Daniel Morgan said:
DM [Daniel Morgan]: 1) I'm confused as to how there is "secular vs Christian" warrant. Perhaps I misunderstand your position Steve, but you seem to imply that certain levels of proof/evidence/support are necessary in one worldview, and different in another, with special pleading.
SH [Steve Hays]: I’m not distinguishing between different kinds of warrant, as if an atheist has a burden of proof to discharge, but a Christian does not, or as though the Christian has a lower burden of proof to discharge. Each side has its own burden of proof.
My immediate point is that you put forward a circular argument for your own position.
DM: If X is necessary for Y, and Y is a normative ethic, then X is subsumed as a part/component of Y. Thus X becomes a necessary means to the ethical end.
SH: The problem is not with the validity of your reasoning, but with the veracity of your premise.
Your argument was predicated on noble values/virtues. What you did was to posit noble values/virtues as second-order values, then argue since these second-order values could not exist absent the first-order value of survival, that the second-order values validated the first-order value.
But one problem with this line of argument is that you failed to validate the operating premise: are there second-order values?
What is your secular argument for the existence of these higher virtues?
As it stands, you left your operating premise dangling in thin air.
DM: In considering your position, this would be akin to God's command to "keep the Sabbath" -- the means of which are not working, but on any other day of the week, not working is not an ethical imperative. Context and necessity exist within your ethical framework and I see little value in labeling "secular vs Christian".
SH: Okay, but to play along with your parallel, a Christian apologist would need to establish the value of Sabbath-keeping for the end to justify the means.
DM: 2) Survival of existing life cannot be equivocated as an "obligation" to reproduction or nonentities.
SH: Fine, but that admission undercuts another leg of your argument.
No, the survival of the present generation doesn’t depend on the existence of a future generation. But the survival of the species does depend on reproduction.
You tried to validate the value of survival by positing second-order values, and then contend that, absent survival, there would be no agents to exemplify these values.
Yet the force of that argument assumes an obligation to reproduce in order to have agents that exemplify these second-order values.
But in what sense do we have an obligation to nonentities? Given the existence of moral agents, said moral agents enjoy mutual obligations, including the exemplification of second-order values.
But absent their existence, nonexistent agents have no obligations, and we, as existing agents, have no obligation to nonexistent agents.
So I don’t see how you can’t bootstrap the first-order value of survival from your second-order values.
Your second-order values are not free-floating obligations which compel the existence of property-bearers. Rather, they only kick in given the existence of a suitable property-bearer.
DM: 3) THis is a very good question. I have been reading a little bit on social contracts, and it appears to me that any tenable ethos is set up such that individual rights and freedoms are established as a foundation upon which societies and social contracts are framed. In this sense, we a priori rule against the infringement of basic rights (life, liberty, property), unless the person forfeits their claim to the protection of the contract by breaking its terms (breaking a law).
SH: And what’s your secular justification for social contractualism?
DM: Now, we can get bogged down in particulars about questions of "eminent domain" or the trolley car problem. In cases where we have no choice but to lose life, or lose property, and the question is "how much, and how many", then I suppose one word is key -- minimal.
SM: That doesn’t harmonize self-interest over altruism.
The trolley care problem doesn’t pose a choice between my survival and the survival of the many.
Rather, it poses a choice between the survival of the few (if I don’t intervene, and thereby let them die), and the survival of the many (if, in effect, I kill a lesser number to save a greater number).
The question I’m posing for secular ethics is different. Let’s say I’m an atheist. Let’s say I’m put in a position where I must choose between either saving my own life, or sacrificing my life to spare many others from destruction.
How should a secularist choose?
There is only one of me, and while I’m expendable in the great scheme of things, I’m not expendable to myself.
Am I, as an atheist, under some obligation to forfeit my life for the common good?
Why can’t I just be a selfish SOB? It’s not as if a godless universe is going to reward me for my altruism.
DM: Do you want me to reinvent the wheel of utilitarian thinking? I can't.
SH: No, you don’t have to reinvent utilitarianism. But your challenge is twofold:
i) How do you derive utilitarian ethics from evolutionary ethics?
ii) How do you derive egalitarianism from utilitarianism?
DM: In cases where an individual may die in order to save many others, we would have to get specific. Does the individual have a choice? What is the dilemma? Whose responsibility is it for getting into the dilemma? If you want me to answer these questions, it would probably be futile for me to generalize, as I attempted to do above. Let's get down to the "nitty gritty"
SH: At this stage of the argument, I don’t see that we need to get specific. Is there any case in which, from a secular standpoint, I should put altruism ahead of self-interest? Collective survival above (my) personal survival?
Is there ever such an obligation in secular ethics? If so, why?
On a side note, readers should observe, in the recent exchanges with Danny, that it’s quite possible for a believer and an unbeliever to have a civil exchange of views.
Cross-posted this at my site, for anyone who would rather comment there, for whatever reason.
ReplyDelete1) Your argument was predicated on noble values/virtues. What you did was to posit noble values/virtues as second-order values, then argue since these second-order values could not exist absent the first-order value of survival, that the second-order values validated the first-order value.
But one problem with this line of argument is that you failed to validate the operating premise: are there second-order values?
I did misunderstand what you were asking before.
Do we agree that as humans we have many basic needs and desires? This seems self-evident. I would argue that because we cannot fulfill all of our needs and desires simultaneously, or equally, that we must arrange our needs and desires into priorities, or order them, and thus we develop values. It seems an unavoidable part of being human to have "first-order, second-order, etc., etc.," values.
In the same way that the Christian says that her own first-order value is serving God, and then in serving the needs of the state (eg a conscientious objector), I am simply saying that if you want to flip virtue/character/goodness around from being a first principle to being an extension of survival (which seems quite unassailable in its logic, when one lives within a society), thus survival becomes an inextricable part of virtue/character/goodness -- you do what is good in order to survive. You don't rape, pillage, and steal because you recognize that you are less likely to be successful, and to pass on your genes, if you live in such a chaotic society, or if you are ostracized from it, or punished within it.
I'm not very articulate here, but I hope this makes sense of my position.
2) What is your secular argument for the existence of these higher virtues?
Are you asking me how I define them? In the same way Marcus Aurelius did, and many others before and after him.
Are you asking me why they exist? They exist as a part of the spectrum of human behavior. Humans can act in many ways, and acting virtuously is one way humans are capable of acting.
Are you asking me why I should act virtuously?
Because we are in a prisoner's dilemma situation -- we all must work together in a societal structure, or we may as well have a "free-for-all" morally and otherwise. Assuming we will work together (which history has shown works 95% of the time), then exercising virtuous character contributes to the stability of society, and society, just like virtues, becomes a means to an end -- success in health, wealth, and reproduction.
3) SH: Okay, but to play along with your parallel, a Christian apologist would need to establish the value of Sabbath-keeping for the end to justify the means.
If we do not care to survive, then ethics are futile. Why do we care what is "good" for us, if we don't care if we live or die? If we don't use our own life, and if we don't value our own life, and the lives of others, in determining what we ought to do generally, then I would argue that ethics are absurd. We have to start with some primary value around which we frame our ethics. Yours is "what [you think] God said/does/wants".
4) No, the survival of the present generation doesn’t depend on the existence of a future generation. But the survival of the species does depend on reproduction.
Yes, but consider that overpopulation leads to starvation. Consider that there are "premium times" to harvest, and the same applies to having babies -- certain environmental and societal conditions that are more conducive to raising children, and thus we are considering our survival as a species in choosing when and how to have children -- so that they will be most healthy and likely to survive.
5) Yet the force of that argument assumes an obligation to reproduce in order to have agents that exemplify these second-order values.
It is indeed necessary to reproduce, but not necessary to reproduce at all times, since giving birth does not always guarantee the collective survival of the species, and at times may endanger it (overpopulation). Thus, we can choose when and how, in order that the second generation is able to exemplify those values as well (maximally so).
6) But in what sense do we have an obligation to nonentities? Given the existence of moral agents, said moral agents enjoy mutual obligations, including the exemplification of second-order values.
Right.
7) But absent their existence, nonexistent agents have no obligations, and we, as existing agents, have no obligation to nonexistent agents.
One of our obligations is to ensure the survival of our collective species, another to the survival of our society (which is a means to the first), and that the virtues and values we hold dear don't die with us (which we hold, again, virtue to be a means to survival, and survival as our primary value).
8) Your second-order values are not free-floating obligations which compel the existence of property-bearers. Rather, they only kick in given the existence of a suitable property-bearer.
I don't disagree. I am not sure what the real issue here is, to be honest, Steve. Of course it is somewhat tautological, but not all tautologies are invalid. Consider "it is good that humans survive, and ethical behavior is a means to further that survival" and "goodness is itself defined by virtues, when we discover, through learning, what the virtues are, and we extol them, we ought to do what is good; then survival is necessary to extol the virtues and practice them, and pass them on to the next generation".
It is absurd to assume that either survival or virtues or society (the two latter as means to the former) are not already forgone conclusions. We exist. Our species exists. Our species is capable of both virtuous and unvirtuous behavior. We have learned what these mean, within the context of how they promote the welfare of the species, and seen them both played out in history many times over in civilizations.
The question is not whether property-bearers exist, for they already do, but how these property-bearers should act, what they should value. If they do not value their own survival, then ethics is itself undermined -- how can we determine the goodness or rightness of an action if we do not care whether it brings about
I am not sure what the categorical difference here is, or why you think it invalid to use our survival as a primary value, and ethics as a means to further it. Do we disagree that ethical behavior in society leads to the most healthy and successful society, which in turn gives rise to the most healthy and successful progeny?
9) SH: And what’s your secular justification for social contractualism?
Humans either go it alone or form societies. If they go it alone, they are much less likely to survive, or to live healthy, than if they form societies. Social contracts are one valid way to establish societies in which everyone agrees (a sort of prisoner's dilemma) to hold to ethical precepts to ensure the success of the society, and by proxy, the individual.
10) SM: That doesn’t harmonize self-interest over altruism.
It does. Consider two things:
i) you are more likely to be on the receiving end and receive benefits from living in a society that agrees to put the "many" above the "few" at any given time, by virtue of statistics. Thus, it certainly is in your self-interest to pledge in to such a society, and pledging to it is necessary to maintain its function, that if you should need to sacrifice yourself for the good of the many, you will.
ii) We have to look at self-interest from the perspective of every individual in the society. If you are X, and the question is how many X's must die, then you certainly view as "self-interest" what appears to Y as "altruism". Obviously, we consider it "unselfish" to sacrifice our lives for many other lives, should such a dilemma arise, but from the perspective of the utilitarian, it is acting in the interest of our own society/species/kin, which retains selfish motive -- we want to further their survival because they are us: our children, cousins, whatever. Even other animals shown kin altruism (which makes it significantly less altruistic).
What is interesting is how humans show "clan altruism" and, historically, are very selfish when it comes to "non-clan" humans. This is esp true of the Hebraic peoples, but no more so than any other race or tribe.
11) The trolley care problem doesn’t pose a choice between my survival and the survival of the many.
In the formulations I have seen, it wouldn't alter the problem's significance to put you aboard the trolley, and the switch aboard the trolley as well.
12) The question I’m posing for secular ethics is different. Let’s say I’m an atheist. Let’s say I’m put in a position where I must choose between either saving my own life, or sacrificing my life to spare many others from destruction.
How should a secularist choose?
I just went through that a bit above with kin altruism, but this could also be formulated within the context of viewing your action's morality by its consequences: consider that if you do NOT do X, you are, effectively, killing many people, while if you DO X, you are killing only one. Part of our morality is to minimize the loss of life, so the ethical choice here is clear.
Consider a social contract as well -- that while a priori the society cannot take a life (unnecessarily -- considering the trolley problem and other sorts of dilemmas), an inbuilt clause and understanding is that the success and stability of the survival promotes the greater good -- as it promotes the survival of the many -- and thus if one can choose to take their own life in order to contribute to this society's stability, they ought to do so. Obviously, this ethical onus would be followed only by those persons acting responsibly for the greater good. There is no guarantee that our inbuilt survival instinct could be overcome by all persons at all times, but the ethical choice remains clear.
13) There is only one of me, and while I’m expendable in the great scheme of things, I’m not expendable to myself.
Am I, as an atheist, under some obligation to forfeit my life for the common good?
With arguably more "obligation" than you're under as a Christian -- if I command an ant to obey me and it doesn't, does it render me any harm? In the same way, if your God is not obeyed by humans, is it weakened or lessened by it? No. Conversely, if we do not choose to put the greater good (maximum survival) above our own, when the time calls for it, we are clearly and obviously hurting/harming others. Now, whether or not that matters to you is another question.
As with Christianity, ethics are a choice you make, whether to be selfish and thus cause harm (or death) to many, which is immoral, or to act unselfishly and thus alleviate harm and promote survival to many, which is moral.
14) Why can’t I just be a selfish SOB? It’s not as if a godless universe is going to reward me for my altruism.
You can be selfish. You will get no reward for not being so. However, your fellow kin, society, and the species in general will. That is what makes it an "ought" situation.
Ah, but you see, this is where the atheist's ethics are so much different than the Christian's -- we choose to do the right thing only because it is the right thing, not expecting a cosmic reward or fearing a cosmic punishment. If you choose not to cause the death of many by allowing your own life to be extinguished, and the atheist knows that this is all they have (no afterlife), how much greater a sacrifice is this than dying for only three measly days (and knowing this beforehand), before being raised to life eternal? Who couldn't take that kind of "fall" for others
15) SH: No, you don’t have to reinvent utilitarianism. But your challenge is twofold:
i) How do you derive utilitarian ethics from evolutionary ethics?
This is a point that needs clarification. Why is it that the process by which humans arose determines how they ought to act? Why is it that "evolutionary ethics" even relevant, if someone starts with survival as a primary value, without saying "evolution dictates that we must survive"? Imagine, if you must, that this person is a theist, but not a Christian, and says, "God dictates that we must survive" if you can't get past something undermining the primacy of survival.
16) ii) How do you derive egalitarianism from utilitarianism?
It is not a derived function, it is taken as an a priori commitment -- to the survival of our species, irrespective of race, IQ, gender, ethnicity, religion, age, etc. Since we are using human life as a primary value, there is no way to logically or rationally devalue some lives and add value to others. [and no, embryos, zygotes and fetuses are not elevated in value to the status of human beings -- they are potential human beings, but let's lay aside the issue of abortion as to not chase after red herrings]
17) SH: At this stage of the argument, I don’t see that we need to get specific. Is there any case in which, from a secular standpoint, I should put altruism ahead of self-interest? Collective survival above (my) personal survival?
In the outline above, self-interest demands that you agree to utilitarianism, because more often than not, your own life is furthered by the collective good, and thus statistically speaking, you agree to the potential need for self-sacrifice, as in the trolley car dilemma, ironically out of self-interest. Consider that statistically speaking, it is much more likely for you to be a part of the "many" the the "one/few" when it comes to dilemmas in which there is no way to avoid casualties. You sign in to the agreement/contract out of self-interest, and agree that just as you will more likely receive benefit from it the majority of the time, there is a potentiality for altruism.
18) Is there ever such an obligation in secular ethics? If so, why?
Hopefully I've made it clear by now.
19) On a side note, readers should observe, in the recent exchanges with Danny, that it’s quite possible for a believer and an unbeliever to have a civil exchange of views.
And I hope to see it continue. Both ways.