Peter van Inwagen offers an informal statement of the Consequence Argument against freedom and determinism: “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events of the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences of these things are not up to us” (van Inwangen, An Essay on Free Will, p.16).
I offer an informal statement of a consequence argument against molinism and freedom: "If molinism is true, then our actual acts are the consequences of the possible world God actualized in the remote past. But it is not up to us what possible world God actualizes. Who knows, if it were really "up to me" perhaps I'd choose to actualize the world where I freely do A over B. But God actualized B over A because B is the world that best brings about his will. Therefore, that I actually did B over A wasn't really "up to me." Therefore the consequences of these things are not up to us."
You said: "If molinism is true, then our actual acts are the consequences of the possible world God actualized in the remote past."
ReplyDeleteResponse: I think Molinism is false, but I'm not convinced that you've made the parallel with van Inwagen's argument against determinism. The sense in which our acts are "consesquences" of the possible world God actualized is not relevantly similar to the sense in which our choices are consequences of the past and laws of nature (assuming for the sake of argument that the determinist believes precisely that). In the latter case, the preceding states of affairs causally determine the consequent actions. In the former, God's choice of a world does not causally determine our actions. Rather, God chose to actualize certain antecedent circumstances that He knew were such that, were we put in them, we would libertarianly do what we do.
You said: "But it is not up to us what possible world God actualizes. Who knows, if it were really "up to me" perhaps I'd choose to actualize the world where I freely do A over B."
Response: It is partly up to us what worlds God can actualize. The counterfactuals concerning our libertarian choices, on Molinism, constrain God's options. If he knows that if He puts me in circumstance C then I will libertarianly do A, then He cannot choose a world wherein I am in C and do not-A.
You cannot choose a world wherein you do A over B in C, in the sense that you cannot choose to exist nor to be in C; but if God puts you in C, you do have the choice to do A over B (unlike in the determinism case).
You said: "But God actualized B over A because B is the world that best brings about his will. Therefore, that I actually did B over A wasn't really "up to me." Therefore the consequences of these things are not up to us."
Response: The only sense in which a Molinist will claim that God "actualizes" our choices is that He puts us in circumstances with the knowledge of how we will respond; and this sense of 'actualize' does not entail that what we do is not up to us.
A quick question, how can any libertarian escape the fact that they make God learn? What it boils down too is that God gains knowledge when we actualize a choice/decision, but not until then would God know. So how is that different than saying that God just “saw” the movie and knows how it will end?
ReplyDeleteI have asked Arminians about this very thing, making God dependent on man, and some have even said “So what?”.
I guess ignorance is bliss.
Grace & Peace
If I understand Molinism, which may be a stretch, the point is that God saw all possible worlds and then in His infinite wisdom and knowledge chose the one that He would bring about. The minute that God actualized this world all alternative possibilities were closed off.
ReplyDeleteSo in world A I would be a Seinfeld fan and say in all other worlds I would not be a Seinfeld fan. The minute God chose world A there was no doubt or possibility for me not to be a Seinfeld fan.
I fail to see how one has the power of contrary choice in Molinism; perhaps someone could try and explain it to me.
BTW, thank God I’m in world A in this scenario:)
Grace & Peace
[quote]A quick question, how can any libertarian escape the fact that they make God learn? What it boils down too is that God gains knowledge when we actualize a choice/decision, but not until then would God know. So how is that different than saying that God just “saw” the movie and knows how it will end?[/quote]
ReplyDeleteNo, according to Molinism God doesn't gain knowlege of what one would libertarianly choose only when one does it; God knows from all eternity, before creation. Open Theists hold that God only knows once we choose. The difference from just watching a movie and seeing the end is that God gets to pick what movie to watch, so to speak, from the beginning - God is not entirely passive. However, the choice of the movie is constrained by His middle knowledge of how creatures would behave. He can't pick a movie wherein you choose A in circumstsance C unless He knows via middle knowledge that if you were in C, you would choose A.
[quote]If I understand Molinism, which may be a stretch, the point is that God saw all possible worlds and then in His infinite wisdom and knowledge chose the one that He would bring about.[/quote]
This is not incorrect, but it doesn't really capture Molinism, because this description is satisfied by Reformed theology too: God picks a certain world to bring about. The point of Molinism is not really anything with possible worlds but about God's having pre-creation knowledge of hypothetical libertarian behavior.
[quote]The minute that God actualized this world all alternative possibilities were closed off.[/quote]
There may be a sense in which this is true, but stated without qualification the Molinist will say, "no."
[quote]So in world A I would be a Seinfeld fan and say in all other worlds I would not be a Seinfeld fan. The minute God chose world A there was no doubt or possibility for me not to be a Seinfeld fan.[/quote]
No; it was possible for you to not be a Seinfeld fan. To say that God actualizes a world wherein you are a fan is only to say that God put you in certain circumstances where you had to choose whether to be a fan or not, and in so doing knew that you would freely choose to become a fan.
[quote]I fail to see how one has the power of contrary choice in Molinism; perhaps someone could try and explain it to me.[/quote]
I've already said a little; the best way to learn about Molinism is to read Molinists. The best books I'm aware of that exposit Molinism are Alfred Freddoso's "On Divine Foreknowledge" and Thomas Flint's "Divine Providence."
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteThank you for that information. One question, how does God know what I will choose if nothing has been instantiated? Sounds like it is just probability at work, like saying if I were put in world A and certain circumstances occurred I may become a fan of Seinfeld. Now are you saying that there is a probability that I would not become a fan of Seinfeld if placed in world A?
Correct me if I am wrong, but is that like saying that it is certain to occur but not necessary? Since God created this world and He knows how we will respond in certain circumstances and all that, would it be fair to say that He uses that knowledge to bring about His will? And if that is true then would it be fair to say that it is not only certain, but necessary? Let me try to simplify it for myself, God brings about this world and knows with absolute certainty what I will do in all circumstances. He has a plan for me and He uses the perfect knowledge that He has to bring about His plan. He uses my “free” choices in His plan for my life, now doesn’t that mean it is not just certain but necessary for me to choose/react/do all that God knew I would do before creation?
Grace & Peace
Mitch,
ReplyDelete>>>Thank you for that information. One question, how does God know what I will choose if nothing has been instantiated?<<<
God knows what you *will* choose because He first knew, before creation, what you *would* choose *were* He to place you in the circumstances that He has in fact placed you. If I knew the proposition: if Mitch were to be put in C, then Mitch would choose A; and if I had the power to put Mitch in C, then upon putting Mitch in C, I can know, because of the conditional proposition, that Mitch *will* choose A in C. As far as how God knows the subjunctive-conditional, there really is no explanation that will satisfy someone who doesn't already incline towards Molinism. God is omniscient and knows all truths; the conditional is just a primitive, contingent fact and God knows it in virtue of being omniscient.
>>>Sounds like it is just probability at work, like saying if I were put in world A and certain circumstances occurred I may become a fan of Seinfeld.<<<
No one is really "put in" a possible world. A possible world, at least on the theory espoused by all Molinists as far as I am aware, is simply an abstract entity, like a proposition, that describes a way the universe could be exhaustively (i.e., including all space and all time). To say that God actualizes a world is only to say that He decides to perform certain creative acts such that those acts, in conjunction with the response of creatures that He knows will occur, constitute a total way the universe is - which the "actual" world describes or maps on to. It is better to say that God puts people in concrete circumstances; there is no "world" *over and above* the totality of circumstances and events that occur in the universe.
There may or may not be an objective probability that you become a fan in certain circumstances, but according to Molinism, God knows what you would in fact do. This is compatible with there being a probability. God could know both "There is a .7 probability that Mitch would be a fan if put in C" and "Mitch will in fact choose to become a fan if put in C."
>>>Correct me if I am wrong, but is that like saying that it is certain to occur but not necessary?<<<
If by "certain" you refer to knowledge and by "not necessary" objective contingency in the world, yes it is "certain" (for God, because He knows what you would do) but "not necessary" (because you do what you do freely, with the power to other than you do). Some philosophers have argued that this is an impossible situation, that if God knew with certainty what someone would do then they in fact do not do it freely. But it is important to distinguish the Molinist claim from objections to the Molinists claims. On Molinism God knows with certainty what we will freely do ahead of time. Their response to the above objection can be put briefly this way: if God knows you will do A, that does not mean you are constrained and prohibited from doing not-A; rather, you are free to do not-A, and *were you to do not-A*, God would have always known you would do not-A rather than knowing you would do A. That is, God's knowledge is *responsive to* what you will do, it does not determine what you will do.
>>>Since God created this world and He knows how we will respond in certain circumstances and all that, would it be fair to say that He uses that knowledge to bring about His will?<<<
Yes; that is one of the driving points of Molinism; to maintain a strong view of divine providence and sovereignty.
>>>And if that is true then would it be fair to say that it is not only certain, but necessary? Let me try to simplify it for myself, God brings about this world and knows with absolute certainty what I will do in all circumstances. He has a plan for me and He uses the perfect knowledge that He has to bring about His plan. He uses my “free” choices in His plan for my life, now doesn’t that mean it is not just certain but necessary for me to choose/react/do all that God knew I would do before creation?<<<
I don't see why it logically follows, from the supposition that God plans how your life will go and knows with certainty how it will go, that you do what you do necessarily. I've explained above the Molinist take on God's both being *certain* but also our choices being *free*.
Of course, there are serious philosophical problems with this whole scheme. But it is important to distinguish what they believe from the problems. There is a danger in saying things of the form "well on Molinism it follows that such-and-such is the case," where "such-and-such" is not what Molinists believe. This is because the locution is ambiguous between "Molinists *believe* such-and-such" and "Molinist principles logically lead to such-and-such *despite* their beliefs..." It is ambiguous between a presentation of Molinism and an objection to Molinism. This ambiguity is present in saying, for instance, that "on Molinism God's alleged certain knowledge of our choices would violate our freedom." This is explicitly what Molinists deny, though many objectors think that this is an unsustainable denial, that if God really knew what we would do it must be the case that we are not free. Whenever objecting to Molinism we need to be clear to distinguish between what they believe and what we think the problems are with what they believe.
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteForgive my ignorance, but I’m still not seeing it. For example this exchange between us-
Me - Since God created this world and He knows how we will respond in certain circumstances and all that, would it be fair to say that He uses that knowledge to bring about His will?
You - Yes; that is one of the driving points of Molinism; to maintain a strong view of divine providence and sovereignty.
I’m struggling to see how my choices/actions are not only certain but necessary. God uses the information to fulfill His plan; I would think that would then make it necessary.
Let me try to use a biblical reference instead of Seinfeld. God knew with absolute certainty that Joseph’s brothers would sell him in to slavery, God used that knowledge to make certain that Joseph would go to Egypt to fulfill Gods ultimate plan.
So in this “concrete” world that God created there was no possibility of Joseph’s brothers not selling him into slavery and it was necessary for them to do it because God used that information to bring about His ultimate plan.
To me it seems that the moment God knows X and uses that to plan Y that it becomes certain and necessary. Maybe I’m just not seeing it though, but this seems logical to me.
Grace & Peace
>>>I’m struggling to see how my choices/actions are not only certain but necessary. God uses the information to fulfill His plan; I would think that would then make it necessary.<<<
ReplyDeleteHow does God's making use of information in carrying out a plan make that information "necessary"? Suppose you read the newspaper and form a plan based on what you read. All that your plan requires is that what you read is *reliable*; not that everything in the newspaper is *necessary*. Your plans can take into account *contingent* (i.e., not necessary) truths.
>>>Let me try to use a biblical reference instead of Seinfeld. God knew with absolute certainty that Joseph’s brothers would sell him in to slavery, God used that knowledge to make certain that Joseph would go to Egypt to fulfill Gods ultimate plan.<<<
This isn't what the passages say. They say that God intended Joseph's being sold for the sake of his delivering people from famine. It doesn't say that God *first* knew that he would be sold and *then* used that knowledge to send Him to Egypt. The most natural account is that God had a certain goal in mind, and then, as part of achieving that goal, determined that Joseph's brothers sell Joseph.
A Molinist can say this: God knew that Joseph's brothers were such that, if they were put in a certain circumstance C (corresponding to the biblical circumstances where Joseph meets them and angers them), then they would freely choose to sell him to the passing slavetraders. Since God knew this subjunctive-conditional fact, He could guarantee Joseph's being sold by putting his brother's precisely in circumstance C.
>>>So in this “concrete” world that God created there was no possibility of Joseph’s brothers not selling him into slavery and it was necessary for them to do it because God used that information to bring about His ultimate plan.<<<
You say it was impossible for Joseph's brothers to not sell Joseph, that they sold him necessarily, *because* God used some information to bring about His ultimate plan. How does this follow? If the relevant "information" is the counterfactual I suggested above, then it does not logically follow. The counterfactual says that the brothers will *freely* choose to sell Joseph if put in circumstance C.
>>>To me it seems that the moment God knows X and uses that to plan Y that it becomes certain and necessary.<<<
What does 'it' refer to; X or Y? If God knows X then X is already certain; God wouldn't know it in the first place unless it were certain to Him. The plan Y doesn't affect the certainty of X.
If God knows that the brothers will choose A in C, and God then plans to place them C, God is then certain that they will in fact choose A. This does not entail that they choose A *necessarily*. It does entail that they *will in fact* choose A; but the choice is contingent. There is nothing logically incoherent about the following proposition: Joseph's brothers will libertarianly choose A. "Will" indicates that this is about the future, and "libertarianly" indicates that the choice will be contingent, not determined or necessitated by anything. This proposition makes sense; it may be false (to the Molinist's dismay), but it is not nonsensical. Now suppose, with the Molinist, that is is *true* and that God knows that it is true. It follows from this both that God is certain of A's being chosen and that A is chosen freely and contingently. The brothers will have the power to choose other than they in fact do, but God knows they will not choose otherwise.
I'm just trying to clarify the Molinist theory. I think it is false. If you have more concerns, try and think about whether your concerns are with understanding the content of the Molinist theory or with understanding how it could be true or plausible. If it is the *latter*, then you are in good company and the fact is that it is an implausible theory in the eyes of many philosophers. If you have more concerns about the *former*, then I can try to explain it better, though the best thing, as I said, is to read Molinist philosophers.
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteThank you for answering and for correcting some of my assumptions.
I think I have a problem with the *latter* and will leave it at that.
Curious though and you do not have to answer, but what exactly do you hold too? It seems that you are not a Molinist, so are you a libertarian/compatibilist/determinist?
Grace & Peace
>>>Curious though and you do not have to answer, but what exactly do you hold too? It seems that you are not a Molinist, so are you a libertarian/compatibilist/determinist?<<<
ReplyDeletecompatibilist
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteDaniel,
ReplyDelete"The sense in which our acts are "consesquences" of the possible world God actualized is not relevantly similar to the sense in which our choices are consequences of the past and laws of nature (assuming for the sake of argument that the determinist believes precisely that)."
First, Daniel, there's weak and strong Molinist readings of 'actualization.' At best, you defend only the weak version. But you act as if that is the only version.
Anyway...
I don't need it to be "relevantly similar" in that sense. I never said I was making an argument that used the terms in relevantly the same way. It's my own version of the consequence argument. I hijacked van Inwagen's argument for obvious reasons.
"In the former, God's choice of a world does not causally determine our actions."
Never said it did.
"Rather, God chose to actualize certain antecedent circumstances that He knew were such that, were we put in them, we would libertarianly do what we do."
Right. And he instantiated the possible world where we libertarianly did A rather than the possible world where we libertarianly did B. He chose which choice of mine would be actualized, not me. I had no control over that. I get sent to hell for actually sinning and not trusting in Christ. I don't go to the actual heaven if I trust in Christ in a possible world.
"It is partly up to us what worlds God can actualize. The counterfactuals concerning our libertarian choices, on Molinism, constrain God's options. If he knows that if He puts me in circumstance C then I will libertarianly do A, then He cannot choose a world wherein I am in C and do not-A."
I'm wondering if that's enough control for libertarians...hence Open Theists like Tuggy who claim that there is no actual world yet.
Of course, even *determinists* can say that actions are "partly" up to them.
And, I don't see how it is "up to me" what action I *actually* do. That looks entirely up to God.
"The only sense in which a Molinist will claim that God "actualizes" our choices is that He puts us in circumstances with the knowledge of how we will respond; and this sense of 'actualize' does not entail that what we do is not up to us."
C = all those features of W of which it satisfies these conditions.
God actualizes the world where I would do * if C obtains.
But here I'd bring in lick objections. If one has libertarian freedom one could do otherwise given *the same* past. But, given *the same* past on Molinism, then if C obtains, * does.
It must be causally open for any libertarianly free agent to do otherwise, even given the same past.
The Molinist response here should be that S might * and might not *.
If God puts us in the circumstances we would respond, and I will never do otherwise given those circulstances, that weak "consequence" is enough for me.
Paul,
ReplyDeleteRight. And he instantiated the possible world where we libertarianly did A rather than the possible world where we libertarianly did B. He chose which choice of mine would be actualized, not me. I had no control over that.
God can strongly actualize Adam's being in the garden (i.e., by directly causally bringing about his being there) and subsequently facing a particular temptation. Call Adam's total context here 'C'. If Adam is libertarianly free in C, which is possible on Molinism, then Adam can libertarianly choose to do action A. Suppose he does. In that case, the "actual world" (taking 'actual world' as a definite description, as denoting whatever world *happens* to be actual) will be one wherein (1) Adam exists and is put in C and (2) Adam libertarianly chooses A. God strongly actualizes (1) (i.e., brings (1) about directly by His causal power alone) and weakly actualizes (2) (i.e., brings (2) about indirectly by putting Adam in C, upon which Adam himself strongly actualizes (2) by his own autonomous causal activity). For God to actualize a world wherein Adam libertarianly does A in C, instead of doing B in C, is just for (1) and (2) to obtain in the way described.
Your claims about what follow from this, from God's actualizing a world wherein one does A as opposed to B, can be interpreted in a number of ways. It does not entail that (1) Adam had no control over what he did. Adam *libertarianly* choose A over B. This logically implies that Adam had control or power over whether to choose A or refrain. Neither does it follow that (2) Adam has no control over God's actualizing his libertarianly choosing A. God's actualization of Adam's libertarianly choosing A is dependent on Adam's libertarianly choosing A; insofar as Adam has control over the latter, he has control over the former. And it does not follow, from God's actualizing a world wherein Adam does A in C rather than B in C, that (3) there is a dichotomy of God's as opposed to Adam's deciding which choice will be actualized. God can choose to put Adam in C, and Adam can choose what to do once put there; hence both have a "choice" (though 'choice' cannot be taken in the same way in both cases) with respect to which action is actualized.
Daniel:It is partly up to us what worlds God can actualize. The counterfactuals concerning our libertarian choices, on Molinism, constrain God's options. If he knows that if He puts me in circumstance C then I will libertarianly do A, then He cannot choose a world wherein I am in C and do not-A.
Paul:I'm wondering if that's enough control for libertarians...hence Open Theists like Tuggy who claim that there is no actual world yet.
I don't see how a libertarian could have any more control than this picture gives. I can see how a libertarian can deny *God* control by limiting His knowledge, but the denial of the existence (or truth) of these counterfactuals does not, as far as I can see, *add* any sort of freedom to us. It just makes the circumstances we find ourselves in more due to chance rather than providence. Whether God or chance puts us in the circumstances we find ourselves in, either way, we have the same libertarian freedom to do what we do in those circumstances.
Of course, even *determinists* can say that actions are "partly" up to them.
And, I don't see how it is "up to me" what action I *actually* do. That looks entirely up to God.
What a Molinist can, and a determinist (as defined by van Inwagen) cannot, say, however, is that states of affairs in my *past* do *not* "wholly" determine my actions. That is, the sense in which the determinist can say his actions are "partly up to him" is a sense compatible with those actions being wholly "up to" or determined by the past.
On Molinism, your libertarian choices are "up to you" in the sense that nothing determines you to choose what you do. It will be "up to" God to create you and put you in some circumstances, but that doesn't obviate your freedom to choose otherwise in those circumstances (unlike the case with determinism).
God actualizes the world where I would do * if C obtains.
God has no choice over whether or not the actual world contains the counterfactual "Paul would do * if C obtains"; that is an item of His middle knowledge, which He has no control over.
But here I'd bring in lick objections. If one has libertarian freedom one could do otherwise given *the same* past. But, given *the same* past on Molinism, then if C obtains, * does.
Molinism agrees, in fact asserts, that, in the case of a libertarian choice, one can do A given a certain past and can do not-A given that same past; this is implied by the nature of what it is for a choice to be libertarian. This does not contradict *'s happening in C; for the connection between C and * is contingent (hence part of middle knowledge).
It must be causally open for any libertarianly free agent to do otherwise, even given the same past.
It is causally open for the Molinist. Given a certain past C, it is causally open for Adam to do A and for him to do not-A, and middle knowledge informs God of which way Adam would go were he to exist and be put in C.
The Molinist response here should be that S might * and might not *.
It seems to me a Molinist could to this. It depends on how "might" is understood. If it indicates an epistemic uncertainty on God's part as to whether S, in C, would do A or not, then this is incompatible with Molinism. If "might" refers to some objective probability, then it seems consistent. That is, the Molinist could say that God knows both that (1) if the roulette wheel were spun it might stop in a black piece (where "might" means, there is an objective probability in nature that it do so) and (2) if the roulette wheel were spun it would stop on a black piece (where "would" refers not to an objective necessity in nature but rather to some primitive fact known only to God, that the objective indeterminism in nature *would* turn out *this way*).
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteTwo things:
a) You're just telling me that Molinists *say* that man can have libertarian freedom given all the other stuff they (typically) claim to accept. I don't disagree about what they say. But I disagree that libertarian freedom is consistent with foreknowledge. I don't see how it is compatible with it being eternally true that they do A or that they would A in cirtain circumstances. This point is even granted by some libertarians. You said you weren't a Molinist. If you continie to defend them at this point I wonder why you're not. If you don't, I wonder the purpose of the time spent here? So, I just don't grant that one has libertarian freedom given that what one actually does is a consequence of what possible world gets actualized. You may claim that ability to do otherwise, PAPs, *just is* the definition of free will. Well, (i) libertarians like Hunt would disagree and (ii) that's one reason I find libertarianism problematic given a robust view of omniscience.
b) I mean 'might' as its used in the literature. That's why Open Theists call themselves "neo-molinists," and hold that God knows "might counterfactuals." Traditional molinists don't want a "might counterfactual." A might counterfactural is problematic if we want to hold that God knows what the relevant agents would do in possible circumstance C, and what a relevant agent does do in actual circumstance AC.
Paul,
ReplyDeleteI don't disagree about what they [Molinists] say. But I disagree that libertarian freedom is consistent with foreknowledge.
I agree with you in denying the consistency of libertarian freedom and foreknowledge. But there can be unsound arguments for true conclusions and as I argued in my last post you gave some in your response to me. As far as this distinction between what Molinists say and what some of their beliefs really imply despite what they say, the informal argument in your opening post, which set the context for this discussion, was explicitly based on the claims of the Molinist theory itself ("If molinism is true, then..." (my emphasis)).
I don't see how it [libertarian freedom?] is compatible with it being eternally true that they do A or that they would A in cirtain circumstances.
Suppose it is true from all eternity that (for some C and A) "If Peter were in C, he would libertarianly do A." I don't see anything logically incoherent about this proposition or about the supposition that it is true from all eternity. Yet if it indeed is true, it entails that if Peter is in C he will libertarianly choose A. So I don't see a logical incompatibility between libertarian freedom and such a counterfactual.
This point is even granted by some libertarians. You said you weren't a Molinist. If you continie to defend them at this point I wonder why you're not.
I haven't been defending the truth of Molinism but rather the actual content and claims of Molinism, as well as arguing that certain things do and do not logically follow from those claims. There are a number of reasons to reject Molinism (aside from its unbiblical synergistic soteriology), like the grounding objection. I don't think any of these alleged counterfactuals could be true; there is no basis in reality for their truth. But as I noted above that doesn't mean I find them logically incoherent.
If you don't, I wonder the purpose of the time spent here?
Initially to object to your informal argument and subsequently to respond to Mitch and you.
So, I just don't grant that one has libertarian freedom given that what one actually does is a consequence of what possible world gets actualized.
It's not clear at all what precisely you mean by what I've bolded, and I think I've already responded to what it could mean in my last post.
You may claim that ability to do otherwise, PAPs, *just is* the definition of free will.
I couldn't care less about defining "free will"; I don't see what good it does. Define it for me and I'll tell you if I think we have it =)