According to Michael Liccione:
"Therefore, it is a necessary condition for interpreting the NT adequately that one identify which visible body counts as 'the' Church founded by the Lord, and then choose to conform one’s mind with hers. One can only do that by choosing to submit one’s judgment on matters de fide to those with divinely given authority to speak for and to the whole Church: those who hold and exercise the Magisterium. But such a submission would only be justifiable if in fact the Magisterium speaks with divine authority, and is not giving just its own opinions. Anybody can have opinions, but those are always provisional because always fallible. Divine authority, when exercised, is infallible, and thus its judgments are irreformable."
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/11/solo-scriptura-sola-scriptura-and-the-question-of-interpretive-authority/
Of course, that's viciously circular inasmuch as submission to the de fide judgment of "the" Church is only as good as our fallible, provisional judgment regarding which visible body counts as "the" Church.
The argument would only work if the claims of the Roman Church were self-evidently true.
"The NT is 'adequate' only when prayerfully read in that context. It is of course possible for a person to simply read the NT on its own and learn a great deal of what’s necessary; in fact, I believe it happens a lot. But partly for the reasons given above, I don’t think it’s possible for anybody to assent by faith to the entire content of the deposit of faith in such a way...Thus, as St. Thomas had said, it is possible to learn by reading the NT alone much of that which is 'of faith'; but unless one submits one’s judgment to that of the bishops in apostolic succession, one does not adhere 'by faith' to what one thereby learns. For one has no way of knowing that what one learns is the actual faith of the Church rather than just one’s personal opinions."
Just imagine a Judaizer sitting in church as Paul's courier finished reading aloud his letter to the Galatians, and then exclaiming: "That's inadequate! I can't assent by faith to the content of Galatians. For whether or not Paul condemns justification by works of the law as a false gospel is just a matter of one's personal opinion."
Catholics like Liccione never put themselves in the position of a NT Christian.
Tuesday, February 02, 2010
Lex Lutheranism
STEVE SAID:
THEOLDADAM SAID:
“It's all a matter of emphasis.”
Really? Edward Reiss seems to think it’s a matter of principle.
“But since there is no such a thing as ‘a Christian good work’, no one will be able to tell the works of a Christian apart from those of an unbeliever.”
Which fails to draw an elementary distinction between what we can know about ourselves and what we can know about a second party.
“And since no one knows the heart (and therefore the motive), no one but God Himself really can know.”
So Lutheranism denies the assurance of salvation. No Christian can really know whether he’s bound for heaven or bound for hell.
“To place an emphasis on works, or feelings, is to play into the hands of the devil.”
God is Lord over works and feelings. You suffer from a Manichaean dualism.
“(St. paul reminds us that the devil can come ‘all dressed up as an angel of light’ - did he not?).”
So it’s possible that Luther was a personification of the devil. Is that your point?
“That is why Lutherans rely on nothing other than the works that God does (has done, is doing) ...for us.”
Regeneration and sanctification are works of the Spirit. Or do Lutherans deny the deity of the Holy Spirit?
“The Holy Spirit is the one who inspires good works.”
Therefore, we’d be examining the evidence of God’s own handiwork.
“No goading of the law will do that, and filthy rags will be the fruit of any such efforts on our part.”
You’re schizophrenic. You lurch back and forth between works as “filthy rags” and works as good deeds inspired by the Holy Spirit. Which is it?
“There is never assurance when you are left to examining yourself.”
But you just attributed good works to the inspiration of the Spirit. Are you capable of thinking straight from one sentence to the next?
“This IS my body.”
So you worship the Pillsbury Doughboy?
“This IS my blood, I AM Baptized. This is where I receive my comfort and my assurance...because it comes from outside of me. To me. From God.”
Circumcision also came from the outside. From God. Did St. Paul therefore urge the Judaizers to find assurance in their circumcision?
“And that is somethimg that I can trust in...absolutely.”
But according to you, hell is full of baptized communicants.
STEVE SAID:
THEOLDADAM SAID:
“There is no such a thing as a ‘nominal Christian’. One is either in Christ..or he is not.”
I take it that you’re ignorant of standard terminology. A nominal Christian is a professing Christian who is not, however, a true believer.
Do Lutherans think that every professing Christian, however perfunctory his faith, is a true believer?
“And who are we to say who the strong Christians are, since ‘all our righteous deeds are as filty rags’?”
Since St. Paul admonished the strong brethren to be gentle to the weak brethren, Christians would be unable to obey his directive if it were impossible to distinguish one from the other.
“Dis not Christ HImself turn many away who were doing works in His name? (‘depart from Me, I never knew you’)”
There are multiple grounds for assurance in Scripture.
“Baptism isn't a sure fore way to Heaven because we can abandon our Baptisms.”
So by your own admission, you can’t ground the assurance of salvation in baptism.
“But St. paul clearly tells us that those who have been Baptized, have put on Christ.’ That is clear enough to me. So is Romans 6.”
What’s clear is your selective, one-sided prooftexting.
“The Calvinist answer is to look to yourself. To work harder.”
What Reformed preachers or theologians have you actually read, anyway? Your attempt to describe Calvinism resembles Richard Dawkins attempt to describe Christianity. You sound as though you got all your information filtered through hostile thirdhand sources. Lutheran caricatures of Calvinism.
If, in fact, you hand any firsthand acquaintance with Reformed theology, then it’s obvious that you didn’t grasp what you read or heard.
“To strive more and to examine yourself for that inner...whatever (works, feelings, etc.).”
i) To begin with, Scripture itself treats introspection as a legitimate spiritual exercise.
ii) Moreover, there’s nothing wrong with “doing” certain things–like prayer, Christian fellowship, Bible reading, and other means of grace–to foster the assurance of salvation in case that’s lacking in one’s life.
“The Lutheran way is to look OUTSIDE of yourself and to God's promises.”
Sorry to disillusion you, but Lutherans don’t own the copyright to God’s promises. Calvinists also look to God’s promises in Scripture.
“That is exactly why I believe our Lord commanded that we do the Sacraments (He really is the One who 'does them'...to us).”
Sorry to disillusion you, but Lutherans don’t own the patent to the sacraments. Calvinists also celebrate baptism and communion.
“Luther told us to ‘return to our Baptisms...daily.’”
And whatever Luther says, God says. Who needs the Bible when we’ve got Luther? He’s the seal of the prophets.
“No lucky charms there. Just a return (a repentance) and a re-trusting of what God has done for us on the cross, in His Supper, and in our Baptisms.”
To the contrary, you have the same superstitious veneration of the sacraments as idolatrous Israelites abode in the ark of the covenant (1 Sam 4) and the Nehushtan (2 Kgs 18:4).
Indeed, you’re no different than a Catholic clutching his crucifix and prayer beads.
STEVE SAID:
THEOLDADAM SAID:
“And Calvinists do not have the same regard for the Sacraments.”
True. I don’t subscribe to the Real Rabbit’s Foot or baptismal Rabbit’s-footsie.
“’Jesus is sitting at the right hand of the Father, so how could He be present in the bread and the wine?’ Does that sound familiar? It makes God into a puny god.”
I see. So you don’t actually subscribe to the real presence of the True Body & Blood.
Instead, you subscribe to the presence of Jesus’ divinity in the bread in wine. Why bother with an Incarnation at all?
“Good luck with your spiritual navel gazing, Steve.”
Good luck with your spiritual Rabbit’s-foot, Theoldadam.
“Those of us who actually trust in Christ do not have to go there.”
But you don’t trust in Christ. You really put your trust in a wafer.
THEOLDADAM SAID:
“It's all a matter of emphasis.”
Really? Edward Reiss seems to think it’s a matter of principle.
“But since there is no such a thing as ‘a Christian good work’, no one will be able to tell the works of a Christian apart from those of an unbeliever.”
Which fails to draw an elementary distinction between what we can know about ourselves and what we can know about a second party.
“And since no one knows the heart (and therefore the motive), no one but God Himself really can know.”
So Lutheranism denies the assurance of salvation. No Christian can really know whether he’s bound for heaven or bound for hell.
“To place an emphasis on works, or feelings, is to play into the hands of the devil.”
God is Lord over works and feelings. You suffer from a Manichaean dualism.
“(St. paul reminds us that the devil can come ‘all dressed up as an angel of light’ - did he not?).”
So it’s possible that Luther was a personification of the devil. Is that your point?
“That is why Lutherans rely on nothing other than the works that God does (has done, is doing) ...for us.”
Regeneration and sanctification are works of the Spirit. Or do Lutherans deny the deity of the Holy Spirit?
“The Holy Spirit is the one who inspires good works.”
Therefore, we’d be examining the evidence of God’s own handiwork.
“No goading of the law will do that, and filthy rags will be the fruit of any such efforts on our part.”
You’re schizophrenic. You lurch back and forth between works as “filthy rags” and works as good deeds inspired by the Holy Spirit. Which is it?
“There is never assurance when you are left to examining yourself.”
But you just attributed good works to the inspiration of the Spirit. Are you capable of thinking straight from one sentence to the next?
“This IS my body.”
So you worship the Pillsbury Doughboy?
“This IS my blood, I AM Baptized. This is where I receive my comfort and my assurance...because it comes from outside of me. To me. From God.”
Circumcision also came from the outside. From God. Did St. Paul therefore urge the Judaizers to find assurance in their circumcision?
“And that is somethimg that I can trust in...absolutely.”
But according to you, hell is full of baptized communicants.
STEVE SAID:
THEOLDADAM SAID:
“There is no such a thing as a ‘nominal Christian’. One is either in Christ..or he is not.”
I take it that you’re ignorant of standard terminology. A nominal Christian is a professing Christian who is not, however, a true believer.
Do Lutherans think that every professing Christian, however perfunctory his faith, is a true believer?
“And who are we to say who the strong Christians are, since ‘all our righteous deeds are as filty rags’?”
Since St. Paul admonished the strong brethren to be gentle to the weak brethren, Christians would be unable to obey his directive if it were impossible to distinguish one from the other.
“Dis not Christ HImself turn many away who were doing works in His name? (‘depart from Me, I never knew you’)”
There are multiple grounds for assurance in Scripture.
“Baptism isn't a sure fore way to Heaven because we can abandon our Baptisms.”
So by your own admission, you can’t ground the assurance of salvation in baptism.
“But St. paul clearly tells us that those who have been Baptized, have put on Christ.’ That is clear enough to me. So is Romans 6.”
What’s clear is your selective, one-sided prooftexting.
“The Calvinist answer is to look to yourself. To work harder.”
What Reformed preachers or theologians have you actually read, anyway? Your attempt to describe Calvinism resembles Richard Dawkins attempt to describe Christianity. You sound as though you got all your information filtered through hostile thirdhand sources. Lutheran caricatures of Calvinism.
If, in fact, you hand any firsthand acquaintance with Reformed theology, then it’s obvious that you didn’t grasp what you read or heard.
“To strive more and to examine yourself for that inner...whatever (works, feelings, etc.).”
i) To begin with, Scripture itself treats introspection as a legitimate spiritual exercise.
ii) Moreover, there’s nothing wrong with “doing” certain things–like prayer, Christian fellowship, Bible reading, and other means of grace–to foster the assurance of salvation in case that’s lacking in one’s life.
“The Lutheran way is to look OUTSIDE of yourself and to God's promises.”
Sorry to disillusion you, but Lutherans don’t own the copyright to God’s promises. Calvinists also look to God’s promises in Scripture.
“That is exactly why I believe our Lord commanded that we do the Sacraments (He really is the One who 'does them'...to us).”
Sorry to disillusion you, but Lutherans don’t own the patent to the sacraments. Calvinists also celebrate baptism and communion.
“Luther told us to ‘return to our Baptisms...daily.’”
And whatever Luther says, God says. Who needs the Bible when we’ve got Luther? He’s the seal of the prophets.
“No lucky charms there. Just a return (a repentance) and a re-trusting of what God has done for us on the cross, in His Supper, and in our Baptisms.”
To the contrary, you have the same superstitious veneration of the sacraments as idolatrous Israelites abode in the ark of the covenant (1 Sam 4) and the Nehushtan (2 Kgs 18:4).
Indeed, you’re no different than a Catholic clutching his crucifix and prayer beads.
STEVE SAID:
THEOLDADAM SAID:
“And Calvinists do not have the same regard for the Sacraments.”
True. I don’t subscribe to the Real Rabbit’s Foot or baptismal Rabbit’s-footsie.
“’Jesus is sitting at the right hand of the Father, so how could He be present in the bread and the wine?’ Does that sound familiar? It makes God into a puny god.”
I see. So you don’t actually subscribe to the real presence of the True Body & Blood.
Instead, you subscribe to the presence of Jesus’ divinity in the bread in wine. Why bother with an Incarnation at all?
“Good luck with your spiritual navel gazing, Steve.”
Good luck with your spiritual Rabbit’s-foot, Theoldadam.
“Those of us who actually trust in Christ do not have to go there.”
But you don’t trust in Christ. You really put your trust in a wafer.
The Development Of The Canon (Part 3)
Dave Armstrong writes:
Catholics often cite such disputes as if they're problematic for the Evangelical. But what does Dave think the disputes prove? They seem to have involved a minority's rejection of the books rather than a majority rejection. What does Dave think he's proving, then?
He goes on:
Again, what does Dave think he's proving? Manuscripts and Bibles often include documents that their producers or readers didn't consider scripture. Documents would often be reused or placed together in order to conserve resources, for example, or documents of a non-scriptural religious nature would sometimes be combined with documents viewed as scripture.
We often do such things today. Bibles will include passages or books that only some readers consider scripture, such as Apocryphal books in the Old Testament. Eldon Epp refers to some ancient manuscripts that contain New Testament books or portions of New Testament books, but also portions of documents obviously not considered scripture, such as "a history of Rome by Livy" and "a Christian letter" (in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], n. 16 on p. 490). Epp also notes that Codex Alexandrinus originally included eighteen Psalms Of Solomon (p. 493). He refers to a codex containing the Nativity Of Mary and 3 Corinthians, for example (p. 492). Does Dave want to argue that there was significant ancient support for the canonicity of works like Second Clement, the Psalms Of Solomon, and the Nativity Of Mary?
It's true that a book like The Shepherd Of Hermas will sometimes be referred to as scripture by the patristic sources. Its canonicity seems to have been accepted by only a small minority of Christians, however. See here. As I note in that article, Tertullian refers to The Shepherd Of Hermas as generally rejected by Christians, and he contrasts that rejection with the wider acceptance of Hebrews (On Modesty, 10, 20). Even though Hebrews is often categorized as one of the disputed books of the New Testament, it seems to have been much more widely accepted than documents like The Shepherd Of Hermas.
Dave writes:
Keep in mind what I said earlier about the history of the papacy. The concept is absent and widely contradicted early on. When it first appears in the historical record around the middle of the third century, it's denounced by bishops in the West and East. Read what Firmilian wrote in response to Stephen. Do Firmilian's comments come across as part of a "dispute around the edges", but not about the papacy itself? When a Catholic historian like Joseph Kelly refers to the rejection of the Roman bishop's universal jurisdiction by the Eastern bishops at the Council of Nicaea (a council at which the large majority of bishops were Eastern), for example, does such a view of the bishop of Rome seem like a "dispute around the edges"? Is universal jurisdiction just a minor aspect of the papacy? If so, should we conclude that Eastern Orthodox accept the papacy, since they can affirm some type of "Roman primacy" without accepting the universal jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome?
As I've argued elsewhere, it seems that even the most disputed books of the New Testament were accepted by a majority during the ante-Nicene era. I'm not aware of any reason to conclude that any of the twenty-seven books had been rejected by a majority.
And it would be reasonable for a document like James or 3 John to not be mentioned often in the earliest generations of church history, given the brevity of the documents, the narrow scope of their relevance to what the early sources were discussing, and other factors involved. In contrast, the early absence of any reference to a papacy makes far less sense, if there was widespread belief in a papacy at the time. I explained some of the reasons why in an earlier response to Dave. If Irenaeus doesn't cite 3 John when arguing against the Gnostics, then his failure to cite that document doesn't have much significance for its canonicity. Why would we expect him to cite 3 John? But if he says nothing about a papacy when writing at length on issues of authority, even when discussing Roman primacy specifically, then that's a more significant problem for Roman Catholicism.
At the Council of Nicaea, according to Protestant apologist Norman Geisler (How we Got the Bible, with co-author William E. Nix, Chicago: Moody Press, 1974, 109), the books of James, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, and Jude, were "named as disputed." Geisler seems, however (based on his comments on p. 111), to merely be talking about the time period of 325-340, and to base his conclusion on Eusebius' summary in Ecclesiastical History (III, 25, 3)...
In any event, there is considerable evidence that all these books were disputed by not a few until late into the 4th century: some of which I have discussed in other installments of this four-part reply.
Catholics often cite such disputes as if they're problematic for the Evangelical. But what does Dave think the disputes prove? They seem to have involved a minority's rejection of the books rather than a majority rejection. What does Dave think he's proving, then?
He goes on:
The Codex Sinaiticus manuscript from the late fourth century included the Epistle of Barnabas and the Shepherd of Hermas. The Codex Alexandrinus in the early fifth century included 1 and 2 Clement.
Again, what does Dave think he's proving? Manuscripts and Bibles often include documents that their producers or readers didn't consider scripture. Documents would often be reused or placed together in order to conserve resources, for example, or documents of a non-scriptural religious nature would sometimes be combined with documents viewed as scripture.
We often do such things today. Bibles will include passages or books that only some readers consider scripture, such as Apocryphal books in the Old Testament. Eldon Epp refers to some ancient manuscripts that contain New Testament books or portions of New Testament books, but also portions of documents obviously not considered scripture, such as "a history of Rome by Livy" and "a Christian letter" (in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], n. 16 on p. 490). Epp also notes that Codex Alexandrinus originally included eighteen Psalms Of Solomon (p. 493). He refers to a codex containing the Nativity Of Mary and 3 Corinthians, for example (p. 492). Does Dave want to argue that there was significant ancient support for the canonicity of works like Second Clement, the Psalms Of Solomon, and the Nativity Of Mary?
It's true that a book like The Shepherd Of Hermas will sometimes be referred to as scripture by the patristic sources. Its canonicity seems to have been accepted by only a small minority of Christians, however. See here. As I note in that article, Tertullian refers to The Shepherd Of Hermas as generally rejected by Christians, and he contrasts that rejection with the wider acceptance of Hebrews (On Modesty, 10, 20). Even though Hebrews is often categorized as one of the disputed books of the New Testament, it seems to have been much more widely accepted than documents like The Shepherd Of Hermas.
Dave writes:
This is a strange place for Jason to try to make some sort of case for proto-Protestantism in the fathers, for the canonical disputes of those times are exceedingly complicated. The disputes are at the "edges" of the canon (mostly about books other than the Gospels and Paul's epistles).
In the same fashion, the disputes about the papacy and Roman primacy and the authority of same are about the "edges" and particulars: but not about the thing itself.
Keep in mind what I said earlier about the history of the papacy. The concept is absent and widely contradicted early on. When it first appears in the historical record around the middle of the third century, it's denounced by bishops in the West and East. Read what Firmilian wrote in response to Stephen. Do Firmilian's comments come across as part of a "dispute around the edges", but not about the papacy itself? When a Catholic historian like Joseph Kelly refers to the rejection of the Roman bishop's universal jurisdiction by the Eastern bishops at the Council of Nicaea (a council at which the large majority of bishops were Eastern), for example, does such a view of the bishop of Rome seem like a "dispute around the edges"? Is universal jurisdiction just a minor aspect of the papacy? If so, should we conclude that Eastern Orthodox accept the papacy, since they can affirm some type of "Roman primacy" without accepting the universal jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome?
As I've argued elsewhere, it seems that even the most disputed books of the New Testament were accepted by a majority during the ante-Nicene era. I'm not aware of any reason to conclude that any of the twenty-seven books had been rejected by a majority.
And it would be reasonable for a document like James or 3 John to not be mentioned often in the earliest generations of church history, given the brevity of the documents, the narrow scope of their relevance to what the early sources were discussing, and other factors involved. In contrast, the early absence of any reference to a papacy makes far less sense, if there was widespread belief in a papacy at the time. I explained some of the reasons why in an earlier response to Dave. If Irenaeus doesn't cite 3 John when arguing against the Gnostics, then his failure to cite that document doesn't have much significance for its canonicity. Why would we expect him to cite 3 John? But if he says nothing about a papacy when writing at length on issues of authority, even when discussing Roman primacy specifically, then that's a more significant problem for Roman Catholicism.
Monday, February 01, 2010
A right strawy epistle
Catholics are fond of quoting Luther’s pejorative characterization of James as a “right strawy epistle.” And I have to say that Lutheran epologists like Edward Reiss seem to play right into the stereotype.
How representative is he of Lutheranism in general? If Lutherans take the position that it’s inherently wrong for Christians to ever examine the “quality” of their faith, then do they really have any room in their theological system for Jas 2? Or do they really have a canon within a canon–wherein they pay lipservice to the inspiration of James while, in practice, James is a dead letter in Lutheran theology?
How representative is he of Lutheranism in general? If Lutherans take the position that it’s inherently wrong for Christians to ever examine the “quality” of their faith, then do they really have any room in their theological system for Jas 2? Or do they really have a canon within a canon–wherein they pay lipservice to the inspiration of James while, in practice, James is a dead letter in Lutheran theology?
Do dogs go to heaven?
I’m going to post some comments by Lydia McGrew on the possibility of postmortem survival for animals. Of course, this is speculative, but I think she gives some good reasons for that possibility.
At the same time I think she also raises some difficulties which I don’t regard a serious difficulties. If, for example, you equate heaven with the Beatific Vision, then that’s a problem for the postmortem survival of animals. However, the Beatific Vision is a Thomistic construct, and there’s no compelling or even plausible reason to use that model.
The answer to this question is also bound up with your philosophical and/or theological position on other issues, such as the conditions of personal identity, the nature of glorification, “fair” treatment of animals, &c.
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[Quote] C. S. Lewis, however, conjectured that animals might participate in the resurrection through their relationship with human beings. In fact, he went so far as to conjecture that whole places--such as one's childhood home--might be similarly resurrected by means of the resurrection of human beings. His idea was that God would in some sense give reality to the ideas and memories of those human beings who are glorified.
Lewis has influenced me by these conjectures to be open to the possibility that dogs go to heaven, but there is at least one problem: Lewis was a Berkeleyan idealist. So when he talks about these things, one has to bear in mind that Lewis did not believe in mind-independent physical matter at all. This helps to explain his notion that your dog or your childhood home might be resurrected with you. God would give to your ideas that order of reality that currently is possessed by God's own ideas, which we call "physical existence." It is also useful to Lewis in that he does not have to say that it is of the intrinsic nature of animals, as it is of man, to be immortal, which I also want to avoid. But if one isn't a Berkleyan idealist, the metaphysics of all of this becomes much more problematic. God would have to choose really to create physical entities corresponding to the resurrected body of one's dog or one's childhood home.
Not that that is impossible. But it does raise the question of why it should be a human being's own dog that is resurrected rather than any and all dogs, including vicious ones, feral ones, and so forth. Lewis can explain this because all that exists is ideas. Hence, your ideas are resurrected along with you, and one may conjecture that the resurrection takes the form of giving some of those ideas an existence independent of you, though never independent of God, the Great Perceiver.
Obviously, if dogs are included in eternal and redeemed nature, their own natures must be compatible with the eternal bliss of the redeemed, unless we imagine them as having no interaction with the redeemed, which would seem to remove at least part of the point of having animals in heaven at all. So vicious dogs would have to be reformed, which raises the mind-boggling question of whether dogs have free will or whether God would reform the nature of bad dogs by force, an operation He would certainly never carry out on human beings.
Hold on a minute. I didn't raise this question because I couldn't be happy in heaven without a dog. To tell you the truth, I'm not really a dog person. I could be perfectly happy in heaven without dogs. (Though I'd be sad to think that when history and the world end, there will never again be any more horses.) Moreover, I never suggested that we could find out by pure reason whether dogs in heaven are required for our own perfect happiness, or for the perfect happiness of dog-lovers, or anything like that. I'm sure we can't discover that, and I didn't in any event raise the question, "Could we be happy in heaven without dogs?"
I raised the question because it is theoretically interesting in relation to the ontology of the mind and consciousness and in relation to the doctrine of the new heaven and the new earth and the resurrection of the body. Scripture says that the whole creation waits for the redemption of the body, and it promises a new heaven and a new earth. As one commentator said above, if we are permitted to imagine non-animate, non-human parts of creation in that new heaven and new earth (and the whole image of such a new creation urges us to do so, as do passages in Revelation concerning a river, trees, and a banquet), then it would seem a bit odd if the whole of animal nature were left out.
Lewis clearly raises the question because he is interested in the telos of animals, particularly those who are clearly in some sense conscious, who have what we would call personalities, and who have been ennobled by their communion with man. Here is this whole aspect of creation about which God has not revealed to us His ultimate plan. It is an aspect of creation, moreover, that includes creatures that have some of the qualities that lead us to love them and to have what we should be inclined to call friendship with them. With our human friends, we desire that they should live eternally in bliss, and we desire this as part of loving them. It seems sad that they should be nothing after death. And it seems similarly sad that beloved animals should be nothing after death, not even chiefly or only because we ourselves would "need" them for _our_ happiness in heaven but because we believe we have experienced something like their individuality, and it would be a loss in some larger sense if that individuality died forever. This love and experience of friendship and personality lead people to ask the question of whether dogs go to heaven. It is a small part of the larger question of what it will mean for the whole creation to be redeemed, for good things to be glorified rather than lost, for God to give back the years that the locusts have eaten. As such, it is not something that can simply be reduced to anything like pantheism much less to a gross or sensual desire that we ourselves should have eternally all the pleasures we have enjoyed here on earth.
All that being said, I don't know the answer to the question.
Zach, part of what I'm saying is that you can't make an _in principle_ argument along those lines (concerning indirect enjoyment of God), because such an argument would also apply to human love and friendship, which I believe we have quite strong reason to believe is completed and continued rather than replaced in the Beatific Vision.
Now, I'm certainly not saying that friendship with animals is on a par with human friendship. I'm just saying that one can't argue in principle against God's making an experience of animal creation one of the joys of heaven on the grounds that our enjoyment of animal creation here has been an indirect enjoyment of or proxy for our enjoyment of Him. Because you could say that even about things that we have every reason to believe will not disappear in heaven.
If I had to say more on the DIH side, MC, I'd be inclined to say that the nature of friendship with an animal is sui generis and cannot be represented in a glorified form by friendship with humans. Now, that cd. just as easily mean that that sui generis type of friendship is intrinsically mortal and won't be glorified. Which is why I don't know if there will be dogs (or horses, which I'm far more concerned about) in heaven. But it doesn't seem to me to be an argument against that to say that human friendship is of a higher order than human-animal friendship. To be sure, it is. But it doesn't follow that the thing of lower order could not be part of the glorified life. Just as we legitimately enjoy different musical genres, even though some musical genres are of a higher order than others, so we legitimately enjoy different types of friendships. Man's friendship with an animal--that master-animal relationship--cannot be replaced by a man to man relationship, because no man is another man's master in anything like that same sense.
For that matter, different human friendships are closer than others, and I should be sorry to think that all such distinctions will be necessarily abolished in heaven, so that all our relationships with other created beings in heaven must be in some egalitarian sense the same as one another.
Uniqueness and variety are things God glories in. The great chain of being and all that.
http://www.whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2009/09/do_dogs_go_to_heaven.html
At the same time I think she also raises some difficulties which I don’t regard a serious difficulties. If, for example, you equate heaven with the Beatific Vision, then that’s a problem for the postmortem survival of animals. However, the Beatific Vision is a Thomistic construct, and there’s no compelling or even plausible reason to use that model.
The answer to this question is also bound up with your philosophical and/or theological position on other issues, such as the conditions of personal identity, the nature of glorification, “fair” treatment of animals, &c.
***************************************************
[Quote] C. S. Lewis, however, conjectured that animals might participate in the resurrection through their relationship with human beings. In fact, he went so far as to conjecture that whole places--such as one's childhood home--might be similarly resurrected by means of the resurrection of human beings. His idea was that God would in some sense give reality to the ideas and memories of those human beings who are glorified.
Lewis has influenced me by these conjectures to be open to the possibility that dogs go to heaven, but there is at least one problem: Lewis was a Berkeleyan idealist. So when he talks about these things, one has to bear in mind that Lewis did not believe in mind-independent physical matter at all. This helps to explain his notion that your dog or your childhood home might be resurrected with you. God would give to your ideas that order of reality that currently is possessed by God's own ideas, which we call "physical existence." It is also useful to Lewis in that he does not have to say that it is of the intrinsic nature of animals, as it is of man, to be immortal, which I also want to avoid. But if one isn't a Berkleyan idealist, the metaphysics of all of this becomes much more problematic. God would have to choose really to create physical entities corresponding to the resurrected body of one's dog or one's childhood home.
Not that that is impossible. But it does raise the question of why it should be a human being's own dog that is resurrected rather than any and all dogs, including vicious ones, feral ones, and so forth. Lewis can explain this because all that exists is ideas. Hence, your ideas are resurrected along with you, and one may conjecture that the resurrection takes the form of giving some of those ideas an existence independent of you, though never independent of God, the Great Perceiver.
Obviously, if dogs are included in eternal and redeemed nature, their own natures must be compatible with the eternal bliss of the redeemed, unless we imagine them as having no interaction with the redeemed, which would seem to remove at least part of the point of having animals in heaven at all. So vicious dogs would have to be reformed, which raises the mind-boggling question of whether dogs have free will or whether God would reform the nature of bad dogs by force, an operation He would certainly never carry out on human beings.
Hold on a minute. I didn't raise this question because I couldn't be happy in heaven without a dog. To tell you the truth, I'm not really a dog person. I could be perfectly happy in heaven without dogs. (Though I'd be sad to think that when history and the world end, there will never again be any more horses.) Moreover, I never suggested that we could find out by pure reason whether dogs in heaven are required for our own perfect happiness, or for the perfect happiness of dog-lovers, or anything like that. I'm sure we can't discover that, and I didn't in any event raise the question, "Could we be happy in heaven without dogs?"
I raised the question because it is theoretically interesting in relation to the ontology of the mind and consciousness and in relation to the doctrine of the new heaven and the new earth and the resurrection of the body. Scripture says that the whole creation waits for the redemption of the body, and it promises a new heaven and a new earth. As one commentator said above, if we are permitted to imagine non-animate, non-human parts of creation in that new heaven and new earth (and the whole image of such a new creation urges us to do so, as do passages in Revelation concerning a river, trees, and a banquet), then it would seem a bit odd if the whole of animal nature were left out.
Lewis clearly raises the question because he is interested in the telos of animals, particularly those who are clearly in some sense conscious, who have what we would call personalities, and who have been ennobled by their communion with man. Here is this whole aspect of creation about which God has not revealed to us His ultimate plan. It is an aspect of creation, moreover, that includes creatures that have some of the qualities that lead us to love them and to have what we should be inclined to call friendship with them. With our human friends, we desire that they should live eternally in bliss, and we desire this as part of loving them. It seems sad that they should be nothing after death. And it seems similarly sad that beloved animals should be nothing after death, not even chiefly or only because we ourselves would "need" them for _our_ happiness in heaven but because we believe we have experienced something like their individuality, and it would be a loss in some larger sense if that individuality died forever. This love and experience of friendship and personality lead people to ask the question of whether dogs go to heaven. It is a small part of the larger question of what it will mean for the whole creation to be redeemed, for good things to be glorified rather than lost, for God to give back the years that the locusts have eaten. As such, it is not something that can simply be reduced to anything like pantheism much less to a gross or sensual desire that we ourselves should have eternally all the pleasures we have enjoyed here on earth.
All that being said, I don't know the answer to the question.
Zach, part of what I'm saying is that you can't make an _in principle_ argument along those lines (concerning indirect enjoyment of God), because such an argument would also apply to human love and friendship, which I believe we have quite strong reason to believe is completed and continued rather than replaced in the Beatific Vision.
Now, I'm certainly not saying that friendship with animals is on a par with human friendship. I'm just saying that one can't argue in principle against God's making an experience of animal creation one of the joys of heaven on the grounds that our enjoyment of animal creation here has been an indirect enjoyment of or proxy for our enjoyment of Him. Because you could say that even about things that we have every reason to believe will not disappear in heaven.
If I had to say more on the DIH side, MC, I'd be inclined to say that the nature of friendship with an animal is sui generis and cannot be represented in a glorified form by friendship with humans. Now, that cd. just as easily mean that that sui generis type of friendship is intrinsically mortal and won't be glorified. Which is why I don't know if there will be dogs (or horses, which I'm far more concerned about) in heaven. But it doesn't seem to me to be an argument against that to say that human friendship is of a higher order than human-animal friendship. To be sure, it is. But it doesn't follow that the thing of lower order could not be part of the glorified life. Just as we legitimately enjoy different musical genres, even though some musical genres are of a higher order than others, so we legitimately enjoy different types of friendships. Man's friendship with an animal--that master-animal relationship--cannot be replaced by a man to man relationship, because no man is another man's master in anything like that same sense.
For that matter, different human friendships are closer than others, and I should be sorry to think that all such distinctions will be necessarily abolished in heaven, so that all our relationships with other created beings in heaven must be in some egalitarian sense the same as one another.
Uniqueness and variety are things God glories in. The great chain of being and all that.
http://www.whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2009/09/do_dogs_go_to_heaven.html
Consoling the inconsolable
From the meta:
STEVE SAID:
Yes, it's possible to be saved without assurance.
Moreover, those who commit the unforgivable sin never give it a second thought. It's only those who never commit the unforgivable sin who torment themselves with unfounded fears in this respect.
You have nothing to fear. Had you committed the unforgivable sin, you'd be far too hardened to worry about it.
The devil is simply trying to rob you of your Christian joy. Tell the devil to go to hell!
EDWARD REISS SAID:
“I am not sure this is true. It is possible for someone who is not one of the elect to have remorse, and not repentance and subjectively experience this remorse as if it was repentance. Of course, if one is not one of the elect one cannot ever repent.”
i) I’m not dealing with the generic notion of remorse. Rather, I’m dealing with the specific question of individuals who are anxious or even despairing over the prospect that they may have committed the unforgivable sin.
I’m not aware of reprobates who fret over that question. Does Gore Vidal fret over that question?
ii) It’s also useless to tell such a person that Christ died for him. To begin with, I daresay that many or most individuals who fret over the unforgivable sin have been associated with churches which teach universal atonement. And, by definition, the unforgivable sin is unforgivable even if Christ died for the sinner who committed that particular sin. So that’s the wrong answer.
“I would also point out that you have pointed rach back to himself--because of his ‘inner testimony’ that he cares about his sin. Instead we should point him to Christ.”
That’s futile advice. Unless you feel the weight of sin, you feel no need of a Savior.
“Well, Christ said I am baptized, so I have the gift of eternal life.”
But elsewhere you admit that baptism is no guarantee of salvation. So that statement is duplicitous.
“But Lutherans do not have the same issues, nor does Lutheranism encourage the reflection on the quality of faith that Calvimism does.”
Which is a recipe for nominal Christians.
STEVE SAID:
EDWARD REISS SAID:
“Is it possible for a reprobate to have an outwardly good life? Is every reprobate like Gore Vidal? I would answer yes and no respectively.”
You’re dissimulating. The question at issue was a very specific question–concerning the unforgivable sin.
What type of person worries about committing the unforgivable sin? Someone who believes the Bible and has a very particular interpretation of that passage. That’s who.
“And the question is raised by the WCF itself…”
Once again, you’re dissimulating. The question at issue was about the unforgivable sin. That’s not what the WCF is addressing here.
“Again, they have operations of the Spirit yet they never *truly* come to Christ. Thi smeans a Christian could be repentant and still have doubts he is aceptable for the sake of Christ because if he i snot elect he only had ‘some common operations of the Spirit.’”
i) Once more, you’re dissimulating. The WCF isn’t dealing with the unforgivable sin.
ii) Moreover, there is, indeed, a distinction between nominal Christians and genuine Christians–just as there was, in the OT, a distinction between nominal Jews and pious Jews. Those who only received physical circumcision and those who also received circumcision of the heart.
John the Baptist draws that sort of distinction in Mt 3. If Lutheran theology can’t honor that Biblical distinction, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“So it would appear than not all reprobates are like Gore Vidal. Neither are they all like Stalin, Robspierre, Ivan the Terrible, Caligula or other monsters from history.”
Once again, you’re dissimulating–since that’s irrelevant to the unforgivable sin.
“Nor is there a guarantee the elect will always exhibit a godly life.”
Which is irrelevant to what I said.
“Did Judas fret over his acts to betray Christ? Scripture says yes, though he committed suicide.”
i) Once more, you’re dissimulating. Judas wasn’t fretting over the unforgivable sin.
ii) Moreover, you’re assuming that he was guilt-stricken. In context, it’s more likely that his suicide was a symptom and side-effect of his demonic possession (Lk 22:3; Jn 13:2,27). Suicidal impulses are common among those who suffer from occult bondage.
“The point is that the test of "Do I feel bad about it" will always be ambiguous because unless one is one of the elect and knows it, it all may be nothing more than a feeling one brought out of one's self.”
i) Unbelievers aren’t afraid of “sinning.” They don’t feel guilty about “sinning.” “Sin” is a Biblical category. They disbelieve the Bible.
They may feel guilty about “wrongs,” but not about “sins”–especially a theological sin like the unforgivable sin.
Since they don’t believe in the Holy Spirit, they don’t believe it’s possible to sin against the Holy Spirit.
ii) There are anxieties and guilt-feelings which only a believer can feel.
1/30/2010 7:22 PM
STEVE SAID:
Cont. “So, given the Calvinist system, only the ones who have been told by the HS that he is one of the elect can really have any assurance--everyone else has to look into one's self for ‘internal’ evidence.”
i) You deliberately misrepresent the “Calvinist system” when you habitually divorce the “internal” evidence from its external object–God’s promises.
ii) The Gospel promises are not unconditional promises. Rather, the Gospel promises are conditional promises.
They are promises to and for believers. They are not promises to Caligula or Stalin or Ivan the Terrible (to use your own examples).
They can only become promises to and for unbelievers if and when unbelievers cease to be unbelievers. Gospel promises must be appropriated by faith.
“Lutheranism looks to the external evicence of Christ's acts on our behalf.”
And according to Lutheranism, Christ acts on behalf of the damned as well as the saints.
So what do his acts on our behalf evidence, exactly? Nothing to distinguish one man’s eternal fate from another’s.
“I don't think it is ever useless to tell someone Christ died for him…”
That’s a malicious distortion of what I said. I gave a reason for my statement. And I was answering you on your own grounds in the process.
You respond by giving a deviously butchered version of what I actually said.
“But don't you see ow potentially dangerous it is to tell such a one to look into himself for ‘the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises are made’ when he is tormented by doubts of his salvation?”
It’s a good thing that you’re a Lutheran layman rather than a Lutheran pastor. What you’re trying to do here, which is truly despicable, is to exploit someone’s vulnerability to score theological points. I guess it’s all the same to you if you drove someone to suicide to score points.
I told the individual in question that he/she had no reason to fear. And I gave a perfectly sound reason. Those who commit the unforgivable sin are too hardened to give it a second thought.
If you want to attack Calvinism, go right ahead. But do not, I repeat, do not abuse this individual’s anxiety as a pretext to score theological points.
I will not permit you to do that here. I only responded at all because it was necessary to repair any damage you may have done. I hope it wasn’t irreparable.
“It is better by far to point him to the promises, wouldn't you agree?”
No, I wouldn’t agree. If someone fears that he committed the unforgivable sin, then pointing him to promises of forgiveness is pointless. For if he really committed the unforgivable sin, then he crossed a line of no return. No forgiveness in this age or the next, remember?
So it’s necessary to challenge the premise.
You’d make a lousy pastor. You have no capacity to listen to the individual across the table. Instead, you try to stamp everyone with your cookie-cutter bromide regardless of what they specifically told you.
1/30/2010 7:23 PM
STEVE SAID:
Cont. “Not futile, because it is the weight of sin to which the acts of Christ in history are directed. As I said, the difference between us is because we have different doctrines.”
Once again, you’re dissimulating. Was I referring to the “weight of sin” in the sense of objective culpability? No.
I was making the obvious point that unless someone feels guilty, feels “sinful,” then he has no motivation to turn to Christ.
Is there some reason you can’t honestly represent what people tell you? Do you always try to win a debate at any cost, by any expedient?
“Why is it duplicitous to tell someone what has happened in hoistory?”
Now you prop up one duplicitous statement with another duplicitous statement.
What was I responding to? Remember? Your statement that: “Well, Christ said I am baptized, so I have the gift of eternal life.”
That is false assurance. And it’s false assurance on your own grounds since you yourself don’t actually believe that everyone who been baptized is heaven-bound. So you made a very deceptive statement. And what is worse, you made it on a subject of utmost importance.
You then respond with a bait-and-switch: “Why is it duplicitous to tell someone what has happened in hoistory…”–as if that’s what you originally said, as if that follows from what you originally said, as if that’s what I was responding to.
“So telling someone that he is baptized is analogous to telling someone that, since he is hungry, he should use the food we provided for him which he has neglected. In the case of baptism as well as that of the food, there is an objective reality to which we have access.”
Once more, you’re dissimulating. You originally said: “Well, Christ said I am baptized, so I have the gift of eternal life.”
That’s an indicative statement. Fait accompli. Done deal.
Which is altogether different from treating baptism as merely a provision that an individual is then encouraged to take advantage of.
But your basic problem in all of this is that you seek a formulaic shortcut to the assurance of salvation.
Many theological traditions are guilty of this. They all have their gimmicks, viz. “I know I’m saved because I responded to the alter call on such-and-such a date.” “I know I’m saved because my church preserves apostolic succession.” “I know I’m saved because I was baptized as a baby!” “I know I’m saved because I’m a covenant child!” “I know I’m saved because I still observe the Julian calendar.” “I know I’m saved because I celebrate the Sabbath on Saturday instead of Sunday.” “I know I’m saved because I only use the KJV.”
The gimmick varies, but the psychology is interchangeable.
STEVE SAID:
EDWARD REISS SAID:
“I simply reject that categorization.”
The unforgivable sin is a biblical category. If Lutheran theology can’t make room for biblical categories, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“I am pointing out that a reprobate can lead an outwardly good life and a Christian can lead a more or less dissolute life--as the WCF states BTW.”
In Calvinism, a true believer can be a backslider. However, God also restores his backslidden children through divine chastisement.
“Given that, my point is quite relevant.”
It’s totally irrelevant to the unforgivable sin.
“And again we are pointed to the quality of our faith to prove to ourselves we are real Christians, instead of to the promises of Christ.”
The Bible itself encourages a measure of introspection and self-examination, viz. 2 Cor 13:5-6; 1 Jn 3:14; 5:10 (see commentaries by M. J. Harris on 2 Cor and Yarbrough for exegesis).
If Lutheran theology can’t make room for biblical counsel, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“I used the example of Judas. If you saw him after he betrayed Christ and had remorse and before he killed himself, would you be able to peer into his soul and see he is a reprobate? I don't think so, but perhaps you can. So, it is easy to extrapolate that to other reprobates.”
Now you’re confusing first-party assurance with second-party assurance. In the nature of the case, I only have direct access to my own mental states. The fact that I can’t be sure of someone else’s salvation doesn’t mean I can’t be sure of my own. Those are obviously two different issues.
Indeed, I discussed that distinction in some detail in the article (by James Anderson) that I referred you to. See the combox. So you’re raising objections I already dealt with.
“IOW, you have not shown a reprobate could be sorry for his sins and yet not be justified.”
Is it your position that the damned are justified? Isn’t justification contingent on saving faith? Was Suleiman the Magnificent justified by faith in Christ?
“Nor could you tell such a one Jesus died for him, as I keep pointing out.”
So I can’t tell Judas that Christ died for him. Big deal.
“Calvinism. In fact, I don’t see why this is even controversial--a Calvinist cannot tell anyone Christ died for him unless he somehow infallibly knows he is one of the elect.”
It isn’t my duty to give a second party that blanket assurance. A second party is responsible for his own assurance. I have no right to give him proxy assurance regardless of his spiritual status.
2/01/2010 8:55 AM
STEVE SAID:
“And unless a pastor can peer into someone's heart, he does not know if Christ died for him.”
It’s not the job of a pastor to take that upon himself. Christ is the mediator, not the pastor.
“You are once again either having the Christian look inside himself or perhaps have another look into his heart to discern if he is a ‘genuine’ Christian.’”
i) He’s “looking inside himself” in the same way he might examine a scan of his pacemaker. Although the pacemaker is inside of him, it didn’t originate with him. It was put there by someone else.
To see if the pacemaker is functioning properly isn’t an exercise in self-reliance.
Likewise, both John and Paul tell us that Christians normally enjoy the inner witness of Spirit. And they introduce this in polemical settings where that’s a ground of assurance and evidence of salvation (Gal 4:6; 1 Jn 5:10).
What’s “inside us” (the work of the Spirit) isn’t “us.” We’re not looking at ourselves, any more than scanning a pacemaker is looking at ourselves.
If Lutheran theology can’t make room biblical modes of spiritual attestation, then so much the worse for biblical theology.
ii) And you have a habit of dishonestly reducing the Reformed grounds of assurance to subjective grounds, even though, in Reformed theology, the subjective grounds and the objective grounds are complementary.
“I am not so sure of that. You assert it, but shouldn't that be proved beyond a reasonable doubt?”
It follows from the definition of an unbeliever. But if Lutheran theology can’t distinguish between believers and unbelievers, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“I did no such thing. I told him Jesus died for him. That is, in a nutshell, the gospel promises. You disagree, but that hardly makes my actions ‘despicable.’”
i) You’re using a vulnerable individual as a theological football to score points. Yes, that’s despicable.
ii) If universal atonement is the gospel in a nutshell, then it’s odd that none of the evangelistic sermons in Acts say, “Christ died for you!”
iii) As I said before, if somebody fears that he committed the unforgivable sin, then telling him that Christ died for him does nothing to assuage his fears since that’s impotent to absolve the unforgivable sin.
You, however, refuse to engage the argument because you can’t accommodate anything that doesn’t shoehorn into the preset parameters of your Lutheran system.
“Ad hominem remarks are not strong arguments.”
Is there something about Lutheran theology that makes you that utterly sociopathic?
A person is not an argument. A vulnerable individual isn’t cannon fodder for you to win the argument.
If Lutheranism is that callous and tone-deaf to the rudiments of pastoral theology, then to hell with Lutheranism.
STEVE SAID:
WHEAT SAID:
"Do you agree with Gordon Clark when he says that belief must always have a proposition as its proper object?"
i) That's overstated. A 2-year-old believes in his parents. Has faith in them. But that doesn't involve a conscious proposition.
ii) Doctrinal propositions are a necessary component of saving faith.
iii) However, there is more to saving faith than orthodox belief. There must also be an appropriate attitude towards the truth.
The devil knows the truth, but he hates it. And he lives in willful defiance of the truth.
Saving faith includes a trustful attitude towards revealed truth.
Moreover, the Bible often speaks of a spiritual yearnings. A longing for God's presence. That also goes beyond mere belief.
STEVE SAID:
Yes, it's possible to be saved without assurance.
Moreover, those who commit the unforgivable sin never give it a second thought. It's only those who never commit the unforgivable sin who torment themselves with unfounded fears in this respect.
You have nothing to fear. Had you committed the unforgivable sin, you'd be far too hardened to worry about it.
The devil is simply trying to rob you of your Christian joy. Tell the devil to go to hell!
EDWARD REISS SAID:
“I am not sure this is true. It is possible for someone who is not one of the elect to have remorse, and not repentance and subjectively experience this remorse as if it was repentance. Of course, if one is not one of the elect one cannot ever repent.”
i) I’m not dealing with the generic notion of remorse. Rather, I’m dealing with the specific question of individuals who are anxious or even despairing over the prospect that they may have committed the unforgivable sin.
I’m not aware of reprobates who fret over that question. Does Gore Vidal fret over that question?
ii) It’s also useless to tell such a person that Christ died for him. To begin with, I daresay that many or most individuals who fret over the unforgivable sin have been associated with churches which teach universal atonement. And, by definition, the unforgivable sin is unforgivable even if Christ died for the sinner who committed that particular sin. So that’s the wrong answer.
“I would also point out that you have pointed rach back to himself--because of his ‘inner testimony’ that he cares about his sin. Instead we should point him to Christ.”
That’s futile advice. Unless you feel the weight of sin, you feel no need of a Savior.
“Well, Christ said I am baptized, so I have the gift of eternal life.”
But elsewhere you admit that baptism is no guarantee of salvation. So that statement is duplicitous.
“But Lutherans do not have the same issues, nor does Lutheranism encourage the reflection on the quality of faith that Calvimism does.”
Which is a recipe for nominal Christians.
STEVE SAID:
EDWARD REISS SAID:
“Is it possible for a reprobate to have an outwardly good life? Is every reprobate like Gore Vidal? I would answer yes and no respectively.”
You’re dissimulating. The question at issue was a very specific question–concerning the unforgivable sin.
What type of person worries about committing the unforgivable sin? Someone who believes the Bible and has a very particular interpretation of that passage. That’s who.
“And the question is raised by the WCF itself…”
Once again, you’re dissimulating. The question at issue was about the unforgivable sin. That’s not what the WCF is addressing here.
“Again, they have operations of the Spirit yet they never *truly* come to Christ. Thi smeans a Christian could be repentant and still have doubts he is aceptable for the sake of Christ because if he i snot elect he only had ‘some common operations of the Spirit.’”
i) Once more, you’re dissimulating. The WCF isn’t dealing with the unforgivable sin.
ii) Moreover, there is, indeed, a distinction between nominal Christians and genuine Christians–just as there was, in the OT, a distinction between nominal Jews and pious Jews. Those who only received physical circumcision and those who also received circumcision of the heart.
John the Baptist draws that sort of distinction in Mt 3. If Lutheran theology can’t honor that Biblical distinction, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“So it would appear than not all reprobates are like Gore Vidal. Neither are they all like Stalin, Robspierre, Ivan the Terrible, Caligula or other monsters from history.”
Once again, you’re dissimulating–since that’s irrelevant to the unforgivable sin.
“Nor is there a guarantee the elect will always exhibit a godly life.”
Which is irrelevant to what I said.
“Did Judas fret over his acts to betray Christ? Scripture says yes, though he committed suicide.”
i) Once more, you’re dissimulating. Judas wasn’t fretting over the unforgivable sin.
ii) Moreover, you’re assuming that he was guilt-stricken. In context, it’s more likely that his suicide was a symptom and side-effect of his demonic possession (Lk 22:3; Jn 13:2,27). Suicidal impulses are common among those who suffer from occult bondage.
“The point is that the test of "Do I feel bad about it" will always be ambiguous because unless one is one of the elect and knows it, it all may be nothing more than a feeling one brought out of one's self.”
i) Unbelievers aren’t afraid of “sinning.” They don’t feel guilty about “sinning.” “Sin” is a Biblical category. They disbelieve the Bible.
They may feel guilty about “wrongs,” but not about “sins”–especially a theological sin like the unforgivable sin.
Since they don’t believe in the Holy Spirit, they don’t believe it’s possible to sin against the Holy Spirit.
ii) There are anxieties and guilt-feelings which only a believer can feel.
1/30/2010 7:22 PM
STEVE SAID:
Cont. “So, given the Calvinist system, only the ones who have been told by the HS that he is one of the elect can really have any assurance--everyone else has to look into one's self for ‘internal’ evidence.”
i) You deliberately misrepresent the “Calvinist system” when you habitually divorce the “internal” evidence from its external object–God’s promises.
ii) The Gospel promises are not unconditional promises. Rather, the Gospel promises are conditional promises.
They are promises to and for believers. They are not promises to Caligula or Stalin or Ivan the Terrible (to use your own examples).
They can only become promises to and for unbelievers if and when unbelievers cease to be unbelievers. Gospel promises must be appropriated by faith.
“Lutheranism looks to the external evicence of Christ's acts on our behalf.”
And according to Lutheranism, Christ acts on behalf of the damned as well as the saints.
So what do his acts on our behalf evidence, exactly? Nothing to distinguish one man’s eternal fate from another’s.
“I don't think it is ever useless to tell someone Christ died for him…”
That’s a malicious distortion of what I said. I gave a reason for my statement. And I was answering you on your own grounds in the process.
You respond by giving a deviously butchered version of what I actually said.
“But don't you see ow potentially dangerous it is to tell such a one to look into himself for ‘the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises are made’ when he is tormented by doubts of his salvation?”
It’s a good thing that you’re a Lutheran layman rather than a Lutheran pastor. What you’re trying to do here, which is truly despicable, is to exploit someone’s vulnerability to score theological points. I guess it’s all the same to you if you drove someone to suicide to score points.
I told the individual in question that he/she had no reason to fear. And I gave a perfectly sound reason. Those who commit the unforgivable sin are too hardened to give it a second thought.
If you want to attack Calvinism, go right ahead. But do not, I repeat, do not abuse this individual’s anxiety as a pretext to score theological points.
I will not permit you to do that here. I only responded at all because it was necessary to repair any damage you may have done. I hope it wasn’t irreparable.
“It is better by far to point him to the promises, wouldn't you agree?”
No, I wouldn’t agree. If someone fears that he committed the unforgivable sin, then pointing him to promises of forgiveness is pointless. For if he really committed the unforgivable sin, then he crossed a line of no return. No forgiveness in this age or the next, remember?
So it’s necessary to challenge the premise.
You’d make a lousy pastor. You have no capacity to listen to the individual across the table. Instead, you try to stamp everyone with your cookie-cutter bromide regardless of what they specifically told you.
1/30/2010 7:23 PM
STEVE SAID:
Cont. “Not futile, because it is the weight of sin to which the acts of Christ in history are directed. As I said, the difference between us is because we have different doctrines.”
Once again, you’re dissimulating. Was I referring to the “weight of sin” in the sense of objective culpability? No.
I was making the obvious point that unless someone feels guilty, feels “sinful,” then he has no motivation to turn to Christ.
Is there some reason you can’t honestly represent what people tell you? Do you always try to win a debate at any cost, by any expedient?
“Why is it duplicitous to tell someone what has happened in hoistory?”
Now you prop up one duplicitous statement with another duplicitous statement.
What was I responding to? Remember? Your statement that: “Well, Christ said I am baptized, so I have the gift of eternal life.”
That is false assurance. And it’s false assurance on your own grounds since you yourself don’t actually believe that everyone who been baptized is heaven-bound. So you made a very deceptive statement. And what is worse, you made it on a subject of utmost importance.
You then respond with a bait-and-switch: “Why is it duplicitous to tell someone what has happened in hoistory…”–as if that’s what you originally said, as if that follows from what you originally said, as if that’s what I was responding to.
“So telling someone that he is baptized is analogous to telling someone that, since he is hungry, he should use the food we provided for him which he has neglected. In the case of baptism as well as that of the food, there is an objective reality to which we have access.”
Once more, you’re dissimulating. You originally said: “Well, Christ said I am baptized, so I have the gift of eternal life.”
That’s an indicative statement. Fait accompli. Done deal.
Which is altogether different from treating baptism as merely a provision that an individual is then encouraged to take advantage of.
But your basic problem in all of this is that you seek a formulaic shortcut to the assurance of salvation.
Many theological traditions are guilty of this. They all have their gimmicks, viz. “I know I’m saved because I responded to the alter call on such-and-such a date.” “I know I’m saved because my church preserves apostolic succession.” “I know I’m saved because I was baptized as a baby!” “I know I’m saved because I’m a covenant child!” “I know I’m saved because I still observe the Julian calendar.” “I know I’m saved because I celebrate the Sabbath on Saturday instead of Sunday.” “I know I’m saved because I only use the KJV.”
The gimmick varies, but the psychology is interchangeable.
STEVE SAID:
EDWARD REISS SAID:
“I simply reject that categorization.”
The unforgivable sin is a biblical category. If Lutheran theology can’t make room for biblical categories, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“I am pointing out that a reprobate can lead an outwardly good life and a Christian can lead a more or less dissolute life--as the WCF states BTW.”
In Calvinism, a true believer can be a backslider. However, God also restores his backslidden children through divine chastisement.
“Given that, my point is quite relevant.”
It’s totally irrelevant to the unforgivable sin.
“And again we are pointed to the quality of our faith to prove to ourselves we are real Christians, instead of to the promises of Christ.”
The Bible itself encourages a measure of introspection and self-examination, viz. 2 Cor 13:5-6; 1 Jn 3:14; 5:10 (see commentaries by M. J. Harris on 2 Cor and Yarbrough for exegesis).
If Lutheran theology can’t make room for biblical counsel, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“I used the example of Judas. If you saw him after he betrayed Christ and had remorse and before he killed himself, would you be able to peer into his soul and see he is a reprobate? I don't think so, but perhaps you can. So, it is easy to extrapolate that to other reprobates.”
Now you’re confusing first-party assurance with second-party assurance. In the nature of the case, I only have direct access to my own mental states. The fact that I can’t be sure of someone else’s salvation doesn’t mean I can’t be sure of my own. Those are obviously two different issues.
Indeed, I discussed that distinction in some detail in the article (by James Anderson) that I referred you to. See the combox. So you’re raising objections I already dealt with.
“IOW, you have not shown a reprobate could be sorry for his sins and yet not be justified.”
Is it your position that the damned are justified? Isn’t justification contingent on saving faith? Was Suleiman the Magnificent justified by faith in Christ?
“Nor could you tell such a one Jesus died for him, as I keep pointing out.”
So I can’t tell Judas that Christ died for him. Big deal.
“Calvinism. In fact, I don’t see why this is even controversial--a Calvinist cannot tell anyone Christ died for him unless he somehow infallibly knows he is one of the elect.”
It isn’t my duty to give a second party that blanket assurance. A second party is responsible for his own assurance. I have no right to give him proxy assurance regardless of his spiritual status.
2/01/2010 8:55 AM
STEVE SAID:
“And unless a pastor can peer into someone's heart, he does not know if Christ died for him.”
It’s not the job of a pastor to take that upon himself. Christ is the mediator, not the pastor.
“You are once again either having the Christian look inside himself or perhaps have another look into his heart to discern if he is a ‘genuine’ Christian.’”
i) He’s “looking inside himself” in the same way he might examine a scan of his pacemaker. Although the pacemaker is inside of him, it didn’t originate with him. It was put there by someone else.
To see if the pacemaker is functioning properly isn’t an exercise in self-reliance.
Likewise, both John and Paul tell us that Christians normally enjoy the inner witness of Spirit. And they introduce this in polemical settings where that’s a ground of assurance and evidence of salvation (Gal 4:6; 1 Jn 5:10).
What’s “inside us” (the work of the Spirit) isn’t “us.” We’re not looking at ourselves, any more than scanning a pacemaker is looking at ourselves.
If Lutheran theology can’t make room biblical modes of spiritual attestation, then so much the worse for biblical theology.
ii) And you have a habit of dishonestly reducing the Reformed grounds of assurance to subjective grounds, even though, in Reformed theology, the subjective grounds and the objective grounds are complementary.
“I am not so sure of that. You assert it, but shouldn't that be proved beyond a reasonable doubt?”
It follows from the definition of an unbeliever. But if Lutheran theology can’t distinguish between believers and unbelievers, then so much the worse for Lutheran theology.
“I did no such thing. I told him Jesus died for him. That is, in a nutshell, the gospel promises. You disagree, but that hardly makes my actions ‘despicable.’”
i) You’re using a vulnerable individual as a theological football to score points. Yes, that’s despicable.
ii) If universal atonement is the gospel in a nutshell, then it’s odd that none of the evangelistic sermons in Acts say, “Christ died for you!”
iii) As I said before, if somebody fears that he committed the unforgivable sin, then telling him that Christ died for him does nothing to assuage his fears since that’s impotent to absolve the unforgivable sin.
You, however, refuse to engage the argument because you can’t accommodate anything that doesn’t shoehorn into the preset parameters of your Lutheran system.
“Ad hominem remarks are not strong arguments.”
Is there something about Lutheran theology that makes you that utterly sociopathic?
A person is not an argument. A vulnerable individual isn’t cannon fodder for you to win the argument.
If Lutheranism is that callous and tone-deaf to the rudiments of pastoral theology, then to hell with Lutheranism.
STEVE SAID:
WHEAT SAID:
"Do you agree with Gordon Clark when he says that belief must always have a proposition as its proper object?"
i) That's overstated. A 2-year-old believes in his parents. Has faith in them. But that doesn't involve a conscious proposition.
ii) Doctrinal propositions are a necessary component of saving faith.
iii) However, there is more to saving faith than orthodox belief. There must also be an appropriate attitude towards the truth.
The devil knows the truth, but he hates it. And he lives in willful defiance of the truth.
Saving faith includes a trustful attitude towards revealed truth.
Moreover, the Bible often speaks of a spiritual yearnings. A longing for God's presence. That also goes beyond mere belief.
Papacy and priesthood
Continuity
“The first Christians had no doubts about how to determine which was the true Church and which doctrines the true teachings of Christ. The test was simple: Just trace the apostolic succession of the claimants.
Apostolic succession is the line of bishops stretching back to the apostles. All over the world, all Catholic bishops are part of a lineage that goes back to the time of the apostles, something that is impossible in Protestant denominations (most of which do not even claim to have bishops).
The Church Fathers, who were links in that chain of succession, regularly appealed to apostolic succession as a test for whether Catholics or heretics had correct doctrine. This was necessary because heretics simply put their own interpretations, even bizarre ones, on Scripture. Clearly, something other than Scripture had to be used as an ultimate test of doctrine in these cases.”
http://www.catholic.com/library/Apostolic_Succession.asp
Discontinuity
“There was a second fundamental difference between Melchizedek and the Levitical priests. There was an established line of succession to the Levitical high priesthood. But this is not true of Melchizedek in Scripture. For the writer of Hebrews, engaged in the interpretation of Scripture, this was a crucial consideration. Scripture does not refer to any predecessor and it is silent concerning any successor. Consequently, there were no Scriptural limitations to Melchizedek’s life and work. He did not require priestly ancestry nor priestly succession to authorize his unique and unending priesthood,” W. Lane, Hebrews 1-8 (Word 1991), cxxxi.
Notice the antithesis between the Catholic priesthood and the priesthood of Christ. A chain of succession, linking successors to predecessors, is a key principle which underlies the Catholic priesthood. It must be stepwise.
By contrast, the Melchizdekian priesthood of Christ is fundamentally unsuccessive. Discontinuity is a key principle. It skips over everything in-between. A long jump from Melchizedek to Christ.
“The first Christians had no doubts about how to determine which was the true Church and which doctrines the true teachings of Christ. The test was simple: Just trace the apostolic succession of the claimants.
Apostolic succession is the line of bishops stretching back to the apostles. All over the world, all Catholic bishops are part of a lineage that goes back to the time of the apostles, something that is impossible in Protestant denominations (most of which do not even claim to have bishops).
The Church Fathers, who were links in that chain of succession, regularly appealed to apostolic succession as a test for whether Catholics or heretics had correct doctrine. This was necessary because heretics simply put their own interpretations, even bizarre ones, on Scripture. Clearly, something other than Scripture had to be used as an ultimate test of doctrine in these cases.”
http://www.catholic.com/library/Apostolic_Succession.asp
Discontinuity
“There was a second fundamental difference between Melchizedek and the Levitical priests. There was an established line of succession to the Levitical high priesthood. But this is not true of Melchizedek in Scripture. For the writer of Hebrews, engaged in the interpretation of Scripture, this was a crucial consideration. Scripture does not refer to any predecessor and it is silent concerning any successor. Consequently, there were no Scriptural limitations to Melchizedek’s life and work. He did not require priestly ancestry nor priestly succession to authorize his unique and unending priesthood,” W. Lane, Hebrews 1-8 (Word 1991), cxxxi.
Notice the antithesis between the Catholic priesthood and the priesthood of Christ. A chain of succession, linking successors to predecessors, is a key principle which underlies the Catholic priesthood. It must be stepwise.
By contrast, the Melchizdekian priesthood of Christ is fundamentally unsuccessive. Discontinuity is a key principle. It skips over everything in-between. A long jump from Melchizedek to Christ.
The Development Of The Canon (Part 2)
Dave Armstrong writes:
I referred to Eusebius' comments about "the degree of acceptance of the books among the churches". I wasn't addressing the canon of Eusebius. I was addressing what he said about the canonical beliefs of Christians in general.
I was aware of Eusebius' doubts about some of the New Testament books. I didn't "casually mention" him. But if the evidence suggests that Eusebius was in the minority on the issue of the canonicity of Revelation, then what would his minority view prove? And how does adding sources like Cyril of Jerusalem and Gregory Nazianzen to the discussion refute anything I said? As I mentioned in an article last year, Revelation seems to have been widely accepted early on, despite later disputes like the ones Dave is citing.
And he isn't interacting with the main point I was making. I was making the point that Eusebius tells us how widely accepted various New Testament books were among the churches, whereas we don't have such information on how widespread something like Irenaeus' view of the church was. I was pointing out that we have better evidence for the degree of acceptance of particular books of scripture than we have for the degree of acceptance of particular views of the church. To respond to such a point by citing Eusebius' rejection of Revelation and that book's absence from the canons of some other patristic sources is diversionary.
Dave does go on to address my main point to some extent, but not much. He writes:
Later on, I'll be addressing whether it's sufficient for Dave to appeal to the vague concept of "an authoritative, binding Church". But, for now, I'll note that I'm not aware of anything comparable to Eusebius' comments on the canon that could be cited in support of an infallible church.
Remember, I'm citing what Eusebius said about specific books and how they were viewed by Christians in general. It's not enough for Dave to respond by citing what "the fathers" allegedly believed about a concept as vague as "an authoritative, binding Church". As I said in my 2008 article that started this exchange, if Evangelicals are going to be asked to defend the highly specific twenty-seven-book New Testament, then their critics, such as Roman Catholics, should be expected to defend their own highly specific view of an infallible church. (My article was addressing those two concepts, a canon and an infallible church.) Eusebius was a church historian who had consulted many sources of earlier generations in the process of compiling his church history, and he often cites those sources on canonical issues. And what he reports about the degree of acceptance of the New Testament books among the churches seems generally consistent with the evidence we have from his day and from earlier generations. Eusebius was describing the views of Christians in general, not just "the fathers", and he was addressing specific books, not some vague notion like "an authoritative, binding Church".
The point I made in my 2008 article stands. We have better evidence for the widespread acceptance of the specific books of the Evangelical New Testament than we have for the widespread acceptance of the specific concepts that make up something like Dave's view of an infallible church.
Jason wants to casually mention Eusebius? He wrote about the book of Revelation (Apocalypse):
Among the books which are spurious should be reckoned . . . the Apocalypse of John, should it seem right. For, as I said, some reject it, while others count it among the acknowledged books.
(in Bruce, ibid., 199)
St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Sr. John Chrysostom, and St. Gregory Nazianzen all disputed the canonicity of Revelation.
I referred to Eusebius' comments about "the degree of acceptance of the books among the churches". I wasn't addressing the canon of Eusebius. I was addressing what he said about the canonical beliefs of Christians in general.
I was aware of Eusebius' doubts about some of the New Testament books. I didn't "casually mention" him. But if the evidence suggests that Eusebius was in the minority on the issue of the canonicity of Revelation, then what would his minority view prove? And how does adding sources like Cyril of Jerusalem and Gregory Nazianzen to the discussion refute anything I said? As I mentioned in an article last year, Revelation seems to have been widely accepted early on, despite later disputes like the ones Dave is citing.
And he isn't interacting with the main point I was making. I was making the point that Eusebius tells us how widely accepted various New Testament books were among the churches, whereas we don't have such information on how widespread something like Irenaeus' view of the church was. I was pointing out that we have better evidence for the degree of acceptance of particular books of scripture than we have for the degree of acceptance of particular views of the church. To respond to such a point by citing Eusebius' rejection of Revelation and that book's absence from the canons of some other patristic sources is diversionary.
Dave does go on to address my main point to some extent, but not much. He writes:
An authoritative, binding Church is all over the place in the fathers. I don't have time to reproduce all that again. It is displayed in many other papers of mine, and books.
Later on, I'll be addressing whether it's sufficient for Dave to appeal to the vague concept of "an authoritative, binding Church". But, for now, I'll note that I'm not aware of anything comparable to Eusebius' comments on the canon that could be cited in support of an infallible church.
Remember, I'm citing what Eusebius said about specific books and how they were viewed by Christians in general. It's not enough for Dave to respond by citing what "the fathers" allegedly believed about a concept as vague as "an authoritative, binding Church". As I said in my 2008 article that started this exchange, if Evangelicals are going to be asked to defend the highly specific twenty-seven-book New Testament, then their critics, such as Roman Catholics, should be expected to defend their own highly specific view of an infallible church. (My article was addressing those two concepts, a canon and an infallible church.) Eusebius was a church historian who had consulted many sources of earlier generations in the process of compiling his church history, and he often cites those sources on canonical issues. And what he reports about the degree of acceptance of the New Testament books among the churches seems generally consistent with the evidence we have from his day and from earlier generations. Eusebius was describing the views of Christians in general, not just "the fathers", and he was addressing specific books, not some vague notion like "an authoritative, binding Church".
The point I made in my 2008 article stands. We have better evidence for the widespread acceptance of the specific books of the Evangelical New Testament than we have for the widespread acceptance of the specific concepts that make up something like Dave's view of an infallible church.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Popes, antipopes, and hidden imams
The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam
Muhammad b. al-Hasan al- `Askari is the Twelfth Imam of the "Imamates" or "Twelve-Imam Shi’ites", al-Ithna Ashariyya, who form the second largest denomination in Islam after the Sunnis. He appears to have been born in 256 A.H./869 A.D. Four years later, after the death of his father al- `Askari, the eleventh Imam, he was hidden from the authorities of the `Abbasid caliphs as a precaution. His whereabouts were disclosed only to a very few of his followers. Four of his father's close associates became successive mediators between the Imam and his followers until the year 329/941. This period has been considered by the Imamites as the first or the short occultation (al-Ghayba) of the Twelfth Imam. During it the four Saf’irs directly supervised the underground religious and political activities
of the Imamites.
The last Saf’ir announced on his death-bed in 329/941 that the Twelfth Imam had decided not to appoint another Saf’ir and had entered into total occultation. The Imamites considered this declaration the beginning of the Twelfth Imam's second occultation, which has continued until the present time.
Because of the second occultation the series of Imams stopped at the number twelve. Accordingly the Imamites believe that the Twelfth Imam is al-Qa’im ("he who will rise"), whose rising was promised by the Prophet. For the Prophet is said to have predicted that a descendant of his daughter Fatima would rise with the sword and fill the world with justice and equity. For this reason the Imamites believe that he is still alive, but in a state of occultation until the moment of his rising at an unspecified time in the future.
The Imamate during the life of the last six Imams of the Twelver Imamites (al-Imamiyya al-Ithna ‘ashariyya) was distinguised by the many splits which occurred after the death of each Imam, who was considered by the Imamites as one of the twelve Imams, over the recognition of his successor. In spite of these repeated schisms, after a hard struggle each Imam was able to maintain the obedience of the majority of the followers of the previous Imam.
se the Imamites were distinguished from other Islamic denominatons by the principle of the designation of the Imam by his predecessor they seem to have found themselves in a critical situation after their Imam's death, since he had not designated his successor openly. Therefore the Imamite jurists had recourse to the traditions of the Prophet and his progeny to determine who was to be the Twelfth Imam.
A study of the claims of these factions reveals that there were apparently only five major schisms. However, each of these became further split over the theological and traditional arguments employed to support their claims. At any rate it seems important to set down the major claims of these schisms in order to achieve a clear conception of the Imamites at that time.
http://www.al-islam.org/occultation_12imam/
The Great Western Schism
In many dioceses, two bishops and two cathedral chapters emerged, with the very validity of the masses offered by the opposing sides coming under theoretical and actual physical attack. Pro-Urban bishops were barred entry to certain Sees and pro-Clement prelates to others. Serious Catholics looked upon the spectacle with an equal mixture of confusion and horror. Archbishop Peter Tenorio of Toledo prayed simply, in the Canon of the Mass, for the man who was truly pope, since he himself could not determine who that might be. Still, at least he continued to offer supplication. In some places, public worship ceased altogether. (Pastor, I, 141-146),
Supporters of Urban included most of the States of the Church, the Emperor, Flanders, England, and Portugal. Clement gained the backing of important sections of the hopelessly splintered Empire, such as Speyer and Mainz, along with Savoy, Scotland, and — after much soul searching and delay — Aragon, Castile, and Navarre. Many French prelates and the University of Paris were terribly troubled by the split. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of France accepted Clement in 1379 after an orchestrated public assembly of the sort perfected by the legalists of Philip the Fair to give that monarch's crimes a broad respectability. The University's coerced public stamp of arrival in 1383 led faculty and students who disagreed with the decision to leave for new centers of higher learning like Heidelberg and Lerida. Many cities and some states, like Naples, really could not make up their minds concerning whom they wished to support, or switched their allegiance due to dynastic changes. The mystic front eventually divided in two along with the rest of Christendom, Catherine of Siena remaining firmly with Urban, Vincent Ferrer and Peter of Luxembourg with Clement.
The Roman line of popes suffered due to its lack of administrative structures. It has a badly documented history. We know that Urban's situation remained forever troubled. He had miserable relations with his twenty-nine newly created Cardinals, some of whom he imprisoned, tortured, and put to death under atrocious conditions. Difficulties with Naples pursued him throughout his reign, while he continued the very abuses that he had so vigorously condemned when they were perpetrated by others. Prignani was followed onto the throne of Peter by a sick, badly cultivated, and impossibly simoniac Boniface IX (Pietro Tomacelli, 2 November 1389 - 1 October, 1404). Boniface was perpetually destitute and lived by dubious expedients, offering enough examples of sales of benefices and plenary indulgences, Jubilee corruption, and outright robbery to give credence to Nicholas de Clémangis' claim, in his book On the Ruin of the Church (1401), that "money was the origin of the Schism and the root of all the confusion." (Ibid., 146) He was succeeded by Innocent VII (Cosimo Megliorati, 17 October, 1404 - 6 November, 1406), and Gregory XII (Angelo Corrario, 30 November, 1406 - 4 July, 1415).
Avignon's line is much better known. It is also simpler to memorize. Clement VII, who died on 16 September, 1394, was followed only by the Aragonese Benedict XIII (Pedro de Luna , 28 September, 1394 - either 29 November 1422 or 23 May, 1423). Nevertheless, this one superhumanly wily figure, ordained a priest only after his election, gave the Roman popes more than a run for their money for the prize of greatest irritant to prostrate Christendom.
As the original protagonists of the Schism died, more and more contemporaries began to echo Archbishop Tenorio's fear that there might not be any definitive way to know who the true pope really was. Perplexity was accompanied by an expansion of local and national efforts to ensure self-protection. Aragon had very speedily organized its own Apostolic Camera to collect Church taxes. England soon re-enacted laws to fill the kingdom's bishoprics promulgated during earlier tiffs with the pre-1378 Avignon Papacy. Others then followed suit, with certain rulers beginning to enjoy the benefits of the game so much as to argue that there should be as many popes as there were political jurisdictions. Peter Suchenwirt related popular reactions to the situation in simple poetic form:
"In Rome itself we have a Pope — in Avignon another;
And each one claims to be alone — the true and lawful ruler.
The world is troubled and perplext — twere better we had none;
Than two to rule o'er Christendom — where God would have but one.
He chose St. Peter who his fault — with bitter tears bewailed;
As you may read the story told — upon the sacred page.
Christ gave St. Peter power to bind — and also power to loose;
Now men are binding here and there — Lord loose our bonds we pray!"
http://www.seattlecatholic.com/a060201.html
But the Schism, so many decades in duration, had not, exactly, ended "by the book", according to crystal-clear existing canonical rules. Just look at the complications involved in the solution to the problem again. How "legal" was the pressure exerted by Sigismund and the other secular powers and university scholars in gaining the desired results? Had it not precisely been the contention of the Church, since the time of the reforms of the eleventh century, that such intervention in the affairs of the Papacy was nefarious? What rendered this particular involvement permissible? What was the legality of the strange addition of national electors to the College of Cardinals in the Constance conclave? And what about the man elected? If Gregory XII really was the legitimate Pope, what did this have to say about the actions of Odo Colonna, one of his renegade cardinals? The future Martin V had, after all, fled Rome, taken part in the Council of Pisa, and helped to elect Alexander V and John XXIII. Why did he not have to do penance for his "schismatic" activity before becoming Supreme Pontiff? But, then again, how could he have humbled himself without rendering the abdication of his former master, Gregory XII, itself ludicrous? And what should one think of Alexander V? The next universally recognized Clement and Benedict took up the numbering that had been used by the Avignon pontiffs of those names (VII and XIII), therefore, historically identifying them as anti-popes. On the other hand, the next Alexander, Rodrigo Borgia, who ought, by right, to have styled himself the fifth of that line, assumed that he was the sixth. Does this mean that he believed Alexander V to have been legitimate? Apparently. If so, then how could the simultaneously reigning Gregory XII have also been the true pope? And why was Alexander's successor, John XXIII, not valid, as Angelo Roncalli appears to have made clear in 1958 by adopting the numbering previously used by Baldassare Cossa?
http://www.seattlecatholic.com/a060215.html
Sedevacantism
How appropriately did the late Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre on the occasion of his Suspension a divinis by Paul VI write the following reflection on June 29, 1976:
“That the Conciliar Church is a schismatic Church, because it breaks with the Catholic Church that has always been. It has its new dogmas, its new priesthood, its new institutions, its new worship, all already condemned by the Church in many a document, official and definitive.
Others hold the opinion of St. Robert Bellarmine in De Romano Pontifice (Chapter XXX):
“The fifth opinion (regarding a heretical pope) therefore is true; a pope who is a manifest heretic by that fact (per se) ceases to be pope and head (of the Church), just as he by that fact ceases to be a Christian (sic) and a member of the body of the Church. This is the judgment of all the early Fathers, who teach that manifest heretics immediately lose all jurisdiction.”
http://www.cmri.org/sedevac.htm
Muhammad b. al-Hasan al- `Askari is the Twelfth Imam of the "Imamates" or "Twelve-Imam Shi’ites", al-Ithna Ashariyya, who form the second largest denomination in Islam after the Sunnis. He appears to have been born in 256 A.H./869 A.D. Four years later, after the death of his father al- `Askari, the eleventh Imam, he was hidden from the authorities of the `Abbasid caliphs as a precaution. His whereabouts were disclosed only to a very few of his followers. Four of his father's close associates became successive mediators between the Imam and his followers until the year 329/941. This period has been considered by the Imamites as the first or the short occultation (al-Ghayba) of the Twelfth Imam. During it the four Saf’irs directly supervised the underground religious and political activities
of the Imamites.
The last Saf’ir announced on his death-bed in 329/941 that the Twelfth Imam had decided not to appoint another Saf’ir and had entered into total occultation. The Imamites considered this declaration the beginning of the Twelfth Imam's second occultation, which has continued until the present time.
Because of the second occultation the series of Imams stopped at the number twelve. Accordingly the Imamites believe that the Twelfth Imam is al-Qa’im ("he who will rise"), whose rising was promised by the Prophet. For the Prophet is said to have predicted that a descendant of his daughter Fatima would rise with the sword and fill the world with justice and equity. For this reason the Imamites believe that he is still alive, but in a state of occultation until the moment of his rising at an unspecified time in the future.
The Imamate during the life of the last six Imams of the Twelver Imamites (al-Imamiyya al-Ithna ‘ashariyya) was distinguised by the many splits which occurred after the death of each Imam, who was considered by the Imamites as one of the twelve Imams, over the recognition of his successor. In spite of these repeated schisms, after a hard struggle each Imam was able to maintain the obedience of the majority of the followers of the previous Imam.
se the Imamites were distinguished from other Islamic denominatons by the principle of the designation of the Imam by his predecessor they seem to have found themselves in a critical situation after their Imam's death, since he had not designated his successor openly. Therefore the Imamite jurists had recourse to the traditions of the Prophet and his progeny to determine who was to be the Twelfth Imam.
A study of the claims of these factions reveals that there were apparently only five major schisms. However, each of these became further split over the theological and traditional arguments employed to support their claims. At any rate it seems important to set down the major claims of these schisms in order to achieve a clear conception of the Imamites at that time.
http://www.al-islam.org/occultation_12imam/
The Great Western Schism
In many dioceses, two bishops and two cathedral chapters emerged, with the very validity of the masses offered by the opposing sides coming under theoretical and actual physical attack. Pro-Urban bishops were barred entry to certain Sees and pro-Clement prelates to others. Serious Catholics looked upon the spectacle with an equal mixture of confusion and horror. Archbishop Peter Tenorio of Toledo prayed simply, in the Canon of the Mass, for the man who was truly pope, since he himself could not determine who that might be. Still, at least he continued to offer supplication. In some places, public worship ceased altogether. (Pastor, I, 141-146),
Supporters of Urban included most of the States of the Church, the Emperor, Flanders, England, and Portugal. Clement gained the backing of important sections of the hopelessly splintered Empire, such as Speyer and Mainz, along with Savoy, Scotland, and — after much soul searching and delay — Aragon, Castile, and Navarre. Many French prelates and the University of Paris were terribly troubled by the split. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of France accepted Clement in 1379 after an orchestrated public assembly of the sort perfected by the legalists of Philip the Fair to give that monarch's crimes a broad respectability. The University's coerced public stamp of arrival in 1383 led faculty and students who disagreed with the decision to leave for new centers of higher learning like Heidelberg and Lerida. Many cities and some states, like Naples, really could not make up their minds concerning whom they wished to support, or switched their allegiance due to dynastic changes. The mystic front eventually divided in two along with the rest of Christendom, Catherine of Siena remaining firmly with Urban, Vincent Ferrer and Peter of Luxembourg with Clement.
The Roman line of popes suffered due to its lack of administrative structures. It has a badly documented history. We know that Urban's situation remained forever troubled. He had miserable relations with his twenty-nine newly created Cardinals, some of whom he imprisoned, tortured, and put to death under atrocious conditions. Difficulties with Naples pursued him throughout his reign, while he continued the very abuses that he had so vigorously condemned when they were perpetrated by others. Prignani was followed onto the throne of Peter by a sick, badly cultivated, and impossibly simoniac Boniface IX (Pietro Tomacelli, 2 November 1389 - 1 October, 1404). Boniface was perpetually destitute and lived by dubious expedients, offering enough examples of sales of benefices and plenary indulgences, Jubilee corruption, and outright robbery to give credence to Nicholas de Clémangis' claim, in his book On the Ruin of the Church (1401), that "money was the origin of the Schism and the root of all the confusion." (Ibid., 146) He was succeeded by Innocent VII (Cosimo Megliorati, 17 October, 1404 - 6 November, 1406), and Gregory XII (Angelo Corrario, 30 November, 1406 - 4 July, 1415).
Avignon's line is much better known. It is also simpler to memorize. Clement VII, who died on 16 September, 1394, was followed only by the Aragonese Benedict XIII (Pedro de Luna , 28 September, 1394 - either 29 November 1422 or 23 May, 1423). Nevertheless, this one superhumanly wily figure, ordained a priest only after his election, gave the Roman popes more than a run for their money for the prize of greatest irritant to prostrate Christendom.
As the original protagonists of the Schism died, more and more contemporaries began to echo Archbishop Tenorio's fear that there might not be any definitive way to know who the true pope really was. Perplexity was accompanied by an expansion of local and national efforts to ensure self-protection. Aragon had very speedily organized its own Apostolic Camera to collect Church taxes. England soon re-enacted laws to fill the kingdom's bishoprics promulgated during earlier tiffs with the pre-1378 Avignon Papacy. Others then followed suit, with certain rulers beginning to enjoy the benefits of the game so much as to argue that there should be as many popes as there were political jurisdictions. Peter Suchenwirt related popular reactions to the situation in simple poetic form:
"In Rome itself we have a Pope — in Avignon another;
And each one claims to be alone — the true and lawful ruler.
The world is troubled and perplext — twere better we had none;
Than two to rule o'er Christendom — where God would have but one.
He chose St. Peter who his fault — with bitter tears bewailed;
As you may read the story told — upon the sacred page.
Christ gave St. Peter power to bind — and also power to loose;
Now men are binding here and there — Lord loose our bonds we pray!"
http://www.seattlecatholic.com/a060201.html
But the Schism, so many decades in duration, had not, exactly, ended "by the book", according to crystal-clear existing canonical rules. Just look at the complications involved in the solution to the problem again. How "legal" was the pressure exerted by Sigismund and the other secular powers and university scholars in gaining the desired results? Had it not precisely been the contention of the Church, since the time of the reforms of the eleventh century, that such intervention in the affairs of the Papacy was nefarious? What rendered this particular involvement permissible? What was the legality of the strange addition of national electors to the College of Cardinals in the Constance conclave? And what about the man elected? If Gregory XII really was the legitimate Pope, what did this have to say about the actions of Odo Colonna, one of his renegade cardinals? The future Martin V had, after all, fled Rome, taken part in the Council of Pisa, and helped to elect Alexander V and John XXIII. Why did he not have to do penance for his "schismatic" activity before becoming Supreme Pontiff? But, then again, how could he have humbled himself without rendering the abdication of his former master, Gregory XII, itself ludicrous? And what should one think of Alexander V? The next universally recognized Clement and Benedict took up the numbering that had been used by the Avignon pontiffs of those names (VII and XIII), therefore, historically identifying them as anti-popes. On the other hand, the next Alexander, Rodrigo Borgia, who ought, by right, to have styled himself the fifth of that line, assumed that he was the sixth. Does this mean that he believed Alexander V to have been legitimate? Apparently. If so, then how could the simultaneously reigning Gregory XII have also been the true pope? And why was Alexander's successor, John XXIII, not valid, as Angelo Roncalli appears to have made clear in 1958 by adopting the numbering previously used by Baldassare Cossa?
http://www.seattlecatholic.com/a060215.html
Sedevacantism
How appropriately did the late Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre on the occasion of his Suspension a divinis by Paul VI write the following reflection on June 29, 1976:
“That the Conciliar Church is a schismatic Church, because it breaks with the Catholic Church that has always been. It has its new dogmas, its new priesthood, its new institutions, its new worship, all already condemned by the Church in many a document, official and definitive.
Others hold the opinion of St. Robert Bellarmine in De Romano Pontifice (Chapter XXX):
“The fifth opinion (regarding a heretical pope) therefore is true; a pope who is a manifest heretic by that fact (per se) ceases to be pope and head (of the Church), just as he by that fact ceases to be a Christian (sic) and a member of the body of the Church. This is the judgment of all the early Fathers, who teach that manifest heretics immediately lose all jurisdiction.”
http://www.cmri.org/sedevac.htm
We have a Pope!
In their wilderness wandering, Sedevacantists of the Catholic Diaspora have been searching high and low in their murky quest for the long-lost Apostolic See.
But I have glad tidings of great joy for Gerry Matatics and his faithful remnant. For after many perilous expeditions to far-flung regions of the globe, I finally found the hideout of the true succession:
Our Chief Apostle
Bishop Bonner's ministry began in the 1940s under the tutelage of the late Bishop Robert C. Lawson (1883-1961), founder of the Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith. His first pastorate was the Green Avenue Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ in Brooklyn, New York.
It was in 1944 that Bishop Lawson sent Bishop Bonner to Detroit to pastor the First Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ. It was a store front. Today, it is a two thousand and five hundred (2,500) seat edifice known as Solomon's Temple.
In 1961, upon the death of Bishop Lawson, Bishop Bonner became the pastor of the three thousand (3,000) member mother church, the Greater Refuge Temple in the village of Harlem in New York City.
Apostle Bonner currently pastors churches in Detroit, Michigan, New York City, Washington, D.C., Jackson, Mississippi, and Columbia, South Carolina. He is the Chief Apostle and Senior Prelate of the General Assembly of the Churches of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. This is an international body of churches. Under his administration, the assembly has grown from one hundred and fifty-five (155) churches in 1961 to over five hundred (500) churches and missions throughout the world. He has faithfully kept the charge of the founder Bishop Lawson to "Add Thou to It".
http://www.angelfire.com/al2/myhp/bonner.html
But I have glad tidings of great joy for Gerry Matatics and his faithful remnant. For after many perilous expeditions to far-flung regions of the globe, I finally found the hideout of the true succession:
Our Chief Apostle
Bishop Bonner's ministry began in the 1940s under the tutelage of the late Bishop Robert C. Lawson (1883-1961), founder of the Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith. His first pastorate was the Green Avenue Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ in Brooklyn, New York.
It was in 1944 that Bishop Lawson sent Bishop Bonner to Detroit to pastor the First Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ. It was a store front. Today, it is a two thousand and five hundred (2,500) seat edifice known as Solomon's Temple.
In 1961, upon the death of Bishop Lawson, Bishop Bonner became the pastor of the three thousand (3,000) member mother church, the Greater Refuge Temple in the village of Harlem in New York City.
Apostle Bonner currently pastors churches in Detroit, Michigan, New York City, Washington, D.C., Jackson, Mississippi, and Columbia, South Carolina. He is the Chief Apostle and Senior Prelate of the General Assembly of the Churches of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. This is an international body of churches. Under his administration, the assembly has grown from one hundred and fifty-five (155) churches in 1961 to over five hundred (500) churches and missions throughout the world. He has faithfully kept the charge of the founder Bishop Lawson to "Add Thou to It".
http://www.angelfire.com/al2/myhp/bonner.html
The Development Of The Canon (Part 1)
I addressed some canonical issues in previous responses to Dave Armstrong. And I wrote a series of articles on the subject last year. What I want to do in this post and some others to follow is respond to some of the other comments Dave has made about the canon in his recent series of posts responding to me.
Dave wrote:
As I mentioned in an earlier response to Dave, we have to distinguish between developments that are implied by apostolic teaching and developments that aren't. The amount of time it took a concept to first appear in the extant historical record or to reach a particular level of popularity isn't as important as whether the concept is an implication of what the apostles taught.
I've used a DNA illustration in the past. Jesus' humanity implies that He had DNA, so we conclude that He had it, even though we didn't develop an awareness of DNA until recently. If somebody had claimed, in the same year that DNA was discovered, that Jesus was six feet tell, would we place the two conclusions in the same category? Would we say that the two concepts developed in the same manner? No, since DNA is a probable implication of a person's humanity, whereas a height of six feet isn't an implication, but only a possibility. A human might be that tall, but we wouldn't conclude that he's six feet tall merely because he's a human.
As I've argued in previous responses to Dave and elsewhere, nothing the apostles taught implies a papacy, much less the entire Roman Catholic system of church infallibility. Thus, even if the twenty-seven-book New Testament first appeared in the extant historical record around the same time as the papacy, or even if the two attained a high level of popularity around the same time, we would still have to distinguish between the two. The canon is an implication of apostolic teaching. The papacy isn't.
In my first response to Dave, I replied to his comments about the Old Testament canon. I explained why he was wrong about the relevance of that canon to the context I was addressing. I also linked to an article in which I summarize an Evangelical argument for that canon. The Jewish consensus we appeal to predates the Christian consensus Dave appeals to.
If Dave is going to reduce church infallibility to "most of the explicit elements of the historic papacy", then the appropriate object of comparison would be some reduced form of the New Testament canon. To compare "most of the explicit elements of the historic papacy" to the entirety of the twenty-seven-book New Testament is misleading. The Catholic system of church infallibility involves more than a papacy.
And as I explained in an earlier response to Dave, forming a canon of scripture, which involves judging many documents written by many authors to different locations under different circumstances, is much more difficult than judging whether one individual has papal authority. We would expect a canon of scripture to take some time to develop, as we see with other canons of literature. But why would so much time be needed to discern that one bishop has universal jurisdiction? The idea that we should expect the two concepts to be discerned in a similar manner is unreasonable.
And what claims do Catholics make about the history of the papacy? Have they usually suggested that the doctrine was discerned in a way similar to how the canon was gradually discerned? Were forgeries like the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals intended to promote such a view of the papacy's development? Is that the impression you come away with after reading the First Vatican Council? Or after reading a Catholic apologist who writes about how necessary the papacy is for church unity? (How was unity maintained before an understanding of the papacy developed?) Or after seeing a Catholic argue that Peter acted as a spokesman for the disciples in the gospels because of his papal authority? Or that Peter was presiding as a Pope in Acts 15? Or that Victor acted as a Pope, exercising universal jurisdiction, during the Quartodeciman controversy? Etc. It seems that Catholics often try to have it both ways. On the one hand, they suggest that a papacy involving universal jurisdiction was understood in the earliest generations of church history. On the other hand, they appeal to doctrinal development when evidence is offered against an early understanding of the papacy and they're unaware of a way to overcome that evidence.
The twenty-seven-book New Testament canon and the papacy are similar in some ways. Both concepts seem to first appear in the extant historical record around the middle of the third century. But the reasoning offered to justify each is much different, as is their history following their first appearance in the historical record.
The canon is first found in Origen, whose qualifications for judging such a matter are significant. See here. The papacy is first found in the Roman bishop Stephen, a man about whom we have much less information, when he was acting in his own interests in a dispute with other Christians. As I documented in a previous response to Dave, Stephen's claim was denounced by bishops in the West and East. Though disputes over the canon continued after Origen's day, his twenty-seven-book canon wasn't nearly as controversial as Stephen's assertion of papal authority, and Origen's canon would go on to gain far more widespread acceptance over time. Stephen's church would accept Origen's canon, but the churches of the East would long reject Stephen's papal claims, as reflected to this day in Eastern Orthodoxy.
Dave wrote:
Jason now begins his [church] infallibility / canon of the Bible disanalogy. He claims that there was more consensus on the latter than the former. In fact, development proceeded in both cases, rapidly in the fourth century. Most of the explicit elements of the historic papacy were in place by the reign of Pope St. Leo the Great (440-461), which was not long after the formulation of the canon. The true late (and radical) development here was when Protestants decided to demote the Deuterocanon over a thousand years later.
As I mentioned in an earlier response to Dave, we have to distinguish between developments that are implied by apostolic teaching and developments that aren't. The amount of time it took a concept to first appear in the extant historical record or to reach a particular level of popularity isn't as important as whether the concept is an implication of what the apostles taught.
I've used a DNA illustration in the past. Jesus' humanity implies that He had DNA, so we conclude that He had it, even though we didn't develop an awareness of DNA until recently. If somebody had claimed, in the same year that DNA was discovered, that Jesus was six feet tell, would we place the two conclusions in the same category? Would we say that the two concepts developed in the same manner? No, since DNA is a probable implication of a person's humanity, whereas a height of six feet isn't an implication, but only a possibility. A human might be that tall, but we wouldn't conclude that he's six feet tall merely because he's a human.
As I've argued in previous responses to Dave and elsewhere, nothing the apostles taught implies a papacy, much less the entire Roman Catholic system of church infallibility. Thus, even if the twenty-seven-book New Testament first appeared in the extant historical record around the same time as the papacy, or even if the two attained a high level of popularity around the same time, we would still have to distinguish between the two. The canon is an implication of apostolic teaching. The papacy isn't.
In my first response to Dave, I replied to his comments about the Old Testament canon. I explained why he was wrong about the relevance of that canon to the context I was addressing. I also linked to an article in which I summarize an Evangelical argument for that canon. The Jewish consensus we appeal to predates the Christian consensus Dave appeals to.
If Dave is going to reduce church infallibility to "most of the explicit elements of the historic papacy", then the appropriate object of comparison would be some reduced form of the New Testament canon. To compare "most of the explicit elements of the historic papacy" to the entirety of the twenty-seven-book New Testament is misleading. The Catholic system of church infallibility involves more than a papacy.
And as I explained in an earlier response to Dave, forming a canon of scripture, which involves judging many documents written by many authors to different locations under different circumstances, is much more difficult than judging whether one individual has papal authority. We would expect a canon of scripture to take some time to develop, as we see with other canons of literature. But why would so much time be needed to discern that one bishop has universal jurisdiction? The idea that we should expect the two concepts to be discerned in a similar manner is unreasonable.
And what claims do Catholics make about the history of the papacy? Have they usually suggested that the doctrine was discerned in a way similar to how the canon was gradually discerned? Were forgeries like the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals intended to promote such a view of the papacy's development? Is that the impression you come away with after reading the First Vatican Council? Or after reading a Catholic apologist who writes about how necessary the papacy is for church unity? (How was unity maintained before an understanding of the papacy developed?) Or after seeing a Catholic argue that Peter acted as a spokesman for the disciples in the gospels because of his papal authority? Or that Peter was presiding as a Pope in Acts 15? Or that Victor acted as a Pope, exercising universal jurisdiction, during the Quartodeciman controversy? Etc. It seems that Catholics often try to have it both ways. On the one hand, they suggest that a papacy involving universal jurisdiction was understood in the earliest generations of church history. On the other hand, they appeal to doctrinal development when evidence is offered against an early understanding of the papacy and they're unaware of a way to overcome that evidence.
The twenty-seven-book New Testament canon and the papacy are similar in some ways. Both concepts seem to first appear in the extant historical record around the middle of the third century. But the reasoning offered to justify each is much different, as is their history following their first appearance in the historical record.
The canon is first found in Origen, whose qualifications for judging such a matter are significant. See here. The papacy is first found in the Roman bishop Stephen, a man about whom we have much less information, when he was acting in his own interests in a dispute with other Christians. As I documented in a previous response to Dave, Stephen's claim was denounced by bishops in the West and East. Though disputes over the canon continued after Origen's day, his twenty-seven-book canon wasn't nearly as controversial as Stephen's assertion of papal authority, and Origen's canon would go on to gain far more widespread acceptance over time. Stephen's church would accept Origen's canon, but the churches of the East would long reject Stephen's papal claims, as reflected to this day in Eastern Orthodoxy.
Saturday, January 30, 2010
The selective right of private judgment
Over at Called to Union with the Scarlet Woman, Michael Liccione has been conscientiously digging an ever deeper hole for the Catholic position:
“The chief difference between the old leadership of Israel and the Magisterium arises from the fact that divine revelation was definitively completed in Jesus, whereas it had only been unfolding gradually under the OC. Hence, the old leadership had the charism of authority, as Jesus said, but there is no suggestion that it had the charism of infallibility. The new leadership did and does, however, at least under certain conditions. If it didn’t, then the question whose interpretation of the sources conveying the definitive and complete revelation is binding as a matter of faith, rather than more or less persuasive as a matter of opinion, could not be answered with anything more than–well, opinions. We would be limited to the latter-day equivalents of warring parties like the Pharisees, Sadduccees, Essenes, etc. That would not compatible with the transmission of a complete deposit of faith from God in the flesh, or with the unity of his Body, the Church.”
i) Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this is the chief difference, Liccione is conceding that fallible private judgment was sufficient for OT Jews.
ii) He then says the church operates on a higher principle.
a) However, he doesn’t give an exegetical argument from the example of the NT church itself to substantiate this claim. Rather, we seem to have an a priori argument based on the allegedly unacceptable consequences of not having an infallible church.
b) And even on a priori grounds, it’s unclear why fallible “opinion” was sufficient to interpret OT revelation, but insufficient to interpret NT revelation.
Sure, the former is incomplete whereas the latter completes the former, but in both cases we’re dealing with divine revelation, and in both cases we’re dealing with the interpretation of verbal revelation.
Why is the possibility that OT/Second Temple Jewish leaders might misinterpret revelation tolerable, but intolerable in the case of church officers?
Was fidelity to God’s word any less important in OT times or Intertestamental times than it is during the church age?
Likewise, nothing could be more catastrophic than misinterpreting Messianic prophecy–which is what befell so many 1C Jews.
“Until the Pharisee/Sadducee/Essene split developed in the century or so before Christ, the two primary matters of dispute were how to apply the Law when in cases where it was not explicit, and how much weight to give the post-Mosaic ‘prophets’ and the ‘wisdom literature.’ Such disputes could not be resolved in the OC, which is why the Jews never developed a biblical ‘canon’ beyond the Pentateuch until the challenge of Christianity caused them to.”
I don’t know where he gets his information on the Jewish canon, but let’s waive that for now. Disputes over how to apply the law are pretty fundamental. Not to mention the “Pharisee/Sadducee/Essene” split.
Yet if those disputes were insoluble, because God didn’t see fit to introduce a mechanism for resolving such disputes, then why insist on the necessity of that mechanism during the church age?
“Revelation was not complete and definitive as yet, and the fullness of God’s people, i.e. the Church, had not yet developed. Hence, it was natural and inevitable that the Jews would get certain important matters wrong, which is one reason why Jesus and the Apostles had to set them right.”
Well, that’s also one reason God sent prophets to set them strait in OT times. Yet that was an extraordinary vocation, not a regular office.
“The situation became different once the Church was established as a covenant family open to all peoples, entrusted with the task of preserving, transmitting, and interpreting the complete and definitive divine revelation. At that point, it became crucially important for people to be able to identify, as a visible body not maintained by physical descent, God’s new covenant family as such before they could understand what the definitive divine revelation was.”
i) That’s an interesting theory, but it’s not an exegetical argument. The NT doesn’t give that rationale.
ii) Moreover, physical descent was never sufficient to faithfully preserve, transmit, and interpret divine revelation.
iii) In addition, the Jewish community of faith was always open to converts (e.g. proselytes and Godfearers). It was never confined to ethnic Jews (i.e. lineal descendents of Abraham).
iv) Furthermore, the Babylonian exile also blurs the argument from ethnic purity. Consider the status of the Samaritans.
v) You also had apostate kings and apostate high priests. So you couldn’t look to the institutional leaders for sure guidance in times of national apostasy.
Liccione is giving us a schematic description which has to steamroll far too much inconvenient counterevidence to be convincing or accurate.
“If the situation were reversed–that is, if people were in the position of having to identify and interpret the complete deposit of faith as individuals, so that they could then decide which visible body counted as the Church faithful to that deposit–then there could be no criteria other than personal opinion for determining which ecclesial community is the unitary, visible, historically continuous people whose leadership speaks with divine authority.”
i) Personal opinion is not a “criterion.” Personal opinion applies criteria.
ii) There is also a strangely blinkered quality to Liccione’s arguments. He acts as though there was all this intractable diversity in 1C Judaism, but God fixed all that with the advent of the Roman Magisterium.
Yet church history has been a history of theological diversity. It’s not as though everything changed once Peter became the first pope.
“Accordingly, infallibility in the NC is necessary if fidelity to the complete, definitive deposit of faith is to be anything more than fidelity to one’s own fallible interpretation of ‘the sources.’ One must first be able to identify some visible body as ‘the’ Church, the Body of Christ on earth speaking with his authority, before one can know by what authority disputed doctrinal matters can be resolved.”
i) Does this mean Liccione regards all the Lutherans and Anglicans and Baptists and Anabaptist and Presbyterians and Pentecostals as infidels?
ii) And what does he mean by “the” Church? How is “the” Church manifested in history? Why does Liccione treat the church like a franchise? The Church, Inc.?
Seems to me that Stephen, in Acts 7, as well as the author of Hebrews, in Heb 11, operate with a more nomadic view of God’s people. The remnant. The Diaspora.
“In the OC, God’s people were understood to be Abraham and his descendants. Given that physical bond, there was no dispute among God’s people about what the phrase ‘God’s people’ denoted. Accordingly, there was no dispute among about just which collectivity God had chosen as the special object of his love and the bearer of his self-revelation to man.”
That’s patently false. There are provisions in the Mosaic law to incorporate Gentile converts into the covenant community.
“If the Magisterium could always be wrong in its doctrinal determinations, then it would always and ultimately be up to the individual believer to decide which church leaders were orthodox and which were heretical, so that it would always and ultimately be up to individuals to decide who are the legitimate authorities of ‘the Church’ and who are apostates and usurpers.”
i) Don’t various books of the NT warn their readers to beware of false teachers? Is it not, then, incumbent on Christians to distinguish between true and false claimants?
ii) Isn’t Liccione deciding for himself which church leaders are orthodox and which are heretical when he opts for the Roman Catholic church over the LDS church or the Swedenborgian church?
iii) And what about times in Catholic church history when the true successor to Peter was in dispute? Is this man a pope or antipope? The real deal or a usurper?
So what about the times in church history when the Magisterium was a house divided? Who decides?
Or what about the Arian bishops? Was their succession in dispute–or their doctrine?
“In the final analysis, it would always be up to individuals to decide, on the basis of their own doctrinal opinions, which body of people is truly ‘the Church’ founded by Christ and which bodies were only pretenders.”
This assumes that you should view the church as a franchise. It’s then a question of “finding” and joining the one true franchise. There can only be one. Any other franchise must be a “pretender.”
McDonald’s versus Burger King–or Taco Bell, or Wendy’s, or IHOP, or KFC. In Liccione’s world, if you eat at one, then you can’t eat at the other. Instead, you must search and search until, by process of elimination, you discover the one true fast-food “chain.” But why should we accept that model in the first place?
Or, to switch metaphors, Liccione treats “the Church” as if he were rooting for his high school football team. You show your school Spirit by being loyal to the hometown team. You can’t be a fan of more than one team at a time. That would be treasonous.
It’s our team v. their team. Our school v. their school.
“On Catholic doctrine, it is not up to ‘the faithful,’ as individuals or in groups, to decide who are the legitimate authorities of the Church. The legitimate authorities of the Church are the bishops who stand in unbroken apostolic succession through the laying on of hands by other bishops.”
In which case the “legitimate authorities” are accountable to no one below them. Subordinates answer to superiors, but superiors never answer to subordinates. And in a fallen world, it isn’t hard to predict how that scenario plays out.
For someone who judges truth by consequences, Liccione is oddly myopic about the consequences of his own system. The priestly abuse scandal is just one case in point.
“The situation in OT times was different. The identity of the ecclesia, the ‘assembly’ of the people of God, was not in question, and what counted as fidelity to the covenant was not in question either. Fidelity to God was fidelity to the Law, which was mostly about doing certain things and avoiding others.”
But there was a crucial distinction between the tribes of Israel and the faithful remnant. There was a crucial distinction between physical circumcision and circumcision of the heart.
“A Jew knew when a leader was unfaithful to the covenant when that leader–be he priest, prophet, or king–violated the Law himself and/or caused others to do so. It was quite important for Jews not to follow that example, and it was not a difficult matter for the average Jew to decide; but it was only the ‘faithful remnant’ which persevered, because the siren song of ‘the world’ was too seductive, as it is for many today.”
Which takes for granted the legitimacy of private interpretation. Why does Liccione think it’s easier to interpret “the Law” than it is to interpret the NT?
“To be sure, there were always legitimate, duly recognized authorities in the OC, which is why Jesus preached (Matt 23): ‘The scribes and the Pharisees have taken their seat on the chair of Moses…’”
And what made them “recognized authorities”? Was it their institutional standing? But they had no institutional standing. Scribes and Pharisees didn’t have an official position in the way the Levitical priesthood did.
“For the average Jew under the OC, the pertinent question was whether the leaders of God’s people at any given time were following the precepts of the Law or not. To what extent were the leaders doing the specific things the Law prescribed and avoiding the specific things the Law forbade? That was not a hard question for any faithful Jew to answer in principle–if and when said Jew had the written Torah available to him, and also had the relevant information about what his leaders were doing. Now in one respect, the same is true for average Christians in the NC. If and when they know what church leaders should be doing and avoiding, it’s not that hard for average Christians to find out what their leaders are actually doing and avoiding, and then to assess their performance accordingly.”
That’s a pretty deadly concession, although Liccione will try to resuscitate his argument.
“But the controversial question for our purposes is how to fill out that ‘if and when’ clause when the matter at hand is what doctrines the leaders should be teaching as belonging to the deposit of faith, and what doctrines they should be condemning as incompatible with the deposit of faith.”
How is that the key question? Isn’t the key question the interpretation of any text? Whether or not a text is dealing with doctrine is secondary. For principles of interpretation remain the same, whether the text is dealing with doctrine or practice.
“When that is the question, average Christians have nothing so clear and simple as a rather small body of texts containing explicit commandments to do such-and-such things and avoid others.”
i) Why does Liccione think the ethical teaching of Scripture is so “clear and simple” that Christians can figure that much out on their own, but it requires the services of the Magisterium to clarify the doctrinal teaching of Scripture? That’s a highly artificial disjunction.
ii) Moreover, magisterial teaching hardly limits itself to doctrine. Magisterial teaching is also concerned with Christian ethics, viz. divorce, contraception, &c.
“Christians have a larger body of data, written and otherwise, conveying not merely the preparatory stages of divine revelation that we find in the OT, but the complete and definitive revelation in the God-man Jesus Christ.”
Actually, there’s a sense in which it’s easier to interpret the Bible once you know how the story comes out. Easier for us to interpret the OT now that we now where God was going with that story. Having read the ending, we see more clearly how the preparatory stages were leading up to that denouement.
So, by Liccione’s logic, there would be more need for a Jewish Magisterium than a Christian Magisterium.
“Hence it is of critical importance that there be a way of resolving doctrinal disputes which doesn’t leave believers merely with a human opinion about how to interpret the sources, but with statements that bear the credentials of Christ’s authority itself.”
Why is that of critical importance? Just because Liccione regards the consequences of not having that mechanism unacceptable? But how can he presume to say what is antecedently unacceptable?
Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Three Chapters controversy? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Photian Schism? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Avignon papacy? Or the Borgia papacy? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Reformation? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the priestly abuse scandal?
“Two pertinent things need to be said about that. The first is that one can see the apostolic hermeneutic developing throughout the New Testament, in such a way that there is no one point in the New Testament where one can safely say that no more questions need be asked, no more of the truth needs to become manifest over time.”
i) Sure, we can always ask more questions, but the real issue is whether the Bible answers all the questions that God intended to answer.
ii) For that matter, there are far more questions than the Magisterium has ever ventured to answer.
“But the Holy Spirit did not stop leading the Church, the ‘pillar and bulwark of truth,’ into all truth when the last Apostles died. The second point that must be stressed is that such a situation required that the duly ordained leadership of the Church inherit the authority of the Apostles to teach in Christ’s name and with his authority. If that were not the case, then the Church would have ceased being the pillar and bulwark of the truth, and that role would have been narrowed down, uselessly, to the writings that the Church leadership agreed were of apostolic origin.”
I own two Catholic commentaries on 1 Tim 3:15 (by Monsignor Quinn and Luke Timothy Johnson), neither of which interpret that verse in the way Liccione does. And these two are the major Catholic commentaries on that epistle.
“Rather, said writers all spoke as though they had inherited from the Apostles the same mantle of authority in and by the Holy Spirit.”
i) So did Joseph Smith, Brigham Young, Swedenborg, and Sun Myung Moon (to name a few).
ii) But I also suspect that Liccione is equivocating. For example, do the Apostolic Fathers presume to write Scripture?
“The chief difference between the old leadership of Israel and the Magisterium arises from the fact that divine revelation was definitively completed in Jesus, whereas it had only been unfolding gradually under the OC. Hence, the old leadership had the charism of authority, as Jesus said, but there is no suggestion that it had the charism of infallibility. The new leadership did and does, however, at least under certain conditions. If it didn’t, then the question whose interpretation of the sources conveying the definitive and complete revelation is binding as a matter of faith, rather than more or less persuasive as a matter of opinion, could not be answered with anything more than–well, opinions. We would be limited to the latter-day equivalents of warring parties like the Pharisees, Sadduccees, Essenes, etc. That would not compatible with the transmission of a complete deposit of faith from God in the flesh, or with the unity of his Body, the Church.”
i) Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this is the chief difference, Liccione is conceding that fallible private judgment was sufficient for OT Jews.
ii) He then says the church operates on a higher principle.
a) However, he doesn’t give an exegetical argument from the example of the NT church itself to substantiate this claim. Rather, we seem to have an a priori argument based on the allegedly unacceptable consequences of not having an infallible church.
b) And even on a priori grounds, it’s unclear why fallible “opinion” was sufficient to interpret OT revelation, but insufficient to interpret NT revelation.
Sure, the former is incomplete whereas the latter completes the former, but in both cases we’re dealing with divine revelation, and in both cases we’re dealing with the interpretation of verbal revelation.
Why is the possibility that OT/Second Temple Jewish leaders might misinterpret revelation tolerable, but intolerable in the case of church officers?
Was fidelity to God’s word any less important in OT times or Intertestamental times than it is during the church age?
Likewise, nothing could be more catastrophic than misinterpreting Messianic prophecy–which is what befell so many 1C Jews.
“Until the Pharisee/Sadducee/Essene split developed in the century or so before Christ, the two primary matters of dispute were how to apply the Law when in cases where it was not explicit, and how much weight to give the post-Mosaic ‘prophets’ and the ‘wisdom literature.’ Such disputes could not be resolved in the OC, which is why the Jews never developed a biblical ‘canon’ beyond the Pentateuch until the challenge of Christianity caused them to.”
I don’t know where he gets his information on the Jewish canon, but let’s waive that for now. Disputes over how to apply the law are pretty fundamental. Not to mention the “Pharisee/Sadducee/Essene” split.
Yet if those disputes were insoluble, because God didn’t see fit to introduce a mechanism for resolving such disputes, then why insist on the necessity of that mechanism during the church age?
“Revelation was not complete and definitive as yet, and the fullness of God’s people, i.e. the Church, had not yet developed. Hence, it was natural and inevitable that the Jews would get certain important matters wrong, which is one reason why Jesus and the Apostles had to set them right.”
Well, that’s also one reason God sent prophets to set them strait in OT times. Yet that was an extraordinary vocation, not a regular office.
“The situation became different once the Church was established as a covenant family open to all peoples, entrusted with the task of preserving, transmitting, and interpreting the complete and definitive divine revelation. At that point, it became crucially important for people to be able to identify, as a visible body not maintained by physical descent, God’s new covenant family as such before they could understand what the definitive divine revelation was.”
i) That’s an interesting theory, but it’s not an exegetical argument. The NT doesn’t give that rationale.
ii) Moreover, physical descent was never sufficient to faithfully preserve, transmit, and interpret divine revelation.
iii) In addition, the Jewish community of faith was always open to converts (e.g. proselytes and Godfearers). It was never confined to ethnic Jews (i.e. lineal descendents of Abraham).
iv) Furthermore, the Babylonian exile also blurs the argument from ethnic purity. Consider the status of the Samaritans.
v) You also had apostate kings and apostate high priests. So you couldn’t look to the institutional leaders for sure guidance in times of national apostasy.
Liccione is giving us a schematic description which has to steamroll far too much inconvenient counterevidence to be convincing or accurate.
“If the situation were reversed–that is, if people were in the position of having to identify and interpret the complete deposit of faith as individuals, so that they could then decide which visible body counted as the Church faithful to that deposit–then there could be no criteria other than personal opinion for determining which ecclesial community is the unitary, visible, historically continuous people whose leadership speaks with divine authority.”
i) Personal opinion is not a “criterion.” Personal opinion applies criteria.
ii) There is also a strangely blinkered quality to Liccione’s arguments. He acts as though there was all this intractable diversity in 1C Judaism, but God fixed all that with the advent of the Roman Magisterium.
Yet church history has been a history of theological diversity. It’s not as though everything changed once Peter became the first pope.
“Accordingly, infallibility in the NC is necessary if fidelity to the complete, definitive deposit of faith is to be anything more than fidelity to one’s own fallible interpretation of ‘the sources.’ One must first be able to identify some visible body as ‘the’ Church, the Body of Christ on earth speaking with his authority, before one can know by what authority disputed doctrinal matters can be resolved.”
i) Does this mean Liccione regards all the Lutherans and Anglicans and Baptists and Anabaptist and Presbyterians and Pentecostals as infidels?
ii) And what does he mean by “the” Church? How is “the” Church manifested in history? Why does Liccione treat the church like a franchise? The Church, Inc.?
Seems to me that Stephen, in Acts 7, as well as the author of Hebrews, in Heb 11, operate with a more nomadic view of God’s people. The remnant. The Diaspora.
“In the OC, God’s people were understood to be Abraham and his descendants. Given that physical bond, there was no dispute among God’s people about what the phrase ‘God’s people’ denoted. Accordingly, there was no dispute among about just which collectivity God had chosen as the special object of his love and the bearer of his self-revelation to man.”
That’s patently false. There are provisions in the Mosaic law to incorporate Gentile converts into the covenant community.
“If the Magisterium could always be wrong in its doctrinal determinations, then it would always and ultimately be up to the individual believer to decide which church leaders were orthodox and which were heretical, so that it would always and ultimately be up to individuals to decide who are the legitimate authorities of ‘the Church’ and who are apostates and usurpers.”
i) Don’t various books of the NT warn their readers to beware of false teachers? Is it not, then, incumbent on Christians to distinguish between true and false claimants?
ii) Isn’t Liccione deciding for himself which church leaders are orthodox and which are heretical when he opts for the Roman Catholic church over the LDS church or the Swedenborgian church?
iii) And what about times in Catholic church history when the true successor to Peter was in dispute? Is this man a pope or antipope? The real deal or a usurper?
So what about the times in church history when the Magisterium was a house divided? Who decides?
Or what about the Arian bishops? Was their succession in dispute–or their doctrine?
“In the final analysis, it would always be up to individuals to decide, on the basis of their own doctrinal opinions, which body of people is truly ‘the Church’ founded by Christ and which bodies were only pretenders.”
This assumes that you should view the church as a franchise. It’s then a question of “finding” and joining the one true franchise. There can only be one. Any other franchise must be a “pretender.”
McDonald’s versus Burger King–or Taco Bell, or Wendy’s, or IHOP, or KFC. In Liccione’s world, if you eat at one, then you can’t eat at the other. Instead, you must search and search until, by process of elimination, you discover the one true fast-food “chain.” But why should we accept that model in the first place?
Or, to switch metaphors, Liccione treats “the Church” as if he were rooting for his high school football team. You show your school Spirit by being loyal to the hometown team. You can’t be a fan of more than one team at a time. That would be treasonous.
It’s our team v. their team. Our school v. their school.
“On Catholic doctrine, it is not up to ‘the faithful,’ as individuals or in groups, to decide who are the legitimate authorities of the Church. The legitimate authorities of the Church are the bishops who stand in unbroken apostolic succession through the laying on of hands by other bishops.”
In which case the “legitimate authorities” are accountable to no one below them. Subordinates answer to superiors, but superiors never answer to subordinates. And in a fallen world, it isn’t hard to predict how that scenario plays out.
For someone who judges truth by consequences, Liccione is oddly myopic about the consequences of his own system. The priestly abuse scandal is just one case in point.
“The situation in OT times was different. The identity of the ecclesia, the ‘assembly’ of the people of God, was not in question, and what counted as fidelity to the covenant was not in question either. Fidelity to God was fidelity to the Law, which was mostly about doing certain things and avoiding others.”
But there was a crucial distinction between the tribes of Israel and the faithful remnant. There was a crucial distinction between physical circumcision and circumcision of the heart.
“A Jew knew when a leader was unfaithful to the covenant when that leader–be he priest, prophet, or king–violated the Law himself and/or caused others to do so. It was quite important for Jews not to follow that example, and it was not a difficult matter for the average Jew to decide; but it was only the ‘faithful remnant’ which persevered, because the siren song of ‘the world’ was too seductive, as it is for many today.”
Which takes for granted the legitimacy of private interpretation. Why does Liccione think it’s easier to interpret “the Law” than it is to interpret the NT?
“To be sure, there were always legitimate, duly recognized authorities in the OC, which is why Jesus preached (Matt 23): ‘The scribes and the Pharisees have taken their seat on the chair of Moses…’”
And what made them “recognized authorities”? Was it their institutional standing? But they had no institutional standing. Scribes and Pharisees didn’t have an official position in the way the Levitical priesthood did.
“For the average Jew under the OC, the pertinent question was whether the leaders of God’s people at any given time were following the precepts of the Law or not. To what extent were the leaders doing the specific things the Law prescribed and avoiding the specific things the Law forbade? That was not a hard question for any faithful Jew to answer in principle–if and when said Jew had the written Torah available to him, and also had the relevant information about what his leaders were doing. Now in one respect, the same is true for average Christians in the NC. If and when they know what church leaders should be doing and avoiding, it’s not that hard for average Christians to find out what their leaders are actually doing and avoiding, and then to assess their performance accordingly.”
That’s a pretty deadly concession, although Liccione will try to resuscitate his argument.
“But the controversial question for our purposes is how to fill out that ‘if and when’ clause when the matter at hand is what doctrines the leaders should be teaching as belonging to the deposit of faith, and what doctrines they should be condemning as incompatible with the deposit of faith.”
How is that the key question? Isn’t the key question the interpretation of any text? Whether or not a text is dealing with doctrine is secondary. For principles of interpretation remain the same, whether the text is dealing with doctrine or practice.
“When that is the question, average Christians have nothing so clear and simple as a rather small body of texts containing explicit commandments to do such-and-such things and avoid others.”
i) Why does Liccione think the ethical teaching of Scripture is so “clear and simple” that Christians can figure that much out on their own, but it requires the services of the Magisterium to clarify the doctrinal teaching of Scripture? That’s a highly artificial disjunction.
ii) Moreover, magisterial teaching hardly limits itself to doctrine. Magisterial teaching is also concerned with Christian ethics, viz. divorce, contraception, &c.
“Christians have a larger body of data, written and otherwise, conveying not merely the preparatory stages of divine revelation that we find in the OT, but the complete and definitive revelation in the God-man Jesus Christ.”
Actually, there’s a sense in which it’s easier to interpret the Bible once you know how the story comes out. Easier for us to interpret the OT now that we now where God was going with that story. Having read the ending, we see more clearly how the preparatory stages were leading up to that denouement.
So, by Liccione’s logic, there would be more need for a Jewish Magisterium than a Christian Magisterium.
“Hence it is of critical importance that there be a way of resolving doctrinal disputes which doesn’t leave believers merely with a human opinion about how to interpret the sources, but with statements that bear the credentials of Christ’s authority itself.”
Why is that of critical importance? Just because Liccione regards the consequences of not having that mechanism unacceptable? But how can he presume to say what is antecedently unacceptable?
Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Three Chapters controversy? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Photian Schism? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Avignon papacy? Or the Borgia papacy? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the Reformation? Why was it not unacceptable for God to allow the priestly abuse scandal?
“Two pertinent things need to be said about that. The first is that one can see the apostolic hermeneutic developing throughout the New Testament, in such a way that there is no one point in the New Testament where one can safely say that no more questions need be asked, no more of the truth needs to become manifest over time.”
i) Sure, we can always ask more questions, but the real issue is whether the Bible answers all the questions that God intended to answer.
ii) For that matter, there are far more questions than the Magisterium has ever ventured to answer.
“But the Holy Spirit did not stop leading the Church, the ‘pillar and bulwark of truth,’ into all truth when the last Apostles died. The second point that must be stressed is that such a situation required that the duly ordained leadership of the Church inherit the authority of the Apostles to teach in Christ’s name and with his authority. If that were not the case, then the Church would have ceased being the pillar and bulwark of the truth, and that role would have been narrowed down, uselessly, to the writings that the Church leadership agreed were of apostolic origin.”
I own two Catholic commentaries on 1 Tim 3:15 (by Monsignor Quinn and Luke Timothy Johnson), neither of which interpret that verse in the way Liccione does. And these two are the major Catholic commentaries on that epistle.
“Rather, said writers all spoke as though they had inherited from the Apostles the same mantle of authority in and by the Holy Spirit.”
i) So did Joseph Smith, Brigham Young, Swedenborg, and Sun Myung Moon (to name a few).
ii) But I also suspect that Liccione is equivocating. For example, do the Apostolic Fathers presume to write Scripture?
Orthodox objections to the Protestant canon of Scripture
Perry Robinson Says:
Patton’s article is confused and somewhat superficial. He confuses questions of knowledge with normativity. Everyone may begin from the same position with respect to knowledge but that is irrelevant to the question of whether everyone’s judgments are equally normative. A maigsterium is about normativity and not knowledge per se.
He also dismisses the problem without really engaging it, that of a continually revisionary belief system being seemingly inconsistent with a once for all revealed body of doctrine. Added to that is the implicit Pelagianism of seeing doctrine as a purely human reconstruction project. There are other mistakes like confusing certainty with knowledge, which has nothing to do with knowledge. If you know, you do not have to be certain and if you are certain you may not know, since certainty is a psychological disposition.
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2010/01/27/apostolic-succession-2-presbyterian-ordination/#comment-10340
This summarizes the Orthodox objection to the Protestant canon. Sorting through the various objections, Perry’s argument seems to be as follows:
i) Protestants can know the true canon of Scripture.
ii) Although Protestants can know the true canon, their knowledge may still fall short of certainty.
iii) Although the Protestant canon could be the true canon, their canon still lacks normativity.
iv) Because their canon lacks normativity, their canon is revisable.
And what do we make of that argument?
1.If the true canon can be an object of Protestant knowledge, then it what sense is their canon still revisable? It could only be revisable in case they held a mistaken belief in the canon. But, in that event, their believe wouldn’t count as knowledge.
2.As long as Protestants can know the true canon of Scripture, why is it necessary to append additional conditions like certainty or normativity? Why isn’t knowledge of the true canon sufficient?
Patton’s article is confused and somewhat superficial. He confuses questions of knowledge with normativity. Everyone may begin from the same position with respect to knowledge but that is irrelevant to the question of whether everyone’s judgments are equally normative. A maigsterium is about normativity and not knowledge per se.
He also dismisses the problem without really engaging it, that of a continually revisionary belief system being seemingly inconsistent with a once for all revealed body of doctrine. Added to that is the implicit Pelagianism of seeing doctrine as a purely human reconstruction project. There are other mistakes like confusing certainty with knowledge, which has nothing to do with knowledge. If you know, you do not have to be certain and if you are certain you may not know, since certainty is a psychological disposition.
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2010/01/27/apostolic-succession-2-presbyterian-ordination/#comment-10340
This summarizes the Orthodox objection to the Protestant canon. Sorting through the various objections, Perry’s argument seems to be as follows:
i) Protestants can know the true canon of Scripture.
ii) Although Protestants can know the true canon, their knowledge may still fall short of certainty.
iii) Although the Protestant canon could be the true canon, their canon still lacks normativity.
iv) Because their canon lacks normativity, their canon is revisable.
And what do we make of that argument?
1.If the true canon can be an object of Protestant knowledge, then it what sense is their canon still revisable? It could only be revisable in case they held a mistaken belief in the canon. But, in that event, their believe wouldn’t count as knowledge.
2.As long as Protestants can know the true canon of Scripture, why is it necessary to append additional conditions like certainty or normativity? Why isn’t knowledge of the true canon sufficient?
Friday, January 29, 2010
How Dave Armstrong Has Violated His Own Inconsistent Standards
Dave Armstrong continues to put up posts complaining that I haven't responded to enough of his material (here and here, for example). I and others have repeatedly pointed out the irrationality and inconsistency of Dave's standards and his failure to abide by those standards himself. See, for example, here.
Dave acknowledges that he's ignored some of my articles that have been written in response to him over the years. He wrote:
But he did reply to part of one of those "shorter replies", so his partial response to that article is an example of his failure to abide by his own standards. And I've given him other examples of partial replies he's posted in response to me. Here's his revised standard in a more recent thread:
Apparently, what Dave was saying was that it's acceptable for him to post a partial reply to me, in which he only interacts with a portion of what I said, as long as he does so as he's concluding his end of the discussion. So, he believes that it's acceptable for him to:
- Ignore entire posts written in response to him.
- Ignore portions, including a large majority, of posts in an ongoing discussion, as long as his partial response is coming at the end of his participation in the discussion.
But does Dave even abide by those standards? No, he doesn't. He recently claimed that he "cited 100% of Jason's words in all six of my recent lengthy replies to him." Yet, if you go to one of those six articles, you see Dave commenting:
And if you go to that thread to which he was responding, you can see that Dave did "pass over" many of my comments, neither quoting them nor responding to them. Much of what I wrote there was in response to an Eastern Orthodox poster, but not all of it was. Some of my comments were written in response to David Waltz, for example, when he was still a Catholic. And much of what I said in response to the Eastern Orthodox poster has some relevance to Catholicism and my own arguments on the subjects under consideration. If Dave is going to choose to ignore large portions of what I wrote, "for space' sake", including material in which I expand upon my arguments and address issues Dave would be addressing in his replies to me, then how can he claim to be consistent with his own professed standards? How can he claim to have "cited 100% of Jason's words"?
In my discussion with Dave on the doctrine of justification last year (see the comments section of the thread here), Dave didn't just ignore some of my material as he concluded his end of the discussion. He also ignored some of my material prior to that point, as the reader can see by comparing my posts to his.
For reasons I and others have explained to him, Dave's standards of judging what people should respond to and how they should respond to it are unreasonable. Considering how he's so often inconsistent with those standards, should we conclude that Dave agrees with us?
Dave acknowledges that he's ignored some of my articles that have been written in response to him over the years. He wrote:
It's true that I chose not to respond to two of Jason's shorter replies. (one was merely a short introduction; big wow). That was my choice, and people make those choices all the time. But when I do respond, I do so properly and respectfully, by dealing with the complete argument of my opponent, and not ignoring 88% of it, including major points and often the very heart (or aspects closely related to the heart) of the argument of my opponent. If an argument is made, I reply to it, and show exactly why I reject it, and I also usually offer what I think is a superior alternative.
But he did reply to part of one of those "shorter replies", so his partial response to that article is an example of his failure to abide by his own standards. And I've given him other examples of partial replies he's posted in response to me. Here's his revised standard in a more recent thread:
One must understand the key distinction between how one participates in a discussion as it is in process and how one decides to stop participating in one (for what could be many good and perfectly legitimate reasons).
Apparently, what Dave was saying was that it's acceptable for him to post a partial reply to me, in which he only interacts with a portion of what I said, as long as he does so as he's concluding his end of the discussion. So, he believes that it's acceptable for him to:
- Ignore entire posts written in response to him.
- Ignore portions, including a large majority, of posts in an ongoing discussion, as long as his partial response is coming at the end of his participation in the discussion.
But does Dave even abide by those standards? No, he doesn't. He recently claimed that he "cited 100% of Jason's words in all six of my recent lengthy replies to him." Yet, if you go to one of those six articles, you see Dave commenting:
I will pass over comments where there is no particular disagreement, for space' sake.
And if you go to that thread to which he was responding, you can see that Dave did "pass over" many of my comments, neither quoting them nor responding to them. Much of what I wrote there was in response to an Eastern Orthodox poster, but not all of it was. Some of my comments were written in response to David Waltz, for example, when he was still a Catholic. And much of what I said in response to the Eastern Orthodox poster has some relevance to Catholicism and my own arguments on the subjects under consideration. If Dave is going to choose to ignore large portions of what I wrote, "for space' sake", including material in which I expand upon my arguments and address issues Dave would be addressing in his replies to me, then how can he claim to be consistent with his own professed standards? How can he claim to have "cited 100% of Jason's words"?
In my discussion with Dave on the doctrine of justification last year (see the comments section of the thread here), Dave didn't just ignore some of my material as he concluded his end of the discussion. He also ignored some of my material prior to that point, as the reader can see by comparing my posts to his.
For reasons I and others have explained to him, Dave's standards of judging what people should respond to and how they should respond to it are unreasonable. Considering how he's so often inconsistent with those standards, should we conclude that Dave agrees with us?
The church question
The argument is (roughly) the following :
(1) If we know God’s purposes in giving the canon, then we can have certainty regarding which books belong to the canon.
(2) We know God’s purposes in giving the canon.
Therefore,
(3) We know which books belong to the canon. [from (1) and (2)]
Then the conclusion is:
(4) The 66 books of the Protestant Bible, and only those books, belong to the canon.
There are at least three problems with this argument, for a Protestant.
First, you can’t get to (3), from (1) and (2), unless you fill in more precisely what you know about God’s purposes in giving the canon. If, for example, you know that one of God’s purposes in giving the canon was to give the 66 books, and only the 66 books, found in Protestant Bibles , then you could go from (1) and (2), to (3), and from (3), to (4). But, then there would be no point of the argument, because you would have loaded the conclusion into the second premise, and so the argument would be question-begging.
If, however, you don’t know that giving the 66 books (and only those books) found in Protestant Bibles was one of God’s purposes in giving the canon, but instead know that God gave the inspired books (whichever ones those are) for the purpose of instructing His people, that does not entail (3). Nor does (4) follow.
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/01/the-canon-question/#comment-6305
The argument is (roughly) the following :
(1) If we know God’s purposes in giving the church, then we can have certainty regarding which church God has given.
(2) We know God’s purposes in giving the church.
Therefore,
(3) We know which church God has given. [from (1) and (2)]
Then the conclusion is:
(4) The Roman church, and only the Roman church, is the one true church.
There are at least three problems with this argument, for a Catholic.
First, you can’t get to (3), from (1) and (2), unless you fill in more precisely what you know about God’s purposes in giving the church. If, for example, you know that one of God’s purposes in giving the church was to give the Roman church, and only the Roman church, then you could go from (1) and (2), to (3), and from (3), to (4). But, then there would be no point of the argument, because you would have loaded the conclusion into the second premise, and so the argument would be question-begging.
If, however, you don’t know that giving the Roman church (and only the Roman church) was one of God’s purposes in giving the church, but instead know that God gave the church (whichever one [or ones] that is) for the purpose of instructing His people, that does not entail (3). Nor does (4) follow.
(1) If we know God’s purposes in giving the canon, then we can have certainty regarding which books belong to the canon.
(2) We know God’s purposes in giving the canon.
Therefore,
(3) We know which books belong to the canon. [from (1) and (2)]
Then the conclusion is:
(4) The 66 books of the Protestant Bible, and only those books, belong to the canon.
There are at least three problems with this argument, for a Protestant.
First, you can’t get to (3), from (1) and (2), unless you fill in more precisely what you know about God’s purposes in giving the canon. If, for example, you know that one of God’s purposes in giving the canon was to give the 66 books, and only the 66 books, found in Protestant Bibles , then you could go from (1) and (2), to (3), and from (3), to (4). But, then there would be no point of the argument, because you would have loaded the conclusion into the second premise, and so the argument would be question-begging.
If, however, you don’t know that giving the 66 books (and only those books) found in Protestant Bibles was one of God’s purposes in giving the canon, but instead know that God gave the inspired books (whichever ones those are) for the purpose of instructing His people, that does not entail (3). Nor does (4) follow.
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/01/the-canon-question/#comment-6305
The argument is (roughly) the following :
(1) If we know God’s purposes in giving the church, then we can have certainty regarding which church God has given.
(2) We know God’s purposes in giving the church.
Therefore,
(3) We know which church God has given. [from (1) and (2)]
Then the conclusion is:
(4) The Roman church, and only the Roman church, is the one true church.
There are at least three problems with this argument, for a Catholic.
First, you can’t get to (3), from (1) and (2), unless you fill in more precisely what you know about God’s purposes in giving the church. If, for example, you know that one of God’s purposes in giving the church was to give the Roman church, and only the Roman church, then you could go from (1) and (2), to (3), and from (3), to (4). But, then there would be no point of the argument, because you would have loaded the conclusion into the second premise, and so the argument would be question-begging.
If, however, you don’t know that giving the Roman church (and only the Roman church) was one of God’s purposes in giving the church, but instead know that God gave the church (whichever one [or ones] that is) for the purpose of instructing His people, that does not entail (3). Nor does (4) follow.
Christological filters
I was initially startled to find a recent post over at Energetic Procession that actually engages the text of Scripture. An exegetical critique of Presbyterian ordination.
Now, it’s almost unheard of for Perry Robison to even make a token gesture towards Biblical exegesis. His standing excuse is that Protestant hermeneutics and Orthodox hermeneutics are incommensurable. According to him, you can’t properly interpret the Bible unless you filter the Bible through the prism of Eastern Orthodox Christology.
However, there’s a reason why this post marks such a radical break with Perry’s MO. And that’s because, on closer inspection, it wasn’t posted by Perry at all. Instead, it was posted by Michael Garten.
The thrust in the post seems to combine Garten’s summary of Felix Cirlot’s analysis with some of Garten’s own supporting arguments.
For now I’m not going to comment on the specifics. Instead, I’ll make a general observation.
The post generates an unintended paradox. And that’s because, in his exegesis of 1 Tim 4:14 and 2 Tim 1:6, Garten doesn’t apply a Greek Orthodox Christological filter to the text. Rather, he simply applies his own logic to the text. It’s basically an exercise in logical analysis by comparing one text with another. There’s nothing distinctively Christological about his methodology.
And that, in turn, generates the paradox. Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that his interpretation is sound. If so, then he arrived at that interpretation without recourse a Christological lens.
So if we judge Garten’s argument by Robinson’s yardstick, then, at best, Garten accidentally arrived at the right destination. He got there in despite using the wrong hermeneutical roadmap.
So either we need Christological hermeneutics or we don’t. If Christological hermeneutics is a prerequisite to sound exegesis, then we can summarily dismiss Garten’s interpretation. But if his interpretation is sound, then Christological hermeneutics is superfluous. As it stands, his means subvert his ends.
Now, it’s almost unheard of for Perry Robison to even make a token gesture towards Biblical exegesis. His standing excuse is that Protestant hermeneutics and Orthodox hermeneutics are incommensurable. According to him, you can’t properly interpret the Bible unless you filter the Bible through the prism of Eastern Orthodox Christology.
However, there’s a reason why this post marks such a radical break with Perry’s MO. And that’s because, on closer inspection, it wasn’t posted by Perry at all. Instead, it was posted by Michael Garten.
The thrust in the post seems to combine Garten’s summary of Felix Cirlot’s analysis with some of Garten’s own supporting arguments.
For now I’m not going to comment on the specifics. Instead, I’ll make a general observation.
The post generates an unintended paradox. And that’s because, in his exegesis of 1 Tim 4:14 and 2 Tim 1:6, Garten doesn’t apply a Greek Orthodox Christological filter to the text. Rather, he simply applies his own logic to the text. It’s basically an exercise in logical analysis by comparing one text with another. There’s nothing distinctively Christological about his methodology.
And that, in turn, generates the paradox. Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that his interpretation is sound. If so, then he arrived at that interpretation without recourse a Christological lens.
So if we judge Garten’s argument by Robinson’s yardstick, then, at best, Garten accidentally arrived at the right destination. He got there in despite using the wrong hermeneutical roadmap.
So either we need Christological hermeneutics or we don’t. If Christological hermeneutics is a prerequisite to sound exegesis, then we can summarily dismiss Garten’s interpretation. But if his interpretation is sound, then Christological hermeneutics is superfluous. As it stands, his means subvert his ends.
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Church & canon
“Second, if given what we know about God’s purposes in giving the inspired books ‘it necessarily follows that He would guide His people (the Church),’ then Protestants will need to abandon ecclesial deism. It would be ad hoc to maintain that God will guide His Church to recognize the canon, but not guide His Church to recognize orthodoxy from heresy between 451 to 1517.”
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/01/the-canon-question/#comment-6305
Second, if given what we know about God’s purposes in giving the inspired books “it necessarily follows that He would guide His people (the Church),” then Catholics will need to abandon their selective ecclesial deism. It would be ad hoc to maintain that God will guide His Church to recognize the 66 books of canon, but not guide His Church to recognize orthodoxy from heresy at the Westminster Assembly.
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/01/the-canon-question/#comment-6305
Second, if given what we know about God’s purposes in giving the inspired books “it necessarily follows that He would guide His people (the Church),” then Catholics will need to abandon their selective ecclesial deism. It would be ad hoc to maintain that God will guide His Church to recognize the 66 books of canon, but not guide His Church to recognize orthodoxy from heresy at the Westminster Assembly.
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