Monday, January 29, 2007

Once More With Feeling

John Loftus said:
“According to Steve these children go to hell.”

Steve replied:
Really? Can he quote me on that? Where have I ever said that everyone who dies in infancy goes straight to hell?

All I said here is that infants die as a consequence of original sin.

The same holds true for Christians. Christians die. And they die as a result of original sin (; ).


In order to mount a internal critique from this platform, it would be helpful if Loftus would actually mount an internal critique. Simply getting mad about what Christian theology or a particular theological tradition states is not an internal critique. That's an external critique. Now, he can certainly do the latter, but, as Steve has repeatedly stated, the way to do an internal critique is to actually show how it is wrong or inconsistent given the actual and properly stated ideas of your opponent for the opponent to hold that position, in this case with reference to theodicy.

1. As usual, Loftus assumes, I presume from his Arminian theological training, a particular position on the death of infants. However, that would only work against an Arminian, not a supralapsarian (or even infralapsarian Calvinist or an Amyraldian). It wouldn't work against a great many Arminians. It may, at best, apply to the Campbellites and a few others. As a rule, evangelical Arminians have a doctrine of original sin, though they temper it with a theology of "the age of accountability" and posit all infants dying in infancy go to heaven.

2. As usual, Loftus presents us with an inaccurate picture of what Steve has actually said. Below, I'm going to repeat a great deal of what Steve has actually discussed in the past few years he has been blogging, as he did happen to touch on this subject way, way back, before Loftus and Steve began engaging.

3. I'd add that an Arminian professor at Duke University and I had a chat on this issue in email about a year ago or so, and I was able to point out some of these same things to him. Granted, he's a professing Christian, but the point I was making is that objecting to infant damnation in order to object to Calvinism presents a massive misunderstanding of the Reformed tradition on this issue. In the course of our discussion, he actually agreed, though he still, to be best of my knowledge sees any view that might allow for the damnation of infants to hell as "hyper-Calvinistic." From my perspective, that's pure rationalism intruding on his theology, for he is allowing his emotions and particular apriori notions about God, justice, mercy, etc. to control his views. It would be better to mount (a) an internal critique of Calvinism with some emotional distance, or (b) for him to mount an exegetical defense of his position. I'd further add that both of these would be helpful for Loftus to attempt if he truly desires to mount an internal critique from this platform.

That said, once more, with feeling...

Infant Election

There are a number of issues that intersect with this particular subject, and some of them are issues I will be covering in a forthcoming paper here in August dealing with the theological language about regeneration itself in the Reformed tradition. What is said here will cover a piece of that. (This was originally posted on my other blog, and that paper was posted, I believe, both there and here at Triablogue).

Typically, the non-Calvinist proceeds toward a notion that there is an age of accountability, normally a person variable index, and that any infant who dies before that age, whatever it may be, is automatically elect and goes to heaven. Immediately this raises several questions, not the least of which is the age itself. In addition, if the person dies and is not morally “accountable” for sin, then why do they die at such a young age. Arminianism that denies that children are counted guilty of sin have a problem, here, as that would infer that such children enter heaven because they are “innocent.” But if they are innocent of sin, why do infants die? In addition to this, this idea in incompatible with the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. If infants are not guilty of sin in some sense, then Adam’s sin is not imputed to mankind through the fall, and Christ’s righteousness, conversely, has no basis for being imputed to men through justification.

How then does Reformed theology answer this? Traditionally, Warfield has classified no fewer than five different positions on this issue:

1.From the beginning a few held with Zwingli that death in infancy is a sign of election, and hence that all who die in infancy are the children of God and enter at once into glory. After Zwingli, Bishop Hooper was probably the first to embrace this view. It has more lately become the ruling view.

2.At the opposite extreme a very few held that the only sure sign of election is faith with its fruits, and, therefore, we can have no real ground of knowledge concerning the fate of any infant; as, however, God certainly has his elect among them too, each man can cherish the hope that his children are of the elect. Peter Martyr approaches this sadly agnostic position.

3.Many held that faith and the promise are sure signs of election, and accordingly all believes and their children are certainly saved; but the lack of faith and the promise is an equally sure sign of reprobation, so that all the children of unbelievers, dying such, are equally certainly lost. The younger Spanheim, for example, writes…”they are justly reprobated by God on account of the corruption and guilt derived to them by natural propagation.

4.More held that faith and the promise are certain signs of election, so that the salvation of believers’ children is certain, while the lack of the promise only leaves us in ignorance of God’s purpose; nevertheless that there is good ground for asserting that both election and reprobation have place in this unknown sphere. Accordingly, they held that all the infants of believers, dying such, are saved, but that some of the infants of unbelievers, dying such, are lost. Probably no higher expression of this general view can be found that John Owen’s.

5.Most Calvinists of the past, however, have simply held that faith and the promise are marks by which we may know assuredly that all those who believe and their children, dying such, are elect and saved, while the absence of sure marks of either election or reprobation in infants, dying such outside the covenant, leaves us without ground for inference concerning them…It is this cautious, agnostic view which has the best historical right to be called the general Calvinistic one. Warfield, Works, 9:431-434.

Warfield also mentions that

“Calvin seems, while speaking with admirable caution, to imply that he believed some infants dying such to be lost,”ibid. 431, n66

Most Reformed Baptists seem to move along 1,5, and 2, though you may find
representatives of each of those 5 if you looked hard enough. I personally speak where Scripture speaks. There are too few Scriptures chasing this question, so any answer I give is speculative. I agree that if they are all universally saved, it is by sovereign election and thus they all pass into glory on the merits of Christ alone. I do not affirm that infants are regenerated “willy nilly” and survive into childhood without being converted at a very early age. I am also inclined to believe Calvin’s view on infant reprobation, but that is because a person is either reprobate or elect from eternity past; he is not reprobated or elect at birth, as God is not bound by time, rather he is either elect or reprobate by eternal decree. I’d add that this is even true of the Arminian order of decrees. So, I’m inclined to affirm that, while in one sense it is wise to remain agnostic where Scripture is agnostic, it is likely that their death in infancy is a sign of their election. I have no theology of covenant children, as I am a Baptist, but I affirm with the 1689 Confession that elect infants go to heaven. That is, they go based on God’s merciful election, because they are still imputed with original sin/guilt and require election to salvation in order to enter heaven.

Calvin on infant reprobation, according to Boettner(Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, 147). :

While, therefore, Calvin teaches that there are reprobate infants, and that these will be finally lost, he nowhere teaches they will be lost as infants, sand while they are infants; but, on the contrary, he declares that all the reprobate “procure” their own destruction by personal acts of impiety, wickedness, and rebellion. Consequently, his own reasoning compels him to hold (to be consistent with himself) that no reprobate child will die in infancy; but such must live to the age of moral accountability, and translate original sin into actual sin.

R. C. Sproul even calls the doctrines of infant salvation “speculative.” (Providence, Tape 10,Q&A). Sproul points out that some reformers believe that all babies who die are numbered among the elect, and other reformers believe that all babies of saved parents who die are numbered among the elect. Boettner writes:

Most Calvinistic theologians have held that those who die in infancy are saved. The Scriptures seem to teach plainly enough that the children of believers are saved; but they are silent or practically so in regard to those of the heathens. The Westminster Confession does not pass judgment on the children of heathens who die before coming to years of accountability. Where the Scriptures are silent, the Confession, too, preserves silence. Our outstanding theologians, however, mindful of the fact that God’s “tender mercies are over all His works,” and depending on His mercy widened as broadly as possible, have entertained a charitable hope that since these infants have never committed any actual sin themselves, their inherited sin would be pardoned and they would be saved on wholly evangelical principles.Such, for instance, was the position held by Charles Hodge, W. G. T. Shedd, and B. B. Warfield. Concerning those who die in infancy, Dr. Warfield says: “Their destiny is determined irrespective of their choice, by an unconditional decree of God, suspended for its execution on no act. (Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, 143-144)

Most objectors to this seem to move along the assumption, at least in part, that those who have held to the doctrine of infant reprobation have affirmed that infants suffer in hell as infants, but is this really the case? Those I have read qualify their position quite heavily.

i) Of course, much of what makes this mental image repellent is just that—the colorful imagery. But let’s not mistake Dante for whatever hell is really like. Those who hold this view have generally stayed away from “burning in hell” and looked beyond this imagery to hell as as Arminian heaven, where all bets are off and all its residents can do what they want as they want to their hearts content. Moreover, hell is a place of differing degrees, so it’s not as if such persons, in this view are placed near the center. No, that is, it seems reserved for those who apostatized in particular. What we’re literally talking about is the state of the soul—whether a younger or older soul, which–at the general resurrection–will be reunited with a body.

ii) Is the age you die at the age you remain? If you die at 90, are you still 90 in heaven?

In heaven, wouldn’t you, in a sense, age up, age down, or both? You would age down in the sense that if you were past your prime when you died, you’d then revert to an optimal time of life—both mentally (in the intermediate state) and physically (in the final state). But you’d also continue to mature—in that same ageless and youthful state—to mature intellectually, emotionally, and spiritually.

iii) The same with those who go to hell. Suppose that some of the great bloodletters of history like Hitler and Stalin and Mao and Attila and and Genghis Khan had died in childhood, died before they murdered their millions. And suppose they went to hell.

Should we really visualize them as cute, curly-haired, cherubic babies in hell—50 years later, a 100 years later? Or should be visualize them as what they became, and worse—far worse. In fact, if you put anyone in hell, without the preservative of common grace, much less saving grace, they’ll all turn into a Hitler or Nero or Stalin—a super-duper Hitler, Nero, or Stalin.

What you have here is a natural evolution of sin, from seed to full flower. It is not a little angel turning into devil, but a little devil turning into a bigger devil.

iv) And when we debate the merits of universal infant salvation, not only are we forming a mental image of babies in heaven or hell, but we’re tacitly projecting our mental image onto the mind of God, as if he is visualizing the very same spectacle.

But does God see a baby as a baby, as only a baby? According to , God sees a baby as a storybook character in a novel that he himself has written. His entire life and afterlife is present to the mind of God—present because he penned every single page.

What is more—God has a number of unpublished manuscripts as well. Books that never went to press. Books he’s written with alternative endings (cf. ; ).
The point is not that God chooses according to what’s in the book. The point, rather, is that what’s in the book is according to God’s choosing.

Moreover, when we see a baby or a little child, that is literally all we see. We don’t see the soul. But God sees the invisible soul. Not only does he see the future, but he sees an delitescent dimension of the present. Parts of his book are written in invisible ink—legible to his eyes alone.

Let’s not forget this is still a problem for other theological traditions. The traditional rationale for infant baptism was the presupposition that infants were hell-bound due to original sin unless they received the sacrament of baptism. Although Catholicism has softened its initial position, it can only do so by impeaching its rationale for infant baptism. Logically speaking, the structure of Presbyterian theology is more predisposed to universal infant salvation than Reformed Baptist theology. To some extent, then, you have the same arguments and counterarguments for universal infant salvation as you have for infant baptism, and for a Baptist, since Baptists do not include infants in the covenant community, isn’t this a major problem, since we affirm a person must be converted in order to be saved?

Intersecting with this is Prebyterian and Dutch Reformed theology on infant regeneration, as well as James Boyce who speaks of infant regeneration as well in his Abstract of Theology. So, let’s take a quick look at their work on this subject before continuing.

The Presbyterian and Dutch Reformed tradition allow for infant regeneration. Some Reformed Baptists (James Boyce) do as well, but for different reasons. Hardshells also affirm that infants can be regenerated.

Difference between Hardshell doctrine and dominant Reformed doctrine:

In Hardshell doctrine, infants regenerated may come to Christ very late in life. In Presbyterian and Dutch Reformed churches (and as abstract limiting cases in the views of some Baptists), an infant that is regenerated will come to faith, not as an adult, but at an exceptionally young age.

On this latter view, they are reared in believing homes, exposed from infancy to the Word of God, the gospel, etc. and make a saving and credible profession very early. Therefore, their conversion is not separated from instrumentality at all. They may through their behavior prove not to be “problem children” at all, but behavior itself is not a measure of their status with God at this age. This is considered the exception to the rule in God’s dealings with people and is very rare. It is put forward to account for those who either have no memory of their conversion (like Ruth Graham) or were converted at the ages of 3 or 4 and generally shown the fruits of conversion (faith, understanding of truth, apprehension and love for God and Christ, sorrow over sin, etc.). Shedd epitomizes this view, in his discussion of regeneration in adults vs. infants. After his discussion of preaching, prayer, etc. and its connection to regeneration and conversion, he writes:

The regenerate child, youth, and man, believe· and repent* immediately. The regenerate infant believe· and repent· when his· faculties will admit of the exercise and manifestation of faith and repentance. In the latter instance, re­generation in potential or latent faith and repentance.

Historically, the Presbyterian and Dutch Reformed traditions have oscillated between 2 views on the treatment of children. Abraham Kuyper, for example, advocated a position by which children born to believers (and of course baptized) should be presumed to be elect (and thus presumptively regenerate) until they show signs otherwise. They appeal to Maccovius, Voetius, Gomarus and others, but this is far from conclusive. (See: http://members.aol.com/RSIGRACE/neo3.html) Presently, those Presbyterians favoring Auburn Ave./Federal Vision theology tend toward this direction. This view also seems to involve the a time gap between regeneration and effectual calling.

Archibald Alexander summarizes the dominant view among Presbyterians in the Princeton tradition (emphasis mine): “The education of children should proceed on the principle that they are in an unregenerate state, until evidences of piety clearly appear, in which case they should be sedulously cherished and nurtured. . . . Although the grace of God may be communicated to a human soul, at any period of its existence, in this world, yet the fact manifestly is, that very few are renewed before the exercise of reason commences; and not many in early childhood.” (Archibald Alexander, Thoughts on Religious Experience (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1967), pp. 13-14.) So, the first presumption is not that the child is regenerate, rather it is that s/he is unregenerate. What then is the age about which we are speaking here?

Vern Poythress articulates this position today (emphasis mine) from www.frame-poythress.org/poythress_articles/1997Linking.htm

It might seem that I have pushed hard in the direction of finding genuine faith even in very young children. But it would be artificial and speculative to place any great weight on demonstrating the character of the child’s response. It is much more important that we recognize that God can meet and spiritually bless such young children. Obviously the very young child is more passive, and the signs of response may be very vague. But the blessing of God, his spiritual care, rebuke, comfort, and strengthening are quite vividly real, as they come largely through the channel of the child’s parents. To a large extent, these very young children are receiving the substance of the care that ought to characterize participation in the Christian community.

The experience of the Christian community also shows what happens to children who are raised in this kind of environment. Let us suppose that the parents and the larger community are diligent in practicing their faith and in raising children “in the training and instruction of the Lord” (). Let us suppose that they are diligent in praying for their children to be saved and to grow spiritually. Then the children will be professing faith in Christ when they are two and three and four. There are no four-year-old apostates in a healthy Christian community.

Infants do not directly manifest their faith by verbal confession. But the prayers of their parents, the training of their parents, and the power of the Holy Spirit in the Christian community are evidence that they will give credible professions by the time they are a few years old. One might then argue that this evidence is in practice just as convincing as a verbal confession. There is no more danger that the children will apostasize when four years old than that an adult convert would apostasize after four years in the faith.

This is, therefore in contrast to the Kuyperian and Old Hardshell traditions which state that infant regeneration can occur (and in the Old Hardshell tradtion, regeneration can occur at any time), and the individual is not converted either immediately or in a very short period thereafter.

Thus we can outline these 2 positions as follows:

A. Kuyperian/Old Hardshell*

Infant Regeneration
Time Gap, even into adulthood
Effectual Calling
Conversion, even in adulthood

*In Old Hardshell doctrine any person, not only an infant, may be regenerated by the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit and not become conscious of it for a lengthy interval, even a great many years. From this comes their doctrines of “time salvation” and “eternal justification.” In contrast, View 2 above states that, while the agency of the Holy Spirit is immediate and, technically, His own work apart from means, in all but infants (the exception to the rule), this does not happen apart from instrumentality of the Word, and the first conscious action of the person is to repent and believe, and, moreover, because of the use of instrumentality, they are actively engaged in the psychology of this process.

B. Princetonian:

Infant Regeneration
No time gap
Effectual calling commences immediately

Conversion at very early age “as soon as his faculties will admit”; very rare

Strictly speaking, from a Baptist perspective, both views seem to involve a time gap between regeneration and effectual calling, judging from a surface level comparison. Moreover, because Baptists deny that children are part of the new covenant, Reformed / Sovereign Grace Baptists have no conceptual mechanism by which to presume infants regenerate, making the Old Hardshell position / Kuyperian position seem grossly illogical as a result. However, Baptists standing in the broader Reformed tradition do often, as Boyce demonstrates, affirm the possibility of infant regeneration under the Princetonian, not the Kuyperian, paradigm, because of their pastoral experience, not because of any theology of covenant children, and we all affirm that elect infants dying in infancy go to heaven. (SLC 10.3)

William Young, responding to the Kuyperian position taken by the hyper-covenantalists / Federal Visionists responds to this idea (emphasis mine):

The view of Voetius and Kuyper involves the anomaly of a time gap between regeneration and effectual calling, particularly appalling in the case of the apostle Paul, of whom, on the basis of , the younger Kuyper is reported to have preached as an example of a regenerated blasphemer.

In his detailed exposition in E Voto, Kuyper devotes a chapter to documentation and argumentation for his claim that he is introducing no novelty, but simply returning to the doctrine of Calvin and the Reformed fathers which a later generation allowed to fall into oblivion.(32) Does he make out his case?

Kuyper quotes from Institutes IV.xvi.17-20 to find support in Calvin, who does teach: “That some infants are saved; and that they are previously regenerated by the Lord, is beyond all doubt.” What Kuyper fails to quote is Calvin’s rejoinder to the Anabaptist evasion that the sanctification of John the Baptist in his mother’s womb “was only a single case, which does not justify the conclusion that the Lord generally acts in this manner with infants.” Calvin’s rejoinder is: “For we use no such argument.”(33) But Kuyper does use such an argument, in contending that children of the covenant are to be presumed to be regenerated because in fact that is the general manner of the Lord’s dealing with them. Calvin does speak of a seed of future repentance and faith implanted by the Spirit,(34) but does not state the false proposition that this is the case with all baptized infants, nor the highly disputable thesis of Voetius that this is the case with all elect children of believers. Certainly there is no hint of the presumptive doctrine of Kuyper in any of these texts of Calvin. (Historic Calvinism and Neo-Calvinism Westminster Theological Journal, vol. 36 (1973-74).)

The understanding of the dominant Princeton tradition represented by Presbyterians outside the Auburn Avenue/Federal Vision/”hyper-covenantal” position, has been that those who are regenerated in infancy will, because of God’s providential care, be exposed from birth to the means of grace, including the gospel (as soon as they can understand language) and thus, the effectual call begins from that moment and culminates in their conversion. This view is also the view of Reformed Baptists who hold this out as an abstract possibility. These individuals reason as James Boyce in his Abstract of Theology (http://www.founders.org/library/boyce1/ch32.html) as follows:

2. Regeneration (as in infants) may exist without faith and repentance, but the latter cannot exist without the former. Therefore, regeneration precedes.

3. Logically the enabling act of God must, in a creature, precede the act of the creature thus enabled. But this logical antecedence involves actual antecedence, or the best conceptions of our mind deceive us and are not reliable. For this logical antecedence exists only because the mind observes plainly a perceived dependence of the existence of the one on the other. But such dependence demands, if not causal, at least antecedent existence. Here it is only antecedent.

VI. There is not only antecedence, but in some cases an appreciable interval.

1. This is true even of conversion regarded as a mere turning to God. Between it and regeneration must intervene in some cases some period of time until the knowledge of God’s existence and nature is given, before the heart turns, or even is turned towards that God.

(1.) This must be true of all infants and of all persons otherwise incapable of responsibility, as for example idiots.

Boyce will go on to discuss the heathen and some pastoral cases, but they are not germane to this particular discussion on infants. For Boyce, such individuals are regenerated in infancy and are brought under the effectual call and believe as soon as they are able.

Thus, unlike the Kuyperian tradition, there is not a time gap between regeneration and the effectual call, since all the means of grace, including the Word of God are included in the Princetonian tradition’s definition of the external and internal call, but there is a time gap between regeneration and conversion itself. In addition, then, at the conceptual level, this view is quite at home in View 1 of Regeneration above, and View 1 itself is, as we have seen, at home in View 2 as a subset of View 2. A Reformed Baptist holding to View 2 would be more prone to say that the child making an early saving/credible profession of faith was regenerated by the Holy Spirit at the time of his actual conversion, but, strictly speaking, given the speculative nature of such analysis, and the further rarity attached to infant regeneration as such, the two evaluations, while differing on the timing of regeneration, are generally equivalent.

In the Kuyperian tradition, there is a time gap between regeneration and effectual calling. This is closer to the Old Hardshell doctrine, but it is not the view of Sproul, Frame, et.al. They hold to the Princeton tradition in this matter. It is unfair, therefore, for individuals like Bob L. Ross to lump all persons affirming the regeneration of infants in the Presbyterian tradition together while dropping their distinctive approaches.

Now, that said,

Related to Presbyterian theology is the assumption that if some infants are lost, they are the infants of unbelievers. This is why a Presbyterian in Gill’s day would have found more comfort than Gill, since his theology is more conducive to universal infant salvation than Gill’s was at the time.

But how this is supposed to follow? In the case of adults, we know for a fact that election cuts across family lines: that you have elect children of reprobate parents and reprobate children of elect parents—as well as elect children of elect parents and reprobate children of reprobate parents. Ergo, there’s no pattern here from which one could extrapolate to the case of infant mortality.

Thus, you end up with universal infant salvation is justified on the grounds of some chronological threshold. This is variously called the age of discretion or the age of accountability. Although the two terms are used interchangeably, the concepts are hardly synonymous. Scriptural evidence for an age of discretion is not necessarily evidence for an age of accountability—especially in light of original sin, which both Arminians and Calvinists have generally affirmed, with the exception of certain more Pelagian traditions like the Campebellites.

On the face of it, the chronological threshold seems pretty artificial—if not wholly so. If a child dies at the age of 6, he is saved–but if the very same child dies at the age of 8, he is damned? One is, in effect, positing a transition from election to reprobation. This is a hypothetical transition, to be sure, but the whole discussion is hypothetical in the absence of clear revelation. Does your eternal fate really turn on which side of the age range you fall on? Is that the boundary-condition?

This doesn’t seem to be an argument that has nature in its favor. After all, cognitive development ranges along a continuum. It’s not as if the kid goes to bed one night below the age of discretion and wakes up the next morning above the age of discretion. Likewise, it’s hard to see how grace would respect a chronological threshold. How is the boundary drawn? Where is it drawn? Why is it drawn? If it isn’t a natural boundary or a gracious boundary, then what is it?

Is there really some invisible line to cross? Is the same line in the same place in the case of every human being? Or only those who die in infancy? Does God have the same line for those who die in infancy in some possible world, but not the actual world? The whole scheme strikes me as hopelessly ad hoc. It would seem preferable to affirm universal infant salvation by way of de facto election and regeneration into the kingdom, which is exactly the method that the SLC/WCF 10.3 affirms or take an agnostic position, since too few Scriptures are chasing this topic.

John Piper today is representative of this position.

In his monograph on imputation, Counted Righteous In Christ (pp. 95 -96), he writes on the teaching of that there are those who had not sinned in the likeness of Adam:

“Who are they? I am still inclined to think, against the most common scholarly opinion, that the group of people begging for an explanation, and providing the most relevant illustration for Paul’s point, is infants. Infants died…

I know that many commentators object to the reference to children. It is indeed a very difficult complex connection of thoughts….Personal, individual sin cannot be the reason all died, because some died without transgressing a known law the way Adam did (v.14), and thus without the ability to have their personal sins reckoned to them in the sense of which he is speaking (v.13). Therefore, they must have died because of the sin of Adam imputed to them. “All sinned” in 5:12b thus means that all sinned, through the one man’s disobedience.” (v.19).”

From my perspective an Arminian arguing for universal salvation has an bigger problem, for it seems he should logically deny the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, since babies die and would have to do so from the imputation of Adam’s sin, if they are innocent of personal sins themselves and not counted “guilty” until that ever illusive “age of accountability” which is generally the view they take. True God in His graciousness allows them into heaven and His presence, but they get their by way of moral innocence, not by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, or, alternatively by way of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness which is conditioned on their moral innocence at the time of death, not sovereign election as such, so this view still moves salvation out of the ethical category of mercy and into remunerative justice. If this view denies the imputation of Adam’s guilt, and they are not guilty of sin in some sense, why do they pay the wages of sin, death? This certainly wouldn’t be saved due to election, since election based on foreseen faith puts election itself outside a chain effected by grace, unless there is an alternative, hidden scheme for the election of infants operative in Arminianism or “moderate Calvinism” that they’ve never articulated, at least to my knowledge, that includes “moral innocence.”

There is one way, theoreticaly, to alleviate this difficulty, and that is to posit the imputation of Adam’s sin, suspended on the first actual sin of the infant, who, by his sin or the certainty of his sin should he survive to commit it (a certainty known by divine foreknowledge), agrees with Adam and thus violates the covenant of works himself. So Adam’s federal guilt is imputed retroactively on the child. But that still does not answer for why such a one would die, for death comes as a wage of sin. It also suspends the imputation of guilt on divine foreknowledge without warrant and in violation of ’s paradigm case, Jacob and Esau, and such foreknowledge is itself predicated on a divine decree. Ergo, this solution ultimately fails on the horns of the regressive fallacy, by moving the question back just one step.

I would argue that is it precisely the imputation of Adam’s sin to infants who die in infancy that allows them to die, but this is also that which means that God imputes the righteousness of Christ to them in order to bring them into heaven with Him. In this sense death becomes a sign of their election the way that, in those who survive infancy (all of us alive at this moment), faith and repentance are signs of election. We must remember that infants contain sin in “germ form.” All that we are, they are in principle, but not yet in practice, yet not yet expressed. God, unlike man, sees the whole book, not just the first page. These children may be innocent babies to us, but to God they are much more. By imputing them guilty in Adam, He can then impute them righteous in Christ, and, in so doing, no man, including those who were taken as infants, will be able to glory in his innocence as a means to gain eternal life. They will have all, infants, included arrived by the grace of God alone. I suspect those who die in infancy will have the most marvelous testimonies of all in the next world, for they never had to know much of what we experience here. They got to be with the Lord from the start!

The question of infant salvation is a limiting-case of hell. The reason for these makeshift distinctions is the unbearable specter of babies burning in hell. But is that an accurate depiction?

Once again, this ranges along a continuum. Consider the opposite end of the spectrum. What about the specter of your dear old grandmother roasting in the everlasting bonfire. Is that any less intolerable? What about your mother or father? What about an adult child who dies prematurely? Everyone is related to someone. Most-all of us would like to exempt our own family members for liability to damnation. So the logic for universal infant salvation is really of a piece with the logic for universal salvation, simpliciter. And, by that same token, the logic is reversible. If everyone is not saved, then…

Many things in life are unbearable, yet we go on with life. We all live with a certain amount of sorrow and heartache–some more than others. Life is a fallen world is rife with personal tragedy.

Those that do not favor universal infant salvation (at least as a universalizable truth) generally proceed on the notion that no man, infant or adult, has a free pass to heaven. God would be perfectly just in condemning them to hell. To us, this seems quite harsh. On the other hand, in doing so, He may be punishing one who would flower into a Hitler on steroids if left to common grace working itself out. God sees us as a whole book, not page one or two. He sees us as we really are. Who’s to say that the spirit of a child does not go to heaven with all the faculties of adulthood? This is a relation about which we know nothing. God does. From our perspective, an infant is dying. From His, a serial killer may be dying. To deny this, from the perspective of this view, involves a denial of imputation and/or original sin and/or the fall of men. Either all men are fallen and corrupt or they are not. Either they have been imputed guilty or they have not. Either no one can boast because grace alone gets them into the kingdom or they can boast that their moral innocence served to aid in the process.

Samuel Hopkins writes: “Many have supposed that none of mankind are capable of sin or moral agency before they can distinguish between right and wrong. But this wants proof which has never yet been produced. And it appears to be contrary to divine revelation. Persons may be moral agents and sin without knowing what the law of God is or of what nature their exercises are and while they have no consciousness.”

Scripture itself is largely silent on this issue. It simply depends on how convinced one is about the exegetical arguments as to which position one takes. I wonder, is David’s, “I will go to him” is really meant to infer universal infant salvation for all infants who die in infancy? That’s a rather grand, sentimental application of the text. God may well do this. I think there is a pretty good chance He does. On the other hand, I must admit (a) He would not be unjust not to do this; and (b) if He does, it is by way of Calvary, not some kind of “age of accountability” that mitigates against us being counted guilty in Adam.

Those who affirm reprobation of infants, at least by way of abstract possibility, believe that it as it seems to lack in biblical certainty, it would be unloving to extend to someone “absolute assurance” where Scripture itself is not absolutely clear. What we can give unshakable assurance to, is that God is just and righteous desiring that none should perish; delighting not in the death of the wicked; and is at the same time both loving and holy, just and merciful, wrathful and full of grace. And in all that He does, He does with absolute perfection befitting His own righteous, holy character after the council of His will, to accomplish His purpose, for His own pleasure and for His glory alone (Cf. Ephesians 1:4-14 ). And it is there, that we must rest, find our resolve, and leave it with Him.


Debating the problem of evil

Over at David Wood's blog, I've been debating the problem of evil in the combox. Here's my side of the exchange:

steve said...
Hi David,

I see you're using the freewill defense. That's a standard theodicy. No surprise there.

As a Calvinist, I'm not a big fan of the FWD.

However, that's beside the point since you're debating Loftus rather than me.

With that in mind, I'd like to make a few points if I might:

1. A cornerstone of Loftus' atheology is his assumption that Christians are, in principle, able to override their (religious) social conditioning.

That's one reason he writes and blogs and debates in favor of atheism.

Although he doesn't think he can dissuade every Christian, he believes it's possible to convince some Christians that Christianity is false.

The question this poses for him is whether it commits him to some version of (libertarian?) freewill.

Are we ever free to override our social conditioning, including our religious conditioning?

If not, then who is his audience? What is he trying to accomplish?

If need be, this could also be expanded to the question of biological or genetic determinism. From his viewpoint, we are strictly biochemical organisms.

So, if you combine physical determinism with social conditioning, it's hard to see where there's room to break our religious programming, for those of us who have been conditioned (on his view) to be Christian.

2. BTW, it's not clear to me whether he's attempting to mount an internal or external argument from evil in his debate with you.

That needs to be clarified, for it affects the burden of proof. If he is covertly operating with an external argument from evil, then the onus is on him to establish some version of secular ethics which will underwrite his paradigm-cases of evil.

3. On a related note, he would also need to establish some version of secular anthropology which makes room for pain and suffering, pace eliminative materialism.

I don't think he has any good answers to these questions, which is why he invariably dodges that challenge.

4. Yet another problem is that, even if he's mounting a consistently internal critique, unless he's a moral realist, who cares where the truth lies?

In other words, it's only (morally) wrong to be (factually) wrong if there's such a thing as right and wrong.

If you deny the distinction between right and wrong, then the distinction between truth and falsehood is trivialized.

For even if I'm mistaken, why should I care unless I'm under some moral obligation to hold true beliefs?

While it's logically possible to be both an ethical antirealist and an alethic realist, ethical antirealism detroys the logical incentive to be a truth-seeker.

9:09 AM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

"Free will does not have to exist for one to be able to come to disagree with opinions they were brought up in. That should be obvious. Only an absurdly naive view of human psychology could claim otherwise."

You seem to be parachuting into this discussion without knowing much about Loftus' position. In his "Outsider Test," which he trots out ad nauseum, Loftus argues that religious beliefs are socially conditioned.

Therefore, the question of whether we are ever free to override our socially-conditioned beliefs (be they religious or irreligious) is directly relevant to his own position.

I'd add that his position on social conditioning logically commits him to cultural relativism, which—in turn—logically commits him to moral relativism. In that event he could never mount an external argument from evil, but, at best, an internal argument from evil.

"A secular ethic is no problem."

Surely you jest. There are many obstacles to secular ethics. Indeed, a number of secular philosophers subscribe to some version of moral relativism as a logical entailment of their secular outlook. For examples of both, see:

http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=6383

http://www.qsmithwmu.com/moral_realism_and_infinte_spacetime_imply_moral_nihilism_by_quentin_smith.htm

http://www.believermag.com/issues/200307/?read=interview_ruse

http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/evol-eth.htm

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/

http://www.bringyou.to/apologetics/p20.htm

"But it isn't necessary to the argument from evil (so I won't go into my own meta-ethical views here). The argument from evil depends on the contradiction between calling a person loving and saying they would not help someone in dire need."

This is a straw man argument. What position are you opposing? Judeo-Christian theism? If so, such a simplistic formulation of the "contradiction" will hardly do. There's more at issue than a loving God and a person in need.

There is also the issue of how a *just* God should treat a *sinner*.

There are times when it would be immoral to help a person in dire need. If Joseph Stalin is in dire need of a heart transplant, and I'm a heart surgeon, should I supply his need? Hardly. He's a mass murderer. The longer his lives, the more innocent victims he murders.

"Please clarify. I'm not sure what you are saying here."

Eliminative materialism relegates pain and suffering to folk psychology. Eliminativism denies such mental states as pain and suffering.

"To be moral, fundamentally, is simply to be concerned for the well-being of others. To love."

That's all assertion and no argument.

"Love needs no external sanction. Divine or otherwise. It is of value in and of itself and, therefore, the basis of morality poses no difficultly for either I, an atheist, nor you, a theist."

That's another assertion absent an argument. You are *reducing* morality to love, and then *stipulating* that love is an intrinsic value.

How does a secular worldview underwrite your value system? How do you avoid the naturalistic fallacy or the is-ought fallacy?

"If you are going to argue that the nontheist has no basis for morality then you cannot, as I do, consider love of intrinsic value---for you it can only draw its worth from an external source. Surely that is not a position you are comfortable taking."

1. To begin with, I don't reduce the sum total of morality to love.

2. An external source can be quite germane to grounding morality. In Christian ethics, God endowed human beings with a certain nature. We are a specific *kind* of creature. Hence, what is licit or illicit conduct is in some measure indexed to our natural constitution. To the way in which we were designed to function.

"So far as I can recall, John never claimed to be an eliminative materialist, nor is that position the only or the the dominant position, among athiests. So why would he need to explain suffering in terms of it?"

If his argument from evil is, in part, an external argument, then he needs to establish that biochemical organisms like men and other animals are capable of pain and suffering. For if they are incapable of suffering, then they are incapable of *gratuitous* suffering—and the argument from evil turns on the alleged existence of gratuitous suffering.

Eliminativism is arguably the most consistent form of naturalized epistemology. A secularist is committed to a program of naturalized epistemology.

Yes, there are well-known critics of eliminativism like Nagel and Searle. And eliminativism is easy to critique on its own grounds.

But it's not so easy to critique of you share the operating assumptions of the eliminative materialist. The Churchlands argue that if you're a committed physicalist, then that, in turn, commits you to eliminative materialism.

Nagel and Searle don't attack it on that basis. They attack it on its own grounds.

But that doesn't relieve the dilemma. The relation between physicalism and eliminativism. They don't explain how physicalism fails to implicate eliminativism.

4:48 PM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

"And I still contend that its quite obvious that, even if free will does not exist, that social conditioning is not necessarily absolute or inescapable. If you think otherwise please present an actual argument or evidence for this claim."

You're missing the point. This isn't *my* argument. This is Loftus' argument. I am merely pointing out a tension between his appeal to social conditioning in the Outsider Test, and his attempt to persuade readers of the moral and intellectual superiority of atheism.

He using social conditioning to discredit Christian faith, but he acts as if the secular humanist is exempt from social conditioning.

"The working out of this conflict in favor of abandoning religious beliefs is just as compatible with determinism as with free will."

Remember that my objections weren't originally directed at your position, whatever that is, but against Loftus' position.

Are you presuming to speak for him, or to speak for yourself?

"ReallY? Like an newborn slowly and agonizingly dying of a congenital defect? What is a just God's response to this newborn 'sinner'."

Once again, what position do you think you're opposing? Christian theology? According to Christian theology, why do some people die in infancy? Due to original sin.

If you don't like that rationale, you can attack it, but you can only do so by shifting from an internal critique, based on the allegation of inner tensions in Christian theology, to an external critique, in which you criticize original sin according to some principle of secular ethics.

"Its my understanding of how the concept of being moral is generally used (as in the Golden Rule)."

You're isolating the Golden Rule from the totality of Biblical ethics. The God of the Bible is the judge of mankind. He's a God who punishes sinners with historical as well as eternal penalties. He is a divine warrior as well as a redeemer.

If you're going to mount an internal critique of Christian theism, then you don't get to be arbitrarily selective and lopsided about the revealed character of God.

Thus far you're attacking a caricature of Christian theism. So your objections miss the target.

"According to you.....not according to any atheist posting in these comments."

The fact that the atheist commenters on this blog haven't throughout through their position is irrelevant to the inner logic of physicalism.

"We've certainly gotten far removed from the problem of evil."

No, eliminative materialism is not far removed from the problem of evil. Nothing could be more salient to the issue at hand.

An atheist can either try to mount an internal argument from evil or else an external argument from evil.

To do the latter, he must, among other things, show that, despite physicalism, biochemical organisms are capable of pain and suffering.

If he can't do that, then he's left with an internal critique.

8:37 PM

steve said...
I'd add that over at my blog, Loftus has commented favorably on Francis Crick and Daniel Dennett. That would point him in the direction of eliminative materialism.

5:37 AM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

“So this is your explanation for a loving God's inaction to aid an infant in terrible pain? The infant is tainted with original sin and that makes inaction A-OK.”

You have a problem keeping track of your own argument. If you are presenting an *internal* critique of Christian theism according to the argument from evil, then you have to define the key terms in light of Christian *theology*.

This really shouldn’t be hard to grasp. What Christian theologians have you read? What Bible commentators have you read?

“Its perfectly subject to both critiques---inconsistent internally and, in terms of an external critique of the values expressed, it leads (as in your excuse for inaction in response to a suffering infant) to blatantly cruel moral principles.”

Internally inconsistent according to what yardstick? According to Biblical descriptions and ascriptions?

In order to substantiate your claim that it’s “blatantly cruel,” you will need to mount several interrelated arguments:

i) You will need to mount a general argument for some version of secular ethics.

ii) You will need to mount a general argument for some version of secular anthropology consistent with the notion of cruelty to biochemical organisms.

iii) You will need to mount a specific argument regarding the cruelty of original sin.

Thus far you are using adjectives to do the work of arguments. Do you have any supporting arguments for your position? Are you capable of making a reasoned case for your belief in the argument from evil? Or will you continually resort to tendentious assertions and question-begging adjectives?

“I, and so far as I can tell, no other atheist posting here, is an eliminative materialist. You can attempt to paint us with that brush all you like but you will only be attacking a strawman if you do.”

The question at issue is not what you *do* believe, but what you *should* believe given your secular precommitments.

If you’re going to shift to an external version of the argument from evil, then you have an intellectual obligation to deal with eliminative materialism since that is a potential secular defeater to your critique.

“I'm not a physicalism (as I said before). And, even if I were, eliminative physicalism is a minority position among atheists.”

i) That’s not a cogent objection.

ii) The leading contemporary critics of Christian theism are card-carrying materialists. And that’s integral to their attack on the faith.

“We all know pain and suffering exists because we've all experienced it. Any claim that they don't is simply too absurd to take seriously.”

I agree with you that eliminative materialism is absurd. But I agree with you on my grounds rather than yours.

While it is, indeed, absurd on its own grounds, it is not absurd in relation to metaphysical naturalism. If it’s absurd, then that represents a reductio ad absurdum of metaphysical naturalism.

“Why is it the theist posters are all attempting to divert the discussion from the problem of evil. It is, after all, the chosen topic of this blog. But every time we begin to discuss it someone want to divert the issue to some supposed problem they see with atheism. You can discuss that if you like, of course, but the evasiveness is telling all the same.”

You seem to lack a certain degree of mental discipline. Try to remember that we are answering you on your own grounds.

Either you are presenting an internal version or an external version of the argument from evil.

If internal, then you need to define the key terms according to Christian theology.

If you claim to be performing an internal critique, but fail to do this, then you are being inconsistent with your own stated agenda.

If external, then you need to do two or more things:

i) Establish a secular version of moral realism;

ii) Establish that biochemical organisms like human beings or higher animals are capable of being wronged and or suffering pain.

And that’s just for starters. Beyond the preliminaries, you would that have to show that:

iii) The evils in question are gratuitous evils.

Thus far you have failed every step of the way by assuming what you need to prove.

If it’s your position that atheism is intellectually superior to Christian theism, then you need to redeem your rationalistic claims with a commensurate level of argumentation.

Are you up to the task you set for yourself? Or is your atheism a blind faith-commitment? Secular fideism.

9:35 AM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

“Anyway, Steve has given his answer to the problem of the infant slowly and agonizingly dying of a congenital defect (since its tainted with original sin, God is, apparently, willing to stand by and watch it suffer). What's your answer? Hopefully you can come up with something less blatantly cruel.”

i) Once again, Ellis is unable to stick to his own point. He was the one who, along with Loftus, and a number of others, chose to frame the argument from evil as an internal critique of Christian theism.

I am simply answering him according to the terms in which he himself chose to cast the issue. When, however, I answer within his chosen framework, I repeatedly encounter this unresponsive response.

So I guess the question we need to ask at this juncture is if Ellis was being sincere or disingenuous in the way he framed the issue?

Does he believe his own argument or not? If he doesn’t believe his own argument, why should anyone else?

By reiterating the charge of “blatant cruelty,” he has apparently reverted to an external version of the argument. If so, then how does he propose justify his external standard or morality?

The argument from evil is a philosophical argument. It will not do level intellectual objections to the Christian faith, only to resort to anti-intellectual question-begging as soon as someone takes you up on your challenge.

By shifting from an internal to an external argument, he is thereby shifting the burden of proof. The onus is back on him to justify his moral discourse. This is not something which is logically entailed by metaphysical naturalism, even if metaphysical naturalism were true. It isn’t even clear that this is at all consistent with metaphysical naturalism. So he needs to come up with an argument for his own position instead of ducking the burden of proof which he himself has implicitly assumed by switching over to an external version of the argument from evil.

ii) You also caricature the opposing position by saying that, on this view, God is willing to “stand by and watch it suffer,” as if God is indifferent to human suffering. Once again, that hardly constitutes an internal critique of Christian theism.

There is, in Scripture, an overarching rationale for the fall (e.g. Rom 11:32; Gal 3:22).

Has Ellis ever read the Bible? What Christian theologians or Bible commentators has he read, if any?

It should be needless to point out that you can’t very well perform an internal critique of Christian theism in ignorance of Christian theology. Why does Ellis find that such a novel or difficult concept to wrap his mind around?

Could I perform an internal critique of naturalistic evolution without bothering to read the standard evolutionary literature?

“It is your position that it is not inconsistent for the entity you call God to be described as loving and benevolent and yet to do nothing for an infant suffering excruciating pain over the course of days or weeks. You claim that this is so because of original sin.”

It is not inconsistent with the character of God in Scripture that babies sometimes suffer or die. Infant mortality was high in Bible times. Bible writers were certainly aware of infant mortality. More so that we are with the benefit of modern medical science.

The question at issue is whether such suffering is ever gratuitous. Is it unjust? Is it pointless? I’d say no on both counts.

“Please present an argument for this position, if you don't mind.”

An argument for what position? The justice of original sin? The purpose of pain and suffering?

One argument I’d direct you to is Alvin Plantinga’s supralapsarian theodicy:

Perhaps the most intriguing argument of the book is made by Alvin Plantinga in ‘Supralapsarianism, or ‘‘ O felix culpa ’’ ’. First Plantinga offers a careful discussion of a traditional position : The value of the Incarnation is so inestimably great that a world in which sin occurs and the need for atonement arises is a very, very good world. He responds to possible questions. Why suffering ? Some is the result of free creatures choosing evil and causing suffering, and some suffering may be instrumentally valuable, perhaps as a means towards improving our character, and especially as a way of our sharing in the redeeming passion of Christ. Why so much sin and suffering ? Plantinga writes, ‘ it seems to me that we have no way at all of estimating how much suffering the best worlds will contain ’.

journals.cambridge.org/production/ action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=394002

1:31 PM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

“Steve, I think we would all agree that if we were given the ability to make whatever we imagined come true and we saw an infant slowly dying in agony of a congenital defect we would cure it (or for that matter if we simply had a medicine which would cure it we would administer it). We would do so because we love and care for others and wish them well.”

1.Before addressing his question, I’d note for the record that Ellis has been running away from the internal version of the argument at every opportunity. He clearly doesn’t want to defend his version of the argument from evil because he cannot.

Instead, he wants to debate my own position on the problem of evil. I’m okay with that, but it represents a complete abdication of his original position. Even though this was his own argument, he has to abandon it.

2.His example also demonstrates the degree to which the persuasive force of the argument hinges on the apt choice a particular illustration.

For Ellis, it’s self-evident that one should help a child in need. But it only takes a little imagination to see how simplistic that is.

Sure, I’ll help a child if I can because all I see is the child. I don’t see his future career.

But if he’s healed, the child will grow up. Suppose I could see him as an adult.

Suppose I’m a Jewish physician. Suppose the child is little Hitler. Suppose I foresee that this child will be the instrument of the holocaust if I save him.

By saving this one child, countless other innocent children will be burned alive in the ovens of Dachau. By saving this child, I condemn my own children to death and destruction.

Suddenly, the moral clarity of Ellis’ illustration loses its moral clarity. Suddenly our moral intuitions become cloudy and conflicted.

I don’t wish everyone well. I don’t wish Bin Laden well. To wish Bin Laden well is to wish his victims ill.

This is one of the problems with Ellis’ myopic analysis. He never attempts to consider the counterexamples.

“But you feel that, although God also loves and cares for us all and wishes us well, he has some intervening valid reason why he refrains from doing what one would naturally expect a caring person to do in this situation.”

i) Actually, I don’t feel that way. I’m a supralapsarian Calvinist. I don’t believe that God loves everyone equally. I don’t believe that God loves the reprobate in the way he loves the elect.

ii) And this goes to another difficulty with the argument from evil. There is no uniform version which will target every theological tradition. You can’t use the same version on me that you can use on David Wood, or vice version.

Likewise, a libertarian will have a different theodicy than a Calvinist or Thomist.

iii) Ellis also operates with a fundamentally unscriptural assumption. From a Biblical standpoint, the real question is not, “Does God love everyone?” but “Does God love anyone?”

God is just, but we are unjust. Therefore, we would expect a just God to condemn everyone if everyone is sinful.

That’s what a just God is supposed to do. Exact judgment on evildoers.

If you’re going to present an internal critique, that’s the sort of consideration you must take into account. But you have the presumption exactly backwards.

BTW, there is a Scriptural solution to the Scriptural conundrum in the cross.

“I am not going to get into an argument with you concerning who knows more about christian theology. I just want an answer to this very important question: Why does a loving God refrain from coming to the aid of this infant?”

Depends on what you mean. A theodicy offers a general answer to the problem of evil. It doesn’t presume to explain how any particular evil fits into the grand scheme of things. Rather, it explains, at a general level, the ulterior rationale for the existence of evil in the plan and purpose of God.

4:40 PM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

“Interesting response. However, when comforting a friend who has lost a child as an infant I don't recommend explaining to them ‘God had his reasons, perhaps your child would have been a Hitler, or a serial killer’.”

Now you’re posing a different question. And if you really think that’s a valid objection to my position, then it’s an equally valid objection to metaphysical naturalism.

How would Michael Ruse or Richard Dawkins answer your question? Well, if they were brutally frank, the answer would go something like this:

“Remember that for the first half of geological time our ancestors were bacteria. Most creatures still are bacteria, and each one of our trillions of cells is a colony of bacteria. You child was just a survival machine—a robotic vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. Sure, you may grieve over his premature demise, but keep in mind that ethics is an illusion put into place by our genes to keep us social. Ultimately there is nothing—moral nihilism, if you wish.”

The problem with unbelievers like Ellis is that while they window-shop for atheism, they refuse to pay the high price for the goods they covet. They pretend that they can continue to retain their common sense morality. They don’t face up to how utterly grim their secular outlook really is.

Now, there are candid writers like Quentin Smith and Michael Ruse who do admit the cost of atheism.

You also have morally and intellectually conflicted unbelievers like Dawkins who are very moralistic even though they also champion a ruthlessly reductionistic view of human nature.

“An infant is an evildoer?”

No, but he would grow into an evildoer.

“OK, so far your answer for why God doesn't aid the, oh, I suppose it must be millions of infants over the ages who have died slow agonizing deaths is that they might have grown up to be terrible people like Hitler.”

No, I didn’t offer that as a comprehensive explanation. I’m merely commenting on the limitations of your chosen illustration. What you ignore or overlook by treating these cases in such a discrete, self-contained, compartmentalized fashion.

“Are there any other explanations you consider plausible?”

I’ve given you two other explanations. Original sin is a general explanation, and that, in turn, figures in a supralapsarian theodicy—which I pointed you to.

john w. loftus said...

“If this is God's excuse for not saving the lives of over 40,000 children who die every day of hunger…”

No, that’s not an all-purpose “excuse.” I’m merely answering Ellis on his own level. He gives an example, and I point out the shortsighted quality of his example.

david b. ellis said...

“And, remember as well, that there may well be people who visit this blog who HAVE experienced the loss of a beloved infant child. Such a comment as Steve made can only serve as salt in an already terrible wound.”

i) If that is his chief concern, then I trust that Mr. Ellis will write to Dawkins, Dennett, Michael Ruse, Peter Singer and the Churchlands to stop publishing books and articles in which they purvey such an utterly bleak outlook on human nature and human existence.

After all, we wouldn’t want grieving parents to stumble across such discouraging literature. If they took it to heart, it would leave them inconsolable.

Come to think of it, I trust that Mr. Ellis will lobby for the removal of naturalistic evolution or atheism generally from the public school and college curriculum since it presents such a depressing view of the human condition.

ii) Speaking of which, naturalistic evolution, unlike Christianity, offers no hope beyond the grave. It’s the counsel of despair.

iii) Oh, and why does Ellis think it’s wrong to hurt the feelings of grieving parents? What is his moral justification for that position? I can give a Christian justification. But what does he offer by way of secular warrant for his scruples?

john w. loftus said...

“So understood. But then let's have Steve give us some realistic examples for why 40,000 children die every single day of hunger while Hitler was allowed to live!”

As usual, Loftus is posing questions I’ve often answered on my blog.

“According to Steve these children go to hell.”

i) Really? Can he quote me on that? Where have I ever said that everyone who dies in infancy goes straight to hell?

All I said here is that infants die as a consequence of original sin.

The same holds true for Christians. Christians die. And they die as a result of original sin (Rom 5; 1 Cor 15).

ii) I’d add that while Loftus indulges in his Ingersoll-style of demagoguery, he has yet to make a case for secular ethics.

david b. ellis said...

“It would be equally valid to focus on the suffering of animals.”

i) Why does a naturalist fret over the suffering of animals? Animal suffering is a natural part of the ecosystem. This is not gratuitous evil. It has a natural function in the survival of the fittest.

Here is yet another example of how an unbeliever cannot bring himself to be true to his secular creed. He measures the natural world by some ideal yardstick. His yardstick is not derived from the natural world itself, for he measures the world by his yardstick.

Why does he, as a secularist, act as if things are not the way they are supposed to be? What’s his standard of comparison? Where does it come from? Isn’t the world all there is?

ii) Do animals suffer? The Churchlands regard that sort of claim as a relic of folk psychology.

iii) He should also read Nagel’s classic essay on what it’s like to be a bat. Nagel is another secularist.

11:34 AM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

“Naturalism does not entail moral nihilism. I would ask you to present an argument for that claim but it would take us off topic (yet again) and I prefer not to keep getting sidetracked.”

1.Apparently you think my links are merely cosmetic or decorative. I already gave you what you ask for. If you scoll back up to my very first response to you, I link to a number of secular philosophers who argue for moral relativism. It would expedite the dialogue if you were to acquaint yourself with your own side of the argument.

In my last reply to you I was quoting verbatim from Dawkins and Ruse. For starters, read Ruse’s evolutionary argument for moral nihilism in the above-cited interview.

2.And, once again, you act as if this is a side-issue. To remind you once again of what you shouldn’t need to be reminded of, if the argument from evil amounts to an external argument, then whether an atheist can justify moral absolutes is hardly a side-issue.

Is there some reason you are either unwilling or unable to absorb these basic distinctions, no matter how ever they’re drawn to your attention?

Or are you just being evasive because you are unable to uphold your end of the argument?

“Does that mean its a morally perfect being has no motivation to come to his aid.”

Are you still attempting to deploy an *internal* argument from evil? If so, are you defining “moral perfection” according to Scripture, or your extraneous preconception of moral perfection? If you’re going to present an internal critique, then Christian theology must supply the lexicon.

Thus far you have made no effort to do so. If you don’t take your own argument seriously, why should anyone else?

“If it does, then being morally perfect sounds remarkably like being evil.”

The essence of justice involves a fundamental distinction between guilt and innocence, and the respective response appropriate to each.

If you can’t grasp that distinction, then it’s your position which is indistinguishable from evil.

“I am looking for YOUR position.”

I have stated MY position.

However, the onus hardly lies entirely on me. Each side has its own burden of proof to discharge. I realize that, at this point, you have no recourse but to shift the whole load over to me since you’ve been unable to make good on your original claims.

But I will continue to hold you to the terms in which you chose to frame the argument from evil unless and until you admit that your version of the argument was a failure, and you publicly withdraw that form of the objection. If you think I’m going to let you off the hook, you’re greatly mistaken.

“I do not equate the good with the natural.”

i) That’s an assertion, not an argument. If you think animal suffering is a defeater for Christian theism, then you need to work this up into an actual argument.

ii) And I don’t equate animal suffering with gratuitous suffering since animal suffering serves a natural purpose in the ecological balance. And if it’s purposeful, then—by definition—it isn’t gratuitous.

“I am able to imagine a world where there is no extreme suffering and living beings are able to live richer, more fulfilling lives. This is a state of affairs which would be intrinsically preferable to the world we observe.”

Several problems:

i) Not everything that’s conceivable is possible. You need to present a detailed, working model of your alternative. What are the unspoken or unforeseen trade-offs in your scenario?

ii) You are now appealing to hypotheticals and counterfactuals. What is the ontological status of abstract possibilities in your secular outlook? In what or whom do such possibilities inhere? Does your worldview have the metaphysical machinery to underwrite these modalities?

iii) Why would you, as a secularist, imagine a better world if the actual world is the only world you know? This is not an argument from experience.

iv) How do you get around the naturalistic fallacy and the is-ought problem?

“Are you contending animals cannot suffer?”

i) That’s a red-herring. Suffering, per se, is irrelevant to the argument from evil. The only thing that’s pertinent is the existence (or not) of *gratuitous* evil.

Do you think you can get away with dropping key features of the argument from evil and I won’t notice?

ii) BTW, are you still attempting to deploy the *internal* version of the argument from evil? If so, how is animal suffering incompatible with Christian theology? Does the Bible have a doctrine of animal rights? Did Peter Singer write a book of the Bible?

“I have.”

If you’ve read Nagel’s essay, then how does your ascription of animal suffering avoid the charge of anthropomorphism?

“Rather than namedropping, though, I would be more interested in hearing arguments for your position on the problem of evil.”

That’s a very vague request. And I’ve already spoken to that issue several times now.

eas239 said...

“Steve, just because you don't like the alternative doesn't prove Christianity is right.”

True, but irrelevant to the issue at hand. The argument from evil levels a moralistic objection to the Christian faith. Hence, the question of whether secularism devolves into moral nihilism is quite germane to the debate.

If the alternative is amoral, and if the argument from evil collapses into an external objection, then the argument from evil collapses of its own dead weight.

7:01 AM

steve said...
david b. ellis said...

“I am well aware there are naturalists who believe in moral relativism (as there are also naturalists arguing for practically every possible metaethical position). That no more necessitates that I agree with them than you are required to agree with a christian holding theological opinions contrary to your own.”

i) To begin with, I’m debating positions, not people. The fact that you choose to turn a blind eye to basic problems with metaphysical naturalism makes it easier for you to foster the illusion that you have a strong case against Christian theism—when, in fact, you’ve dealt yourself a losing hand.

I don’t limit myself to your arbitrarily restrictive and intellectually evasive version of metaphysical naturalism as it bears on the argument from evil.

I reserve the right to quote other representatives of atheism who don’t duck the hard questions the way you do.

You are not the only spokesman for the position you represent, and thus far, you are a very selective representative.

ii) The question is not whether Ruse et al. have a different *opinion* on the subject. Rather, the question is what supporting arguments they present for their opinions. Ruse has *argued* for moral nihilism on the basis of naturalistic evolution. So have others whom I cite.

So, yes, you, as a secular humanist or whatever you call yourself, are responsible for defending your version of atheism over against rival versions.

They have made a case for their position. You have offered no counterargument.

And if you are unable or unprepared to shoulder the intellectual responsibilities, that will not hinder me from citing other spokesmen who are either more candid or more thoughtful that you are.

iii) Oh, and incidentally, I spend a lot of time defending my theological position in relation to rival theological traditions.

“The other form of the problem avoids debate on meta-ethics and is for that reason simpler and preferable. That version claims not that God would be evil for his inaction but simply that it is entirely implausible to that a loving person would not act to come to the aid of a suffering infant.”

“Implausible” on what grounds? Internal or external?

“It does not make a moral judgment.”

i) Of course it makes a moral judgment. It makes a moral judgment about what constitutes a “loving” or “caring” person, and it makes another moral judgment about what constitutes an “unloving” or “uncaring” action. You are blind to your own, unconscious assumptions.

So you are knee-deep in moral judgments in order to leverage your version of the argument from evil.

ii) But even though the question of plausibility is irrelevant to the internal argument from evil, let’s say a couple of things about it anyway:

a) As David Wood rightly points out, when you start talking about whether a Christian theodicy is plausible or not, you cannot isolate the question of plausibility from your larger body of beliefs. What is plausible (or not) is plausible in relation, not only to the immediate issue at hand, but to what other evidence you have that bears on the existence of God.

b) Ironically, the argument from evil is only plausible if you believe in God. For if there is no God, there is no evil.

An atheologian must affirm in the premise what he denies in the conclusion. Without the existence of God feeding into the premise to underwrite moral absolutes, the argument from evil is a racecar with square wheels.

iii) Hence, nothing could be more implausible than the argument from evil. Its plausibility derives from our instinctual belief in evil, a belief which secularism falsifies. Put another way, evil falsifies secularism.

“And, therefore, one is not required to endorse a secular system of object moral truths to consider the problem of evil valid. Even the moral relativist and moral nihilist can consistently employ this argument.”

Even if this were true, which, as I just pointed out, it is not, who cares? If there is no right or wrong, then why should your or I care whether or not people are loving or caring?

If there is notright or wrong, then why should you or I care whether Christianity is true or false?

If it’s not morally wrong to be factually wrong, then what difference does it make whether I was right and you were wrong, or vice versa?

If moral antirealism is true, then there’s no duty to be truthful.

Like a lot of unbelievers, you blink in the face of the secular abyss. You refuse to consider the radical consequences of a consistently secular outlook.

“It is you that claims a secularist should consider what is natural some sort of moral standard.”

Since, for a secularist, nature is all there is, the only moral standard could be a naturalistic standard. A standard which in some sense derives from the natural world.

“Since an omnipotent being is able to order the world in ways that do not require animals to suffer it is, in fact, gratuitous.”

Now you’re redefining the terms of the argument from evil. The fact that there might be an alternative state of affairs doesn’t render the actual state of affairs gratuitous as long as the actual state of affairs is purposeful or functional in the sense that everything happens for a reason.

What you are trying to do is shift the debate from gratuitous evil to greater or lesser evils, or greater or lesser goods. Comparative goods and evils. That’s a completely different argument.

“A deity is not limited to a natural order that requires animal suffering. If he is he's a rather pathetically weak god.”

Which is not the issue. The issue is the gratuity (or not) of evil.

You would have to argue (i) that a world without animal suffering is a better world over all than a world with animal suffering, and furthermore, (ii) that God is obligated to choose between the greater of two alternative goods.

That’s a very different argument. And you have yet to offer such an argument. All you do is to verbally hypothesize about a better world without presenting a working model of what such a world would look like through-and-through.

“For omnipotent beings this would be achievable. And they certainly could improve on this world. “

i) When you say that God could improve on this world, is that an internal or external value-judgment?

ii) Christian theology doesn’t maintain that the present state of the world represents the best-case scenario. This is a fallen world. But you have left eschatology out of your evaluation.

iii) You *say* God could improve on it, but you fail to *show* how he could. You are only making verbal noises without *illustrating* your assertions in any detail.

It’s one thing to *talk* about a better world, quite another thing to *lay it out*.

It’s easy to postulate what seem to be discrete, self-contained improvements while freezing everything else in place. Quite another to integrate those hypothetical improvements into a fully-furnished world.

But apparently discrete changes may entail far-ranging adjustments or tradeoffs between one good and another good.

So show us your blueprint for a better world.

“Another effort to send the discussion into abstract metaphysical sidealleys. Sorry, but I'm not going to take the bait.”

i) I appreciate your felt need to argue on the cheap and limit exposure to your vulnerable outpost. But you don’t enjoy that luxury.

The argument from evil involves possible worlds semantics. Could God come up with a better world than the actual world? Is this the kind of world we would expect from him?

By definition, possible worlds involve global, maximal scenarios rather than localized tinkering, as if you can propose airtight changes that have no larger ramifications. But that’s not how possible worlds hang together.

ii) Much as you would rather not expose your soft underbelly to rational prodding, you don’t have the intellectual right to make convenient assumptions that have no place in a secular worldview.

You’re the one who’s floating hypotheticals and counterfactuals. Fine. You have to pay for merchandise on the way out door. No intellectual shoplifting or freeloading allowed.

I realize that, for tactical reasons, you’d like nothing better than to artificially and duplicitously restrict the range of issues by, on the one hand, helping yourself to cost-free assumptions while, on the other hand, debarring your opponent from charging you for the merchandise.

Either you argue from your worldview or mine. If from yours, then you will have to articulate a coherent worldview whenever you make claims that carry a metaphysical surcharge.

Unbelievers get away with a lot by taking many things for granted that are implicitly rescinded by their unbelieving viewpoint.

“Do you think God cares whether animals suffer?”

i) I can’t speak for God since God has never spoken to that issue.

ii) According to Scripture, animal suffering would not be on a par with human suffering. Animals are amoral. They are essentially mortal, disposable creatures.

iii) Ironically, I have a more pragmatic and hardnosed attitude towards the animal kingdom than the average unbeliever, who claims to be a naturalist and card-carrying Darwinian, but entertains a very teary-eyed view of the animal kingdom.

iv) From a Biblical standpoint, there’s a basic difference between Eden and the wilderness. The wilderness isn’t meant to be Edenic. It’s harsh and inhospitable. That’s one reason the expulsion from Eden was punitive.

A wilderness can be cultivated. Wild animals can be tamed. It can be turned into Eden. But that is part of the cultural mandate.

v) I don’t take the argument from animal suffering seriously. It’s an argument that’s appealing to decadent, pampered urbanites who like dogs, cats, and whales better than children.

Ranchers, farmers, and hunters aren’t so sentimental.

“Since I do not think you honestly believe animals are incapable of pain I am not going to waste my time on the above nonsense.”

You think that Thomas Nagel’s tightly-reasoned essay is nonsense?

Notice how frequently Ellis must retreat into anti-intellectual evasions and dismissals to salvage his secular outlook.

“You claimed that original sin is the reason it is not inconsistent with God's caring nature for him to not come to the aid of a suffering infant.”

i) No, I never made that claim. Observe the way in which Ellis builds his own question-begging assumptions into his mischaracterization of my claim.

Let’s step back a few paces and set the record straight. I have never bought into his tendentious talk about God’s “loving” or “caring” nature, because these are cipher terms which he chooses to define without recourse to Scripture or Christian theology.

ii) Incidentally, Ellis happen to believe that Peter Singer is a loving and caring person when he proposes to euthanize infants instead of intervening to save them?

iii) The internal argument from evil purports to generate a logical and theological dilemma for the Christian, thereby forcing the Christian to relinquish at least one of the key premises, and thereby forfeiting Christian theism.

I simply pointed out that, according to Scripture, human beings die as a consequence of original sin, including the death of infants or young children.

So infant morality doesn’t generate a logical or theological dilemma among the set of doctrines comprehending the Christian belief-system.

There is no even prima facie contradiction.

iv) The atheologian generates a false dilemma by presenting a severely stripped down version of the relevant data.

To begin with, there is more to the Christian faith than Christian theism. There is also Christian theology, which is inclusive of, but broader than, Christian theism. There is much more to the theological status of evil than the doctrine of God alone.

v) For purposes of rebutting the internal argument from evil, I don’t even need to demonstrate that original sin or a supralapsarian theodicy is *true*, but only that the problem of evil is *consistent* with Christian theology.

1:10 PM

steve said...
David B. Ellis said...

"If you wish to actually present your argument as to how original sin explains a loving Gods inaction in regard to the suffering of infants I'll be glad to respond to that though. So far you have consistently ducked that question."

You seem to be constitutionally unable to get inside a position you disagree with to attack it on its own grounds. Yet that is the essence of an internal critique.

As I said at the very outset of this thread, the question at issue is not how a *loving* God deals with people qua people, but how a *just* God deals with fallen creatures.

You invariably strip away the theological presuppositions which condition a Christian answer to the problem of evil.

Your mental block prevents you from ever mounting an internal argument from evil.

"I don't believe anything is intrinsically good"

john w. loftus said...

"David, I am a consequentialist. I do not believe anything is intrinsically good."

http://problemofevil.blogspot.com/2007/01/stepford-wives-and-problem-of-freedom.html


To my knowledge, this is the first time that Loftus has every come clean about his own ethical commitments.

And it's easy to see why he's been so reluctant to lay his cards on the table.

If nothing is intrinsically good, then nothing is intrinsically evil.

This admission instantly disqualifies him from ever mounting an external argument from evil.

And it also trivializes any attempt to deploy the internal argument from evil.

Let's assume, for discussion purposes, that he is able to successfully deploy a sound version of the internal argument from evil.

That would disprove Christianity.

But since, according to Loftus, nothing is intrinsically good or evil, there's nothing intrinsically wrong with believing a falsehood. There's no absolute obligation to choose truth over falsehood.

Hence, his victory would be a purely Pyrrhic victory. He inherits a necropolis.

So file away his disclaimer for future reference.

Sunday, January 28, 2007

What's the problem of evil?

Since a number of unbelievers who deploy the argument from evil lack an elementary grasp of the essential distinctions or underlying issues, here are a couple of expository essays:

The Problem of Evil
The Cosmos as a Work of Art

Licona/Ataie Debate

Kumikata from the New Testament Research Ministries board recently brought to my attention an online version of a debate Michael Licona had with a Muslim, Ali Ataie. The debate occurred on November 30, 2006 at the University of California, Davis. The topic is "Was Jesus Resurrected Or Rescued?".

Classical Historians On The New Testament

Christopher Price has written an article on the subject.

I'm The Best Around, Nothing's Ever Gonna Bring Me Down

So goes the chorus to the song You're The Best from the 80's that made movie fans cheer as Daniel LaRusso, The Karate Kid, got ready to take on Johnny. Perhaps Vincent Cheung watched this movie too many times. Reading his latest post conjured images in my head of Vince sitting at his desk with his iTunes headphones on, rocking out to Joe Esposito's You're The Best:

You’re the best!
Around!
Nothing’s gonna ever keep you down
You’re the Best!
Around!
Nothing’s gonna ever keep you down
You’re the Best!
Around!
Nothing’s gonna ever keep you dow-ow-ow-ow-own

Vince must have internalized much of the movie, The Karate Kid. He treats his position as if it were the "Crane Technique." Says Mr. Miyagi about the "Crane Technique: "If done right, none can defend."

So, Cheung "responds" to one of Steve Hays' criticisms against Cheung's occasionalism. Cheung writes,

"As for the critic who raised the objection, he might read this response and attempt another one. I will probably ignore him, or more likely, I will be unaware of his new attack. But this does not mean that I cannot answer him, or that you cannot answer him."


Notice the bolded word. One thing is clear, Cheung is offering a "response" to Hays. But why should that cause us to cast an evil eye upon what Cheung is doing. After all, that's what you do when someone critiques you - you write a response. Well, that would seem like the regular course of action for us, but not for Cheung. How does one come to that conclusion you're wondering. Simple. Cheung previously told us in a blog entry titled Taking Time To Refute Cheung that, "Nevertheless, if I ever realize that my materials are inadequate to handle a particular refutation, then of course I will take time to write a specific response." He has also stated that he doesn't feel the need to respond unless the critique is "earth shattering."

Now, you'll probably notice that I have no link to the old blog entry by Cheung (written on 06/27/05). Let me offer an apologetic for that. I don't because I cannot find it anymore. Cheung probably felt the need to hide this embarrassing quote. But why should he considering how smart he is and how everyone besides him is stupid? In case you doubt me, though, let me provide (Cheung forbid!) and inductive argument for my case. Take this post by James Anderson back in June of '05. You'll note that the first comment has a link to the Taking Time To Refute Cheung blog entry:

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/06/27/taking-time-to-refute-cheung/


But as of the writing of this post, the link is down. I have also searched Cheung's archives, can't find it. Now, unless James Anderson is a precog like those in Minority Report, why would he link to a post that never existed? Could he see that I'd write this post and so he set the chain of events in motion almost two years ago. Well, since I cannot deduce from Scripture that James Anderson is not a precog, and therefore can't know that he's not (according to Cheung, of course), I suppose this is all possible. Unlikely, though. Or, one could argue that Cheung did write that entry, but the quotes I cited are fabricated. But, I pulled those quotes from an July '05 entry of mine entitled Cheung, Knowledge, and Occasionalism. I'm no precog. So why would I make those quotes up almost two years ago? Perhaps I am a precog, but God (as Cheung conceives him) is allowing me to believe a lie. Possible, however unlikely.

But why have I gone to such lengths to show that Cheung did write said piece? Simple. His missing blog post is embarrassing (that he needed to take it down is even more embarrassing. He pretends like he never said such things so he can continue to portray the image of "invincible warrior" to the world). Take note of how Cheung belittles Steve Hays' critique:

"The fact that he was unable to even describe my position, but left God completely out of the picture, betrayed his incompetence and irreverence. [...] What he has against me is trivial [...] please, do not send me anymore objections from this person or anyone related to him. He is just not good enough. He possesses an altogether lower class of intellect. There is no competition, no comparison — I have no interest in him and no use for him."


First, Cheung wrote a blog entry once titled "Seminary Elitism." In part two he writes,

"If I ever find out that someone I’ve trained were to exhibit elitism, I would privately rebuke him and make him ask forgiveness from those whom he has offended. If he refuses, then he is a piece of spiritual garbage, and I would publicly denounce and humiliate him. I regard elitism in a believer as this serious and sinful, and teachers who do not correct this in their students partake in their sins." ("Seminary Elitism," pt. 2)


Second, Cheung previously claim of Hays,

"So, I will say this now: Unless Mr. H comes up with something spectacular against me, I will not say anything else in reference to him."


And so Cheung appears to have an unstable mind. He acts like an elitist, but chastises elitists. He says he'll not respond to hays anymore unless Steve comes up with something spectacular. But he belittled and made fun of Steve's post. Does he now think it's "spectacular?" If not, then why "say anything else in reference to him?" Was your response "inadequate?" Putting aside these problems, let's go back to the main criticism.

Recall above that Cheung previously had said, "Nevertheless, if I ever realize that my materials are inadequate to handle a particular refutation, then of course I will take time to write a specific response." He has also stated that he doesn't feel the need to respond unless the critique is "earth shattering."

So, above we have a "specific response" to Hays. According to Cheung, then, he must have "realize[d] that [his] materials are inadequate to handle a particular refutation." He had also said that he would respond if the critiques were "earth shattering." But in the quoted passage directly above Cheung says Hays' critiques are "mischaracterizations," and that they are "trivial," not "good enough," and from a "lower class of intellect." And so if we are to take Cheung at his word, and assume that he's so smart, never making mistakes, then we must assume that Cheung's "materials" were "inadequate to handle" some weak, trivial, ignorant, and stupid objections, from a stupid person. That doesn't bode to well for Cheung's "materials." Indeed, why would something "trivial" be considered "earth shattering?" How does Cheung handle this seeming inconsistency from his own words? Perhaps he's just talking smack? He didn't really mean what he wrote. He wasn't being honest (and, he was, because elsewhere he's written that, "Here I will just refer all of you to the recommended readings listed on the blog entry in question (and listed again below) as my response to ALL criticisms that you can find ANYWHERE written by ANYONE on this subject. I have confidence in my products — they are accurate and irrefutable"). Well, how much stock should we put into his most recent smack talking then? If Cheung was serious in his missing post, then dire consequences result. If he was not serious, then dire consequences result.

But more can be said. Cheung's response to Hays' critique of Occasionalism is essentially to say that Hays doesn't take God into account. Hays in an atheist, according to Cheung. Says Cheung,

"Here is the problem: Where in the world is GOD in this analogy? God — remember him? In my exposition of biblical occasionalism, I refer to God's constant and active power again, and again, and again, and again, and again. It is the defining factor in both my metaphysics and epistemology. So, although I put God before him over, and over, and over, and over again, this critic completely blocks God out in his thinking, and in his representation of my epistemology. If the critic is an unbeliever, then he has simply disregarded my belief in God — the very thing we disagree about in the first place — in order to refute my knowledge of God. If the critic is a professing believer, then it is even worse, for this betrays the irreverence — even secret atheism — in his thinking. How is it possible that I can put God before the face of a "Christian" again and again, and then he answers me as if God is absent from the conversation, as if I never mentioned him? This is his "secret fudge-factor" — atheism."


Note the bolded word. Cheung thinks he has "knowledge" of his occasionalism as the biblical model. Cheung thinks he has "knowledge" of all the little pieces to his Scripturalist package. All the knowledge Cheung has, he has via his occasionalist model. But that model has two parts (P1 and P2) to it which turn against Cheung. Cheung claims:

P1: "Christian epistemology affirms that all knowledge must be immediately – that is, without mediation – granted and conveyed to the human mind by God. Thus on the occasion that you look at the words of the Bible, God directly communicates what is written to your mind, without going through the senses themselves. That is, your sensations provide the occasions upon which God directly conveys information to your mind apart from the sensations themselves. Therefore, although we do read the Bible, knowledge never comes from sensation." (Cheung, (“Ultimate Questions,” p. 38)


P2: "God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches)..." (Cheung, "Short Answers To Several Criticisms")


God immediately and directly causes people to believe everything they believe. Lie or truth. At this point I would like to know how Cheung knows anything? How does he know that God is not deceiving Cheung? If he replies that he has deductively valid arguments, deduced from scriptural premises, he doesn't escape. This is because the argument is only good if the premises are true. Cheung takes his understanding of verses and this understanding he has was immediately conveyed to his mind by God. Could God be deceiving Cheung? How would Cheung know? Cheung could take an externalist out here, but he has not done so yet. To date, he's still and internalist. He always asks his interlocutors how they know X is true, and, how do they know that they know.

Cheung believes that the most brilliant theological minds have all had non-truths conveyed to them since he says that he has his own system and doesn't think any theologian got everything right. So, when those divines who argued for an infralapsarian position, from the texts of Scripture, their understanding of those texts was wrong, according to Cheung, and their understanding, according to Cheung, was immediately conveyed by God on the occasion that they read those texts. Is Cheung better than those men? Would God not deceive Cheung? What absolute standard does Cheung use to determine if God has not caused him to believe a lie? How was this standard obtained? If by his doctrine of occasionalism, then Cheung would need to show in a non-question begging manor that he was not deceived in this instance. But then we may ask Cheung how he came to the belief that his standard was correct and God did not deceive him in conveying this information? If by occassionalism (and it would have to be, see P1), then Cheung needs to know that God did not deceive him into thinking that his standard was the ultimate standard he could employ to determine if he had been deceived or not... ad infinitum.

Let's now give a concrete example to this argument: Cheung appears to think that he knows his apologetic method is true. On his blog he writes: "Here I will just refer all of you to the recommended readings listed on the blog entry in question (and listed again below) as my response to ALL criticisms that you can find ANYWHERE written by ANYONE on this subject. I have confidence in my products — they are accurate and irrefutable." Very well then, Cheung thinks his apologetic method is correct and he thinks he knows this. To claim to know something one must know that there is no possibility that one is wrong, according to Cheung. Or, one must have a reliable method which does not admit for error or mistake. But the method of Cheung's belief formation is just as unreliable and subject to false belief and error as, say, his points against intuition are (if not more so!). This infallibilist criteria is summed up nicely by Aquascum. Aquascum writes:

"Despite all this, we have hit upon something interesting: what Cheung is after is “an objective and infallible foundation,” and intuition is definitely not it. When one reads through “Arguing By Intuition,” Cheung’s main reason for rejecting intuition is because it doesn’t satisfy an infallibilist constraint on knowledge. Because intuition doesn’t give us certainty, then it can’t be a source of knowledge, because knowledge requires certainty, that is, a way of proceeding that is guaranteed not to lead to error.

For proof of this, consider the following, which immediately follows the quotes above:


When debating Arminians, or when reading their literature, you will notice that many of them base many of their crucial premises on intuition, and often on intuition alone. Ganssle’s pattern of argument is very common with them – they just assume that their needed premises are true because to them they seem to be true. They say that they are convinced that these premises are true (often they say that we are all convinced), and then they proceed on that basis. One of these premises is that we all seem to have free will; another is that it would seem unjust to hold someone morally accountable who does not have free will. At least in these instances, their ultimate standard of truth and morality is not God’s revelation but their own intuition. Their “seems like” seems unquestionable to them.

However, all the “seems like” could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don’t know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone. (Cheung,“Arguing By Intuition,” pp. 3-4)


What is the main reason Cheung rejects the appeal to intuition? Here it is clear: intuitions are fallible, while knowledge must be infallible. Thus, just because some premises “seem to be true,” or you are “convinced that these premises are true,” or your “‘seems like’ seems unquestionable” to you, this is a very bad way of proceeding. Why? Because “all the ‘seems like’ could be wrong,” that is, because intuition is fallible. To put it another way, it might be consistent with everything else we know (i.e., epistemically possible) that the intuition in question is false. As Clark puts it, “it might be that… we don’t know something,” or “it might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant.” Or as Luther puts it, we might be “deceived by Satan.” Indeed, it “might be” any number of possibilities that is the source of the deception or mistake."

So if Cheung knows that his apologetic method is correct then he knows that God is not deceiving him into falsely believing it is correct. Cheung does not know this. Therefore Cheung does not know that his apologetic method is correct. Cheung would need to be able to "deduce from scripture, or find verses in scripture" which tell us that God is not deceiving Vincent Cheung in order to even have a fighting chance that God is not deceiving Vincent Cheung. But the second problem is that if he does find such a verse he needs to know that God has not deceived him into falsely understanding what the verse(s) mean!

And so Vince can keep thinking he's the best, a rou hound, but in all actuality he decimates Christianity and Christian apologetics rather than his Christian interlocutors. Oh, and by the way, we're still all waiting for Cheung to respond to his critics. But if he does, he's admitting his work is inadequate and our critiques are earth shattering. Quite a dilemma. Wouldn't want to be in his shoes.

{Note: Thanks to Patrick Chan who found the link to Taking Time To Refute Cheung via the internet archives "way back machine." If you go here and click on July 3, then scroll down until you get to the Taking Time To Refute Cheung entry. It's interesting that you cannot find it on his site, though. I searched his archives, and it is gone.}