The Radical Skeptic

This post will consist of two parts in one post. The first part is directed toward T-Stone. The second part is for everyone else :-)

Part I

In comments on this post, I pointed out the irony that Touchstone would defend Cameron’s subjective testimony during his & Comfort’s “debate” (which isn’t really the correct word for what happened) with Brian Sapient and Kelli Whatshername (you know, from the Green Day song). The irony of T-Stone’s comment is due to the fact that T-Stone never misses a chance to bash the Triabloguers who, rather than presenting subjectivist “testimony,” actually produce arguments.

T-Stone took umbrage with my classification of his position. He said:

Peter,

The problem is that you offer arguments that are supremely subjective, yet suppose they are objective. Nothing wrong with subjective arguments, or objective arguments. But it's a problem when you try to claim the mantle of objectivity for your subjective assertions. A "truth in advertising" problem.

-Touchstone

(If you disagree, let's have a look at your "objective arguments", shall we and we'll see just how much subjective you tuck away in there...)

The problem is that T-Stone hypocritically applies a radical skepticism to anything I say in an attempt to turn everything into a subjective argument when he does not use the same radical skepticism against his own views. There is a reason for this. He isn’t a radical skeptic (no one is, for we all must actually live in this world).

When it comes to T-Stone, I could argue “2 + 2 = 4 in a Base-10 system is objectively true” and T-Stone would counter: "Have you considered quantum mechanics possibly making 2 + 2 both equal to and NOT equal to 4 at the same time and in the same relationship? No? Then you're being subjective while pretending to be objective!"

T-Stone's refuge is to hold onto pure skepticism as his weapon against the T-Bloggers. But his skepticism comes at a price. If T-Stone is to remain faithful to his skeptical position, he can never assert any positive claim. This includes his claim that I am being subjective instead of objective, as well as his claim that skepticism is a valid approach.

Perhaps the best argument is a demonstration. So, T-Stone can have it back now. He begins by saying: “The problem is that you offer arguments that are supremely subjective, yet suppose they are objective.” T-Stone: is this an objective statement? That is, can you objectively demonstrate that my arguments are “supremely subjective”? Can you even define “subjective” and “objective” (without doing another of your “trivial Google searches” that you are so fond of)? And if you do define those words, how do you know that you defined them correctly? Isn’t your use of the words themselves subjective rather than objective?

T-Stone continues: “Nothing wrong with subjective arguments, or objective arguments.” Really? Is THIS an objective statement, or a subjective statement? How do you know it is true that there is nothing wrong with either type of argument?

T-Stone charges: “But it's a problem when you try to claim the mantle of objectivity for your subjective assertions.” But A) how is it objectively a problem for me to lie (if, indeed, that is what I have done) and B) how do you KNOW that i) it actually is a problem for me too and ii) that I did violate this principal? What is your objective proof that I am engaged in such bad behavior here? Show me your objectivity, T-Stone.

You challenge me to show my arguments (as if I hadn’t already done this hundreds of times). I’m challenging you to back up your statements.

And since this began as a discussion in interpretation in the first place, I want you to objectively prove to me right now that you have objectively understood my statements (whether you agree or disagree with them). Keep in mind that no matter what you say, I’m going to respond with, “But how do you know this is true?” just as you do.

Dealing with the radical skeptic is oh-so-fun, isn’t it T-Stone? But if it’s good enough for you to behave this way, it’s good enough for me to respond in kind. When you’ve had enough of this nonsense, we can move on.

Part II

While my above challenge to T-Stone is a serious challenge (that is, T-Stone has to do it if he’s going to keep any sense of self-respect), it may also actually appear to some as a valid method of attacking someone’s point of view. It appears valid because A) the method employed is only asking questions and B) there is a level of “uncertainty” associated with knowledge. But in reality, the radical skeptic approach is self-contradictory and, as such, it is impossible for it to actually be true.

It is rather simple to demonstrate this if we take the radical skeptic view toward radical skepticism in the first place. “Is radical skepticism objective? How can we know? Have we understood radical skepticism correctly in order to know whether we’re using it right in the first place?”

The bottom line is, if radical skepticism is true we cannot know that it is true. If we know that radical skepticism is true, then we know that radical skepticism must be false for radical skepticism cannot know anything. This is the self-contradictory nature of radical skepticism. As such, even before we look at the questions in any attack against our position, we know that at the basic level skepticism can no longer be viable.

But there is another level where the radical skeptic approach becomes self-contradictory, and that is during its application. When we get into language (which is where this subject with T-Stone originated), this means that the radical skeptic who assumes that there can be no objective transfer of meaning in a text must, in the midst of attacking that text, make an objective statement about the very text he is criticizing. To illustrate this, consider the following:

I write out a concept C. Our radical skeptic reads concept C and applies his radical skepticism to it. His radical skepticism says, “I cannot know for certain anything about C.” But in order to make this claim, he must have universal knowledge of C! If he does not know the totality of C, he cannot say, “I cannot know anything about C” for there could remain a part of C that he is able to know, if he surveyed it. Thus, in order for the skeptic to say that he cannot know anything about a concept, he must first assert that he knows all there is to know about the concept!

In reality, the skeptic, in an attempt to remain consistent, can only say: “I cannot know that I cannot know anything about concept C.” But this, in turn, is yet another concept! This concept (“I cannot know that I cannot know anything about concept C”) we will call concept C'. C' falls to the same problem. The skeptic cannot say, “I cannot know C'” without knowing C' universally. This leads to C'': “I cannot know that I cannot know C'.” Ad infinitum.

Maintaining a radical skepticism is, therefore, inherently irrational. Skepticism must end somewhere. And in language this is ultimately demonstrated in the fact that the radical skeptics will write, talk, gesture, or use all other types of language in order to convey the meaning that you cannot know any meaning they are attempting to convey. This hypocrisy undoes their arguments, for it is obvious that if they convince someone to their position they have conveyed the meaning they wished to convey using the very means they say cannot do this.

As such, it cannot be “skepticism all the way down.” There must be some point where we have unquestionable positions, for to question them would be to commit ourselves to infinite regress.

T-Stone said he wanted examples of my arguments that were objective so he could see how much subjectivism was in them. Perhaps he can start with this one…