An excerpt from Hell: against universalism by Ioanna-Maria Patsalidou.
The main problems that universalists must resolve concern: (a) the notion of libertarian freedom; (b) the nature of the afterlife worlds; (c) the notion of curative punishment; (d) interpretation and translation of key scriptural texts; and (e) the nature of God as love.
a. Libertarian view
Most universalists, if not all, affirm a kind of libertarian freedom of choice. Libertarian freedom is thought to be important not only for morally significant choices but also for genuine personal relationships. Taking libertarian freedom seriously universalists hold that all will reconcile with God freely in trust, faith and love. I have argued throughout the three core chapters of the thesis that universalists cannot consistently hold this view of freedom and at the same time affirm universal salvation. In supporting universal salvation they are committed to the claim that whatever human beings do, they will, nevertheless, enjoy fellowship with God. Universalists will have to find a way to argue that God does not rob His human creatures of their freedom while He attempts to reconcile them to Himself.
It might seem that one way for the universalist to avoid this difficulty would be to hold that people do not have libertarian freedom but compatibilist freedom. Compatibilism holds that free will is compatible with some degree of causal determinism. However, if libertarian freedom were to be denied, and universalists were to hold that freedom and determinism are compatible, then things would not be entirely trouble free for universalism. If God has given human beings compatibilist freedom then, following John Mackie, one could ask: why did God not create humans in such a way as to always choose good in their earthly lives? Moreover, if it were in God's power to create a world in which human beings are free to choose the good in their earthly life and consequently are free to choose God instead of hell then someone would wonder why God did not create all human beings in heaven in the first place. Furthermore, in explaining why God did not create all in a heavenly state from the beginning, a universalist might say that it is because it is more important for humans to develop a good character for themselves through overcoming difficulties and challenges. For these reasons, universalism cannot support a compatibilist view of freedom but require a libertarian view.
There is a tension if not a contradiction in affirming both the certainty of universalism, on the one hand, and a libertarian view of freedom, on the other. A clear commitment to libertarian freedom leaves open the possibility that not all will be saved. If universalists hold onto a libertarian view of freedom, then they will be forced to admit the possibility that some of the damned will continue refusing God's love.
b. Nature of the afterlife and intermediate worlds
Universalists hold that God will not cease helping people and guiding them in the life to come. Most human beings die without ever knowing God. If God's plan is to save all then He will give to sinners more opportunities in further lives to continue their moral development and find and love God. Of the universalists considered in this thesis, only Hick attempts to give a detailed account of what the next worlds will consists in. Other universalists, may shy away from providing details about this in order to avoid further questions which would inevitably arise about memory and personal identity.376 They affirm that the environments in the next worlds will be such that they will compel the sinners freely to join God through some kind of curative punishment for the sins which they have committed in their earthly lives. Moreover, the environments of the future lives will be designed to nourish all humans and help them transform into children of God.
The main problem with this characterization of the next worlds is that it portrays them as far too similar to the current earthly environment. These future environments will be places with challenges to overcome through pain and suffering. If this is the nature of the environments in the afterlives, and if humans have the kind of libertarian freedom which universalists affirm, then universalists will have to accept that there is the possibility that salvation will not be every single person's eternal fate. There are two reasons for this: Firstly, there is no guarantee that some sinners will refrain from committing evils acts. Knowing that they can continue existing and knowing that whatever they do they will eventually be saved might give them more reasons to continue doing what they are doing, acting in ways contrary to God's will. Secondly, although it may be the case that in the presence of severe punishment and challenges to overcome some of the sinners would decide to join God, their decision would be based on their wish to escape punishment and not on feelings of trust and love towards God.
The universalist would have to give a better account of what would be different in the afterlife environments which would lead even the worst sinners to act in good ways, repent and be reconciled to God. They would have to explain what element the next worlds have that would necessarily lead sinners to come to God. One suggestion could be that God would be obvious in the afterlives thus making sure that all humans know that He exists and that it is best for them to follow Him. However, this reply would create a problem for universalists as we have seen in Hick's account. If they want to hold onto a libertarian view of human freedom then they cannot claim that God will be obvious. The only way that humans can make free and autonomous choices is if God and His purpose for creation are not obvious to them.377 Moreover, a question that inevitably emerges if someone claims that God would be obvious in the post-mortem lives would be why God has been hidden in this current life. Why did God wait until the occurrence of the post-mortem lives to reveal himself? If human freedom is essential in the earthly life, and if it remains essential in the lives to come, God would have to remain hidden from His human beings in their future lives, in the same way as He has been hidden from them in their earthly life.
On the other hand, if universalists hold that God is hidden in the lives to come another problem comes up. I have argued that the worst of the sinners would not have a different nature in the afterlives than the one which they have in their earthly lives. Their perception of what is good would be twisted, and if instant transformation of character is off the table for universalists, this distorted nature would be carried into the immediate future life. If their nature is severely corrupted, and if the environment in which they would have to exercise this nature is similar to the earthly one, and if God remains hidden, it is difficult to see how the worst kind of sinners would come to understand God's love and thus repent for their crimes. So it is not obvious how the worst of the sinners would ever begin the process of restoration and achieve salvation.
Another task for universalist positions then would be to give a more detailed or careful presentation of the nature of the afterlives. To do so they may have to give arguments regarding human memory and personal identity. However, offering and examining arguments of that sort may well lead to problems that are even more difficult to solve because arguments about human memory and personal identity after death are themselves highly contentious. Another approach, that some have tried, is to give some detail about what kind of experiences the damned would have in the lives to come and to explain the kind of punishment that would take place. Nevertheless, as we see in the next section, this strategy also fails.
c. Curative punishment
As we have seen, universalists do not deny that there might be some kind of punishment in the afterlife and some of them have argued that the punishment might be as severe as the pains and suffering someone would have been afflicted with on the traditional view of hell. What makes the universalist's view different from the traditional account of punishment in hell is that they hold that the punishment inflicted is not retributive in nature but curative. Pain they argue, following Origen, cures. The main problem with this view is that it is not obvious that pain cures and if pain does not cure then universal salvation is not guaranteed. There must be some arguments or evidence which would establish the curative efficacy of pain and punishment. Here I suggest the more obvious things that universalists would have to show if their arguments are to guarantee salvation for all human beings. Firstly, they will have to explain how the worst sinners will come to realize that their punishment is for their own good. Secondly, it has to be shown that severe physical and mental punishment lead to moral amendment. Thirdly, universalists have to show that the character which emerges from severe punishment can be legitimately called virtuous.
Let us begin with the first point. It seems that universalists fail to show how the villain in the lives to come is in a mental state such that would permit him to understand the reasons behind his punishment. The sinners, as I have said above, carry their evil nature with them into the next lives. If they did not recognize what was good for them and which actions it would have been good to perform during their earthly life, and also, have a twisted idea of what is good and what is bad then it seems likely that they would not understand the reasons behind their punishment and so experience it as a hateful thing. But perhaps a more important point relevant to the whole process of restorative punishment is that the legislator who aims to cure the worst villains, in this case God, would have to be recognized as such. The sinner has to have some idea of the nature of the person or entity that inflicts the pain and suffering. That is, God has to be recognized as the appropriate distributor of punishment. The curative process of punishment would only begin if the sinner accepts the punishment which is inflicted on him by accepting firstly, the reasons for him been punished and realizing the wrongness of his actions and, secondly, that the person who punishes him is the appropriate distributor of punishment. Universalists then will have to give a better account of what makes it the case that the sinners will realize that their punishment is for their own good and that God loves them.
Secondly, even if we did agree that it is generally necessary, and so acceptable, to inflict cruel punishment on the worst kind of villains, it would still be difficult to argue or affirm that severe physical pain and/or the mental sufferings of remorse and of feelings of guilt in themselves lead to moral amendment. There is little doubt that prolonged suffering interferes with a person's life-in-action. If the punishment in the afterlives will be excruciating and its duration will last according to the needs of each sinner, we may argue that the punishment might be harsh and in such a degree that would produce a neurotic state in which the person who experiences the pain and suffering can no longer see any future possibilities for change.378 In short, the case that severe physical or mental punishment leads to moral amendment is yet to be made.
Thirdly, another more radical method of attacking the value of curative punishment as a punishment which deters the damned from continuing to sin and compels them to repent is to argue that the resultant behaviour may not legitimately be called good or virtuous. An attitude that is arrived at through the coercion of excruciating punishment would not be as worthwhile as an attitude which has been formed willingly. So virtue induced as a result of such excruciating punishment would seem to be unworthy of the name. I have argued in all three chapters that even if the curative punishment which the damned will have to undergo may bring about repentance, their repentance would be unlikely to be genuine. Fear or boredom might be the reasons behind the sinners' repentance, and if this is the case, repentance is not made through love, faith and trust in God. If the reasons for obeying God are fear of punishment or hope for reward and the wish to evade punishment, I argue that it adds nothing to the moral value of good conduct; on the contrary the damned have been put in a position in which it is even more difficult to attain a pure love and submission to God's will.379
Even granted that the damned must be reformed, is such excruciating suffering necessary and inevitable? To answer this question positively universalists have to demonstrate that the kind of punishment which they envisage would have the required curative effects. Unless they provide substantial grounds to convince us that punishment remedies the sinners' disorder of the character, then there is no good reason to accept a curative theory of punishment.
d. The interpretation and translation of particular texts in the scriptures
In the second chapter of the thesis, I pointed out that one of the main reasons why the doctrine of hell remained unchallenged for so long and why a Christian could not easily refrain from believing it is the hard-to-deny fact that the doctrine is preached in the scriptures. Someone could, of course, say that what is in the scriptures should have no bearing on the philosophical debate about the fate of sinners. But this arguments cuts both ways. We have seen that those who support universalism do base their arguments on particular interpretations of the scriptures. For example, one of the main arguments which they proposed in favour of universalism is based on the interpretation of the Greek word αιώνιος. They argue that the Greek adjective αιώνιος, that is translated in English Bibles as 'eternal' or 'everlasting', literally means 'age enduring'. It has been claimed that this word need not mean eternal or unending and, in fact, there are passages in the scriptures which speak of a mystery which is 'age enduring' and which can come to an end. So punishment in hell can be taken to be 'age enduring' and not eternal.380
I suggest that a further investigation into the translation and interpretation of these passages may be promising in shedding light on whether universalism is definitively preached in the scriptures. Defenders of universalism would have to demonstrate that the claim that all will be saved in the end is clearly there in the text. This seems unpromising though as the evidence so far available in favour of universalism is not as strong as the evidence in favour of a doctrine of hell. Future research will also have to investigate why the early Christian fathers did not include the Testament of Paul and other testaments (which are categorized as, what is known as, apocrypha) in the main teaching of Christian religion.381 The Testament of Paul, for example, provides the greater amount of passages which support universal salvation. If this investigation into the translation and interpretation of the Christian texts is ultimately unfruitful then defenders of universalism will have to support their position by arguments which reject the doctrine of hell on philosophical and moral grounds; such an approach, as I have argued in previous chapters, does not succeed.
e. Is universal salvation necessarily an expression of God's love?
Universalism maintains that God's love for His creation is inconsistent with the claim that God does not wish to save all of it. The argument focuses on two claims: that if God truly loves a human being then He desires to save it; and if God truly loves all human beings then His desire will be to save them all. If God is by His nature love, then God must love all humans and desire their salvation. Universalism cannot begin to support the salvation of all human beings unless it defines God's love in these terms. If God's nature is not in fact the one that universalists propose then their argument does not hold.
There has been a sustained attempt throughout the centuries from many Christian philosophers and theologians to reconcile a doctrine of hell with God's loving nature. Aquinas has made one of the most well known attempts to reconcile God's love with a doctrine of hell, and it has been recently modified and developed by Eleonore Stump.382 Philosophers in this tradition argue that hell flows from God's love. Stump, for example, holds that by properly defining God's goodness we can reconcile it with the doctrine of hell. The key point is that God's loving nature can be defined in such a way that would not be inconsistent with a doctrine of hell. So the universalist would have to not only define God's love in such a way as to exclude the possibility of eternal hell but also give better accounts of the nature of curative punishment and human freedom, as well as of God's omnipotent love.
[Footnotes]
376 For more on this see Ducasse C. J., The Belief in a Life After Death (Charles C Thomas Publisher), 1961. Paul Badham, Christian Beliefs about Life After Death (The Macmillan Press, 1976). Immortality, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1992). Terence Penelhum, Survival and Disembodied Existence (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York: Humanities Press, 1970).
377 On the distinction between freedom and autonomy, see chapter three, part I, section 1.
378 While discussing Adams account in chapter five I offered an argument against her claim that all sinners will come to embrace God freely. I argued that in cases of severe forms of depression it is not obvious that the victim of such in her own words, 'horrendous evils' would be able to exercise its freedom. See chapter five, part II, section 2.
379 For example, Aristotle and Spinoza have denied any moral value to actions performed through fear. Moreover, Walker says that the only thinker that applied this principle to the doctrine of hell was Shaftesbury. See D. P. Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 167–177.
380 See for example, Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God (Universal Publishers, 1999), p. 86.
381 For more see Alan E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds (UCL Press, 1993). Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, Arthur Goldhammer, trans., (London: Scholar Press, 1984). Robin A. Parry and Christopher H. Partridge, eds., Universal Salvation? The Current Debate (Paternoster Press, 2003).
382 See Eleonore Stump, 'Dante's Hell, Aquinas' Moral Theory, and the Love of God', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, n. 2 (1986), pp. 181–198. Eleonore Stump, 'Love, by All Accounts', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 80, no. 2 (2006), pp. 25–43. Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (Routledge, 2003). Eleonore Stump, 'Suffering, Theodicy, and Defense, in Wandering in Darkness - Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Eleonore Stump and Kretzmann Norman, 'Being and Goodness', in Being and Goodness, Scott MacDonald, ed. (Cornell University, 1991), pp. 98–128.
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