Divorce, Part 1

TFan has posted a 2-part response to my discussion of divorce vis-à-vis domestic violence. In this post I’ll reply to part 1:

http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2012/10/understanding-divorce-from-biblical.html

The Lord hates divorce. That was one of the messages of the prophet of Malachi…So, naturally, I also hate divorce - and you should too.

Divorce is not the only thing the Lord hates. Given what God says about marriage in Eph 5 (to take one example), I’m sure that God also hates domestic violence.

Before we get further, though, it is perhaps important to provide a little background into what divorce is, in Biblical terms.

From a Biblical standpoint, a divorce is the husband putting away the wife. The classical passage is this: Deuteronomy 24:1-4…There is no similar provision for wives in the Old Testament law. A wife could not decide that her husband was unclean and write him a bill of divorcement and put it in his hand and send him out of her house. There was no category of women divorcing their husbands.

There are several serious problems with TFan’s appeal to Deut 24:1-4:

i) TFan doesn’t seem to grasp the nature of case law, even though I already went over that ground. OT case law is illustrative rather than exhaustive. It doesn’t cover every conceivable situation. Rather, when an issue arose which wasn’t specifically addressed in the Mosaic law, Jewish judges had to extrapolate from the nearest applicable law. So TFan’s argument from silence is fallacious.

Notice that TFan doesn’t even attempt to show that my explanation of case law is false. He simply ignores it.

I find it disappointing that he refuses to argue in good faith. When he raises an objection, and I present a counterargument, it’s incumbent on him to acknowledge and interact with the counterargument. For him to simply repeat the same objection, as if no response was offered, is intellectually frivolous.

ii) In addition, I presented another counterargument. To quote myself:

To begin with, the complementarian position is that masculine nouns and pronouns can include women. That follows both from the conventions grammatical gender and generic masculine usage as well as the theological fact that men can function in a representative capacity for women.

For instance, the soteriological and eschatological promises (or threats) of Scripture are often addressed to male referents, yet they implicitly include women. Women as well as men can be saved or damned.

Of course, masculine language is sometimes used to single out males. But there’s no presumption to that effect. Rather, that’s context-dependent.

i) In his latest response to me, TFan blows right past that. Once again, it’s disappointing when he refuses to argue in good faith.

ii) In addition, he’s arguing like a feminist or egalitarian. “Evangelical feminists” deny generic masculine usage. They assume that all grammatically masculine usage is gender-specific and gender-exclusive. TFan seems to share the same understanding. I find it odd that he’s siding with feministic hermeneutics.

iii) Regarding Deut 24:1-4: if you read it carefully, this statute didn’t authorize men to divorce their wives.

This statute doesn’t institute, command, or condone divorce. It’s really about remarriage after divorce rather than divorce proper. It takes a certain custom for granted, then protects the divorcée against certain consequences of the customary divorce.

iv) To take a comparison, the Mosaic law doesn’t ban prostitution across the board. Although prostitution is a sin, not all sins are crimes.

Rather, the Mosaic law takes the status quo (i.e. social reality of prostitution) for granted, then restricts it. Jews are forbidden from being prostitutes.

Likewise, Deut 24:1-4 doesn’t legitimate the right of a husband to divorce his wife under those circumstances. Rather, it takes the status quo (i.e. customary divorce) for granted, then limits remarriage under those circumstances–apparently to limit the harm done to the divorcée, who was divorced against her will.

v) Likewise, it doesn’t address divorce in general, but a very special case.

I’ll have more to say about this statute in a moment:

This is important to remember when dealing with the text of Scripture. It is easy to anachronistically apply contemporary cultural norms to the text. In an age when people are redefining marriage to include reference to same sex couples, one might think that Christians would be on their guard to remember that this is not the first redefinition of marriage.

That’s a nice exercise in well-poisoning. Remember, though, that the question at issue is whether wife-battery is grounds for divorce. Is that “redefining” marriage? Does TFan think wife-battery figures in the original definition of marriage, which contemporary cultural norms are trying to redefine out of marriage?

Regardless of what the practice may or may not have been, the "bill of divorcement" passage was inauthentically interpreted by the Jewish leaders, and this wrong interpretation was corrected by Jesus [Mt 5:31-32; 19:3-10; Mk 10:2-12; Lk 16:18].

Jesus' argument relies on the authority of the institution of marriage [Gen 2:22-24].

The apparent rabbinical view was that the "uncleanness" mentioned was anything that the husband found undesirable. Jesus, however, tightly confined the exception to adultery/fornication.

So, what the law says is that there is one legitimate ground of divorce, and that is fornication/adultery (see Jesus' own interpretation of Deuteronomy above).  Moreover, it was not supposed to be the mere suspicion of that fornication/adultery (for mere suspicion there was a remedy in Numbers 5).

Several more problems:

i) It’s odd that TFan also quotes the Markan and Lukan passages to establish adultery/fornication as the one legitimate ground of divorce, for those Synoptic variants lack the exceptive clauses in Matthew.

ii) This also illustrates the weakness of TFan’s argument from silence. One the one hand, Mark and Luke give no grounds for divorce. On the other hand, Matthew only gives a single ground for divorce.

iii) Moreover, the exceptive clauses in Matthew are worded in terms that apparently exclude any other grounds for divorce. Yet TFan will later concede that 1 Cor 7:15 offers an additional ground for divorce–desertion.

iv) It’s also unclear to me why TFan limits the exceptive clauses to “adultery/fornication.” As I pointed out before, porneia has a wider semantic range. It covers a range of sexual immorality, viz., adultery, fornication, incest, bestiality, and homosexuality.

Now, perhaps TFan would say that although the word has multiple meanings, the context of Matthew narrows the semantic scope.

Or he might say that although incest, bestiality, and homosexuality aren’t inherently adulterous, inasmuch as single men and women can commit these sins, yet they are adulterous if a married man or woman commits them.

But as it stands, his usage lacks due qualifications.

v) I’m also unclear on why he thinks fornication is grounds for divorce. In standard usage, fornication denotes premarital sex, in contrast to extramarital sex. Is he claiming that unless a man or woman is a virgin on their wedding night, that that’s grounds for divorce?

What about someone who was sexually active before he (or she) became a Christian? Is he debarred from marriage? Considering the fact that many 1C converts to Christianity were former pagans, it’s unrealistic to think most of them were celibate prior to marriage. For instance, Greek males typically deferred marriage until the age of 30. In the interim, they had recourse to prostitutes.

vi) For some strange reason, TFan seems to think Jesus is correcting the rabbinic interpretation of Deut 24:1-4. I don’t see where he finds that in the text. Rather, I see Jesus doing something more radical. Rather than correcting their misinterpretation of Deut 24:1-4, he corrects their misvaluation of Deut 24:1-4. He denies the normativity of Deut 24:1-4.

Jesus bypasses the appeal to Deut 24:1-4 by going back to Gen 1-2. He treats Gen 1-2 as the primary, normative passage, while he demotes Deut 24:1-4 to a pragmatic, ad hoc concession to the reality of sin.

Put another way, he abrogates Deut 24:1-4 by sidestepping and sidelining Deut 24:1-4. Jesus opposes Gen 1-2 to Deut 24:1-4.

vii) It doesn’t make sense to think Deut 24:1-4 alludes to adultery as the ground for divorce. The Mosaic punishment for adultery isn’t divorce, but execution. There’s a different statute that deals with adultery (22:22).

Based on linguistic and contextual evidence, Bock and Walton think Deut 24:1 has in view a chronic menstrual irregularity which renders the wife ritually impure, thereby precluding conjugal relations (cf. Lev 12:2-8; 15:14).

However, it’s unnecessary for us to identify the underlying condition. It’s sufficient to point out that adultery is contextually excluded.

For a post entitled “Understanding Divorce from a Biblical Perspective,” I’m afraid don’t see the evidence that TFan has actually done his exegetical spadework. It seems to be more a matter of rote prooftexting to retroactively validate a foregone conclusion.

In 1 Corinthians 7, Paul describes marriage and provides for the case of a believing spouse married to an unbelieving spouse.  Jesus and Paul command:

So, Paul announces the general rule that husbands and wives should stay together and if, despite this command, they separate they should only remain unmarried or be reconciled to their spouse.

Paul then turns to the specific case of unbelief.  Husbands are not to divorce their wives and women are not to leave their husbands over disbelief.  However, if an unbelieving spouse desires to break the marriage, the believing spouse is allowed to permit this.

This provides a second exception to the general rule.  The general rule is "no divorce," and the two exceptions are a breaking off of the marriage by an unbeliever and adultery/fornication.  For those of us who are Presbyterian, our confession of faith also affirms this (Westminster Confession of Faith 24:5&6).

There are no other grounds for divorce authorized in Scripture.  So, it gives me great sorrow to read Christian brethren promoting the idea of divorce in other cases.

For example, I recently read a Christian brother's blog, in which he tried to argue that "domestic violence" is a legitimate ground of divorce.  The Scriptures don't teach this, and our confession doesn't recognize this ground.

P.S. It might be interesting to get into the question of whether women should be permitted to divorce their husbands at all (given that the law does not provide for it), but that question goes beyond the scope of this post.

This is confused on several grounds:

i) To begin with, TFan has offered what appear to be contradictory statements on 1 Cor 7:15. In an earlier response to me, he said:

Turretinfan10/18/2012 2:50 PM

Where does the Bible ever speak of a woman divorcing her husband?

Turretinfan10/18/2012 4:01 PM

In 1 Corinthians 7 Paul addresses the issue of the attempted desertion of a believing spouse by an unbelieving spouse. You are right that a kind of gender neutrality is maintained. Neither a Christian man nor a Christian woman is to prevent the desertion of the unbelieving spouse. You should notice, however, that divorce is not mentioned. May I encourage you to re-read the context of the verse you quoted, and you will see the contrast between men divorcing and women leaving.

Here he seems to deny that 1 Cor 7 is even referring to divorce. “You should notice, however, that divorce is not mentioned.”

Yet in the same paragraph he also says “you will see the contrast between men divorcing and women leaving”–which seems to concede that it does address divorce, but limits that to a male prerogative.

Yet in the same paragraph he also says “You are right that a kind of gender neutrality is maintained.”

And in his latest reply, he says:

“There is some question about whether women ever divorced their husbands even in the NT era. There is no discussion about wives writing writs of divorcement for their husbands, and yet the discussion of marriage relationships is sometimes balanced (see Mark 10:11-12 and 1 Corinthians 7).”

But if the discussion is “balanced,” if  “a kind of gender neutrality is maintained,” then there’s no “contrast between men divorcing and women leaving.”

On the face of it, TFan is twisting himself in knots. I think the reason for his contradictory explanations is that he wants to reserve 1 Cor 7:15 as a prooftext for the right of men to divorce women, but not vice versa. Unfortunately for him, appeal to 1 Cor 7:15 either proves too much or too little. If it’s a prooftext for divorce, then it applies irrespectively to husbands and wives. The only way of denying that to women is to deny it to men.

Apparently, that’s why TFan is so equivocal in his treatment of 1 Cor 7:15.

ii) Sensing, perhaps, the inadequacy of his exegetical arguments, TFan tries to bolster his case by a last-ditch appeal to the Westminster Confession. But that’s an illicit appeal to authority. You can’t rightly invoke the WCF to leverage the interpretation of Scripture. Your exegesis just stand or fall on the merits.

iii) Moreover, his appeal to the WCF is self-defeating. For the WCF doesn’t confine the right of divorce to husbands. For the WCF says:

Adultery or fornication committed after a contract, being detected before marriage, gives just occasion to the innocent party to dissolve that contract. In the case of adultery after marriage, it is lawful for the innocent party to sue out a divorce and, after the divorce, to marry another, as if the offending party were dead (24:5).

That clearly applies without respect to gender, for wives as well as husbands can be the “innocent party.” Clearly a husband can be the “offending party.”

iv) That’s also the traditional understanding of the passage. As A. A. Hodge says, in his classic commentary on the WCF,

It is allowed by Paul to the Christian husband or wife deserted by their heathen partner.

v) In addition, the WCF is a 17C document. But 17C society was quite hierarchical. You had upperclass women and lower class men. For instance, when Richard Baxter married Margaret Charlton, he married up. She was his social superior. His father was genteel poor whereas her father was a wealthy justice of the peace.

Does TFan think Puritan or Anglican women in the 17C never had the legal right to divorce their husbands? If we’re going to interpret the WCF in its historical context, we have to take social class into account. Some women outranked some men. And that had legal implications.

Kosher laws

There’s an academic debate regarding the kosher laws. Why were some animals declared clean/edible while others were declared unclean/inedible? The animals themselves don’t seem to yield a consistent distinction.

For Christians, the question is, of course, fairly moot. Nevertheless, it’s still important for us to understand the Bible as best we can. And even in the case of obsolete OT laws, there is some time’s an underlying principle which is still germane to Christian  faith and practice.

Desi Alexander has a useful observation on the kosher laws:

Moreover, the food regulations made it difficult for an Israelite to participate in meals provided by non-Israelites…They also had the practical effect of limiting contact with other people, which might compromise Israel’s special status.

T. D. Alexander, From Paradise to the Promised Land: An Introduction to the Pentateuch (Baker, 3^rd ed., 2012), 263.

It’s worth expanding on this observation. Eating is frequently a social or communal activity. Humans normally like to eat with other humans. Friends or relatives. And when humans congregate to eat, that social activity as often accompanied by other social activities, during or after the meal. As long as they are spending time together to share a common meal, they do other things together.

This can be perfectly innocent, but it can also be an occasion to indulge in sinful social activities–like a gateway drug. 

By limiting the dietary choices of Jews, so that Jews and pagans didn’t consume the same food, God was thereby limiting the opportunity of Jews to get drawn into the social activities of pagans. Heathen social activities were often immoral or idolatrous. If you ate with pagans, you’d be tempted to do other things with pagans in the same setting. Opportunity and peer pressure kick in.

So even if the kosher laws seem to be arbitrary, they may have a perfectly reasonable rationale. If we find it hard to discern the rationale, that may be because the purpose is indirect. We’re focused on the dietary prohibitions rather than the impact of the dietary prohibitions. Yet the kosher laws may not be concerned with the intrinsic difference between clean and unclean animals (which is tenuous), but with the mediate effect of limiting social contact with pagans by limiting the menu.

There’s an asymmetry here. Gentiles could eat whatever Jews could eat, but not vice versa. Just as Christians can eat kosher food, but observant Jews can’t eat non-kosher food.

Likewise, Christians can participate a synagogue service, and pray Jewish prayers–but observant Jews can’t participate in a Christian service, praying Christian prayers (or singing Christian hymns). Indeed, that’s why the Birkat ha-Minim was introduced–to exclude Christians (although that’s disputed).

Although Christians aren’t bound by the kosher laws, there is a principle of prudence which carries over. It is generally wise to avoid social activities which would tempt you to commit sin. Even if the social activity is innocent in itself, it may place you in a social environment that’s morally and spiritually testing. It’s easier to sin when it’s so convenient. It’s easier to sin when everyone around you is sinning.

Think of college students who hit the bars on Friday night. They may come for dinner, but that’s not all they come for. Indeed, that’s not primarily what they are there for.

Get in by Grace, Stay in by Faithfulness?

This is Part 1:

http://heidelblog.net/2012/10/in-by-grace-stay-in-by-faithfulness:

To desire sanctity in God’s people is a very good thing. God clearly reveals himself in Scripture as desiring, even demanding it of his people. What Scripture teaches and what the Reformation rediscovered, however, is that making our acceptance with God in any way conditional upon our obedience or our cooperation with grace will never produce the sanctity desired.

Michael Licona And Dale Martin On Jesus’ Resurrection

Here’s a video of a recent discussion between Michael Licona and Dale Martin, concerning Jesus’ resurrection.

A mission without a mission field

Peter Enns and BioLogos are on a mission. Unfortunately for them, they are foreign missionaries, packed for travel, but they have no takers.

Not surprisingly, Enns & Co. usually come under fire from those on their right, but there are critics on their left. They try to snuggle up to the Darwinians, and use that as a weapon against Christians, but the bullet ricochets:

http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2012/10/15/biologos-suggests-that-much-of-the-bible-is-metaphor/

Preacher man

server10/23/2012 9:16 AM

"I don’t listen to his sermons."

Whose sermons do you listen to, or whose sermons do you recommend?

Just to clarify, when I said I don’t listen to his sermons, that doesn’t mean his sermons aren’t worthwhile. For me, it’s just a question of time management. I don’t generally consult sermons for exegesis.

Although it’s unusual, some professional Bible scholars are pastors. Of the top of my head, I can think of John Currid, Douglas Stuart, Paul Barnett, Iain Duguid, R. T. France, and Jim Hamilton. No doubt there are others.

I do think it would be good for Christians to read or listen to sermons by professional Bible scholars (conservative evangelical scholars). Expository sermons that are properly grounded in the sermon text, and not just tacked onto the text.

There are other preachers who are very good at practical theology. Martyn Lloyd-Jones is an obvious case in point. I believe you can now listen to his sermons for free.

And, yes, I’d recommend John Piper. He’s eloquent, theologically solid, and a careful exegete.

Honoring wives and mothers

Turretinfan

The primary objection to your argument was and is that you haven't demonstrated that it qualifies as a legitimate case for application of a fortiori. Once I raise the objection, the burden falls on you to demonstrate that it qualifies, not on me to somehow prove that it does not.

Actually, that’s wrong. The mere fact that somebody raises an objection doesn’t ipso facto shift the burden of proof. For his objection may be unfounded. Merely raising an objection doesn’t automatically create a prima facie presumption in favor of the objection. People often raise unreasonable objections to reasonable positions.

It’s not enough to raise an objection. Anyone can object to anything. The disputant continues to shoulder his own burden of proof. He needs to give his opponent a reason for thinking the objection raises a legitimate issue.

Take the case of false accusations. If someone accuses me of doing something I didn’t do, the mere allegation of wrongdoing doesn’t suddenly shift the burden of proof onto the accused. Rather, the initial onus lies on the accuser to present some plausible evidence to support his allegation. Only in that event does the burden of proof shift to the accused.

Likewise, when Christians say God is necessary to ground objective moral norms, many atheist quote “offensive” passages from the OT to disprove the claim. But the mere fact that they find those passages morally offensive doesn’t shift the burden of proof onto the Christian. The onus lies on them to show why the offending passages are, indeed, reprehensible–especially on atheistic assumptions.

Every argument has to start somewhere. Every argument has to take something for granted.

For instance, TFan said:

What makes you think that a wife has greater rights than a slave?

The argument was premised on the idea that slave is the lesser to wife being the greater. But that is not a premise I’m willing to accept without some reason.

I suspect most conservative Christians would find it off-the-wall to even think we need to argue that a wife has (or ought to have) a higher social standing that a slave.

Now, that doesn’t make it right, but it’s not as if my starting point is obviously unreasonable or dubious.

That said, it’s often useful to assume the burden of proof, even if that’s not incumbent on you to do so. For even if an objection is unfounded, it is often useful to demonstrate the groundless nature of the objection. But that’s not a given.

The illustration is just an illustration to help you see why your argument is not buttressed simply by identifying any way in which A is greater than B. You need more than that.

The objection could be briefly expressed this way: the argument you are using requires comparing two things that lie at different points on a single spectrum, with the second thing on the same side but farther from the dividing line that divides the spectrum; however, you haven’t established either that the two things are on the same spectrum or that the second thing is farther away from the dividing line that divides the spectrum.

That objection is unresponsive to some of the things I’ve already said. In this very thread (as well as follow-up post), I dealt some those objections when I said:

i) TFan hasn’t shown how marital obligations are different in kind from slavish obligations.

ii) Even assuming that they are different in kind, TFan hasn't shown how that's relevant to the comparison.

iii) Two things can be similar or identical at a higher level of generality, but dissimilar at a lower level of generality. TFan needs to show why specific differences vitiate the comparison. He needs to demonstrate that my comparison operates at the wrong level of abstraction.

iv) I wonder how his objections would cut against a fortiori arguments in Scripture, viz. Lk 13:15-16; 1 Cor 9:9-10. Are these the same kinds of things? They are clearly different in kind in some respects.

v) Now you seem to be saying the obligations could be comparable at a legal level, but not at a moral level. Legally of a kind, not morally of a kind. Yet you also say the two different kinds are “interrelated.”

These qualifications greatly complicate the nature of your objection.

Apparently you’d have to admit that even though the marital/slavish obligation is the same kind of obligation in one respect, that’s not the right kind of obligation to carry the a fortiori argument.

vi) Scripture classifies marriage as a type of “bond” service (cf. Rom 7:2; 1 Cor 7:15,39). Both husband and wife were bound to each other by marriage. So that’s analogous to slavery, without the pejorative connotations of slavery.

More specifically, your argument seems to rely on the following premises (my objections in parenthesis):

1) A wife has greater rights than a slave (a. the evidence you provide is actually explicitly the opposite - the slave has an explicit right never given to wives;

That’s an argument from silence. Scripture never gives wives an explicit right to relieve themselves. Does that mean they have no such right?

b. "rights" are an anachronistic framework in which to interpret OT law or its NT explication, "legal protections" would be a better framework).

i) It’s true that we should guard against the danger of imposing an anachronistic grid on OT legislation.

ii) However, the OT provisions aren’t confined to legal protections. They can also include privileges or prerogatives.

2) Wives have greater social status and grater social status implies greater rights (a. this isn’t actually a Scriptural teaching; b. male slaves had greater social status than female slaves, but had equal legal protection under the cited provision;

Of course, comparing menservants to maidservants is equivocal. You’re not comparing men to women, per se–or comparing women to slaves, per se.

To take a counterexample, noblewomen had authority over their slaveboys.

 c. in general, where the law provided different legal protection based on social status, the law provided more legal protection for those with lower social status, example, the wife who was also a slave had more legal protection than a normal wife)

You’re recasting the issue in terms of “legal protections.” But that’s simplistic and reductionistic. Let’s take some counterexamples:

i) In the OT, slavery was a demeaning condition. That’s why OT laws goes out of its way to limit the humiliation where Hebrew slaves are concerned. And that goes back to Israel’s experience in Egypt.

(An apparent exception is that Jews/Christians are God’s “slaves.” But that master/slave relation isn’t demeaning inasmuch as that’s grounded in two genuinely unequal parties.)

ii) By contrast, to be a Jewish wife is not inherently demeaning. It lacks the pejorative connotations of slavery. It’s not punitive. It’s not a misfortune.

iii) A wife and mother was the feminine counterpart to the husband and father in a way that a slave could never be a counterpart to the husband and father. Although the wife was subordinate to the husband, her relation to him was symmetrical in a way that’s not the case for a slave.

iv) Apropos (iii), there was a pecking order in a Jewish household. As one scholar notes:

Wives occupied the second rung in the social order of the household.

By contrast:

As noted earlier, in addition to the blood relatives, the Israelite family included a variety of individuals who had by their own choice or through economic necessity come to be associated with the household…Slaves, both male and female, occupied the lowest rung on the social ladder.

D. Block, “Marriage and Family in Ancient Israel,” K. Campbell, ed., Marriage and Family in the Biblical World (IVP 2003), 58-59,77.

v) Children were required to honor both parents (Exod 20:12; Deut 5:16). In Lev 19:3, the mother is even mentioned before the father as the obligatory recipient of filial honor. By the same token, children are condemned for dishonoring father and mother alike (e.g. Prov 20:20; 30:11-14,17).

By contrast, there’s no command to honor house slaves. In an honor/shame culture, higher honor is a mark of social rank.

vi) Wives could name children. In Scripture, naming is considered an exercise of authority. Indeed, that’s one of the complementarian arguments for male headship (Gen 2:19-20).

vii) Children were required to obey the instruction of mothers and fathers alike (Prov 1:8; 6:20).

viii) Malachi characterizes husbands who divorce their wives for illicit reasons as traitors and covenant-breakers (Mal 2:10-16). By contrast, slaves are, at best, employees–and often less.

ix) Paul discusses husband/wife relations as well as master/slave relations (e.g. Eph 5:22-33; 6:5-9). Both involve a degree of submission. But the wife clearly has a higher status than the slave. The husband has greater obligations to the wife than a master has to his slave. 

3) freedom from slavery is so closely analogous to freedom from marriage that if something warrants one kind of freedom it warrants the other (but obviously no one thinks that slave owners were bound by the law to permit unbelieving slaves to leave…

Which seems to be alluding to 1 Cor 7:15, but that’s a separate argument.

…nor does anyone think that adultery on the part of the master gave the slave freedom, nor did the death of the master free the slaves - if none of the things that explicitly justify liberation from marriage justify liberation from slavery, why should we think that anything that justifies liberation from slavery justifies liberation from marriage?)

Every argument from analogy has disanalogies. That’s the nature of the argument.

Notice, though, that TFan is trying to turn an a minore ad maius argument into an a maiore ad minus argument. But that misses the essentially asymmetry of an a fortiori argument. Whatever applies to the greater doesn’t apply to the lesser. They aren’t convertible.

An argument from the lesser to the greater takes the basic form:

A, what’s more B.

And to reiterate something I said before, how would TFan's dismissive approach apply to Biblical arguments from analogy, viz. Lk 13:15-16; 1 Cor 9:9-10?

Finally, what is TFan’s own position? To what is he opposing my position? To take two questions which come immediately to mind:

i) Does he think husbands have the right (duty, prerogative) to beat their wives under some circumstances?

ii) Does he think husbands have the right to divorce a wife on Biblical grounds (however defined), but a wife has no right to divorce her husband if he’s guilty of the very same offense?

And if he doesn’t like the paradigm of rights, we could easily recast the question: are the grounds for divorcing a wife the same as for a husband? Are there any grounds for divorcing a husband? 

The significance of the fourth day

The fourth day in Gen 1 poses a traditional crux interpretum. It appears to be out of sequence. For you have the diurnal cycle in place, on day 1, prior to the creation(?) of the sun on day 4.

Unbelievers treat this apparent anachronism as damning evidence for the prescientific character of the account. However, even if we deny the inspiration of Genesis, the narrator was certainly aware of the fact that daylight normally comes from sunlight. That’s not a scientific discovery. Indeed, people living before the advent of artificial lighting had to regulate their lives by daylight.

So even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Gen 1:14-19 is out of sequence, the dischronologous arrangement would be deliberate. A way of throwing something into high relief, in studied contrast to what surrounds it. But what?

In v14, the referent of “seasons” is ambiguous. Does it denote festal seasons or agricultural seasons? These are not mutually exclusive interpretations. Since Israel had an agrarian economy as well as a religious calendar, it makes sense if this reference sets the stage for farming as well as Jewish holidays later in the Mosaic.

On a related note, the “separation” motif (vv14,18) anticipates the distinction between sacred and profane in the Mosaic covenant.    

Assuming that 1:14f. has an agricultural connotation, that foreshadows the postdiluvian restoration of the agricultural cycle in Gen 8:22, which was disrupted by the yearlong flood.

Assuming that 1:14f. has a cultic connotation, that foreshadows the Mosaic law, with its sacred festivals and regulations distinguishing the sacred from the profane.

As I say, one doesn’t have to choose between these two interpretations. Both may well be in play.

Gen 1 is part of a literary unit, comprising the Pentateuch as a whole. And it was written for the immediate benefit of Jews in the wilderness, to prepare them for life in the Promised Land.

Assuming that these identifications are correct, that would account for the emphatic, nonsequential position of the fourth day. The placement of the fourth day prefigures these later events or subsequent developments. A way of cuing the reader by accentuating the fourth day, which–in turn–throws emphasis on what follows. 

If it seems to be out of sequence, perhaps that's because it really is out of sequence. It is what it seems to be, as a part of the narrator's rhetorical strategy.   

Of course, whether the fourth day is actually out of sequence is disputable. But even if it were anachronistic, that would be intentional. A studied anachronism. And this would be the most likely explanation. As one commentator notes:
 

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If the Genesis 1 creation account is at least partly nonchronological, several puzzling problems can be easily solved. For example, how can it be that God “separated the light from the darkness” and that he “called the light ‘day’ and the darkness…’night’” on day 1 (1:4-5) if the sun was not created until day 4? The simplest answer would seem to be that these two days are not related to each other chronologically but that they both refer to the same event–the creation of the sun. Indeed, this would seem to be implied in 1:17-18 where it is stated that God set the sun “in the expanse of the sky…to separate light from darkness” (the latter phrase, in fact, is quoted directly from 1:4). In other words, we are told in Genesis 1:4 that God separated light from darkness and in 1:18 how he did it. R. Youngblood, The Book of Genesis: An Introductory Commentary (WS, 2^nd ed., 1999), 26-27.

Scientific enlightenment

And here I thought secular science was the royal road to moral enlightenment:

[warning: blue language ahead]

http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/19/furor-over-male-scientists-facebook-post-about-female-scientists#ixzz29qvMJgar

If you didn't know any better, you'd think these big-brained monkeys were acting like...big-brained monkeys.

Shedding crocodile tears for Paul Kurtz

 

Paul Kurtz, the grand old man of secular humanism, has died. Tributes are pouring in from secular outlets. However, his fellow infidels weren't so magnanimous when he was still alive. Stab him in the back, then mourn his demise:

http://richardcarrier.blogspot.com/2009/01/amherst-conference.html

http://rjosephhoffmann.wordpress.com/2010/04/15/the-heat-of-the-moon-a-crisis-for-inquiry/

Brady Bunch-less?

http://www.reformation21.org/blog/2012/10/brady-bunchless.php

Faith, Assurance, and “Resolute Confidence”

I’ve been in discussions with both Roman Catholics and Lutherans in recent weeks, on the topics of election and assurance, and after all that, this article caught my eye:

http://www.koinoniablog.net/2012/10/is-faith-merely-assurance-heb-111-monday-with-mounce-160.html

As you know, [Hebrews 11:1] is one of the more important verses in the Bible as it helps to define what “faith” is. I am always looking for new and clearer ways to define Christian terminology so that people outside the Christian tradition can understand — and for that matter, people within the tradition who tend to repeat words they don’t always understand. That’s what caught my eye.

This passage also points out the challenges of finding just the right English word for a Greek word. Sometimes, there just isn’t a word.

The NIV writes, “Now faith is confidence (ὑπόστασις) in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see” (also NLT). The problem with “confidence” ... is that it is too weak. I can be confident, and wrong. Other translations speak of “assurance” (ESV, NASB, NRSV). The NET says, “Now faith is being sure of what we hope for.”

The HCSB is getting much closer to what the word means: “Now faith is the reality of what is hoped for.” The NKJV speaks of “substance.” The NJB has, “Only faith can guarantee the blessings that we hope for.” You can see what they are all struggling to say. Faith is the bedrock, complete and total, conviction of what is true, even though the fulfillment lies in the future. This is the context for John Piper’s statement.

John [Piper] writes, “The closest thing we have to a definition of faith in the New Testament is in Hebrews 11:1, ‘Faith is the assurance (Greek: hypostasis) of things hoped for.’ That word ‘assurance’ can mean ‘substance’ or ‘nature’ as in Hebrews 1:3: ‘[Christ] is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature (hypostaseos).’ Therefore, it seems to me, that the point of Hebrews 11:1 is this: When faith pictures the future which God promises, it experiences, as it were, a present ‘substantiation’ of the future. The substance of the future, the nature of it, is, in a way, present in the experience of faith. Faith realizes the future. It has, so to speak, a foretaste of it — as when we are so excited about something and so expectant of it, we say, ‘I can already taste it!’”

I checked with Guthrie’s commentary, and George says much the same thing. “The word hypostasis, translated by the NIV as a participle (‘being sure’), is in fact a noun, which was used variously to communicate the idea of substance, firmness, confidence, a collection of documents establishing ownership, a guarantee, or a proof. It probably should be understood in 11:1, as in 3:14, in the sense of a ‘firm, solid confidence’ or a ‘calm courage’ with reference to things hoped for. Thus, we can translate this part of the verse: ‘Now faith is the resolute confidence….’ The examples that follow demonstrate a posture of firm confidence in the promises of God even though the believers had not yet received the fulfillment of those promises (11:39).”

We know that without faith it is impossible to please God (Heb 11:6). The one indispensable quality of a true followers of Jesus is that he or she is completely and totally convinced that Jesus is who he says he is and will do what he says he will do. We trust not in ourselves but him Jesus and what he did, does, and will do for us. In fact, the purest form of faith sees very little difference between looking forward in the present, and what it will be like to actually experience the future when our hope becomes reality.

Perhaps it is better to say that faith sees the future as our present reality, and we do so with resolute confidence.

Unlimited fill-in-the-blank

Arminians try to draw an invidious contrast between limited atonement and unlimited atonement. But that's equivocal. What do Arminians even mean by the atonement?

Take this book:

http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Atonement_Debate.html?id=sqZTEF4hjpwC

Two of the contributors are Joel Green and I. H. Marshall. They are premier Arminian NT scholars.

When Arminians promote unlimited atonement, is the "atonement" a placeholder to be filled in differently by different Arminians?

What the Rest of the Bible Says about Genesis

Dr. Pipa will be addressing the above issue on Thursday evening (25th) at 2nd Pres, Greeville SC.  This lecture will be Webcast live at 7pm.

http://www.creationstudygroup.org/

HT: Jeff Downs

Increasing The Impact Of A Romney Victory

What if you live in a state where Mitt Romney is well ahead of or well behind Barack Obama in the polls? Does it make sense to vote for a third party candidate or not vote in such a context?

 

Christ and Krishna

http://wincorduan.net/krishna-christ.html

On the eve of the election

Stein-Erik Dahle10/20/2012 1:37 PM

Hello friend.

This might come across as a bit harsh, but how can any intelligent christian person support Mitt Romney? He changes his position on ANYTHING depending on who he is talking to, including abortion, taxes, health care, you name it, and tells any kind of lies without flinching. I'm following your election here from Norway and I must say I'm astonished by all the obvious stupidity I witness.

 i) The allegation that Romney panders to his base, which is largely true, cuts both ways. When his base is more liberal (e.g. Massachusetts), his policies tack more to the left–but when his base is more conservative (e.g. national GOP candidate), his policies tack more to the right. Better a candidate who does the right thing for the wrong reason than a candidate who does the wrong thing, regardless of his motivations.

ii) No doubt Romney is a flip-flopper, but you’re exaggerating his vacillation. For instance, I think Romney is patriotic in a way that Obama is not. Romney’s not a self-hating American like Obama. He’s proud to be American.

Likewise, Romney’s a successful businessman, so when he campaigns for pro-business policies, that’s authentic. That’s something he really believes in. Shallow, but genuine.

By the same token, when he opposes a “government-centered” society, that’s consistent with his free market ideology. He believes in competition. He believes in capitalism.

In addition, there’s no evidence thus far that Romney would flout the rule of law (and thereby subvert representative democracy) the way Obama and his apparatchiks do.

iii) Are those the first things I value in a candidate? No. I’d prefer a culture warrior. But that’s not in the cards this election cycle.

iv) I’d also add that at this juncture, economics and social issues are interrelated. Democrats like joblessness. That’s a pretext to hike taxes. That increases dependence on government.

The more that Democrats co-opt the private sector, the more power they have to socially reengineer the country. Look at how they are using Obamacare, as HHS administers the program and “interprets” the law, under Kathleen Sebelius, to impose their social agenda on the nation.

So even though capitalism isn’t directly linked to the culture wars, moving away from a “government-centered” society (in Romney’s words) would contribute to the culture wars. The two issues are now linked.

Likewise, he's not going to nominate someone like Eric Holder for a key cabinet position. 

Romney’s a shallow man with a shallow value-system, but it facilitates a deeper, better value-system.

Ryan10/21/2012 7:25 AM

Jason,

I don't discourage voting. My interest lies in the idea that it doesn't make sense to vote for a third party candidate. I am not sure what message you think ought to be conveyed such that undecided voters in non-swing states - a number that even at this point in the process I would hesitate to call "few and far between" and certainly is more than 1% - should vote for Romney? We can talk about what "potential damage" that could be done of a relatively higher portion of the state voted for a third party candidate, but we could also talk about the actual damage the virtual two-party system has done. Even though we are speaking pragmatically, I see no reason to vote for Romney over Gary Johnson when I prefer the latter. I live in Georgia, a classic red state. Romney's going to win it this year, so I don't see any point in campaigning for a candidate who would not be my first choice. Maybe it would be different if I were in a swing state, though I admit I tend to be more of an idealist.

i) It’s true that in very red states or very blue states, you can cast a free vote. It won’t cost the election. That’s more relevant in politically competitive states.

ii) Mind you, I don’t think Gary Johnson is an improvement over Mitt Romney. I realized he’s the darling of some libertarians, but I never cared for his platform–even if he’d been a viable candidate.

The genesis of physics and physics of Genesis

http://creation.mobi/jim-mason-nuclear-physicist

Omnipresence, Multilocation, The Real Presence and Time Travel

“Omnipresence, multilocation, the real presence and time travel”, Journal of Analytic Theology, forthcoming

https://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/cv.html

This will clearly be a very ingenious argument for transubstantiation. However, I think I’ll wait until George Lucas makes the movie version. Science fiction is more entertaining to see, with popcorn and a girlfriend, than reading about it in a dry academic journal.

Of course, Lucas will have to come up with a catchier title. A movie called Omnipresence, Multilocation, The Real Presence and Time Travel is box office poison.

Although I don’t have access to the full script, my informant at Lucasfilm was able to leak me some of the details of the plot.

In the future a mad scientist (played by Brent Spiner) travels back in time to kidnap Thomas Aquinas (played by John  Goodman). The mad scientist is attempting to reproduce the miracle of transubstantiation in the laboratory, but he needs Aquinas to advise him on the theological niceties.

The true body and blood of Christ coexists in a plurality of eigenstates (superposition). The wave function collapses whenever the priest pronounces the words of consecration. At least, that’s the theory.

But the Angelic Doctor obstinately refuses to assist the mad scientist on the grounds that it would be impious to artificially transubstantiate the communion elements.

The mad scientist then kidnaps Pope Benedict XVII (played by Maximilian Schell). If the pope commands Aquinas to advise him, the mad scientist will stage the experiment in St. Peter’s Basilica, which will be a PR bonanza for the papacy–which never quite recovered after a papal butler posthumously revealed the scandalous fact that his namesake and predecessor, Benedict XVI, was a closet Buddhist monk who took orders from the Dalai Lama.

But before the mad scientists is able to demonstrate his theory, a militant atheist (played by Tom Hanks), in cahoots with the Prelate of Opus Dei (played by Mads Mikkelsen), kidnaps the mad scientist and sends him back to the Cretaceous period, where he has an unfortunate encounter with a Spinosaurus.

A Review of Rachel Held Evans’ A Year of Biblical Womahood

http://networkedblogs.com/DLfFg

Is God free?

I’m going to comment on a post by Roger Olson. The original post doesn’t seem to be directly available, but you can find it here:

http://relevancy22.blogspot.com/2012/03/does-god-always-do-wisest-thing.html

Many (not all) Calvinists argue that libertarian free will or, the power of contrary choice, is an incoherent concept. (E.g., Jonathan Edwards, Lorraine Boettner, R. C. Sproul, John Frame, John Piper, et al.)

i) It isn’t just “many Calvinists” who take that position. There are non-Calvinist philosophers who also take that position.

ii) Olson has a bad habit of citing random Calvinists. But if you’re going to attack a belief-system, then you need to attack its best representatives. That means you need to distinguish between popularizers and high-level thinkers. You also need to differentiate between different specializations. Are we dealing with philosophical theology? Exegetical theology? You need to target the best exponents of the relevant discipline. 

The reason is, they argue, that it amounts to belief in uncaused effects. They argue that people act according to their strongest motive.

Olson doesn’t stop to ask if that’s an accurate characterization or mischaracterization of libertarian freedom. Does he disagree with Calvinists who say libertarian freedom amounts to uncaused effects? Or does he agree with that characterization, but denies the incoherence of uncaused effects?

What I’ve often wondered is whether Calvinists who argue this believe God has power of contrary choice. If God has power of contrary choice, then it cannot be a strictly incoherent concept.

Well, that’s simplistic. They may think uncaused effects are incoherent in the case of contingent, timebound creatures. It wouldn’t follow that that’s incoherent in the case of a timeless, self-subsistent agent (i.e. God).

But to say God does NOT have power of contrary choice seems to make God a prisoner of creation; without power of contrary choice God’s decision to create would be necessary and that would make creation less than gracious and, in fact, a part of God’s own life – not a free act as if God could have done otherwise.

Yet Olson has also said:

We have run around this bush numerous times here and I tire of it (no offense intended). From an Arminian perspective, God knows because something happens; it doesn’t happen because God knows it. God’s foreknowledge corresponds to what happens; it does not cause it or even render it certain.

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2012/06/more-about-prayer-for-unsaved-loved-ones-and-friends/comment-page-1/#comment-31491

That makes God’s knowledge of the future dependent on the future itself. For instance, God’s knowledge of what human agents will do is caused by what they will “freely” do (in the libertarian sense), apart from divinely agency. Doesn’t that make God a “prisoner of creation”? His foreknowledge is contingent on the independent choices of his creatures. If his knowledge of the future is the effect of what they freely choose, if he is dependent on them for that information, then doesn’t that make him a prisoner of creation?

The way Jonathan Edwards attempted to get around this in The Freedom of the Will was to say that "God always does the wisest thing." Contemporary Calvinists who follow him closely agree. In other words, according to Edwards, God could have done otherwise than create the world, but he created the world because it was “most fitting” to do so.

My question is how this gets around the problem. To me it seems like a dodge; that is, it seems to attempt to answer the challenge without answering it. It seems like saying both at the same time – that God could have not created and that God could not have not created.

The question is simply this: Is it logically conceivable that God might not have created the world? Is it conceivable that God might have decided against this creation or any creation?

Edwards’ answer seems to say yes and no at the same time. That’s against the laws of logic UNLESS he can explain how the “yes” and the “no” are referring to different things. But in his explanation, they aren’t.

The question is: Is God the prisoner of his own wisdom (or of anything)?

i) Well, that’s a very different question. What’s the alternative? Is Olson suggesting that for God to have libertarian freedom, he must be free to think or act foolishly? Is Olson saying the God of Arminian theism is a fool?

ii) There’s a difference between saying God always acts wisely and saying God always does the wisest thing. We can affirm the former without affirming the latter.

IF one says that God “always does the wisest thing” WITH THE ASSUMPTION that there is always only ONE “wisest thing,” then how is one not making creation necessary and therefore not gracious? (A basic principle of theology is that what is by nature cannot be by grace. If I HAVE to rescue you, it’s not an act of mercy or grace.)

The upshot is, of course, that IF the creation and redemption of the world by God is truly gracious and not automatic, then God must possess libertarian free will, power of contrary choice. And if God possesses such, it cannot be an incoherent concept.

i) Olson is equivocating. Does he mean “gracious” in the sense of “gratuitous” or “gracious” in the sense of “merciful”?

ii) Moreover, since he seems to be using “gracious” in the soteriological sense, his objection undercuts a key plank of Arminian theology. Arminians routinely contend that God would be morally defective unless he made salvation available to everyone. But on Olson’s own definition, unless God is at liberty not to be gracious or merciful to sinner, then salvation isn’t really an act of mercy or grace.

It seems to me that to say “God always does the wisest thing,” implying by that that God must do such-and-such (e.g., create the world), is the same as to say that God is a machine and that the creation and redemption of the world is not by grace but by nature. Only if God really could have done otherwise than create can creation be by grace only. Grace cannot be compelled and still be grace.

I think Edwards skirted the issue and so do his followers who repeat his argument in one form or another. To say “God always does the wisest thing” is either to imply that God is an automaton, in which case creation and redemption are automatic and not gracious, or to imply that God COULD do that which is something other than “the wisest thing.”

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is a wisest thing to do, always choosing to do the wisest thing wouldn’t make God an “automaton” or a “machine.” Rather, it would mean God is benevolent and rational. God always does the wisest thing because that’s the most reasonable thing to do, and a good God is a reasonable God. Automata don’t act for reasons.

The alternative is for God to be unreasonable. Once again, is Olson admitting that the God of Arminian theism is unhinged?

Why assume that there is always only ONE “wise thing” to do – even for God? Why couldn’t it have been wise to create but also wise not to create? Of course, as any rationalist will ask, then why did God create? Was it simply an arbitrary choice – like throwing the dice?

However, I prefer to argue that for God, as for us, there are moments when two alternative options are equally wise and no controlling, determining factor interior (such as motive) or otherwise determines which option one must choose to be right.

I reject the notion that “God always does the wisest thing,” not because I think God is anything less than absolutely wise but because I don’t believe there is always only one “wisest thing” in every situation of choice between options. To avoid making creation and redemption other than gracious, we have to suppose that God really could have chosen not to create. To say “God always does the wisest thing” is to imply that God really could not have done otherwise.

i) Because Roger Olson inhabits an Arminian bubble, where he defines his position exclusively in reaction to Calvinism, he’s oblivious to the fact that the question of divine freedom is hardly confined to Calvinism. That’s an issue which cuts across various schools of thought in historical and philosophical theology. Arminianism is by no means exempt from the same considerations:

William Rowe, Can God Be Free? (Oxford University Press, 2004).

_____, “Divine Freedom,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-freedom/

http://philosophynow.org/issues/81/Why_Buridans_Ass_Doesnt_Starve

Arminians must also wrestle with the question of how or whether God is free.

ii) Historically, the question is bound up with two interrelated issues: (a) Is there a best possible world? (b) The principle of sufficient reason.

iii) There are different ways of engaging the argument. You can deny the existence of a best possible world. You can affirm the existence of a best possible world, but deny that God is obligated to instantiate the best possible world. You can deny the PSR, although that’s a very costly denial. You can also argue that the question poses a false dichotomy.

iv) Speaking for myself, I doubt the existence of a best possible world. I think there are better and worse possible worlds, but it’s not obvious to me that there’s a best possible world.

Among the better possible worlds, we have tradeoffs between incommensurable goods. These are incommensurable inasmuch as not all possible goods are compossible goods. One possible world encapsulates some goods to the exclusion of other goods. These can’t both be realized within the same timeline. Rather, they represent alternate timelines.

Let’s compare two possible worlds. In 1.0, Ethan marries Effie. They have a happy marriage. They have three kids, who turn out well.

In 2.0, Ethan marries Effie. They have two kids before Effie dies of cervical cancer. Ethan then marries Gwen, by whom he has two more children.

His son by Gwen betrays his (son's) best friend. Later, his son becomes a Christian, repents of his perfidy, and is reconciled to his old friend.

His daughter by Effie is so mad at God for letting her mother die that the daughter becomes a bitter atheist who goes to hell when she dies.

Which possible world is the better possible world? Well, 1.0 is better in the sense that it generally avoids the evils of 2.0. However, it avoids the evils of 2.0 by eliminating the goods of 1.0.

For one thing, Ethan has three kids by his second wife. They don’t exist in 1.0. In addition, Ethan’s son in 2.0 experiences redemption.

Although 2.0 has certain evils not found in 1.0, those are evened out by certain goods not found in 1.0.

So it’s hard for us to say which possible world is better overall.

v) But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that 1.0 is somewhat better than 2.0. Even so, is there some compelling reason why God should choose 1.0 over 2.0? I don’t see why.

“Better” for whom? There are people who go to heaven in 2.0 who don’t exist in 1.0. So 1.0 isn’t better for them! And there’s no corresponding good in 1.0, for they have no counterparts in 1.0.

Likewise, even if 1.0 is better overall, 2.0 may have a distinctive good which is better in itself. What if it’s a tradeoff between a possible world where the whole is greater than the parts, and a possible world where the parts are greater than the whole?

Is a possible world with some unique goods which are individually better than anything in another possible world less preferable? Is a more uniformly good world preferable to a world with higher highs and lower lows? Hard to say how we’d make that calculation.

But even if a more equitably good world is better overall, why assume that’s preferable to the alternative? What’s superior in one respect (whole greater than parts) may be inferior in another respect (parts greater than whole).

vi) For all we know, this is a false dichotomy. What if God doesn’t have to choose between instantiating one possible world rather than another? Perhaps God created a multiverse in which different forking paths actually play out in parallel worlds. (Which doesn’t mean God instantiates every alternative, just some.)

vii) But the issue is also bound up with the PSR. Alexander Pruss has offered a sophisticated exposition and defense of this principle:

The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge University Press, 2006)

“Leibnizian cosmological arguments,” W. L. Craig & J. P. Moreland, eds. Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009)

viii) There are stronger and weaker versions of the PSR. Let’s define the PSR thusly: Every contingent fact has an explanation. There’s a reason for every event.

What’s striking about the PSR is how closely that principle corresponds to predestination. According to predestination, everything happens for a reason. Indeed, there’s a good reason for whatever happens.

So it’s hard to attack predestination without attacking the principle of sufficient reason. But if Arminians attack the PSR, they will pay a very high price. That throws into question the rationality or intelligibility of the universe. If you question the PSR, you question our ability to explain anything. Where do we draw the line?

ix) However, commitment to the PSR doesn’t commit us to the proposition that God wasn’t free to choose otherwise. Rather, it simply means God had a good reason for choosing to make this world.

Here I’m tempted to throw back at the Calvinist his or her own argument that God’s choice of "some to save" and "others to damn" is not arbitrary without any hint at what might explain it. In other words, if it’s fair for the Calvinist to argue that divine selection is not based on anything God “sees” in the elect or the damned (that differentiates them) and yet is not arbitrary, then why couldn’t the person who believes in God’s power of contrary choice argue that God’s choice to create is not arbitrary even though no specific reason for it can be given?

This is one of Olson’s stock objections to Calvinism, as if that hasn’t been dealt with. Olson has a dishonest habit of repeating the same objections while ignoring the answers.

i) As I recently observed, in 1 Cor 1-3, Paul talks about God disproportionately electing or reprobating certain social classes. One might be tempted to say that makes election conditional, but that’s ambiguous–for in this case, God creates the distinguishing conditions. God determines when, where, and to whom you will be born. So God isn’t electing or reprobating individuals on account of their social class, as if that’s an independent variable. It’s not “conditional” in that sense.

Likewise, both Calvinists and Arminians say faith is a necessary condition of salvation. But in the case of Calvinism, faith is not an external factor which affects or effects the divine response. Rather, faith is a divine gift. That’s a condition which God himself supplies and satisfies.

In both cases, the condition is ultimately contingent or dependent on divine agency. Not something God responds to. Rather, our responsiveness, or lack thereof, is the result of divine agency.

Likewise, God can have reasons for electing one sinner and reprobating another sinners. But these are his reasons. They don’t take their source of origin in the creature. If God differentiates one creature from another, God made them different in the first place.

ii) Moreover, it’s not just a question of the individual, but his life-story. If God elected the same individual rather than reprobating said individual, that would result in a different life-story. Conversely, if God reprobated the same individual rather than electing said individual, that would result in a different life-story. And when you combine different life-stories, that, in turn, generates an alternate world history.

So God can have a reason for electing one person and reprobating another: he prefers one world history over another world history. Consider the chain-reaction triggered by God calling Abraham out of Ur. That sets in motion a long-range series of nested events, none of which would take place if God reprobated Abraham.

iii) Furthermore, Arminians don’t posit libertarian freedom for its own sake. Rather, they claim that’s a necessary condition for praise and blame. However, even if God had libertarian freedom, that doesn’t mean libertarian freedom is a necessary condition for praise or blame.

Now, it’s another thing entirely to argue that God possesses power of contrary choice but humans don’t. That’s a different argument. The natural answer is “Why?” If God possesses it, why couldn’t he give it to humans? There doesn’t seem to be anything about power of contrary choice that requires deity. It’s not like omnipotence, for example.

For one thing, that’s giving some humans godlike power over the fate of other humans. For instance, the past choices or choices of past libertarian agents create our present. The alternate possibilities they select become our realties. They shuffle the deck. We must play the hand they dealt.

Consider how Arminians construe Rom 14:15 & 1 Cor 8:11. They actually imagine that God has delegated to mere human beings the power to effectively damn their fellow human beings. To seal their eternal demise through the choices they made for them. Sinful, shortsighted men reprobating their fellow man.