steve said...
Peter Sean Bradley said...
“Catholics can't be ‘guilty’ of idolatry because (a) they give exclusive devotion to God as God and (b) know that Mary is not God. Shouldn't that end the discussion right there?”
No, that doesn’t end the discussion. Their devotion to Mary competes with their devotion to God.
“Yes, true, exactly. This is the point.”
No, that’s not the point–for reasons I give. The distinction is inconsequential.
“’Veneration’ means, inter alia, ‘respect’ or ‘honor.’ We ‘venerate’ our parents in some sense, but not in the same sense that we ‘venerate’ God. Yet, no one accuses people who honor their parents as being crypto-idolators.”
Since Catholics don’t venerate their parents the way they venerate Mary, your comparison is fatally equivocal.
Moreover, it’s quite possible for someone to idolize one or both parents.
“But in Viking ‘theology,’ if there was any such thing, Thor was as "divine" as it got.”
Which is irrelevant to the question of idolatry.
“On the other hand, because of about 2,000 of Christian theology, which is to say Catholic theology, no one says that Mary is consubstantial with the Trinity. Mary is a created being. End of story. Hence, the comparison to Thor is inapposite.”
You don’t know how to follow an argument. My argument didn’t turn on Mary’s consubstantiality with the Trinity. To the contrary, my argument made explicit allowance for such distinctions. Hence, your reply doesn’t leave a dent in my actual argument.
“But the Satan worshipper rejects the true good of God for the false good of Satan.”
Once again, you don’t know how to follow an argument. All you’ve done is to restate a premise of my argument, which does nothing to invalidate the conclusion.
“Catholics do not deny God any such honor by according Mary a position of the highest respect and describe her as God's greatest creation.”
Once more, you miss the point. Is there something about Catholicism that conditions you to suffer from this mental block?
Did my argument turn on equating Mary with God? No. The point of my argument was just the opposite. Try to get past your intellectual impediments so that you can engage the actual argument.
“First, do these ‘gods’ actually exist, and, if they do, are they actually demonic entities.”
Idolatry doesn’t depend on whether the idolatrous object is real or fictional. As long as the idolater believes it to be real, that’s sufficient. The ontological status of the object is irrelevant to the psychological state of an idolater.
“Second, doesn't this beg the question. I haven't heard any definition of ‘worship’…”
As usual, you’re unable to follow the argument. Is there something about Catholicism that conditions you so be so persistently uncomprehending?
I was simply responding to a Catholic argument with a counterargument. I haven’t, as of yet, tried to show that Marian devotion is idolatrous. Rather, I was clearing away some bad Catholic arguments against the possibility that Marian devotion is idolatrous.
“The bible teaches that Mary was to be called ‘blessed’ by all geneations. Where do Protestants follow this Biblical injunction?”
i) Mary was blessed to be the mother of the Messiah. See how easy that is?
ii) At this same time, this is a prediction, not an injunction.
“Are Protestants unbiblical for the way that they take Mary out once a year for Christmas, but for the rest of the year treat her as the embarrassing unmarried daughter who has to be kept out of sight.”
Since the Bible doesn’t enjoin us to “venerate” Mary in the way that Catholics do, the fact that we refrain from so doing is hardly “unbiblical.”
“No, she is the ‘functional equivalent’ of the Mother of God as defined at the Council of Ephesus in 431.”
And you honor her and pray to her the way pagans honor and pray to mother goddesses.
“How should the Mother of God be venerated?”
Mary should be honored in the same way the Bible honors her. No more and no less.
“Instead of assuming that the present Protestant approach to Mary - which was not shared by Calvin or Luther and is a minority position held by a small number of the total Christians who have ever lived for a comparatively brief time - is normal, perhaps Protestants would benefit by providing an apologia of their position.”
The church began with just 120 members in a private home. It was a miniscule sect within Judaism. By your yardstick, we should be reject the Messiahship of Jesus since that was a fringe position within mainstream Judaism.
“Here is what I see as a weird disconnect in this discussion - it seems that none of the Protestants interlocutors have engaged with who Mary is. Isn't it the case that before anyone can discuss whether Catholic devotions are ‘excessive’ they first have to answer the question of who Mary is?”
For an answer, try Who Is My Mother?: The Role and Status of the Mother of Jesus
~ Eric D. Svendsen.
“Further, Protestants should be willing to ask themselves whether they are being biblical in their Mariophobia.”
Further, Catholics should be willing to ask themselves whether they are being biblical in their Mariolatry.
“Lastly, what is ‘worship’? Does the Mormon approach to Jesus constitute ‘worship’ in a ‘biblical’ sense?”
It constitutes idolatry. Idolatry is a subset of worship: false worship. Mormonism is polytheistic. Mormon Christology is unscriptural.
“Presumably, everyone would agree that God's ability to sort and direct prayers to the correct saints would not be above His pay grade.”
Millions of daily prayers are directed to Mary. For God to redirect millions of daily prayers to Mary does nothing to solve the problem of how a finite human mind can process millions of prayers per day.
“If necessary I can supply the citations to Aquinas that back up what I'm indicating.”
Quoting one man’s opinion to prop up your opinion is not an argument. Aquinas is not a prophet.
“Obviously, that is a naked assertion, rather than an argument or an offer of empirical proof.”
i) I was responding to your naked assertion (clothed as a rhetorical question) that this “should end the discussion right there.”
ii) And empiricism is irrelevant. Idolatry is not simply a sense datum.
“It is, in essence, a statement of Steve’s belief about Catholics, rather than a statement of Catholic belief, which is why I have repeatedly questioned the ability of third parties to read the hearts and souls of others.”
i) “Empiricism” is not about reading hearts and souls. You don’t grasp the significance of the words and concepts you intone.
ii) Naturally we’d expect idolaters to deny that they are idolaters. So what? Suppose a Catholic were an idolater. Would he admit it?
Spiritual self-delusion is blind to the reality of its delusive thoughts and actions.
“If a person can’t read the soul of another, than comments like this constitute the sin of ‘detraction’ and unchristian conduct.”
We can judge idolatry by the x-ray vision of Scripture.
“For example, ought a husband to have a devotion to his wife?”
The marital analogy is only as good as the Marian analogue. But to play along with your analogy, there’s a reason OT Jews were forbidden to marry pagan women. Their heathen wives would lead them into idolatry. So thanks for bringing that up. It nicely underscores my point.
“It is not the case that devotion to Mary competes with devotion to God inasmuch as Mary is ordered to God.”
You’re citing one Catholic dogma to prop up another Catholic dogma. Viciously circular.
“I reiterate something that no one wants to deal with – Mary was the Mother of God.”
I reiterate something that no Catholic wants to deal with – God was the Father of Mary.
“The point that I made previously, which has been ignored, is that honor is relative to the person.”
And, for that reason, Catholics dishonor Mary.
“So, I ask again, what is the honor that is appropriate to the Mother of God?”
Answer: “While he [Jesus] was still speaking to the people, behold, his mother and his brothers stood outside, asking to speak to him. But he replied to the man who told him, ‘Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?’ And stretching out his hand toward his disciples, he said, ‘Here are my mother and my brothers! For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother’” (Mt 12:47-50).
“On the contrary, your argument has asserted that Catholics worship Mary as if she were God.”
Now you’re equivocating. I never said Catholics actually view Mary as a goddess. Rather, she’s the functional equivalent of a patron goddess. They pay lip-service to her humanity while elevating her to the practical status of a mother goddess.
The way of Roman might pray to Juno to placate the wrath of Mars. Since Mars is her son, his mother has leverage.
“Look, my point about the ordering of creation to God is not ‘rocket science.’ It has been around for millennia of orthodox Christian theology and is, you know, in the Bible.”
What you need to show is that Catholic Marian devotion is, you know, in the Bible. Your fallback appeal to Aquinas is a tacit admission that Catholic Marian devotion is not, you know, in the Bible.
“Do we agree with that. If so, doesn’t that make some different when you offer up wood nymphs as an example of idolatry, and then I respond that Mary is ordered to God.”
Crickets are also “ordered to God.” Do you pray to crickets?
“What about “MOTHER OF GOD”!!!!! makes you think that any of your analogies make sense?”
I realize it’s hard for you to break through your Pavlovian Catholic conditioning, but the analogies illustrate the point that an idolater doesn’t have to think the idolatrous object has the attributes of the Trinity to be an idolater.
“And that’s all there is to it?”
I responded to you on your own terms. You said, “The bible teaches that Mary was to be called ‘blessed’ by all geneations. Where do Protestants follow this Biblical injunction?”
My answer is directly responsive to your chosen framework.
“Her fiat meant nothing?”
Of course, that’s another bit of Catholic dogma rearing its ugly head. It’s not as if the angel Gabriel was bargaining with Mary. This was not a negotiation of terms. Rather, it was a formal announcement of God’s prior decision.
“And then her relationship with the Son of God ended?”
Once a mother, always a mother. But precisely because he is the Son of God, Mary has no special leverage. She’s the creature–he’s the Creator.
“What a cruel, cold, inhuman, heartless picture of our Savior you ascribe to.”
What a childish picture of our Savior you ascribe to.
“Hmmm….if it was a prediction it would seem that only one group matches this prophecy and it isn’t evangelical Christians. Shouldn’t that be a concern?”
To the contrary, evangelicals fulfill the prediction by honoring the terms of the prediction, whereas Catholics dishonor the name and memory of Mary by their sacrilegious impieties.
“So, how about repeating what the angel said to Mary – ‘Hail, Mary, full of grace, blessed art thou amongst women….’”
I’d be happy to repeat what the angel said if that’s what he said. Unfortunately for Catholics, Gabriel didn’t say that. The Greek word doesn’t mean “full of grace.” That’s a traditional mistranslation. In Greek, Mary is the object of divine favor, not the source of divine grace. That’s also clear from the context.
So, yes, I can agree with everything Gabriel actually said. Mary was the object of divine favor. And Mary was blessed to be the mother of the Messiah.
“Also, you might want to say ‘Holy Mary, mother of God, pray for us now and at the hour of our death.’”
And why would I want to say that? Does the Bible ever instruct me to say that?
“I mean, what could it hurt inasmuch as it is all orthodox Christian belief recognized by the Orthodox, Coptic, Nestorian, Jacobite and every other Christian church that existed prior to 1517.”
i) Actually, to utter an idolatrous prayer on my deathbed wouldn’t be a very propitious way of preparing to meet my Maker. Indeed, that could be quite harmful to my immortal soul.
ii) I’d add that Scripture never put much stock in the wisdom of the majority. Baal-worshipers outnumbered true believers in the time of Elijah. Pagans outnumbered Christians in the 1C.
iii) And to say it’s “orthodox” belief assumes what you need to prove. More to the point, is it Scriptural?
“You’re simply begging the question. You’re telling me that idolatry is false ‘worship’ but I’m asking whether Mormons ‘worship’ Jesus in the first place.”
Mormonism is irrelevant to my argument. That’s your hobbyhorse, not mine.
For the record, Mormons worship as false Jesus as if he were the true Jesus. That’s a form of idolatry. Idolatry takes many different forms. Mariology is another case in point.
“Is it worship when Mormons don’t pray to Jesus as the object of their prayers, but only pray to the Father?”
Since Mormons have a false doctrine of Jesus and a false doctrine of God, they are idolaters on both counts. To worship a false concept of God is a form of idolatry.
“I said no, and I said that the problem with this is that it treats the Creator as a creature, which was the heresy of Arianism.”
And Catholics treat the creature (Mary) as if she were the Creator, which is the heresy of idolatry.
“OK, so you’re saying that 'With God all things are NOT possible.'”
Unless you think Mary is a goddess, prooftexts for divine omnipotence are hardly prooftexts for Marian omniscience. The issue is not what is possible for the omnipotent Creator, but what is possible for a finite creature. The fact that you conflate the two nicely illustrates the way in which your Marian devotion is interchangeable with idolatry. Thanks for the confirmation.
“Well, yes it is if I am saying that a view is well-recognized as orthodox Christian belief, as opposed to a new-fangled innovation and the person lived in the 13th Century is recognized by all Christians as a fundamental shaper of Christian thought. But I guess it would be better to defer to ‘steve’ then to Aquinas about such matters.”
An elementary question which intelligent men to ask in such situations is whether the speaker is in a position to know what he’s talking about.
Aquinas was a brilliant man, but he was just a mortal like you and me. He knew nothing about the afterlife than what is revealed to us in the Scriptures. He didn’t die and return from the dead to tell us what he saw.
So, no, Aquinas knew no more about the Beatific Vision, or the postmortem activities of the saints, or their enhanced aptitudes, than Dr. Seuss.
But, as with so many other Catholics, you’re like a character in a novel of manners–where artificial rules of aristocratic etiquette are elevated to laws of nature.
“Of course, the circumlocution of ‘Mother of the Messiah’…”
“Mother of the Messiah” is no more circumlocutionary than “Mother of God.” They are syntactically equivalent (unless you think the anarthrous construction is highly significant.)
Thursday, November 05, 2009
Red pill-poppers and blue pill-poppers
Various SF films and TV shows (i.e. Harsh Realm, Total Recall, The Matrix) deal with the theme of characters that are trapped inside a virtual world.
Some characters have no awareness of the simulation. For them, virtual reality is reality. Other characters discern a larger reality behind the simulation.
So you have to types of characters: red pill-poppers and blue pill-poppers.
Blue pill-poppers deny the existence of a computer programmer. They point to “reality” and ask, “Show me the programmer? We can’t see him. We can’t find him.”
Red pill-poppers say that question misses the point. If the programmer exists, then he exists outside the program. In that sense, he’s absent from the program he designed. At most, he could write himself into the program as a virtual character.
But in another sense, the programmer is a ubiquitous. He designed the simulation. Activated the simulation. Although the programmer is intangible, your every tangible experience is the end-result of his design.
So he’s both absent from the program and omnipresent. Even if you never see him, he’s “there” in the sense that his program is there. He’s behind every simulated detail of the program you inhabit.
Some characters have no awareness of the simulation. For them, virtual reality is reality. Other characters discern a larger reality behind the simulation.
So you have to types of characters: red pill-poppers and blue pill-poppers.
Blue pill-poppers deny the existence of a computer programmer. They point to “reality” and ask, “Show me the programmer? We can’t see him. We can’t find him.”
Red pill-poppers say that question misses the point. If the programmer exists, then he exists outside the program. In that sense, he’s absent from the program he designed. At most, he could write himself into the program as a virtual character.
But in another sense, the programmer is a ubiquitous. He designed the simulation. Activated the simulation. Although the programmer is intangible, your every tangible experience is the end-result of his design.
So he’s both absent from the program and omnipresent. Even if you never see him, he’s “there” in the sense that his program is there. He’s behind every simulated detail of the program you inhabit.
Empirical evidence for God
I was asked to the following question: "If you were in a debate with an atheist and he asked you to give empirical evidence for God, what would you say?"
To which I answered:
I’d make a couple of preliminary observations before I tried to answer that question:
1.We need to clarify our expectations, and have reasonable expectations. It might obvious to some that if God exists, then his existence should be easy to prove. After all, if he exists, then shouldn’t that be fairly evident or conspicuous? He’s the source of everything else. The biggest fact of all.
However, there’s a paradox in proving God’s existence. Normally, when we try to prove that something exists, we use one thing to prove another. We take for granted the existence of something else, something related, and use that as a launch pad.
For example, we use time and consciousness as background conditions to prove other things. If, however, you were asked to prove the existence of time or consciousness itself, you might be stumped. It’s hard to come up with a non-circular argument for the existence of a background condition. Precisely because time and consciousness are so fundamental, they are resistant to direct demonstration. It’s hard to get “behind” them.
Because we see with our eyes, we never see our eyes. Not directly.
2.The answer to your question also turns, in part, on the precise form of the question or the implied audience. Is the question what empirical evidence would you cite to undergird your own belief in God? Or is it what empirical evidence would you cite for the benefit of someone who is not already a believer?
If, for example, you’re speaking for yourself, then depending the specifics of your religious experience, certain empirical evidence might dovetail with the argument from religious experience. For example, the argument from miracles could also count as empirical evidence in case you or someone you trusted had had a fairly unmistakable experience of God’s miraculous involvement in your life or his.
If, on the other hand, the answer is directed at outsiders, you might appeal to something more public.
3.Depending on how you define empirical evidence:
i) Among formal theistic proofs, I think the teleological argument has the most general appeal. And, as you know, there are different versions.
ii) If you regard testimonial evidence as an oblique form of empirical evidence (i.e. testimony to an empirical event), then the argument from miracles is also in play (although it needs to be carefully qualified).
iii) The argument from religious experience can also have a lot of popular appeal.
To which I answered:
I’d make a couple of preliminary observations before I tried to answer that question:
1.We need to clarify our expectations, and have reasonable expectations. It might obvious to some that if God exists, then his existence should be easy to prove. After all, if he exists, then shouldn’t that be fairly evident or conspicuous? He’s the source of everything else. The biggest fact of all.
However, there’s a paradox in proving God’s existence. Normally, when we try to prove that something exists, we use one thing to prove another. We take for granted the existence of something else, something related, and use that as a launch pad.
For example, we use time and consciousness as background conditions to prove other things. If, however, you were asked to prove the existence of time or consciousness itself, you might be stumped. It’s hard to come up with a non-circular argument for the existence of a background condition. Precisely because time and consciousness are so fundamental, they are resistant to direct demonstration. It’s hard to get “behind” them.
Because we see with our eyes, we never see our eyes. Not directly.
2.The answer to your question also turns, in part, on the precise form of the question or the implied audience. Is the question what empirical evidence would you cite to undergird your own belief in God? Or is it what empirical evidence would you cite for the benefit of someone who is not already a believer?
If, for example, you’re speaking for yourself, then depending the specifics of your religious experience, certain empirical evidence might dovetail with the argument from religious experience. For example, the argument from miracles could also count as empirical evidence in case you or someone you trusted had had a fairly unmistakable experience of God’s miraculous involvement in your life or his.
If, on the other hand, the answer is directed at outsiders, you might appeal to something more public.
3.Depending on how you define empirical evidence:
i) Among formal theistic proofs, I think the teleological argument has the most general appeal. And, as you know, there are different versions.
ii) If you regard testimonial evidence as an oblique form of empirical evidence (i.e. testimony to an empirical event), then the argument from miracles is also in play (although it needs to be carefully qualified).
iii) The argument from religious experience can also have a lot of popular appeal.
Wednesday, November 04, 2009
Fiscal or Social?
One of the refrains that leftist newscasters (but I repeat myself) oft repeat is that the Republican Party is in trouble because it embraces its radical right wing kook fringe. The premise is that if the GOP would just get rid of social conservatives and focus only on maintaining fiscal conservatives, the GOP would win elections again.
Given that this advice comes from leftists, conservatives already ought to reject it (since when does the opposition really care about helping their enemy win elections?). However, since there is a libertarian wing that is fiscally conservative while socially liberal, they echo these claims too.
That’s why examining the recent initiatives in California and Maine are so important. In California, the courts ruled that gay marriage should be allowed because there was nothing in the state constitution to deny it. So social conservatives passed a constitutional amendment to outlaw it. Even though Obama carried the state by a wide margin, gay marriage failed.
Ditto in Maine, where the only distinction is that the legislature passed the law instead of the courts ruling it. Still, it was not put to a popular vote, and once it was…gay marriage was defeated. In fact, in every state (31 total) where gay marriage has been put to a vote, it has been defeated.
And more importantly, in the California election, the initiative came at the same time as the presidential election. Which means there were a lot of people casting a vote for Obama and Proposition 8 at the same time. In Maine, homosexual activists were quite vocal in trying to keep the law the legislature had passed, yet they failed too.
Because of libertarians, we know that one can be fiscally conservative and socially liberal. But voting evidence indicates there are also a sizeable number who are fiscally liberal while remaining socially conservative. This is why California and Maine could vote for a liberal president and still vote against gay marriage.
If the GOP wants to win elections, they have to stop nominating “moderate” candidates and return to their socially conservative base. The public consistently votes for socially conservative initiatives even in liberal states. This means liberals must rely on the courts to impose their agenda, because they lack popular support.
Why anyone would consider socially conservative voters to be a weak-point in their party can only be explained by willful blindness.
Given that this advice comes from leftists, conservatives already ought to reject it (since when does the opposition really care about helping their enemy win elections?). However, since there is a libertarian wing that is fiscally conservative while socially liberal, they echo these claims too.
That’s why examining the recent initiatives in California and Maine are so important. In California, the courts ruled that gay marriage should be allowed because there was nothing in the state constitution to deny it. So social conservatives passed a constitutional amendment to outlaw it. Even though Obama carried the state by a wide margin, gay marriage failed.
Ditto in Maine, where the only distinction is that the legislature passed the law instead of the courts ruling it. Still, it was not put to a popular vote, and once it was…gay marriage was defeated. In fact, in every state (31 total) where gay marriage has been put to a vote, it has been defeated.
And more importantly, in the California election, the initiative came at the same time as the presidential election. Which means there were a lot of people casting a vote for Obama and Proposition 8 at the same time. In Maine, homosexual activists were quite vocal in trying to keep the law the legislature had passed, yet they failed too.
Because of libertarians, we know that one can be fiscally conservative and socially liberal. But voting evidence indicates there are also a sizeable number who are fiscally liberal while remaining socially conservative. This is why California and Maine could vote for a liberal president and still vote against gay marriage.
If the GOP wants to win elections, they have to stop nominating “moderate” candidates and return to their socially conservative base. The public consistently votes for socially conservative initiatives even in liberal states. This means liberals must rely on the courts to impose their agenda, because they lack popular support.
Why anyone would consider socially conservative voters to be a weak-point in their party can only be explained by willful blindness.
Is justification synergistic?
Francis Beckwith tried to argue that justification is synergistic. Here’s what one commenter had to say about his efforts:
Bryan said...
Hi Frank,_I think what you have done here is actually proven monergism with your analogy.
Let me explain. I think you are doing what my old OT professor, Pete Enns, did with the incarnational analogy to Scripture. You seem to be confusing the idea that because Christ is fully human and fully divine with the idea that His human and divine natures are equal in power and control of one another. That of course would be heretical, as the finite human nature does not have equal control over the infinite divine nature.
In other words, Christ is non posse pecare because, although He is able to be tempted in His human nature, His divine nature keeps His human nature in "check," since God cannot sin. The same goes for Scripture. Although men are able to express themselves and their opinions, they cannot do so to the point of theological and ethical error, so that the human will is controlled and limited by the divine will. In other words, the human will does whatever the divine wills it to do. It functions no further than the boundaries which are set for it by the divine will. This, therefore, means in your analogy that the human decision is only a response to the divine will, and cannot do otherwise than that which God has willed it to do.
So the human nature of Christ is controlled by the divine nature, the human nature of Scripture is controlled by the divine will, and the human will in salvation is controlled by the divine will.
Hence, any system of merit based upon the idea that a person joins with God to perform a task in synergism must include a human act that can act in favor of God or against Him; but this would be to deflate your analogy. If the person's salvific actions are only a response to, or set within, the boundaries of God's will, then no salvific act can be attributed to the human element at all; and thus, Roman Catholicism would be refuted.
Do you resolve this problem in some other way?
http://romereturn.blogspot.com/2009/11/justification-and-analogy-with_02.html?showComment=1257326092725#c1676995401068665964
Bryan said...
Hi Frank,_I think what you have done here is actually proven monergism with your analogy.
Let me explain. I think you are doing what my old OT professor, Pete Enns, did with the incarnational analogy to Scripture. You seem to be confusing the idea that because Christ is fully human and fully divine with the idea that His human and divine natures are equal in power and control of one another. That of course would be heretical, as the finite human nature does not have equal control over the infinite divine nature.
In other words, Christ is non posse pecare because, although He is able to be tempted in His human nature, His divine nature keeps His human nature in "check," since God cannot sin. The same goes for Scripture. Although men are able to express themselves and their opinions, they cannot do so to the point of theological and ethical error, so that the human will is controlled and limited by the divine will. In other words, the human will does whatever the divine wills it to do. It functions no further than the boundaries which are set for it by the divine will. This, therefore, means in your analogy that the human decision is only a response to the divine will, and cannot do otherwise than that which God has willed it to do.
So the human nature of Christ is controlled by the divine nature, the human nature of Scripture is controlled by the divine will, and the human will in salvation is controlled by the divine will.
Hence, any system of merit based upon the idea that a person joins with God to perform a task in synergism must include a human act that can act in favor of God or against Him; but this would be to deflate your analogy. If the person's salvific actions are only a response to, or set within, the boundaries of God's will, then no salvific act can be attributed to the human element at all; and thus, Roman Catholicism would be refuted.
Do you resolve this problem in some other way?
http://romereturn.blogspot.com/2009/11/justification-and-analogy-with_02.html?showComment=1257326092725#c1676995401068665964
Is religion maladaptive?
LEVI SAID:
“Your premise is wrong. While true beliefs are generally adaptive and false beliefs are generally maladaptive, this is not a necessary connection.”
My premise wasn’t predicated on a necessary connection. Rather, if, according to the Darwininan, misbeliefs are maladaptive, and if, according to the Darwinian, the majority of human hominids suffer from a misbelief in the supernatural, then natural selection is an unreliable belief-forming mechanism. On this view, misbeliefs are not the exception to the rule. Rather, they are dominant.
“Based on the major suppositions of EP and evolutionary biology generally, it isn't the truth or falsity that evolution cares about…”
I never said evolution “cares” about anything. By definition, naturalistic evolution (which is the thesis under review) is indifferent.
“…it is whether the belief promotes the fitness of the individual who holds that belief.”
The question is whether true beliefs promote survival. Darwinians typically argue that they do.
“Your best bet for criticizing evolutionary approaches to understanding religion would be to emphasize the dearth of empirical work on how religious beliefs promotes the fitness of the individual. And not the direct you're currently taking.”
I don’t have to critique evolutionary psychology by documenting (if possible) that religious beliefs are adaptive.
It’s quite sufficient to note a dilemma in the Darwinian argument against religion. If misbeliefs are generally maladaptive, yet most human primates hold false beliefs about the supernatural, then natural selection is selecting for misbeliefs. And doing so on a massive scale. So how did we survive our maladaptive religious beliefs?
“Your premise is wrong. While true beliefs are generally adaptive and false beliefs are generally maladaptive, this is not a necessary connection.”
My premise wasn’t predicated on a necessary connection. Rather, if, according to the Darwininan, misbeliefs are maladaptive, and if, according to the Darwinian, the majority of human hominids suffer from a misbelief in the supernatural, then natural selection is an unreliable belief-forming mechanism. On this view, misbeliefs are not the exception to the rule. Rather, they are dominant.
“Based on the major suppositions of EP and evolutionary biology generally, it isn't the truth or falsity that evolution cares about…”
I never said evolution “cares” about anything. By definition, naturalistic evolution (which is the thesis under review) is indifferent.
“…it is whether the belief promotes the fitness of the individual who holds that belief.”
The question is whether true beliefs promote survival. Darwinians typically argue that they do.
“Your best bet for criticizing evolutionary approaches to understanding religion would be to emphasize the dearth of empirical work on how religious beliefs promotes the fitness of the individual. And not the direct you're currently taking.”
I don’t have to critique evolutionary psychology by documenting (if possible) that religious beliefs are adaptive.
It’s quite sufficient to note a dilemma in the Darwinian argument against religion. If misbeliefs are generally maladaptive, yet most human primates hold false beliefs about the supernatural, then natural selection is selecting for misbeliefs. And doing so on a massive scale. So how did we survive our maladaptive religious beliefs?
Tuesday, November 03, 2009
Another Darwinian bites the dust
JORGON GORGON SAID:
Ach so. I suppose I'll take your words for that and be done with it. :)
Needless to say, however, I think that despite the inflammatory language I find it difficult to imagine a valid refutation to most of his statements, since they are, stripped of fighting words, thoroughly unconroversial.
STEVE SAID:
If you can't imagine a valid refutation, that means you've only been reading one side of the argument. What intelligent design theorists have you read?
STEVE SAID:
I didn't say you'd agree with them. I was responding to your claim that you can't "imagine valid refutations" to the canned objections raised by Boris. And, thus far, you've just treated us to to some rhetorical finery.
STEVE SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said...
“Indeed. But the problem with intelligent design is that all of its basic principles (appearance of desing, irreducible complexity, specified complexity) are artifacts of observation and knowledge about the system and are not inherent to the system (despite Dembski's attempts to formalize them, a mathematical in-joke by now). Hnece, no specific claims are made beyond ‘It looks like it has been designed, from our current vantage point; and we cannot imagine how in Hell it has been designed (again, with our current knowledge)’.”
All scientific theories are theories of appearances. Theories based on how things appear to our senses. You can never get beyond the perception of the observer to the raw datum as it exists apart from our perception. The scientist is, himself, a percipient. At most, science can uncover deeper layers of phenomena. Higher and lower scales of magnification. Chemical analysis. Correlations between one event and another. But that will always come down to how the evidence appears to the sensory-processing system of the outside observer. There is always a gap between the distal stimulus and the proximal stimulus.
“Of course, evolutionary biologists are in a privileged position, in a sense: we do not have to show that a specific system evolved in a specific way, we only have to present a plausible pathway in which evolution acted upon by natural selection.”
Of course, that’s viciously circular. Unless you already know that evolution is true, then you can’t take for granted that there is an evolutionary pathway in the first place. If you can’t show it, then you don’t know. Your theory should only be as specific as the level of your evidence.
“The emergence of specific features at specific times in geological record, for example.”
i) You’d need to have a continuous series of fossils to draw that conclusion. The fact (assuming it is a fact) that you can discover a datable fossil remnant with specific features hardly means said feature emerged at around the time that organism happened to be fossilized. Even if you can date an isolated fossil, this doesn’t tell you at what point the specific trait emerged (assuming it did); rather, it just tells you that, as of that date, that organism had said trait.
ii) Moreover, the emergence of specific features doesn’t begin to prove macroevolution or common descent. You’re equivocating.
“Or--a major prediction of evolutionary theory--the presence of exapted traits, as well as in general the evidence of blind tinkering (the construction of mammalian eye? giraffe's laryngeal nerve?).”
If you think that’s a design flaw, give us a working model of a superior design. And test it in a real world setting. Show us how your new and improved design confers a survival advantage on the organism in its natural environment.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
"Oh, and on Boris: it appears to me (and I cannot test the appearances since the original posts have been removed! :) that you are quibbling between metaphysics and epistemology: while methodological naturalism is indeed a principle in the latter sense, it is not metaphysical at all. In fact, many of my acquaintances have no problem pursuing methodological naturalism in their work (laudable!) while holding all sorts of wacky metaphysical beliefs outside of it (pointless, but often quite lovable)."
There is no presumption in favor of methodological naturalism unless you presume metaphysical naturalism. Unless reality is like what metaphysical naturalism postulates, there's no prior reason to apply the interpretive grid of methodological naturalism to our scientific or historical investigations. The only reason to limit ourselves to this restrictive methodology is in case we already expect reality to be purely naturalistic in its causes and effects.
Therefore, methodological naturalism is a disguised version of metaphysical naturalism. It's a question-begging filter which screens out any and all supernatural explanations in advance of the evidence.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“And Steve...what can I say? I am embarrassed to have to respond.”
Given the inadequacy of your response, your embarrassment is justified. .
“Just a couple of notes: we knew that evolution (in the sense of change of living forms through time) was true long before Darwin.”
Of course, that’s a bait-and-switch tactic. “Evolution” in that generic sense is hardly synonymous with macroevolution or common descent.
“Oh, and the classic trick of demanding an unrealistic level of evidence from evolutionary theory.”
It’s unrealistic to demand evidence specific to the specificity of the theory? How is that unrealistic?
If you lack specific evidence to corroborate specific claims of your theory, then your theoretical belief is evidentially unwarranted. All you’ve given us is your imaginary narrative.
“While settling for no evidence whatsoever to support one's own view is noted, and laughed at.”
You haven’t begun to show that my own view has no supporting evidence. Try to present an actual argument the next time around. Mere assertions pull no weight.
Feel free to keep laughing in your padded cell.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Um, human eye can be easily redesigned to get rid of a blind spot.”
If that’s easy to do, then do it. Show us your working model. Show us your model in action.
Show how that’s an improvement. Show how you can make that adjustment while leaving everything else intact.
“Our spines, to use another immediate example, are engineered for quadrupeds, not so well for bipeds. These are elementary anatomical facts.”
You haven’t given us any elementary fact. You’ve given us elementary assertions masquerading as facts. Asserting X to be a fact does not a fact make. A factual assertion is not a fact.
STEVE SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said...
"And giraffe's laryngeal nerve does not have to traverse its neck multiple times."
How is that a design flaw? Is redundancy a design flaw? Is that your point? If so, how is redundancy a design flaw? If not, then what's your point?
BTW, according to you, the giraffe has been around for millions of years. It's managed to survive in a harsh, competitive, unforgiving environment. So why do you think the giraffe is poorly designed? Poorly designed in relation to what? Its ecological niche?
STEVE SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said...
“Your usage of the term ‘macroevolution’ with the connotation that it is somehow a qualitatively different process than ‘micro’ is duly noted and again, laughed at.”
i) “Laughed at” is not an argument. Is “laughed at” your idea of scientific evidence? If so, that would certainly explain what you’re prepared to believe.
ii) You’re free to disregard the distinction between microevolution and macroevolution, but you still need to furnish evidence commensurate with the specificity of your theory. If you believe in macroevolution, then you need to furnish specific evidence–on a case-by-case basis.
If you can’t furnish specific evidence, then your theory is based on something other than real evidence. What would that be? Secular dogma? Do you use methodological naturalism to putty in the evidentiary gaps in your theory?
“Your incredulity at the idea of common descent is also noted.”
In my response to you, I haven’t staked out a position one way or the other. I’ve merely noted your threadbare assertions and slippery equivocations.
“Your lack of response to my engineering questions is again not unexpected.”
Lack of response? In fact, I have responded. Where’s your counterargument?
“I suppose next you'll express doubts at radiometric dating systems, and we can go from there to cosmological time scales.”
Actually, you’re the one who’s changing the subject, not me. Shall we take that as a tacit admission that you couldn’t back up your previous claims?
“Octopuses, for example, have no blind spot. it is strictly a function of mammalian eyes.”
i) Of course, aquatic organisms function in a very different environment than mammalian land animals. The challenges are hardly comparable.
ii) Moreover, their eyes are not discrete organs which you can isolate from the overall requirements of their octopoid systems. Different designs have trade-offs. You may have to trade down in one department to trade up in another.
It’s simple-minded to focus on one organ or body part to the exclusion of the overall design. An engineer has to balance out all the competing variables.
iii) Show us a working model of how you’d adapt an octopoid eye to a human body. What corresponding adjustments would be required to pull that off? How would that improve on human vision, in our non-aquatic environment? How would that confer a survival advantage on human beings?
“You do realize that organs of vision evolved on multiple occasions and did so in different ways, thoroughly consistent with the blind process tinkering with pre-existing structures under environmental pressures?”
Actually, your faith in the miraculous ability of a blind process to independently hit upon so many feasible solutions is a tribute to your secular credulity.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“I realize that from what appears to be your point of view, all scientists are insane, but it is refreshing to hear it expressed so clearly.”
Sorry to disillusion you, but you don’t speak for all scientists–even if it seems that way from your padded cell.
“By the way, you do realize that Behe subscribes to common descent as well?”
Oh dear. Jorgon, Jorgon: you do realize that in my response to you, I haven’t expressed a personal opinion about intelligent design theory or macroevolution or common descent.
Thus far I’ve confined myself to shooting down your lame objections and tendentious assertions.
One of your many problems is an inability to listen. You assume you already know what your opponent is going to say, so treat us to your canned objections and your rote assertions.
And if I don’t play the typecast role you’ve assigned to me, then you’re at a loss.
You’ve dutifully copied down the little zingers from Stenger, Dawkins, & Dennett. You have all those zippy one-liners alphabetically indexed in your Rolodex of cue cards.
But as soon as you bump into a Christian who doesn’t play into your Hollywood narrative of the gap-toothed fundy, you have nothing in reserve.
And you’re doing no better on the historical Jesus. Trying to bluff your way through the debate doesn’t win you any chips here. You actually have to present real honest-to-goodness arguments.
And, yes, I’m aware of Behe’s arguments for common descent. I’m also aware of the counterarguments.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Who said anything about redundancy?”
If the RLN doubles back rather than taking the most direct route, then why do you object to “redundancy” to characterize this feature?
And I ask, once again, how is redundancy a design flaw? For example, redundancy can sometimes preserve function or partial function in case of injury.
“It is a single nerve…”
Actually, from what I’ve read, the RLN has branches.
“It is not redundant, but only to be expected ifthe giraffe's ancestors had shorter necks. Capiche?”
Several problems with that assertion:
i) You dismissed intelligent design arguments as God-of-the-gap arguments. However, if that’s the case, then design flaw arguments are Godless-of-the-gap arguments. If you can’t explain the purpose of “suboptimal adaptations,” you fall back on blind evolutionary mechanisms. So your objection is simply the reverse of what you fault in ID-theory. But if appeal to intelligent teleology is a “cop-out” or “science-stopper,” then appeal to blind dysteleology is likewise a “cop-out” or “science-stopper.”
ii) The giraffe has a highly specialized circulatory system. You need to explain how a blind evolutionary process could synchronize the fortuitous emergence of these interdependent adaptations.
iii) But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that the modern giraffe did “evolve” from ancestors with shorter necks. How would that disapprove intelligent design?
Dog breeders cultivate different subspecies of dogs with a variety of specialized features.
“As far as laughter is concerned: when one exhibits ignorance of itroductory biology while thinking that they may make protentious pronouncements on much more advanced subjects, laughter is the only answer. (BTW, I laugh at myself all the time: try it, it may turn out to be beneficial...:))”
It’s true that your ignorance of introductory biology makes you a laughingstock. That’s one thing we agree with on.
“Lo and behold! Steve takes a small albeit unwitting step towards understanding how evolution actually works. Will he realize this momentous breakthrough? I doubt it, but anything is possible.”
You’re dodging the issue, even though you were the one who choose to introduce that issue. I’m still waiting for you to furnish a working model of a functional human eye with octopoid improvements.
“Meanwhile, a hypothetical designer is not limited by preexisting structures, of course.”
i) You’re the one who cited the octopoid eye as your point of reference. Therefore, the onus lies on you to present a detailed physiological explanation of how you’d combine features of the octopoid eye with features of the human eye to produce a more optimal design.
ii) Use of preexisting structures is a mark of simplicity and efficiency.
“I wish I could apologize for my laughter; but no matter, no matter.”
No need to apologize. A buffoon like you makes an excellent foil. You’re like a clown we hire to entertain little tikes at the birthday party.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Oh boy. Are you really trying to tell me that you do not see how a single nerve from larynx traversing the length of the neck, looping around the aorta and traversing the length of the neck again on its return path to the brain has nothing to do with redundancy (where is the backup system, my friend?)?”
i) You have a simple-minded grasp of redundancy. For example:
http://www.uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/jerry-pz-ron-faitheism-templeton-bloggingheads-and-all-that-some-follow-up-comments/#comment-327882
ii) Since a giraffe is a unified organism with a set of functionally integrated subsystems, you must detail how, exactly (and I do mean “exactly”) you could reroute the RLN without disrupting the delicate balance. Optimality is a property of the entire organism, in relation to its ecological niche, and not an isolated organ or body party.
BTW, you’re not my friend.
“Oh boy. I apologize.”
You have a lot to apologize for. Don’t stop now.
“I thought I was conversing with people with at least a freshman level understanding of basic biology; my mistake.”
Since I never mistook you for someone with at least a freshmen level understanding of basic biology, I’m unapologetic.
“BTW, regarding your earlier confusion between methodological and metaphysical naturalism: do not fall into Johnson's rhetorical cesspit: they are two different devices entailing quite different committments. I know of plenty people who are methodologically quite naturalistic (perhaps even more orthodox than me in that sense) while holding all sorts of metaphysically non-naturalistic beliefs: Miller, Gilberson, Collins, Abdus Salam (!) spring to mind instantly.”
I spelled out why your makeshift dichotomy is unstable. Methodological naturalism logically collapses into metaphysical naturalism. I gave reasons. You offer no counterargument.
Instead, you resort to biographical anecdotes. But what some people happen to believe is irrelevant. Name-dropping is not an argument. Collecting opinions is no substitute for reasoned argument.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Steve: your claim that methodological naturalism is unstable is belied by many practitioners that use it without a problem.”
I give arguments, you give anecdotes. Needless to say, citing biographical vignettes doesn’t go an inch towards disproving my argument. You’re an irrationalist posing as a rationalist.
“(Your claim is akin to a crank-point from John Baez's list: 5 points for every mention of the sueriority of a thought experiment that contradicts well-observed empirical observation).”
That’s such a stupid comparison. There’s no analogy between the metaphysical/methodological dichotomy and the thought-experimental/empirical-experimental dichotomy.
Your anecdotes about methodological naturalists don’t count as observational facts about the concept of methodological naturalism. Rather, that merely tells us something about the mental state of the methodological naturalist. His opinions. That’s irrelevant to whether their opinions are true or false.
The truth or falsity of the metaphysical/methodological dichotomy is a logical issue, not a psychological or empirical issue. Are you too dense to figure that out?
“My grasp of redundancy may or may not be simplistic, but a single system is not redundant in any sense without another system fulfilling the same/similar task. Your apparent inability to grasp it does not bode well for future discussion.”
It’s redundant in the sense I gave. See the link.
“It could, easily, go directly from the brain to larynx.”
You say it but you don’t show it. Asserting something to be the case is not an argument, especially when you’re making counterfactual claims about optimal bioengineering. A real engineer needs to demonstrate his claims, not make promissory assertions about what’s allegedly easy to do.
You act as if we were dealing with an isolated system. What corresponding changes would be required to implement that particular change? Do you have any idea? We’re waiting to see your schematics.
“BTW, I assume you may be aware that the giraffe's engineering is quite faulty, for old specimen in any case: often they are not able to get up after drinking and die.”
Another stupid statement. It reflects your chronic inability to keep more than one idea in your head at a time.
Specialization has advantages and disadvantages. Which is a better design: A leopard, a tiger, or a cheetah?
There is no uniform answer to that question. A cheetah sacrifices power and claws for sheer speed. Speed is advantageous. But it comes at a cost.
A leopard is more flexible. More powerful than a cheetah. Can climb better than a lion or cheetah.
On the other hand, it lacks the power of a lion, or the speed of a cheetah.
What is a survival advantage in one situation, one environment, one ecological niche, may be disadvantageous in another environment.
Optimality is relative to other considerations. A cost/benefit ratio. There are tradeoffs to being a giraffe. Better in some ways, worse in others.
STEVE SAID:
[JG] “What's more, your requirements of specificity are a classic ID/creationist canard: a demand for 100% specific and proven pathway/method/system from an opponent while themselves providing nothing but vague generalities (in fact, s vague as to be useless, as with IC, for example.”
Even if ID theory were guilty of the inadequacies you allege, shifting the blame to the inadequacies of the opposing position does nothing whatsoever to rectify the inadequacies of your own position. That’s just a diversionary tactic on the part of somebody who can’t back up his sweeping claims with comparable evidence.
“In fact, I am under no obligation to demonstrate anything to you that you cannot fiind out by perusing your local college library. Would you like a reading list? It can be provided, upon request. If you raised any interestig points, I would be happy to engage in a thoughtful dialogue (contrary to what you may believe, my training in relevant disciplines is quite real.”
Flaunting your epaulets like the head of a banana republic is no substitute for putting hard evidence on the table or presenting a counterargument.
I’ve been answering you on your own terms. When I do so, you respond with an abundance of bluster and schoolboy fallacies.
“Instead, you repeat well-worn non-points from Dembski et al, without betraying any knowledge of the current state of research in real biology.”
Once again, you have no argument. You talk about knowledge without putting the relevant knowledge on display. Stalling for time.
“I must say, I have not had this much fun since watching A fock of Dodos...”
There’s nothing behind your façade. It’s just a cardboard wall. Once we punch a hole in your facade, there’s nothing but air on the other side.
You’re long on scientific rhetoric, but short on scientific evidence.
PATRICK CHAN SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said:
Um, human eye can be easily redesigned to get rid of a blind spot.
Are you referring to the optic disc of the retina? If so, how do you propose to redesign the optic disc in order to get rid of this blind spot without adversely affecting the physiology of vision?
And giraffe's laryngeal nerve does not have to traverse its neck multiple times. (Vagus nerve has the same problem).
Specifically, what do you find problematic about how the vagus nerve innervates the human body? For one thing, it's responsible for significant parasympathetic functions which would not be possible if it didn't innervate the human body in the manner it does.
Our spines, to use another immediate example, are engineered for quadrupeds, not so well for bipeds. These are elementary anatomical facts.
You can't simply take the spine in isolation and make such a sweeping claim.
What specifically is it about the human vertebral column that you believe to be poorly engineered for bipedal motion over and against quadrupedal motion?
How do you explain other skeletal features such as the clavicle which serves as a strut and keeps the humerus away from the thorax and allows it the range of motion it has (and which, as you'd claim, is one reason we're not quadrupeds)?
Not to mention that if you were to do away with the clavicle, then you'd have other problems such as deep inspiration because it wouldn't be possible for humans to elevate their ribs.
And we've said nothing of other anatomical features such as the various muscle attachments that are involved in bipedal motion.
PATRICK CHAN SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said:
Mammalian eye is designed as a reflector. It did not have to be. Had it been designed by an intelligent and logical engineer, it most likely would have been a refractor. The fact that I cannot think of specific details of its design means nothing: I assume that such a designer would have much more advanced tools than any of us do. All I can concentrate on is function; and for a given function, better designs are possible.
Of course that assumes an "intelligent and logical" designer. It could have been Arioch the Duke of Chaos, and often it seems that way.
1. I don't know if this is what you're assuming but I'm not arguing for intelligent design. Rather, I'm simply asking you to make good on the claims you've made. If you claim x, then specify how claim x would work. And, yes, it does mean "something" if you can't make good on your claim.
2. You're simply wrong to say that the eye is designed as a reflector and not a refractor. How do you explain the refractive media of the eye: the cornea, aqueous humor, lens, and vitreous humor?
And I thought you understood "introductory biology" since you were the one who said the following:
As far as laughter is concerned: when one exhibits ignorance of itroductory biology while thinking that they may make protentious pronouncements on much more advanced subjects, laughter is the only answer.
Ach so. I suppose I'll take your words for that and be done with it. :)
Needless to say, however, I think that despite the inflammatory language I find it difficult to imagine a valid refutation to most of his statements, since they are, stripped of fighting words, thoroughly unconroversial.
STEVE SAID:
If you can't imagine a valid refutation, that means you've only been reading one side of the argument. What intelligent design theorists have you read?
STEVE SAID:
I didn't say you'd agree with them. I was responding to your claim that you can't "imagine valid refutations" to the canned objections raised by Boris. And, thus far, you've just treated us to to some rhetorical finery.
STEVE SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said...
“Indeed. But the problem with intelligent design is that all of its basic principles (appearance of desing, irreducible complexity, specified complexity) are artifacts of observation and knowledge about the system and are not inherent to the system (despite Dembski's attempts to formalize them, a mathematical in-joke by now). Hnece, no specific claims are made beyond ‘It looks like it has been designed, from our current vantage point; and we cannot imagine how in Hell it has been designed (again, with our current knowledge)’.”
All scientific theories are theories of appearances. Theories based on how things appear to our senses. You can never get beyond the perception of the observer to the raw datum as it exists apart from our perception. The scientist is, himself, a percipient. At most, science can uncover deeper layers of phenomena. Higher and lower scales of magnification. Chemical analysis. Correlations between one event and another. But that will always come down to how the evidence appears to the sensory-processing system of the outside observer. There is always a gap between the distal stimulus and the proximal stimulus.
“Of course, evolutionary biologists are in a privileged position, in a sense: we do not have to show that a specific system evolved in a specific way, we only have to present a plausible pathway in which evolution acted upon by natural selection.”
Of course, that’s viciously circular. Unless you already know that evolution is true, then you can’t take for granted that there is an evolutionary pathway in the first place. If you can’t show it, then you don’t know. Your theory should only be as specific as the level of your evidence.
“The emergence of specific features at specific times in geological record, for example.”
i) You’d need to have a continuous series of fossils to draw that conclusion. The fact (assuming it is a fact) that you can discover a datable fossil remnant with specific features hardly means said feature emerged at around the time that organism happened to be fossilized. Even if you can date an isolated fossil, this doesn’t tell you at what point the specific trait emerged (assuming it did); rather, it just tells you that, as of that date, that organism had said trait.
ii) Moreover, the emergence of specific features doesn’t begin to prove macroevolution or common descent. You’re equivocating.
“Or--a major prediction of evolutionary theory--the presence of exapted traits, as well as in general the evidence of blind tinkering (the construction of mammalian eye? giraffe's laryngeal nerve?).”
If you think that’s a design flaw, give us a working model of a superior design. And test it in a real world setting. Show us how your new and improved design confers a survival advantage on the organism in its natural environment.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
"Oh, and on Boris: it appears to me (and I cannot test the appearances since the original posts have been removed! :) that you are quibbling between metaphysics and epistemology: while methodological naturalism is indeed a principle in the latter sense, it is not metaphysical at all. In fact, many of my acquaintances have no problem pursuing methodological naturalism in their work (laudable!) while holding all sorts of wacky metaphysical beliefs outside of it (pointless, but often quite lovable)."
There is no presumption in favor of methodological naturalism unless you presume metaphysical naturalism. Unless reality is like what metaphysical naturalism postulates, there's no prior reason to apply the interpretive grid of methodological naturalism to our scientific or historical investigations. The only reason to limit ourselves to this restrictive methodology is in case we already expect reality to be purely naturalistic in its causes and effects.
Therefore, methodological naturalism is a disguised version of metaphysical naturalism. It's a question-begging filter which screens out any and all supernatural explanations in advance of the evidence.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“And Steve...what can I say? I am embarrassed to have to respond.”
Given the inadequacy of your response, your embarrassment is justified. .
“Just a couple of notes: we knew that evolution (in the sense of change of living forms through time) was true long before Darwin.”
Of course, that’s a bait-and-switch tactic. “Evolution” in that generic sense is hardly synonymous with macroevolution or common descent.
“Oh, and the classic trick of demanding an unrealistic level of evidence from evolutionary theory.”
It’s unrealistic to demand evidence specific to the specificity of the theory? How is that unrealistic?
If you lack specific evidence to corroborate specific claims of your theory, then your theoretical belief is evidentially unwarranted. All you’ve given us is your imaginary narrative.
“While settling for no evidence whatsoever to support one's own view is noted, and laughed at.”
You haven’t begun to show that my own view has no supporting evidence. Try to present an actual argument the next time around. Mere assertions pull no weight.
Feel free to keep laughing in your padded cell.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Um, human eye can be easily redesigned to get rid of a blind spot.”
If that’s easy to do, then do it. Show us your working model. Show us your model in action.
Show how that’s an improvement. Show how you can make that adjustment while leaving everything else intact.
“Our spines, to use another immediate example, are engineered for quadrupeds, not so well for bipeds. These are elementary anatomical facts.”
You haven’t given us any elementary fact. You’ve given us elementary assertions masquerading as facts. Asserting X to be a fact does not a fact make. A factual assertion is not a fact.
STEVE SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said...
"And giraffe's laryngeal nerve does not have to traverse its neck multiple times."
How is that a design flaw? Is redundancy a design flaw? Is that your point? If so, how is redundancy a design flaw? If not, then what's your point?
BTW, according to you, the giraffe has been around for millions of years. It's managed to survive in a harsh, competitive, unforgiving environment. So why do you think the giraffe is poorly designed? Poorly designed in relation to what? Its ecological niche?
STEVE SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said...
“Your usage of the term ‘macroevolution’ with the connotation that it is somehow a qualitatively different process than ‘micro’ is duly noted and again, laughed at.”
i) “Laughed at” is not an argument. Is “laughed at” your idea of scientific evidence? If so, that would certainly explain what you’re prepared to believe.
ii) You’re free to disregard the distinction between microevolution and macroevolution, but you still need to furnish evidence commensurate with the specificity of your theory. If you believe in macroevolution, then you need to furnish specific evidence–on a case-by-case basis.
If you can’t furnish specific evidence, then your theory is based on something other than real evidence. What would that be? Secular dogma? Do you use methodological naturalism to putty in the evidentiary gaps in your theory?
“Your incredulity at the idea of common descent is also noted.”
In my response to you, I haven’t staked out a position one way or the other. I’ve merely noted your threadbare assertions and slippery equivocations.
“Your lack of response to my engineering questions is again not unexpected.”
Lack of response? In fact, I have responded. Where’s your counterargument?
“I suppose next you'll express doubts at radiometric dating systems, and we can go from there to cosmological time scales.”
Actually, you’re the one who’s changing the subject, not me. Shall we take that as a tacit admission that you couldn’t back up your previous claims?
“Octopuses, for example, have no blind spot. it is strictly a function of mammalian eyes.”
i) Of course, aquatic organisms function in a very different environment than mammalian land animals. The challenges are hardly comparable.
ii) Moreover, their eyes are not discrete organs which you can isolate from the overall requirements of their octopoid systems. Different designs have trade-offs. You may have to trade down in one department to trade up in another.
It’s simple-minded to focus on one organ or body part to the exclusion of the overall design. An engineer has to balance out all the competing variables.
iii) Show us a working model of how you’d adapt an octopoid eye to a human body. What corresponding adjustments would be required to pull that off? How would that improve on human vision, in our non-aquatic environment? How would that confer a survival advantage on human beings?
“You do realize that organs of vision evolved on multiple occasions and did so in different ways, thoroughly consistent with the blind process tinkering with pre-existing structures under environmental pressures?”
Actually, your faith in the miraculous ability of a blind process to independently hit upon so many feasible solutions is a tribute to your secular credulity.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“I realize that from what appears to be your point of view, all scientists are insane, but it is refreshing to hear it expressed so clearly.”
Sorry to disillusion you, but you don’t speak for all scientists–even if it seems that way from your padded cell.
“By the way, you do realize that Behe subscribes to common descent as well?”
Oh dear. Jorgon, Jorgon: you do realize that in my response to you, I haven’t expressed a personal opinion about intelligent design theory or macroevolution or common descent.
Thus far I’ve confined myself to shooting down your lame objections and tendentious assertions.
One of your many problems is an inability to listen. You assume you already know what your opponent is going to say, so treat us to your canned objections and your rote assertions.
And if I don’t play the typecast role you’ve assigned to me, then you’re at a loss.
You’ve dutifully copied down the little zingers from Stenger, Dawkins, & Dennett. You have all those zippy one-liners alphabetically indexed in your Rolodex of cue cards.
But as soon as you bump into a Christian who doesn’t play into your Hollywood narrative of the gap-toothed fundy, you have nothing in reserve.
And you’re doing no better on the historical Jesus. Trying to bluff your way through the debate doesn’t win you any chips here. You actually have to present real honest-to-goodness arguments.
And, yes, I’m aware of Behe’s arguments for common descent. I’m also aware of the counterarguments.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Who said anything about redundancy?”
If the RLN doubles back rather than taking the most direct route, then why do you object to “redundancy” to characterize this feature?
And I ask, once again, how is redundancy a design flaw? For example, redundancy can sometimes preserve function or partial function in case of injury.
“It is a single nerve…”
Actually, from what I’ve read, the RLN has branches.
“It is not redundant, but only to be expected ifthe giraffe's ancestors had shorter necks. Capiche?”
Several problems with that assertion:
i) You dismissed intelligent design arguments as God-of-the-gap arguments. However, if that’s the case, then design flaw arguments are Godless-of-the-gap arguments. If you can’t explain the purpose of “suboptimal adaptations,” you fall back on blind evolutionary mechanisms. So your objection is simply the reverse of what you fault in ID-theory. But if appeal to intelligent teleology is a “cop-out” or “science-stopper,” then appeal to blind dysteleology is likewise a “cop-out” or “science-stopper.”
ii) The giraffe has a highly specialized circulatory system. You need to explain how a blind evolutionary process could synchronize the fortuitous emergence of these interdependent adaptations.
iii) But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that the modern giraffe did “evolve” from ancestors with shorter necks. How would that disapprove intelligent design?
Dog breeders cultivate different subspecies of dogs with a variety of specialized features.
“As far as laughter is concerned: when one exhibits ignorance of itroductory biology while thinking that they may make protentious pronouncements on much more advanced subjects, laughter is the only answer. (BTW, I laugh at myself all the time: try it, it may turn out to be beneficial...:))”
It’s true that your ignorance of introductory biology makes you a laughingstock. That’s one thing we agree with on.
“Lo and behold! Steve takes a small albeit unwitting step towards understanding how evolution actually works. Will he realize this momentous breakthrough? I doubt it, but anything is possible.”
You’re dodging the issue, even though you were the one who choose to introduce that issue. I’m still waiting for you to furnish a working model of a functional human eye with octopoid improvements.
“Meanwhile, a hypothetical designer is not limited by preexisting structures, of course.”
i) You’re the one who cited the octopoid eye as your point of reference. Therefore, the onus lies on you to present a detailed physiological explanation of how you’d combine features of the octopoid eye with features of the human eye to produce a more optimal design.
ii) Use of preexisting structures is a mark of simplicity and efficiency.
“I wish I could apologize for my laughter; but no matter, no matter.”
No need to apologize. A buffoon like you makes an excellent foil. You’re like a clown we hire to entertain little tikes at the birthday party.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Oh boy. Are you really trying to tell me that you do not see how a single nerve from larynx traversing the length of the neck, looping around the aorta and traversing the length of the neck again on its return path to the brain has nothing to do with redundancy (where is the backup system, my friend?)?”
i) You have a simple-minded grasp of redundancy. For example:
http://www.uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/jerry-pz-ron-faitheism-templeton-bloggingheads-and-all-that-some-follow-up-comments/#comment-327882
ii) Since a giraffe is a unified organism with a set of functionally integrated subsystems, you must detail how, exactly (and I do mean “exactly”) you could reroute the RLN without disrupting the delicate balance. Optimality is a property of the entire organism, in relation to its ecological niche, and not an isolated organ or body party.
BTW, you’re not my friend.
“Oh boy. I apologize.”
You have a lot to apologize for. Don’t stop now.
“I thought I was conversing with people with at least a freshman level understanding of basic biology; my mistake.”
Since I never mistook you for someone with at least a freshmen level understanding of basic biology, I’m unapologetic.
“BTW, regarding your earlier confusion between methodological and metaphysical naturalism: do not fall into Johnson's rhetorical cesspit: they are two different devices entailing quite different committments. I know of plenty people who are methodologically quite naturalistic (perhaps even more orthodox than me in that sense) while holding all sorts of metaphysically non-naturalistic beliefs: Miller, Gilberson, Collins, Abdus Salam (!) spring to mind instantly.”
I spelled out why your makeshift dichotomy is unstable. Methodological naturalism logically collapses into metaphysical naturalism. I gave reasons. You offer no counterargument.
Instead, you resort to biographical anecdotes. But what some people happen to believe is irrelevant. Name-dropping is not an argument. Collecting opinions is no substitute for reasoned argument.
STEVE SAID:
JORGON GORGON SAID:
“Steve: your claim that methodological naturalism is unstable is belied by many practitioners that use it without a problem.”
I give arguments, you give anecdotes. Needless to say, citing biographical vignettes doesn’t go an inch towards disproving my argument. You’re an irrationalist posing as a rationalist.
“(Your claim is akin to a crank-point from John Baez's list: 5 points for every mention of the sueriority of a thought experiment that contradicts well-observed empirical observation).”
That’s such a stupid comparison. There’s no analogy between the metaphysical/methodological dichotomy and the thought-experimental/empirical-experimental dichotomy.
Your anecdotes about methodological naturalists don’t count as observational facts about the concept of methodological naturalism. Rather, that merely tells us something about the mental state of the methodological naturalist. His opinions. That’s irrelevant to whether their opinions are true or false.
The truth or falsity of the metaphysical/methodological dichotomy is a logical issue, not a psychological or empirical issue. Are you too dense to figure that out?
“My grasp of redundancy may or may not be simplistic, but a single system is not redundant in any sense without another system fulfilling the same/similar task. Your apparent inability to grasp it does not bode well for future discussion.”
It’s redundant in the sense I gave. See the link.
“It could, easily, go directly from the brain to larynx.”
You say it but you don’t show it. Asserting something to be the case is not an argument, especially when you’re making counterfactual claims about optimal bioengineering. A real engineer needs to demonstrate his claims, not make promissory assertions about what’s allegedly easy to do.
You act as if we were dealing with an isolated system. What corresponding changes would be required to implement that particular change? Do you have any idea? We’re waiting to see your schematics.
“BTW, I assume you may be aware that the giraffe's engineering is quite faulty, for old specimen in any case: often they are not able to get up after drinking and die.”
Another stupid statement. It reflects your chronic inability to keep more than one idea in your head at a time.
Specialization has advantages and disadvantages. Which is a better design: A leopard, a tiger, or a cheetah?
There is no uniform answer to that question. A cheetah sacrifices power and claws for sheer speed. Speed is advantageous. But it comes at a cost.
A leopard is more flexible. More powerful than a cheetah. Can climb better than a lion or cheetah.
On the other hand, it lacks the power of a lion, or the speed of a cheetah.
What is a survival advantage in one situation, one environment, one ecological niche, may be disadvantageous in another environment.
Optimality is relative to other considerations. A cost/benefit ratio. There are tradeoffs to being a giraffe. Better in some ways, worse in others.
STEVE SAID:
[JG] “What's more, your requirements of specificity are a classic ID/creationist canard: a demand for 100% specific and proven pathway/method/system from an opponent while themselves providing nothing but vague generalities (in fact, s vague as to be useless, as with IC, for example.”
Even if ID theory were guilty of the inadequacies you allege, shifting the blame to the inadequacies of the opposing position does nothing whatsoever to rectify the inadequacies of your own position. That’s just a diversionary tactic on the part of somebody who can’t back up his sweeping claims with comparable evidence.
“In fact, I am under no obligation to demonstrate anything to you that you cannot fiind out by perusing your local college library. Would you like a reading list? It can be provided, upon request. If you raised any interestig points, I would be happy to engage in a thoughtful dialogue (contrary to what you may believe, my training in relevant disciplines is quite real.”
Flaunting your epaulets like the head of a banana republic is no substitute for putting hard evidence on the table or presenting a counterargument.
I’ve been answering you on your own terms. When I do so, you respond with an abundance of bluster and schoolboy fallacies.
“Instead, you repeat well-worn non-points from Dembski et al, without betraying any knowledge of the current state of research in real biology.”
Once again, you have no argument. You talk about knowledge without putting the relevant knowledge on display. Stalling for time.
“I must say, I have not had this much fun since watching A fock of Dodos...”
There’s nothing behind your façade. It’s just a cardboard wall. Once we punch a hole in your facade, there’s nothing but air on the other side.
You’re long on scientific rhetoric, but short on scientific evidence.
PATRICK CHAN SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said:
Um, human eye can be easily redesigned to get rid of a blind spot.
Are you referring to the optic disc of the retina? If so, how do you propose to redesign the optic disc in order to get rid of this blind spot without adversely affecting the physiology of vision?
And giraffe's laryngeal nerve does not have to traverse its neck multiple times. (Vagus nerve has the same problem).
Specifically, what do you find problematic about how the vagus nerve innervates the human body? For one thing, it's responsible for significant parasympathetic functions which would not be possible if it didn't innervate the human body in the manner it does.
Our spines, to use another immediate example, are engineered for quadrupeds, not so well for bipeds. These are elementary anatomical facts.
You can't simply take the spine in isolation and make such a sweeping claim.
What specifically is it about the human vertebral column that you believe to be poorly engineered for bipedal motion over and against quadrupedal motion?
How do you explain other skeletal features such as the clavicle which serves as a strut and keeps the humerus away from the thorax and allows it the range of motion it has (and which, as you'd claim, is one reason we're not quadrupeds)?
Not to mention that if you were to do away with the clavicle, then you'd have other problems such as deep inspiration because it wouldn't be possible for humans to elevate their ribs.
And we've said nothing of other anatomical features such as the various muscle attachments that are involved in bipedal motion.
PATRICK CHAN SAID:
Jorgon Gorgon said:
Mammalian eye is designed as a reflector. It did not have to be. Had it been designed by an intelligent and logical engineer, it most likely would have been a refractor. The fact that I cannot think of specific details of its design means nothing: I assume that such a designer would have much more advanced tools than any of us do. All I can concentrate on is function; and for a given function, better designs are possible.
Of course that assumes an "intelligent and logical" designer. It could have been Arioch the Duke of Chaos, and often it seems that way.
1. I don't know if this is what you're assuming but I'm not arguing for intelligent design. Rather, I'm simply asking you to make good on the claims you've made. If you claim x, then specify how claim x would work. And, yes, it does mean "something" if you can't make good on your claim.
2. You're simply wrong to say that the eye is designed as a reflector and not a refractor. How do you explain the refractive media of the eye: the cornea, aqueous humor, lens, and vitreous humor?
And I thought you understood "introductory biology" since you were the one who said the following:
As far as laughter is concerned: when one exhibits ignorance of itroductory biology while thinking that they may make protentious pronouncements on much more advanced subjects, laughter is the only answer.
All Hat, No Cattle
My recent exchange with some Catholics over at Justin Taylor's blog:
[Bryan Cross] “Jason, Is it even possible, in your mind, that you have misinterpreted St. Paul’s words in his letter to the Galatians?”
Since that objection cuts both ways, it’s self-refuting. We can all entertain the hypothetical possibility of error. However, that, of itself, doesn’t create any presumption of error. And it’s clear that Bryan is very one-sided in his skepticism. Jason ought to be skeptical about his evangelical interpretation of Galatians, but Bryan ought not be skeptical about his Catholic interpretation of Galatians. Jason should doubt his evangelical faith, but Bryan’s Catholic faith is indubitable.
“You are not making any distinction between the works of the ceremonial law as part of the Old Covenant, and works of the moral law, done in a state of grace in the New Covenant, out of love [agape] for God. In his letter to the Galatians, St. Paul wasn’t condemning (or even referring to) growth in justification through good works done in a state of grace; he was condemning a return to the Old Covenant by Christians, because that was a rejection of the New Covenant and implicitly a rejection of Jesus as the Messiah who established the New Covenant in which the requirement of those ceremonial laws is done away. If you don’t understand the distinction between the ceremonial law and the moral law, then you have entirely misunderstood Paul’s point in his letter to the Galatians. Then your whole warrant for calling the Church’s teaching a ‘false gospel’ is based on a misinterpretation of Scripture.”
Actually, it’s far more likely that Bryan has “entirely misunderstood” Paul’s point in Galatians. As Gordon Fee explains, in his exegesis of Gal 3:10-12,
“Paul thereby moves from the blessing of Abraham in Genesis (vv7-9) to the curses of Deut 27-28 on those who do not obey the law (vv10-13). He does so by citing the final, summarizing curse in Deut 27:26–as it appears in the LXX, but with some verbal modifications from 29:19-20: ‘Cursed is anyone who does not abide in all the things written in the book of the law, to do them.’ Paul has chosen his citation carefully, as the addition from Deut 29:20 and the citation of Lev 18:5 in v12 make certain. At issue for Paul is the Judaizer’s selectivity with regard to the law…Paul’s point is that those who choose to live by the law thereby exclude themselves from the blessing, because they must now ‘abide in the whole law, to do it,’ and they are cursed if they do not so ‘abide.’ What Paul is thus setting out to demonstrate is the total incompatibility of living on the basis of faith while also trying to live on the basis of doing the law…First, if the Galatian men allow themselves to be circumcised, they are making a choice ‘to live by the law’; and because people must ‘abide in [continue to live in] everything written in the law,’ they are thereby excluding themselves from living by the Spirit, based on faith in Christ Jesus. What the Galatians must recognize is that these two ways of living are mutually exclusive; one lives one way (by faith) or the other (by law); and to live by the other (the law) only partially is to be under a curse. Therefore, second, they cannot be partial in their obedience: to choose to live by the law means of necessity to live by the whole law; partial obedience (just circumcision, food laws, and Sabbath observance) is not permissible. So this too is part of the curse; it is either no law or the whole law. Third, to abide in the law carries with it the necessity of ‘doing the law,’ which automatically means that one is not trusting Christ for salvation. The logical consequence of all this is that the one who chooses to live by the law is thereby excluded from Christ, cut off from salvation altogether; and this is the real concern for Paul in all of this argumentation…Paul’s’ Gentile converts in Galatia cannot pick and choose what they will obey from the law. Rather, to go the way of the Torah is to go the whole way; there is no provision for partial obedience. Here, then, is the paragraph that puts all of this in its starkest form…His point now is, and it is the crucial point in the entire argument with the Galatians, that one cannot add ‘works of law’ to faith as a basis of ‘living’ before God. To the contrary, the law itself is quite plain on this matter…The ‘logic’ is thus certain and forceful, and Paul’s point is clear: You Galatians cannot have it both ways; it is an either/or situation. One either comes to life, and continues to live, on the basis of faith, or one is condemned to living by the law and that alone, and that quite excludes living by faith. To make this mean something else theologically is not only to do injustice to what Paul actually says, but takes the argument out of Paul’s’ context in order to make it fit another concern altogether,” Galatians (Deo Publishing 2007), 117-21.
Ironically and unwittingly, Bryan is siding with the Judaizers.
[Bryan Cross] “You claim that ‘passages like Romans 3:27 and Galatians 3:21-25 illustrate [that] Paul wanted works of every type excluded.’ But the texts don’t demand that interpretation.”
Well, according to the Catholic NT scholar Joseph Fitzmyer, commenting on the follow-up verse (3:28):
“[Paul’s] emphasis falls on pistei, ‘by faith,’ as Kuss, Bardenhewer, and Sickenberger recognize. That emphasis and the qualification ‘apart from deeds of (the law)’ show that in this context Paul means ‘by faith alone,’” Romans (Doubleday 1993), 364.
[Bryan Cross] “But that shouldn’t be interpreted as ruling out the ability to store up a righteous reward in heaven for good works done here: ‘every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor.’ (1 Cor 3:8), and ‘Behold, I am coming quickly, and My reward is with Me, to render to each man according to what he has done.’ (Rev 22:12) The reward for our good works is based on the law, not on some arbitrary standard God just makes up on the Day of Judgment.”
Two problems:
i) As a point of exegetical method, it’s methodologically erroneous to use John to gloss Paul. The usage of each author needs to be construed on its own terms. After we’ve established what each writer meant, we can then proceed to systematic theology.
But until you interpret each writer on his own terms, it’s circular to assume that two different authors are even talking about the same thing. You need to exegete each writer on his own terms to know what he’s talking about in the first place before you’re in any position to relate what he says to what another author says.
ii) The fact that Scripture has a doctrine of heavenly rewards doesn’t mean that good works are justificatory (in the Pauline sense). Bryan is assuming the very conclusion which he needs to prove.
[Bryan Cross] “Steve, You’re conflating initial justification and growth in justification.”
Bryan, you’re interpolating a distinction between initial justification and final justification without first having established the existence of said subdivision in the text. You need to demonstrate through suitable exegesis that Paul conceived of justification as gradual process with different stages.
“Fitzmeyer’s comment, whether true or not, is fully compatible with works being excluded from initial justification, and yet not excluded from growth in justification or from final justification.”
Compatible under the tendentious assumptions that (a) justification is phased in over time, and (b) works contribute to final justification. You keep assuming what you need to prove.
“And Fee gets St. Paul wrong in the quotation you cited, because he doesn’t understand that it is through agape that we fulfill the whole law, as Jeremiah foretold (Jer 31:33) and St. Paul teaches in Rom 2:29.”
Which doesn’t establish that law-keeping is justificatory. You constantly anticipate your conclusion–minus the supporting argument.
“This is precisely why to break one point of the law is to break the whole law (James 2:10), because by doing so one has abandoned agape.”
It’s fallacious to use James to gloss Paul. To begin with, that prejudges the meaning of James. In addition, unless you already know what Paul means, you don’t know whether the two statements are even conceptually related.
“And by contrast, to retain agape is to fulfill the whole law, as St. Paul teaches. (Gal 5:14) Fee presents us with an either/or [all the OT law, or faith alone]. But that’s not St. Paul’s either/or. St. Paul’s either/or is Old Covenant or New Covenant.”
Several problems;
i) Gal 5:14, with its appeal to Lev 19:18, accentuates the continuity between the old covenant and the new at this juncture. That’s not either/or.
ii) Moreover, it’s in the context of the new covenant that Paul accentuates the inadmissibility of law-keeping as a basis of justification before God. So that’s not a contrast between the old covenant and the new. Rather, that’s a contrast within the new covenant itself.
iii) Do you think law-keeping was justificatory under the old covenant? Were Jews saved by works while Christians are saved by grace?
“With regard to the moral law and faith, in Christ they are both/and, by the supernatural gift of agape. The law is not abolished in the New Covenant; it is written on the hearts of men by the Spirit.”
The internalization of the law doesn’t mean the law is justificatory. You keep presuming the very thing you need to demonstrate. Is that because you’re reading everything through a Catholic lens–which superimposes Catholic concepts onto the text? Unfortunately, your conclusions are etched on your lens rather than your prooftext. Remove the lens and the conclusion disappears.
[Francis Beckwith] “Well, some us actually believe that it does not ‘harmonize the data’ as well as you think, if you mean by ‘harmonize the data’ a theory that best accounts for the data of scripture (including the teachings of Jesus), requires fewer ad hoc hypotheses, and best accounts for the development of the practices and beliefs of the ante-nicean and post-nicean church. After all, the first readers of Scripture should be accorded great deference since it is in their communities that canon developed and was eventually recognized, its parts recited and read in their liturgical practices, and they were the closest to the Apostles and their immediate successors (including Ignatius and Polycarp).”
i) Is Beckwith telling us that Roman Catholicism has ad hoc hypotheses, but fewer ad hoc hypotheses than Protestantism?
ii) Notice the slippage as he goes straight from the “first readers of Scripture” through the subapostolic fathers and ante-nicean fathers to the post-nicean fathers–as if all these different generations enjoy the same privileged epistemic situation. But that’s’ clearly not the case. Consider a court of law. If you subpoenaed a witness to offer testimony on the state of the NT church, would you subpoena Papias or John Chrysostom? Clearly Papias. No court of law would summon a “witness” who lived centuries after the fact. That would be hearsay evidence many many many times removed from the event in question.
iii) There are other obvious distinctions. While an eyewitness may well know more about an event he saw than somebody living 100 years after the event, it’s possible for a historian living 500 years after the event to know more about the event than somebody living 100 years after the event. That’s because the historian may consult more sources of information. Likewise, a modern Egyptologist knows more about ancient Egypt than St. Anselm, even though Anselm was born hundreds of before the Egyptologist.
iv) And we also know from reading the NT epistles that it was quite possible for contemporaries of the apostles who sat at their feet to misconstrue apostolic teaching. That’s why Paul is forced to write a follow-up letter to correct their misunderstanding. And that’s despite the fact that he also taught them face-to-face.
v) Finally, does the church of Rome consistently defer to the church fathers? Or does the church of Rome pick and choose which patristic teachings to follow?
Who was closer to NT times: Marcion (c. 85-160) or Gregory the Great (c. 540-604)? Does this mean, using Beckwith’s chronological yardstick, that Marcion takes precedence over Gregory the Great? Does that represent Catholic priorities? I don’t think so.
“To do a word study on the word ‘work,’ for example, as if that can ever settle this sort of question is lexical gnosticism, reminiscent of the sort of exoteric/esoteric reading of classical texts found among the followers of Leo Strauss in political philosophy. People write in sentences, embedded in paragraphs of which letters and books are composed.”
Of course, that’s just a straw man argument.
“But, remember, for those of us who are many generations removed from the founders of that theology, we are reading the text with those background beliefs firmly in place, situated in the center of a well-regarded theological tradition with some of wonderful Christian thinkers who advocate for it…some people are going to come to the theological table with a different plausibility structure than others, and this is why some of us find some arguments and reasons better than others…Suppose, also, that the person has been a life-long member of a Baptist Church that has a wonderful pastor and loving and charitable Christians who live out the words of Christ. These people, who he knows and trusts, teach him that the proper way to look at the Lord’s Supper is that it is symbolic. This person’s plausibility structure (or ‘evidential set’) will make it difficult for him to accept the Catholic position, even if one can make a church history argument for it. So, this person is going assess counter-arguments from Catholics and Orthodox partly on the resources of his plausibility structure.”
i) Of course, the problem with this objection is that it cuts both ways. A cradle Catholic will have a Catholic plausibility structure or evidential set. So that objection either proves too much or too little.
ii) Moreover, it’s misleading to suggest that Catholic exegetes arrive at Catholic conclusions while Protestant exegetes arrive at Protestant conclusion. If you actually read modern Catholic exegetes (e.g. Raymond Brown, Joseph Fitzmyer; John Meier, Luke Timothy Johnson), they frequently challenge traditional Catholic interpretations of Scripture and offer more “Protestant” interpretations in their place.
iii) And as far as church history is concerned, let’s remember that Protestants can be church historians, too. Protestant church historians are also “deep into church history.” They know the same primary and secondary source materials as Catholic theologians.
“On the other hand, there are other people, such as Scott Hahn, Jimmy Akin, Richard John Neuhaus, Avery Cardinal Dulles, John Henry Cardinal Newman, Robert Louis Wilken, and R. R. Reno, who have found the Reformed account less plausible than the Catholic one.”
Sure you want to use Newman to prove your point? As a recent historical monograph has documented, “it was events in Newman’s life that changed his interpretation of the Fathers, not the interpretation of the Fathers that caused Newman to change his life. King argues that Newman tailored his reading, ‘trying on’ the ideas of different Fathers to fit his own needs.”
Cf. B. King, Newman and the Alexandrian Fathers (OUP 2009).
Continuing with Beckwith:
“After all, these gentlemen, after careful study and reflection, though it no longer possible to embrace the Reformed view in good conscience. Are they irrational?”
But, of course, that’s misleading. Beckwith isn’t vying for epistemic parity between Catholicism and Protestantism. He doesn’t content himself with the even-handed notion that both sides are rational. Rather, Beckwith is vying for the superiority of Catholicism.
“However, there are other aspects of Catholic theology–apostolic succession, Eucharistic realism, the importance of avoiding the sin of schism, its ancient patrimony, etc.–that tip the scales for me in favor of Catholicism.”
i) That’s a makeweight. Unable to justify your Catholic interpretation of Scripture on exegetical grounds, you leverage your Catholic interpretation by lobbing a kitchen sink of extraneous considerations at the text. But how does that ascertain the meaning of the Bible writer? Do we simply vacate the meaning of Scripture if it comes into conflict with extrascriptural precommitments?
ii) And, of course, it’s not as if astute Protestants never evaluated the “other aspects” of Catholic theology.
[Francis Beckwith] “On the other hand, there are other people, such as Scott Hahn, Jimmy Akin, Richard John Neuhaus, Avery Cardinal Dulles, John Henry Cardinal Newman, Robert Louis Wilken, and R. R. Reno, who have found the Reformed account less plausible than the Catholic one.”
i) I’m unclear on why Beckwith is casting the debate in terms of Calvinism v. Catholicism (since “Reformed” is synonymous with “Calvinist”). Belief in sola fide is hardly limited to Calvinism.
ii) Of the names he ticked off, Newman and Dulles are clearly the most distinguished of the lot. I’ve already commented on Newman. So what about Dulles? Well, let’s take a few test-cases, shall we?
a) Consider his articles on the topic of salvation and damnation: “The Population of Hell,” “Who Can Be Saved?” (both of which are available online). On a related note is his article on the Jewish question: “The Covenant With Israel” (also available online).
As he rummages through church history, notice how he traces out the checked history of this central issue in Catholic theology. Notice the sea-change in Catholic theology.
On a different topic, but illustrating the same theological instability, consider his article on “Catholicism & Capital Punishment” (available online).
b) Then we have his article “From Ratzinger to Benedict” (available online).
On the one hand, it documents the way in which Karol Wojtyła and Joseph Ratzinger arrive at divergent interpretations of Vatican II. This despite the fact that both men were participants at the council, worked side by side for a quarter century, and ascended the papacy (one right after the other.
On the other hand, it also documents the divergence between early Ratzinger’s interpretation of Vatican II and late Ratzinger’s interpretation of Vatican II.
c) I’d also recommend that people read the book by Dulles on the Magisterium, which details the difficulties in arriving at a definitive statement of Catholic theology.
Catholicism is a sea island, the boundaries of which keep shifting.
“This person’s plausibility structure (or ‘evidential set’) will make it difficult for him to accept the Catholic position, even if one can make a church history argument for it.”
Keep in mind that Catholic church historians like Ignaz von Döllinger, Klaus Schatz, and Robert Eno challenge the official version of Catholic church history.
Indeed, Döllinger was excommunicated for his refusal to rubberstamp the historical revisionism of Vatican I.
[Francis Beckwith] “How do you know that this author is not mistaken as well?”
i) Why do you pose a self-defeating question? If you can ask me that question, then I can ask you the same question in return. So what does that move accomplish for you?
Have you settled for mutual skepticism? How does that give anyone a reason to be Roman Catholic rather than Lutheran or Anglican or Presbyterian or Baptist or Anabaptist?
For example, you earlier cited Cardinal Dulles. What if I replied by saying, “How do you know Dulles isn’t mistaken as well?” Surely you don’t think that’s an adequate response.
ii) Moreover, the possibility that so-and-so could be mistaken doesn’t ipso facto create a presumption that he is mistaken, or probably mistaken. And some folks are less likely to be mistaken than others. Benjamin King is a church historian who’s obviously made a specialized study of Newman. His monograph is published by a leading academic press. Is he infallible? No. But if we were to choose between his interpretation and yours, doesn’t he bring more expertise to the subject than you do?
Sure, you can challenge his interpretation. You might even be right. But you’d have to bring some counterevidence to bear. Not simply float the abstract possibility that he might be mistaken.
“One of the things you learn over the years…”
That line might work with one of your 19-year old students at Baylor. But since you’re about one year my junior, that just doesn’t fly.
“If I may offer a pastoral note here, it is really unhealthy to always be worrying about arguments as the woof and warp of your faith and walk with Jesus. Arguments are, of course, important. And I suspect less important than you think.”
Well, that disclaimer is rather duplicitous in this setting, don’t you think? Both you and Bryan are trying, kinda sorta, to argue for Catholicism. To argue against the Evangelical alternative.
So why do you suddenly introduce this disclaimer? Is that a fallback maneuver because you sense you’re losing the argument?
Disclaimers like this simply boomerang on yourself. It looks like you’re trying to preemptively minimize the value of arguments against Catholicism while, however, we’re supposed to take your arguments against evangelicalism (such as they are) far more seriously.
“Parts of the Development are clearly better than others, but in general I think he makes a good case.”
But that’s in tension with your initial appeal to “the first readers” of Scripture, the subapostolic fathers, &c.
As Mozley pointed out in his 19C review of Newman’s essay, if you’re going to invoke primitive tradition to validate Catholic dogma, then the dogma should be more evident upstream, not downstream.
“For example, Steve cites the B. King book, published in 2009. Are we to actually believe that prior to 2009 he was just waiting for the B. King book or something like it in order to not be tempted to cross the Tiber.”
I was merely responding to Beckwith on his own terms. A tu quoque argument. That doesn’t mean I have a dog in that fight one way or the other as far as Newman is concerned.
[Francis Beckwith] “Yikes Steve. I wrote this right after I dealt with King’s book. It was just a kind word to point out that none of us waits for the next issue of Theology Today or the next OUP catalog to see if its still rational to believe what we believe. For if we did, it would be a horrible and creepy (and thus, unhealthy).”
No, you just wait for the next papal encyclical to see if what you were required to believe the day before is what you’re forbidden to believe the day after, or vice versa.
[Phil Buster] “The great irony here: Justification by faith alone being turned into self-justification and a means for boasting, in this case, ways to justify oneself against the Catholic church and boast in the superiority of Protestantism. And therein lies the shallowness of evangelical Protestantism, it loves to wield doctrines but seldomly takes them to heart.”
First of all, I notice that you don’t rebut a single thing that Jason and I have said. So, to judge by your own performance, you regard your Catholic faith as indefensible.
Beyond that, your statement is a study in confusion. Whether we, as sinners, can merit our justification before God is a completely different question than providing an intellectual justification for our belief-system. An intellectual justification is not a question of personal merit, much less personal merit in relation to God. That’s hardly the “boasting” which Paul had in mind. Don’t you know the difference? And there’s nothing essentially “boastful” about an intellectual justification.
And if you think that providing an intellectual justification for one’s faith betrays the shallowness of one’s faith, then you condemn the Roman Catholic tradition of fundamental theology and polemical theology. Likewise, doesn’t Catholicism claim to be superior to evangelicalism? Why are you Roman Catholic rather than Protestant if you deem the two positions to be coequal?
[Bryan Cross] “Jason, Is it even possible, in your mind, that you have misinterpreted St. Paul’s words in his letter to the Galatians?”
Since that objection cuts both ways, it’s self-refuting. We can all entertain the hypothetical possibility of error. However, that, of itself, doesn’t create any presumption of error. And it’s clear that Bryan is very one-sided in his skepticism. Jason ought to be skeptical about his evangelical interpretation of Galatians, but Bryan ought not be skeptical about his Catholic interpretation of Galatians. Jason should doubt his evangelical faith, but Bryan’s Catholic faith is indubitable.
“You are not making any distinction between the works of the ceremonial law as part of the Old Covenant, and works of the moral law, done in a state of grace in the New Covenant, out of love [agape] for God. In his letter to the Galatians, St. Paul wasn’t condemning (or even referring to) growth in justification through good works done in a state of grace; he was condemning a return to the Old Covenant by Christians, because that was a rejection of the New Covenant and implicitly a rejection of Jesus as the Messiah who established the New Covenant in which the requirement of those ceremonial laws is done away. If you don’t understand the distinction between the ceremonial law and the moral law, then you have entirely misunderstood Paul’s point in his letter to the Galatians. Then your whole warrant for calling the Church’s teaching a ‘false gospel’ is based on a misinterpretation of Scripture.”
Actually, it’s far more likely that Bryan has “entirely misunderstood” Paul’s point in Galatians. As Gordon Fee explains, in his exegesis of Gal 3:10-12,
“Paul thereby moves from the blessing of Abraham in Genesis (vv7-9) to the curses of Deut 27-28 on those who do not obey the law (vv10-13). He does so by citing the final, summarizing curse in Deut 27:26–as it appears in the LXX, but with some verbal modifications from 29:19-20: ‘Cursed is anyone who does not abide in all the things written in the book of the law, to do them.’ Paul has chosen his citation carefully, as the addition from Deut 29:20 and the citation of Lev 18:5 in v12 make certain. At issue for Paul is the Judaizer’s selectivity with regard to the law…Paul’s point is that those who choose to live by the law thereby exclude themselves from the blessing, because they must now ‘abide in the whole law, to do it,’ and they are cursed if they do not so ‘abide.’ What Paul is thus setting out to demonstrate is the total incompatibility of living on the basis of faith while also trying to live on the basis of doing the law…First, if the Galatian men allow themselves to be circumcised, they are making a choice ‘to live by the law’; and because people must ‘abide in [continue to live in] everything written in the law,’ they are thereby excluding themselves from living by the Spirit, based on faith in Christ Jesus. What the Galatians must recognize is that these two ways of living are mutually exclusive; one lives one way (by faith) or the other (by law); and to live by the other (the law) only partially is to be under a curse. Therefore, second, they cannot be partial in their obedience: to choose to live by the law means of necessity to live by the whole law; partial obedience (just circumcision, food laws, and Sabbath observance) is not permissible. So this too is part of the curse; it is either no law or the whole law. Third, to abide in the law carries with it the necessity of ‘doing the law,’ which automatically means that one is not trusting Christ for salvation. The logical consequence of all this is that the one who chooses to live by the law is thereby excluded from Christ, cut off from salvation altogether; and this is the real concern for Paul in all of this argumentation…Paul’s’ Gentile converts in Galatia cannot pick and choose what they will obey from the law. Rather, to go the way of the Torah is to go the whole way; there is no provision for partial obedience. Here, then, is the paragraph that puts all of this in its starkest form…His point now is, and it is the crucial point in the entire argument with the Galatians, that one cannot add ‘works of law’ to faith as a basis of ‘living’ before God. To the contrary, the law itself is quite plain on this matter…The ‘logic’ is thus certain and forceful, and Paul’s point is clear: You Galatians cannot have it both ways; it is an either/or situation. One either comes to life, and continues to live, on the basis of faith, or one is condemned to living by the law and that alone, and that quite excludes living by faith. To make this mean something else theologically is not only to do injustice to what Paul actually says, but takes the argument out of Paul’s’ context in order to make it fit another concern altogether,” Galatians (Deo Publishing 2007), 117-21.
Ironically and unwittingly, Bryan is siding with the Judaizers.
[Bryan Cross] “You claim that ‘passages like Romans 3:27 and Galatians 3:21-25 illustrate [that] Paul wanted works of every type excluded.’ But the texts don’t demand that interpretation.”
Well, according to the Catholic NT scholar Joseph Fitzmyer, commenting on the follow-up verse (3:28):
“[Paul’s] emphasis falls on pistei, ‘by faith,’ as Kuss, Bardenhewer, and Sickenberger recognize. That emphasis and the qualification ‘apart from deeds of (the law)’ show that in this context Paul means ‘by faith alone,’” Romans (Doubleday 1993), 364.
[Bryan Cross] “But that shouldn’t be interpreted as ruling out the ability to store up a righteous reward in heaven for good works done here: ‘every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor.’ (1 Cor 3:8), and ‘Behold, I am coming quickly, and My reward is with Me, to render to each man according to what he has done.’ (Rev 22:12) The reward for our good works is based on the law, not on some arbitrary standard God just makes up on the Day of Judgment.”
Two problems:
i) As a point of exegetical method, it’s methodologically erroneous to use John to gloss Paul. The usage of each author needs to be construed on its own terms. After we’ve established what each writer meant, we can then proceed to systematic theology.
But until you interpret each writer on his own terms, it’s circular to assume that two different authors are even talking about the same thing. You need to exegete each writer on his own terms to know what he’s talking about in the first place before you’re in any position to relate what he says to what another author says.
ii) The fact that Scripture has a doctrine of heavenly rewards doesn’t mean that good works are justificatory (in the Pauline sense). Bryan is assuming the very conclusion which he needs to prove.
[Bryan Cross] “Steve, You’re conflating initial justification and growth in justification.”
Bryan, you’re interpolating a distinction between initial justification and final justification without first having established the existence of said subdivision in the text. You need to demonstrate through suitable exegesis that Paul conceived of justification as gradual process with different stages.
“Fitzmeyer’s comment, whether true or not, is fully compatible with works being excluded from initial justification, and yet not excluded from growth in justification or from final justification.”
Compatible under the tendentious assumptions that (a) justification is phased in over time, and (b) works contribute to final justification. You keep assuming what you need to prove.
“And Fee gets St. Paul wrong in the quotation you cited, because he doesn’t understand that it is through agape that we fulfill the whole law, as Jeremiah foretold (Jer 31:33) and St. Paul teaches in Rom 2:29.”
Which doesn’t establish that law-keeping is justificatory. You constantly anticipate your conclusion–minus the supporting argument.
“This is precisely why to break one point of the law is to break the whole law (James 2:10), because by doing so one has abandoned agape.”
It’s fallacious to use James to gloss Paul. To begin with, that prejudges the meaning of James. In addition, unless you already know what Paul means, you don’t know whether the two statements are even conceptually related.
“And by contrast, to retain agape is to fulfill the whole law, as St. Paul teaches. (Gal 5:14) Fee presents us with an either/or [all the OT law, or faith alone]. But that’s not St. Paul’s either/or. St. Paul’s either/or is Old Covenant or New Covenant.”
Several problems;
i) Gal 5:14, with its appeal to Lev 19:18, accentuates the continuity between the old covenant and the new at this juncture. That’s not either/or.
ii) Moreover, it’s in the context of the new covenant that Paul accentuates the inadmissibility of law-keeping as a basis of justification before God. So that’s not a contrast between the old covenant and the new. Rather, that’s a contrast within the new covenant itself.
iii) Do you think law-keeping was justificatory under the old covenant? Were Jews saved by works while Christians are saved by grace?
“With regard to the moral law and faith, in Christ they are both/and, by the supernatural gift of agape. The law is not abolished in the New Covenant; it is written on the hearts of men by the Spirit.”
The internalization of the law doesn’t mean the law is justificatory. You keep presuming the very thing you need to demonstrate. Is that because you’re reading everything through a Catholic lens–which superimposes Catholic concepts onto the text? Unfortunately, your conclusions are etched on your lens rather than your prooftext. Remove the lens and the conclusion disappears.
[Francis Beckwith] “Well, some us actually believe that it does not ‘harmonize the data’ as well as you think, if you mean by ‘harmonize the data’ a theory that best accounts for the data of scripture (including the teachings of Jesus), requires fewer ad hoc hypotheses, and best accounts for the development of the practices and beliefs of the ante-nicean and post-nicean church. After all, the first readers of Scripture should be accorded great deference since it is in their communities that canon developed and was eventually recognized, its parts recited and read in their liturgical practices, and they were the closest to the Apostles and their immediate successors (including Ignatius and Polycarp).”
i) Is Beckwith telling us that Roman Catholicism has ad hoc hypotheses, but fewer ad hoc hypotheses than Protestantism?
ii) Notice the slippage as he goes straight from the “first readers of Scripture” through the subapostolic fathers and ante-nicean fathers to the post-nicean fathers–as if all these different generations enjoy the same privileged epistemic situation. But that’s’ clearly not the case. Consider a court of law. If you subpoenaed a witness to offer testimony on the state of the NT church, would you subpoena Papias or John Chrysostom? Clearly Papias. No court of law would summon a “witness” who lived centuries after the fact. That would be hearsay evidence many many many times removed from the event in question.
iii) There are other obvious distinctions. While an eyewitness may well know more about an event he saw than somebody living 100 years after the event, it’s possible for a historian living 500 years after the event to know more about the event than somebody living 100 years after the event. That’s because the historian may consult more sources of information. Likewise, a modern Egyptologist knows more about ancient Egypt than St. Anselm, even though Anselm was born hundreds of before the Egyptologist.
iv) And we also know from reading the NT epistles that it was quite possible for contemporaries of the apostles who sat at their feet to misconstrue apostolic teaching. That’s why Paul is forced to write a follow-up letter to correct their misunderstanding. And that’s despite the fact that he also taught them face-to-face.
v) Finally, does the church of Rome consistently defer to the church fathers? Or does the church of Rome pick and choose which patristic teachings to follow?
Who was closer to NT times: Marcion (c. 85-160) or Gregory the Great (c. 540-604)? Does this mean, using Beckwith’s chronological yardstick, that Marcion takes precedence over Gregory the Great? Does that represent Catholic priorities? I don’t think so.
“To do a word study on the word ‘work,’ for example, as if that can ever settle this sort of question is lexical gnosticism, reminiscent of the sort of exoteric/esoteric reading of classical texts found among the followers of Leo Strauss in political philosophy. People write in sentences, embedded in paragraphs of which letters and books are composed.”
Of course, that’s just a straw man argument.
“But, remember, for those of us who are many generations removed from the founders of that theology, we are reading the text with those background beliefs firmly in place, situated in the center of a well-regarded theological tradition with some of wonderful Christian thinkers who advocate for it…some people are going to come to the theological table with a different plausibility structure than others, and this is why some of us find some arguments and reasons better than others…Suppose, also, that the person has been a life-long member of a Baptist Church that has a wonderful pastor and loving and charitable Christians who live out the words of Christ. These people, who he knows and trusts, teach him that the proper way to look at the Lord’s Supper is that it is symbolic. This person’s plausibility structure (or ‘evidential set’) will make it difficult for him to accept the Catholic position, even if one can make a church history argument for it. So, this person is going assess counter-arguments from Catholics and Orthodox partly on the resources of his plausibility structure.”
i) Of course, the problem with this objection is that it cuts both ways. A cradle Catholic will have a Catholic plausibility structure or evidential set. So that objection either proves too much or too little.
ii) Moreover, it’s misleading to suggest that Catholic exegetes arrive at Catholic conclusions while Protestant exegetes arrive at Protestant conclusion. If you actually read modern Catholic exegetes (e.g. Raymond Brown, Joseph Fitzmyer; John Meier, Luke Timothy Johnson), they frequently challenge traditional Catholic interpretations of Scripture and offer more “Protestant” interpretations in their place.
iii) And as far as church history is concerned, let’s remember that Protestants can be church historians, too. Protestant church historians are also “deep into church history.” They know the same primary and secondary source materials as Catholic theologians.
“On the other hand, there are other people, such as Scott Hahn, Jimmy Akin, Richard John Neuhaus, Avery Cardinal Dulles, John Henry Cardinal Newman, Robert Louis Wilken, and R. R. Reno, who have found the Reformed account less plausible than the Catholic one.”
Sure you want to use Newman to prove your point? As a recent historical monograph has documented, “it was events in Newman’s life that changed his interpretation of the Fathers, not the interpretation of the Fathers that caused Newman to change his life. King argues that Newman tailored his reading, ‘trying on’ the ideas of different Fathers to fit his own needs.”
Cf. B. King, Newman and the Alexandrian Fathers (OUP 2009).
Continuing with Beckwith:
“After all, these gentlemen, after careful study and reflection, though it no longer possible to embrace the Reformed view in good conscience. Are they irrational?”
But, of course, that’s misleading. Beckwith isn’t vying for epistemic parity between Catholicism and Protestantism. He doesn’t content himself with the even-handed notion that both sides are rational. Rather, Beckwith is vying for the superiority of Catholicism.
“However, there are other aspects of Catholic theology–apostolic succession, Eucharistic realism, the importance of avoiding the sin of schism, its ancient patrimony, etc.–that tip the scales for me in favor of Catholicism.”
i) That’s a makeweight. Unable to justify your Catholic interpretation of Scripture on exegetical grounds, you leverage your Catholic interpretation by lobbing a kitchen sink of extraneous considerations at the text. But how does that ascertain the meaning of the Bible writer? Do we simply vacate the meaning of Scripture if it comes into conflict with extrascriptural precommitments?
ii) And, of course, it’s not as if astute Protestants never evaluated the “other aspects” of Catholic theology.
[Francis Beckwith] “On the other hand, there are other people, such as Scott Hahn, Jimmy Akin, Richard John Neuhaus, Avery Cardinal Dulles, John Henry Cardinal Newman, Robert Louis Wilken, and R. R. Reno, who have found the Reformed account less plausible than the Catholic one.”
i) I’m unclear on why Beckwith is casting the debate in terms of Calvinism v. Catholicism (since “Reformed” is synonymous with “Calvinist”). Belief in sola fide is hardly limited to Calvinism.
ii) Of the names he ticked off, Newman and Dulles are clearly the most distinguished of the lot. I’ve already commented on Newman. So what about Dulles? Well, let’s take a few test-cases, shall we?
a) Consider his articles on the topic of salvation and damnation: “The Population of Hell,” “Who Can Be Saved?” (both of which are available online). On a related note is his article on the Jewish question: “The Covenant With Israel” (also available online).
As he rummages through church history, notice how he traces out the checked history of this central issue in Catholic theology. Notice the sea-change in Catholic theology.
On a different topic, but illustrating the same theological instability, consider his article on “Catholicism & Capital Punishment” (available online).
b) Then we have his article “From Ratzinger to Benedict” (available online).
On the one hand, it documents the way in which Karol Wojtyła and Joseph Ratzinger arrive at divergent interpretations of Vatican II. This despite the fact that both men were participants at the council, worked side by side for a quarter century, and ascended the papacy (one right after the other.
On the other hand, it also documents the divergence between early Ratzinger’s interpretation of Vatican II and late Ratzinger’s interpretation of Vatican II.
c) I’d also recommend that people read the book by Dulles on the Magisterium, which details the difficulties in arriving at a definitive statement of Catholic theology.
Catholicism is a sea island, the boundaries of which keep shifting.
“This person’s plausibility structure (or ‘evidential set’) will make it difficult for him to accept the Catholic position, even if one can make a church history argument for it.”
Keep in mind that Catholic church historians like Ignaz von Döllinger, Klaus Schatz, and Robert Eno challenge the official version of Catholic church history.
Indeed, Döllinger was excommunicated for his refusal to rubberstamp the historical revisionism of Vatican I.
[Francis Beckwith] “How do you know that this author is not mistaken as well?”
i) Why do you pose a self-defeating question? If you can ask me that question, then I can ask you the same question in return. So what does that move accomplish for you?
Have you settled for mutual skepticism? How does that give anyone a reason to be Roman Catholic rather than Lutheran or Anglican or Presbyterian or Baptist or Anabaptist?
For example, you earlier cited Cardinal Dulles. What if I replied by saying, “How do you know Dulles isn’t mistaken as well?” Surely you don’t think that’s an adequate response.
ii) Moreover, the possibility that so-and-so could be mistaken doesn’t ipso facto create a presumption that he is mistaken, or probably mistaken. And some folks are less likely to be mistaken than others. Benjamin King is a church historian who’s obviously made a specialized study of Newman. His monograph is published by a leading academic press. Is he infallible? No. But if we were to choose between his interpretation and yours, doesn’t he bring more expertise to the subject than you do?
Sure, you can challenge his interpretation. You might even be right. But you’d have to bring some counterevidence to bear. Not simply float the abstract possibility that he might be mistaken.
“One of the things you learn over the years…”
That line might work with one of your 19-year old students at Baylor. But since you’re about one year my junior, that just doesn’t fly.
“If I may offer a pastoral note here, it is really unhealthy to always be worrying about arguments as the woof and warp of your faith and walk with Jesus. Arguments are, of course, important. And I suspect less important than you think.”
Well, that disclaimer is rather duplicitous in this setting, don’t you think? Both you and Bryan are trying, kinda sorta, to argue for Catholicism. To argue against the Evangelical alternative.
So why do you suddenly introduce this disclaimer? Is that a fallback maneuver because you sense you’re losing the argument?
Disclaimers like this simply boomerang on yourself. It looks like you’re trying to preemptively minimize the value of arguments against Catholicism while, however, we’re supposed to take your arguments against evangelicalism (such as they are) far more seriously.
“Parts of the Development are clearly better than others, but in general I think he makes a good case.”
But that’s in tension with your initial appeal to “the first readers” of Scripture, the subapostolic fathers, &c.
As Mozley pointed out in his 19C review of Newman’s essay, if you’re going to invoke primitive tradition to validate Catholic dogma, then the dogma should be more evident upstream, not downstream.
“For example, Steve cites the B. King book, published in 2009. Are we to actually believe that prior to 2009 he was just waiting for the B. King book or something like it in order to not be tempted to cross the Tiber.”
I was merely responding to Beckwith on his own terms. A tu quoque argument. That doesn’t mean I have a dog in that fight one way or the other as far as Newman is concerned.
[Francis Beckwith] “Yikes Steve. I wrote this right after I dealt with King’s book. It was just a kind word to point out that none of us waits for the next issue of Theology Today or the next OUP catalog to see if its still rational to believe what we believe. For if we did, it would be a horrible and creepy (and thus, unhealthy).”
No, you just wait for the next papal encyclical to see if what you were required to believe the day before is what you’re forbidden to believe the day after, or vice versa.
[Phil Buster] “The great irony here: Justification by faith alone being turned into self-justification and a means for boasting, in this case, ways to justify oneself against the Catholic church and boast in the superiority of Protestantism. And therein lies the shallowness of evangelical Protestantism, it loves to wield doctrines but seldomly takes them to heart.”
First of all, I notice that you don’t rebut a single thing that Jason and I have said. So, to judge by your own performance, you regard your Catholic faith as indefensible.
Beyond that, your statement is a study in confusion. Whether we, as sinners, can merit our justification before God is a completely different question than providing an intellectual justification for our belief-system. An intellectual justification is not a question of personal merit, much less personal merit in relation to God. That’s hardly the “boasting” which Paul had in mind. Don’t you know the difference? And there’s nothing essentially “boastful” about an intellectual justification.
And if you think that providing an intellectual justification for one’s faith betrays the shallowness of one’s faith, then you condemn the Roman Catholic tradition of fundamental theology and polemical theology. Likewise, doesn’t Catholicism claim to be superior to evangelicalism? Why are you Roman Catholic rather than Protestant if you deem the two positions to be coequal?
SGU
SGU is a new series which premiered last month. It’s the third franchise spawned by the 1994 film. Roger Ebert subjected the film to a witty and scornful review. While I basically agree with him as far as he goes, it’s a rather lopsided review. I think he takes the film too seriously. If you treat it as pure entertainment, then I think it works fairly well on its own level. A fun popcorn movie.
In particular, Kurt Russell is enjoyable in all the films I’ve seen of his. He brings a down-to-earth, all-American presence to his film work which is increasingly rare in Hollywood. That lends a deadpan humor to his role in this outing.
I saw the first few episodes of SG-1. However, it was too campy to retain my interest. I never saw SGA, which had some aging retreads from other SF series. For all I know, it may have been a fine series.
Thus far, SGU is promising, although it’s promise may be limited. Unfortunately, the female characters seem to be fairly bland, so I don’t see much potential for character development in that department.
Two of the male characters play conflicted loners. There’s Dr. Rush, an obsessive and somewhat misanthropic scientist. He’s not exactly evil. However, he’s prepared to sacrifice human life to satisfy his scientific curiosity.
Then there’s Lt. Scott, a lapsed Catholic. He’s an idealist who fell short of his ideals.
Thus far, these are the two most compelling characters. And they have the most dramatic potential.
You also have “Math Boy,” who exists for comic relief.
Col. Young is played by Louis Ferreira, a Canadian actor with proudly aristocratic Iberian features. To my recollection, he’s the at least the third Latino actor to play the commander of a star ship. Thus far he’s rather low-key. A steady hand at the helm. He lacks the dramatic range of Eddie Olmos or the melodramatic flair of Ricardo Montalbán.
Of primary interest is to see the way in which, if at all, a SF series deals with religious themes. Thus far, SGU strikes that chord on two different registers. There’s a Christian or Catholic subtext involving some of the characters. This is exemplified by the Lord’s Prayer.
There is also a “living dust cloud” (reminiscent of the Exodus) which guides Lt. Scott to an oasis in the desert.
The dust cloud is some sort of (intelligent) alien lifeform. However, aliens often represent the transcendental dimension in the SF genre. A secularized version of God.
We’ll see how the series develops–for better or worse.
In particular, Kurt Russell is enjoyable in all the films I’ve seen of his. He brings a down-to-earth, all-American presence to his film work which is increasingly rare in Hollywood. That lends a deadpan humor to his role in this outing.
I saw the first few episodes of SG-1. However, it was too campy to retain my interest. I never saw SGA, which had some aging retreads from other SF series. For all I know, it may have been a fine series.
Thus far, SGU is promising, although it’s promise may be limited. Unfortunately, the female characters seem to be fairly bland, so I don’t see much potential for character development in that department.
Two of the male characters play conflicted loners. There’s Dr. Rush, an obsessive and somewhat misanthropic scientist. He’s not exactly evil. However, he’s prepared to sacrifice human life to satisfy his scientific curiosity.
Then there’s Lt. Scott, a lapsed Catholic. He’s an idealist who fell short of his ideals.
Thus far, these are the two most compelling characters. And they have the most dramatic potential.
You also have “Math Boy,” who exists for comic relief.
Col. Young is played by Louis Ferreira, a Canadian actor with proudly aristocratic Iberian features. To my recollection, he’s the at least the third Latino actor to play the commander of a star ship. Thus far he’s rather low-key. A steady hand at the helm. He lacks the dramatic range of Eddie Olmos or the melodramatic flair of Ricardo Montalbán.
Of primary interest is to see the way in which, if at all, a SF series deals with religious themes. Thus far, SGU strikes that chord on two different registers. There’s a Christian or Catholic subtext involving some of the characters. This is exemplified by the Lord’s Prayer.
There is also a “living dust cloud” (reminiscent of the Exodus) which guides Lt. Scott to an oasis in the desert.
The dust cloud is some sort of (intelligent) alien lifeform. However, aliens often represent the transcendental dimension in the SF genre. A secularized version of God.
We’ll see how the series develops–for better or worse.
Called to Communal Naval-Gazing
“Called to Communion” is a Catholic website that Francis Beckwith frequently plugs. It consists of dropouts from evangelicalism (with a Reformed accent).
What's ironic about this is that, on the one hand, they convert to Catholicism because sola scriptura doesn't afford them the degree of guidance they say they need. There's no substitute of a divine teaching office, ya know.
On the other hand, as soon as they convert, who do they turn to for theological advice? Do they consult their parish priest? No. Their local bishop? No.
Instead, they form a circle of Catholic converts (or reverts) and then proceed to gaze at their collective navals for theological enlightenment. Francis Beckwith gazes at the navel of Bryan Cross, who gazes at the navel of Neal Judisch, who gazes at the navel of Taylor Marshall, who gazes at the naval of Tim Troutman, &c.
They turn to each other for theological insight. This is just like a schismatic sect in which disgruntled members split with their church and form a breakaway church–consisting of themselves. By and for themselves.
What's ironic about this is that, on the one hand, they convert to Catholicism because sola scriptura doesn't afford them the degree of guidance they say they need. There's no substitute of a divine teaching office, ya know.
On the other hand, as soon as they convert, who do they turn to for theological advice? Do they consult their parish priest? No. Their local bishop? No.
Instead, they form a circle of Catholic converts (or reverts) and then proceed to gaze at their collective navals for theological enlightenment. Francis Beckwith gazes at the navel of Bryan Cross, who gazes at the navel of Neal Judisch, who gazes at the navel of Taylor Marshall, who gazes at the naval of Tim Troutman, &c.
They turn to each other for theological insight. This is just like a schismatic sect in which disgruntled members split with their church and form a breakaway church–consisting of themselves. By and for themselves.
"Zero-sum" salvation
When I was a Reformed Protestant, I viewed salvation as a “zero-sum” situation. This led to the question, “How much does God do and how much do I do in salvation?”
Clearly it can’t be God does 50% and I do 50%. Then there was the Arminian position that came down to God does 99.9% and I do 0.1%. The Calvinist position rejects all this and states God does 100% and I do 0% – entirely monergistic.
The Catholic position (which I argue is the Pauline position on this site and in the book) is that the “zero-sum” paradigm is misleading. If you start with a scale ranging from zero to one hundred percent, you never get to the truth…We are not completely passive. Scripture NEVER speaks like that.
Calvinism only has it half right. So the right answer is that salvation is 100% divine and 100% human – the divine grace being prior to human faith and works. That’s the Catholic position and I would challenge you to read the New Testament with this Catholic paradigm in mind. I think that you will find that it sheds light on passages, brings about a cohesive whole, and clarifies those “difficult passages” that Protestants avoid or dismiss (e.g. James 2, Hebrews 6).
http://pauliscatholic.com/2009/08/the-zero-sum-paradigm-and-the-catholic-view-of-salvation/
This is incompetent from start to finish:
1.Reformed soteriology never was “entirely monergistic” (in the sense of human passivity).
2.We need to draw an elementary distinction between subjective grace and objective grace. If, according to Paul, justification is an objective divine act, then, for that reason alone (not to mention other reasons), Christians can make no personal contribution to their own justification. It’s not a subjective process, but an objective state or standing. Forensic rather than dynamic. God imputes the merit of Christ to his elect. Something done to us and for us, not in us or with us.
Justification is monergistic because (among other reasons) the grace of justification is objective to the recipient.
3.By contrast, it’s possible for subjective grace to have a cooperative dimension. However, that also depends on the initial state of the recipient.
The unregenerate cannot give their consent their own regeneration. For a fundamental feature of their unregenerate state is their implacable enmity to the things of God. Therefore, regeneration must be monergistic.
As a result of regeneration, the regenerate are then able to make productive use of the means of grace in their sanctification. While they are passive in regeneration, they are not passive in sanctification. Of course, their perseverance in the faith is ultimately dependent on God’s gracious, sovereign preservation. The outcome is not in doubt.
Clearly it can’t be God does 50% and I do 50%. Then there was the Arminian position that came down to God does 99.9% and I do 0.1%. The Calvinist position rejects all this and states God does 100% and I do 0% – entirely monergistic.
The Catholic position (which I argue is the Pauline position on this site and in the book) is that the “zero-sum” paradigm is misleading. If you start with a scale ranging from zero to one hundred percent, you never get to the truth…We are not completely passive. Scripture NEVER speaks like that.
Calvinism only has it half right. So the right answer is that salvation is 100% divine and 100% human – the divine grace being prior to human faith and works. That’s the Catholic position and I would challenge you to read the New Testament with this Catholic paradigm in mind. I think that you will find that it sheds light on passages, brings about a cohesive whole, and clarifies those “difficult passages” that Protestants avoid or dismiss (e.g. James 2, Hebrews 6).
http://pauliscatholic.com/2009/08/the-zero-sum-paradigm-and-the-catholic-view-of-salvation/
This is incompetent from start to finish:
1.Reformed soteriology never was “entirely monergistic” (in the sense of human passivity).
2.We need to draw an elementary distinction between subjective grace and objective grace. If, according to Paul, justification is an objective divine act, then, for that reason alone (not to mention other reasons), Christians can make no personal contribution to their own justification. It’s not a subjective process, but an objective state or standing. Forensic rather than dynamic. God imputes the merit of Christ to his elect. Something done to us and for us, not in us or with us.
Justification is monergistic because (among other reasons) the grace of justification is objective to the recipient.
3.By contrast, it’s possible for subjective grace to have a cooperative dimension. However, that also depends on the initial state of the recipient.
The unregenerate cannot give their consent their own regeneration. For a fundamental feature of their unregenerate state is their implacable enmity to the things of God. Therefore, regeneration must be monergistic.
As a result of regeneration, the regenerate are then able to make productive use of the means of grace in their sanctification. While they are passive in regeneration, they are not passive in sanctification. Of course, their perseverance in the faith is ultimately dependent on God’s gracious, sovereign preservation. The outcome is not in doubt.
Justification by the numbers
Is the Bible 100% God's Word? The answer, according to Dei Verbum, is "yes." And yet, the Bible was written by human beings, with their own distinct writing styles and personal touches...So, even though the authors of Scripture cooperated with the production of Scripture, and even though their cooperation was a necessary condition for the Bible that resulted, the Bible is 100% God's Word. In order to make sense of this, one must bring to bear on this analysis the distinction between secondary and primary causality. That is, in the work of inscripturation, God is the primary cause of Scripture, but he is not the secondary cause. In fact, the secondary cause consists of all the human authors of the Bible. Because what resulted is precisely what God intended, the fact that he employed secondary causes in order to achieve this end, means that the final product is 100% God's Word. But, in a sense, we can also say that because the secondary causes he employed were human agents with rational powers, therefore, St. Paul wrote Romans, I Corinthians, and Galatians, St. John penned the Gospel of John, I, II, and III John, and other Bible writers authored the other books, and so forth. This understanding does not diminish the divine authorship of Scripture, but neither does it diminish the human contribution to it. So, the Bible is 100% God's Word, even though it is entirely authored by human beings.
If you can understand this, then you can understand the Catholic view of justification. Here's what the Catholic Catechism states:
"The merit of man before God in the Christian life arises from the fact that God has freely chosen to associate man with the work of his grace. The fatherly action of God is first on his own initiative, and then follows man’s free acting through his collaboration, so that the merit of good works is to be attributed in the first place to the grace of God, then to the faithful...Since the initiative belongs to God in the order of grace, no one can merit the initial grace of forgiveness and justification, at the beginning of conversion. Moved by the Holy Spirit and by charity, we can then merit for ourselves and for others the graces needed for our sanctification, for the increase of grace and charity, and for the attainment of eternal life."
So, if one mistakenly insists that Catholicism embraces "works righteousness" because justification requires human cooperation (though performed in sanctifying grace), then one must be prepared to abandon the idea that the Bible is 100% God's Word, since the theory of inscripturation requires human cooperation. Conversely, if one accepts the theory of inscripturation while insisting that the Bible is still 100% God's Word, then one must abandon the idea that Catholicism is semi-Pelagian because its view of justification requires human cooperation (though performed in sanctifying grace).
One can, of course, reject Catholicism for a variety of other reasons. But the semi-Pelagian (or "work's righteousness") charge simply cannot be one of them, unless one is willing to abandon one's theory of inscripturation.
http://romereturn.blogspot.com/2009/11/justification-and-analogy-with_02.html
There are some glaring problems with this comparison:
1.Beckwith has given us an argument from analogy minus the argument. He takes for granted that justification and inspiration are analogous. He takes for granted that justification and inspiration are both synergistic.
At no point, however, does he even attempt to show, through serious exegesis, that Pauline justification is synergistic. So all Beckwith has done here is to assert an analogy without arguing the point. Where is the exegetical spadework to warrant the comparison in the first place?
2.In addition, there are some pretty conspicuous disanalogies. Since human beings are rational agents, God can use the medium of human agency to reveal himself in and through the written word or spoken word.
Is that parallel to justification?
i) To begin with, human beings are sinners. We stand guilty before the bar of God. So how can culpable human beings merit, even in part, their own acquittal? How can they merit divine acceptance and approval on the partial basis of their personal virtue?
For example, a Mafia Don might be a wonderful family man. A devoted husband and father. Loving, caring, considerate.
He attends every ballgame his son plays. Attends every dance his daughter performs. Always remembers the anniversary of his marriage.
Yes, he murders his business rivals, but he keeps his business life separate from his family life. So, if he’s indicted on 20 counts of murder, should he get partial credit for being such a swell guy at home?
ii) And even if human beings were sinless, in what sense could they accrue merit with God? How could they ever put God in their debt? Since they owe their being and wellbeing to God, how could God owe them anything in return? Isn’t that patently absurd?
If you can understand this, then you can understand the Catholic view of justification. Here's what the Catholic Catechism states:
"The merit of man before God in the Christian life arises from the fact that God has freely chosen to associate man with the work of his grace. The fatherly action of God is first on his own initiative, and then follows man’s free acting through his collaboration, so that the merit of good works is to be attributed in the first place to the grace of God, then to the faithful...Since the initiative belongs to God in the order of grace, no one can merit the initial grace of forgiveness and justification, at the beginning of conversion. Moved by the Holy Spirit and by charity, we can then merit for ourselves and for others the graces needed for our sanctification, for the increase of grace and charity, and for the attainment of eternal life."
So, if one mistakenly insists that Catholicism embraces "works righteousness" because justification requires human cooperation (though performed in sanctifying grace), then one must be prepared to abandon the idea that the Bible is 100% God's Word, since the theory of inscripturation requires human cooperation. Conversely, if one accepts the theory of inscripturation while insisting that the Bible is still 100% God's Word, then one must abandon the idea that Catholicism is semi-Pelagian because its view of justification requires human cooperation (though performed in sanctifying grace).
One can, of course, reject Catholicism for a variety of other reasons. But the semi-Pelagian (or "work's righteousness") charge simply cannot be one of them, unless one is willing to abandon one's theory of inscripturation.
http://romereturn.blogspot.com/2009/11/justification-and-analogy-with_02.html
There are some glaring problems with this comparison:
1.Beckwith has given us an argument from analogy minus the argument. He takes for granted that justification and inspiration are analogous. He takes for granted that justification and inspiration are both synergistic.
At no point, however, does he even attempt to show, through serious exegesis, that Pauline justification is synergistic. So all Beckwith has done here is to assert an analogy without arguing the point. Where is the exegetical spadework to warrant the comparison in the first place?
2.In addition, there are some pretty conspicuous disanalogies. Since human beings are rational agents, God can use the medium of human agency to reveal himself in and through the written word or spoken word.
Is that parallel to justification?
i) To begin with, human beings are sinners. We stand guilty before the bar of God. So how can culpable human beings merit, even in part, their own acquittal? How can they merit divine acceptance and approval on the partial basis of their personal virtue?
For example, a Mafia Don might be a wonderful family man. A devoted husband and father. Loving, caring, considerate.
He attends every ballgame his son plays. Attends every dance his daughter performs. Always remembers the anniversary of his marriage.
Yes, he murders his business rivals, but he keeps his business life separate from his family life. So, if he’s indicted on 20 counts of murder, should he get partial credit for being such a swell guy at home?
ii) And even if human beings were sinless, in what sense could they accrue merit with God? How could they ever put God in their debt? Since they owe their being and wellbeing to God, how could God owe them anything in return? Isn’t that patently absurd?
Faith Alone In Romans 10:9-10 And Why It's Important
The issue of how "work" is to be defined came up in a recent thread. What I want to do here is link to a couple of other articles I've written on related themes.
We don't have to know why justification is received through faith alone in order to know that it's received in that manner. But scripture gives us some explanations, and we can think of possible reasons apart from what the Bible explains. There has to be a human response to God in order to have a relationship between the person and God, and faith effectively minimizes the human role while maximizing the Divine role. See here for some quotes of Biblical and extra-Biblical sources addressing this subject.
What about Romans 10:9-10, though? Does it contradict justification through faith alone by involving an outward act that follows faith? Here's an article I wrote on the subject a few years ago for the Real Clear Theology blog.
We don't have to know why justification is received through faith alone in order to know that it's received in that manner. But scripture gives us some explanations, and we can think of possible reasons apart from what the Bible explains. There has to be a human response to God in order to have a relationship between the person and God, and faith effectively minimizes the human role while maximizing the Divine role. See here for some quotes of Biblical and extra-Biblical sources addressing this subject.
What about Romans 10:9-10, though? Does it contradict justification through faith alone by involving an outward act that follows faith? Here's an article I wrote on the subject a few years ago for the Real Clear Theology blog.
Monday, November 02, 2009
Sometimes a light surprises
-i-
Dean and Dizzy were the best of friends. Friends from the cradle. In a small-town like Hennessey Oklahoma, everybody knew everybody else. Knew them, their parents, grandparents, cousins–second-cousins. You name it. You saw the same folks every day. One big extended family.
Dean and Dizzy went to the same school, the same church, the same A&W–where all the local kids hung out.
Sang in the choir. Played on the same football team.
Of course, that was no great distinction. In a small-town like Hennessey, Coach Brawler couldn’t be too finicky. It was all he could to do just to fill the positions. But they had heart. And great camaraderie.
Of course, “Dizzy” wasn’t his real name. But that’s what everyone called him for as long as Dean could remember.
They were best friends in grade school, junior high and high school. Well, until their senior year of high school.
That’s when they both fell for Anita. Anita was a cheerleader. And the homecoming queen. Voted most likely to succeed. By all accounts the most eligible girl in town.
Dean and Dizzy loved each other like brothers, but they also loved Anita, and they couldn’t both have her.
Anita dated both of them at one time or another. When she dated Dean, that made Dizzy jealous. When she dated Dizzy, that made Dean jealous.
But that was bearable. Their friendship could withstand a dash of jealousy. At first they even enjoyed the rivalry. They’d always been a bit competitive. Daring each other. Upping the ante.
It was all good fun until Dean found out from one of Anita’s classmates that Anita and Dizzy were engaged.
Dean felt betrayed. Felt that Dizzy had stolen her away from him. And, what is worse, Dizzy didn’t have the guts to tell him to his face. Of course, his reaction was why Dizzy didn’t break the news to him in the first place.
-ii-
Dean had always been a happy-go-lucky kind of guy. He had a short fuse, but he didn’t hold grudges.
Forgiveness came easy–as long as there wasn’t much at stake. But this was the first time in his life that he was deeply hurt. Try as he might, he couldn’t bounce back. He maintained a chipper façade–as best he could–but underneath it all, something very different was brewing.
Dizzy sensed a change. All of a sudden, Dean was moody and aloof. And he suspected the cause. But he was afraid to ask. Afraid to bring it out into the open. After all, what could he say? He hadn’t done anything wrong. But trying to defend himself wouldn’t make Dean feel any better. Indeed, it might make it worse. Rub it in.
Of course, there was a part of Dean that knew his resentment was unfair. He knew deep down that Dizzy hadn’t stolen his girlfriend. She made her own choices.
But what he thought and what he felt were two different things. His head told him one thing, but his heart told him something else, and–right now–he went with his heart. If Dizzy hadn’t stabbed him in the back, then why did he feel that stabbing pain in his back every time he saw his old friend? And why did the stabbing pain multiple every time he saw his old friend with Anita? He just couldn’t get over it.
Hennessey didn’t have a whole lot going for it. Anita was the best thing that every happened to him–while it lasted.
He deeply resented Dizzy’s glib indifference to the pain he was causing him. Not that Dizzy meant to be callous. Dizzy was so bowled over by Anita that he didn’t even notice the effect that had on Dean.
-iii-
But if he couldn’t get over it, he could at least get even. This was a new experience for Dean. An act of self-discovery. He wasn’t a naturally vindictive kind of guy. He didn’t know until now that he had it in him. It put him in touch with a side of his personality he never knew existed. Was that stranger there all along, just waiting to come out of the shadows? He could scarcely recognize his new self. Or was this his old self? Was this the real Dean?
He decided to frame Dizzy for a crime he didn’t commit. It wouldn’t be hard to do. Dean knew Dizzy inside and out. Had access to all his personal affects. Could predict his every move.
Planting evidence was easy. Making him show up in the wrong place at the wrong time was easy to orchestrate.
Dean knew it was wrong. Unchristian. It’s almost like he was watching stranger in action. Could this really be him?
Sitting in church, with murder in his heart every time he caught sight of Dizzy out of the corner of his eye–over there in the next row–where he always sat with his family, year-after-year, since they were both toddlers–made Dean feel like a hypocrite. Because he was.
As for the sermon, Pastor Joe might as well have been reciting the phonebook for all the difference it made to Dean. His ears were brass.
-iv-
The hallway was abuzz when Dean went to school that day. Nothing very newsworthy ever happened in a place like Hennessey. It gave him a grim sense of satisfaction to hear the fervid rumors about Dizzy’s arrest last night. Revenge was sweet.
Of course, he had to feign surprise. Utter disbelief. Shake his head on cue. Feign ignorance. Play dumb. Ask questions he knew the answer to. Layer upon layer of deception.
He was especially curious to find out how Anita would react. He sought her out. Was she going to see Dizzy in jail? Rush to his defense? Stand by her man?
As it turned out, Anita dumped her fiancé at the first sign of trouble. Hearing from her own lips how she broke up with Dizzy gave Dean yet another grim sense of satisfaction. He’d have her back. The plan was working. Or so he hoped.
Only she didn’t fall into his waiting arms. Indeed, after graduation, she moved to Oklahoma City and tied the knot with some enterprising young oilman. Married up. That’s the last they ever saw her. She moved out of their lowly orbit. The wedding was an invitation-only affair, and her old friends from Hennessey didn’t make the cut.
-v-
Dean’s satisfaction lasted for a day or two. But the sweet taste of revenge had a bittersweet aftertaste. At least for him.
He felt torn. His very success triggered misgivings. It was fun to plot and scheme. It was fun to imagine the outcome.
But when it really happened, there was a concrete finality to the outcome that bothered him. The sharp, hard-edged aspect of reality.
He felt betrayed. But to use his intimate knowledge of Dizzy, acquired over a lifetime of daily companionship, of confidences shared in mutual trust, to use all that to trap him, to turn friendship against itself–what was that if not the Judas kiss?
He’d been hurt, so he struck back. He hurt the person who hurt him. But after the initial satisfaction wore off, he was still hurting inside. He set out to do as much harm to his best friend as he could get away with. But having succeeded, the ugliness of the deed he set into motion slapped him in the face.
It stung when he had to bluff his way through a conversation with Dizzy at the jail. Of course, Dean had to go. That was part of the act. That’s what friends are for. Visit your best friend in jail.
And, really, how could he blame Dizzy for being smitten by Anita when Dizzy saw the very same thing in her that he did? They were both smitten by Anita.
Yet even if he wanted to, what could he do at this point to undo the damage? Turn himself in? But to frame someone for a crime was, itself, a crime. He didn’t want to take Dizzy’s place in the jail cell. He still resented the fact that Dizzy got the girl. On top of that, to then be imprisoned for Dizzy’s sake while Dizzy went free and lived happily ever after was a bit much.
And even if Dizzy chose to drop the charges for wrongful imprisonment, Dean would be a pariah once the news leaked out–as it was bound to in a gossipy small-town–of Dean’s complicity. He’d never live it down. He’d be shunned by one and all. What was he to do? What do you do when you know the right thing to do, but the price is too high? Sky-high?
Was it too late to turn back? Too late to recall the irrevocable deed?
-vi-
Dizzy was stunned when the sheriff arrested him. He was innocent. And he never imaged that his life would take such a fickle turn.
He didn’t think anything more shocking could possibly happen. That’s until he found out that his best friend was the culprit. His best friend set him up.
Now he was the one who felt a surge of steaming hot vengeance bubbling in his veins. To be betrayed by his best friend. His friend from as long as he could remember. He wanted his pound of flesh. Wanted Dean to get his comeuppance.
And for some unfathomable reason. So he paid Dean a visit in jail. He had a one-word question: “Why?”
When Dean explained the situation, Dizzy could have kicked himself. How could he miss anything that obvious? What would he have done were the tables turned?
Mind you, he was still smarting over the public humiliation. The arrest. The interrogation. The time in jail. His parents’ unspeakable shame. Not to mention losing Anita forever. Part of him still wanted to retaliate.
But it hadn’t dawned on him that both of them felt betrayed by the other. Felt as though each went behind the other’s back. He considered what it took for Dean to fess up. How hard that must have been. How much that cost him.
In a roundabout way, Dean had done him a favor. If Anita was that quick to leave him in the lurch, it was better that he found out now–before they tied the knot.
Now it was up to Dizzy to choose between vengeance and forgiveness. Would he press charges or drop the charges?
-vii-
Dean and Dizzy moved to Davis Oklahoma. With Anita out of the picture, there was nothing much to keep them nailed down in Hennessey. So they went into business together, renting boats and horses for sun-parched tourists drawn to Turner Falls.
There they met their wives–two nice college girls from Edmond on spring break. Dean and Dizzy’s boys frequently went horseback riding in the Arbuckles. Their two families often went on picnics together at Turner Falls Park. Dean and Dizzy both sang in the choir–with their wives.
Dean and Dizzy were the best of friends. Friends from the cradle. In a small-town like Hennessey Oklahoma, everybody knew everybody else. Knew them, their parents, grandparents, cousins–second-cousins. You name it. You saw the same folks every day. One big extended family.
Dean and Dizzy went to the same school, the same church, the same A&W–where all the local kids hung out.
Sang in the choir. Played on the same football team.
Of course, that was no great distinction. In a small-town like Hennessey, Coach Brawler couldn’t be too finicky. It was all he could to do just to fill the positions. But they had heart. And great camaraderie.
Of course, “Dizzy” wasn’t his real name. But that’s what everyone called him for as long as Dean could remember.
They were best friends in grade school, junior high and high school. Well, until their senior year of high school.
That’s when they both fell for Anita. Anita was a cheerleader. And the homecoming queen. Voted most likely to succeed. By all accounts the most eligible girl in town.
Dean and Dizzy loved each other like brothers, but they also loved Anita, and they couldn’t both have her.
Anita dated both of them at one time or another. When she dated Dean, that made Dizzy jealous. When she dated Dizzy, that made Dean jealous.
But that was bearable. Their friendship could withstand a dash of jealousy. At first they even enjoyed the rivalry. They’d always been a bit competitive. Daring each other. Upping the ante.
It was all good fun until Dean found out from one of Anita’s classmates that Anita and Dizzy were engaged.
Dean felt betrayed. Felt that Dizzy had stolen her away from him. And, what is worse, Dizzy didn’t have the guts to tell him to his face. Of course, his reaction was why Dizzy didn’t break the news to him in the first place.
-ii-
Dean had always been a happy-go-lucky kind of guy. He had a short fuse, but he didn’t hold grudges.
Forgiveness came easy–as long as there wasn’t much at stake. But this was the first time in his life that he was deeply hurt. Try as he might, he couldn’t bounce back. He maintained a chipper façade–as best he could–but underneath it all, something very different was brewing.
Dizzy sensed a change. All of a sudden, Dean was moody and aloof. And he suspected the cause. But he was afraid to ask. Afraid to bring it out into the open. After all, what could he say? He hadn’t done anything wrong. But trying to defend himself wouldn’t make Dean feel any better. Indeed, it might make it worse. Rub it in.
Of course, there was a part of Dean that knew his resentment was unfair. He knew deep down that Dizzy hadn’t stolen his girlfriend. She made her own choices.
But what he thought and what he felt were two different things. His head told him one thing, but his heart told him something else, and–right now–he went with his heart. If Dizzy hadn’t stabbed him in the back, then why did he feel that stabbing pain in his back every time he saw his old friend? And why did the stabbing pain multiple every time he saw his old friend with Anita? He just couldn’t get over it.
Hennessey didn’t have a whole lot going for it. Anita was the best thing that every happened to him–while it lasted.
He deeply resented Dizzy’s glib indifference to the pain he was causing him. Not that Dizzy meant to be callous. Dizzy was so bowled over by Anita that he didn’t even notice the effect that had on Dean.
-iii-
But if he couldn’t get over it, he could at least get even. This was a new experience for Dean. An act of self-discovery. He wasn’t a naturally vindictive kind of guy. He didn’t know until now that he had it in him. It put him in touch with a side of his personality he never knew existed. Was that stranger there all along, just waiting to come out of the shadows? He could scarcely recognize his new self. Or was this his old self? Was this the real Dean?
He decided to frame Dizzy for a crime he didn’t commit. It wouldn’t be hard to do. Dean knew Dizzy inside and out. Had access to all his personal affects. Could predict his every move.
Planting evidence was easy. Making him show up in the wrong place at the wrong time was easy to orchestrate.
Dean knew it was wrong. Unchristian. It’s almost like he was watching stranger in action. Could this really be him?
Sitting in church, with murder in his heart every time he caught sight of Dizzy out of the corner of his eye–over there in the next row–where he always sat with his family, year-after-year, since they were both toddlers–made Dean feel like a hypocrite. Because he was.
As for the sermon, Pastor Joe might as well have been reciting the phonebook for all the difference it made to Dean. His ears were brass.
-iv-
The hallway was abuzz when Dean went to school that day. Nothing very newsworthy ever happened in a place like Hennessey. It gave him a grim sense of satisfaction to hear the fervid rumors about Dizzy’s arrest last night. Revenge was sweet.
Of course, he had to feign surprise. Utter disbelief. Shake his head on cue. Feign ignorance. Play dumb. Ask questions he knew the answer to. Layer upon layer of deception.
He was especially curious to find out how Anita would react. He sought her out. Was she going to see Dizzy in jail? Rush to his defense? Stand by her man?
As it turned out, Anita dumped her fiancé at the first sign of trouble. Hearing from her own lips how she broke up with Dizzy gave Dean yet another grim sense of satisfaction. He’d have her back. The plan was working. Or so he hoped.
Only she didn’t fall into his waiting arms. Indeed, after graduation, she moved to Oklahoma City and tied the knot with some enterprising young oilman. Married up. That’s the last they ever saw her. She moved out of their lowly orbit. The wedding was an invitation-only affair, and her old friends from Hennessey didn’t make the cut.
-v-
Dean’s satisfaction lasted for a day or two. But the sweet taste of revenge had a bittersweet aftertaste. At least for him.
He felt torn. His very success triggered misgivings. It was fun to plot and scheme. It was fun to imagine the outcome.
But when it really happened, there was a concrete finality to the outcome that bothered him. The sharp, hard-edged aspect of reality.
He felt betrayed. But to use his intimate knowledge of Dizzy, acquired over a lifetime of daily companionship, of confidences shared in mutual trust, to use all that to trap him, to turn friendship against itself–what was that if not the Judas kiss?
He’d been hurt, so he struck back. He hurt the person who hurt him. But after the initial satisfaction wore off, he was still hurting inside. He set out to do as much harm to his best friend as he could get away with. But having succeeded, the ugliness of the deed he set into motion slapped him in the face.
It stung when he had to bluff his way through a conversation with Dizzy at the jail. Of course, Dean had to go. That was part of the act. That’s what friends are for. Visit your best friend in jail.
And, really, how could he blame Dizzy for being smitten by Anita when Dizzy saw the very same thing in her that he did? They were both smitten by Anita.
Yet even if he wanted to, what could he do at this point to undo the damage? Turn himself in? But to frame someone for a crime was, itself, a crime. He didn’t want to take Dizzy’s place in the jail cell. He still resented the fact that Dizzy got the girl. On top of that, to then be imprisoned for Dizzy’s sake while Dizzy went free and lived happily ever after was a bit much.
And even if Dizzy chose to drop the charges for wrongful imprisonment, Dean would be a pariah once the news leaked out–as it was bound to in a gossipy small-town–of Dean’s complicity. He’d never live it down. He’d be shunned by one and all. What was he to do? What do you do when you know the right thing to do, but the price is too high? Sky-high?
Was it too late to turn back? Too late to recall the irrevocable deed?
-vi-
Dizzy was stunned when the sheriff arrested him. He was innocent. And he never imaged that his life would take such a fickle turn.
He didn’t think anything more shocking could possibly happen. That’s until he found out that his best friend was the culprit. His best friend set him up.
Now he was the one who felt a surge of steaming hot vengeance bubbling in his veins. To be betrayed by his best friend. His friend from as long as he could remember. He wanted his pound of flesh. Wanted Dean to get his comeuppance.
And for some unfathomable reason. So he paid Dean a visit in jail. He had a one-word question: “Why?”
When Dean explained the situation, Dizzy could have kicked himself. How could he miss anything that obvious? What would he have done were the tables turned?
Mind you, he was still smarting over the public humiliation. The arrest. The interrogation. The time in jail. His parents’ unspeakable shame. Not to mention losing Anita forever. Part of him still wanted to retaliate.
But it hadn’t dawned on him that both of them felt betrayed by the other. Felt as though each went behind the other’s back. He considered what it took for Dean to fess up. How hard that must have been. How much that cost him.
In a roundabout way, Dean had done him a favor. If Anita was that quick to leave him in the lurch, it was better that he found out now–before they tied the knot.
Now it was up to Dizzy to choose between vengeance and forgiveness. Would he press charges or drop the charges?
-vii-
Dean and Dizzy moved to Davis Oklahoma. With Anita out of the picture, there was nothing much to keep them nailed down in Hennessey. So they went into business together, renting boats and horses for sun-parched tourists drawn to Turner Falls.
There they met their wives–two nice college girls from Edmond on spring break. Dean and Dizzy’s boys frequently went horseback riding in the Arbuckles. Their two families often went on picnics together at Turner Falls Park. Dean and Dizzy both sang in the choir–with their wives.
Ersatz paradise
As technology continues to advance, we have the increasing ability to turn our fallen world into a simulacrum of long-lost Eden. Through landscape engineering, we can turn a desert into a tropical paradise. Through plastic surgery, cosmetic surgery, cosmetic dentistry, and “Follicular Unit Extraction,” we can not only birth defects, but make ordinary men and women look like fashion models.
It wasn’t always so. Look at artwork from the past. Look at Da Vinci’s drawings of men and women with various deformities.
It the past, it wasn’t uncommon for someone to have buckteeth or bat ears, a big nose or hairlip.
My point is not to complaint about these developments. Technology can be a blessing.
But I suspect that our modern obsession with physical perfection and the illusory pursuit of perpetual youth is fostering social intolerance for the inevitable effects of the fall. Intolerance for the elderly and the disabled. Intolerance for men, women, and babies who commit the unforgivable sin of physical imperfection.
Why are most babies with Down Syndrome routinely aborted? Is it just because of their substandard IQ? Or is it simply their appearance? Because many parents are ashamed to have abnormal looking kids? The social stigma of physical imperfection.
A corollary to this simulacrum of long-lost Eden is the studied avoidance of those “soul-building” virtues which loom large in Christian sanctification. We avoid personal suffering. And, by the same token, we avoid the suffering of others. We don’t want to be around them.
Therefore, we don’t cultivate the sanctified virtues which are seeded by adversity and watered by grace.
In a combat situation, you want to have a comrade who will watch your back. A comrade who, if you were wounded, won’t leave you behind.
In the past, a measure of self-sacrifice was only to be expected. Many people suffered from incurable illnesses. There were no painkillers. Suffering was a normal part of life. The strong cared for the weak. The weak cared for the weaker.
That was underwritten in part by faith in the future. Heavenly-mindedness. The hope of better things to come.
But the loss of heavenliness mindedness makes people stingy. If this life is all there is, then they can’t waste precious time on the weak and needy. They can’t afford to take a personal-risk. Instead of building character, we rebuild bodies and engineer resort communities.
But as we perfect our physical environment, we hollow out the soul. Handsome on the outside, ugly on the inside. Strong bodies clothing sick souls.
It wasn’t always so. Look at artwork from the past. Look at Da Vinci’s drawings of men and women with various deformities.
It the past, it wasn’t uncommon for someone to have buckteeth or bat ears, a big nose or hairlip.
My point is not to complaint about these developments. Technology can be a blessing.
But I suspect that our modern obsession with physical perfection and the illusory pursuit of perpetual youth is fostering social intolerance for the inevitable effects of the fall. Intolerance for the elderly and the disabled. Intolerance for men, women, and babies who commit the unforgivable sin of physical imperfection.
Why are most babies with Down Syndrome routinely aborted? Is it just because of their substandard IQ? Or is it simply their appearance? Because many parents are ashamed to have abnormal looking kids? The social stigma of physical imperfection.
A corollary to this simulacrum of long-lost Eden is the studied avoidance of those “soul-building” virtues which loom large in Christian sanctification. We avoid personal suffering. And, by the same token, we avoid the suffering of others. We don’t want to be around them.
Therefore, we don’t cultivate the sanctified virtues which are seeded by adversity and watered by grace.
In a combat situation, you want to have a comrade who will watch your back. A comrade who, if you were wounded, won’t leave you behind.
In the past, a measure of self-sacrifice was only to be expected. Many people suffered from incurable illnesses. There were no painkillers. Suffering was a normal part of life. The strong cared for the weak. The weak cared for the weaker.
That was underwritten in part by faith in the future. Heavenly-mindedness. The hope of better things to come.
But the loss of heavenliness mindedness makes people stingy. If this life is all there is, then they can’t waste precious time on the weak and needy. They can’t afford to take a personal-risk. Instead of building character, we rebuild bodies and engineer resort communities.
But as we perfect our physical environment, we hollow out the soul. Handsome on the outside, ugly on the inside. Strong bodies clothing sick souls.
Sunday, November 01, 2009
A Papacy In Irenaeus?
There's a passage in Irenaeus that's often brought up in disputes over the papacy (Against Heresies 3:3). I addressed the passage in the comments section of a recent thread.
Mapping the map of Scripture
Debates involving the particular interpretation of Scripture frequently graduate to debates involving hermeneutics in general. And these, in turn, often involve the use of metaphors, like the “hermeneutical circle” or “interpretive grid” or “lens,” &c.
What these metaphors have in common is the suggestion that interpretation is a purely subjective process in which we simply project our preconceived methods and assumptions onto the text. We find what we were looking for. We take from the text what we brought to the text.
As a matter of human psychology or group psychology, that’s often true to one degree or another. Some readers are systematically guilty of doing just that. Indeed, some readers consciously do that very thing.
However, this type of metaphor tends to be overdrawn. For one thing, those that use it usually do think they know what Scripture means. They exempt themselves from the skeptical metaphor they apply to their opponents.
Every metaphor has its limitations. But if we’re going to use a metaphor to capture the hermeneutical process, my preference would be a cartographic metaphor.
There are different kids of maps. Different maps focus on different features, or combine different features. Maps can be general, thematic, topographic, topological, or orienteering. Maps can be up to date or out of date. Maps can be local, regional, or global.
In principle, you could use one map to find another map. Suppose you hid a map, like a treasure hunt. If you already had a map, you could use that map to locate the other map.
Which brings me to another point: you could use one kind of map to locate another kind of map. Perhaps the map you were using in your treasure hunt is not a very good map. Sketchy. Dated. Barely adequate. You make a few wrong turns.
Still, by using that map, you are able to find the other map. The map you discover is a much better map. More current. More detailed. Now that you have a better map, you can discard the inferior map.
You use your inferior map to discover a superior map. Once you have your hands on the superior map, you no longer need the inferior map. You can now use the superior map to find what you need.
We all bring different maps to our reading of Scripture. But Scripture is, itself a map. And we can compare one map with another. We can begin to observe the differences.
Once we study the Scriptural map, we become less dependent on the extrascriptural map we initially brought to the quest. Even if we needed an extrascriptural map to locate the Scriptural map, once we discover the Scriptural map, we can transition to the Scriptural map. The Scriptural map can correct for mistakes on the extrascriptural map.
What we start with is not what we end with. You can use one map to search for another. You don’t have to keep using the same map from start to finish. It’s possible to trade-up.
Or, to return to the lens metaphor, you can use an old pair of glasses to find a new pair of glasses. Even if you can’t see without a pair of glasses, and the old pair has an old prescription, it may be adequate to help you locate the new pair. Once you find the new pair, you don’t need to keep wearing the old pair.
What these metaphors have in common is the suggestion that interpretation is a purely subjective process in which we simply project our preconceived methods and assumptions onto the text. We find what we were looking for. We take from the text what we brought to the text.
As a matter of human psychology or group psychology, that’s often true to one degree or another. Some readers are systematically guilty of doing just that. Indeed, some readers consciously do that very thing.
However, this type of metaphor tends to be overdrawn. For one thing, those that use it usually do think they know what Scripture means. They exempt themselves from the skeptical metaphor they apply to their opponents.
Every metaphor has its limitations. But if we’re going to use a metaphor to capture the hermeneutical process, my preference would be a cartographic metaphor.
There are different kids of maps. Different maps focus on different features, or combine different features. Maps can be general, thematic, topographic, topological, or orienteering. Maps can be up to date or out of date. Maps can be local, regional, or global.
In principle, you could use one map to find another map. Suppose you hid a map, like a treasure hunt. If you already had a map, you could use that map to locate the other map.
Which brings me to another point: you could use one kind of map to locate another kind of map. Perhaps the map you were using in your treasure hunt is not a very good map. Sketchy. Dated. Barely adequate. You make a few wrong turns.
Still, by using that map, you are able to find the other map. The map you discover is a much better map. More current. More detailed. Now that you have a better map, you can discard the inferior map.
You use your inferior map to discover a superior map. Once you have your hands on the superior map, you no longer need the inferior map. You can now use the superior map to find what you need.
We all bring different maps to our reading of Scripture. But Scripture is, itself a map. And we can compare one map with another. We can begin to observe the differences.
Once we study the Scriptural map, we become less dependent on the extrascriptural map we initially brought to the quest. Even if we needed an extrascriptural map to locate the Scriptural map, once we discover the Scriptural map, we can transition to the Scriptural map. The Scriptural map can correct for mistakes on the extrascriptural map.
What we start with is not what we end with. You can use one map to search for another. You don’t have to keep using the same map from start to finish. It’s possible to trade-up.
Or, to return to the lens metaphor, you can use an old pair of glasses to find a new pair of glasses. Even if you can’t see without a pair of glasses, and the old pair has an old prescription, it may be adequate to help you locate the new pair. Once you find the new pair, you don’t need to keep wearing the old pair.
Saving Faith Prior To Baptism
From the discussion at Justin Taylor's blog, linked earlier:
Bryan Cross wrote:
"If what you were saying were true, then every catechumen who died prior to his baptism would be damned. But the Church has never believed that. A person who claims to have faith, and knows that Jesus Christ has established baptism as the sacrament of faith through which we are born again, and yet refuses to be baptized, does not have faith. But faith comes *through* the sacrament of baptism, even when the reception of faith precedes the reception of the sacrament of baptism."
I said, earlier in this discussion, that I was addressing the normative means of justification in Catholicism. Catechumens who die prior to baptism, a category I mentioned as an exception before you mentioned them, are an exception, not representatives of what's normative.
Your assertion that faith comes through baptism is a claim you don't support, and it's one that's contradicted by the evidence. Nobody in the Biblical era is described as having faith, yet needing to wait until baptism to have that faith enhanced in some manner and thereby attain justification. Rather, people are justified as soon as they come to faith, and every instance in which it's narrated for us occurs prior to baptism (Mark 2:5, Luke 7:50, 18:10-14, Acts 10:44-48, Galatians 3:2, Ephesians 1:13-14, etc.). Even in the unusual context of Acts 19:1-6, the people in question receive the Spirit at the time of the laying on of hands, not at the time of baptism, and Paul's question in verse 2 suggests that he considered it normative to receive the Spirit at the time of faith, not at the time of baptism. To dismiss one of these passages as an exception to the rule would be unreasonable. To dismiss all of them as exceptions would be even more unreasonable. Some of the passages occur in contexts that are treated as normative (Acts 11 and Acts 15 treat the method of receiving justification in Acts 10 as normal; it's doubtful that all of the Galatians and Ephesians to whom Paul was writing were exceptions to a rule; etc.). And even the passages that aren't described as normative can't be dismissed as exceptions unless we have evidence to that effect. And we don't.
Furthermore, asserting that these passages are including baptism when they mention faith, or are assuming baptism without mentioning it, would also be an insufficient argument. We don't normally assume that the term faith includes baptism, and some of the relevant contexts can't reasonably include such a ceremony. There wouldn't have been a baptism in the Jewish temple in Luke 18. The people in Acts 10 are described as being baptized after receiving the Spirit through faith. Etc. Even in a passage like Galatians 3 or Ephesians 1, where reading baptism into the passage would be less unreasonable, it's still unreasonable to do so. Not only is baptism not mentioned (despite being mentioned explicitly in so many other contexts), but Paul even tells us that these people were justified at the time when they heard the message and believed. He's referring to the preaching of the gospel, and to interpret that as a reference to people being baptized as they hear the preaching would make little sense. Rather, the image Paul presents us with is reminiscent of what we see in Acts 10 and elsewhere in Acts, where people believe a preached message prior to baptism. Those who hear the preached word in Acts and accept it are said to believe, even though they haven't yet been baptized (15:7-9). Baptism is sometimes mentioned, but it's distinguished from faith (Acts 8:12-13, 18:8). It's not just assumed that any mention of faith includes baptism.
Baptism does unite us to Christ. But so do other activities that occur after the attaining of justification (Romans 13:14, 2 Corinthians 4:10-11, Philippians 3:10-12).
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