just *fundamentally* unintelligible, but that it's completely unintelligilble.

    You are assuming that you have a subjective filter. Why? Because "everyone" does?

    Simply because this assumption has proven the most effective for me as a model of the real world. It performs better than other hypotheses in explaining my experience and making successful assessments about what is going on around me.


    --But how could you possibly know that? Because "everyone" might have one? --But how do you know what "might" be possible in the first place? Don't you have to assume a lot about reality in order to consider what "might" happen? (For instance, you most likely don't think it "might" happen that Abraham Lincoln will be transported through time and show up on your doorstep tomorrow, but you do think it "might" happen that you are in a car accident tomorrow. What you think might happen, therefore, is tied to what you think reality actually is. As such, as soon as you think something might be true, you must be making an objectivist truth claim about reality. So, how do you know what might happen? How do you know what is possible?)


    I don't know for certain that Abraham Lincoln will not show up on my door tomorrow. I also do not know for certain that I will not be in a car accident tomorrow. But I do have experience that suggests that car accidents happen regularly, and since I drive a car regularly, and plan on driving my car tomorrow, there is a significant (if small) risk that I will be in a car accident tomorrow.

    But I have no experience available to me, no precedent, for the re-appearance of a long dead American President. I can't be certain that it can't or won't happen, but I have no empirical basis to suggest that it will.

    So if you mean by "might happen" that I can't rule it out for certain, then indeed, it might happen. If you mean by "might happen" that I see an appreciable probability that it *will* happen, I don't have any experience that establishes that probability.

    So, impossible to absolutely rule out, but extremely improbable, based on my experience.

    Hey, why am I answering all these questions you offer, when you won't answer the few that I've put to you?

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  32. Patrick,

    The funny bit about Touchstone's latest comment to Peter is that, while Touchstone asks for Peter to establish his own grounds for objectivity, he himself has no means by which to objectively measure Peter's response. So why should Peter need to state let alone prove his case to Touchstone?

    Because I don't need to be perfectly objective to measure Peter's response. It's useful to assess it, even if I have subjective perceptions and biases that I can't rule out.

    As for why he should state his case, simply out of reciprocation. I answer his questions, it's fair that he should be willing to answer mine. I've nearly given up hope on expecting such from you, Patrick, but I'm still waiting to hear you state how you determine what is "rightly exegeted", and what is not...


    In other words, if at bottom Touchstone has no reason to believe anything himself, because for him nothing is certain, then why is Peter under any obligation to state or attempt to prove to Touchstone what Touchstone himself won't believe, given Touchstone's responses in this post? It's not like whatever Peter says will be certain to Touchstone anyway!


    That's nonsense Patrick. I don't have to be certain of a thing to accept it or believe it. The fact that Peter can't prove anything exhaustively doesn't prevent me at all from embracing it. If I'm just convinced, while maintaining signficant doubts, then I'm still convinced. That's a good reason to offer an argument, even if it isn't exhaustively proven.

    I'm at a loss as to why you would suppose that it must be completely certain, else it's of no use at all. That's the "all or nothing" thinking you were railing against, but you're offering it here yourself. If Peter offers an argument that leaves me 90% certain that it is corrected, then that's a significant amount of persuasion. I was about 60% certain that George Bush was the best presidential candidate available among the possible winners. Hardly positively certain, but I voted for him anyway.

    So, certainty isn't a useful requirement here at all.

    Moreover, as Peter has already well noted, the burden of proof rests squarely on Touchstone's shoulders to prove to us why we should believe him given his radical skepticism rather than for us to prove to him our grounds for objectivity.

    Sigh. I'm not a radical skeptic, Patrick. You're confused on this, too. When one makes a claim that asserts transcendent certainty, I simply apply skepticism as a way to reduce those claims to their base forms, which in my experience, are unjustifiable assumptions. If Peter claims ultimate certainty, that implies an epistemology that is ultimate. As such, he should be able to "show his work", and demonstrate the ultimate nature of that epistemology.

    For my own beliefs, I eschew solipsism, and embrace practical epistemologies that don't pretend to be ultimate, or perfectly objective. That means I don't make claims that imply "turtles all the way down". I acknowledge up front that I operate from experiences that flauntingly violate the requiremets of a fundamentally intelligible universe -- I expect the sun to rise tomorrow morning even though I'm ultimately unjustified in such an expectation.

    So, unleash radical skepticism on my epistemology, and I say "Guilty! I have no ultimate justification, no absolute certain for my beliefs." Peter, on the other hand claims that he has ultimate justifications for his knowledge, (or his objectivity, whichever you want to look at). He must, or he could not be *certain*, ultimately. That's a claim I don't make, and one that skeptical analysis routinely tears to shreds.



    And if Touchstone doesn't like this response, then he can re-interpret it to mean whatever he may like instead. After all, when you wish upon a Touchstone, makes no difference who you are, anything your heart desires will come to you!


    Uh. OK, Patrick. Whatever.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  33. Touchstone what do you make of this:

    Luke 1
    Since many have undertaken to compile a narrative of the events that have been fulfilled among us,
    2
    just as those who were eyewitnesses from the beginning and ministers of the word have handed them down to us,
    3
    I too have decided, after investigating everything accurately anew, to write it down in an orderly sequence for you, most excellent Theophilus,
    4
    so that you may realize the certainty of the teachings you have received.

    The Gospel according to Dr Special One Who Sees It Right™ Luke

    ReplyDelete
  34. Touchastone wrote to Patrick:

    "For my own beliefs, I eschew solipsism, and embrace practical epistemologies that don't pretend to be ultimate, or perfectly objective."

    But what he has said elsewhere shows that his "episetmology" requires one to "point to a deductive argument" which necessitates the conclusion, in order to "know" (his episetmology) anything.

    Touchstone had said in a thread last year on Debunking Christianity when asked how he knew something,


    "Espistemically, we *don't* know that God got it right this time. I'm not one to point to a deductive production that establishes that."


    And therefore according to Touchstone to epistemically know (whatever that means, is there non-epistemic knowledge that is distinct from opinion? If not, then "epistemic knowledge" seems a bit redundant. Anyway...) that P one must be able to "point to a deductive production that establishes that" P.

    Despite the problems with this infallibilist constraint on knowledge, Touchstone pretty much ruins anything he says here. Does he know that TAG is a bad argument? No. In fact, given his antipathy towards "words like necessity" why would he even say what he says above! Apparently since he has such a big problem with "necessity," and cringes when us Triabloggers use the word, then he should never try to know anything. Unless, perhaps he will be consistent and say that "point[ing] to a deductive production that establishes that" P doesn't necessitate the conclusion. That is, there could still be a possibility that P is false. If so, then why can't he say that "God got it right this time?" That doesn't require certainty. That doesn't require necessity. And so we must interpret Touchstone as saying that he can't know that P because he can't establish P in a necessary and infallible way. Not only is he tacitly assuming that laws of logic are necessarily true, he's also acted like a hypocrite here. Indeed, since he has such an aversion towards "necessity," especially "logical necessity," then I guess Touchstone doesn't "know" anything! Therefore, all Touchstone has been doing here is offering his opinion on matters. Why someone debates so vigorously and in such a long winded way about matters of opinion is beyond me. But perhaps I'm wrong. Perhaps Touchstone is the sort of fellow that stands out in front of Baskin And Robbins ice cream shop debating people about whether chocolate tastes better than vanilla.

    This is what happens to people with bad philosophy. People who don't bother to think through their system. People who say things without thinking them through. Touchstone said he doesn't like philosophy. Perhaps if he didn't hate it so much he'd avoid silly mistakes like the one above. Now, if he wants to deny his internalist and infallibilist constraint on knowledge, fine. Then he's wrong in what he said on Debunking Christianity. He's not a careful and cautious thinker. More like a gun man who fires wildly with his M-60, hoping to hit anything. A sniper takes his time, systemizes his thoughts. But Touchstone hates sniping. Takes too much intellectual time and effort. Better to blaze away. Touchstone is the Kamikaze of apologists, not the Bob Lee Swagger. In order to "save" his faith, he must make knowledge unatainable. In order to save himself, he kills himself. He knows he's going down, so he takes others with him.

    ReplyDelete
  35. 1. Touchstone imputes to us things we've never stated.

    2. Where we have proffered responses, the fact that Touchstone has an impoverished level of reading comprehension does not then mean that we have not given him sufficient answers. Such as when he says things like, "This is nonsense!", it doesn't then necessarily mean what we've said really and truly is nonsense (the attentive can read our arguments and his). Rather, it would appear he doesn't understand the argument and so labels it "nonsense" as a cop-out.

    3. Notice that his current stance is somewhat toned down from his original stance. Just compare his first posts with his later ones. In other words, he's either backpedaling or utterly confused. Neither of these speaks to his credit.

    4. To sum up, we've established that Touchstone is a radical skeptic (his statements to the contrary notwithstanding). Fundamentally speaking, he believes everything is subjective -- including his own beliefs and arguments. Yet he continues to make objective pronouncements against the position of others. Logically, he can't do this without contravening his own subjectivity. Yet that's precisely what he does. Thus, if Touchstone wants to be consistent, he must concede there is objective truth. But will he? Nope. Instead, he falters between subjectivity and objectivity, on the one hand claiming everything is fundamentally subjective, while on the other hand using an objective standard to make such a claim.

    5. Given these things, why should anyone take him seriously? They shouldn't.

    ReplyDelete