Is it evil to cause evil? That seems transferable. But is it a reliable inference?
This crops up in debates over Calvinism. Mind you, there are various respects in which the God of freewill theism causes evil.
Now, there are certainly situations in which causing evil is evil. Indeed, that may well be typical. I'm just discussing whether, as a matter of principle, it is evil to cause evil.
Suppose torrential rain causes a damed river to become swollen. That accelerates the downstream current. There's a much greater volume of water, moving much faster, resulting in tremendous kinetic energy pounding the dam. The dam operator has a choice: he can release some water to relieve the strain on the dam. If he does so, that will flood riverside towns downstream, causing major damage. That's an evil. That causes an evil state of affairs.
Or he can let the water build up behind the dam. The cumulative force will make the dam lose structure integrity and collapse, causing an avalanche or wall of fast-moving water to wipe the downstream towns off the map. That's a greater evil.
Is it evil for him to cause the lesser evil, by releasing some water to diminish pressure on the dam?
Someone might object that God isn't subject to the same constraints as the dam operator. But even if that's the case, the point of the example is to illustrate a point of principle: it is not necessarily evil to cause evil.
Moreover, even an omnipotent God is under a self-imposed constraint if he uses a natural process to produce a desired result.