"I have yet to see a good reason to take God to be in time, and this one--that otherwise time is strictly an illusion--is unsuccessful."
What about the point that God is causally related to the world? If I remember correctly, Helm also uses the idea of causation to argue that time is uni-directional. But if God caused the world and causation is a sufficient condition to distinguish something before or earlier than (the cause) from after or later than (the effect), then isn't God "in time"? If so, then to defend divine timelessness, would merely mapping the temporal order onto the causal order be insufficient? If so, then what would be the sufficient condition?
Thanks. Another question: if secondary causation is sufficient, then given that regeneration causes faith and faith causes justification, was there a time when all regenerates were unbelievers and all believers were unjustified? Or am I misunderstanding what secondary causation refers to?
i) I didn't say secondary causation is sufficient to distinguish between earlier and later events. Rather, unidirectionality is a feature of secondary causality–as well as time.
ii) You're positing a temporal gap between faith and justification, as if there must be an interval between them. I don't see how that follows.
iii) By contrast, faith can be a delayed effect of regeneration. Faith requires a certain level of cognitive development. If God regenerates a baby, then there will be a temporal gap.
Keep in mind that God doesn't have to make justification contingent on faith. That linkage presupposes adult believers. It isn't necessarily addressing the case of babies.
iv) Secondary causation is intramundane causation. Causal relations within the world, were causes precede their effects.
By contrast, if God is timeless, then, strictly speaking, a divine fiat doesn't precede its effect. By the same token, the effect doesn't precede the cause! They aren't even simultaneous. The cause is timeless, while the effect happens in time.
v) We can toy with different models. If we combine divine timelessness with the B-theory of time, then God instantiates the entire timeliness all at once. However, you still have a temporal sequence as well as delayed effects within the timeline.
If we combine divine timelessness with the A-theory of time, then the timeline is, itself, a delayed effect, in the sense that it's phased in. That would be more like God's fiat initiating a preset unfolding process, where earlier stages cause later stages. Acorn to oak.
vi) Strictly speaking, we don't have to define causality in temporal terms. Take the plot of a novel or screenplay. A character does something which causes another character to respond. That's a logical or psychological relation. On the counterfactual theory of causation, the second character would not have responded the way he did had the first character not done what he did. But narrative logic isn't literally temporal. The story is literally static.
I'm not saying that's how our world works. Just introducing a distinction for conceptual clarity.
Hm. Well, thanks for the response, but I guess my grasp of the PoT is still weak.
This question might be better asked elsewhere, but is the idea of a delayed effect of regeneration explored by anyone you would recommend? E.g. if without faith it is impossible to please God, is it problematic to say that regenerates and their works cannot please God?
i) The delayed effect of regeneration is pretty standard in Reformed theology inasmuch as Reformed theologians typically make allowance for the regeneration of infants.
ii) We need to take Heb 11:6 in context. Is it a universal statement about humanity in general? No. Heb 11 illustrates the principle of faith by reviewing the lives OT and Intertestamental saints. The faithful in contrast to the faithless in Heb 3-4. The ill-fated Exodus generation was doomed due to its lack of faith.
Indeed, the author plays on a paradox. The Exodus generation was faithless despite seeing many miracles, whereas the faithful believe in what they can't see (heaven, the world to come).
So this is referring to those who are naturally capable of "believing that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him." It's not talking about those who due to neurological impediments are naturally incapable of exercising faith, viz. babies, comatose patients, people with Down Syndrome, brain cancer, traumatic brain injury, or senile dementia. That's not within the purview of the statement.
Their "works" aren't either pleasing or displeasing to God.
"I have yet to see a good reason to take God to be in time, and this one--that otherwise time is strictly an illusion--is unsuccessful."
ReplyDeleteWhat about the point that God is causally related to the world? If I remember correctly, Helm also uses the idea of causation to argue that time is uni-directional. But if God caused the world and causation is a sufficient condition to distinguish something before or earlier than (the cause) from after or later than (the effect), then isn't God "in time"? If so, then to defend divine timelessness, would merely mapping the temporal order onto the causal order be insufficient? If so, then what would be the sufficient condition?
We need to distinguish between primary and secondary causation.
DeleteThanks. Another question: if secondary causation is sufficient, then given that regeneration causes faith and faith causes justification, was there a time when all regenerates were unbelievers and all believers were unjustified? Or am I misunderstanding what secondary causation refers to?
Deletei) I didn't say secondary causation is sufficient to distinguish between earlier and later events. Rather, unidirectionality is a feature of secondary causality–as well as time.
Deleteii) You're positing a temporal gap between faith and justification, as if there must be an interval between them. I don't see how that follows.
iii) By contrast, faith can be a delayed effect of regeneration. Faith requires a certain level of cognitive development. If God regenerates a baby, then there will be a temporal gap.
Keep in mind that God doesn't have to make justification contingent on faith. That linkage presupposes adult believers. It isn't necessarily addressing the case of babies.
iv) Secondary causation is intramundane causation. Causal relations within the world, were causes precede their effects.
By contrast, if God is timeless, then, strictly speaking, a divine fiat doesn't precede its effect. By the same token, the effect doesn't precede the cause! They aren't even simultaneous. The cause is timeless, while the effect happens in time.
v) We can toy with different models. If we combine divine timelessness with the B-theory of time, then God instantiates the entire timeliness all at once. However, you still have a temporal sequence as well as delayed effects within the timeline.
If we combine divine timelessness with the A-theory of time, then the timeline is, itself, a delayed effect, in the sense that it's phased in. That would be more like God's fiat initiating a preset unfolding process, where earlier stages cause later stages. Acorn to oak.
vi) Strictly speaking, we don't have to define causality in temporal terms. Take the plot of a novel or screenplay. A character does something which causes another character to respond. That's a logical or psychological relation. On the counterfactual theory of causation, the second character would not have responded the way he did had the first character not done what he did. But narrative logic isn't literally temporal. The story is literally static.
I'm not saying that's how our world works. Just introducing a distinction for conceptual clarity.
Hm. Well, thanks for the response, but I guess my grasp of the PoT is still weak.
ReplyDeleteThis question might be better asked elsewhere, but is the idea of a delayed effect of regeneration explored by anyone you would recommend? E.g. if without faith it is impossible to please God, is it problematic to say that regenerates and their works cannot please God?
i) The delayed effect of regeneration is pretty standard in Reformed theology inasmuch as Reformed theologians typically make allowance for the regeneration of infants.
Deleteii) We need to take Heb 11:6 in context. Is it a universal statement about humanity in general? No. Heb 11 illustrates the principle of faith by reviewing the lives OT and Intertestamental saints. The faithful in contrast to the faithless in Heb 3-4. The ill-fated Exodus generation was doomed due to its lack of faith.
Indeed, the author plays on a paradox. The Exodus generation was faithless despite seeing many miracles, whereas the faithful believe in what they can't see (heaven, the world to come).
So this is referring to those who are naturally capable of "believing that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him." It's not talking about those who due to neurological impediments are naturally incapable of exercising faith, viz. babies, comatose patients, people with Down Syndrome, brain cancer, traumatic brain injury, or senile dementia. That's not within the purview of the statement.
Their "works" aren't either pleasing or displeasing to God.