“Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes…And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day.” (Mt 11:21,23).
The question is that since it looks like there are possible worlds where the above possible persons repent and believe, why didn't God create the world at where they believe. One answer is that if God had actualized that world, N1 people would have been saved who are not saved in this world, but in this world (the actual world) N2 people are saved, and N2 > N1
In full disclosure, I once read something similar to the argument made in the last email below in a journal, but I cannot recall which journal or who wrote it. It was an off-the-cuff remark towards the end of the article, the below expands on it and uses my own illustrations.
***********
Well, that is unfortunate for those unsaved people who wonder why God created them in those circumstances where they would freely choose to reject him since he could have created them in circumstances where they would have freely accepted him. God's reply is, "Well, yeah, that's unfortunate for you, but, you see, it isn't for mankind overall. If I had put you in those circumstances where you would have freely accepted me, N1 people would have been saved. However, N2 people have been saved in the world where you freely reject me, and N2 > N1. So, off to hell!" They might respond, "Okay, I'll go, but it still sucks that you had to make me in the first place and put me in those circumstances so to maximize a world where more get saved. So, um, I guess I'll take one for the team."
I wonder if Reppert will use his "God uses the reprobate as means to and end" argument against Calvinism, against Molinism now.
So again, it doesn't look like Molinism has any edge over Calvinism in terms of the "intuition" that it is stomach turning to contemporary philosophers of religion.
******************
******************
Of course, that Molinist response [on Calvinism God determines that the reprobate will go to hell, on Molinism he doesn't] doesn't help our poor hell-bound sinner who only needed to be actualized in a world where he "freely" trusted in Christ rather than his own "selfish reasons." In fact, from his perspective (and perhaps his saved friends and relatives too (since they are his friends and they don't even know 99% of those who were saved through him going to hell)), I would think it doesn't matter much to him whether he was determined to go to hell or simply instantiated in a world with the sufficient circumstances where he freely chooses to go to hell when he could have been instantiated in another world where he didn't. How's that go for consoltation? "Well, of course I could have instantiated you in a world where you accepted the gospel, but instead I instantiated you in a world where you chose hell, and weren't able to choose otherwise [as Craig also reminds us]. But, hey, at least I didn't determine you to go to hell." I guess the response here is, "Awe, shucks, thanks."
******************
******************
It's kind of like the father who has two sons. One he sends one to the best private school, enrolls him in the best etiquette schools, has him trained in polo and fencing, arranges meetings with some of the most powerful men in the world so he can develop contacts for later, lavishes affirmations of praise on him, etc. Heck, we can even stipulate that the child develops some medicine that improves the lives of others and that would not have happened had he not been put in those circumstances.
The other son is sent to an orphanage, much like little orphan Annie was. He goes to the most run-down public school in the ghettos of Chicago. Is not kept away from drug pushers and not put in circumstances where he is praised and affirmed and so takes drugs to fill the gap in his life. His diet is government cheese. He ends up robbing old ladies, sleeping with prostitutes, and selling drugs to the rich kids from the suburbs.
As the story would suggest, these two go on to different lives (though with Molinism the different life-outcomes are certain, there are no rags to riches stories, no Daddy Warbucks to come rescue the little orphan). One is successful and the other is not. One gets "heaven on earth" and the other gets "hell on earth."
The second son finds out about the different upbringings and goes to question his father (he has a gun too, 'cause he's pretty upset). After he questions his father, his father says, "Hey don't blame me. You did all those things freely, I didn't determine you to do them. So what if I knew what would happen if I placed you in those circumstances. Besides, you're brother developed that pill and so tons of people are better off. More than would be if I had put you in his circumstances. Quit yer whining."
In this case, wouldn't we justly blame the father for placing one child in circumstances where he succeeds and the other in circumstances he justifiably believes would result in failure for that son? Many, like Victor Reppert &c., argue that the "God of Calvinism must be judged by human intuitions of what is moral, and if a human did what Calvin's God did, we would call it evil, a monster!" This is one reason why I don't find free will defenses, especially in Molinism, persuasive.
******************
I once read something similar to the argument made in the last email below in a journal, but I cannot recall which journal or who wrote it
ReplyDeleteIf this is of any use, here is a reference of Craig that amounts to the same:
"It may be that in worlds of universal salvation there are other overriding deficiencies that make these worlds less preferable. For example, suppose that the only worlds in which everybody hears the gospel and freely recieves it are worlds with only a handful of people in them, say four or five, and if God were to create any more people then at least one of them would have freely rejected him and been lost. Does God's being all loving compel him to prefer one of these sparsely under populated worlds over a world in which multitudes freely receive him and are saved even though some also reject him freely and are lost? Well, that's just far from obvious to me."
Craig, William Lane. "Religious Pluralism (Part 4)" Defenders Podcast. @ 10:39-11:30.
I'm sure it's not obvious to some unbelievers and universalists that a perfectly loving God would rather create a world where 10 persons go to heaven and 9 go to hell rather than a world where 4 go to heaven and none go to hell.
Thanks for posting this Paul, it is very interesting and helpful.
ReplyDeleteThanks Jonathan, but that's not it, I've read that. I'm referring to just the last email, i.e., the last block quoted section, the one where I talk about the two sons and daddy Warbucks.
ReplyDeleteHi Paul,
ReplyDeleteYou may be thinking of Jerry Wall's 'Is Molinism as bad as Calvinism?' He solves the problem (if you see it as a problem), by appending to traditional Molinism, some form of equal opportunity grace for all.
God be with you,
Dan
Dan, I want to say it was either Linville or Perszyk; but thanks for the Walls reference, I'll check it out.
ReplyDeletePaul,
ReplyDeleteWall's article is in Faith and Philosophy 7, (1990), 85-98. It was also reprinted Eef Dekker's book on MK.
God be with you,
Dan
Thanks Dan, I found it. I don't think it deals with the issues brought up here.
ReplyDeleteWell, it attempts to address your whole concern here, and seems to address the Daddy Warbucks senario in particular fairly well.
ReplyDeleteBut I think we really have two distinct but somewhat related questions:
1) the equality of grace, divine revelation, opportunities for salvation and blessings
2) God's selection between feasable worlds, given that a person gets saved in this possible world, but not that one.
Wall's seems to attempt to address both, but he ends up only addressing #1.
Let's say grace is equal or let's even reverse the Daddy Warbucks senario and say the person with all the blessings ends up lost and the one without them ends up saved. Let's say a preachers kid who grows up in a Christian home and in church ends up rebelling against the many offerings of the gospel. On the other hand, if he would have grown up in a crack house, he would have been saved. Could he then complain about God's blessings and wish God had choosen a different world?
God be with you,
Dan
Dan, you're focusing on the minors I think. The point of my illustration doesn't rest on the particularities of the Daddy Warbucks case. That's illustriative. The point is that God puts them in circumstances where they reject. Chorazin seems to suggest there are circumstances where people don't reject the gospel. So make the circumstances as grand as you'd like. The point is that *those circumstances* are the ones where the sinner rejects God. So, as I said, I don't think Walls succeeds.
ReplyDeleteI should add that I didn't read Walls' paper yet. I'm making the more basic point that my argument depends only on God putting people in the circumstances where they reject rather than the ones where they don't. Besides that, I have serious reservations about how he'd exegetically prove the existence of this ubiquitous equitable grace.
ReplyDeletePaul, I suppose I was mainly trying to help with the reference, rather than argue against the substance. I do think Wall's argument is on point, and it seems to solve some aspects of it, while leaving other aspects unanwered. Perhaps we are agreeing in our special way.
ReplyDeleteGod be with you,
Dan
Dan, I'm always glad to agree with you in special or mundane ways. :-)
ReplyDeleteI was just thinking about this problem for Molinists the other day but I haven't had the time to throw it into a post! So this actually works out in my favour since you had to do all the work and I just got to sit back and say, "Yah, what he said!". :P
ReplyDeleteDavid, another bonus is that when it gets defeated you get to sit back and say, "But *I* never made that argument" :-)
ReplyDelete