Friday, October 27, 2006

Machiavellian atheology

A while back, Daniel Morgan posted a link to a presentation by Gene Witmer.

http://grove.ufl.edu/%7Eaasa/witmer%20talk%201.pdf

At the time I was busy with other things, so I’ll now take the occasion to revisit that issue.

I would note, in passing, that Witmer freely concedes that Manata handily won his debate with Barker:

“To my disappointment, Barker did a terrible job defending atheism; indeed, I
couldn't bear to listen to the entire thing, quitting perhaps 3⁄4 of the way
through. The debate made it clear that presuppositionalists can be effective in
throwing advocates of atheism off balance, leaving them disoriented and at
apparently a terrible disadvantage in responding. Perhaps Barker's generally
not too good at debate; I don't know.”


Exposition aside, Witmer’s presentation is a combination of a few substantive objections along with a lot of tactical advice. These are somewhat interrelated, but, for clarity of analysis, I’ll make some effort to address them separately. Let’s address the substantive objections first:

***QUOTE***

One obvious difficulty with this style of argument is that it requires that
the options be eliminated, and given how many there are, this seems quite
difficult. It is not enough to sum up the opposition as one simplistic kind of
atheism and argue that that can't be right; all varieties thereof must be dealt
with.

***END-QUOTE***

That’s a valid criticism of one particular formulation of presuppositionalism. But this is easily rectified by scaling back the claim to a more reasonable burden of proof. The onus is not on the presuppositionalist to rebut every conceivable alternative to the faith. That would be an inhuman burden of proof. And it would saddle him with a double standard, for no one, whether believer or unbeliever, can meet such a hypothetical challenge.

Rather, the claim is limited to real life alternatives. To an actual debate between a presuppositionist and an actual opponent, representing his own position—whatever that might be.

Continuing:

***QUOTE***

Another difficulty to bear in mind: this sort of argument only succeeds if the
same kind of alleged incoherence does not threaten Christian belief as well.
Suppose we eliminate the opposition, but the tools we used eliminate our own
position; we then need to go back and rethink the techniques used. So, for
instance, if the presuppositionalist argues that atheistic treatments of
morality fail because of such and such an implication, he needs to ask himself
whether or not his own treatment of morality has the same problematic
implication.

***END-QUOTE***

True, when it comes to arguing for one’s own position or against a competing position, both sides have their own burden of proof to discharge.

But Witmer forgets this when he gets around to giving practical advice (see below).

Continuing:

***QUOTE***

In any case, note too what is said about God's originating logic. He did so
"because they are a reflection of his nature." So his nature includes the laws
of logic. This is hardly an explanation of the laws of logic; it's just putting
them, so to speak, inside God. I'm reminded of a famous parody from Moliere
("The Imaginative Illness") in which a pill's ability to cause sleep is said to
be explained by its dormitive virtue -- i.e., its sleep-causing power. In the
same way, the explanation is merely pushed back: Logic is explained by God's
nature, his, you know, logic-causing nature.

***END-QUOTE***

This is a valid criticism as far as it goes. Presuppositionalists can be guilty of substituting slogans for arguments. Paraphrasing the original claim.

Witmer’s objection exposes the limitations of giving short, snappy answers to complicated questions.

However, this doesn’t mean that no such answers exist. There are book-length treatments on modal metaphysics from a theistic perspective which go into excruciating detail.

Continuing:

***QUOTE***

It is, of course, an interesting fact if we cannot argue for the claim that
induction will lead to the truth without presupposing that very claim. But it
is, frankly, absurd for the presuppositionalist to complain about this
presupposition when he, of course, admits doing the very same thing with his
beliefs about God. If it's okay to take some beliefs for granted, then, of
course, this belief -- that using induction is likely to get us to the truth --
may well be one we can take for granted. It is in any case hardly clear why
that belief should be thought any less worthy of being taken for granted than,
say, the belief that God exists!

***END-QUOTE***

Here he’s transitioning from substantive objections to tactical advance. And notice, in the course of this transition, how he’s forgotten where he himself positioned the burden of proof?

His advice takes the form of: “You think we’ve gotta problem? Well, you’ve gotta problem too!”

But this is an attempt to flip the burden of proof rather than discharge the burden of proof. To say that unbeliever doesn’t have to justify induction on secular grounds because the believer has unwarranted beliefs as well—even assuming that this is true—is not an intellectually responsible answer.

It’s fair to point out that the believer has his own burden of proof to meet. But that doesn’t shift the burden of proof from the unbeliever to the believer.

The onus is still on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds. The onus doesn’t go away just because he can claim that the believer has failed to meet his own burden of proof.

For one thing, these are logically unrelated. To say that I don’t have to justify belief A because you can’t justify belief B is illogical. For A and B are not about the same thing. B has nothing to do with A.

It’s like saying “I don’t have to justify my belief that it’s going to snow tomorrow because you can’t justify your belief that the stock market is going to crash tomorrow!”

For another thing, even if these beliefs were about the same thing, both sides would bear their respective burden of proof. The onus is on the believer to justify induction on Christian grounds while the onus is on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds.

Even if the believer was guilty of shirking his side of the argument, that would’t prove that the uvbeliever was right.

Finally, let’s move on to some of his tactical advice:

***QUOTE***

Notice that our discussion earlier of beliefs that we take for granted indicates
that some beliefs might be reasonable without argument. So if my belief that my
senses are mostly trustworthy is to be taken for granted, then, if someone
insists on a basis for this, I can of course say, "there is no basis; this is
one of the things I take for granted." (Again, there's a good question as to
why some things should be taken for granted and others can't; that's a deep
question that I don't want to try to tackle here.) In the same way there are
truths that don't have any deeper explanation. So, perhaps the right answer to
"why is it that 15+16=31?" is just "That's just the way it is; there's no
further explanation." Just as it's hard to see how one could avoid taking some
beliefs for granted, it's hard to see how one could avoid allowing that some
facts are just primitive or unexplained in this fashion. The presuppositionalist
has his own primitive fact, too, of course: the existence and nature of God.
Nothing further explains why God exists or why he is the way he is, on their view.
Maybe he can explain everything else, according to them; but nothing else explains him.
So by their own lights they will accept that some things can be primitive in this way.

I stress this because it is in fact always open to you, if you are defending
yourself against this negative strategy whereby they aim to show that all belief
systems contrary to theirs are self-undermining or incoherent, you can take
advantage of this option. If they say, "But what is your basis for logic?" (and
if they mean "what explains why these things are true?"), you can always say,
"They just are, and that's the end of the story. They can hardly complain that
this move is never allowed, as they need to make it themselves, albeit with a
different (alleged) truth.

Of course, you might not like Platonist atheism. Maybe you'd like something
more satisfying. But it's certainly available as an option. One could explore
other explanations but hold out this one is always what you can revert to if the
other explanations fail.

Keep in mind that while you might want to have more interesting and ambitious
theories about, say, the nature of logic and morality, you can always say things
like "While I'm inclined to think that the laws of logic can be explained by
linguistic facts, I recognize there are problems here. If it turns out that the
laws of logic are primitive and unexplained by anything else, then, so be it."

Above all: remember that insofar as they have an argument, it is purely
negative in character: trying to show that the atheist is committed to some
incoherent view. This gives you enormous resources for responding. All you
have to do is point out that you can be minimal in your commitments and not be
incoherent. You can say that lots of things are primitive and unexplained and
that they've hardly shown that you can't consistently say such things.

***END-QUOTE***

The problem with all this is that it’s so transparently cynical and unprincipled.

The unbeliever is entitled to take some things for granted “if” he has good reason to take these things for granted. The unbeliever is entitled to treat certain facts as primitive facts if they are primitive facts, and he has good reason for believing so. The unbeliever is entitled to say, “they just are, and that’s that,” only “if,” as a matter of fact, that’s a truthful claim.

The unbeliever is only entitled to revert to atheistic Platonism as his last-ditch stand if that fallback maneuver is actually true or he has good reason for believing it’s true.

And, of course, if that’s what he thought all along, then he wouldn’t “revert” to atheistic Platonism, now would he?

The unbeliever is entitled to be noncommittal if he is, indeed, truly noncommittal, and has good reason to be a minimalist.

But what Witmer is saying throughout this section is that an unbeliever should make opportunistic use of any blocking maneuver or evasive maneuver whether he believes it or not.

He is coaching the unbeliever on how to win the debate without winning the argument. How to lose on the merits, but survive intact. It’s pretty revealing that Witmer would resort to such unscrupulous counsel.

Use any old argument, good or bad, just to get the presuppositionalist off your back! The convenience, and not the cogence, of the argument is all that matters.

On another subject, Danny also refers us to an article by Nino Cocchiarella on “Logic & Ontology.”

Two problems:

i) Does Danny subscribe to Cocchiarella’s solution? Of is this just one of those blocking maneuvers recommended by Witmer to silence the presuppositionalist if you can’t answer him?

ii) Cocchiarella discusses the three standard theories of universals, and opts for a synthetic solution: conceptual realism.

I myself also opt for a synthetic solution: theistic conceptual realism.

Cocchiarella confronts me with a false dilemma, for I favor an option which isn’t even on the list. Therefore, Cocchiarella hasn’t boxed me into accepting his solution.

And, for reasons I won’t go into at the moment, I don’t accept his solution.

18 comments:

  1. "There are book-length treatments on modal metaphysics from a theistic perspective which go into excruciating detail."

    For example? :)

    ReplyDelete
  2. 1. The Metaphysics of Theism and Modality (American University Studies Series V, Philosophy) (Peter Lang Pub Inc (August 2001)
    by Richard Brian Davis

    2. Possible Worlds: What They Are Good For and What They Are. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2001.

    http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/PhilThesis.html

    3. An Examination of. Theistic Conceptual Realism. as an Alternative to Theistic Activism

    http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/mphil.pdf

    4. Divine Ideas, Cornell University Press, (forthcoming)

    http://www.fordham.edu/philosophy/Faculty/Leftow.htm

    ReplyDelete
  3. We are supposed to have Gene Witmer on The Narrow Mind on Thursday, Nov. 9.

    Thomas Howe is also considering!

    ReplyDelete
  4. I'm reminded that I've got Plantinga's book, "Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality" here (just unpacked it--haven't read any of it yet though so I won't comment on the details as I don't know them...although were I to run for office.....) :-D

    ReplyDelete
  5. I just received confirmation from Gene Witmer, he will be on the show Nov. 9.

    ReplyDelete
  6. Boy do I look forward to that show. I will definitely have a transcript of that one typed up asap. Prof. Witmer indicated to me that he wants to stick to the negative argument of PS -- that all other worldviews/belief systems are incoherent.

    I'm sure it will be a good show.

    ReplyDelete
  7. Why, Danny? He can't put forth a positive worldview for himself? All that is is a sophistic stall tactic.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Of course, Prof. Witmer admits the purpose of his talk is largely in how to "respond" to those who present the PS in debate formats:

    At the time I was busy with other things, so I’ll now take the occasion to revisit that issue.

    I'm glad you did, and I hope we can continue to discuss general presuppositionalism, as well as the question of whether or not theism is a necessary precondition of logic.

    I would note, in passing, that Witmer freely concedes that Manata handily won his debate with Barker:

    I think most impartial people would agree. I did, long ago (back in August, if I recall).

    Exposition aside, Witmer’s presentation is a combination of a few substantive objections along with a lot of tactical advice. These are somewhat interrelated, but, for clarity of analysis, I’ll make some effort to address them separately. Let’s address the substantive objections first:

    This talk was limited to one hour, and much of what he said was contained in the transcript that was made available. However, some of the peripheral issues that were discussed, especially in the following Q&A session, were not incorporated into his talk. He has told me, though, that he plans to revisit the issue in a while when he gets sufficient feedback and time.

    That’s a valid criticism of one particular formulation of presuppositionalism. But this is easily rectified by scaling back the claim to a more reasonable burden of proof. The onus is not on the presuppositionalist to rebut every conceivable alternative to the faith. That would be an inhuman burden of proof. And it would saddle him with a double standard, for no one, whether believer or unbeliever, can meet such a hypothetical challenge.

    One of the first points to make is that there is a fundamental difference between an individual-directed negative argument (IDNA): "you cannot
    account for X", a generalized negative argument (GNA): "atheism cannot account for X", and a generalized positive argument (GPA): "God is required to account for X". I have seen all three go under the guise of presuppositionalism.

    True, when it comes to arguing for one’s own position or against a competing position, both sides have their own burden of proof to discharge.

    But this is where things get problematic. If you are only making an "internal critique", then the question of how we establish a "burden of proof" that translates across both my own and your own worldviews, and meets our presuppositional standards, is difficult to answer. If I assert some specific premise, such as, "All claims must be substantiated via the scientific method," then you can obviously use that sort of hasty, generalized premise against my other premises, since I have established a metric for the burden of proof. What if I do not think a simple metric can be used, and that different levels of proof are required as we correlate to those things inside of and outside of generalized human experience and induction?

    This is a valid criticism as far as it goes. Presuppositionalists can be guilty of substituting slogans for arguments. Paraphrasing the original claim.

    Or considering a negative argument the same thing as a positive one.

    However, this doesn’t mean that no such answers exist. There are book-length treatments on modal metaphysics from a theistic perspective which go into excruciating detail.

    And I see this as a problem for both IDNA and GNA formulations of presuppositionalism. Rarely do these two ever interact with parallel treatments of metaphysics, ontology or logic from either a God-neutral, or atheistic perspective.

    Here he’s transitioning from substantive objections to tactical advance. And notice, in the course of this transition, how he’s forgotten where he himself positioned the burden of proof?

    I think he's pointing out that we all hold presuppositions, and that anyone who thinks otherwise is deluded. He's asking why "accounts" have to be given for presuppositions themselves, since your presuppositions cannot be properly "accounted for" either -- definitionally, these are assumed truths which form the basis of our starting points to make arguments.

    His advice takes the form of: “You think we’ve gotta problem? Well, you’ve gotta problem too!”

    I don't think he's committing the tu quoque fallacy. He's pointing out that this is a flaw in the PS strategy -- to imply an infinite regress, tautological difficulties, primitive facts, or circularity will not result if we justify what we presuppose, ad nauseum.

    But this is an attempt to flip the burden of proof rather than discharge the burden of proof. To say that unbeliever doesn’t have to justify induction on secular grounds because the believer has unwarranted beliefs as well—even assuming that this is true—is not an intellectually responsible answer. It’s fair to point out that the believer has his own burden of proof to meet. But that doesn’t shift the burden of proof from the unbeliever to the believer.

    Again, I think he's addressing the necessity of "unburdening" everyone at the level of a priori, prima facie presuppositions and primitive facts (including, "I exist, my senses are reliable, logic is valid," etc.).

    The onus is still on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds. The onus doesn’t go away just because he can claim that
    the believer has failed to meet his own burden of proof.


    No, but if the PS argument is that the unbeliever has failed to meet the unbeliever's own burden of proof, and the PS argument is all about "internal critique", then this gets tricky to claim, doesn't it? This is what he addresses later on.

    For another thing, even if these beliefs were about the same thing, both sides would bear their respective burden of proof. The onus is on the believer to justify induction on Christian grounds while the onus is on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds.

    But in so doing, how many other assumptions do you, or we, package in? How much of a regress will we get into? Typically PSs claim they have two assumptions: i) God exists (where God = all good, powerful, knowing, not a liar, etc.); ii) Scripture is God's Word. They then feel consistent in falling back on (i) and (ii) in order to discharge their own burden of proof re induction. I typically hear induction "defended" by Scriptures like Gen 8:22 (KJV) --

    While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease.

    But this assumes many things, especially that all of these things will remain *as they are*, in addition to just "not ceasing". That is, God would not be a liar, per se, if days became 29 hours and nights 5 hours, or if summer was 9 months long, and winter 9 months long. What the reader assumes (unjustifiably) is that induction is strengthened by this primitive verse, when there is no way to find support here without serious other
    leaps in logic. Some of the other assumptions include the translation of the verse, the choice of the MSS, the hermeneutics, etc., etc.

    So, my point is that as much as PS advocates may believe they can always fall back onto these basic internal assumptions, especially when they do metaphysical apologia, they cannot. Too many other considerations are packaged into (ii) to allow that.

    Even if the believer was guilty of shirking his side of the argument, that would’t prove that the uvbeliever was right.

    Correct, because of tu quoque.

    The problem with all this is that it’s so transparently cynical and unprincipled.

    Cynical, perhaps; unprincipled? Hardly.

    The unbeliever is entitled to take some things for granted “if” he has good reason to take these things for granted. The unbeliever is entitled to treat certain facts as primitive facts if they are primitive facts, and he has good reason for believing so. The unbeliever is entitled to say, “they just are, and that’s that,” only “if,” as a matter of fact, that’s a truthful claim.

    Well that's not "for granted" then, is it? Care to tell me what "good reason" you have to believe that other minds exist? How do you show that this is a truthful claim?

    Besides, the whole basis of the PS argument is that *internal critiques* are all we can do. How do you inject into my worldview *your* "burden of proof" and the prerequisites for presuppositions? See the problem, here? You claim there is "no neutral ground". But you also claim you can neutrally evaluate my justification for presuppositions? That's where we get into classical foundationalism, or coherentism, etc., which is where theism and atheism will quickly find some issues.

    The unbeliever is only entitled to revert to atheistic Platonism as his last-ditch stand if that fallback maneuver is actually true or he has good reason for believing it’s true.

    Or perhaps the atheist realizes his own ability to respond to a IDNA is predicated upon that which he is committed to, and how familiar he is with the metaphysics thereof. Saying that the universals are metaphysically possible or impossible within a physicalist framework is one thing; accepting it as a presupposition is another; demonstrating it is quite a whole different story.

    I have attempted to show (elsewhere, in the "Faking It" thread) that conceptual intensional/natural realism is not inconsistent with physicalism to "account for" the laws of logic, and universals in particular.

    Platonism, conversely, is parallel to theism in some ways -- it removes verifiability principles from the ball game, and makes non-veridical statements a matter of rule rather than exceptions. Talk of transcendent, universal, abstractions, existing outside of the spatio-temporal framework of our universe, sounds just about like God, doesn't it?

    And, of course, if that’s what he thought all along, then he wouldn’t “revert” to atheistic Platonism, now would he?

    Many people who are pressed by PS debates into commitments ought not overcommit to things they don't understand (and their opponents likely don't either), myself included. His point is that metaphysical defenses of our worldviews are not simple, and that if one commits to physicalism and is shown they don't properly conceive of how to incorporate morality, values or logic or etc., the *best* thing to do is not dismiss values, logic and morality, (obviously) but instead to change their commitment to a particular metaphysic. This isn't dishonest. He's pointing to the relative priority of core presuppositions versus ontological commitment.

    The unbeliever is entitled to be noncommittal if he is, indeed, truly noncommittal, and has good reason to be a minimalist.

    But how does an *externalist* critique verify "good reason"? Same problem, over and over and over...

    But that Witmer is saying throughout this section is that an unbeliever should make opportunistic use of any blocking maneuver or evasive maneuver whether he believes it or not. He is coaching the unbeliever on how to win the debate without winning the argument. How to lose on the merits, but survive intact. It’s pretty revealing that Witmer would resort to such unscrupulous counsel.

    How to keep ones wits about the debate -- that jettison of one's faculties, morality, etc., is not the end result of "losing". At best, someone can defend themselves adequately from an IDNA, and deflect the criticism of internal incoherence by demonstration.

    At worst, someone can be shown by IDNA that some of their presuppositions conflict with their explanations -- what should "give"? The fundamentals? No. The explanations.

    Use any old argument, good or bad, just to get the presuppositionalist off your back! The convenience, and not the cogence, of the argument is all that matters.

    It can sound that way, but remember that he is indeed referring to a debate strategy, and he calls it such. On the other hand, he points out the flaws in the arguments of PS (which you addressed in the beginning), and gives advice on responding along substantive lines throughout the talk.

    On another subject, Danny also refers us to an article by Nino Cocchiarella on “Logic & Ontology.”

    I have been looking around for a few months for an online, free resource that I could reference to try to describe how logic/morality/etc. can be incorporated into physicalism. This was the best I've yet found. Prof. Witmer recommended some books I put on reserve at the library, but they're not due back until 12/4.

    i) Does Danny subscribe to Cocchiarella’s solution? Of is this just one of those blocking maneuvers recommended by Witmer to silence the presuppositionalist if you can’t answer him?

    I find both his forms of conceptual realism (intensional/natural) completely consistent with physicalism as an ontology. As I was reading them (sections 6 and 7, respectively), I found he had put into words what I tried to describe long ago on this blog, when you brought up "pure" conceptualism, in which these abstractions don't exist apart from our minds at all. Therefore, your accusation is refuted by the evidence that I resorted to conceptualism in the past as an explanation of abstract explananda within physicalism.

    ii) Cocchiarella discusses the three standard theories of universals, and opts for a synthetic solution: conceptual realism.

    With two subtle distinctions: conceptual intensional realism, and conceptual natural realism. I am working on a blog post to put up at DC and my own site on this topic.

    I myself also opt for a synthetic solution: theistic conceptual realism. Cocchiarella confronts me with a false dilemma, for I favor an option which isn’t even on the list. Therefore, Cocchiarella hasn’t boxed me into accepting his solution. And, for reasons I won’t go into at the moment, I don’t accept his solution.

    Steve, the point of my quoting this reference was not to box you into a dilemma, but to extricate myself from the accusation of being in one.

    My purpose was to defend my own presupposition that physicalism is not incompatible with logic. Would you concede that conceptual realism is the solution? Do you admit that there is nothing absurd or incoherent in holding to physicalism and to one of Cocchiarella's forumulations for the explanandum of logic?

    Presuppositionalism claims that all alternative worldviews are inherently and intrinsically self-defeating. Can you show this for someone who subscribes to physicalism and to conceptual intensional realism?

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  9. Paul Manata said above:

    "Why, Danny? He can't put forth a positive worldview for himself? All that is is a sophistic stall tactic."

    That is HILARIOUS coming from you...been waiting a LONG time for your positive worldview argument, as opposed to your 'closing the mouths' of skeptics presup tactics.

    Awesome...

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  10. This post suffers from a refusal to admit that Christians should have to argue for their position rather than just attack others. This is not inherent to presuppositional methods. If you show atheism is incoherent, you have an argument for theism. If you show that rejecting the Trinity leads to contradictions, you have an argument for that doctrine. But finding a problem with one non-Christian religion or one particular atheist's view fo logic isn't an argument for anything.

    That's why the atheistic platonism is a legitimate tactic: if the debate is on the existence of God, then as long as there's a non-theistic account of logic, the existence of logic provides no argument for God.

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  11. Hey anonymous, you'll notice that in my debate with Barker I did so, in my debate with Sansone I did so, in myriad posts here I've done so. In fact, I have to believe you're just playing dumb. Everyone knows my positive worldview (at least some key features of it). What, all this time did you think I was a materialist? Oh, you must have thought that maybe I was a muslim, or a buddhist? So, you do know my positive worldview, don't you?

    Furthermore, I've indicated that I'm a realist (specifically theistic conceptualism realism). I've indicated my ethical position numerous times. I've indicated my eschatology, my theory of origins, my theory of redemption, anthropology, etc., etc., etc.

    So, it turns out that you must be frustrated because no one has *successfuly attacked* my worldview. For someone to say that I've not given my positive worldview they must have their head up their you know what.

    On top of that, I've put forth two "books" which set forth my view (in many areas):

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/07/philosophy-of-christian-religion.html

    and here:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/08/weapons-of-our-warfare.html

    Furthermore, I said that all danny had to do is tell me his view on things. I'm studied enough to do the refuting myself. So, you should know my positive view of things, and so as it turns out, I've been waiting a LONG TIME for someone to refute it!

    Gregfl, hill billy atheist, neil, or whatever teenage atheist you are, you need to do better than this.


    Hallq continues to suffer from ignorance.

    It could be that both theism and platonism are *sufficient* for logic, and, say, physicalism does not allow for it. So, if you're a physicalist atheist then you're out. Go sit in the stands. Let the platonist step up and see if he can provide a worldview. Hint: there's more to a worldview than: "logic." Logic is *contentless.* Even if you had logic that wouldn't do squat for you. You still need to provide the material for the premises, and that hinges on your epistemology. Furthermore, you need a mind that can come in to contact with unchanging laws of logic. So you need a theory of man and his mind. We' re debating *worldviews* and not some *piecemeal* facet of your worldview.

    Anyway, Steve *specifically said* that theists have a burden of proof. So, do you have reading comprehension problems?

    And, if the theist should argue for *their position* then should you? So, if platonism isn't *your* position then you're not arguing for *your* position and if you don't have to then why does the theist.

    I'd train a bit more before you go on the Narrow Mind next week. Seriously, I'm trying to give you helpful advice.

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  12. Paul,

    The title of Prof. Witmer's Ph.D. dissertation can be found here:
    Demanding Physicalism. (Scroll down to 1997)

    He wrote this at what is typically regarded as the #1 philosophy dept in the US, so far as I can tell -- Rutgers. He has since written numerous papers on physicalism, see a sampling here.

    Take a wild guess as to whether or not he could lay out a positive argument for physicalism...

    Take another wild guess as to whether or not he will have logical difficulties on Gene's show...

    I'll let the professor's work and words speak for themselves.

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  13. Good Danny, then he won't be "sticking to the negative argument" because if he does, he'll be sorely mistaken. And, yes, I'm aware of his paper trail and so he can't chump out with the tactic he's taught many of you guys.

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  14. Paul,

    If there is to be a "chump" on Gene's show, I'll publicly wager with you about who it will, and will not, be.

    Guess where I'd put my money?

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  15. Hey Daniel, it is nice to see how you are trying to dictate how the conversation is going to go...but this is not your conversation my friend. If you'd like to call, you are more then welcome, but when 9am PDT his, it will be a question between A and B...you know the rest.

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  16. This...
    but when 9am PDT his, it will
    be a question between A and B...you know the rest.


    should have read "but when 9am PDT hits, it will be a conversation between A and B...you know the rest."

    ReplyDelete