Unbelievers typically say they reject the Resurrection because it's too improbable. Now, one way of testing a position, even if you don't believe it, is to ask yourself what, if anything, would be different in case it were true.
Suppose you're an atheist. You don't believe in the Resurrection because it's too improbable. But as a thought-experiment, you grant the Resurrection.
As far as I can see, that would make absolutely no difference in how unbelievers lay odds on the Resurrection. Even if it happened, they'd still say it was too improbable to happen. Even though (ex hypothesi) it happened, they'd refuse to believe it because their probability calculus discounts it ahead of time.
But isn't there something screwy about that? The fact of the matter has no impact on their outlook. Whether or not it happened makes to no difference to their believing that it never happened. If our probability calculus treats events and nonevents exactly alike, don't we need to revise our probability calculus?