This
will be my fourth and final response to Nate Shannon’s critique of the
Welty/Anderson article on the theistic foundations of logic.
One
thing that struck me about Shannon’s critique is the way he deployed the theory
of divine simplicity against Welty and Anderson’s position. He acts as if
that’s axiomatically true.
This, in
turn, raises the question of how we unpack divine simplicity. Although the
theory has its roots in Neoplatonism, Thomism is the standard formulation in
Western theology. From what I’ve read, divine simplicity involves a bundle of
claims. Whether all these claims are actually generated by a single underlying
principle, or whether divine simplicity is an omnibus category, is itself an
interesting question. Is this a package deal, where we must accept or reject
the whole package? Or are some of these separable claims, with varying degrees
of merit?
From my
reading, these are the claims normally associated with divine simplicity.
1. God
is timeless. God is temporally incomposite. God is not composed of temporal
parts or phases. God has no intrinsic temporal properties.
2. God
is spaceless. God is spatially incomposite. God is not composed of spatial
units. God has no spatial properties.
3. God
is a se. Inderivative. God doesn’t derive from something more ultimate, the way
a whole is dependent on its constituent parts. There is no part/whole relation
in God.
4. God
is not a property-instance of a kind. God doesn’t exemplify a generic nature,
over and above himself.
5. God
possesses his attributes necessarily rather than contingently. His attributes
are not a contingent set. He can’t add or lose an attribute.
6. God’s attributes are coextensive.
6. God’s attributes are coextensive.
7. God’s
existence is identical with his essence.
8. There
is no contingency or unrealized potential in God.
9. God
is an undifferentiated unity. There is no metaphysical complexity in God. His
attributes are reducibly equivalent. We only distinguish them for convenience
or ease of reference. The distinctions exist in the human mind, not in God.
Speaking
for myself, I agree with 1-5. In that respect, I think God is simple.
Concerning #6, although it’s true that his attributes are coextensive (i.e. inseparable), this does not entail their mutual identity or reducibility.
#7 is ambiguous. It could merely mean that existence is an essential property of God. God cannot not exist. In that sense, I agree with #6.
#7 is ambiguous. It could merely mean that existence is an essential property of God. God cannot not exist. In that sense, I agree with #6.
However,
#7 is sometimes taken to entail 8-9. At that point I demure.
#8 is
somewhat ambiguous. #8 is true in the sense that God is not a work in progress.
God is not evolving (pace process theology). God is not on a learning curve (pace open theism). God cannot be affected by the world. If #8 is synonymous with
aseity or impassibility, then I agree with #8.
However,
#8 is sometimes taken in the more metaphysically austere sense that God has no
contingent extrinsic relations. But if God willing the actual world is an
essential divine property, then the actual world is necessary. God was not at
liberty to will a different world or will to create nothing at all.
God
can’t be the same God across different possible worlds if God’s creative will
or creative fiat for different worlds is the same as God’s nature. That’s
incoherent. Different willings or fiats can’t be identical with one
another.
There
are some Christian philosophers and theologians who’d be prepared to bite the
bullet and accept this restriction on divine freedom. But I don’t see how
divine simplicity outranks divine freedom in this respect. I don’t see that
divine simplicity is more important than divine freedom, and I don’t see that
the argument for divine simplicity is stronger than the argument for divine
freedom. Indeed, in case of conflict, I think the opposite is the case.
#9 seems
to be straightforwardly antithetical to the Trinity. For there to be three
distinct persons of the Godhead, each person must have at least one unique
property that individuates that person and differentiates that person from the
other two. But if all God’s properties are reducible and interchangeable, then
there’s no differential property distinguishing one person from another.
More
generally, if nature, person, and relation are strictly identical in the
Godhead, then God is one person rather than three.
I think many modern Calvinists take this position to distance themselves from Barth's view of God.
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