I'm going to discuss a comment on this post:
Bill’s solution in a way just bites the bullet: Yes there is definitely an unequal distribution of opportunity. But that’s acceptable, he says, because everyone who did not get the opportunity would have rejected the opportunity anyway. They would not have repented, even if they had the chance to do so.
Consider the irony of Craig's position. As I recall, Craig takes the position that even though some people in this world will go to hell, they are hellbound in every possible world that includes them. There is no situation under which they'd freely (in the libertarian sense) accept the Gospel.
But if there is no possible world in which they freely accept Christ, then in what respect are they free in the libertarian sense? Doesn't that mean their salvation is impossible? It's not even possible for them to freely believe the Gospel?
There’s also an interesting passage of Scripture which, if read through Arminian eyes, presents a significant problem for Bill’s solution, I think. In Luke 10:13, Jesus laments how reluctant people in his time were to believe, in spite of the evidence of who he was. Then he makes a comparison to a people who lived long ago: “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago, sitting in sackcloth and ashes.” The meaning seems pretty clear: You people aren’t repenting even though I’m right here, working miracles, giving you the opportunity to do so – but these people from long ago, if they had this sort of opportunity, they would have repented.But they didn’t have the opportunity and they did not repent. So it sounds like Jesus thought that there were some people who never had the opportunity to repent, but who would have done so under different circumstances.
This generates a dilemma for Craig. This is one of his prooftexts for Molinism. Mind you, even he admits that, at most, this only proves God's counterfactual knowledge, not God's middle knowledge. (Middle knowledge is a theory of God's prevolitional knowledge of what possible agents with libertarian freedom would do or choose in every situation.)
However, Craig is also a proponent of divine omnibenevolence. He believes that God gives everyone who is receptive to salvation an opportunity to be saved. But this verse forces Craig to choose between middle knowledge and omnibenevolence. If it supports middle knowledge, it opposes omnibenevolence.
"Consider the irony of Craig's position. As I recall, Craig takes the position that even though some people in this world will go to hell, they are hellbound in every possible world that includes them. There is no situation under which they'd freely (in the libertarian sense) accept the Gospel. "
ReplyDeleteNot accurate; you're missing the distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds. Possible worlds include everything any agent COULD choose freely (in the libertarian sense) and belong to God's natural knowledge. Feasible worlds are determined by what an agent actually WOULD choose freely and belong to God's middle knowledge. On Molinism the set of feasible worlds is smaller than the set of possible worlds.
Except that his prooftext disproves transworld damnation.
DeleteThat's nice, but I wasn't addressing that; I was addressing your failure to understand the difference between possible and feasible worlds. Your insinuation that transworld damnation obviates libertarian freedom was predicated on that misunderstanding.
DeleteIn any event, Craig has said that he interprets the passage in question as hyperbole intended to emphasize the wickedness of the cities, rather than as a literal expression of counterfactual knowledge (a similar view is expressed here: http://sententias.org/2012/05/30/they-would-have-believed/). This might contradict what he has said elsewhere, but it is at least an option for the Molinist.
Also, it is possible to affirm that God gives everyone the opportunity to be saved, and yet to deny that all those who are actually damned are transworldly damned. Providing someone sufficient grace to be saved is not the same as providing him with maximal grace. For example, http://www.traditionalbaptistchronicles.com/2013/05/matthew-1121-23-why-were-people-of.html.
christandcosmos
Delete"That's nice, but I wasn't addressing that; I was addressing your failure to understand the difference between possible and feasible worlds. Your insinuation that transworld damnation obviates libertarian freedom was predicated on that misunderstanding."
i) To the contrary, transworld depravity does indeed obviate libertarian freedom. According to transworld depravity, it's inevitable that a free agent will sin. Free agents will go wrong regardless of the situation.
But according to libertarian freedom, if an agent has libertarian freewill, then there's a possible world in which he sins as well as another possible world in which he refrains from sinning. In that case, human freedom is no impediment to God instantiating the possible world in which the agent freely refrains from sinning.
That's a feasible world. For God is not instantiating that world despite what the agent chose, but consistent with what the agent chose–given the fact that there's more than one choice in play–with possible worlds corresponding to each.
ii) Keep in mind that transworld depravity was just a conjecture which Plantinga floated to deflect the logical problem from evil. There's not the slightest reason to think it's true. And, indeed, even on libertarian grounds, there's good reason to think it's false. Cf.:
http://www3.nd.edu/~jrasmus1/docs/philrel/counterfactual.pdf
"In any event, Craig has said that he interprets the passage in question as hyperbole intended to emphasize the wickedness of the cities, rather than as a literal expression of counterfactual knowledge"
In which case he surrenders a locus classicus for Molinism. That's a self-defeating tactic.
"Also, it is possible to affirm that God gives everyone the opportunity to be saved, and yet to deny that all those who are actually damned are transworldly damned."
You're sprinkling pixie dust on the gold at the end of the rainbow. Theology needs to be founded on something more substantial than unbridled speculation.
Again, you fail to understand the difference between feasible and possible worlds, which indicates that the loudness and vociferousness with which you denounce Molinism is grossly disproportionate to your actual grasp on the subject matter.
DeleteConsider a libertarian agent X in circumstances Y who has the choice between Z and not-Z. Under Molinism, both worlds are intrinsically possible, since possible worlds include everything an agent COULD do. However, Molinism also posits that there is a definite fact of the matter about what agent X WOULD do in Y - i.e., a true counterfactual of creaturely freedom. If it is true the agent X WOULD choose Z in Y, then that world is feasible, and the world in which X chooses non-Z in Y is infeasible.
Also, I was not engaging in "unbridled speculation." I was pointing out that, if omnibenevolence be defined as the idea that God gives everyone the opportunity to be saved, then a Molinist could interpret Luke 10.13 as a literal expression AND affirm omnibenevolence without inconsistency. This is because giving everyone sufficient grace is not identical to giving everyone maximal grace. This consideration torpedoes your argument that Luke 10.13, if taken as a statement of Middle Knowledge, is at odds with omnibenevolence.
>>Molinism also posits that there is a definite fact of the matter about what agent X WOULD do in Y
DeletePerhaps you could help me out here. If a Molinist is also going to hold to power of contrary choice, as Craig does, as well as every other Molinist I can think of, then one can't jump directly to what an agent would do in Y, because there is a possible world in which it is true that our agent X would do Z in Y and a possible world in which it is false that our agent X would do Z in Y. And these different possible worlds are identical with respect to their histories just prior to the moment of choice.
So, don't you need to qualify your claim that "there is a definite fact of the matter about what agent X WOULD do in Y"? Since, well, there isn't... apart from backing up to talk about different possible worlds.
In regards to what you say to Steve,
DeleteIt seems to me Steve is going off of the way Glenn Peoples has framed the issue. And Peoples says, "Yes there is definitely an unequal distribution of opportunity. But that’s acceptable, [Craig] says, because everyone who did not get the opportunity would have rejected the opportunity anyway."
In other words, according to Peoples, an unequal distribution of grace is acceptable to Craig *because* all those who don't receive the opportunity would have rejected it anyway. But Luke 10:13 seems to indicate that there are those who would not have rejected the equal opportunity. So Luke 10:13 apparently "torpedoes" the basis upon which Craig thinks unequal grace is acceptable.
So when you say "if omnibenevolence be defined as the idea that God gives everyone the opportunity to be saved, then a Molinist could interpret Luke 10.13 as a literal expression AND affirm omnibenevolence without inconsistency. This is because giving everyone sufficient grace is not identical to giving everyone maximal grace."
But Glenn (following Jerry Walls, mind you) is addressing people receiving *unequal distributions* of grace, whether or not that grace is maximal. So it's a bit silly to change the terms of discussion and then claim victory.
>>In any event, Craig has said that he interprets the passage in question as hyperbole intended to emphasize the wickedness of the cities, rather than as a literal expression of counterfactual knowledge (a similar view is expressed here: http://sententias.org/2012/05/30/they-would-have-believed/). This might contradict what he has said elsewhere, but it is at least an option for the Molinist.
ReplyDeleteThere is nothing in the text itself that indicates Jesus' is speaking hyperbolically. Indeed, I don't see how a hyperbolic reading of the text even makes sense. Hyperbole is an over-statement. It takes something that is true in a weak sense and exaggerates it. But William Lane Craig and Max Andrews don't think Jesus' statement is true in any sense! That's not a hyperbolic statement on Jesus' part, it's just a plain false statement.
Max Andrews, in the blog you link to, cites 4 "presuppositions" that lead him and Craig to take the statement as hyperbolic. But the only point that I can see would actually push Craig (and Andrews) to adopt such a reading is the first one he cites: "God genuinely desires that all men come to repentance and be saved (Ez. 33.10-11, 1 Tim. 2.3-4; 2 Pt. 3.9)". And in Craig's "debate" with Helm, Craig said he took these texts "at face value." But I don't think that's a "face value" reading of these texts. It's just a poor reading of these texts.
Briefly, his other points are:
2. God judges based on revelation (Rom 1-2). So what? A reading of the passage in question which says Tyre and Sidon would have actually repented had Jesus' performed such miracles is not incompatible with this point. So how does this point select Max's and Bill's reading over a straightforward reading? Romans 1-2 is part of Paul's larger argument that all men, apart from Christ, are under the wrath of God ("all who sin without the law also *perish* without the law").
3. "God determines the time and place of man so they may seek God (Acts 17.26-28)." If this is meant to apply to every individual then it's not clear how it comports with what Craig has said elsewhere. In his discussion with Helm, when asked about why some people are geographically situated such that they never hear the gospel or receive other graces (like Jesus' miracles) that might aid their belief, Craig says it's because God knows such persons would have never received these graces anyway. The implication being that God doesn't bother expending such graces on persons who would not receive them. But in that case, God isn't geographically situating persons (per Acts 17:26-28) to do something he knows they won't do.
4. "that humans are damned because of their sin." Ok, but that doesn't select for Max's and Bill's interpretation over a straightforward one.
Max Andrews conspicuously leaves out the philosophical notions of Craig (e.g., libertarian FW, (the extremely implausible) feasible possible worlds issue, and molinism itself) as presuppositions which are driving him to a hyperbolic reading. That's a bit weird since adding those philosophical presuppositions and ignoring those theological presuppositions which don't really select for the hyperbolic reading actually reveals the truth of MacGregor's charge! It's mainly just Craig's philosophical commitments trumping a straightforward reading of the text.
I am not going to respond in detail here, since I happen to take the Luke 10.13 as a statement of literal counterfactual knowledge. My purpose in mentioning Craig's interpretation was because Steve was charging him with an inconsistency between his Scriptural interpretation and his theology.
DeleteAdditionally, I should point out that Francis Turretin, who was of course a Calvinist, also understood Luke 10.13 to be hyperbolic:
"Christ's words are not to be strained to the letter, as if they referred to something which on a certain condition would be determinately future. For it is a hyperbolical and proverbial kind of speech where Christ (by a comparison odious to the Jews) wishes to exaggerate the contumacy and rebellion of their cities (rendered illustrious by his miracles), which, as the searcher of hearts, he knew to be greater and more obstinate than the wickedness of the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon. So Christ does not speak of the foreknowledge of any future conditional things, but wishes by using a hyperbole to upbraid the Jews for ingratitude and impenitence greater than that of the Tyrians and Sidonians; as if a teacher (addressing a slow and dull scholar) should say, if I had taught an ass as long, he would have known it; or of an inexorable judge, if I had beaten rocks and stones as long, I could have broken them; we do not mean that rocks could be softened or an ass taught, but only that the slowness of the scholar and the hardness of the judge are extreme."
From his section on Middle Knowledge in the Institutes of Elenctic theology, courtesy of Dan Chapa here: http://www.traditionalbaptistchronicles.com/search?q=turretin
Thus, obviously, a desire to protect certain Molinist ideas is not the only reason one might adopt a hyperbolic interpretation - indeed, here that interpretation is used against Middle Knowledge!
In any event, at most, if the Molinist takes Luke 10.13 literally he need only deny transworld damnation, which is not essential to Molinism. He also need not jettison the belief that God genuinely provides all men the opportunity to be saved (which we have here been calling omnibenevolence).
>>Thus, obviously, a desire to protect certain Molinist ideas is not the only reason one might adopt a hyperbolic interpretation - indeed, here that interpretation is used against Middle Knowledge!
ReplyDeleteMy argument wasn't that the only motivation one could possibly have for a hyperbolic reading is to protect Molinist ideas, so it's irrelevant to me that Turretin also took a hyperbolic reading. I was simply concerned with why *Craig* (and Max Andrews) want a hyperbolic reading. But I notice that, in the passage you quote, Turretin gives us no reason to think it's hyperbolic. He asserts that it is and gives an example of "hyperbolic" speech, but gives no positive reason for thinking it is such. (However, maybe he provides such reasons elswhere, which are not in the quoted section.)
>>In any event, at most, if the Molinist takes Luke 10.13 literally he need only deny transworld damnation, which is not essential to Molinism.
Again, that wasn't my concern. I wasn't trying to topple Molinism via Luke 10:13. When I discussed this issue elsewhere I pointed out that it's possible Craig's version of Molinism is simply mistaken at this point. Nevertheless, it seems to me that denying what you call "transworld damnation" leaves the Molinist in a considerably less attractive position to those it's trying to attract (namely, those who find Calvinism repulsive because God could saver persons whom he doesn't choose to!).
>>He also need not jettison the belief that God genuinely provides all men the opportunity to be saved (which we have here been calling omnibenevolence).
Right, one can just say that God provides an opportunity that he knows people will refuse, even though he could provide them with an opportunity he knows they won't refuse. Not sure why God, who loves them so much, would do that, but I agree that it's you could say that.