Continuing my disgustingly civil exchange with Jim Lazarus:
http://consolatione.blogspot.com/
***QUOTE***
Let’s proceed with the doctor example that Dr. Reppert provides in his post. Now, let us say that the doctor has a young girl as a patient, and the girl has some rare form of cancer where she must go through chemotherapy treatments and take medication that leads to muscular dystrophy, and in addition she must experience several other painful or discomforting experiences as a result of her medical treatment. Now let us say that her doctor is in fact a very close friend of her’s and her family. The doctor cares very much for the girl, and wants to do everything in his power to help her overcome the cancer. Further, let us say that the girl does not comprehend what is going on. She does not know what she has to go through such painful experiences. She is fearful and is clearly suffering even more in her ignorance of what is going on.
Given this example, we can ask a question. Would the doctor who cares about this young girl explain to her the reason why she has to suffer? The explanation, I’d wager, would help her understand the purpose of her treatments, and it would give her assurance that there was a sensible reason for why she has to experience what she does. It would, in fact, help her to know why her suffering was necessary. I think it is also clear that the doctor would explain to her exactly why she would have to go through this experience, out of compassion for her, out of his concern and his care for her well-being.
Similarly, God is a being who loves his creation, just as the doctor cares for the young girl. I think it is clear that just as in the doctor example, God would not abandon us to our ignorance. Instead, He would reveal to us exactly why we must go through the suffering that we do, why it was necessary for whatever higher good He has in mind. He would do this just like any loving father would, out of his love and compassion.
***END-QUOTE***
A few basic points:
1.We need to be clear on the level at which a theodicy operates. A theodicy may be able to answer the general question, “Why is there cancer?”
But I think it’s quite unrealistic to expect a theodicy to answer the specific question, “Why do I have cancer?” “Why me rather than the next guy?”
2.Once consequence of living in a fallen world is the silence of God. That silence is by no means absolute. But to be fallen creatures in a fallen world does entail a fair measure of disruption in our fellowship with God.
Had Adam and Eve never sinned, we might all enjoy daily theophanies with the Maker of heaven and earth. But one consequence of the Fall is a degree of radio silence between God and sinners.
That silence is broken from time to time. Most notably in the Scriptures. I also don’t deny that God may occasionally reveal himself on a more individual basis. But that’s hardly the norm.
3.This also goes to the Biblical distinction between faith and sight or hope and sight. Fideism takes this to an extreme. Christian faith is not a matter of taking everything on faith. Of walking blind.
But the Bible is intended to cultivate the virtue of faith. Of trusting in God for many things.
Less a matter of knowing “why” than knowing “who.” I don’t know the answer, but I know Him, and that’s answer enough. He knows the answers. And in knowing him, I can leave the answers to him.
4.This, of course, assumes a certain epistemology. I’m simply blocking out my basic response. Pointing to the direction I’d take.
“I should ask Hays, though, exactly how we come to have experiential knowledge of God’s justice and mercy? Is God’s justice and mercy revealed to us by virtue of how he responds to our evil actions? For instance, if I were to steal Alvin Plantinga’s car, would God’s response of punishment and/or redemption be the way in which I can have experiential knowledge of His justice and mercy? Or does Hays envision another way in which we experience God’s justice and mercy?”
If I’m a Christian, then I know, from personal experience, what it’s like to be a sinner; and I also know, from personal experience, what it’s like to be redeemed and forgiven.
In this life, judgment is not quite as clear. I mainly have reference to eschatological judgment.
***QUOTE***
1) I think that, given the Christian worldview, all natural events, including natural disasters, are events that are ultimately events that are attributable to a sentient agent – namely, God. This is so because of God’s providence, and his role in Creation. Everything that occurs, occurs as a result of the decisions that God has made. He can either allow these occurrences or prevent them. So, if a natural event occurs that results in suffering, the credit for the suffering is by corollary attributable to God, who is responsible for the occurrence of the natural event.
***END-QUOTE***
Agreed.
***QUOTE***
Since this is the case, natural disasters would be properly called natural evils in the event that there is no higher-order good that can account for them.
***END-QUOTE***
A few points:
i) My theodicy does not entail a one-to-one correspondence between a given evil and a compensatory good. Teleology isn’t that discrete or atomistic.
It’s not that a given evil, taken in isolation, is a direct means to a greater good. Rather, it’s a part/whole relation. Each event, including evil events, makes its individual contribution to a common end.
ii) I do regard natural evil as a manifestation of divine judgment. But this ordinarily goes back to the Fall. It isn’t directly punitive with respect to any particular victim. But it is a general manifestation of divine judgment.
iii) I’d add that a natural evil can also be a manifestation of divine mercy where the survivors are concerned. But we don’t know enough to draw specific conclusions. Why did so-and-so live and so-and-so die? We can’t say.
iv) There are some exceptions in Scripture. But that’s because we have the benefit of divine revelation where those instances are concerned.
***QUOTE***
Further, as I suggested in my first response, and as I’ll argue again here, it does not seem that Hays has suggested anything that could provide as a sensible account of the occurrence of natural disasters. If this is so, then again the problem of suffering remains a problem.
***END-QUOTE***
I disagree, but maybe this goes to his next point:
***QUOTE***
(2) The occurrence of natural disasters for the sake of the restoration of the ecosystem is a contingent fact. In other words, there is nothing metaphysically necessary about ecosystems being restored to balance by natural disasters. God could have chosen some other means of restoring ecosystems.
***END-QUOTE***
Do we know that for a fact?
i) It fails to distinguish between possibility and conceivability. It’s easy to imagine making discrete changes in the natural order while leaving everything else in place.
But the fact that we can mental compartmentalize those changes doesn’t mean that, in reality, that is possible.
In a system of second causes, it may not be possible to change certain natural mechanisms without making a number of other far-reaching adjustments.
Means are finite. The medium has built-in limitations. To change a few things it may be necessary to change a lot of things.
And such a world might be so different from the one we know that we can no longer compare the two and size them up.
For this alternative scenario might well have its own dangers or trade-offs. A different set of natural evils.
ii) It would be possible for God to make temporary, isolated changes—a flurry of opportune miracles.
Such a world is more flexible, but the lack of continuity comes at a cost. A very unpredictable world. Impossible to plan for the future.
So there’s a practical and ethical dialectic between flexibility and inflexibility—miracle and providence.
Wherever you range along the continuum you are going to face certain advantages and disadvantages.
Life in a fallen world is already quite fragmented. Would we wish it to be even more unstable?
***QUOTE***
Since these events lead to suffering, and since God loves us, and since there seems to be no higher order good that makes these events necessary, I believe that it follows that God would have chosen some other means of restoring the ecosystem. However, there are natural disasters, not some other means of restoration. Since this is the case, it seems that this could count as some evidence against the existence of God.
***END-QUOTE***
One of the recurring problems I have with the way the objection is being framed is that it hinges on a false expectation. As if we should doubt the existence of God because the world we inhabit falls so far below our ideal.
But our existence is, at this point, supposed to be far from ideal. That’s what you’d expect in a fallen world.
These objections act as if the world should be Edenic. But at this stage in the plan of God, Eden lies behind and the Promised Land lies ahead, while we occupy the wilderness.
***QUOTE***
I understand that this is a standard response to arguments from suffering that emphasize natural disasters. However, what confuses me is the causal link between the occurrence of the Fall and the occurrence of natural disasters. How does one lead to the other?
***END-QUOTE***
If human mortality is the result of the fall, then in an unfallen world, you might still have natural disasters, but men would be providentially exempted from their destructive scope.
Being a sinner leaves you morally liable, and therefore, physically liable, to natural evil.
***QUOTE***
Secondly, and just as importantly, the occurrence of natural disasters from the occurrence of the Fall would likewise be a contingent fact. In other words, the consequences of the Fall need not necessarily entail the occurrence of natural disasters. For what reason would God have chosen natural disasters to be a consequence of the Fall?
***END-QUOTE***
I regard natural “disasters” as a consequence of creation, not the fall. They are, in fact, natural goods.
They only become evil to us if we are exposed to natural disasters. It’s not that natural disasters are a consequence of the fall. Rather, our vulnerability to natural disasters is a consequence of the Fall.
***QUOTE***
I think this is sensible, but I also think there is a more serious problem with regard to children. Hays seems to grant the possibility that children can be treated as innocents. However, what about events where children are the ones that directly suffer from the occurrence of the event? For instance, surely there were schools that were destroyed by the tsunami that occurred in South-East Asia last year. What can we say about all of the children that were killed or drowned to death in those schools?
***END-QUOTE***
Several issues:
i) Death is not the end of life. God will do a lot of postmortem sorting of the sheep from the goats.
ii) The life of an orphan, especially in SE Asia, is pretty grim.
iii) Fallen creatures are not entitled to immunity from harm. There’s a running presumption throughout this thread that death is unjust. No, death is just.
iv) Suppose a bank-robber makes a successful getaway, only to be killed when the overpass collapses on his car.
Now, if he’d been shot by the police, we’d see a direct correspondence between the crime and its consequences—whereas his actual death strikes us as a freak accident.
And yet, there’s a sense in which they’re morally equivalent. He got away with one thing, but it caught up to him through the backdoor.
My point being: we should not assume that judgment involves a linear or transparent connection between a specific sin and a specific consequence.
It’s clear in Scripture that divine retribution is often more roundabout. I’m not talking about children in particular, but more generally.
***QUOTE***
Now, I do not mean to make this a petty fight over authorities, but the point is that those professional academics who actually are doubtful about evolution are very, very, few and far between. There simply is a scientific consensus on this matter, and critics of evolution have been consistently unsuccessful both in the scientific arena and in the court room (and for good reason).
***END-QUOTE***
Given the fact that public dissent from Darwinian orthodoxy is a career-killer, I’m surprised that the Discovery Institute has been able to smoke out as many dissenters as it has. I expect that’s just the tip of the iceberg.
Look at the kind of scorn that Michael Ruse and Stephen Jay Gould come in for simply because they are not the right kind of Darwinians. Because they offer a different version of naturalistic evolution. Or because they deny that evolution is inherently atheistic.
Suppose there were no professional repercussions for bucking the system?
***QUOTE***
We can leave this point aside, however. It is relatively unimportant for the purposes of what I mean to say. Instead of pointing our evolutionary biology, I did in fact literally mean historical research, done by historians. For instance, if a literal interpretation of Genesis is correct, then the Flood took place somewhere during the Xing dynasty in China, at least according to creationist critic Frank Zindler. If Zindler is correct about this, then we have every historical reason to suppose that a literal interpretation of Genesis is incorrect, and that we ought to seek out alternative understandings of the Fall and other events as told in the Book of Genesis.
***END-QUOTE***
I’ve addressed these objections on a number of occasions. Most recently:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/10/dawkins-postmortem.html
Monday, October 23, 2006
A Partial Response To A Partial Response
A friend of mine, James Lazarus, posted a response to Steve Hays'response to his partial response to Steve's response to James' original post which started the whole thing.
So, I was going to offer some brief comments on his latest post in his combox, but I decided just to post them here. You could say that this is a partial response to some partial responses. :-)
James,
You wrote: " I’m emphasizing the need for moral intuition in the sense that I discussed at the beginning of this post. I think that what I suggested earlier is sensible: a sensible answer to the problem of suffering will present to us a higher-order good that justifies or trumps the amount of suffering or evil that goes on in the world."
According to the Bible God's glory is the highest good. According to the Bible God does all things for glory, that it might be manifested. And, so, we at least know that the highest order good is God's glory and that's why He allows anything that we call evil to happen. So, why would this not be the answer to gratuitous evil?
Second, you grant that even if this is an answer then we still have a problem of ignorance.
You write: "Given this example, we can ask a question. Would the doctor who cares about this young girl explain to her the reason why she has to suffer? The explanation, I’d wager, would help her understand the purpose of her treatments, and it would give her assurance that there was a sensible reason for why she has to experience what she does. It would, in fact, help her to know why her suffering was necessary."
And
"Similarly, God is a being who loves his creation, just as the doctor cares for the young girl. I think it is clear that just as in the doctor example, God would not abandon us to our ignorance. Instead, He would reveal to us exactly why we must go through the suffering that we do, why it was necessary for whatever higher good He has in mind."
And so I've already mentioned the broad reason. God has told us that it's for his glory.
But, second, why assume that even if God were to tell us how it is for his glory in explicit detail (which I think your request is asking, and I think this is unfair, especially considering who God is, i.e., he's not "the Bible answer man!":-) ) we would understand?
The flaw in your analogy assumed that we're fairly close in intelligence to God and so God just needs to tell us the answers. The doctor can tell the girl and she, knowing English, rules of grammar, concepts, etc., can understand what the doctor is saying. But the more correct analogy may be that of Einstein trying to explain E=MC2 through the stomach of a pregnant mother who has a 1 week old fetus inside her! The only problem is that the gap between God and us is greater!
So, I think I have given the broad reason why and so that should satisy your request. To the extent that you want to know all the details I'm suggesting that we may not even be able to comprehend the answer. This is what happened to Job.
Job 40:
1 Moreover Jehovah answered Job, and said,
2 Shall he that cavilleth contend with the Almighty? He that argueth with God, let him answer it.
3 Then Job answered Jehovah, and said,
4 Behold, I am of small account; What shall I answer thee? I lay my hand upon my mouth.
5 Once have I spoken, and I will not answer; Yea, twice, but I will proceed no further.
6 Then Jehovah answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said,
7 Gird up thy loins now like a man: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me.
8 Wilt thou even annul my judgment? Wilt thou condemn me, that thou mayest be justified?
9 Or hast thou an arm like God? And canst thou thunder with a voice like him?
And so I think what you have is a psychological problem with evil. Regarding this problem Dr. Greg Bahnsen writes,
"The Problem is Not Logical, But Psychological
It turns out that the problem of evil is not a logical difficulty after all. If God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists, as the Bible teaches, then His goodness and power are not challenged by the reality of evil events and things in human experience. The only logical problem which arises in connection with discussions of evil is the unbeliever's philosophical inability to account for the objectivity of his moral judgments.
The problem which men have with God when they come face to face with evil in the world is not a logical or philosophical one, but more a psychological one. We can find it emotionally very hard to have faith in God and trust His goodness and power when we are not given the reason why bad things happen to us and others. We instinctively think to ourselves, "why did such a terrible thing occur?" Unbelievers internally cry out for an answer to such a question also. But God does not always (indeed, rarely) provide an explanation to human beings for the evil which they experience or observe. "The secret things belong to the Lord our God" (Deuteronomy 29:29). We might not be able to understand God's wise and mysterious ways, even if He told us (cf. Isaiah 55:9). Nevertheless, the fact remains that He has not told us why misery and suffering and injustice are part of His plan for history and for our individual lives.
So then, the Bible calls upon us to trust that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which can be found in this world, but it does not tell us what that sufficient reason is. The believer often struggles with this situation, walking by faith rather than by sight. The unbeliever, however, finds the situation intolerable for his pride, feelings, or rationality. He refuses to trust God. He will not believe that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists, unless the unbeliever is given that reason for his own examination and assessment. To put it briefly, the unbeliever will not trust God unless God subordinates Himself to the intellectual authority and moral evaluation of the unbeliever -- unless God consents to trade places with the sinner.
The problem of evil comes down to the question of whether a person should have faith in God and His word or rather place faith in his own human thinking and values. It finally becomes a question of ultimate authority within a person's life. And in that sense, the way in which unbelievers struggle with the problem of evil is but a continuing testimony to the way in which evil entered human history in the first place. The Bible indicates that sin and all of its accompanying miseries entered this world through the first transgression of Adam and Eve. And the question with which Adam and Eve were confronted way back then was precisely the question which unbelievers face today: should we have faith in God's word simply on His say-so, or should we evaluate God and His word on the basis of our own ultimate intellectual and moral authority?
God commanded Adam and Eve not to eat of a certain tree, testing them to see if they would attempt to define good and evil for themselves. Satan came along and challenged the goodness and truthfulness of God, suggesting He had base motives for keeping Adam and Eve from the delight of the tree. And at that point the whole course of human history depended upon whether Adam and Eve would trust and presuppose the goodness of God. Since they did not, the human race has been visited with torments too many and too painful to inventory. When unbelievers refuse to accept the goodness of God on the basis of His own self-revelation, they simply perpetuate the source of all of our human woes. Rather than solving the problem of evil, they are part of the problem.
Therefore, it should not be thought that "the problem of evil" is anything like an intellectual basis for a lack of faith in God. It is rather simply the personal expression of such a lack of faith. What we find is that unbelievers who challenge the Christian faith end up reasoning in circles. Because they lack faith in God, they begin by arguing that evil is incompatible with the goodness and power of God. When they are presented with a logically adequate and Biblically supported solution to the problem of evil (viz., God has a morally sufficient but undisclosed reason for the evil that exists), they refuse to accept it, again because of their lack of faith in God. They would rather be left unable to give an account of any moral judgment whatsoever (about things being good or evil) than to submit to the ultimate and unchallengeable moral authority of God. That is too high a price to pay, both philosophically and personally."
Lastly, as to the reason why the fall brought even natural disasters, Laz asked,
"I understand that this is a standard response to arguments from suffering that emphasize natural disasters. However, what confuses me is the causal link between the occurrence of the Fall and the occurrence of natural disasters. How does one lead to the other? "
The causal link is that Adam represented not only all of his people, but also the good creation God made. I defended the doctrine of Federal Headship here and here. Adam's sin had repercussions for creation. The second Adam (Jesus) brings about restoration. And so we read in Romans 8 about the effects of the fall on creation,
Romans 8:18 I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us. 19 The creation waits in eager expectation for the sons of God to be revealed. 20 For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope 21 that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God. 22 We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time. 23 Not only so, but we ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait eagerly for our adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies. 24 For in this hope we were saved. But hope that is seen is no hope at all. Who hopes for what he already has? 25But if we hope for what we do not yet have, we wait for it patiently.
Not only was man cursed because of the fall, the ground was (cf. Gen. 3:1-24). But because of the second Adam we will live in a world where there is no more curse (cf. Rev. ch. 21-22).
All of this was ordained by God for the glory of God, which is the highest good.
Ephesians 1:11 In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will, 12 in order that we, who were the first to hope in Christ, might be for the praise of his glory.
Lastly, you wrote,
"For instance, if a literal interpretation of Genesis is correct, then the Flood took place somewhere during the Xing dynasty in China, at least according to creationist critic Frank Zindler. If Zindler is correct about this, then we have every historical reason to suppose that a literal interpretation of Genesis is incorrect, and that we ought to seek out alternative understandings of the Fall and other events as told in the Book of Genesis."
I don't think the Bible commits us to an exact date of creation and the fall. Indeed, one could have an orthodox view of the fall and have plenty of time between the fall and the flood account. At any rate, I don't see how a "literal" interpretation of Genesis places the flood during the Xing dynasty. And, as I said, one could still have an orthodox view of the fall and allow for various amounts of time to have passed between the fall and the flood. And, if the fall is secured, then that's what matters as far as it's an answer to many of the questions regarding the problem of evil.
So, I was going to offer some brief comments on his latest post in his combox, but I decided just to post them here. You could say that this is a partial response to some partial responses. :-)
James,
You wrote: " I’m emphasizing the need for moral intuition in the sense that I discussed at the beginning of this post. I think that what I suggested earlier is sensible: a sensible answer to the problem of suffering will present to us a higher-order good that justifies or trumps the amount of suffering or evil that goes on in the world."
According to the Bible God's glory is the highest good. According to the Bible God does all things for glory, that it might be manifested. And, so, we at least know that the highest order good is God's glory and that's why He allows anything that we call evil to happen. So, why would this not be the answer to gratuitous evil?
Second, you grant that even if this is an answer then we still have a problem of ignorance.
You write: "Given this example, we can ask a question. Would the doctor who cares about this young girl explain to her the reason why she has to suffer? The explanation, I’d wager, would help her understand the purpose of her treatments, and it would give her assurance that there was a sensible reason for why she has to experience what she does. It would, in fact, help her to know why her suffering was necessary."
And
"Similarly, God is a being who loves his creation, just as the doctor cares for the young girl. I think it is clear that just as in the doctor example, God would not abandon us to our ignorance. Instead, He would reveal to us exactly why we must go through the suffering that we do, why it was necessary for whatever higher good He has in mind."
And so I've already mentioned the broad reason. God has told us that it's for his glory.
But, second, why assume that even if God were to tell us how it is for his glory in explicit detail (which I think your request is asking, and I think this is unfair, especially considering who God is, i.e., he's not "the Bible answer man!":-) ) we would understand?
The flaw in your analogy assumed that we're fairly close in intelligence to God and so God just needs to tell us the answers. The doctor can tell the girl and she, knowing English, rules of grammar, concepts, etc., can understand what the doctor is saying. But the more correct analogy may be that of Einstein trying to explain E=MC2 through the stomach of a pregnant mother who has a 1 week old fetus inside her! The only problem is that the gap between God and us is greater!
So, I think I have given the broad reason why and so that should satisy your request. To the extent that you want to know all the details I'm suggesting that we may not even be able to comprehend the answer. This is what happened to Job.
Job 40:
1 Moreover Jehovah answered Job, and said,
2 Shall he that cavilleth contend with the Almighty? He that argueth with God, let him answer it.
3 Then Job answered Jehovah, and said,
4 Behold, I am of small account; What shall I answer thee? I lay my hand upon my mouth.
5 Once have I spoken, and I will not answer; Yea, twice, but I will proceed no further.
6 Then Jehovah answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said,
7 Gird up thy loins now like a man: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me.
8 Wilt thou even annul my judgment? Wilt thou condemn me, that thou mayest be justified?
9 Or hast thou an arm like God? And canst thou thunder with a voice like him?
And so I think what you have is a psychological problem with evil. Regarding this problem Dr. Greg Bahnsen writes,
"The Problem is Not Logical, But Psychological
It turns out that the problem of evil is not a logical difficulty after all. If God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists, as the Bible teaches, then His goodness and power are not challenged by the reality of evil events and things in human experience. The only logical problem which arises in connection with discussions of evil is the unbeliever's philosophical inability to account for the objectivity of his moral judgments.
The problem which men have with God when they come face to face with evil in the world is not a logical or philosophical one, but more a psychological one. We can find it emotionally very hard to have faith in God and trust His goodness and power when we are not given the reason why bad things happen to us and others. We instinctively think to ourselves, "why did such a terrible thing occur?" Unbelievers internally cry out for an answer to such a question also. But God does not always (indeed, rarely) provide an explanation to human beings for the evil which they experience or observe. "The secret things belong to the Lord our God" (Deuteronomy 29:29). We might not be able to understand God's wise and mysterious ways, even if He told us (cf. Isaiah 55:9). Nevertheless, the fact remains that He has not told us why misery and suffering and injustice are part of His plan for history and for our individual lives.
So then, the Bible calls upon us to trust that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which can be found in this world, but it does not tell us what that sufficient reason is. The believer often struggles with this situation, walking by faith rather than by sight. The unbeliever, however, finds the situation intolerable for his pride, feelings, or rationality. He refuses to trust God. He will not believe that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists, unless the unbeliever is given that reason for his own examination and assessment. To put it briefly, the unbeliever will not trust God unless God subordinates Himself to the intellectual authority and moral evaluation of the unbeliever -- unless God consents to trade places with the sinner.
The problem of evil comes down to the question of whether a person should have faith in God and His word or rather place faith in his own human thinking and values. It finally becomes a question of ultimate authority within a person's life. And in that sense, the way in which unbelievers struggle with the problem of evil is but a continuing testimony to the way in which evil entered human history in the first place. The Bible indicates that sin and all of its accompanying miseries entered this world through the first transgression of Adam and Eve. And the question with which Adam and Eve were confronted way back then was precisely the question which unbelievers face today: should we have faith in God's word simply on His say-so, or should we evaluate God and His word on the basis of our own ultimate intellectual and moral authority?
God commanded Adam and Eve not to eat of a certain tree, testing them to see if they would attempt to define good and evil for themselves. Satan came along and challenged the goodness and truthfulness of God, suggesting He had base motives for keeping Adam and Eve from the delight of the tree. And at that point the whole course of human history depended upon whether Adam and Eve would trust and presuppose the goodness of God. Since they did not, the human race has been visited with torments too many and too painful to inventory. When unbelievers refuse to accept the goodness of God on the basis of His own self-revelation, they simply perpetuate the source of all of our human woes. Rather than solving the problem of evil, they are part of the problem.
Therefore, it should not be thought that "the problem of evil" is anything like an intellectual basis for a lack of faith in God. It is rather simply the personal expression of such a lack of faith. What we find is that unbelievers who challenge the Christian faith end up reasoning in circles. Because they lack faith in God, they begin by arguing that evil is incompatible with the goodness and power of God. When they are presented with a logically adequate and Biblically supported solution to the problem of evil (viz., God has a morally sufficient but undisclosed reason for the evil that exists), they refuse to accept it, again because of their lack of faith in God. They would rather be left unable to give an account of any moral judgment whatsoever (about things being good or evil) than to submit to the ultimate and unchallengeable moral authority of God. That is too high a price to pay, both philosophically and personally."
Lastly, as to the reason why the fall brought even natural disasters, Laz asked,
"I understand that this is a standard response to arguments from suffering that emphasize natural disasters. However, what confuses me is the causal link between the occurrence of the Fall and the occurrence of natural disasters. How does one lead to the other? "
The causal link is that Adam represented not only all of his people, but also the good creation God made. I defended the doctrine of Federal Headship here and here. Adam's sin had repercussions for creation. The second Adam (Jesus) brings about restoration. And so we read in Romans 8 about the effects of the fall on creation,
Romans 8:18 I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us. 19 The creation waits in eager expectation for the sons of God to be revealed. 20 For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope 21 that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God. 22 We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time. 23 Not only so, but we ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait eagerly for our adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies. 24 For in this hope we were saved. But hope that is seen is no hope at all. Who hopes for what he already has? 25But if we hope for what we do not yet have, we wait for it patiently.
Not only was man cursed because of the fall, the ground was (cf. Gen. 3:1-24). But because of the second Adam we will live in a world where there is no more curse (cf. Rev. ch. 21-22).
All of this was ordained by God for the glory of God, which is the highest good.
Ephesians 1:11 In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will, 12 in order that we, who were the first to hope in Christ, might be for the praise of his glory.
Lastly, you wrote,
"For instance, if a literal interpretation of Genesis is correct, then the Flood took place somewhere during the Xing dynasty in China, at least according to creationist critic Frank Zindler. If Zindler is correct about this, then we have every historical reason to suppose that a literal interpretation of Genesis is incorrect, and that we ought to seek out alternative understandings of the Fall and other events as told in the Book of Genesis."
I don't think the Bible commits us to an exact date of creation and the fall. Indeed, one could have an orthodox view of the fall and have plenty of time between the fall and the flood account. At any rate, I don't see how a "literal" interpretation of Genesis places the flood during the Xing dynasty. And, as I said, one could still have an orthodox view of the fall and allow for various amounts of time to have passed between the fall and the flood. And, if the fall is secured, then that's what matters as far as it's an answer to many of the questions regarding the problem of evil.
Lucky Charms Atheology
Ayn Rand disciple, Dawson Bethrick, recently tried to justify his fallacious attacks on Christianity in his latest post: Is the Expression ‘Invisible Magic Being’ “Pejorative”? This is all understandable given that this line of attack seems to be Bethrick’s bee in his bonnet. Rather than take the bit between his teeth and engage the theist in real debate, Bethrick’s all thumbs approach to atheological argumentation makes him known as the enfant terrible of theist-atheist debate. He employ’s Fabian tactics. Actually, Bethrick doesn’t write to engage theists. His hubristic writing is meant to appeal to the dyed-in-the-wool atheist. But not the intelligent sort, the hoi polloi. Dawson plays to the gallery. This is all fine and dandy, except when an outsider analyzes the situation, T-blog does not suffer fools gladly.
What is Bethrick’s method? It’s fallacy ridden. Bethrick’s modus operandi is to argue by slogans. He uses expressions (e.g., “cartoon universe,” “invisible magic being”) to produce thoughtless knee-jerk reactions of agreement from the hoi polloi on the basis of the familiarity of the words, rather than on reason. Bethrick’s blog posts function like the logo for the Oakland Raiders. The team stinks, but the logo induces fear, or respect. Bethrick also relies heavily on hyperbole. He draws absurd extensions from the claims of his interlocutors. (These are not to be confuses with reductio ad absurdum arguments.) Another tactic of Bethrick is to argue ad baculum. He takes the fear of having a “cartoon worldview” and exchanges that for honest interaction with the other side. Bethrick’s post also employ much argumentum ad ignominiam. He thinks that he can shame his opponant into submission by the use of employing claims which commit the above fallacies. Bethrick also makes use of arguing dicto simpliciter (for example, he frequently will argue that the ‘all’ in Jesus’ claim that “all things are possible” includes the possibility that God could cease to exist, or that people who trust in Jesus could possibly end up in hell). I believe that these types of fallacies make up the sine qua non of Bethrick’s atheological arguments against theism. Having said that by way of introduction, let’s now turn to Bethrick’s latest laid egg.
Bethrick begins his post by stating the purpose he’s writing it:
I would encourage everyone to visit Dawson’s link to “one of his posts” above. James Anderson offered some critical remarks on Dawson’s position on the problem of universals. Rather than spending his Saturday offering something useful, Betrhick instead chose to talk about why he uses the term “Magic Being.” Bethrick’s all style and no substance. I would also like to point out Bethrick’s hail-fellow-well-met approach to interaction with people he considers lost in a delusion. His posts are actually intended to offer left-handed compliments. Bethrick’s playing dumb and he knows precisely why James Anderson thinks the tem “invisible magic being” is “pejorative.” But instead he treats Dr. Anderson as a confused individual needing Dawson Bethrick to enlighten him. If we read between the lines of Bethrick’s soft soap we can quite easily discern that he sails under false colors. If I’m wrong then we must read Bethrick as sincerely thinking that Christians can “benefit” from the reasons for why we believe in an “invisible magic being.” I think the obvious reading is that Bethrick intends this to be another insult, though in a glad-hander sort of way. Lastly, note that Bethrick “hopes that James and others will finally understand.” Why would he hope that we would finally understand? To my knowledge this is the first time Bethrick has justified his shool yard tactics. He acts as if he’s taken pains to explain all of this before, and now he’ll explain it yet again and “hope” that we “will finally understand.” This is all very lowbrow.
After the back-handed insults, Bethrick plays dumb. He writes,
We’ve made no progress. Well, we can add a new fallacy. Bethrick constantly peppers his posts with question begging epithets (e.g., “imaginary” personal entity). This is the fallacy of slanting. Bethrick uses terms like this to denote as well as connote an evaluating attitude.
Next, note that Bethrick isn’t certain as to why Christians would consider the use of “invisible magic being” in place of our Holy Lord as disparaging and belittling. Either Bethrick is so thick-headed that he sincerely believes we would find no problem, or he’s, again, playing dumb. I opt for the latter, the charitable reading. Everyone knows that God is Dawson’s bête noire. Does he expect us to believe that he intends no belittlement of God by this phrase? Does he not think that “invisible magic being” has negative connotations? If he does not, then he’s plain ignorant. If he does, then he’s a liar. Dawson acts concerned how we take his claim, but it’s obvious he’s laughing up his sleeve.
After the glad-handing, Dawson gives us the reasons for why he does not think this term pejorative. He writes,
Bethrick’s tactic is to take each single word and conclude that we shouldn’t have a problem with either “being” or “invisible” used to describe God, and so since “magic” is the only word left then we only have a problem with the phrase because "magic" is in there. But this isn’t necessarily so.
Bethrick seems to confuse words and terms. Of course Christians have used the word “invisible,” but it’s not the word that we’re concerned with in Bethrick’s case, but the meaning poured into the word. The “invisible” as used with respects to Jehovah is different than the “invisible” used in, say, the term “invisible friend.” When I tell people that my son has an “invisible friend” they know that this means he has a pretend and imaginary friend. “Invisible” here, then, is used to connote the idea of “imaginary.” Indeed, when people hear that a child has an “imaginary friend” they know that this means he has an “invisible friend.” Or, take Wonder Woman’s invisible jet. In the cartoon this is meant to be real, and so it’s not imaginary, but is that what Christians mean when they say God is invisible?
Bethrick cites I Timothy 1:17 where we read that God is “invisible.” But what does this mean? Bethrick’s stuck at the superficial level of words. Of course this deficiency is advantageous for the one who employs equivocation as one of his main weapons. But if one were to be honest with his analysis one would move beyond the similarity of words and into the real of meaning. Only then can real critique be made. This only goes to show that Bethrick has no interest in honestly engaging Christian theists, instead he quibbles over words.
And so what is the Bible trying to convey when it uses the term “invisible” of God? It is indeed true that God cannot be placed into a Petri dish and examined, but that’s because he’s spirit. He’s a person without a body (or, more accurately, God is three persons without a body). He’s immaterial. I don’t think it is necessarily the case that “invisible things” could not be detected. Take Wonder Woman’s jet for a thought experiment. From what I remember, people could touch the jet and so there was some sort of empirical investigation that could be done on the jet. So it’s conceivable that something invisible could be detected by empirical means. It’s not conceivable that pure spirit could be directly investigated by one of the five (or, six) senses. So I don’t think “invisible” is the term to use when describing God’s ontological status. Rather, I think “invisible” has epistemological and spiritual connotations in the Bible. God is “invisible” (I Tim. 1:17) because he “dwells in inaccessible light” (I Tim. 6:16). Frequently “see,” as used by Paul, means “understand” (cf. Rom. 1:20, 5:6, 7:23, 11:10; 2 Cor. 10:9, etc.,). (Do you see what I mean!) God’s “invisible” according to Paul because “He dwells in unapproachable light. Calvin comments,
“He means two things, that God is concealed from us, and yet that the cause of obscurity is not in himself, as if be were hidden in darkness, but in ourselves, who, on account of the weak vision, or rather the dullness of our understanding, cannot approach to his light. We must understand that the light of God is unapproachable, if any one endeavor to approach to it in his own strength; for, if God did not open up the entrance to us by his grace, the prophet would not say: "They who draw near to him are enlightened." (Ps. 35:5).
And so it certainly can be the case that we would even have a problem with Bethrick’s use of the word “invisible.”
Since I have no quibble with Dawson over calling God a “being,” since I assume he’s using that word in roughly the same sense I am, let’s move on then to his justification for applying the term “magic” to God. It’s important to note that Bethrick calls magic a “term.” The problem is that he runs to the dictionary. Dictionaries do not have terms in them, only words and the building blocks for making a term. Also, a dictionary is something like a history book. It simply reports how words have been used by society. They are little more than helpful hints as to how used have been used. Furthermore, he uses Webster’s, but that’s not the only dictionary. Dictionary dot com has “magic” defined in various ways,
1.the art of producing illusions as entertainment by the use of sleight of hand, deceptive devices, etc.; legerdemain; conjuring: to pull a rabbit out of a hat by magic.
2.the art of producing a desired effect or result through the use of incantation or various other techniques that presumably assure human control of supernatural agencies or the forces of nature. Compare contagious magic, imitative magic, sympathetic magic.
3.the use of this art: Magic, it was believed, could drive illness from the body.
4.the effects produced: the magic of recovery.
5.power or influence exerted through this art: a wizard of great magic.
The American Heritage dictionary cites these two examples first,
1. The art that purports to control or forecast natural events, effects, or forces by invoking the supernatural.
2. The practice of using charms, spells, or rituals to attempt to produce supernatural effects or control events in nature. The charms, spells, and rituals so used.
It seems, though, that most people have the idea of humans doing something that can be attributed to the divine, and so when the divine works a miracle, that is not “magic.” So, Easton’s 1897 Bible Dictionary states,
Easton's 1897 Bible Dictionary - Cite This Source
magic
The Jews seem early to have consulted the teraphim (q.v.) for oracular answers(Judg. 18:5, 6; Zech. 10:2). There is a remarkable illustration of thisdivining by teraphim in Ezek. 21:19-22. We read also of the divining cup ofJoseph (Gen. 44:5). The magicians of Egypt are frequently referred to in thehistory of the Exodus. Magic was an inherent part of the ancient Egyptianreligion, and entered largely into their daily life. All magical arts weredistinctly prohibited under penalty of death in the Mosaic law. The Jews werecommanded not to learn the "abomination" of the people of the Promised Land(Lev. 19:31; Deut. 18:9-14). The history of Saul's consulting the witch ofEndor (1 Sam. 28:3-20) gives no warrant for attributing supernatural power tomagicians. From the first the witch is here only a bystander. The practice ofmagic lingered among the people till after the Captivity, when they graduallyabandoned it. It is not much referred to in the New Testament. The Magimentioned in Matt. 2:1-12 were not magicians in the ordinary sense of the word.They belonged to a religious caste, the followers of Zoroaster, the astrologersof the East. Simon, a magician, was found by Philip at Samaria (Acts 8:9-24);and Paul and Barnabas encountered Elymas, a Jewish sorcerer, at Paphos(13:6-12). At Ephesus there was a great destruction of magical books (Acts19:18, 19).
And so we see that with so many definitions there’s an air of subjectivity to which definition one will choose.
Recall that Bethrick gave Webster’s definition and then said that he’s “warranted” in applying this term to God. Though he may think he is warranted in applying this term to God, we’ve actually steered off course now. Bethrick’s job, as he told us, was to show how this word was not pejorative as applied to God. But, since “pejoratives” are words meant to belittle or degrade something then it matters not if Bethrick is “warranted” in using the term! Betrhick forgot what he was trying to prove not even four paragraphs into his blog entry! I feel I am “warranted” in referring to Bethrick as a hack, but does this mean that the term is not a “pejorative?” Certainly not. One should think twice about the “arguments” of a man who can’t even keep his own thoughts straight four paragraphs into a argument or defense piece. We can all agree that Bethrick failed to defend his case and answer James Anderson. More than that, I think it is obvious that Bethrick intends his claim that God is an “invisible magic being” to have negative and belittling connotations attached to it, and therefore it is indeed a pejorative. But, he still wrote more than his opinion that he’s warranted in using the term, and so we can continue to subject his post to critical analysis.
Let’s look at his definition:
“the use of means (as charms or spells) believed to have supernatural power over natural forces,”
or
“an extraordinary power or influence seemingly from a supernatural source.”
Now, we can knock out the first definition since God doesn’t use “charms or spells” to have “supernatural power” over “natural forces.” Indeed, give the reformed view of providence, there are no such things as “natural forces.”
Second, these definitions clearly imply the common use of the word in that it is understood that humans are the ones doing the “magical acts.” They “have power” which comes from a supernatural force.
Third, even if we applied this to God, this would not be a good definition since it fails to distinguish God from, say, another worker of magic. Stated another way, Dawson has broken one of the rules for making a good definition.
Fourth, it is clearly obvious that the vast majority of people have something like Harry Potter in mind when they think of “magic.” Even when I was a god-hater I never thought of God as “magical.” Indeed, in all my research of this term I did not see one instance where Jehovah was ever referred to as magical. However, I did see a plethora of instances where this term was applied to something humans did.
But, Dawson really has something more basic in mind when he applies this term to God, so let’s look at what that is. He writes,
First, I do not believe in “natural forces.” Second, I don’t know what Bethrick means by calling God a “supernatural source.” All of this is very sloppy. But despite the sloppiness, we can still offer something by way of reply.
I take it that Dawson is calling the traditional attribute “omnipotence,” magic. He’s saying, “Hey, God is supernatural, and he has power, therefore he’s magical.” But this is obviously an equivocation. The problem here is that if this is what it is to be “magical” than the term can be applied to nothing else! No, “magic” is traditionally understood as the non-supernatural “tapping in” to the supernatural in order to have some control over the environment, or discern some information from the netherworld. God is not like this in any respect. Actually, what pops into most people’s minds when they hear the word “magic” is maybe an image of a Leprechaun. Or Harry Potter. But none of these beings are anywhere close to being like God. It’s not even a comparison. The only way that it’s close is if one views the God of the Bible as being a creature like this, but the problem is that this then is not the God of the Bible anymore. So, to the extent that you view God like Harry Potter, you’re not attacking Christianity anymore. To the extent that you want to say that God of the Bible is “magic” then those other beings I mentioned above would not be “magic.” Either way Dawson ends up going against our basic intuitions of either God or magic workers.
At any rate Dawson is calling the traditional doctrine of omnipotence, magic. Let’s define God’s omnipotence as “being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created.” So when we read that God is “magic” we must read my definition into the word.
Next Bethrick tries to cash in on his equivocal argument by making some claims which he thinks follow from it. He writes,
Bethrick again makes use of pejoratives (e.g., “wish). The problem is that God doesn’t wish. Wishing is usually understood as the desire for something you cannot have, or want really really bad, but it’s so unattainable that the only way to get it is by “wishing” for it. Again, Dawson’s just preaching to the choir. Creation ex nihilo has never been understood by any atheologian as “wishing.” But, remember our clarifications. Dawson’s claiming that: “a being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” created the world out of nothing. The claim that an “all-powerful” God created a universe from nothing isn’t logically or conceptually or biblically or rhetorically problematic.
Dawson then makes some interesting blunders,
We’ve already dismissed the “wishing” term. Next, let’s look at this claim that God “revises the identity of entities or substances.” Some background information is required here. Bethrick is part of what atheist Michael Shermer calls “The Unlikeliest Cult In History." Dawson’s an “Objectivist.” Objectivism has three axioms which they think are unique to Objectivism and unique to Dawson’s own worldview and also devastating to Christian theism. They are: the axioms of (1) existence, (2) identity, and (3) consciousness.
Real fast and in order, (1) is also called by the famous phrase “existence exists” (when you ask Objectivists what “existence exists” means they’ll tell you it means “things exist”). (2) Simply states that an entity is itself and not another thing (A is A). (3) States that (a) consciousness does not have primacy over existence (something must exist in order for you to be conscious, a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is, according to Rand, a contradiction in terms) and (b) consciousness is axiomatic because you’d have to be conscious to deny that you were conscious.
It’s dubious how these can be used as an argument against theism, though. For example, how does the fact that “things exist” even remotely count as an argument against theism? And, how is this at all unique to Bethrick’s position? Christianity teaches that God exists and has existed eternally. Christianity begins with the creation account. One could say that one of the things you come away with no matter what from reading Genesis 1-2 is that “things exist!” The Objectivist makes a mountain out of molehill with this one. So, my contention is that one cannot possibly mount a successful atheological argument from the axiomatic claim that “things exist.” To the extent that an argument can be made, “existence exists” will not be axiomatic anymore and hence subject to all the epistemological missiles who choose to launch at it. So the objectivist has two options: (a) keep his axiom and loose his critique against Christianity or (b) loose his axiom and be forced to defend a position not unlike this one: “existence exists means that only indestructible hard bits of matter exist and even an omnipotent God cannot affect them.” When the objectivist makes this move ((b)) it won’t be too hard to slice and dice him.
I’ll address (3) briefly since (2) concerns us with the post by Bethrick that I’m replying to. So, regarding consciousness: (i) Dawson’s a materialist and so I don’t think he can account for consciousness. That is, if Dawson’s Objectivism (I say Dawson’s since I don’t know if materialism is necessitated by Objectivism) is correct, then we’re not conscious in any interesting way. Indeed, beliefs, thoughts, and intentionality cannot be had on Dawson’s materialism. (ii) At best the axiom let’s us say that we are conscious, not any one else. That is, Objectivism doesn’t escape the ego-centric predicament. (iii) Dawson has made this claim: “Propositions are functions of a consciousness.” And so the problem here is what to do with necessary propositions? Granting Dawson’s claim that propositions are functions of consciousness, it would appear that he’d need to have a necessary consciousness that exists in all possible worlds. Though I’d not use the term “function,” it appears that Dawson’s stating Theistic Conceptual Realism! And (iv), it’s hard to see how “consciousness” could be used as an argument against theism unless it has non-axiomatic meaning poured into it. At this point it looses it’s privileged protection as an “axiom” and is subject to critique.
Now, (2). Bethrick uses the idea of “reversing identity” to support his “invisible magic being” pejorative which, as we saw, may be warranted (even though it’s not given my analysis) but it’s still a pejorative. Why is turning water into wine a problem? Well, because A is A. Water is water. But we can gladly agree that A is A. Wine is wine. How does it follow that “a being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” can’t turn water in to wine. Water is still water. Wine is still wine. Jesus’ miracle at Cana didn’t mean that water was wine, it means that wine is wine. Apparently, it looks as if the Objectivist’s argument is that nothing could turn something into another thing, lest it defy the law of identity. But the law of identity doesn’t tell us that. All it says is that while A is A it’s A. Unfortunately for Dawson, his argument helps theism. The problem is that evolution teaches us that, say, dinosaurs became birds. Is Bethrick seriously advocating that time plus mutation plus chance can turn something into its opposite, but that a “being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” cannot do this? It’s obvious that Dawson’s arguing from prejudice here. But, even if nature can do this, how is turning, say, the non-living into the living not a violation of the law of identity on Dawson’s own terms? That’s just as much a “violation” of the law of identity as is “turning water in to wine.” Bethrick can’t argue that how something turns into something else is relevant since the law of identity doesn’t have that information included in it. (As a side, a man walking on water is not a violation of the law of identity unless Bethrick means to argue that it is necessarily a part of man’s nature that he can’t walk on water.) And so Dawson’s “victory” is a pyrrhic victory. To beat theism he needed the cut his own throat in the process.
What is Bethrick’s method? It’s fallacy ridden. Bethrick’s modus operandi is to argue by slogans. He uses expressions (e.g., “cartoon universe,” “invisible magic being”) to produce thoughtless knee-jerk reactions of agreement from the hoi polloi on the basis of the familiarity of the words, rather than on reason. Bethrick’s blog posts function like the logo for the Oakland Raiders. The team stinks, but the logo induces fear, or respect. Bethrick also relies heavily on hyperbole. He draws absurd extensions from the claims of his interlocutors. (These are not to be confuses with reductio ad absurdum arguments.) Another tactic of Bethrick is to argue ad baculum. He takes the fear of having a “cartoon worldview” and exchanges that for honest interaction with the other side. Bethrick’s post also employ much argumentum ad ignominiam. He thinks that he can shame his opponant into submission by the use of employing claims which commit the above fallacies. Bethrick also makes use of arguing dicto simpliciter (for example, he frequently will argue that the ‘all’ in Jesus’ claim that “all things are possible” includes the possibility that God could cease to exist, or that people who trust in Jesus could possibly end up in hell). I believe that these types of fallacies make up the sine qua non of Bethrick’s atheological arguments against theism. Having said that by way of introduction, let’s now turn to Bethrick’s latest laid egg.
Bethrick begins his post by stating the purpose he’s writing it:
“Recently Christian apologist James Anderson visited my blog and, while posting some comments critical of one of my posts, he stated:
“I’ve never understood why you feel the need to pepper your writing with playground pejoratives like “invisible magic beings”, which add nothing to your analysis.”
James states that he “never understood why” I use this term, so I will take this opportunity to explain it. Others believers may benefit from this as well, as a number of Christians have apparently taken umbrage at the term. So hopefully after reading my reasons here, James and others will finally understand.”
I would encourage everyone to visit Dawson’s link to “one of his posts” above. James Anderson offered some critical remarks on Dawson’s position on the problem of universals. Rather than spending his Saturday offering something useful, Betrhick instead chose to talk about why he uses the term “Magic Being.” Bethrick’s all style and no substance. I would also like to point out Bethrick’s hail-fellow-well-met approach to interaction with people he considers lost in a delusion. His posts are actually intended to offer left-handed compliments. Bethrick’s playing dumb and he knows precisely why James Anderson thinks the tem “invisible magic being” is “pejorative.” But instead he treats Dr. Anderson as a confused individual needing Dawson Bethrick to enlighten him. If we read between the lines of Bethrick’s soft soap we can quite easily discern that he sails under false colors. If I’m wrong then we must read Bethrick as sincerely thinking that Christians can “benefit” from the reasons for why we believe in an “invisible magic being.” I think the obvious reading is that Bethrick intends this to be another insult, though in a glad-hander sort of way. Lastly, note that Bethrick “hopes that James and others will finally understand.” Why would he hope that we would finally understand? To my knowledge this is the first time Bethrick has justified his shool yard tactics. He acts as if he’s taken pains to explain all of this before, and now he’ll explain it yet again and “hope” that we “will finally understand.” This is all very lowbrow.
After the back-handed insults, Bethrick plays dumb. He writes,
“In a nutshell, I use the term “invisible magic being” because I think it accurately captures the imaginary personal entity that Christians and other religionists insist exists.In fact, it seems dubious to me that any religionists would consider my use of this expression ‘pejorative.’”
We’ve made no progress. Well, we can add a new fallacy. Bethrick constantly peppers his posts with question begging epithets (e.g., “imaginary” personal entity). This is the fallacy of slanting. Bethrick uses terms like this to denote as well as connote an evaluating attitude.
Next, note that Bethrick isn’t certain as to why Christians would consider the use of “invisible magic being” in place of our Holy Lord as disparaging and belittling. Either Bethrick is so thick-headed that he sincerely believes we would find no problem, or he’s, again, playing dumb. I opt for the latter, the charitable reading. Everyone knows that God is Dawson’s bête noire. Does he expect us to believe that he intends no belittlement of God by this phrase? Does he not think that “invisible magic being” has negative connotations? If he does not, then he’s plain ignorant. If he does, then he’s a liar. Dawson acts concerned how we take his claim, but it’s obvious he’s laughing up his sleeve.
After the glad-handing, Dawson gives us the reasons for why he does not think this term pejorative. He writes,
“Christians, for instance, claim that their god exists, and often refer to it as a “being.” They claim that their god is “the supreme being,” a “divine being,” an “infinite being,” etc. So I don’t know why Christians like James would find my use of this term bothersome.
Also, Christians claim that their god is invisible – that is, no one can see it, not even believers themselves. Van Til himself affirms that his god is invisible in The Reformed Pastor and Ecumenism when he favorably quotes Col. 1:13-20. In fact, the bible itself, upon which Christianity is (for some part anyway) based, tells us that its god is invisible in I Tim. 1:17. So again, I don’t know why a Christian would be disturbed by the use of this term.
The controversial element of the expression in dispute, then, must, by process of elimination, be the use of the adjective ‘magic’. But in my view, this term is wholly warranted. According to Webster’s dictionary, magic is:
“the use of means (as charms or spells) believed to have supernatural power over natural forces,”
or
“an extraordinary power or influence seemingly from a supernatural source.”
Bethrick’s tactic is to take each single word and conclude that we shouldn’t have a problem with either “being” or “invisible” used to describe God, and so since “magic” is the only word left then we only have a problem with the phrase because "magic" is in there. But this isn’t necessarily so.
Bethrick seems to confuse words and terms. Of course Christians have used the word “invisible,” but it’s not the word that we’re concerned with in Bethrick’s case, but the meaning poured into the word. The “invisible” as used with respects to Jehovah is different than the “invisible” used in, say, the term “invisible friend.” When I tell people that my son has an “invisible friend” they know that this means he has a pretend and imaginary friend. “Invisible” here, then, is used to connote the idea of “imaginary.” Indeed, when people hear that a child has an “imaginary friend” they know that this means he has an “invisible friend.” Or, take Wonder Woman’s invisible jet. In the cartoon this is meant to be real, and so it’s not imaginary, but is that what Christians mean when they say God is invisible?
Bethrick cites I Timothy 1:17 where we read that God is “invisible.” But what does this mean? Bethrick’s stuck at the superficial level of words. Of course this deficiency is advantageous for the one who employs equivocation as one of his main weapons. But if one were to be honest with his analysis one would move beyond the similarity of words and into the real of meaning. Only then can real critique be made. This only goes to show that Bethrick has no interest in honestly engaging Christian theists, instead he quibbles over words.
And so what is the Bible trying to convey when it uses the term “invisible” of God? It is indeed true that God cannot be placed into a Petri dish and examined, but that’s because he’s spirit. He’s a person without a body (or, more accurately, God is three persons without a body). He’s immaterial. I don’t think it is necessarily the case that “invisible things” could not be detected. Take Wonder Woman’s jet for a thought experiment. From what I remember, people could touch the jet and so there was some sort of empirical investigation that could be done on the jet. So it’s conceivable that something invisible could be detected by empirical means. It’s not conceivable that pure spirit could be directly investigated by one of the five (or, six) senses. So I don’t think “invisible” is the term to use when describing God’s ontological status. Rather, I think “invisible” has epistemological and spiritual connotations in the Bible. God is “invisible” (I Tim. 1:17) because he “dwells in inaccessible light” (I Tim. 6:16). Frequently “see,” as used by Paul, means “understand” (cf. Rom. 1:20, 5:6, 7:23, 11:10; 2 Cor. 10:9, etc.,). (Do you see what I mean!) God’s “invisible” according to Paul because “He dwells in unapproachable light. Calvin comments,
“He means two things, that God is concealed from us, and yet that the cause of obscurity is not in himself, as if be were hidden in darkness, but in ourselves, who, on account of the weak vision, or rather the dullness of our understanding, cannot approach to his light. We must understand that the light of God is unapproachable, if any one endeavor to approach to it in his own strength; for, if God did not open up the entrance to us by his grace, the prophet would not say: "They who draw near to him are enlightened." (Ps. 35:5).
And so it certainly can be the case that we would even have a problem with Bethrick’s use of the word “invisible.”
Since I have no quibble with Dawson over calling God a “being,” since I assume he’s using that word in roughly the same sense I am, let’s move on then to his justification for applying the term “magic” to God. It’s important to note that Bethrick calls magic a “term.” The problem is that he runs to the dictionary. Dictionaries do not have terms in them, only words and the building blocks for making a term. Also, a dictionary is something like a history book. It simply reports how words have been used by society. They are little more than helpful hints as to how used have been used. Furthermore, he uses Webster’s, but that’s not the only dictionary. Dictionary dot com has “magic” defined in various ways,
1.the art of producing illusions as entertainment by the use of sleight of hand, deceptive devices, etc.; legerdemain; conjuring: to pull a rabbit out of a hat by magic.
2.the art of producing a desired effect or result through the use of incantation or various other techniques that presumably assure human control of supernatural agencies or the forces of nature. Compare contagious magic, imitative magic, sympathetic magic.
3.the use of this art: Magic, it was believed, could drive illness from the body.
4.the effects produced: the magic of recovery.
5.power or influence exerted through this art: a wizard of great magic.
The American Heritage dictionary cites these two examples first,
1. The art that purports to control or forecast natural events, effects, or forces by invoking the supernatural.
2. The practice of using charms, spells, or rituals to attempt to produce supernatural effects or control events in nature. The charms, spells, and rituals so used.
It seems, though, that most people have the idea of humans doing something that can be attributed to the divine, and so when the divine works a miracle, that is not “magic.” So, Easton’s 1897 Bible Dictionary states,
Easton's 1897 Bible Dictionary - Cite This Source
magic
The Jews seem early to have consulted the teraphim (q.v.) for oracular answers(Judg. 18:5, 6; Zech. 10:2). There is a remarkable illustration of thisdivining by teraphim in Ezek. 21:19-22. We read also of the divining cup ofJoseph (Gen. 44:5). The magicians of Egypt are frequently referred to in thehistory of the Exodus. Magic was an inherent part of the ancient Egyptianreligion, and entered largely into their daily life. All magical arts weredistinctly prohibited under penalty of death in the Mosaic law. The Jews werecommanded not to learn the "abomination" of the people of the Promised Land(Lev. 19:31; Deut. 18:9-14). The history of Saul's consulting the witch ofEndor (1 Sam. 28:3-20) gives no warrant for attributing supernatural power tomagicians. From the first the witch is here only a bystander. The practice ofmagic lingered among the people till after the Captivity, when they graduallyabandoned it. It is not much referred to in the New Testament. The Magimentioned in Matt. 2:1-12 were not magicians in the ordinary sense of the word.They belonged to a religious caste, the followers of Zoroaster, the astrologersof the East. Simon, a magician, was found by Philip at Samaria (Acts 8:9-24);and Paul and Barnabas encountered Elymas, a Jewish sorcerer, at Paphos(13:6-12). At Ephesus there was a great destruction of magical books (Acts19:18, 19).
And so we see that with so many definitions there’s an air of subjectivity to which definition one will choose.
Recall that Bethrick gave Webster’s definition and then said that he’s “warranted” in applying this term to God. Though he may think he is warranted in applying this term to God, we’ve actually steered off course now. Bethrick’s job, as he told us, was to show how this word was not pejorative as applied to God. But, since “pejoratives” are words meant to belittle or degrade something then it matters not if Bethrick is “warranted” in using the term! Betrhick forgot what he was trying to prove not even four paragraphs into his blog entry! I feel I am “warranted” in referring to Bethrick as a hack, but does this mean that the term is not a “pejorative?” Certainly not. One should think twice about the “arguments” of a man who can’t even keep his own thoughts straight four paragraphs into a argument or defense piece. We can all agree that Bethrick failed to defend his case and answer James Anderson. More than that, I think it is obvious that Bethrick intends his claim that God is an “invisible magic being” to have negative and belittling connotations attached to it, and therefore it is indeed a pejorative. But, he still wrote more than his opinion that he’s warranted in using the term, and so we can continue to subject his post to critical analysis.
Let’s look at his definition:
“the use of means (as charms or spells) believed to have supernatural power over natural forces,”
or
“an extraordinary power or influence seemingly from a supernatural source.”
Now, we can knock out the first definition since God doesn’t use “charms or spells” to have “supernatural power” over “natural forces.” Indeed, give the reformed view of providence, there are no such things as “natural forces.”
Second, these definitions clearly imply the common use of the word in that it is understood that humans are the ones doing the “magical acts.” They “have power” which comes from a supernatural force.
Third, even if we applied this to God, this would not be a good definition since it fails to distinguish God from, say, another worker of magic. Stated another way, Dawson has broken one of the rules for making a good definition.
Fourth, it is clearly obvious that the vast majority of people have something like Harry Potter in mind when they think of “magic.” Even when I was a god-hater I never thought of God as “magical.” Indeed, in all my research of this term I did not see one instance where Jehovah was ever referred to as magical. However, I did see a plethora of instances where this term was applied to something humans did.
But, Dawson really has something more basic in mind when he applies this term to God, so let’s look at what that is. He writes,
“Do not Christians believe that their god has "supernatural power over natural forces," that it possesses "an extraordinary power or influence"? Is their god not said to be "a supernatural source"?”
First, I do not believe in “natural forces.” Second, I don’t know what Bethrick means by calling God a “supernatural source.” All of this is very sloppy. But despite the sloppiness, we can still offer something by way of reply.
I take it that Dawson is calling the traditional attribute “omnipotence,” magic. He’s saying, “Hey, God is supernatural, and he has power, therefore he’s magical.” But this is obviously an equivocation. The problem here is that if this is what it is to be “magical” than the term can be applied to nothing else! No, “magic” is traditionally understood as the non-supernatural “tapping in” to the supernatural in order to have some control over the environment, or discern some information from the netherworld. God is not like this in any respect. Actually, what pops into most people’s minds when they hear the word “magic” is maybe an image of a Leprechaun. Or Harry Potter. But none of these beings are anywhere close to being like God. It’s not even a comparison. The only way that it’s close is if one views the God of the Bible as being a creature like this, but the problem is that this then is not the God of the Bible anymore. So, to the extent that you view God like Harry Potter, you’re not attacking Christianity anymore. To the extent that you want to say that God of the Bible is “magic” then those other beings I mentioned above would not be “magic.” Either way Dawson ends up going against our basic intuitions of either God or magic workers.
At any rate Dawson is calling the traditional doctrine of omnipotence, magic. Let’s define God’s omnipotence as “being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created.” So when we read that God is “magic” we must read my definition into the word.
Next Bethrick tries to cash in on his equivocal argument by making some claims which he thinks follow from it. He writes,
“According to its spokesmen, this magic-endowed personal agent can wish things into existence (cf. “creation ex nihilo”).”
Bethrick again makes use of pejoratives (e.g., “wish). The problem is that God doesn’t wish. Wishing is usually understood as the desire for something you cannot have, or want really really bad, but it’s so unattainable that the only way to get it is by “wishing” for it. Again, Dawson’s just preaching to the choir. Creation ex nihilo has never been understood by any atheologian as “wishing.” But, remember our clarifications. Dawson’s claiming that: “a being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” created the world out of nothing. The claim that an “all-powerful” God created a universe from nothing isn’t logically or conceptually or biblically or rhetorically problematic.
Dawson then makes some interesting blunders,
“Also, it can revise the identity of entities or substances (e.g., turning water into wine), or enable an entity to behave like an entity which it is not (e.g., men walking on unfrozen water), just by wishing.”
We’ve already dismissed the “wishing” term. Next, let’s look at this claim that God “revises the identity of entities or substances.” Some background information is required here. Bethrick is part of what atheist Michael Shermer calls “The Unlikeliest Cult In History." Dawson’s an “Objectivist.” Objectivism has three axioms which they think are unique to Objectivism and unique to Dawson’s own worldview and also devastating to Christian theism. They are: the axioms of (1) existence, (2) identity, and (3) consciousness.
Real fast and in order, (1) is also called by the famous phrase “existence exists” (when you ask Objectivists what “existence exists” means they’ll tell you it means “things exist”). (2) Simply states that an entity is itself and not another thing (A is A). (3) States that (a) consciousness does not have primacy over existence (something must exist in order for you to be conscious, a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is, according to Rand, a contradiction in terms) and (b) consciousness is axiomatic because you’d have to be conscious to deny that you were conscious.
It’s dubious how these can be used as an argument against theism, though. For example, how does the fact that “things exist” even remotely count as an argument against theism? And, how is this at all unique to Bethrick’s position? Christianity teaches that God exists and has existed eternally. Christianity begins with the creation account. One could say that one of the things you come away with no matter what from reading Genesis 1-2 is that “things exist!” The Objectivist makes a mountain out of molehill with this one. So, my contention is that one cannot possibly mount a successful atheological argument from the axiomatic claim that “things exist.” To the extent that an argument can be made, “existence exists” will not be axiomatic anymore and hence subject to all the epistemological missiles who choose to launch at it. So the objectivist has two options: (a) keep his axiom and loose his critique against Christianity or (b) loose his axiom and be forced to defend a position not unlike this one: “existence exists means that only indestructible hard bits of matter exist and even an omnipotent God cannot affect them.” When the objectivist makes this move ((b)) it won’t be too hard to slice and dice him.
I’ll address (3) briefly since (2) concerns us with the post by Bethrick that I’m replying to. So, regarding consciousness: (i) Dawson’s a materialist and so I don’t think he can account for consciousness. That is, if Dawson’s Objectivism (I say Dawson’s since I don’t know if materialism is necessitated by Objectivism) is correct, then we’re not conscious in any interesting way. Indeed, beliefs, thoughts, and intentionality cannot be had on Dawson’s materialism. (ii) At best the axiom let’s us say that we are conscious, not any one else. That is, Objectivism doesn’t escape the ego-centric predicament. (iii) Dawson has made this claim: “Propositions are functions of a consciousness.” And so the problem here is what to do with necessary propositions? Granting Dawson’s claim that propositions are functions of consciousness, it would appear that he’d need to have a necessary consciousness that exists in all possible worlds. Though I’d not use the term “function,” it appears that Dawson’s stating Theistic Conceptual Realism! And (iv), it’s hard to see how “consciousness” could be used as an argument against theism unless it has non-axiomatic meaning poured into it. At this point it looses it’s privileged protection as an “axiom” and is subject to critique.
Now, (2). Bethrick uses the idea of “reversing identity” to support his “invisible magic being” pejorative which, as we saw, may be warranted (even though it’s not given my analysis) but it’s still a pejorative. Why is turning water into wine a problem? Well, because A is A. Water is water. But we can gladly agree that A is A. Wine is wine. How does it follow that “a being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” can’t turn water in to wine. Water is still water. Wine is still wine. Jesus’ miracle at Cana didn’t mean that water was wine, it means that wine is wine. Apparently, it looks as if the Objectivist’s argument is that nothing could turn something into another thing, lest it defy the law of identity. But the law of identity doesn’t tell us that. All it says is that while A is A it’s A. Unfortunately for Dawson, his argument helps theism. The problem is that evolution teaches us that, say, dinosaurs became birds. Is Bethrick seriously advocating that time plus mutation plus chance can turn something into its opposite, but that a “being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” cannot do this? It’s obvious that Dawson’s arguing from prejudice here. But, even if nature can do this, how is turning, say, the non-living into the living not a violation of the law of identity on Dawson’s own terms? That’s just as much a “violation” of the law of identity as is “turning water in to wine.” Bethrick can’t argue that how something turns into something else is relevant since the law of identity doesn’t have that information included in it. (As a side, a man walking on water is not a violation of the law of identity unless Bethrick means to argue that it is necessarily a part of man’s nature that he can’t walk on water.) And so Dawson’s “victory” is a pyrrhic victory. To beat theism he needed the cut his own throat in the process.
Lucifer's Last Stand
At the moment it looks like the secular bloggers have decided to put all their chips on the problem of evil. DC has been running a series of posts on this subject.
In addition, unbelievers have also been piling on Victor Reppert over at his blog on the problem of evil.
Apparently, they regard the problem of evil as their best shot at taking down the Christian faith.
Let’s spend a little time on Babinski’s formulation:
***QUOTE***
Point 1) Theistic philosophers who discuss the problem of pain/evil without acquainting themselves with specific cases in detail from nature are like Kant who apparently avoided the museum of art that he walked past each day on his way to write a book on the "philosophy of art/aesthetics." (A philosophy professor even shared with me that Kant boasted something to the effect that it wasn't even necessary to look at art in order to write his treatise).
Unlike Kant I prefer to begin all investigations, philosophical or otherwise, by pondering specific instances. And since the topic is suffering (including suffering unto madness) please see the collection of instances found HERE. The effect of reading and pondering those examples is a bit different from reading a philosophical treatise on "suffering" that spends the majority of its time juggling-stretching-and-playing with huge generalizations such as "good," "evil," "pain," "suffering," "God," "perfection," "omnipotence," and "freewill," etc.)
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2006/10/four-points-concerning-problem-of-evil.html
***END-QUOTE***
Several problems here:
1.For some deeply conceited reason, a lot of unbelievers act as if they have a monopoly on mercy, compassion and charity; that they know something we don’t; that Christians must have grown up in a germ-free laboratory wherein we have no personal knowledge of pain and suffering.
Since Babinski and his ilk choose to ignore the obvious, I guess we’ll have to spell it out for them:
We grew up in the very same world you did. At the same time and place. Same culture. Same social class.
We see the same headlines you do. We’ve gone to the same schools you’ve attended. We’ve read history books, too.
Believers have the same share of personal tragedies as unbelievers. We know pain and suffering from first-hand experience. Family tragedies. Disasters befalling our friends and neighbors.
Many converts were involved in destructive, addictive-compulsive behavior. Came from broken homes. Domestic violence. Urban warfare.
So spare us the unctuous tone and the sanctimonious affectation—as if you are unbelievers because you know something we don’t.
2. If anything, the truth is just the opposite. One of the ironies with the problem of evil is that the popularity of this objection has increased at a time when those who are so fond of raising that objection have led fairly charmed lives compared with the generality of mankind.
There has never been a better time and place to be alive than in the United States since the post-WWII era. Unprecedented peace and prosperity. The ever-increasing amenities of modern technology—from medical science and climate control to leisure time, recreational activities, an endless supply and infinite variety of foods, &c.
Just imagine a man from the 18C, whether a peasant or nobleman, walking into the average shopping mall.
And the American lifestyle is reproducible around the world. Indeed, it has been in many parts of the world.
3.So why has the appeal to pain and suffering become so popular among so many pampered unbelievers?
It’s the guilt-stricken conscience of the limousine liberal. We’ve seen this before, now haven’t we?
Filthy rich politicians who justify their lavish lifestyle by bussing working class and middle class kids around while they send their own kids to preppy, private schools.
Filthy rich politicians who hand out food stamps while they sail on their superyachts.
Filthy rich politicians who talk up affirmative action when the only racial diversity they know is the domestic help they hire at dirt-cheap wages to drive their limos and clean their gated estates or Park Avenue suites.
That’s the mentality behind the faddish appeal to the problem of evil. Like Ted Kennedy writing a check to Mother Teresa. Only he doesn’t write his own checks. Or spend his own money.
This is Laguna Beach atheology. Airbrushed atheism. A latte in one hand and a laptop in the other as your atheologian composes his indignant treatise on pain and suffering.
It’s time to drop the Marie Antoinette routine.
Those who’ve suffered the least are the most verbose about pain and suffering, while those who’ve suffered the most are the least likely to whine and snivel about their sorry lot in life.
My parents’ generation came of age during the great depression and fought in WWII. They simply rolled up their sleeves and got to work.
4.Babinski acts as if Christian philosophers write their theodicies in the comfort of their ivory-towered studies while secular philosophers get their hands dirty with real life examples of pain and suffering.
Pardon me for once again stating the obvious, but it’s atheologians who began by writing dry, formalistic versions of the logical problem of evil. Then, when they were answered on their own grounds, they shifted to the inductive problem of evil, using abstract hypotheticals like Bambi dying in a forest fire—a la William Rowe.
A Christian philosopher or apologist is simply answering an atheologian on his own level.
An atheologian raises an intellectual objection to the faith. When a Christian apologist presents a tightly-reasoned counterargument, the atheologian then twivels around and accuses the apologist of being a hard-hearted rationalist!
Moving along:
***QUOTE***
Point 2) Has any philosopher yet explained (except via verbal alchemy) how something can start out perfectly good and yet evil can come out of it? If God is defined as the perfectly good and only source of everything, then whence comes evil? Endless ages of verbal alchemy attached to this question explain nothing, the question remains.
[Here's my question...
A free-willed
All powerful
All knowing
All good
All perfect
All blissful God
creates something SOLELY out of His own will, power, knowledge, goodness, perfection, and bliss...so what room is there for anything less?]
***END-QUOTE***
1.Notice the prejudicial expression “verbal alchemy.” This is an attempt to poison the well. Babinski poses a seemingly sincere question, but he has already planted a disclaimer. If he doesn’t like the answer, then he’ll dismiss it as “verbal alchemy.” So you can already see that this is a disingenuous question. He doesn’t want to hear the answer.
2.In terms of how he chose to frame the question, it’s easy to answer. He’s assuming that the effect must replicate all of the properties of the cause.
Then he asks, “so what room is there for anything less”?
Less than what? The creature is, indeed, less than God. The creature is not omniscient or omnipotent or intrinsically and immutable good.
So it’s quite obvious, from the standpoint of Christian theism, which is Babinski’s target, that a creature would not replicate every attribute of the Creator.
3.In fact, Scripture gives a precise answer to Babinski’s question:
“For God consigned all to disobedience, that he may have mercy on all” (Rom 11:32).
“But Scripture imprisoned everything under sin, so that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe” (Gal 3:24).
The goodness of God is superlative, but the goodness of the creation is comparative. God is best. But where the creation is concerned, we’re dealing with finite goods. Degrees of goodness. Lesser and greater goods.
Eden was good. But there was something even better.
However, that greater good was a second-order good. The manifestation of mercy presupposes disobedience. Mercy can only be shown to sinners.
4.Or is Babinski poses a psychological question: how could a sinless agent (e.g. Lucifer, Adam) become sinful?
i) That’s a speculative question. So the only answers are speculative answers. If he doesn’t like speculative answers (“verbal alchemy”?), then he shouldn’t ask speculative questions.
ii) Is this question answerable? It depends on what you mean. It’s often thought to be unanswerable because we have no personal experience of sinless agents. We are sinners. Our desires are sinful because we are already sinful.
So this would be like asking someone who’s never tasted chocolate ice cream what chocolate ice cream tastes like.
But are we asking the wrong question? Or are we asking the wrong person?
Someone who’s never had chocolate ice cream can’t answer the question. But that hardly means the question is unanswerable. The fact that someone who’s never tasted chocolate ice cream can’t tell you what it’s like doesn’t mean that chocolate ice cream is tasteless.
So, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Babinski is posing a psychological question, then even if we couldn’t answer his question, that wouldn’t render the question inherently unanswerable.
It’s unreasonable to ask someone a question if he is in no position to know the answer. The fact that he doesn’t know the answer doesn’t make the answer inherently unknowable. It doesn’t mean there is no answer.
Since, from our experience, a sinless agent is sui generis, then perhaps we can’t answer the question. If so, this only means that a sinful agent cannot get inside the head of a sinless agent. We cannot project ourselves into that state of mind.
iii) But if Babinski is asking a psychological question, there may be one or more unspoken assumptions to his question.
Do all sinful desires presuppose a sinful agent? Must an agent be sinful before he can entertain a sinful desire?
Just as there are second-order goods, there are second-order evils. There are desires which only a sinner would have.
For a man to find a beautiful woman desirable is not intrinsically evil. But for a man to find another man desirable is intrinsically evil.
Only a sinful man can find another man desirable. That’s a second-order evil. You have to be sinful in order to entertain such a desire in the first place.
iv) A natural good can be a potential evil. Take the temptation in the garden. “And the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise” (3:6).
Food. Wisdom. Beauty. These are natural goods. And there’s nothing wrong with finding them desirable. A sinless agent can find them desirable.
v) Another unspoken assumption of his question, assuming it’s a psychological question, is the supposition that it would take some positive factor, some extra dynamic, to tip the scales.
But why would we assume that? Why not assume the opposite? That absent some positive restraint, it’s possible for a sinless agent to succumb to his desire.
Why assume that you must give him an extra little shove? Push him over the edge?
Why not assume that you may need to hold him back?
vi) Remember the nature of the temptation. There was something that Eve didn’t have. What she didn’t have was a natural good. It was something desirable.
Under other circumstances, it might well be better than what she already had. But the timing was wrong. A lack of patience.
Instead of waiting for the Lord to give it, she took it.
I don’t see that there’s anything especially mysterious about the incentive. Seems to me that in that situation, a sinless agent could form a sinful motive, for the initial inducement is innocuous enough.
The proper question is not, “What made her do the wrong thing?” but, “What would prevent her from doing the wrong thing”
Sinlessness is not the same thing as impeccability. It’s a privative condition. Innocence. Inexperience. The absence of sin.
An inclination to the good, all other things being equal, but subject to change.
And even an impeccable agent can imagine sinful choices.
vii) So I don’t find anything especially mind-bending about the first sin.
And if you say that I don’t know what I’m talking about, since I can’t enter into the mindset of a sinless agent, then I’d say that you’re objection cuts both ways.
If I don’t know enough about the psychological makeup of a sinless agent to explain how Eve could ever commit the first sin, then you don’t know enough to explain how she never could have done so.
Continuing:
“Note that if God is perfectly good and has freewill then a freewilled being can exist in a state of perfect goodness. But if God has freewill then wouldn't it be possible for God Himself to commit evil, or become evil? (Or do Christian apologists employ a different definition of "freewill" when it comes to "God?") Conversely, if God does not have freewill then doesn't that imply that freewill is not necessarily of ultimate value and that humanity has something even God lacks?”
1.God is a free agent, but God is not at liberty to do anything possible, for God is also impeccable. God is wise. God is just.
2.Adam was a free agent. So was Lucifer. They were sinless. But they were not impeccable.
3.Traditional Reformed theology, going all the way back to Augustine, talks about the fourfold state of man. There are, indeed, degrees of freedom. Between good and evil. Or alternative evils. Or alternative goods.
Continuing:
“Point 3) Is there something, ANYTHING, that a Christian apologist might consider to be ‘unjustifiable suffering?’"
1.Is this a hypothetical question? Gratuitous evil would be unjustified. But I’d deny the actual existence of gratuitous evil.
2.We also need to distinguish between the viewpoint of the sinner and the viewpoint of God. Sinners often commit wanton evil. Such evil is gratuitous from their standpoint.
But their evil deeds unwittingly serve a higher end. Their sins have unintended consequences for the good. Unintended by them, but not by God.
3.Likewise, sinners often wrong one another. In terms of their social obligations, their actions are unjustified.
But in terms of God’s obligations to them, God does them no wrong. So their misdeeds are not unjustifiable at that higher level.
“And why must people believe that the only way God can "accept" a person is if that person believes God has wrath (or a need to punish), and cannot simply forgive.”
Notice Babinski’s intellectual schizophrenia. After railing about all of the “unjustified” evil in the world, he asks why God can’t simply “forgive” evildoers?
But that would be a monumental miscarriage of justice. Unrequited evil.
“Point 4) I wonder whether Christian apologists have ever come to grips in a truly convincing fashion with the ways their God is portrayed (either in reality or metaphorically) in the book that they claim ‘reveals’ the truth of their beliefs to humanity?”
The shoe is on the other foot. It’s apostates like Babinski who were operating with an ignorant, defective, intellectually immature faith. Who entertained false expectations based on false interpretations. Who, when their false expectations were dashed, defected from the faith rather than learning from their mistakes and correcting their faulty theology.
“Have Christian philosophers really dealt with questions like those above and below, or do they tend to flee them till they reach a nice quiet corner of huge generalizations resembling nothing so much as pious platitudes? But think for just a moment longer about this...”
I’ll ask Babinski the same question in reverse:
Will Babinski really deal with the point-by-point answers I’ve given to his questions? Or will he flee until he reaches a nice quiet corner of huge generalizations resembling nothing so much as impious platitudes? But think for just a moment longer about this...
Finally, Babinski likes to act as if the burden of proof lies entirely on the shoulders of the Christian. But he has his own burden of proof to discharge.
1.Does he believe in moral absolutes? If so, how does his secular philosophy underwrite moral absolutism?
And if, instead, he’s a moral relativist, then what’s the point of his moralistic crusade against the Christian faith?
2.Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that he can justify a distinction between right and wrong, what is his basis for believing in human rights?
How is it possible to wrong a purely biochemical organism? What is the moral standing of a meat machine? What’s the moral difference between a man and a steak?
3.He talks about pain and suffering. Does he believe in consciousness? Or is talk of pain and suffering a relic of folk psychology?
Babinski had thrown down the gauntlet. Now let’s see if he can respond in kind. Or will he kick up a dust cloud and head for the hills?
In addition, unbelievers have also been piling on Victor Reppert over at his blog on the problem of evil.
Apparently, they regard the problem of evil as their best shot at taking down the Christian faith.
Let’s spend a little time on Babinski’s formulation:
***QUOTE***
Point 1) Theistic philosophers who discuss the problem of pain/evil without acquainting themselves with specific cases in detail from nature are like Kant who apparently avoided the museum of art that he walked past each day on his way to write a book on the "philosophy of art/aesthetics." (A philosophy professor even shared with me that Kant boasted something to the effect that it wasn't even necessary to look at art in order to write his treatise).
Unlike Kant I prefer to begin all investigations, philosophical or otherwise, by pondering specific instances. And since the topic is suffering (including suffering unto madness) please see the collection of instances found HERE. The effect of reading and pondering those examples is a bit different from reading a philosophical treatise on "suffering" that spends the majority of its time juggling-stretching-and-playing with huge generalizations such as "good," "evil," "pain," "suffering," "God," "perfection," "omnipotence," and "freewill," etc.)
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2006/10/four-points-concerning-problem-of-evil.html
***END-QUOTE***
Several problems here:
1.For some deeply conceited reason, a lot of unbelievers act as if they have a monopoly on mercy, compassion and charity; that they know something we don’t; that Christians must have grown up in a germ-free laboratory wherein we have no personal knowledge of pain and suffering.
Since Babinski and his ilk choose to ignore the obvious, I guess we’ll have to spell it out for them:
We grew up in the very same world you did. At the same time and place. Same culture. Same social class.
We see the same headlines you do. We’ve gone to the same schools you’ve attended. We’ve read history books, too.
Believers have the same share of personal tragedies as unbelievers. We know pain and suffering from first-hand experience. Family tragedies. Disasters befalling our friends and neighbors.
Many converts were involved in destructive, addictive-compulsive behavior. Came from broken homes. Domestic violence. Urban warfare.
So spare us the unctuous tone and the sanctimonious affectation—as if you are unbelievers because you know something we don’t.
2. If anything, the truth is just the opposite. One of the ironies with the problem of evil is that the popularity of this objection has increased at a time when those who are so fond of raising that objection have led fairly charmed lives compared with the generality of mankind.
There has never been a better time and place to be alive than in the United States since the post-WWII era. Unprecedented peace and prosperity. The ever-increasing amenities of modern technology—from medical science and climate control to leisure time, recreational activities, an endless supply and infinite variety of foods, &c.
Just imagine a man from the 18C, whether a peasant or nobleman, walking into the average shopping mall.
And the American lifestyle is reproducible around the world. Indeed, it has been in many parts of the world.
3.So why has the appeal to pain and suffering become so popular among so many pampered unbelievers?
It’s the guilt-stricken conscience of the limousine liberal. We’ve seen this before, now haven’t we?
Filthy rich politicians who justify their lavish lifestyle by bussing working class and middle class kids around while they send their own kids to preppy, private schools.
Filthy rich politicians who hand out food stamps while they sail on their superyachts.
Filthy rich politicians who talk up affirmative action when the only racial diversity they know is the domestic help they hire at dirt-cheap wages to drive their limos and clean their gated estates or Park Avenue suites.
That’s the mentality behind the faddish appeal to the problem of evil. Like Ted Kennedy writing a check to Mother Teresa. Only he doesn’t write his own checks. Or spend his own money.
This is Laguna Beach atheology. Airbrushed atheism. A latte in one hand and a laptop in the other as your atheologian composes his indignant treatise on pain and suffering.
It’s time to drop the Marie Antoinette routine.
Those who’ve suffered the least are the most verbose about pain and suffering, while those who’ve suffered the most are the least likely to whine and snivel about their sorry lot in life.
My parents’ generation came of age during the great depression and fought in WWII. They simply rolled up their sleeves and got to work.
4.Babinski acts as if Christian philosophers write their theodicies in the comfort of their ivory-towered studies while secular philosophers get their hands dirty with real life examples of pain and suffering.
Pardon me for once again stating the obvious, but it’s atheologians who began by writing dry, formalistic versions of the logical problem of evil. Then, when they were answered on their own grounds, they shifted to the inductive problem of evil, using abstract hypotheticals like Bambi dying in a forest fire—a la William Rowe.
A Christian philosopher or apologist is simply answering an atheologian on his own level.
An atheologian raises an intellectual objection to the faith. When a Christian apologist presents a tightly-reasoned counterargument, the atheologian then twivels around and accuses the apologist of being a hard-hearted rationalist!
Moving along:
***QUOTE***
Point 2) Has any philosopher yet explained (except via verbal alchemy) how something can start out perfectly good and yet evil can come out of it? If God is defined as the perfectly good and only source of everything, then whence comes evil? Endless ages of verbal alchemy attached to this question explain nothing, the question remains.
[Here's my question...
A free-willed
All powerful
All knowing
All good
All perfect
All blissful God
creates something SOLELY out of His own will, power, knowledge, goodness, perfection, and bliss...so what room is there for anything less?]
***END-QUOTE***
1.Notice the prejudicial expression “verbal alchemy.” This is an attempt to poison the well. Babinski poses a seemingly sincere question, but he has already planted a disclaimer. If he doesn’t like the answer, then he’ll dismiss it as “verbal alchemy.” So you can already see that this is a disingenuous question. He doesn’t want to hear the answer.
2.In terms of how he chose to frame the question, it’s easy to answer. He’s assuming that the effect must replicate all of the properties of the cause.
Then he asks, “so what room is there for anything less”?
Less than what? The creature is, indeed, less than God. The creature is not omniscient or omnipotent or intrinsically and immutable good.
So it’s quite obvious, from the standpoint of Christian theism, which is Babinski’s target, that a creature would not replicate every attribute of the Creator.
3.In fact, Scripture gives a precise answer to Babinski’s question:
“For God consigned all to disobedience, that he may have mercy on all” (Rom 11:32).
“But Scripture imprisoned everything under sin, so that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe” (Gal 3:24).
The goodness of God is superlative, but the goodness of the creation is comparative. God is best. But where the creation is concerned, we’re dealing with finite goods. Degrees of goodness. Lesser and greater goods.
Eden was good. But there was something even better.
However, that greater good was a second-order good. The manifestation of mercy presupposes disobedience. Mercy can only be shown to sinners.
4.Or is Babinski poses a psychological question: how could a sinless agent (e.g. Lucifer, Adam) become sinful?
i) That’s a speculative question. So the only answers are speculative answers. If he doesn’t like speculative answers (“verbal alchemy”?), then he shouldn’t ask speculative questions.
ii) Is this question answerable? It depends on what you mean. It’s often thought to be unanswerable because we have no personal experience of sinless agents. We are sinners. Our desires are sinful because we are already sinful.
So this would be like asking someone who’s never tasted chocolate ice cream what chocolate ice cream tastes like.
But are we asking the wrong question? Or are we asking the wrong person?
Someone who’s never had chocolate ice cream can’t answer the question. But that hardly means the question is unanswerable. The fact that someone who’s never tasted chocolate ice cream can’t tell you what it’s like doesn’t mean that chocolate ice cream is tasteless.
So, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Babinski is posing a psychological question, then even if we couldn’t answer his question, that wouldn’t render the question inherently unanswerable.
It’s unreasonable to ask someone a question if he is in no position to know the answer. The fact that he doesn’t know the answer doesn’t make the answer inherently unknowable. It doesn’t mean there is no answer.
Since, from our experience, a sinless agent is sui generis, then perhaps we can’t answer the question. If so, this only means that a sinful agent cannot get inside the head of a sinless agent. We cannot project ourselves into that state of mind.
iii) But if Babinski is asking a psychological question, there may be one or more unspoken assumptions to his question.
Do all sinful desires presuppose a sinful agent? Must an agent be sinful before he can entertain a sinful desire?
Just as there are second-order goods, there are second-order evils. There are desires which only a sinner would have.
For a man to find a beautiful woman desirable is not intrinsically evil. But for a man to find another man desirable is intrinsically evil.
Only a sinful man can find another man desirable. That’s a second-order evil. You have to be sinful in order to entertain such a desire in the first place.
iv) A natural good can be a potential evil. Take the temptation in the garden. “And the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise” (3:6).
Food. Wisdom. Beauty. These are natural goods. And there’s nothing wrong with finding them desirable. A sinless agent can find them desirable.
v) Another unspoken assumption of his question, assuming it’s a psychological question, is the supposition that it would take some positive factor, some extra dynamic, to tip the scales.
But why would we assume that? Why not assume the opposite? That absent some positive restraint, it’s possible for a sinless agent to succumb to his desire.
Why assume that you must give him an extra little shove? Push him over the edge?
Why not assume that you may need to hold him back?
vi) Remember the nature of the temptation. There was something that Eve didn’t have. What she didn’t have was a natural good. It was something desirable.
Under other circumstances, it might well be better than what she already had. But the timing was wrong. A lack of patience.
Instead of waiting for the Lord to give it, she took it.
I don’t see that there’s anything especially mysterious about the incentive. Seems to me that in that situation, a sinless agent could form a sinful motive, for the initial inducement is innocuous enough.
The proper question is not, “What made her do the wrong thing?” but, “What would prevent her from doing the wrong thing”
Sinlessness is not the same thing as impeccability. It’s a privative condition. Innocence. Inexperience. The absence of sin.
An inclination to the good, all other things being equal, but subject to change.
And even an impeccable agent can imagine sinful choices.
vii) So I don’t find anything especially mind-bending about the first sin.
And if you say that I don’t know what I’m talking about, since I can’t enter into the mindset of a sinless agent, then I’d say that you’re objection cuts both ways.
If I don’t know enough about the psychological makeup of a sinless agent to explain how Eve could ever commit the first sin, then you don’t know enough to explain how she never could have done so.
Continuing:
“Note that if God is perfectly good and has freewill then a freewilled being can exist in a state of perfect goodness. But if God has freewill then wouldn't it be possible for God Himself to commit evil, or become evil? (Or do Christian apologists employ a different definition of "freewill" when it comes to "God?") Conversely, if God does not have freewill then doesn't that imply that freewill is not necessarily of ultimate value and that humanity has something even God lacks?”
1.God is a free agent, but God is not at liberty to do anything possible, for God is also impeccable. God is wise. God is just.
2.Adam was a free agent. So was Lucifer. They were sinless. But they were not impeccable.
3.Traditional Reformed theology, going all the way back to Augustine, talks about the fourfold state of man. There are, indeed, degrees of freedom. Between good and evil. Or alternative evils. Or alternative goods.
Continuing:
“Point 3) Is there something, ANYTHING, that a Christian apologist might consider to be ‘unjustifiable suffering?’"
1.Is this a hypothetical question? Gratuitous evil would be unjustified. But I’d deny the actual existence of gratuitous evil.
2.We also need to distinguish between the viewpoint of the sinner and the viewpoint of God. Sinners often commit wanton evil. Such evil is gratuitous from their standpoint.
But their evil deeds unwittingly serve a higher end. Their sins have unintended consequences for the good. Unintended by them, but not by God.
3.Likewise, sinners often wrong one another. In terms of their social obligations, their actions are unjustified.
But in terms of God’s obligations to them, God does them no wrong. So their misdeeds are not unjustifiable at that higher level.
“And why must people believe that the only way God can "accept" a person is if that person believes God has wrath (or a need to punish), and cannot simply forgive.”
Notice Babinski’s intellectual schizophrenia. After railing about all of the “unjustified” evil in the world, he asks why God can’t simply “forgive” evildoers?
But that would be a monumental miscarriage of justice. Unrequited evil.
“Point 4) I wonder whether Christian apologists have ever come to grips in a truly convincing fashion with the ways their God is portrayed (either in reality or metaphorically) in the book that they claim ‘reveals’ the truth of their beliefs to humanity?”
The shoe is on the other foot. It’s apostates like Babinski who were operating with an ignorant, defective, intellectually immature faith. Who entertained false expectations based on false interpretations. Who, when their false expectations were dashed, defected from the faith rather than learning from their mistakes and correcting their faulty theology.
“Have Christian philosophers really dealt with questions like those above and below, or do they tend to flee them till they reach a nice quiet corner of huge generalizations resembling nothing so much as pious platitudes? But think for just a moment longer about this...”
I’ll ask Babinski the same question in reverse:
Will Babinski really deal with the point-by-point answers I’ve given to his questions? Or will he flee until he reaches a nice quiet corner of huge generalizations resembling nothing so much as impious platitudes? But think for just a moment longer about this...
Finally, Babinski likes to act as if the burden of proof lies entirely on the shoulders of the Christian. But he has his own burden of proof to discharge.
1.Does he believe in moral absolutes? If so, how does his secular philosophy underwrite moral absolutism?
And if, instead, he’s a moral relativist, then what’s the point of his moralistic crusade against the Christian faith?
2.Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that he can justify a distinction between right and wrong, what is his basis for believing in human rights?
How is it possible to wrong a purely biochemical organism? What is the moral standing of a meat machine? What’s the moral difference between a man and a steak?
3.He talks about pain and suffering. Does he believe in consciousness? Or is talk of pain and suffering a relic of folk psychology?
Babinski had thrown down the gauntlet. Now let’s see if he can respond in kind. Or will he kick up a dust cloud and head for the hills?
Sunday, October 22, 2006
Lumpkins
According to Peter Lumpkins:
***QUOTE***
It stands amazing, at least to me, how many Calvinists seem to suggest that Calvinism is such a natural hermeneutic when it comes to interpreting Scripture. Sometimes I get the feeling that Calvinists maintain that the classic five points are so clear, so basic and so incontrovertible that to question any single petal of the TULIP is to question Scripture itself.
More interesting is the theological ambiguity which Calvinism’s founder, John Calvin, possessed toward at least one of the famous five points—Limited Atonement. As the selected quotes from Calvin’s Commentaries will show, Calvin evidently did not hold to the unalterable view of Definite Atonement that his modern day disciples have inherited.
These represent some of the many statements in John Calvin that cause not a little difficulty for those who not only believe the Geneva don himself unwaveringly embraced the doctrine of Limited Atonement, but also those who themselves unwaveringly hold to the questionable doctrine. It appears at least odd that modern Calvinists apparently are more Calvinist than John Calvin.
http://peterlumpkins.typepad.com/peter_lumpkins/2006/10/john_calvin_and.html
***END-QUOTE***
A couple of basic issues here:
i) Have you ever noticed that when some folks discover something for themselves, they act as if they’re the very first person to ever make this discovery?
They then express their amazement that no one ever discovered it before.
Needless to say, this is a very old debate. Here are a couple of Calvinists who’ve gone into some detail on that very issue:
http://www.apuritansmind.com/Arminianism/NicoleRogerCalvinsLimitedAtonement.htm
Will of God and the Cross: An Historical and Theological Study of John Calvin's Doctrine of Limited Redemption (Princeton Theological Monograph Series) (Pickwick Publications 1990)
by Jonathan Herbold Rainbow
Has Lumpkins ever bothered to read Rainbow or Nicole on this subject? If not, why not?
If Lumpkins is sincerely interested what wanting to know what Calvin taught about special redemption, then we look forward to his review of these two works.
But if Lumpkins fails to explain what, exactly, is wrong with the detailed argumentation of Rainbow and Nicole, then we’ll know that he’s just another frivolous critic of Calvinism.
ii) But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that Calvin did not subscribe to special redemption. Suppose there’s a discrepancy between Calvin’s own position and Reformed Orthodoxy? Then what?
At the risk of deeply disillusioning Mr. Lumpkins, I can think of equally shocking examples.
For instance, if you compare the 1828 edition of Noah Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language with the 2006 edition, you will discover that the 2006 edition contains a whole lot of words and definitions absent from the 1828 edition. And yet the publishers continue to market this dictionary under the name of the original lexicographer.
By Lumpkins’ benchmark, it must seem awfully odd that modern lexicographers appear to be more Websterian than Noah Webster.
Continuing with Lumpkins:
“Thus, I simply refuse to allow non-essentials to drive me from my fellow believers. ‘By this, all will know you are my disciples’, Jesus said, ‘if you have love for one another.’"
http://peterlumpkins.typepad.com/about.html
If this is how he views the alternatives, then why is he attacking Reformed Baptists in the SBC? Doesn’t he regard them as fellow believers?
Either he regards the extent of the atonement as a nonessential doctrine, in which case he should refuse to allow this nonessential to drive him away from the Reformed Baptists in the SBC—or else he is attacking 5-point Calvinism because he does regard the extent of the atonement as an essential doctrine, which disqualifies a Calvinist from being treated by him as a fellow believer whom he’s entitled to love.
So, which is it? How is he going to act out his stated policy? We look forward to seeing him lead by example.
Continuing:
“I choose to consciously self-identify as non-calvinist--or, perhaps even post-Calvinist--in the main because I fail to identify with the much too aggressive spirit of many Southern Baptist Calvinists.”
Which Southern Baptists does he have in mind? Are they more aggressive than some of their critics in the SBC?
Also, when Lumpkins launches a public attack on 5-point Calvinism, does this manifest an aggressive spirit as well? Or is it only aggressive to defend Calvinism, but not to oppose it?
“I simply do not sense the urge nor possess the passion to convert the evangelical world to classic Five Point Calvinism, as apparently many of them do.”
Obviously not, since what he instead senses is the contrary urge or passion to dissuade the evangelical world from converting to 5-point Calvinism.
***QUOTE***
It stands amazing, at least to me, how many Calvinists seem to suggest that Calvinism is such a natural hermeneutic when it comes to interpreting Scripture. Sometimes I get the feeling that Calvinists maintain that the classic five points are so clear, so basic and so incontrovertible that to question any single petal of the TULIP is to question Scripture itself.
More interesting is the theological ambiguity which Calvinism’s founder, John Calvin, possessed toward at least one of the famous five points—Limited Atonement. As the selected quotes from Calvin’s Commentaries will show, Calvin evidently did not hold to the unalterable view of Definite Atonement that his modern day disciples have inherited.
These represent some of the many statements in John Calvin that cause not a little difficulty for those who not only believe the Geneva don himself unwaveringly embraced the doctrine of Limited Atonement, but also those who themselves unwaveringly hold to the questionable doctrine. It appears at least odd that modern Calvinists apparently are more Calvinist than John Calvin.
http://peterlumpkins.typepad.com/peter_lumpkins/2006/10/john_calvin_and.html
***END-QUOTE***
A couple of basic issues here:
i) Have you ever noticed that when some folks discover something for themselves, they act as if they’re the very first person to ever make this discovery?
They then express their amazement that no one ever discovered it before.
Needless to say, this is a very old debate. Here are a couple of Calvinists who’ve gone into some detail on that very issue:
http://www.apuritansmind.com/Arminianism/NicoleRogerCalvinsLimitedAtonement.htm
Will of God and the Cross: An Historical and Theological Study of John Calvin's Doctrine of Limited Redemption (Princeton Theological Monograph Series) (Pickwick Publications 1990)
by Jonathan Herbold Rainbow
Has Lumpkins ever bothered to read Rainbow or Nicole on this subject? If not, why not?
If Lumpkins is sincerely interested what wanting to know what Calvin taught about special redemption, then we look forward to his review of these two works.
But if Lumpkins fails to explain what, exactly, is wrong with the detailed argumentation of Rainbow and Nicole, then we’ll know that he’s just another frivolous critic of Calvinism.
ii) But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that Calvin did not subscribe to special redemption. Suppose there’s a discrepancy between Calvin’s own position and Reformed Orthodoxy? Then what?
At the risk of deeply disillusioning Mr. Lumpkins, I can think of equally shocking examples.
For instance, if you compare the 1828 edition of Noah Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language with the 2006 edition, you will discover that the 2006 edition contains a whole lot of words and definitions absent from the 1828 edition. And yet the publishers continue to market this dictionary under the name of the original lexicographer.
By Lumpkins’ benchmark, it must seem awfully odd that modern lexicographers appear to be more Websterian than Noah Webster.
Continuing with Lumpkins:
“Thus, I simply refuse to allow non-essentials to drive me from my fellow believers. ‘By this, all will know you are my disciples’, Jesus said, ‘if you have love for one another.’"
http://peterlumpkins.typepad.com/about.html
If this is how he views the alternatives, then why is he attacking Reformed Baptists in the SBC? Doesn’t he regard them as fellow believers?
Either he regards the extent of the atonement as a nonessential doctrine, in which case he should refuse to allow this nonessential to drive him away from the Reformed Baptists in the SBC—or else he is attacking 5-point Calvinism because he does regard the extent of the atonement as an essential doctrine, which disqualifies a Calvinist from being treated by him as a fellow believer whom he’s entitled to love.
So, which is it? How is he going to act out his stated policy? We look forward to seeing him lead by example.
Continuing:
“I choose to consciously self-identify as non-calvinist--or, perhaps even post-Calvinist--in the main because I fail to identify with the much too aggressive spirit of many Southern Baptist Calvinists.”
Which Southern Baptists does he have in mind? Are they more aggressive than some of their critics in the SBC?
Also, when Lumpkins launches a public attack on 5-point Calvinism, does this manifest an aggressive spirit as well? Or is it only aggressive to defend Calvinism, but not to oppose it?
“I simply do not sense the urge nor possess the passion to convert the evangelical world to classic Five Point Calvinism, as apparently many of them do.”
Obviously not, since what he instead senses is the contrary urge or passion to dissuade the evangelical world from converting to 5-point Calvinism.
Dawkins postmortem
EDWARD T. BABINSKI SAID:
“Steve,_Thanks for the review of Dawkins's book. I'm not an atheist myself, and I agree that Dawkins could have discussed various theistic arguments by citing some of the authors whom you mentioned. We all have favorite authors. And now we know yours, which is good to know. I've read some of them myself.”
These aren’t necessarily my favorite authors. They are simply authors who, in my estimation, are the most able representatives of the particular positions which Dawkins is opposing.
“However, please keep in mind that someone could also string together a list of scholarly authors who have engaged the ones on your list in debate on a host of questions from biblical scholarship to geological science to evolutionary science to philosophy and ethics.”
That’s not the point. This isn’t an issue of name-dropping, but opposing the arguments of the other side.
I’m not mounting an argument from authority. This isn't a bare appeal to the big names on our side of the ledger.
My point, rather, is that Dawkins should first have consulted these writers to acquaint himself with the best arguments of the opposing side, and then mounted suitable counterarguments.
I wasn’t attempting to make a positive case for everything I espouse in the course of my review. I’ve done that sort of thing elsewhere. And that would go well beyond the confines of a book review.
“So the fact that Dawkins has not mentioned your authors does not mean that someone has not engaged their arguments. “
That’s irrelevant. I’m reviewing Dawkins. This is how he chose to make his case for atheism. What he thought was important. He is marshalling his best arguments. And I answer him in kind.
“By the way, the most prolific "debunkers" of each other's views are Christians, who have been debunking other's interpretations of the Bible for ages. In the end few become converts of each others' positions.”
Cute, but, once again, this is not simply a question of name-dropping, but evaluating the quality of the argumentation.
“Philosophers also debunk each other's views, and Blackwell has produced a series in fact of philosphers debating each other's views, including a book in which Christian philosphers debunk each other's arguments concerning questions of great merit to theists. Some of the philosophers in that book were also simply generalized theists, not Christians, and they engaged in debates with some of the Christians. In the end few became converts of each others' positions.”
Which, again, misses the point. You, Ed Babinski, don’t believe that all arguments are equally good. You don’t believe that all competing positions are equally valid.
“As for Dawkins's choice of citing Robin Lane Fox, perhaps Fox is a fellow atheist friend of his? But Fox is unfortunately not a specialist in Biblical scholarship, but an historian of the classical world in general.”
1.Okay, so you’re criticizing his use of Fox?
2.If you think Fox is unreliable on those occasions when he defends the historicity of the Bible, do you also think he’s unreliable on those occasions when he opposes the historicity of the Bible?
3.I didn’t merely quote Fox’s bare opinion. I also quoted some of his arguments for the historicity of John and Acts.
To say he’s a historian rather than a Bible scholar fails to address his actual argumentation.
“It might have made more sense if Dawkins had cited Howard Clark Kee, the editor of The Cambridge Companion to the Bible. (Kee began his scholarly career by attending Dallas Theological Seminary, but apparently Kee eventually became an agnostic). A lot of Biblical scholars agree that stories about Jesus underwent alterations over time. Kee is among them. He has written the following:__"Justin Martyr (100-165 CE) relying on the testimony of Papias refers to the gospel of Mark as the 'memoir' of Peter... [I]t must be acknowledged that the gospels [as we have them today] do not match the description that Justin Martyr offered for them in the middle of the second century A.D. The gospel of Mark is not a 'memoir' of Peter, either in the sense that it recounts in a special way the associations of Peter with Jesus or in the sense that Mark reports first-hand recollections about Jesus. The material on which Mark drew passed through a long process of retelling and modification and interpretation, and it reflects less special interest in Peter than does Matthew's gospel." [Howard Clark Kee, Jesus in History, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1970) p. 120.]”
All you’ve done here is to give us Kee’s opinion with virtually no supporting evidence. Where’s the argument?
And what about the counterargument by conservative scholars?
“And on the traditional Christian identification of the fourth Gospel's author (who is only referred to in that Gospel as the 'beloved disciple') with 'John the son of Zebedee,' Howard Clark Kee remarks that "there is no evidence that this [identification] is accurate." [See Howard Clark Kee, The Cambridge Annotated Study Bible (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 81; and Lüdemann 1994, p. 139.]”
Once more, all you’re giving the reader is a liberal conclusion minus the supporting argument, if any.
“Mark Goodacre denies that "Q" exists and argues that Matthew used extra sources and Luke simply redacted Matthew. So redaction took place from Mark to Matthew to Luke in a straight line, none of the previous Gospel authors treating the previous authors work as so sacrosanct they couldn't rewrite it.”
1.And where is the actual argument for the claim that Luke made direct use of Matthew?
2.Assuming Markan priority, we can see exactly how Matthew and Luke “rewrote” Mark. And their redaction is exceedingly conservative. So comparative Synoptic study shows us how extremely faithful Matthew and Luke were in transmitting primitive tradition.
”Another Biblical scholar whom Dawkins might have cited is James D. G. Dunn whose views lay approximately somewhere between moderate and liberal Christian. In his latest work, Jesus Remembered, Dunn argues that The Gospel of John's narrative is not reliable, nor the claims it makes for Jesus' quasi-divine status. (In his earlier work, Evidence for Jesus, Dunn didn't imagine that Jesus spoke even one word reported in John.) Dunn admits there is little to support the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke, and little evidence that Jesus supported a mission to the gentiles, and no evidence that Jesus saw himself as any kind of messiah. (The term does not even appear in Q.) Nor is there much left of the ‘Son of Man,’ except for a few uncertain eschatological allusions. Dunn argues that Jesus did not claim any title for himself. Jesus may have believed that he was going to die, but he did not believe he was dying to redeem the sins of the world. ‘If Jesus hoped for resurrection it was presumably to share in the general and final resurrection of the dead.’ There is astonishingly little support for what Jesus' last words were. Dunn admits that Jesus believed in an imminent eschatological climax that, of course, did not happen. ‘Putting it bluntly, Jesus was proved wrong by the course of events.’"
As usual, all you’ve done is to give us a string of fact-free assertions. What you don’t do is to reproduce the supporting evidence. And how well does Dunn address the counterarguments by moderate to conservative scholars?
“William Dever the ancient near eastern archeologist is another whom Dawkins might have cited. (Dever was raised fundamentalist, even attended a conservative Christian college, but today he is apparently an agnostic.) Dever's conclusions about what archaeology tells us about the Bible are not very pleasing to fundamentalists or conservative Evangelicals, and I gather that Dever and his colleagues of high standing likewise dismiss fundamentalists and hard-core conservative Evangelicals who want to consider themselves scholars without accepting that which good scholars must do: engage in extensive critical analysis.”
Are you saying that moderate to conservative scholars like Hess, Hoffmeier, Kitchen, Currid, Millard, Yamauchi, Provan, &c. don’t engage in critical analysis?
How do you define critical analysis? Cartesian scepticism? A priori commitment to methodological naturalism?
“Those testifying for Dever's book (on the back cover) are: Paul D. Hanson, Professor of Divinity and Old Testament at Harvard University; David Noel Freedman, Professor Emeritus of Biblical Studies at the University of Michigan; Philip M. King, Professor at Boston College and author of Jeremiah; William W. Hallo, Professor of Assyriology and Babylonian Literature at Yale University; and Bernhard W. Anderson, Professor of Old Testament, Boston University and Professor Emeritus at Princeton Theological Seminary. Like Dever, these are not a bunch of radical revisionists, but moderates in the field of Christian archeology. Dever's latest book is, Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From? Conservative and fundamentalist Christians who interpret the Bible literally will gain no encouragement after reading it.”
You’re alluding to the debate between the minimalists and the maximalists. This debate turns less on evidence than rules of evidence, the burden of proof, the argument from silence, and methodological naturalism.
“Lastly, I noted that Triablogue links to young-earth creationist, and I.D. websites. Do you have any links to old-earth creationists, or theistic evolutionist Christians?”
Since ID websites include OECs as well as YECs, this is a false dichotomy.
A theistic evolutionist like Michael Denton or Rupert Sheldrake can frequently offer a useful critique of naturalistic evolution.
I don’t link to an OEC like Hugh Ross because I don’t find much of either scientific value or exegetical value in his writings.
A partial exception is his version of the fine-tuning/anthropic argument. But one can get that from a lot of Christian writers.
“Correct me if I'm wrong but you're either a young-earth creationist, or you espouse the "agnostic-about-the-age-of-the-earth" view of the Discovery Institute (and J. P. Holding and others), a popular view among Christians since the advent of I.D.”
My own position is more complicated than that. It also depends in part on how we define YEC. Here are some typical elements:
1.The universe is the effect of creation ex nihilo.
2.The universe is between 6000-10,000 years old, give or take.
3.The universe is “apparently” older than it looks.
4.On the one hand, there is scientific evidence for a YEC dating scheme. One the other hand, conventional dating schemes are methodologically flawed.
5.All of the natural kinds of fauna and flora are the result of special creation, although natural kinds enjoy a built-in potential for adaptive variation—within certain limits.
6.Both the animate and inanimate order was fully functional from the time it was made.
7.Because the antelapsarian world was “very good,” disease, aging, parasitism, and predation, and suboptimal adaptations are all due to the Fall.
8.The flood was global in extent.
9.The flood is largely responsible for the fossil record.
10.The Ice age (only one) was postdiluvial.
As a general observation, the average creationist is a scientist rather than an exegete by training. And the creationist paradigm established by Henry Morris was colored by dispensational hermeneutics, where their interpretation of Genesis was a carryover from their literalistic interpretation of Ezekiel, Revelation, &c.
As a result of these two factors, creationist writers often make exegetical judgment calls that I don’t agree with.
Going back through the list:
1.I agree.
2.Once again, I agree, but with certain qualifications:
i) The Bible doesn’t give us a continuous chronology from day one to our day and age. Rather, what the Bible gives us are certain discrete intervals. From T1 to T2.
To work these into a relative or absolute chronology of the ancient world requires a historical reconstruction from extrabiblical evidence as well as the witness of Scripture. So this is by no means a strictly exegetical question. Rather, we have to fit the Biblical intervals into a timeline which is pieced together from a lot of disparate, extrabiblical information. And such a reconstruction will pivot on a number of probabilistic variables.
ii) Beyond the historical question is the metahistorical question of whether time has an intrinsic metric. This is a more specialized question than Scripture was designed to address.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that metric conventionalism is correct, then the historical sequence of Scripture would remain objectively accurate as well as true to the phenomenological experience of time, but any dating scheme will still be an artifact of our extrinsic, chronometric system, which is ultimately conventional.
And that would hold with equal force for light-years and radiometric decay rates.
3.I agree with the basic idea, but it’s poorly expressed. Natural objects have no inherent, temporal appearance. That’s a contingent relation.
If you’d never seen a certain type of object before, you couldn’t guess it’s age by looking at it.
4.I’m noncommittal on this question:
a) I will leave the scientific technicalities to the experts on either side of this debate.
b) The standard dating techniques are reasonable.
At the same time (pardon the pun), they are also rather anthropomorphic—as if we could simply equate a periodic process with a clock. But that, of course, is not its natural function.
Moreover, they rely on circular, unverifiable assumptions regarding the initial conditions and the uniformity of nature.
So while these extrapolations are reasonable, they are also unprovable—and more than a little naïve.
5.I’m in basic agreement with this—although we must, once again, guard against overinterpreting Scripture by drawing very specialized and anachronistic distinctions on which the text is silent.
Gen 1-2 is mainly concerned with the origin of life. It doesn’t address the theoretical range of adaptive variation. But, at a practical level, it does take for granted the basic identity between the natural kinds as they were made, and the natural kinds as they existed in the time of Moses—for the narrative assumes that plants and animals mentioned in the creation account would be recognizable to the original reader.
6.I agree.
7.I generally disagree.
i) It’s applicable to life inside the Garden. It’s inapplicable to conditions outside the garden.
ii) There’s no such thing as an optimal design or adaptation, for every design has its tradeoffs, and specialization can be advantageous in some situations, but disadvantageous in others.
iii) Their definition of what constitutes the “good” is sentimental rather than Scriptural.
8.The extent of the flood is not as easy to determine as many Christians or their critics seem to think:
i) It’s important not to overinterpret (really, to reinterpret) the geographical descriptions with modern geography in mind. Instead, we need to ask ourselves what were the limits of the known world at the time of writing (e.g. Gen 10). What would these descriptions mean to the original reader? What would he envision?
Once we make that adjustment, according to the grammatico-historical method, then what we probably have in Gen 6-9 is a global description according to the narrative viewpoint, but the narrative viewpoint would amount to a local description according to a modern viewpoint.
In other words, the landmarks are global given the ancient Near Eastern perspective of the ancient narrator, but local given the Apollo 11 perspective of the modern-day reader.
So, if we make allowance for original intent, the flood is local rather than global.
ii) Needless to say, what is relevant to geography is equally relevant to biogeography and biodiversity. What animals did the narrator have in mind? All the land animals of the known world, or all the land animals of the New World?
Is the known world the Old World or the New World as well?
A contemporary reader must make a conscientious effort to keep his modern assumptions from leaking into the text. It isn’t easy to separate our often unconscious assumptions from the narrative assumptions, and prevent our modern assumptions from spilling over into the text.
iii) But that’s a question of exegesis. Original intent. The exegetical referent.
Since, however, the text refers to realities outside itself, there’s a difference between the intentional scope of the text and the implicit scope of the event.
Although the depiction is local from our standpoint, it may still be on a scale which would result in a global flood, even if the natural barriers depicted in the narrative fell well short of globalism.
For, even if the boundaries of the known world were limited to the ANE, yet, if the floodwaters overflowed the mountain pass of a major mountain chain in the area, then that could well have global repercussions.
What hills or mountains does the narrator have in mind? What counts as a “mountain” or “high hill” depends entirely on where you live. What were his landmarks? What was his mental geography?
iv) Another reference point is ground level. According to John Walton, Gen 7:20 denotes 15 cubits (cubit=16 inches) above ground level.
v) Yet another imponderable is the degree of continuity or discontinuity between prediluvian and postdiluvian geography.
What was the flood mechanism? If it represents a reversal of the process described in Gen 1:9, then it’s going to be difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the mean sea level since the natural barriers underwent change—both as a flood mechanism and a subsequent drainage mechanism.
vi) There are other considerations to factor in, such as the size of the ark and the duration of the flood.
vii) All things considered, I incline to a global flood, but this turns on certain imponderables.
9.I have no firm opinion on this question because a number of alternative scenarios may well be possible depending on which variables or hypotheticals we plug into our model.
Since I don’t attribute animal death to the fall, I have no reason to attribute all fossilization to the flood.
10.I can’t speak to an ice age, although I will say that ice caps are inevitable at a certain latitude or altitude, and I have no reason to believe that such conditions were absent before the flood or the fall.
“I suppose one can be or believe anything these days, even young-earth creationism, since there's a website for everybody where you can find at least a few Ph.D.s with the same view as yourself, though I once did a search at all the major young-earth creationist websites and only counted 20 or so Ph.D.s who were young-earth creationists working at those organizations.”
Once again, I’m not making an argument from authority. Darwinians (theistic or atheistic), OECs, and YECs all give reasons for what they believe. I evaluate their respective positions according to their stated reasons.
“And young-earth creationist organizations like Answers in Genesis and ICR have backpedaled concerning a host of claims that they expected to topple evolution, from the Lewis Mountain Overthurst (the largest overthrust in the world that they tried to deny there was any evidence of), to the Paluxy footprints. Answers in Genesis even produced a webpage devoted to Arguments Creationist Should Not Use. The view today among young-earth creationists is not to rely on ‘out of place fossils,’ which have been debunked God knows how often (like the ‘human skull in coal’ that CRSQ folks went over to Germany to see for themselves and found out it was a crude hoax molded out of bits of soft brown coal and had no true skull features). No. Today the young-earthers are seeking ingenious ways to somehow accommodate the wealth of geological evidence and wealth of worldwide radiometric evidence, rather than refute the order of the geological column or the multitude of relative radiometric dates of fossils and rock formations as they currently read.”
This may all be true, although you’re going out of your way to characterize these developments in the most invidious terms possible.
But just consider all of the revisions or reversals in evolutionary theory since the time of Darwin.
It’s not surprising that a younger generation of better-educated YECs would continually tweak the YEC model, just as modern-day Darwinians and contemporary cosmologists are constantly tweaking their own theories.
“Steve,_Thanks for the review of Dawkins's book. I'm not an atheist myself, and I agree that Dawkins could have discussed various theistic arguments by citing some of the authors whom you mentioned. We all have favorite authors. And now we know yours, which is good to know. I've read some of them myself.”
These aren’t necessarily my favorite authors. They are simply authors who, in my estimation, are the most able representatives of the particular positions which Dawkins is opposing.
“However, please keep in mind that someone could also string together a list of scholarly authors who have engaged the ones on your list in debate on a host of questions from biblical scholarship to geological science to evolutionary science to philosophy and ethics.”
That’s not the point. This isn’t an issue of name-dropping, but opposing the arguments of the other side.
I’m not mounting an argument from authority. This isn't a bare appeal to the big names on our side of the ledger.
My point, rather, is that Dawkins should first have consulted these writers to acquaint himself with the best arguments of the opposing side, and then mounted suitable counterarguments.
I wasn’t attempting to make a positive case for everything I espouse in the course of my review. I’ve done that sort of thing elsewhere. And that would go well beyond the confines of a book review.
“So the fact that Dawkins has not mentioned your authors does not mean that someone has not engaged their arguments. “
That’s irrelevant. I’m reviewing Dawkins. This is how he chose to make his case for atheism. What he thought was important. He is marshalling his best arguments. And I answer him in kind.
“By the way, the most prolific "debunkers" of each other's views are Christians, who have been debunking other's interpretations of the Bible for ages. In the end few become converts of each others' positions.”
Cute, but, once again, this is not simply a question of name-dropping, but evaluating the quality of the argumentation.
“Philosophers also debunk each other's views, and Blackwell has produced a series in fact of philosphers debating each other's views, including a book in which Christian philosphers debunk each other's arguments concerning questions of great merit to theists. Some of the philosophers in that book were also simply generalized theists, not Christians, and they engaged in debates with some of the Christians. In the end few became converts of each others' positions.”
Which, again, misses the point. You, Ed Babinski, don’t believe that all arguments are equally good. You don’t believe that all competing positions are equally valid.
“As for Dawkins's choice of citing Robin Lane Fox, perhaps Fox is a fellow atheist friend of his? But Fox is unfortunately not a specialist in Biblical scholarship, but an historian of the classical world in general.”
1.Okay, so you’re criticizing his use of Fox?
2.If you think Fox is unreliable on those occasions when he defends the historicity of the Bible, do you also think he’s unreliable on those occasions when he opposes the historicity of the Bible?
3.I didn’t merely quote Fox’s bare opinion. I also quoted some of his arguments for the historicity of John and Acts.
To say he’s a historian rather than a Bible scholar fails to address his actual argumentation.
“It might have made more sense if Dawkins had cited Howard Clark Kee, the editor of The Cambridge Companion to the Bible. (Kee began his scholarly career by attending Dallas Theological Seminary, but apparently Kee eventually became an agnostic). A lot of Biblical scholars agree that stories about Jesus underwent alterations over time. Kee is among them. He has written the following:__"Justin Martyr (100-165 CE) relying on the testimony of Papias refers to the gospel of Mark as the 'memoir' of Peter... [I]t must be acknowledged that the gospels [as we have them today] do not match the description that Justin Martyr offered for them in the middle of the second century A.D. The gospel of Mark is not a 'memoir' of Peter, either in the sense that it recounts in a special way the associations of Peter with Jesus or in the sense that Mark reports first-hand recollections about Jesus. The material on which Mark drew passed through a long process of retelling and modification and interpretation, and it reflects less special interest in Peter than does Matthew's gospel." [Howard Clark Kee, Jesus in History, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1970) p. 120.]”
All you’ve done here is to give us Kee’s opinion with virtually no supporting evidence. Where’s the argument?
And what about the counterargument by conservative scholars?
“And on the traditional Christian identification of the fourth Gospel's author (who is only referred to in that Gospel as the 'beloved disciple') with 'John the son of Zebedee,' Howard Clark Kee remarks that "there is no evidence that this [identification] is accurate." [See Howard Clark Kee, The Cambridge Annotated Study Bible (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 81; and Lüdemann 1994, p. 139.]”
Once more, all you’re giving the reader is a liberal conclusion minus the supporting argument, if any.
“Mark Goodacre denies that "Q" exists and argues that Matthew used extra sources and Luke simply redacted Matthew. So redaction took place from Mark to Matthew to Luke in a straight line, none of the previous Gospel authors treating the previous authors work as so sacrosanct they couldn't rewrite it.”
1.And where is the actual argument for the claim that Luke made direct use of Matthew?
2.Assuming Markan priority, we can see exactly how Matthew and Luke “rewrote” Mark. And their redaction is exceedingly conservative. So comparative Synoptic study shows us how extremely faithful Matthew and Luke were in transmitting primitive tradition.
”Another Biblical scholar whom Dawkins might have cited is James D. G. Dunn whose views lay approximately somewhere between moderate and liberal Christian. In his latest work, Jesus Remembered, Dunn argues that The Gospel of John's narrative is not reliable, nor the claims it makes for Jesus' quasi-divine status. (In his earlier work, Evidence for Jesus, Dunn didn't imagine that Jesus spoke even one word reported in John.) Dunn admits there is little to support the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke, and little evidence that Jesus supported a mission to the gentiles, and no evidence that Jesus saw himself as any kind of messiah. (The term does not even appear in Q.) Nor is there much left of the ‘Son of Man,’ except for a few uncertain eschatological allusions. Dunn argues that Jesus did not claim any title for himself. Jesus may have believed that he was going to die, but he did not believe he was dying to redeem the sins of the world. ‘If Jesus hoped for resurrection it was presumably to share in the general and final resurrection of the dead.’ There is astonishingly little support for what Jesus' last words were. Dunn admits that Jesus believed in an imminent eschatological climax that, of course, did not happen. ‘Putting it bluntly, Jesus was proved wrong by the course of events.’"
As usual, all you’ve done is to give us a string of fact-free assertions. What you don’t do is to reproduce the supporting evidence. And how well does Dunn address the counterarguments by moderate to conservative scholars?
“William Dever the ancient near eastern archeologist is another whom Dawkins might have cited. (Dever was raised fundamentalist, even attended a conservative Christian college, but today he is apparently an agnostic.) Dever's conclusions about what archaeology tells us about the Bible are not very pleasing to fundamentalists or conservative Evangelicals, and I gather that Dever and his colleagues of high standing likewise dismiss fundamentalists and hard-core conservative Evangelicals who want to consider themselves scholars without accepting that which good scholars must do: engage in extensive critical analysis.”
Are you saying that moderate to conservative scholars like Hess, Hoffmeier, Kitchen, Currid, Millard, Yamauchi, Provan, &c. don’t engage in critical analysis?
How do you define critical analysis? Cartesian scepticism? A priori commitment to methodological naturalism?
“Those testifying for Dever's book (on the back cover) are: Paul D. Hanson, Professor of Divinity and Old Testament at Harvard University; David Noel Freedman, Professor Emeritus of Biblical Studies at the University of Michigan; Philip M. King, Professor at Boston College and author of Jeremiah; William W. Hallo, Professor of Assyriology and Babylonian Literature at Yale University; and Bernhard W. Anderson, Professor of Old Testament, Boston University and Professor Emeritus at Princeton Theological Seminary. Like Dever, these are not a bunch of radical revisionists, but moderates in the field of Christian archeology. Dever's latest book is, Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From? Conservative and fundamentalist Christians who interpret the Bible literally will gain no encouragement after reading it.”
You’re alluding to the debate between the minimalists and the maximalists. This debate turns less on evidence than rules of evidence, the burden of proof, the argument from silence, and methodological naturalism.
“Lastly, I noted that Triablogue links to young-earth creationist, and I.D. websites. Do you have any links to old-earth creationists, or theistic evolutionist Christians?”
Since ID websites include OECs as well as YECs, this is a false dichotomy.
A theistic evolutionist like Michael Denton or Rupert Sheldrake can frequently offer a useful critique of naturalistic evolution.
I don’t link to an OEC like Hugh Ross because I don’t find much of either scientific value or exegetical value in his writings.
A partial exception is his version of the fine-tuning/anthropic argument. But one can get that from a lot of Christian writers.
“Correct me if I'm wrong but you're either a young-earth creationist, or you espouse the "agnostic-about-the-age-of-the-earth" view of the Discovery Institute (and J. P. Holding and others), a popular view among Christians since the advent of I.D.”
My own position is more complicated than that. It also depends in part on how we define YEC. Here are some typical elements:
1.The universe is the effect of creation ex nihilo.
2.The universe is between 6000-10,000 years old, give or take.
3.The universe is “apparently” older than it looks.
4.On the one hand, there is scientific evidence for a YEC dating scheme. One the other hand, conventional dating schemes are methodologically flawed.
5.All of the natural kinds of fauna and flora are the result of special creation, although natural kinds enjoy a built-in potential for adaptive variation—within certain limits.
6.Both the animate and inanimate order was fully functional from the time it was made.
7.Because the antelapsarian world was “very good,” disease, aging, parasitism, and predation, and suboptimal adaptations are all due to the Fall.
8.The flood was global in extent.
9.The flood is largely responsible for the fossil record.
10.The Ice age (only one) was postdiluvial.
As a general observation, the average creationist is a scientist rather than an exegete by training. And the creationist paradigm established by Henry Morris was colored by dispensational hermeneutics, where their interpretation of Genesis was a carryover from their literalistic interpretation of Ezekiel, Revelation, &c.
As a result of these two factors, creationist writers often make exegetical judgment calls that I don’t agree with.
Going back through the list:
1.I agree.
2.Once again, I agree, but with certain qualifications:
i) The Bible doesn’t give us a continuous chronology from day one to our day and age. Rather, what the Bible gives us are certain discrete intervals. From T1 to T2.
To work these into a relative or absolute chronology of the ancient world requires a historical reconstruction from extrabiblical evidence as well as the witness of Scripture. So this is by no means a strictly exegetical question. Rather, we have to fit the Biblical intervals into a timeline which is pieced together from a lot of disparate, extrabiblical information. And such a reconstruction will pivot on a number of probabilistic variables.
ii) Beyond the historical question is the metahistorical question of whether time has an intrinsic metric. This is a more specialized question than Scripture was designed to address.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that metric conventionalism is correct, then the historical sequence of Scripture would remain objectively accurate as well as true to the phenomenological experience of time, but any dating scheme will still be an artifact of our extrinsic, chronometric system, which is ultimately conventional.
And that would hold with equal force for light-years and radiometric decay rates.
3.I agree with the basic idea, but it’s poorly expressed. Natural objects have no inherent, temporal appearance. That’s a contingent relation.
If you’d never seen a certain type of object before, you couldn’t guess it’s age by looking at it.
4.I’m noncommittal on this question:
a) I will leave the scientific technicalities to the experts on either side of this debate.
b) The standard dating techniques are reasonable.
At the same time (pardon the pun), they are also rather anthropomorphic—as if we could simply equate a periodic process with a clock. But that, of course, is not its natural function.
Moreover, they rely on circular, unverifiable assumptions regarding the initial conditions and the uniformity of nature.
So while these extrapolations are reasonable, they are also unprovable—and more than a little naïve.
5.I’m in basic agreement with this—although we must, once again, guard against overinterpreting Scripture by drawing very specialized and anachronistic distinctions on which the text is silent.
Gen 1-2 is mainly concerned with the origin of life. It doesn’t address the theoretical range of adaptive variation. But, at a practical level, it does take for granted the basic identity between the natural kinds as they were made, and the natural kinds as they existed in the time of Moses—for the narrative assumes that plants and animals mentioned in the creation account would be recognizable to the original reader.
6.I agree.
7.I generally disagree.
i) It’s applicable to life inside the Garden. It’s inapplicable to conditions outside the garden.
ii) There’s no such thing as an optimal design or adaptation, for every design has its tradeoffs, and specialization can be advantageous in some situations, but disadvantageous in others.
iii) Their definition of what constitutes the “good” is sentimental rather than Scriptural.
8.The extent of the flood is not as easy to determine as many Christians or their critics seem to think:
i) It’s important not to overinterpret (really, to reinterpret) the geographical descriptions with modern geography in mind. Instead, we need to ask ourselves what were the limits of the known world at the time of writing (e.g. Gen 10). What would these descriptions mean to the original reader? What would he envision?
Once we make that adjustment, according to the grammatico-historical method, then what we probably have in Gen 6-9 is a global description according to the narrative viewpoint, but the narrative viewpoint would amount to a local description according to a modern viewpoint.
In other words, the landmarks are global given the ancient Near Eastern perspective of the ancient narrator, but local given the Apollo 11 perspective of the modern-day reader.
So, if we make allowance for original intent, the flood is local rather than global.
ii) Needless to say, what is relevant to geography is equally relevant to biogeography and biodiversity. What animals did the narrator have in mind? All the land animals of the known world, or all the land animals of the New World?
Is the known world the Old World or the New World as well?
A contemporary reader must make a conscientious effort to keep his modern assumptions from leaking into the text. It isn’t easy to separate our often unconscious assumptions from the narrative assumptions, and prevent our modern assumptions from spilling over into the text.
iii) But that’s a question of exegesis. Original intent. The exegetical referent.
Since, however, the text refers to realities outside itself, there’s a difference between the intentional scope of the text and the implicit scope of the event.
Although the depiction is local from our standpoint, it may still be on a scale which would result in a global flood, even if the natural barriers depicted in the narrative fell well short of globalism.
For, even if the boundaries of the known world were limited to the ANE, yet, if the floodwaters overflowed the mountain pass of a major mountain chain in the area, then that could well have global repercussions.
What hills or mountains does the narrator have in mind? What counts as a “mountain” or “high hill” depends entirely on where you live. What were his landmarks? What was his mental geography?
iv) Another reference point is ground level. According to John Walton, Gen 7:20 denotes 15 cubits (cubit=16 inches) above ground level.
v) Yet another imponderable is the degree of continuity or discontinuity between prediluvian and postdiluvian geography.
What was the flood mechanism? If it represents a reversal of the process described in Gen 1:9, then it’s going to be difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the mean sea level since the natural barriers underwent change—both as a flood mechanism and a subsequent drainage mechanism.
vi) There are other considerations to factor in, such as the size of the ark and the duration of the flood.
vii) All things considered, I incline to a global flood, but this turns on certain imponderables.
9.I have no firm opinion on this question because a number of alternative scenarios may well be possible depending on which variables or hypotheticals we plug into our model.
Since I don’t attribute animal death to the fall, I have no reason to attribute all fossilization to the flood.
10.I can’t speak to an ice age, although I will say that ice caps are inevitable at a certain latitude or altitude, and I have no reason to believe that such conditions were absent before the flood or the fall.
“I suppose one can be or believe anything these days, even young-earth creationism, since there's a website for everybody where you can find at least a few Ph.D.s with the same view as yourself, though I once did a search at all the major young-earth creationist websites and only counted 20 or so Ph.D.s who were young-earth creationists working at those organizations.”
Once again, I’m not making an argument from authority. Darwinians (theistic or atheistic), OECs, and YECs all give reasons for what they believe. I evaluate their respective positions according to their stated reasons.
“And young-earth creationist organizations like Answers in Genesis and ICR have backpedaled concerning a host of claims that they expected to topple evolution, from the Lewis Mountain Overthurst (the largest overthrust in the world that they tried to deny there was any evidence of), to the Paluxy footprints. Answers in Genesis even produced a webpage devoted to Arguments Creationist Should Not Use. The view today among young-earth creationists is not to rely on ‘out of place fossils,’ which have been debunked God knows how often (like the ‘human skull in coal’ that CRSQ folks went over to Germany to see for themselves and found out it was a crude hoax molded out of bits of soft brown coal and had no true skull features). No. Today the young-earthers are seeking ingenious ways to somehow accommodate the wealth of geological evidence and wealth of worldwide radiometric evidence, rather than refute the order of the geological column or the multitude of relative radiometric dates of fossils and rock formations as they currently read.”
This may all be true, although you’re going out of your way to characterize these developments in the most invidious terms possible.
But just consider all of the revisions or reversals in evolutionary theory since the time of Darwin.
It’s not surprising that a younger generation of better-educated YECs would continually tweak the YEC model, just as modern-day Darwinians and contemporary cosmologists are constantly tweaking their own theories.
How Influential Was Papias?
In another thread, Ed Babinski quoted Howard Clark Kee commenting:
"Justin Martyr (100-165 CE) relying on the testimony of Papias refers to the gospel of Mark as the 'memoir' of Peter"
Ed's motive in quoting Kee on this subject seems to be to suggest that Justin Martyr's testimony about the background of Mark's gospel isn't of much significance, since he was just repeating what he had read in Papias. This sort of argument is common among critics of Christianity. Testimony from multiple sources will be dismissed on the basis that some or all of the sources can be traced back to one source, then that one source will be dismissed as unreliable. As the apostle Paul is often portrayed as the only source for much of what the earliest Christians claimed about Jesus, Papias is often portrayed as the only source for many of the beliefs of the earliest post-apostolic Christians.
There are many problems with that sort of theory, whether it's applied to Paul, Papias, or somebody else. The only early Christian figure who was widely recognized as having universal authority above the authority of anybody else was Jesus. Paul was an equal among the apostles (1 Corinthians 9:1, 2 Corinthians 12:11, Galatians 2:7-10, Ephesians 2:20, Revelation 21:14, Ignatius' Letter To The Romans 4, etc.), and Papias had no status we know of that would have resulted in his being regarded more highly than anybody else. He was a bishop and probably a disciple of the apostle John, but many other bishops and disciples of the apostles were alive at the time. Irenaeus, commenting on Papias' contemporary Clement of Rome, another probable disciple of the apostles, wrote that "there were many still remaining who had received instructions from the apostles" (Against Heresies, 3:3:3). It's highly unlikely that somebody like Papias would be the only source of information on an issue like the background of Mark's gospel. Papias himself refers to his dependence on other men of his time who had known the apostles (Eusebius, Church History, 3:39:3-4). Whatever information Papias had attained from the apostle John, he hadn't known all of the apostles, so he probably would consult other sources for some of his information. He tells us that he did. As Papias would have had access to many of these sources, so would other people.
Does Justin Martyr mention Papias by name? No. Collections of the fragments of Papias, such as the recent collection by Michael Holmes (The Apostolic Fathers [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2005], pp. 562-591), don't include any material from Justin Martyr. There's no reason to conclude that Justin had Papias as his source for his comments, and it's unlikely that somebody in his position would have been dependent on Papias for such information.
Justin lived in more than one location. He had been in Israel and in Rome (where Mark's gospel is thought to have originated), for example. He was in contact with a variety of Christian and non-Christian sources, as we see reflected in his Dialogue With Trypho. As he explains repeatedly in his writings, the gospels were read in Christian churches along with the Old Testament scriptures (First Apology, 67) and were believed to have been written by "apostles and those who followed them" (Dialogue With Trypho, 103). Notice the plural: "apostles" and "those who followed them". The use of the plural matches our four gospels: apostles (Matthew, John) and those who followed them (Mark, Luke). Justin doesn't cite the number four anywhere, but his comments are consistent with the collection of four gospels that sources living just after Justin's time refer to. In another place, Justin refers to the apostles composing gospels (First Apology, 66), so he can't just be referring to the apostles as the subject matter of the gospels. He attributes some of the gospels to apostles and some to disciples of the apostles.
Why would the early Christians attribute the second gospel to Mark rather than to Peter? If they were dishonest or careless in such matters, why didn't they just claim that Peter wrote the gospel? The concept that the minor and questionable (Acts 15:37-39) figure Mark wrote it, with Peter as his primary source, is credible and is consistent with what other sources tell us about both Peter and Mark. And as Martin Hengel has noted, the widespread early reports about Mark's reliance on Peter differ in some of their details, and it doesn't seem likely that they all were relying on one source (The Four Gospels And The One Gospel Of Jesus Christ [Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2000], pp. 35-38, 40-41). The influence of Peter on the gospel of Mark is also supported by internal evidence:
And quoting Hengel's conclusion:
Given the large amount of internal and external evidence we have for Mark's authorship of the second gospel under Peter's influence, why should we think that Justin Martyr and other sources were just repeating an unreliable account they got from Papias? Similarly, why should we think that somebody like Irenaeus would only repeat what he had heard from Polycarp, as if Polycarp was his only source? Even if Polycarp was Irenaeus' only source, we have good reason to think that Polycarp's testimony would be reliable. But given Irenaeus' contacts with a variety of apostolic churches and given his possession of earlier writings that are no longer extant and his relationships with other contemporaries of the apostles (like Pothinus), we don't have any good reason to conclude that Irenaeus would have been relying on only one source for his information on issues like gospel authorship.
The apostles traveled widely, and contemporaries of the apostles were in contact with a wide variety of sources, as we see reflected in the letters of Paul, the correspondence between Clement of Rome and the Corinthians, the letters of Ignatius, etc. Christians often traveled, and messengers would transmit information from one church to another. The early churches were highly networked, even as early as the time of Paul, and that networking would have increased with the passing of time. An issue as significant as who wrote the gospels or whether Mark had Peter as his primary source wouldn't have been informed or determined by only one person, like Papias. The fact that modern critics of Christianity resort to this sort of argument tells us more about their desperation than it does about an alleged lack of evidence for a Christian view of the origin of the gospels. Martin Hengel probably is correct about a motive of modern critics in rejecting the traditional view of Mark's gospel: "there is probably also an unacknowledged modern apologetic interest, characteristic of Protestant theology after the Enlightenment, namely offence at the numerous miracle stories in the Gospel" (Ibid., p. 88).
"Justin Martyr (100-165 CE) relying on the testimony of Papias refers to the gospel of Mark as the 'memoir' of Peter"
Ed's motive in quoting Kee on this subject seems to be to suggest that Justin Martyr's testimony about the background of Mark's gospel isn't of much significance, since he was just repeating what he had read in Papias. This sort of argument is common among critics of Christianity. Testimony from multiple sources will be dismissed on the basis that some or all of the sources can be traced back to one source, then that one source will be dismissed as unreliable. As the apostle Paul is often portrayed as the only source for much of what the earliest Christians claimed about Jesus, Papias is often portrayed as the only source for many of the beliefs of the earliest post-apostolic Christians.
There are many problems with that sort of theory, whether it's applied to Paul, Papias, or somebody else. The only early Christian figure who was widely recognized as having universal authority above the authority of anybody else was Jesus. Paul was an equal among the apostles (1 Corinthians 9:1, 2 Corinthians 12:11, Galatians 2:7-10, Ephesians 2:20, Revelation 21:14, Ignatius' Letter To The Romans 4, etc.), and Papias had no status we know of that would have resulted in his being regarded more highly than anybody else. He was a bishop and probably a disciple of the apostle John, but many other bishops and disciples of the apostles were alive at the time. Irenaeus, commenting on Papias' contemporary Clement of Rome, another probable disciple of the apostles, wrote that "there were many still remaining who had received instructions from the apostles" (Against Heresies, 3:3:3). It's highly unlikely that somebody like Papias would be the only source of information on an issue like the background of Mark's gospel. Papias himself refers to his dependence on other men of his time who had known the apostles (Eusebius, Church History, 3:39:3-4). Whatever information Papias had attained from the apostle John, he hadn't known all of the apostles, so he probably would consult other sources for some of his information. He tells us that he did. As Papias would have had access to many of these sources, so would other people.
Does Justin Martyr mention Papias by name? No. Collections of the fragments of Papias, such as the recent collection by Michael Holmes (The Apostolic Fathers [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2005], pp. 562-591), don't include any material from Justin Martyr. There's no reason to conclude that Justin had Papias as his source for his comments, and it's unlikely that somebody in his position would have been dependent on Papias for such information.
Justin lived in more than one location. He had been in Israel and in Rome (where Mark's gospel is thought to have originated), for example. He was in contact with a variety of Christian and non-Christian sources, as we see reflected in his Dialogue With Trypho. As he explains repeatedly in his writings, the gospels were read in Christian churches along with the Old Testament scriptures (First Apology, 67) and were believed to have been written by "apostles and those who followed them" (Dialogue With Trypho, 103). Notice the plural: "apostles" and "those who followed them". The use of the plural matches our four gospels: apostles (Matthew, John) and those who followed them (Mark, Luke). Justin doesn't cite the number four anywhere, but his comments are consistent with the collection of four gospels that sources living just after Justin's time refer to. In another place, Justin refers to the apostles composing gospels (First Apology, 66), so he can't just be referring to the apostles as the subject matter of the gospels. He attributes some of the gospels to apostles and some to disciples of the apostles.
Why would the early Christians attribute the second gospel to Mark rather than to Peter? If they were dishonest or careless in such matters, why didn't they just claim that Peter wrote the gospel? The concept that the minor and questionable (Acts 15:37-39) figure Mark wrote it, with Peter as his primary source, is credible and is consistent with what other sources tell us about both Peter and Mark. And as Martin Hengel has noted, the widespread early reports about Mark's reliance on Peter differ in some of their details, and it doesn't seem likely that they all were relying on one source (The Four Gospels And The One Gospel Of Jesus Christ [Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2000], pp. 35-38, 40-41). The influence of Peter on the gospel of Mark is also supported by internal evidence:
As far as Mark is concerned, church tradition tells us that he penned his gospel from the teachings of Peter. Martin Hengel discusses several internal considerations from Mark that support the external evidence, among which I found the following significant:
1. Peter is the first disciple to be called immediately after Jesus' public appearance. His name is also the last of the disciples to appear in Mark (Mark 1:16; 16:7).
2. In Mark 16:7, the and Peter, according to Hengel "disrupts the narrative and is completely superfluous", and it is notable that this unnecessary addition is omitted by Matthew. Hengel states that it is also odd that only here when the disciples and Peter are mentioned together that Peter is mentioned at the end, whereas elsewhere he always is mentioned at the beginning. From this Hengel concludes that Mark structured his gospel so that Peter would be named at the beginning and end in order to give it Peter's stamp of authority.
3. Mark's gospel is predominantly Galilean in character compared with Luke and John, which is significant since Peter served as the "spokesman of the Galilean disciples."
4. According to Hengel, the "disciples" are mentioned a total of 43 times, but Peter is emphasized as he is mentioned 25 times. Matthew also mentions Peter 25 times, but the "disciples" in his gospel are mentioned 75 times. Plus, Matthew's gospel is 70% longer than that of Mark. In an end-note, Hengel cites the work of Feldmeier, who determined ratios for the number of times Peter is mentioned per the number of words in the three Synoptic gospels. The ratio is substantially higher for Mark at 1:443, with that of Matthew and Luke standing at 1:772 and 1:648, respectively. Of course, if the Markan priority paradigm is accurate, then this is that much more significant since the emphases that Matthew and Luke also place on Peter could be largely the result of their use of Mark as a source.
5. Finally, Hengel states that the mentions of Peter tend to accumulate at important parts of Mark's gospel, such as at the beginning of Jesus' activity (ch. 1), the denouement in chs. 8 & 9, and of course, the passion narrative in ch. 14.
And quoting Hengel's conclusion:
Only secondarily is it to be noted that the period of tradition between Jesus and the time of Mark is not more than forty years and the remembrance of the ministry of Jesus in Galilee and Jerusalem was still vivid. In other words, the fact that the name of Simon Peter has been quite deliberately and massively retained in his Gospel is grounded not only in the importance of Peter for the evangelist, but also in remembrance and historical reality. For Mark, the chronological distance from Jesus of about forty years could still be surveyed relatively easily, and hardly more than five years separate him from the martyrdom of Peter, his teacher. Even if we did not have the reports of Irenaeus, the two Clements and Justin, the Papias note and I Peter 5.13, we would have to assume that the author of the Second Gospel is dependent upon Peter in a striking way, for historical, theological, and quite personal reasons. [Hengel 2000; 82-85]
Given the large amount of internal and external evidence we have for Mark's authorship of the second gospel under Peter's influence, why should we think that Justin Martyr and other sources were just repeating an unreliable account they got from Papias? Similarly, why should we think that somebody like Irenaeus would only repeat what he had heard from Polycarp, as if Polycarp was his only source? Even if Polycarp was Irenaeus' only source, we have good reason to think that Polycarp's testimony would be reliable. But given Irenaeus' contacts with a variety of apostolic churches and given his possession of earlier writings that are no longer extant and his relationships with other contemporaries of the apostles (like Pothinus), we don't have any good reason to conclude that Irenaeus would have been relying on only one source for his information on issues like gospel authorship.
The apostles traveled widely, and contemporaries of the apostles were in contact with a wide variety of sources, as we see reflected in the letters of Paul, the correspondence between Clement of Rome and the Corinthians, the letters of Ignatius, etc. Christians often traveled, and messengers would transmit information from one church to another. The early churches were highly networked, even as early as the time of Paul, and that networking would have increased with the passing of time. An issue as significant as who wrote the gospels or whether Mark had Peter as his primary source wouldn't have been informed or determined by only one person, like Papias. The fact that modern critics of Christianity resort to this sort of argument tells us more about their desperation than it does about an alleged lack of evidence for a Christian view of the origin of the gospels. Martin Hengel probably is correct about a motive of modern critics in rejecting the traditional view of Mark's gospel: "there is probably also an unacknowledged modern apologetic interest, characteristic of Protestant theology after the Enlightenment, namely offence at the numerous miracle stories in the Gospel" (Ibid., p. 88).
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