Justification Through Faith Alone In The Second Century

In the excerpt from the Epistle To Diognetus below, notice the reference to "faith, to which alone", followed by the concluding references to "trust" and "faith", with no reference to baptism and other works. The first mention of faith is immediately followed by some comments on the kindness of God and the gracious benefits given to us in his Son, and the section of the document that follows (9) is highly soteriological, all of which indicate that justifying faith is being referred to. The author refers to having faith in God later in the Christian life as well and discusses good works and expects them to follow from faith, but the focus here is on faith, even including the qualifier "alone", and the substitutionary nature of Jesus' work. The reference to faith alone in such a soteriological context makes the most sense as a reference to justifying faith. At the opening of the document, the author refers to how Diognetus wants to know "what God they [Christians] trust in, and what form of religion they observe, so as all to look down upon the world itself, and despise death, while they neither esteem those to be gods that are reckoned such by the Greeks, nor hold to the superstition of the Jews; and what is the affection which they cherish among themselves; and why, in fine, this new kind or practice [of piety] has only now entered into the world" (1). So, it's evident that faith (trust) is being distinguished from the actions that result from faith, and other terms are being used to refer to works, such as "observe" and "practice". So, we shouldn't think that the references to faith in sections 8-10 of the document are including works within them. Even if we only had the usual meanings of words to go by, it would be unlikely that a reference to faith includes works. It's doubly unlikely when the document in question so clearly distinguishes between faith and works. Section 10 refers to love resulting in our imitation of God's kindness, saying, "if you love Him, you will be an imitator of His kindness". That which is in the heart leads to outward actions. The author seems to have in mind an inner response to God that's distinguished from the outer actions that follow, with the inner faith justifying. As Michael Bird and Kirsten Mackerras write, salvation in the Epistle To Diognetus is "by faith alone (8.6; 9.6; 10.1)" (in Michael Bird and Scott Harrower, edd., The Cambridge Companion To The Apostolic Fathers [New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021], 323). In section 9, we're told that our works are excluded. The substitutionary nature of Christ's work is discussed, even with a reference to the "sweet exchange", the paralleling of Jesus' taking our sin with our taking his righteousness, and a reference to our sins' being covered by Jesus' righteousness, which is reminiscent of the dunghill analogy attributed to Martin Luther:

Like Light From A Fire

"And, like as the flame burneth the wood without the help of the light, and yet the flame cannot be without the light; so is it assuredly true that faith alone consumeth and burneth away sin, without the help of works, and yet that the same faith cannot be without good works….Whereupon it cometh that the holy Scripture promiseth the Christian everlasting life for his good works; because good works are the fruits and testimonies of lively faith, and proceed of it, as light proceedeth from a flame of fire" (The Benefit Of Christ's Death, 61-62, 64)

Heaven's Logic In Romans 8:32

The point of Romans 8:32 is that this love of God for his one and only Son was like a massive, Mount Everest obstacle standing between God and our salvation. Here was an obstacle almost insurmountable: Could God - would God - overcome his cherishing, admiring, treasuring, white-hot, infinite, affectionate bond with his Son and hand him over to be lied about and betrayed and denied and abandoned and mocked and flogged and beaten and spit on and nailed to a cross and pierced with a sword, like an animal being butchered and hung up on a rack?...

Would he really do that? If he would, then we could know with full certainty that whatever goal he was pursuing on the other side of that obstacle could never fail. There could be no greater obstacle. So whatever he was pursuing is as good as done….

Therefore, in Paul's a fortiori argument, God has done the hardest thing to give us everlasting happiness. He did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all. What does this guarantee? Paul puts it in the form of a rhetorical question (that means a question he expects us to immediately answer correctly): "how will he not also with him graciously give us all things?"…

I said that when I was twenty-three, this logic of heaven penetrated so deeply into my soul that it changed the way I think about everything - and that the change was full of hope….

I live my life every day by the promises of God. I owe every one of them to the logic of Romans 8:32….

Behind every one of those battles is the logic of heaven: "I did not spare my own Son; therefore, my promise to you cannot fail. I will help you. Go. Do what I have called you to do."

(John Piper, Why I Love The Apostle Paul [Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 2019], 186-89)

The Greatness Of The Gospel

How we view the gospel affects our relationship with God, our relationships with other people, our priorities, our objectives, the sense of urgency we have, and many other aspects of life. It should be a foundational motivating factor every day of our lives. It's important that we have a high view of the gospel and think about it often, deeply, and in a multifaceted way. Here are some examples of authors down through the centuries commenting on certain portions of the gospel:

Faith Alone
He Gives Himself
The Incarnation
Gethsemane
Put On Trial
The Cross
The Tomb
The Resurrection
The Defeat Of Satan
Imputed Righteousness
The Benefits Of The Gospel

"An idea has long possessed the public mind, that a religious man can scarcely be a wise man. It has been the custom to talk of infidels, atheists, and deists, as men of deep thought and comprehensive intellect; and to tremble for the Christian controversialist, as if he must surely fall by the hand of his enemy. But this is purely a mistake; for the gospel is the sum of wisdom; an epitome of knowledge; a treasure-house of truth; and a revelation of mysterious secrets. In it we see how justice and mercy may be married; here we behold inexorable law entirely satisfied, and sovereign love bearing away the sinner in triumph. Our meditation upon it enlarges the mind; and as it opens to our soul in successive flashes of glory, we stand astonished at the profound wisdom manifest in it. Ah, dear friends! if ye seek wisdom, ye shall see it displayed in all its greatness; not in the balancing of the clouds, nor the firmness of earth's foundations; not in the measured march of the armies of the sky, nor in the perpetual motions of the waves of the sea; not in vegetation with all its fairy forms of beauty; nor in the animal with its marvellous tissue of nerve, and vein, and sinew: nor even in man, that last and loftiest work of the Creator. But turn aside and see this great sight!—an incarnate God upon the cross; a substitute atoning for mortal guilt; a sacrifice satisfying the vengeance of Heaven, and delivering the rebellious sinner. Here is essential wisdom; enthroned, crowned, glorified. Admire, ye men of earth, if ye be not blind; and ye who glory in your learning bend your heads in reverence, and own that all your skill could not have devised a gospel at once so just to God, so safe to man." (Charles Spurgeon, The C.H. Spurgeon Collection [Albany, Oregon: AGES Software, 1998], The Park Street Pulpit, Vol. 1, pp. 113-14)

The Great Last Words Of A Great Man

J. Gresham Machen died on this day 81 years ago. Here's something I saw Tim Roof link on Facebook about Machen's last words. And here's something Michael Horton wrote on the subject many years ago.

God, A Tender Shoot

All praise to Thee, eternal Lord,
Clothed in a garb of flesh and blood;
Choosing a manger for Thy throne,
While worlds on worlds are Thine alone.

Once did the skies before Thee bow;
A virgin's arms contain Thee now,
While angels, who in Thee rejoice,
Now listen for Thine infant voice.
(Martin Luther, All Praise To Thee, Eternal Lord)

"a son will be given to us…I will also hold You by the hand and watch over You…He grew up before Him as a tender shoot" (Isaiah 9:6, 42:6, 53:2)

Patronage

A common rap against vicarious atonement, penal substitution, sole fide, and imputation is the charge of legal fiction. Merit and demerit are not transferrable. 

Keep in mind that that's just an intuitive objection. It's not a claim that's demonstrably true or false in the sense that a weather forecast is demonstrably true or false. Moreover, intuition often depends on the particular illustration.

Consider an analogy. Take the caste-system in the stereotypical high school. An honor/shame culture in miniature. You have high-status students and low-status students. 

Imagine the cafeteria. A low-status student is walking past the tables, looking for a spot to sit, as he carries his lunch tray. As a low-status student, he's picked on. In addition, he can't sit just anywhere. Some students don't want to sit by him. 

Another student sticks his foot out and trips the low-status student. He falls down, spilling the food and drink on his clothes. The other students cheer. He feels humiliated. 

Then another student gets up and walks over to him. A high-status student. He's the star quarterback. Most popular kid in school. Hip and cool. The boys wish they could be him while the girls wish they could be with him.

The quarterback has achieved status. He attained his topspot on the pecking order through athletic prowess, by winning state championships.

The cafeteria falls dead silent, waiting to see how the high-status student will respond to the plight of the low-status student, sprawled on the floor. Will he make fun of him? Will he shame him further by taunting him. The suspense is intense.

The quarterback reaches out his hand, raises the fallen student, and pats him on the chest. His action instantly transforms the social dynamic. By siding with the humiliated student, by expressing symbolic solidarity through his physical gesture, he transfers his high-status to the low-status student. He instantly elevates the student's social standing. The unpopular student now has ascribed status by virtue of his patron's achieved status. 

By the same token, the quarterback's action implicitly condemns the schadenfreude of the other students. Now they feel humiliated. His noble action exposes their ignoble reaction. His gesture lowers their status. They've gone down a notch while the unpopular student went up a notch. As students exit the cafeteria, the pecking order has undergone a sudden adjustment. 

The Power Of Christ's Righteousness Imputed

"For, even as Jesus Christ is stronger than Adam was, so is his righteousness more mighty than the sin of Adam. And, if the sin of Adam was sufficient enough to make all men sinners and children of wrath, without any misdeed of our own, much more shall Christ's righteousness be of greater force to make us all righteous, and the children of grace, without any of our own good works; which cannot be good unless that, before we do them, we ourselves be made good" (The Benefit Of Christ's Death, 19)

"Hence also it is proved, that it is entirely by the intervention of Christ's righteousness that we obtain justification before God. This is equivalent to saying that man is not just in himself, but that the righteousness of Christ is communicated to him by imputation, while he is strictly deserving of punishment….This is most clearly declared by the Apostle, when he says, that he who knew no sin was made an expiatory victim for sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him (2 Cor. 5:21). You see that our righteousness is not in ourselves, but in Christ; that the only way in which we become possessed of it is by being made partakers with Christ, since with him we possess all riches….'As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous,' (Rom. 5:19). To declare that we are deemed righteous, solely because the obedience of Christ is imputed to us as if it were our own, is just to place our righteousness in the obedience of Christ. Wherefore, Ambrose appears to me to have most elegantly adverted to the blessing of Jacob as an illustration of this righteousness, when he says that as he who did not merit the birthright in himself personated his brother, put on his garments which gave forth a most pleasant odour, and thus introduced himself to his father that he might receive a blessing to his own advantage, though under the person of another [Genesis 27:1-29], so we conceal ourselves under the precious purity of Christ, our first-born brother, that we may obtain an attestation of righteousness from the presence of God." (John Calvin, Institutes Of The Christian Religion, 3:11:23)

"The righteousness of God here spoken of is just the doing and dying of the Lord Jesus. It is called the righteousness of God, because it is that of God himself. You remember when Christ was a child, it is said he was 'the mighty God' [Isaiah 9:6]…And, in the same manner, the obedience of Christ was the obedience of one who was God; and when he obeyed his parents [Luke 2:51-52], it was the obedience of one who was God….Those of you who are awakened sinners, here is a righteousness that can cover you; behold, for each of your crimson sins, here is a stripe of one who is God. And, brethren, more than that, here are acts of holy obedience to cover your naked soul, here are holy words to cover your unholy words, here are holy deeds to cover your unholy deeds. O brethren! here is a lifetime of obedience to cover your soul….So it is with you; if you have on this righteousness you will be covered, and when God looks down, he will see nothing but the glassy sea of his Son's obedience….When Paul approached the gates of Rome, when he looked at its marble baths, when he saw the multitudes flocking to the theatre, and when he saw the crowds bowing down to the statue of Jupiter or Minerva, the heart of Paul was touched, and why? Because the wrath of God was revealed from heaven against them, and he knew that he had in his hand that which could cover every sinner. O, said Paul, if I could get them to put on this righteousness!…It is like casting a stone into the deep; it sinks, and it is not seen." (Robert McCheyne, A Basket Of Fragments [Scotland: Christian Focus, 2001], 99-101)

The Benefit Of Christ's Death

From a sixteenth-century book about justification, titled The Benefit Of Christ's Death:

let us run unto [Christ] with the feet of lively faith, and cast ourselves between his arms, [since] he allureth us so graciously, crying: "Come unto me, all you that labour and are heavy laden; and I will refresh you;" what comfort or what joy in this life can be comparable to this his saying there, when as a man, feeling himself oppressed with the intolerable weight of his sins, understandeth so sweet and amiable words of the Son of God, who promiseth so graciously to refresh and rid him of his great pains?...

O great unkindness! O thing abominable! that we, which profess ourselves Christians, and hear that the Son of God hath taken all our sins upon him, and washed them out with his precious blood, suffering himself to be fastened to the cross for our sakes, should nevertheless make as though we would justify ourselves, and purchase forgiveness of our sins by our own works; as who would say, that the deserts, righteousness, and bloodshed of Jesus Christ were not enough to do it, unless we came to put to our works and righteousness; which are altogether defiled and spotted with self-love, self-liking, self-profit, and a thousand other vanities, for which we have need to crave pardon at God's hand, rather than reward….

Now, if the seeking of righteousness and forgiveness of sins, by the keeping of the law which God gave upon mount Sinai, with so great glory and majesty, be the denying of Christ and of his grace [Galatians 5:4], what shall we say to those that will needs justify themselves before God by their own laws and observances? I would wish that such folks should a little compare the one with the other, and afterward give judgment themselves. God mindeth not to do that honour, not to give that glory to his own law; and yet they will have him to give it to men's laws and ordinances. But that honour is given only to his only-begotten Son, who alone, by the sacrifice of his death and passion, hath made full amends for all our sins, past, present, and to come…

let us give the whole glory of our justification unto God's mercy and to the merits of his Son; who by his own bloodshed hath set us free from the sovereignty of the law, and from the tyranny of sin and death, and hath brought us into the kingdom of God, to give us life and endless felicity….

for the love of his only begotten Son, [the Father] beholdeth [Christians] always with a gentle countenance, governing and defending them as his most dear children, and in the end giving them the heritage of the world, making them like-fashioned to the glorious image of Christ….

O happy is that man that shutteth his eyes from all other sights, and will neither hear nor see any other thing than Jesus Christ crucified; in whom are laid up and bestowed all the treasures of God's wisdom and divine knowledge! (15-16, 21-23, 26, 69, 93)

The prince and the pauper

Recently I had an impromptu debate on Facebook regarding the Reformed doctrine of imputation. My exchange alludes to this post as a frame of reference:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2017/08/paul-and-james-on-justification.html

This is just a rehash of the hackneyed objection that sole fide is a legal fiction. Is there anything new to say on that issue? What's the point of repeating the stock arguments and counterarguments?

In my experience, debating particular doctrines is never constructive because the participants don't agree on the rules of evidence. For Protestants, it's an essentially exegetical debate over what biblical revelation teaches, using the grammatico-historical method. BTW, contemporary Catholic Bible scholars use the same hermeneutical methodology.

For Catholic apologists, by contrast, it's filtered through selective appeals to the church fathers, the Magisterium, and a priori notions of what is fitting. 

The debate over particular doctrines never gets anywhere because that's a downstream discussion where constructive dialogue is only possible if there's common ground on the rules of evidence, which lies upstream.

i) In my experience, many Catholics don't bother to read Bible commentaries (or articles) by contemporary Catholic Bible scholars. If they did, they could avoid the false dichotomy between Catholic and Protestant hermeneutics. There's no essential difference between the way Joseph Fitzmyer, Raymond Brown, Luke Timothy Johnson, John Meier, John Collins et al. exegete Scripture and their Protestant counterparts. The main difference is that Catholic scholars are typically liberal, whereas Protestant scholars range along a liberal/conservative continuum. 

ii) I don't have to affirm the general perspicuity of Scripture to say that Scripture is clear on particular issues. For one thing, on certain doctrines, the teaching of Scripture is redundant, so even if a particular word or sentence is ambiguous, it doesn't hang on that.

iii) BTW, Mommy and Daddy didn't teach me that Scripture is perspicuous. My parents didn't have a definitive role in the hermeneutical process in the first place. It would behoove you to avoid stereotyping people if you know nothing about their personal background.

iv) Catholic apologists labor under the illusion that they can achieve the certainty denied to Protestants. But Catholic epistemology simply pushes the same issues back a step. To establish the authority of the Magisterium, you must interpret texts apart from the authority of the Magisterium. If you don't have some confidence in your ability to interpret the church fathers, church councils, &c., then your skepticism disqualifies you from ever making a case for the Magisterium.

iv) I don't fret over inconclusiveness. I accept the epistemic situation that God has put us in. I don't invent a makeweight.

In my experience, modern Catholic Bible scholars as well as modern Catholic church historians compartmentalize their faith from their scholarship. Their scholarship yields one set of conclusions, but they partition that off from their faith. They continue to profess Catholicism despite the results of their scholarship. That's analogous to liberal Protestants.

i) This goes to a fundamental difference in theological method, where you appeal to your philosophical intuitions to veto exegesis. That makes an element of sense if one rejects the revelatory status of Scripture. But it's improper to say I preemptively discount an interpretation that conflicts with my philosophical intuitions even if the best exegetical arguments support that interpretation.

ii) I don't think imputation presumes a theologically voluntaristic view of divine sovereignty, if that's what you're angling at. 

iii) I gave hypothetical illustrations in which agent A acts on behalf of and in place of agent B, so that agent B acquires an ascribed status by virtue of what was done for him that's functionally equivalent to an achieved status. That's not unique to Protestant/Reformed theology. That's a commonplace in social interactions. Although my examples were hypothetical, they have many real-world counterparts. So even at the level of philosophical intuitions, there's nothing counterintuitive about it. 

iv) Another potential problem is that many Catholics frame these issues in terms of Thomistic metaphysics. At best, the objections are only cogent if one grants all the paraphernalia of Thomistic metaphysics. 

Notice that I cast the issue, in part, by reference to standard sociological categories (achieved/ascribed status) rather than metaphysical categories.

"1) I don't think scripture allows for a multitude of different metaphysical positions, for one thing. I think it constrains us when we do our exegesis."

What constrains exegesis? Metaphysical positions that Scripture rules out, or metaphysical positions (criteria) we bring to Scripture, apart from Scripture?

"And you appear to be saying that I'm using philosophy to veto your exegesis"

That's manifestly the case.

"And you appear to be saying that I'm using philosophy to veto your exegesis when I'm simply saying that you're exegesis in my exegesis both involve different philosophical frameworks that we should not ignore."

And what distinctive philosophical framework do you think is driving my distinctive interpretation? 

"If your framework is conjoined to your exegesis and your framework is wrong then your exegesis is wrong, too. The same applies to mine."

You haven't identified what framework I've conjoined to my exegesis. You've also indicated that there's something uniquely Protestant about my approach, but that's not the case. For instance, as Eleonore Stump has said in a different context:

"If one passage can be set aside because it strikes us as incompatible with our moral intuitions, then others may have to be treated in the same way. But then our moral intuitions will be the standard by which the texts are judged, and the texts can’t function as divine revelation is meant to function, as a standard by which human beings can measure and correct human understanding, human standards, and human behavior." "The Problem of Evil and the History of Peoples: Think Amalek." M. Bergmann, Michael J. Murray, and M.C. Rea., eds. Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham (Oxford University Press 2011), 181.

The same holds true for setting aside an interpretation because it strikes you as incompatible with your philosophical intuitions–even if that interpretation has the best of the exegetical arguments.

Your position reminds me of my many debates with unitarian philosopher Dale Tuggy. His metaphysical criteria preemptively discount the possibility that Scripture teaches the deity of Christ. 

"If you don't think it presumes that, I'd like to hear an explanation as to what view of divine sovereignty you feel it does involve."

You seem to think the Reformed doctrine of imputation presumes a voluntaristic or Cartesian notion of divine omnipotence. But that's generated by what happens when you plug imputation into your (Thomistic?) metaphysical scheme. I'm not operating with your metaphysical framework (whatever that is). It's up to you, not me, to explicate why you think imputation generates that consequence, inasmuch as that's based on your understanding rather than mine.

"Do you hold the son's friend is truly being treated as the son in an interchangeable way that isn't based on ontology? The father has to realize he is still just a friend and isn't conflating. Obviously the privilege wasn't so exclusive in the first place."

He receives a benefit which the father would normally reserve for his own son. He's not treated "as" the son but "as if" he's the son. No, it's not based on ontology. Sure, he's still just a friend and not the son. That's the point. In the nature of the case, vicarity isn't identity. Not ontological identity, but functional equivalence. 

"As for adoption, I view it ontologically. It certainly is when Scripture talks about us as sons and relates it to our being born again - Christ gets called only-begotten not because that terminology od being begotten can never be applied to us, but because he is so eternally and we are so temporally, hence the semantic distinction. But I'm not a child of God for primarily legal reasons - the designation reflects the ontological reality and does so necessarily (and it seems to me that your metaphysics cannot allow for that since the morally innocent Christ is legally guilty on the cross). In the case of human adoption I entirely view the process of the state calling someone an adopted child as secondary or contingent."

i) To begin with, you're inventing a generic concept by merging different Bible writers like Paul and John, as if their positions are interchangeable or reducible to a common denominator. But each one has his own paradigm. John prefers a reproductive metaphor while Paul prefers an adoptive metaphor. One involves an analogy with biological sonship while the other involves an analogy with adoptive sonship, which, by definition, is not biological. You're blurring an essential distinction between the two.

ii) BTW, while I affirm the eternal sonship of Christ, I reject eternal generation. But that's an argument for another day. 

"Similarly, if the state pronounces someone guilty or innocent it needs to align with "the truth of the matter" about the person, that is to say the MORAL innocence or guilt. It's absolutely counterintuitive for us to say that a court could declare someone legally innocent who is morally guilty or declare someone legally guilty who is morally innocent. Moral guilt and innocence is the thing that most people give a damn about and they expect any legal determination to necessarily reflect it or it is a worthless lie."

It's that attitude which renders Catholics impervious to the Gospel. Paul in particular stresses the prima facie dilemma of how God can justly forgive sinners. A just God is supposed to punish sinners.

Sinners are guilty before God. So how can they be acquitted? How can a just God save anyone if everyone is sinful? That's the conundrum. Paul resolves that dilemma by appeal to vicarious atonement and penal substitution. 

"And you might think that that means that the thing I said is counterintuitive (and it certainly is in every other occurrence)"

The vicarious principle is common in human experience. 

"so that their new legal status is a direct reflection of their ontological, moral status."

Even making allowance for sanctification, they remain sinners.

"You want me to hold that he legally declares ungodly men righteous and sure, is simultaneously morally conforming them to that, but I see that as taking the declaration itself in a rather literal and univocal way."

No, I'm taking that in a substitutionary way.

"And I think the twofold distinction between legal and ontological/moral in the Protestant paradigm creates problems for knowing what specific verses are talking about, justification or sanctification."

Paul repeatedly and emphatically denies that one can be justified by works (or works of the law). In his scheme, justification and works are antithetical principles. He's the one who "radically distinguishes" the two.

"As for adoption, I view it ontologically."

My comparison was more specific. I used adoption to illustrate the distinction between achieved status and ascribed status. A king can adopt a peasant. That instantly elevates the peasant's social standing. He becomes the crown prince and heir apparent not on account of anything he did, but on account of something done for him. It's as if he was the conqueror who founded the kingdom by his military exploits. For the conqueror, that's achieved status. Yet the adoptive son enjoys the equivalent status despite having done nothing. 

In fact, that's true for biological sonship. You are born into a social status. You may inherit the family fortune. You did nothing to earn it.

"For me the issue isn't whether you earned it or not. The issue is whether it is an ontological reality or if it is merely something nominally describing you. As in to me the issue isn't how my brown desk got brown; the issue is that it is completely meaningless to give it the 'status' of being brown or participating in brown-ness unless you are talking about its real participation in that quality. I don't divide the universe into, say, legal brownness vs real brownness."

You're recasting the issue in your preferred metaphysical categories. That's your prerogative, but I don't grant your conceptual scheme as determinative. Moreover, I don't regard justification as analogous to color predications. 

"With regards to the adoptive son focusing on how he got adopted or on questions of who meriting that are entirely besides the point. The Sixth Session of Trent makes it clear that we don't earn our justified status in the first place."

To my knowledge, traditional Catholic theology bifurcates justification into first justification without works and second justification involving congruently meritorious works.

"The issue is whether or not that status is merely reflective on an ontological reality or if it is something else altogether."

You keep insisting that justification must conform to your strictures, but that's imposing your preconception on Pauline categories. In Pauline theology, God justifies sinners. They are not "ontologically" righteous. They are the opposite of "ontologically" righteous. 

"Would you say that the Crown Prince did the military exploits 'legally'?"

I'm not using that framework. The crown prince didn't perform the military exploits at all. Rather, he's the beneficiary, as if those were his personal attainments. 

Your approach reminds me of methodological atheism. Even if divine agency is the correct explanation for a particular phenomenon, the methodological atheist discounts that explanation in advance. By the same token, your approach disallows imputation even if it turns out that in fact this is what Paul really means. You have a screen in place that filters out certain interpretations even if they happen to be correct. Is there any kind of evidence you'd allow to count against your interpretive grid, or is that unfalsifiable?

The Ordo Salutis

http://upper-register.typepad.com/blog/2017/07/justification-and-union-with-christ-part-6.html

Not Ashamed To Call Them Brethren

"Christ came to earth as God to take upon Himself the flesh and blood of our human nature. That is a profound statement. The baby in the manger had the same human nature as you and I, only without sin….Because He is like us, Christ also sympathizes with all the pains and miseries that come from living in a sin-afflicted world….As we glimpse at the manger of His birth we can say, 'This is my brother, my flesh and blood.' As He grows and matures and continues to do the will of God, we can say, 'This is my brother, my flesh and blood.' As He goes to the cross and bleeds and dies, we can say, 'This is my brother, my flesh and blood.' When we see Christ seated at the right hand of God the Father Almighty, we can say, 'This is my brother, my flesh and blood.' And when we see Christ return on clouds of glory to take us home to be with Him we will say 'This is my brother, my flesh and blood.'…'For both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one: for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren' (Heb. 2:11)." (Joel Beeke and William Boekestein, Why Christ Came [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Reformation Heritage Books, 2013], 13-5)

Is imputation a legal fiction?

The stock objection to imputation (or vicarious atonement/penal substitution generally) is that you can't detach the merit/demerit of a deed from the agent who performed it and reattach it to a second party.

There's no knockdown argument for that. It's just the intuitive sense that imputation artificially separates what's inseparable.

One counterarguement I've used in the past goes like this: A defining element of friendship is favoritism. We do things for friends we don't do for strangers. Any particular favor is gratuitous; however, that's grounded having earned someone's friendship, and vice versa.

But there's an extension to that principle:

Bud is Bubba's friend

Bubba is Buster's friend

Buster isn't Bud's friend

(They don't dislike each other, but they don't happen to be friends.)

Bud asks Bubba to do a favor for Buster. Bubba complies, but he's really doing the favor for Bud. He is treating Buster as if Buster is Bud; he is treating Buster as if Buster is his friend, in virtue of his friendship (and their mutual friendship) with Bud. So there's a transferable dynamic. 

Now for a different kind of argument. In criminal law and theological ethics, it's typical to distinguish intent from the objective character of the deed. Not only are they distinct, but separable.

For instance, if a 4-year-old shoots his 5-year-old brother to death, we don't charge the 4-year-old with murder. Although the deed is objectively wrong (i.e. his brother's death is an evil), and even though action may have been deliberate rather than accidental, we make allowance for the fact that at that age he's incapable of forming criminal intent. Even if he was mad at his brother and wanted him dead, he didn't appreciate the significance of the act. He didn't want his brother to stay dead. He didn't expect his brother to stay dead. He doesn't think long-term. At that age he can't.

Consider to other examples: 

Jim and John are bunkmates on a military base. Jim works in military intelligence. Jim is a patriot. Jim and John are best friends.

Unbeknownst to Jim, John is actually a spy. Because he thinks John is trustworthy, Jim sometimes shares things is casual confidence regarding military secrets. Indeed, because John is bit of a math genius, Jim sometimes asks John to help him out on decryption/encryption.

As a result, Jim unwittingly compromises national security. His action is objectively wrong, but because he did not intend to compromise national security, the absence of malicious intent is either exculpatory or a mitigating factor . He had no reason to suspect John's bona fides. That's an extenuating circumstance.

In addition, friendship is praiseworthy. Although John betrayed his trust, it's the kind of betrayal that can only take place in the context of friendship (or apparent friendship), and friendship is virtuous. 

A final example: Drake is driving on a country road during a rainstorm. He spots a pedestrian who's getting drenched. He offers him a ride into town. Unbeknownst to Drake, the pedestrian is a serial killer, on the run from the law. 

A squad car passes them and continues on its way. The policeman is on the lookout for a man matching the description of the suspect. But because Drake gave the suspct a ride, the policeman misses him. Had Drake driven past him, the serial killer would have been apprehended by the policeman.

As a result, Drake unwittingly facilitates serial murder. Thanks to Drake, the sociopath eludes capture and continues his killing spree.

Drake's action is objectively wrong. Objectively blameworthy. But because he intended no wrong, the absence of malicious intent is exculpatory. 

Moreover, it was admirable for him to pick up a stranger in the rain. 

Technically, we might say agents are blameworthy rather than their actions, unless we view the action as an extension of the agent.

A final example is an organ donor. In general, organ donation is morally commendable. However, donors usually have no control over who the organ(s) go to. That liver might go to a patient who will commit murder a decade later. 

These examples illustrate the principle that the elements of moral action, the elements which make an action moral or immoral, are detachable. The intent may be inculpable or praiseworthy even though the deed is objectively blameworthy or culpable. 

That's not necessarily the same as transferable, but it's hard to claim that what's detachable can't be transferable. 

This is a less direct parallel than the friendship/favoritism example. It about a more general principle. 

Why Imputation Is Not a Legal Fiction

http://theaquilareport.com/why-imputation-is-not-a-legal-fiction/

There are a variety of responses, but the best one, it seems to me, resides in the metaphor of marriage union. We will also add a few things afterwards that will help us understand.

In most marriages, property entails joint ownership. Now, if a woman comes into the marriage with a debt (like a college debt), the husband assumes that debt. It becomes their debt (it can also be described as his debt), even though the husband did not incur that debt. Similarly, whatever money the husband brought into the marriage doesn’t belong just to him anymore, it also belongs to her, even though she did not earn it. So, by virtue of the marriage union between husband and wife, the debts and the assets are transferred.

In a very similar way, when the believer becomes united to Christ by faith, a new legal situation results with transfers happening.

Read the whole article here.

Corporate personhood

I'm going to begin by making a legal and political point, then use that to segue into a theological point. Liberals mock or revile the legal concept of corporate personhood when that crops up in certain First Amendment cases that don't go their way. They act like corporate personhood is arbitrary or absurd.

Of course, judges and lawmakers are perfectly aware of the fact that corporate personhood is a legal fiction. But it's a meaningful and essential construction. As one prominent law prof. explains:

The law also treats various nonhuman, nonsentient entities as “persons” for certain legal purposes. Corporations, estates, trusts, partnerships, and government entities are often defined this way. Walmart, Illinois, and the California Pension Fund can sue, for example, without anyone asking if they have a right to abortion. Sometimes, corporations can bring suit (or be sued) because a statute explicitly gives “persons” that right, and defines “persons” to include corporations. At other times, the statute does not define “persons,” but courts interpret the word to include corporations because they believe that is what Congress intended. This transubstantiation of corporations into persons advances some pretty uncontroversial policy goals. If corporations lacked personhood, you couldn’t sue FedEx for crashing a van into your car, or Walmart for selling you a defective space heater that burns down your home, or J.P. Morgan for defrauding you when you get a lemon mortgage. You wouldn’t be able to enter into contracts with a corporation at all. Legislatures and courts have been treating corporations like persons for hundreds of years: There is even a general interpretive rule in the law that when Congress says “persons,” it means corporations as well, unless the context of the statute provides otherwise. 

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/12/personhood_for_corporations_and_chimpanzees_is_an_essential_legal_fiction.html

Here's another useful analysis:

http://www.vox.com/2014/7/2/5860732/six-reasons-liberal-should-like-corporate-personhood

This goes into even more detail:

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/Shapiro-JMLR-vol44-n4-2011.pdf

So the principle is quite important in its own right. But that brings me to the next point. Catholics complain that justification by faith alone, the imputation of Adam's sin, and the imputation of Christ's righteousness, are "legal fictions." Likewise, some atheists (e.g. Ken Pulliam) and Arminian theologians (e.g. Joel Green) complain that penal substitution (or vicarious atonement) is a "legal fiction." To this I'd say three things:

i) If you'd rather die in your sins than accept vicarious atonement, you get what you ask for.

ii) It's not a legal fiction. Christ's righteousness really is imputed to the elect. 

iii) But suppose, for the sake of argument, it was a legal fiction. So what? Maybe that sounds bad. But there's no reason a "legal fiction" should have invidious connotations. The law treats businesses and nonprofit organizations as if these were were persons, even though a legal person is not a real person. Yet there's nothing silly about that construction. To the contrary, it's a necessary acknowledgement of the fact that human action has a social as well as individual dimension. The law must confer personal rights and responsibilities on such organizations. 

Union with Christ is analogous to corporate personhood. Even if we consider it a "legal fiction," that's a meaningful and necessary principle.  

Aquinas’s “donum superadditum” vs the Alien Righteousness of Christ

Here is the heart of the issue between Protestants and Roman Catholics. For those who are following along in my series on “chain-of-being” ontology:

Starting things off: Eastern Orthodoxy: Same as all the other Eastern religions
Part 1: “Metaphysical Religion” and “Becoming One with God”
Part 2: Aquinas, “existence”, and the failure to observe the Creator-creature distinction

Here is the Creator/creature distinction in the ontological sense:

Intrinsically holy, God is qualitatively distinct from creation—not just more than, but different from, his creatures. There is no divine soul, preexisting throughout eternity, thrown mercilessly into the realm of time and matter. God breathed life into Adam in creation, and he “became a living being” (Gen 2:7 NIV)—an embodied soul and an animated body. And yet, God pronounced this creation good (Gen 1:4, 1:10, 1:12, 1:18, 1:21, 1:25, [and “very good” when speaking of man, Gen 1:31]).

It is no crime to be different from God. Finitude is not a “falling away” from some primordial infinitude. There is no part of human nature that is higher, brighter, more infinite, or more real than another. This means that the only legitimate ontological distinction is between the uncreated God and the created world, not between spiritual and material realms (as is posited in the “chain-of-being” ontology). Ontological difference – the strangeness that makes us stand in awe of God’s majesty – is good … (from Michael Horton, “The Christian Faith”, A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims On the Way, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan © 2011, pg 42).

So yes, above and beyond the condition “to exist”, Confessional Protestantism holds this Creator/creature distinction. This distinction also exists in the ethical sense after the fall:

Bethlehem-Town

As I was going to Bethlehem-town,
Upon the earth I cast me down
All underneath a little tree
That whispered in this way to me:
"Oh, I shall stand on Calvary
And bear what burden saveth thee:
Oh, I shall stand on Calvary
And bear what burden saveth thee!"

As up I fared to Bethlehem-town,
I met a shepherd coming down,
And thus he said: "A wondrous sight
Hath spread before mine eyes this night—
An angel host most fair to see,
That sung full sweetly of a tree
That shall uplift on Calvary
What burden saveth you and me!"

And as I got to Bethlehem-town,
Lo! wise men came that bore a crown.
"Is there," cried I, "in Bethlehem
A King shall wear this diadem?"
"Most sure," they said, "and it is He
That shall be lifted on the tree
And freely shed on Calvary
What blood redeemeth us and thee!"

Unto a Child in Bethlehem-town
The wise men came and brought the crown;
And while the Infant smiling slept,
Upon their knees they fell and wept;
But, with her Babe upon her knee,
Naught recked that Mother of the tree,
That should uplift on Calvary
What burden saveth all and me.

Again I walk in Bethlehem-town
And think on Him that wears the crown.
I may not kiss His feet again,
Nor worship Him as did I then;
My King hath died upon the tree,
And hath outpoured on Calvary
What blood redeemeth you and me:
Outpoured for us on Calvary.
(Eugene Field, Bethlehem-Town)

Explaining away Augustine's error

Bryan Cross has contested my article on Augustine and Justification from yesterday (here and here). But he doesn't do it by challenging the version of the facts that I presented. He does it by making an argument that if Augustine had made the error, then the Protestant version of history can't be the correct one because in that case no one for a thousand years would have believed "the article by which the church stands or falls, justification by imputation".


Bryan said:

(1): From a Reformed point of view, justification by faith alone is the article by which the Church stands or falls.

I don't think I need to defend this premise, because no Reformed person I've ever met contests it. Luther said it, and prominent Reformed people say it all the time (see, for example, here). Or just google it.

The meaning of "justification by faith alone" here is not "justification by fides caritate formata, i.e. faith informed by agape. Therefore, "justification by faith alone" is here referring to justification by the extra nos imputation of Christ's righteousness.

1. Yes, we say this, and in fact I have said this, but it's not a doctrinal articulation. In the same way that "Sola Scriptura", "Sola Fide", Soli Deo Gloria" were slogans. They were short-hand for things. They were sound-bites. They were not doctrinal articulations.

So no, "you don't need to defend this premise", except that -- and this is the thing you frequently do -- you need to take on the best theologians of Protestantism -- and that means someone like Turretin, or the WCF, or Bavinck -- folks who are thinking through all the ramifications of these doctrines. And not the articulations of the popular masses.

You would have a conniption if James White put together an in-depth "argument" on the phrase "To Jesus through Mary". It is a popular slogan, not the articulation of a doctrine.

So from unpacking (1) we can see that: ... (2) From a Reformed point of view, justification by the extra nos imputation of Christ's righteousness is the article by which the Church stands or falls.

2. I'm not denying it was important. But you need to "unpack" the doctrine as it exists in the confessions, not a popular understanding of it, or worse, your own caricature of it.

(3) Augustine goofed on justification by claiming that justification was by infused righteousness; the whole medieval world followed him in his goof for a thousand years, and the Council of Trent ratified this error infallibly. (source)

3. Augustine clearly misunderstood the Hebrew notion of hasdiq; as the LXX translated it (there is a range of meanings in any translation) Augustine stepped further away from the original meaning, the term "make righteous". And yes, the net effect was that the concept of "infused righteousness" became a concept in Christian understanding for the first time. (Why don't you make a big deal about this theological novum?)

And I'm not the one saying this, it is Alister McGrath, at Oxford, who spent years studying this in the original languages, and whose work was checked by some of the most knowledgeable scholars in the world.

If you want to contest this, it would seem to me that the "logical" thing to do would be to contest McGrath's findings at a factual level. Simply saying, "this doesn't fit with our paradigm so it's wrong" ... I'm sure you are aware of a named logical fallacy named for this.

(4) As soon as the whole Catholic Church adopted Augustine's goof, the Catholic Church fell, and remained fallen for a thousand years. [from (2) and (3)]

4. As I said above, the church did not fall. Christ did not become inoperative in the world because of Augustine's mistake. No doubt he worked around it. Your characterization "the Catholic Church fell" is a straw man in several respects. First, it assumes that "the Catholic Church" structure is the one that Christ put in place; it assumes that the whole church is dependent upon the word of one theologian; and it assumes that "the church" is dependent upon doctrinal articulations.

(5) "The truly catholic church has always been." [R. Scott Clark (source)]

5. I agree with Clark. And keep reading what he says: That it has not always been visible as it was in the Reformation does not mean that there has not always been a remnant or that the church has not at times been profoundly corrupted. There is an developmental understanding of the church that avoids both the trail of blood historiography and its Romanist alternative.


* * *

Then Bryan says:

So this leaves us with a Reformed version of the Baptist trail of blood, in which ecclesial deism is denied by positing a continuous but historically invisible succession of persons holding "justification by the extra nos imputation of Christ's righteousness" for a thousand years, even though there is no historical record that any such persons ever existed during those thousand years.

So, when Clark says there is a church "that avoids both the trail of blood historiography and its Romanist alternative", and you omit that part of his sentence, but immediately say "this brings us with a Reformed version of the baptist trail of blood", how is it that you are not being the dishonest one here?

We are far from agreed on what your definition of the church is, or should be.

And as for your characterization that "there is no historical record that any such persons ever existed during those thousand years", do you believe that the dogma quoad se [doctrines in themselves] and dogma quoad nos [as they have to do with us] are identical with one another and perfectly correspond at every single point?

If you believe that, you have to make that argument.

If Augustine truly made an error, it is more intellectually honest to say that he made that error, than to explain it away. You are the one trying to explain it away.

Bryan has yet to articulate a positive case for his statement that the Roman Catholic Church is "the Church that Christ Founded".

Richard Belcher on Historic Adam

http://www.reformation21.org/articles/did-adam-and-eve-really-exist-a-review.php

The Righteousness of Christ imputed to believers

One of the sideshows from the recent Dave Armstrong threads involved a discussion of “the righteousness of Christ imputed to believers”. One of the commenters there said, “But you don't really care whether ‘the imputation of Christ’s righteousness’ is in the Bible or not, do you, John? Not really.” He also reiterated many times, “there just is no such thing as ‘the imputation of Christ's righteousness’ in scripture and no amount of verbal acrobatics can change that.”

Another commenter essentially quoted Roman Catholic doctrine: “Imputed righteousness is something that is not taught in the Bible. God's grace is infused and is able to actually clean and recreate a new heart in us as opposed to forensic justification which is the notion that God merely takes an eraser to our "account" and erases our sins.”

One of the better brief statements concerning the Reformed doctrine of “the righteousness of Christ imputed to the believer” is in John Murray’s Redemption Accomplished and Applied. The link here is to his chapter on Justification, but several of the specific pages which deal with that topic are missing. So I’d like to provide here the entire sweep of Murray’s argument that not only is the sinner’s sin forgiven in justification, but as well, the Righteousness of Christ is imputed to the sinner as well.

Murray deals effectively with the notion of why “our own righteousness”, even that given by God’s grace, is not sufficient for what God’s holiness entails: