Thursday, September 01, 2011

Ponter's hypercalvinism


Since Ponter didn’t get the point the first time around, I’ll give it another go:

An offer is by definition (normal standard English usage) this, I am willing and able to give you this, if you are willing to receive it.


When God made his offer to Ahas [Isa 7:10-12] was sincere and remains sincere, despite Ahaz’ unwillingness to act upon it. Again, the sincerity is not indexed or underwritten or grounded in or keyed to the willingness or unwillingness of the offeree. Nor is it invalidated by the unwillingness or inability of the offeree. Again this is basic evangelical Calvinism.


Notice that Ponter’s statement about God’s offer to Ahaz directly contravenes his very own definition of an offer. According to Ponter, a genuine offer is predicated on the ability and willingness of the offeror to give what is tendered as well as the willingness of the offeree to accept when is tendered.

But Ahaz was unwilling to accept God’s offer. Therefore, by Ponter’s tailor-made definition, God’s offer to Ahaz was not a sincere or well-meant offer.

Ponter himself has defined an offer in conditional terms, where it’s contingent on the willingness of the offeror and offeree alike.

But this means, on Ponter’s own grounds, that when God offers the gospel to the reprobate, this is never a well-meant offer since the reprobate are never willing to accept the offer. God’s offer to the reprobate can never sincere inasmuch as they invariably fail to meet a necessary condition of a genuine offer–which Ponter himself defines in bilateral terms.

Ponter’s aim has been to argue that God’s offer to the reprobate is always a sincere or well-meant offer. But on his definition, the offer of the gospel is never a well-meant offer when directed at the reprobate.

So his argument ricochets on himself. Ponter is the reincarnation of Herman Hoeksema.

And if that isn’t bad enough for his position, it also follows, from his very own definition of hypercalvinism, that Ponter is a hypercalvinist:

Denial of a well-meant offer is the hallmark of hypercalvinism, if anything is.


Yet his definition of a genuine offer implicitly denies the well-meant offer in relation to the reprobate. Hence, Ponter is a Hypercalvinist.

8 comments:

  1. Notice that Ponter’s statement about God’s offer to Ahaz directly contravenes his very own definition of an offer. According to Ponter, a genuine offer is predicated on the ability and willingness of the offeror to give what is tendered as well as the willingness of the offeree to accept when is tendered.

    Having talked with David about this a fair bit in the past, I think I'm safe to say you're misunderstanding him on this point. His statement was ambiguous, I'll grant you, but I don't think he was saying the conditions of a genuine/sincere/well-meant offer (O) are such that:

    O just in case{ (S is willing to give X to A) && (A is willing to receive X from S) }

    Rather, he was saying that the form of O is along the lines of "I, S, am willing to give you X, if you, A, are willing to receive it". In which case, we have to infer the conditions, which I suppose would be something like this:

    O just in case{ if (A is willing to accept X from S) then (S is willing to give X to A) }

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  2. But here is David's concrete illustration of his abstract definition:

    'Simple statement of an offer:
    I am willing and able to give you this medicine to cure your disease if you are willing to take it.'

    An implication of this illustrative definition is that a doctor would be unwilling to give the patient medicine if he knew the patient would be unwilling to take it.

    Not only does that follow from the actual wording of the formulation, but it's also common sense: what's the point of giving medicine to a patient who refuses the medicine?

    If he spits out the pill, or throws the plastic cup of pills on the flood, then the medicine did him no good, and the doctor did him no good by giving him the medicine.

    It's pointless to give a patient medicine he refuses, since the purpose of the medicine is to treat his condition, and that's thwarted if the patient refuses to cooperate with his therapy.

    Having said that, "giving" him his medicine is ambiguous. That could mean one of two things:

    i) Handing him his medicine.

    ii) Administering his medicine

    In the case of (i), it's up to the patient. In the case of (ii), it's up to the doctor.

    So we could modify this scenario by saying the doctor administers the medicine against the patient's will. Although the patient refuses to give his consent to be medicated, he is medicated against his will, and reaps the benefit of his involuntary treatment.

    But that can't be what Ponter means, for by analogy, that would mean God actually saves the reprobate.

    So I don't know a way of salvaging Ponter's definition consistent with his overall position. Do you?

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  3. Could Calvin be in hell?

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  4. Could Morrison be in hell?

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  5. Hey Steve, I'm not sure about this.

    In the event a patient is unwilling to receive treatment, we wouldn't expect the doctor to suddenly become unwilling to give it. In fact, we would expect him to try all the more to get the patient to accept. This seems true regardless of whether the doctor is merely prescribing the medicine or administering it.

    It's counterintuitive to say that S's willingness to give is conditioned on A's willingness to receive. Rather, S's willingness is unconditional, but his ability to give (in some sense of the term "ability") is conditioned on A's willingness to receive.

    That's how I would view a "normal" offer, anyway, and I think Ponter would agree.

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  6. Except that's not how Ponter phrased it, either in his abstract definition or his concrete illustration. In fact, he said the very opposite.

    Maybe he's just too muddled to understand what he needs to say to express his true intentions.

    Your formulation improves on his, which doesn't surprise me. Yours makes more ordinary sense. But his is self-defeating.

    However, there's another problem:

    "It's counterintuitive to say that S's willingness to give is conditioned on A's willingness to receive. Rather, S's willingness is unconditional, but his ability to give (in some sense of the term 'ability') is conditioned on A's willingness to receive."

    That's generally the case. Since, however, Ponter keeps stressing a *divine* offer, then *God's* ability to give is not conditioned on the sinner's willingness to receive. Rather, the sinner's ability to receive is conditioned on God's willingness.

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  7. Since, however, Ponter keeps stressing a *divine* offer, then *God's* ability to give is not conditioned on the sinner's willingness to receive. Rather, the sinner's ability to receive is conditioned on God's willingness.

    There is some difficulty here. When you speak of the sinner's ability, do you mean moral or natural? In what sense is ability to receive distinct from willingness to receive?

    There's another distinction to be drawn as well. In terms of God's hidden will, it may be true that the sinner's ability is conditioned on God's willingness. But in terms of the revealed will, it is equally true that God's ability is conditioned on the sinner's willingness.

    Seems like that's a thorny bramble of logic.

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  8. As you know, the distinction between natural/moral (in-)ability is traditionally drawn to explain how the sinner can still be responsible.

    However, that's not germane to the issue at hand, since however we distinguish fallen man's inability, that's no impediment to God.

    The decretive will and the preceptive will are not two equally ultimate factors. The offer of the gospel is a means of realizing God's purpose for the world. God's plan or decree is what gives the offer its significance. What he intends the offer to accomplish. So the preceptive will is subordinate to the decretive will. The offer of the gospel is just a function of the decree. A means to an end–an end dictated by the teleology of the decree.

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