Slicing baloney

Freewill theists typically contend that there's a crucial moral difference between God's involvement in evil vis-a-vis Reformed providence and his involvement in evil vis-a-vis Arminian providence or Molinist providence. All I'd say is that you have to slice the baloney pretty thin to draw a difference:

But in the theological sense divine concurrence is God’s active causal activity in producing everything that occurs. God does not simply let secondary causes in the world produce their effects. On the contrary, according to the doctrine of concurrence, unless God causally produces events in the world, the secondary causes would not produce their effects.  

If He fails to produce the effects, the secondary causes alone will not suffice to produce those effects. So you can see that divine concurrence, far from being passive acquiescence, involves active causation. 

Since concurrence involves God’s causal activity in producing the effects of sinful creaturely free choices, we do have the uncomfortable consequence that God causes, for example, the murderer’s knife to cut open the body of his victim. But I’m inclined to agree with Molina that since God does not will that the murderer do such a thing, He is not morally responsible for the action. William Lane Craig, "Divine Concurrence." 

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/divine-concurrence 

Yes, God in His providence upholds the molecular structure of the murderer’s bullet as it leaves the gun and takes the victim’s life. 

To be sure, a person cannot carry out sinful intentions without Him. One cannot sin independently of God. As Thomas Oden has said, “One cannot even sin without providence.”29 Were it not for God’s providential upholding of one’s physical being, he or she could not pull the trigger to kill, could not utter blasphemy or a lie, could not look on the pornographer’s non-art. Robert E. Picirilli, "Toward a Non-Deterministic Theory of Divine Providence. 

http://baptistcenter.net/journals/JBTM_11-1_Spring_2014.pdf#page=41

Denny Burke on American Sniper

http://www.dennyburk.com/a-few-thoughts-about-american-sniper/#more-29694

Purgatory and evolution

To my knowledge, most contemporary Catholic intellectuals embrace theistic evolution. This goes all the way to the top, beginning with Pius XII. 

Now, physicalism is a common corollary for human evolution. What makes modern man smarter than early man, or other higher animals, is the fact that we have bigger, more complex brains. There's a direct correlation between intelligence and brainpower. The seat of human intelligence is not some incorporeal soul. Rather, it's the end-result of encephalization over the course of human evolution.

But here's the rub: Purgatory is a version of the intermediate state. The intermediate state presupposes a robust version of dualism. The postmortem survival of the soul (i.e. consciousness, personality, memories). 

If, however, physicalism is true, then that falsifies Purgatory. Brain death extinguishes consciousness. There is no immortal, immaterial soul to experience Purgatory. There may be a future resurrection, but nothing in-between. 

Contemporary Catholic philosophers and theologians labor to update and "reinterpret" traditional dogma in light of what they deem to be historical and scientific challenges to traditional dogma. But it's hard to see how they can graft physicalism onto Purgatory.

I suppose they could try to argue for dualism despite their commitment to theistic evolution. But on the face of it, that's ad hoc.

Lost knowledge

I'm going to comment on two related phenomena. 

i) Many OT numbers seem peculiar to modern readers. There are scholarly explanations for these numbers. Some are plausible. In a few cases, these may be transcriptional errors, but that doesn't explain everything. 

Yet I'd like to make a general point: even though these numbers seem peculiar to modern readers, presumably they didn't seem peculiar to the narrator or his intended audience. 

Authors normally write to be understood. The numbers made sense to the intended audience. 

If, therefore, they seem "wrong" to a modern reader, that's not because they are wrong, but because we must be missing something which the first readers implicitly understood. 

ii) Likewise, modern scholars find it challenging to harmonize the genealogies of Christ in Matthew and Luke. However, whatever else we may say about that, presumably the genealogies made sense to Matthew, Luke, and their intended audience. 

To my knowledge, there was never a Matthean faction in the church, over against a Lukan faction. There were never rival Matthean and Lukan churches. The ancient church, from earliest times, always acknowledged both Gospels. Both Gospels were accepted as authentic accounts.

Given all the schisms in the ancient church, if there had been disagreement, we'd expect that to leave traces in the historical record. 

So even though a modern reader finds the relationship between their respective genealogies puzzling, that doesn't mean one or both are wrong. Rather, that means we are missing something that was clear to Matthew, Luke, and the intended audience. A bit of inside knowledge that was lost over time. 

Surely comparisons were made very soon. Quite likely within the lifetimes of Matthew and Luke. The NT church was a pretty close-knit community. They shared the same books. 

It's like having elderly relatives. Sometimes, after they die, you think of questions you wish you had asked them when they were still alive. It's too late. They knowledge they had, which fills in the lacuna, is gone unless that's passed on. As a result, we're sometimes left with puzzles about family history which would be easily resolved if a member of that generation was available to ask. 

Moral opinions

Some atheists believe in right and wrong. That, however, doesn't prevent disagreement over what is right or wrong. Take lifeboat ethics. Is it morally permissible to kill a passenger to up your own chances of survival? The food and water will last twice as long with half the passengers.

Suppose two atheists both believe in right and wrong, but disagree on whether it's permissible to kill another human being in that situation. Both have a moral opinion. But they have conflicting moral opinions.

Here's the rub: given atheism, it's hard to see how a moral opinion is anything more than mere opinion. 

Take a comparison: suppose there's a disagreement about the best way to treat a cancer patient. The oncologist recommends conventional cancer therapy (or perhaps an experimental treatment) while a "naturopathic physician" recommence alternative medicine. So you have conflicting opinions.

There is, however, something more than conflicting opinions. In principle, there's evidence that one treatment is more effective than another. Some treatments have a higher success rate than others. There are, of course, complications about the sample group, but it's not just a matter of opinion. There's something above and beyond conflicting opinions to underlie or undercut respective medical opinions.  

In secular ethics, by contrast, there's really nothing over and above human opinion itself. You have two conflicting human opinions about what is right or wrong. But there's nothing beyond that. It's just your opinion. There's nothing additional to back it up.

There are objective circumstances and consequences, but both sides can agree on that. The point of contention is what is the right thing to do in that situation, and in secular ethics, it's just one human opinion over against another human opinion. In that case, what makes one opinion correct and the other incorrect? If all we have are human opinions about right and wrong, what makes one moral opinion true and another moral opinion false? In virtue of what is your moral opinion better than mine? Not correspondence to the "facts" of the case, for we may agree on the facts. But what makes your moral opinion a fact? 

In the choice between “catholicity” and “correctness”, “correctness” should win every time

The topic of Biblicism is being raised again, in a way that is not helpful.

For example, citing this article, I think (the provided link simply went to a TGC page), Mark Jones has made this statement on Reformation21:

Theology, thankfully, has never been done in terms of "pure biblicism." When it has, the consequences have always been deleterious. "Pure biblicism" is a Socinian way of theologizing, historically speaking. And biblicism can lead someone to hell.

And Ryan McGraw writing at The Aquila Report makes this statement:

Frame unashamedly notes that he includes less historical theology than other comparable works because he wants to be biblical. While this sounds appealing to many Christians, it is impossible to do theology in a historical vacuum… Ignoring historical theology as a conversation partner in the name of producing a theology that is more biblical gives readers a false impression and threatens to confuse Frame’s innovations with a bare reading of Scripture.

A third writer picks up McGraw's argument and takes it further:

Of all of Frame’s bizarre constructions, the one which seems to have gained favor among the confessional-revisionists of our circles is his claim to adopt an approach that is “something close to biblicism.” This sounds quite admirably sola-scripturish, but ultimately it amounts to readily discarding the confessional formulations of the church anytime that the Christian, alone with his Bible, arrives at a personal interpretation distinct from confessional orthodoxy.

First of all, no “Biblicist” that I am aware of advocates “readily discarding the confessional formulations of the church anytime … [a Christian] … arrives at a personal interpretation distinct from confessional orthodoxy”. This is just simply a mischaracterization of what is being said.

Second, Jones shows, in making the statement that I cited above, that he has failed to read the original article he cited with any discernment:

"The Biblical Cosmos"

The most helpful fundamental question raised concerns whether I am over-confident in thinking I know what ancient Israelites thought about the physical structure of the cosmos. This is a tricky issue. It is the case that there is a lot that we cannot be sure about regarding ancient biblical cosmologies. All we have are the texts that we have and we cannot be sure that they represented the views of everyone. Furthermore, we cannot always decipher the meanings of some of the texts, which can be infuriatingly obscure. Other texts are poetic and it is somewhat unclear how literally to take the imagery. (A point Peter makes well.) It is quite likely, given the historical and cultural gap between the Bible and now, that here and there in the book I have over-interpreted this or that image. Nevertheless, I don't think that things are so unclear that we must simply fall back into a global agnosticism about biblical cosmology. I still think that the overall shape of the world-view is clear enough and is as set forth in the book. I tried to detail the case for it (and my case is not simply mine, but that of the majority of OT scholars, so if I err on this score then so does most everyone else). 

http://theologicalscribbles.blogspot.com/2015/01/a-quick-response-to-peter-leitharts.html

Several problems:

i) We have more than texts. Modern readers share the same basic physical world as ancient readers. Of course, the constituency for Parry's book is usually urbanites whose experience of the world is mediated by layers of modern technology. Therefore, it takes some effort on the part of a modern reader to imagine human life in more direct communion with nature in the raw. Mind you, even now it's not that hard to put modern civilization behind you. Just drive to a national park. Go hiking in the wilderness. It's a question of how much civilization you wish to take along with you or leave behind. 

ii) This applies, mutatis mutandis, to the scholars in whom Parry abodes so much faith. But although they interact with ancient texts, they have little occasion to interact with the kind of world in which the texts were produced. They are out of touch with that experience. The fact that Parry takes comfort in the analysis of Peter Enns doesn't inspired confidence. 

iii) The extent that "the majority of OT scholars" agree with his interpretation overlooks the fact that the scholars in question don't believe the OT is true. Indeed, most of them don't believe the OT could be true. Because they are emancipated from concerns about the authority of Scripture, they feel free to indulge in interpretations which, in their opinion, contradict known facts about the world. They don't feel responsible for upholding the veracity of Scripture. Indeed, they presume that Scripture is often wrong. They operate with a secular outlook. 

As, however, an "evangelical universalist" (cough, cough), Parry needs the authority of Scripture to leverage his optimistic eschatology. 

More About the First Century Gospel of Mark Fragment

Tim Henderson at https://earliestchristianity.wordpress.com/ has provided this article which seems to have more information about that elusive “First Century Fragment from the Gospel of Mark” that we’ve been hearing about.

Not long ago, James White and several others had commented on a brief video by Craig Evans, a professor of New Testament studies at Acadia Divinity College in Wolfville, Nova Scotia. That video seemed to have drawn its information from a Josh McDowell video that showed some pretty “unprofessional” handling of these new manuscripts.

Now another publication, again relying on a more in-depth interview with Evans, seems to have some more detailed information about how these manuscripts were obtained:

A text that may be the oldest copy of a gospel known to exist — a fragment of the Gospel of Mark that was written during the first century, before the year 90 — is set to be published.

At present, the oldest surviving copies of the gospel texts date to the second century (the years 101 to 200).

This first-century gospel fragment was written on a sheet of papyrus that was later reused to create a mask that was worn by a mummy. Although the mummies of Egyptian pharaohs wore masks made of gold, ordinary people had to settle for masks made out of papyrus (or linen), paint and glue. Given how expensive papyrus was, people often had to reuse sheets that already had writing on them.

Judaism on the Fall

I will comment on a post by Peter Enns:

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/peterenns/2015/01/something-this-protestant-learned-from-a-jew-about-reading-the-bible-a-story/

i) This conversation took place in the early 1990s. Just because his classmate happens to be Jewish doesn't mean he has the inside track on Gen 3. Somebody who grew up Jewish in the second half of the 20C is far far removed from the culture in which Genesis was given. To say he's Jewish and Gen 3 is Jewish is quite equivocal. 

ii) It's even worse when Enns contrasts the "Jewish" reading of his classmate with St. Paul, as if his Jewish classmate's reading is more authentically Jewish that St. Paul's. 

Enns isn't "hearing Jewish voices talk about their Bible" when he listens to his friend. It's not like his classmate popped out of an ancient Near Eastern time capsule. 

Moreover, Enns is disregarding the Jewish voices of the NT talking about their Bible. 

iii) In addition, there are several NT references or allusions to Gen 3.

a) In addition to Rom 5 and 1 Cor 15, you also have 2 Cor 11:3,14–which implicitly identifies the "snake" as Satan–possibly mediated by Isa 14:12, with its fallen, numinous figure of starlight. 

Rom 16:20 is an allusion to cursing of the snake in Gen 3, which identifies the tempter as Satan.

b) Rev 12:9 & 20:2 identify the snake as Satan.

c) Jn 8:44 alludes to Satan as the tempter in Gen 3. He's the primordial liar and murderer because he dissembles about the death-threat attached to breaking the prohibition. 

d) 1 Jn 3:8 is another allusion to Gen 3, which identifies the tempter as Satan. 

e) In Lk 10:18, Satan's historic defeat at the hands of Jesus is cast in terms of a prehistoric fall from heaven, colored by Isa 14:12. The "war in heaven' motif, where the losers are ousted. 

So the tradition is quite broad-based. 

iv) Is it "just a serpent"? 

a) Keep in mind that Gen 3 was never meant to be understood in isolation to the rest of the Pentateuch. 

b) Although I'm not a Hebraist, it's my understanding that the word can mean "snake," "diviner," and "shining one." 

I expect the narrator chose that designation as a pun or double entendre (even triple entendre) to trigger various associations. 

In the ANE, snakes weren't "just snakes." They could function as emblems of pagan gods. 

v) It is a talking "snake" because it's a "story"? I assume by that his classmate meant it was a fictional story or fable. But is that how the original audience would view the story? Or is that a rationalistic and anachronistic reading of a modern Jewish student at Harvard Divinity School? 

vi) We also need to take into account Pentateuchal angelology, as well as traces of Pentateuchal demonology. These are necessary background elements. 

Jewish theology doesn’t depend on Augustine (or Paul), and so they read the story differently. Rather than being born in sin because of something Adam did, humanity has an “evil inclination,” meaning humans are, for whatever reason, prone to disobey God.
That’s why Adam and Eve disobeyed God in the first place (before there was a “fall”)

But that's not why they disobey God in the first place.  That's not "in" the story. There's no indication that, left to their own devices, they were inclined to disobey God.

That's why an external agent is needed to provide the stimulus. The fatal temptation comes from the outside, not the inside. Not because Adam and Eve were naturally prone to sin, but because they were incited to sin by a malevolent trickster. That's what's actually "in" the story.

Incitement to violence

Ethical guidance for Arminian theologian Roger Olson:

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2015/01/terrorism-is-wrong-so-is-ridiculing-peoples-faiths/

Roger Olson Mod Tim Reisdorf I am opposed to all "blasphemy laws." However, I support laws that criminalize incitement of violence.

Olson's position is naive and circular. If Muslims wax indignant and go on a rampage, that's proof that the offender incited them to violence. It's an airtight rationalization. If I react violently to something you said, then, by definition, that's the effect of what you said. A Muslim can always excuse murderous rioting on the grounds that "blasphemous" expressions provoked him to commit bloodshed. His very violence is retroactive evidence that the offending statement constitutes incitement to violence. Murderous frenzy becomes self-justifying. 

Roger Olson Mod Tim Reisdorf Tim, Nobody that I know is criticizing people who mock and ridicule terrorists. The criticism is rightly aimed at those who target an entire religious tradition even if it does contain among its adherents extremists worthy of mocking and ridicule. Can you see the difference (I hope)?

These aren't generic, vanilla-gray terrorists. These are Muslim terrorists. And they aren't terrorists who just so happen to be Muslim, as if that's incidental to their outlook and conduct. 

Moreover, they aren't just "extremists." 

Olson takes the typical Leftist elitist position. 

Whatever you ask in my name

Therefore I tell you, whatever you ask in prayer, believe that you have received it, and it will be yours (Mk 11:24).

The Gospels contain several sweeping promises like this. Liberals don't think Jesus spoke most of the words attributed to him in the Gospels. Rather, they think anonymous authors, writing about two generations later, who had no personal or reliable knowledge of the historical Jesus, inventing sayings which they put on Jesus' lips. They think the Gospels reflect the viewpoint of the church, not the viewpoint of Jesus. Reflect the outlook of the time when they were written rather than the outlook of Jesus' time. Essentially, the Gospels are a vehicle to backdate later developments.

Let's play along with that contention for the sake of argument. Why would a writer invent these sweeping promises? In his own experience, and the experience of his fellow Christians, God didn't always grant their prayer requests. Indeed, one must ask if God usually grants prayer requests. So promises like this don't reflect the experience of "the church." Indeed, they generate a tension between the prima facie scope of the promise and the disappointing reality, which falls far short. 

So why would Gospel narrators put these words in Jesus' mouth? It doesn't fit the theory of their late composition. 

American Sniper

http://godawa.com/movieblog/american-sniper-mature-patriotism-cynical-america/

Pope Francis vs Cardinal Burke on “Manhood”

A couple of days ago, Steve posted a link to this interview with Cardinal Burke:

"The Catholic man crisis":

I think there has been a great confusion with regard to the specific vocation of men in marriage and of men in general in the Church during the past 50 years or so. It’s due to a number of factors, but the radical feminism which has assaulted the Church and society since the 1960s has left men very marginalized.

Unfortunately, the radical feminist movement strongly influenced the Church, leading the Church to constantly address women’s issues at the expense of addressing critical issues important to men; the importance of the father, whether in the union of marriage or not; the importance of a father to children; the importance of fatherhood for priests; the critical impact of a manly character; the emphasis on the particular gifts that God gives to men for the good of the whole society.

The goodness and importance of men became very obscured, and for all practical purposes, were not emphasized at all....

Now, check out this all-new headline from "Pope Francis":

Listen to women more, don't be macho, Pope tells men:

MANILA (Reuters) - Pope Francis said on Sunday men should listen to women's ideas more and not be male chauvinists.

The Argentine pope made impromptu remarks during a youth rally at a co-ed Catholic university in the Philippine capital, Manila, after he noted that four of the five people who addressed him on stage were male.

"There is only a small representation of females here, too little," he said, bringing laughter from the crowd.

"Women have much to tell us in today's society. At times we men are too 'machista'," he said, using the Spanish term for male chauvinists.

"(We) don't allow room for women but women are capable of seeing things with a different angle from us, with a different eye. Women are able to pose questions that we men are not able to understand," he said to more applause.

He noted that it was a 12-year-old girl, not any of the four men, who had posed the toughest question, asking why God allowed children to be abandoned..

He ended that part of his impromptu remarks with a joke: "So, when the next pope comes to Manila, let's please have more women among you."

Francis has said that, while the Roman Catholic Church's ban on women priests is definitive, he wants to appoint more nuns and other women to senior positions in the Vatican.

Sifting visions

Alex Malarkey's retraction of his NDE is a good occasion to draw some necessary distinctions.

i) When dealing with very young kids, I think it's important to distinguish between lying and make-believe. I'm not saying very young kids never lie. But for very young kids, the distinction between reality and fantasy is blurry. Indeed, that's one reason why very young kids are generally unreliable witnesses. 

ii) There's a distinction between lying, really seeing something, and seeing something real.

Take a hallucination. If you hallucinate, it's not a lie to say you saw something. You really did see something.

Yet you saw something that isn't real. What you saw was a figment of your imagination. 

Conversely, there are people who blatantly lie about seeing things. That goes to the distinction between deception and self-deception. The liar is a witting deceiver, whereas the hallucinator is self-deluded. 

iii) Apropos (ii), this is one reason we need to distinguish between an experience and the interpretation of an experience. The hallucinator had a genuine experience. But his experience is delusional. What he saw and what he thought he saw are two different things. What he saw was an illusion.

iv) Take a dream. We might say that's all in the dreamer's head. Same thing with a subjective vision. It's a psychological state. There's nothing necessarily happening on the outside that corresponds to that mental state. 

a) Yet, as Christians, we need to be careful with that distinction. The Bible records many revelatory dreams and (subjective) visions. In a sense, it was all in the head of the seer or dreamer. 

But unlike ordinary dreams, this isn't the product of the seer's or dreamer's imagination. Rather, God is using that medium to convey information. The mode is psychological, but the source lies outside the mind of the dreamer or visionary. 

b) In addition, although nothing external may be happening at the time of the dream or vision which corresponds to what the dreamer sees, that mental event may have an extramental referent. Often a future situation. 

v) We need to distinguish between veridical and inverdical claims. Take a premonition.

a) Suppose you have a friend who tells you about an interesting dream he had the night before. A few days later the dream comes true. Suppose you're in a position to independently confirm it. That's a veridical premonition. 

b) Suppose your friend tells you about a dream he had. He describes what he saw in his dream. Then he mentions how it came true. That's inverdical.

In the case of (a), he told you in advance of the fact. That puts an outside observer in a position to test it.

In the case of (b), he told you after the fact. In that event, all you have is his word to go on.

vi) Apropos (v), that doesn't mean inveridical claims are false or inherently dubious. Rather, the credibility of the claim turns on the credibility of the witness.

An inverdical claim is an uncorroborated claim. There's no evidence above and beyond the testimony of the claimant. 

If, however, the witness has a reputation for honesty and sobriety, if there's no reason to think he was lying or mistaken, then it can still be a credible claim.

Indeed, we routinely believe things which trusted friends tell us. I believe some things my father told me about his father. I'm in no position to double check his claim. 

Playing football with NDEs

What are we to make of the Alex Malarkey situation? Unfortunately, he's being used by all sides. 

You have nominally Christian publishers and chain stores that will do anything for a bestseller. 

You have hardline cessationists who, as a matter of principle, don't believe that genuine NDEs or OBEs ever happen–much less bona fide visions of heaven and hell.

That makes Alex a theological football. In addition, he's a marital football in an acrimonious divorce. It's very hard on kids to be caught in the middle of a divorce. To be forced to choose between their mother and their father.

Aggravating that situation is the fact that he's not your average 16-year-old boy. To my knowledge, he's physically dependent on his caregivers. I believe his mother has custody. 

As a result, I doubt he's free to speak his mind. He's too dependent on the adults in his life. Under too much pressure to please a father or mother. 

I think it's unwise for outsiders to get in the middle of a nasty divorce or take sides. We don't know what was said and done behind closed doors. And custody battles are notoriously ugly. Moreover, they can bring out the worst in one or both spouses. One or both spouses may say anything for legal leverage. This isn't a simon pure case of a theological issue.  

It's not so much that I think the publisher should pull the book in light of his public retraction. Rather, I don't think it should have been published in the first place.

As a rule, I don't think young children are reliable witnesses. They are too imaginative, too impressionable, too suggestible, too malleable, too vulnerable to adult pressure. Below a certain age, I think memory is unreliable.

In the nature of the case, the story will be retold by an adult or adults. So it's filtered through them. 

In addition, I assume that his accident resulted in astronomical medical bills. There was a strong financial incentive to peddle a lucrative story. 

This doesn't mean I think children cannot or do not experience NDEs or OBEs. It wouldn't surprise me if angels sometimes appear to dying kids. It wouldn't surprise me if Jesus sometimes appears to dying kids. 

But I must suspend judgment, absent evidence that an outsider can evaluate. I didn't see what the child said he saw. 

There are cases that I think merit respectful attention. There are reported veridical NDEs and OBEs. If well-attested, these establish the reality of the phenomena. 

There are reported NDEs and OBEs by prima facie credible witnesses. Even though they may lack veridical details, if it has already been established that that kind of thing happens, and if it's reported by a credible witness, then I think these are believable. 

You also have people like hospice nurses who are in a position to report things that dying patients say they experience. If there's a pattern, then that's cumulative evidence for the reality of certain deathbed experiences. Of course, that's subject to interpretation. 

From what i've read, Alex is not a credible witness. He was too young when the accident occurred. And, at present, he lacks the personal independence to say what he really thinks, one way or the other.

That doesn't mean we should automatically discount uncanny reports by young children. But to be credible, there needs to be some corroboration. For instance:

Back home, our grandson Knox had been praying regularly for her, and he was two or thereabouts. But that night while praying for her, he stopped, and said, “She died. She is in Heaven.” They found out later that she had in fact died that night. 

http://dougwils.com/the-church/excesses-of-the-wahoo-brethren.html

Outside the Bible, I judge supernatural claims on a case-by-case basis. It ranges a long a continuum. Some are incredible. Some are dubious. Some are plausible. Some are convincing. And in some cases I withhold judgment. 

Gov't of the ruling class, by the ruling class, for the ruling class

I'm going to repost some comments I left at Denny Burk's blog on the firing of the Christian fire chief in Atlanta:

steve hays January 9, 2015 at 10:25 pm #

In the pecking order of minority rights, white LGBT rights outrank black civil rights.

steve hays January 10, 2015 at 1:15 pm #

I’m aware of that, James. Doesn’t change the fact that when push came to shove, the feelings of offended LGBTs, including white LGBTs, trumped the rights of a black fire chief.

Keep in mind that black liberals conform their views to the white liberal establishment. Take Jesse Jackson, who used to be prolife, but renounced that as the price for upward mobility in the Democrat party.

steve hays January 11, 2015 at 12:57 pm #

It’s a tendentious redefinition of consent to imagine that handing out free literature “without the consent” of the recipient is nonconsensual. They don’t even have to read the book. Offering free literature which hasn’t been requested hardly violates the recipient’s autonomy.

steve hays January 11, 2015 at 11:12 pm #

What if “the law” in question (a local regulation) represents an unconstitutional infringement on the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment?

steve hays January 12, 2015 at 12:47 pm #

Do you have any evidence that he was “favoring” Christian employees?

There are tradeoffs in a free society. Liberals used to be champions of the First Amendment–like the late Anthony Lewis of the NYT.

Now people like you think citizens need to be bubble-wrapped to protect them from perceived “microaggressions.”

Originally, the Established Clause allowed states to have officially recognized denominations. Church services were held in Congress. Congress appropriated funds for missionary outreach to American Indians. I’m not saying if that’s good or bad. But that reflects the scope of original intent.

You’re indulging in an anachronistic interpretation of the First Amendment which would be unrecognizable to the framers and the 13 states that ratified the Bill of Rights.

steve hays January 12, 2015 at 12:58 pm #

Ryan, your argument is circular. I point out that the restrictions infringe on Constitutional civil liberties. You reply by appealing to restrictions on civil liberties. But that’s the very issue in dispute. Appealing to restrictions to justify restrictions is viciously circular. You can’t simply invoke the current status quo to defend the status quo without begging the question.

Here’s an example of how the Establish Clause allows for, as understood by the Founding Fathers:

http://www.belcherfoundation.org/wallace_v_jaffree_dissent.htm

steve hays January 12, 2015 at 9:42 pm #

I didn’t merely refer to something as Constitutional. Rehnquist gives extensive historical documentation in the opinion I linked to.

steve hays January 12, 2015 at 10:21 pm #

I was responding to you on your own terms, but you’re free to backpedal.

This is not an appeal to authority. I cited him for his documentation. Do you not know the difference between historical evidence and an argument from authority?

steve hays January 13, 2015 at 2:42 am #

I’ve read Posner. Basically, he doesn’t think the Bill of Rights has any objective meaning. It merely means whatever meaning judges assign to it.

steve hays January 13, 2015 at 12:43 pm #

Agreed. Judges like Posner can’t be trusted with power. No one elected judges to make social policy. That’s not their proper role.

It comes down to the question of whether we think the society should consist of a ruling class that plays the role of official adults, treating other citizens as minors who require parental permission for whatever they say or do. Unfortunately, there are a lot of Americans who wish to be treated like children.

steve hays January 14, 2015 at 1:06 pm #

“The Bill of Rights has no fixed meaning. It states broad aspirational principles that are often in tension with each other. It is the duty of an unelected judiciary–uninfluenced by the short-sighted prejudices of the masses–to balance out those tensions in a pragmatic way in view of our current circumstances.”

Our system of gov’t is based on popular sovereignty. The consent of the governed.

The electorate expresses its will through its chosen representatives. Duly elected lawmakers pass laws, responsive to their voting constituents.

It is the job of judges to interpret the law, consistent with legislative intent, in order to apply the law to specific cases.

It’s clear that you, by contrast, repudiate the democratic process. You disdain the consent of the governed.

The Constitution applies to the judiciary, too. It’s the Constitution that authorizes the scope of the judiciary. Judges aren’t supposed to be independent of the Constitution. They don’t have the prerogative to unilaterally rewrite our social contract.

You have a totalitarian outlook in which an unaccountable ruling class imposes social policy on everyone else.

“By your logic, we’d still have whites-only lunch counters.”

How did you derive that from the Bill of Rights?

“That’s why legal pragmatism is more likely to lead to justice than originalism.”

It isn’t the job of judges to produce (allegedly) just outcomes. That’s the job of lawmakers. Given your attitude, we might as well abolish the legislative branch.

“Pragmatism forces one to grapple with the facts.”

You operate with a naive positivism. But facts don’t tell you what is just or unjust.

“Originalism lets one ignore the facts and cloak one’s personal prejudices with the apparent aegis of history.”

You also have the naive notion that judges like Posner are exempt from personal prejudice.

“Originalism is merely the crutch of those whose views aren’t supported well by the evidentiary record, so they reach back into history to dredge up the evidence that suits their preferred policy outcomes.”

No, Originalism is based on the consent of the governed. A nation of laws rather than a ruling class that’s unanswerable to anyone else.

You’re a totalitarian, which is ironic for a professed pragmatist, Totalitarian regimes end badly.

“That’s the joy of being a pragmatism: You can approach each issue with no preferred outcome in mind except for a desire to let the evidence speak.”

If you really believe that, then you’re hopelessly naive. Evidence doesn’t distinguish just from unjust outcomes. You’re committing the naturalist fallacy of inferring ought from is.

Your pragmatism is the caboose, drawn by the choo choo train of your own unexamined prejudices.

steve hays January 11, 2015 at 9:05 pm #

Handing out a book compels no one to read it or believe it. This trivializes the notion of consent and compulsion.

Moreover, who was he discriminating against?

Freewill theism generates moral dilemmas

Moral dilemmasThe crucial features of a moral dilemma are these: the agent is required to do each of two (or more) actions; the agent can do each of the actions; but the agent cannot do both (or all) of the actions. The agent thus seems condemned to moral failure; no matter what she does, she will do something wrong (or fail to do something that she ought to do). 

When one of the conflicting requirements overrides the other, we do not have a genuine moral dilemma. So in addition to the features mentioned above, in order to have a genuine moral dilemma it must also be true that neither of the conflicting requirements is overridden. 

Yet another distinction is between obligation dilemmas and prohibition dilemmas. The former are situations in which more than one feasible action is obligatory. The latter involve cases in which all feasible actions are forbidden…Sophie's case is a prohibition dilemma. 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-dilemmas/

And here's a classic thought-experiment in bioethics and utilitarian ethics:

The organ harvest

Another problem for utilitarianism is that it seems to overlook justice and rights. One common illustration is called Transplant. Imagine that each of five patients in a hospital will die without an organ transplant. The patient in Room 1 needs a heart, the patient in Room 2 needs a liver, the patient in Room 3 needs a kidney, and so on. The person in Room 6 is in the hospital for routine tests. Luckily (for them, not for him!), his tissue is compatible with the other five patients, and a specialist is available to transplant his organs into the other five. This operation would save their lives, while killing the “donor”. There is no other way to save any of the other five patients (Foot 1966, Thomson 1976; compare related cases in Carritt 1947 and McCloskey 1965). 

We need to add that the organ recipients will emerge healthy, the source of the organs will remain secret, the doctor won't be caught or punished for cutting up the “donor”, and the doctor knows all of this to a high degree of probability (despite the fact that many others will help in the operation). Still, with the right details filled in, it looks as if cutting up the “donor” will maximize utility, since five lives have more utility than one life (assuming that the five lives do not contribute too much to overpopulation). If so, then classical utilitarianism implies that it would not be morally wrong for the doctor to perform the transplant and even that it would be morally wrong for the doctor not to perform the transplant. Most people find this result abominable. They take this example to show how bad it can be when utilitarians overlook individual rights, such as the unwilling donor's right to life. 

Utilitarians can bite the bullet, again. They can deny that it is morally wrong to cut up the “donor” in these circumstances. 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/#ConWhaRigRelRul

A commenter ran this hypothetical past Roger Olson. His response was:

Some acts are necessary even though wrong (sinful). My argument is that God automatically forgives necessary acts such as taking life to save innocent life. 

You are asking me to engage in casuistry. I can only say what I think I would probably do--when talking about "limit cases." And in this case I don't know. But I doubt I would condemn the surgeon in your hypothetical scenario. Have you seen "Sophie's Choice?"

https://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2015/01/is-there-a-difference-between-permitting-evil-and-doing-evil/ 

A friend compared this to the film Extreme Measures:

http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/extreme-measures-1996

Even some hard-nosed utilitarians balk at murdering a healthy patient to harvest his organs to save five needy patients. But ironically, this Arminian theologian, with his kinder, gentler theology, would be prepared to murder some patients to save other patients. Take the life of one patient to save the lives of five others.

Imagine if Olson was chief of medicine at a large hospital. Imagine if the bioethics board was dominated by Arminians. Imagine if this was under a totalitarian regime in which they actually had the authority to make some patients involuntary organ donors. 

It's striking to compare and contrast Olson's position with John Frame's:

God’s Word gives us a specific promise concerning temptation in 1 Corinthians 10:13: “No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it.” This text says that no temptation is so great that the Christian cannot escape it. That is, even in the worst temptations, God gives us the resources to be faithful to him, to make right choices, to find ways of escaping from wickedness. Tragic moral choice, however, is a situation where by definition there is no way to escape. So this passage implies directly that there is no tragic moral choice. John Frame, The Doctrine of the Christian Life (P&R 2008), 232-233.

Why do Frame and Olson take diametrically different positions on bioethics? It goes to a fundamental difference between Reformed theism and freewill theism. 

As a Calvinist, Frame believes in absolute predestination and meticulous providence. Because God planned everything that happens, because he providentially executes his plan, God can and does prearrange the course of events such that a Christian will never find himself in a position where there are no morally licit options. Compare that to Olson's position (in the same post):

The underlying issue here is whether the existence of gratuitous evil undermines belief in an all-powerful and all-good God. (“Gratuitous evil” is evil that is not necessary for some greater good.) 

All these Christian thinkers argue that free will requires an environment of natural laws, predictability, risk and ability to do evil. In other words, even God cannot create a world that includes genuine moral free will and responsibility and constantly interfere to stop gratuitous evils from occurring. 

The answer has to lie in divine self-limitation.

Given Olson's "risky" view of providence, odds are that Christians will find themselves cornered by circumstances which compel them to do something immoral to avoid something even more heinous. In a world chockfull of gratuitous evils–a world that's a runaway train–Christians will be confronted with intractable moral dilemmas in which there's no right option. They can't avoid doing something morally wrong. It's just a choice between degrees of wrongdoing.

Arminians are fond of quoting 1 Cor 10:13 to prooftext libertarian freedom, but ironically it's the Calvinist who's appealing to that text whereas Olson's position cuts the ground out from under that text. Given his risky view of providence, God cannot provide an escape route for every ethical challenge. In world where moral chaos theory reigns, where gratuitous evils are inevitable, Christians (as well as unbelievers) will find themselves boxed into situations in which they are forced to commit atrocities. No virtuous alternative is available in that situation. 

As is often the case, more consistent Arminians like Jerry Walls and Roger Olson do us the favor of taking freewill theism to a logical extreme. They are to freewill theism what Alex Rosenberg is to atheism. 

Gregg Allison on Scripture and Its Interpretation

I’m working my way slowly (I apologize) through Gregg Allison’s work,“Roman Catholic Theology and Practice: An Evangelical Assessment”.

Throughout, Allison’s method is to show side-by side, the Roman Catholic beliefs, along with what an “Evangelical Assesment” of those beliefs might say. And he does it in the light of a methodology that he clearly articulates at the beginning.

This is necessarily a broad-brush treatment. Other than his role of the explication of Scripture, which describes in the briefest terms the “grammatical historical hermeneutic” by which most Evangelical Protestants understand Scripture, he fails, at the outset, I think, to show how Roman Catholics understand Scripture (in his text here, he makes a brief allusion to the Medieval “fourfold sense of Scripture”. But that is no longer an official methodology.)

Here is one place where he states what Evangelicals believe, without going into much detail of how Roman Catholics understand Scripture. I’ll give Allison’s overview of an Evangelical understanding of Scripture, then I’ll clarify “actual Catholic beliefs” about Scripture below:

The ending of Acts

http://paulbarnett.info/2015/01/paul-lived-in-rome-two-whole-years-the-mysterious-ending-of-luke-acts/

How Calvinists do it

I don’t know how Calvinists do it. Like many bloggers Justin Taylor posted an obituary of Steve Jobs. Unlike many bloggers, he receives comments. Not three comments in, the post got this one:

I am saddened by Jobs’ passing. My prayers are with his family and friends. I don’t mean for this to be insensitive, but why would those who believe in the concept of God’s sovereign saving grace have any “hope” one way or the other that Jobs found rest in it? Wouldn’t they just want God to carry out His salvific desires in whatever way HE sees fit?

“Does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?”

if God decided to NOT impart Jobs with His sovereign saving grace (he didn’t appear outwardly a believer), this only magnifies the grace that the elect receive: “that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He had prepared beforehand for glory.”

https://ochuk.wordpress.com/2011/10/07/hell-calvinism-and-steve-jobs/

i) One thing I notice about philosophically-inclined critics of Calvinism like Jerry Walls and Adam Omelianchuk is how often they pick on Calvinists who are not philosophically-inclined. Instead of taking on theological opponents in their own weight class, they go after easy marks.

ii) The comment he quotes was apparently made by a freewill theist (or possibly an atheist sockpuppet) who used the obituary as a pretext to attack Calvinism. But the comment regurgitates the usual uncomprehending objections to Calvinism. And you'd think somebody like Adam, who ought to be philosophically sophisticated, would discern that.

iii) At one level, there's not even a prima facie tension between a predestined outcome and hoping for a particular outcome, for if predestination is true, then we were predestined to hope for that particular outcome–whether or not what we hope for comes true. God foreordains our future-oriented hopes as well as the future itself. 

iv) Then we have the hackneyed confusion between fatalism and predestination. But in Calvinism, the actions of human agents (e.g. prayer, evangelism) is one way in which God carries out his salvific desires. 

v) Let's take a comparison. Suppose your daughter attends a small private college. You receive a frantic phone call to turn on the news. A breathless reporters says a gunman reportedly killed a number of students at the school, before he himself was shot and killed. Police are withholding the names of the victims until they ID them and notify next-of-kin. 

Should you pray that your daughter was not one of the victims? But at that point, the event is past. Either he shot her to death or he didn't. Prayer can't change the past.

The accidental necessity of the past is analogous to the fixity of the future (given predestination). And many freewill theists grant the accidental necessity of the past. 

In both cases, you can't change the outcome. That, however, doesn't mean you can't affect the outcome. Answered prayer is a factor in historical causation. Prayer is one of God's appointed means to further his appointed ends. Absent answered prayer, history would turn out differently. That applies to retroactive prayer as well as hopes and prayers about a predestined future. 

So, yes, Adam, that's how Calvinists do it. On the face of it I don't see even an apparent point of tension.