I received this question from an email correspondent on my Fesko review:
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> Hi Paul,
> Thanks for the review of the Fesko book.
> I have some questions about it, if
> you have time to answer.
> Does he go into much depth about belief in sola fide
> between the apostolic era and the Reformation?
Depends on what you mean by "in depth," he has about 13 pages on that era, starting from 100 AD. Given what you've studied on this issue, I'm inclined to say that it's not that "in depth" *for you*.
> How would you summarize his
> position on that issue?
On the early Church Fathers (100-600): He agrees with Berkof that the early church fathers are indefinite, incomplete, and sometimes self-contradictory and erroneous wrt their understanding of justification. But he notes that one can find a number of significant statements that show they had a basic understanding of justification by faith. He finds a clear affirmation of the centrality of faith. And he sees a major strand of justification where the meaning is forensic, non-imputation of sin, and imputation of righteousness. He also comments that to criticize them for not using Reformation language is problematic as a critique.
He then spends a few pages on Augustine and Pelagius, discusses that debate briefly, but notes that however helpful Augustine was dealing with Pelagianism, he had his own problems and jumbled justification and sanctification together, mainly due to his realism.
After 600: He then finds this problem, the mixing of justification and sanctification, in many of the statements on justification after Augustine due to nominalism and 5 other features. He discusses Aquinas and Scotus (finding early hints of a use covenantal categories in the later, though still problematic as to the *nature* of justification) specifically in the section after semi-Pelagianism and Later Augustinianism. He finds the beginnings of a more forensic and Reformational understanding in those like Bradwardine and Rimini. That takes him into the section on the Reformation.
> Does he cite many primary documents or scholarship in
> support of his conclusions about sola fide in that timeframe?
Yes he does. He obviously pulls from the usual secondary sources, as well as some lesser known ones, but he cites directly (or refers directly to) primary sources from: Chrysostom, Clkement, Gregory of Nazanzus, Justin, Tertullian, Pelagius, Augustine, Aquinas, Bradwardine and Rimini. He cites the Epistle of Barnabas and the Synod of Orange too.
> My impression is that most books on justification through faith alone
> either
> ignore that issue or don't say enough about it. The chapter titles you
> listed seem promising, since they mention church history, Catholicism, and
> Orthodoxy. But I'm wondering what level of detail he goes into.
Since I think it's somewhat person relative how much "detail" one thinks one has gone into,. I hope the above has been somewhat helpful.
Since you didn't ask me about RCC and EO, I won't spend much time there, but he goes into much more detail in those chapters than he did from 100 - 1500 AD. His chapter on the RCC is over 40 pages I believe. Btw, I found him to be extremely charitable with all of his opponents. He was not given to rhetoric and polemics...well, maybe in one or two places he snuck in a jab, but that's not bad out of 400 pages!
> Just give me your general
> impressions, if you have time to do that.
As I am not nearly as well-read in matters of historical (or early historical to be more precise) theology as you are, I thought the information helpful for the purposes he needed.
Of course, I got the book for more reasons than early church history (!), and to that end my impressions are impressed. :-) I thought his dealings with the NPP particularly helpful and illumination, as well as his use of the to-age construct; but, that goes beyond your questions.
Paul: This is probably a bit off topic, but ...
ReplyDeleteAugustine ... had his own problems and jumbled justification and sanctification together, mainly due to his realism.
After 600: He then finds this problem, ... due to nominalism and 5 other features.
I have seen some philosophers address nominalism/realism as if somehow nominalism in Protestant thought is responsible for all the evils in the world.
However, if you have any knowledge of database marketing, "nominalism" is exactly how things work, with names and labels applied to clusters of data (however tightly you need them to be arranged).
I look at the world, especially through this lens, and I think, "philosophical realism is just a farce."
Any thoughts on this?
LVKA,
ReplyDelete"13 pages out of some 450 covering the first 1,500 yrs; and then the rest 400+ covering maybe some 500 yrs. Wow! How very impressive! ;-)"
That's not the purpose of the book. Notice the subtitle: "Understanding the Classic Reformed Doctrine of Justification."
It's not about "covering years," either. Frankly, what should matter is if the exegesis of the relevant texts is correct or not and if the Reformed doctrine best summarizes the teaching of Scripture.
Scoffing at books for not living up to some standard they didn't set for themselves is ignorant. I suspect you complain that your Betty Crocker cook book doesn't have a section on how to cook meth!
John,
ReplyDeleteAs I am a metaphysical realist, I don't think realism is a farce.
I hold to the real and extra-mental (outside the mind of man, that is) existence of what is known as "universals" or "abstracta."
Honestly, I think nominalism is philosophically absurd.
But, wrt the justification debate, Fesko's point was that the rise of nominalism changed the philosophical air enough that there was a turn away from ontology in that nature of justification such that the foresnsic view could be developed over and against a view that took justification to be ( at least partly) a real or actual transformation in the sinner. Thus the sinner's righteousness in justification was the imputed righteousness of Jesus. Righteous works are now able to be relegated to sanctification. So Fesko points out that a turn towards nominalism "opened the door" for these Reformed expressions, but he wasn't offering whole-sale endorsement of nominalism.
Paul, I look at the nominalism/realism as descriptions of real life. (I really know very little about any of this; I'm just trying to orient the discussion against something I know).
ReplyDeleteI mentioned the case of databases used in marketing. Of course, data exists just as 1's and 0's in a chart, or bunch of charts. With data mining software, these 1's and 0's are scoped out, and individuals (people) for example, who may have 1's and 0's "clustered" around several variables may be said to have common characteristics. (Age, income, other demographic info).
For certain "clusters" or groupings of this data, the characteristics are similar enough, that a label may be given to them.
This is where the phrase "soccer mom" came from, for example. "Married" "women" "in a certain age range," "with children," "living in certain zip codes,' all get 1's and 0's in similar patterns. To this pattern, the name is given, "soccer mom." No doubt you can think of other categories.
But my point in asking is, even though this is data, this is the way the real world works. There is no "soccer mom" as a reality; it is just a handle given for the purpose of description.
It seems to me that this IS the way the world works. There is no such thing as "red" or "redness" "out there". The color does not exist outside of the rays of light that reflect a certain wavelength in a certain way.
So, hasn't our knowledge of science taken us somewhat beyond the use of these "universals"?
(And if I may take a step further, I know that the Catholic Church relies on philosophical realism as a way of understanding itself as "the bride of Christ," and uses that as a doctrinal way of saying, "the Church is holy," -- and by that I mean, they say "the visible Catholic Church is holy, and in no need of apologizing for anything, except that John Paul was willing to say, "the Church apologizes for the sins of the children of the church." But no pope will ever say, "I apologize for the sins of the Church".
That's a long train of thought, probably fraught with weak links, but I'll turn my radio off now and just listen to your response.
John,
ReplyDeleteHere's some of my notes from Loux's book:
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There are things which agree in attributes: this tomato and that fire truck are the same shade of red, this coin and that ring are circular, this brown animal and this grey animal are elephants, etc. There are objective similarities among things. Suppose it to be a fact that certain objects agree in attribute, they are all, say, 'north of' America. Is there some basic fact more basic than this fact such that because the more fundamental fact holds of these objects that they are all 'north of?' What accounts for attribute agreement?
So, the question all have to answer is: a has the attribute f iff Q. Now, we need to fill in Q. How does a nominalist do so? The realist will reply that: a has the attribute f iff a exemplified f-ness. The general schema we use tells that where a number of objects, a...n, agree in attribute, there is a thing *, and a relation, R, such that each of a...n bears R to *, and, the claim is that it is in virtue of standing to R to * that a...n agree in attribute by being all 'north of,' just,' 'courageous,' whatever.
Metaphysical realists insist that an adequate account of attribute agreement presuppose a distinction between two types of categories of objects: particulars and universals. What is peculiar to a particular is that each occupy a given spatiotemporal at the same time. Universals are, by contrast, repeatable, or, multiply exemplifiable entities.
I'll now look at subject-predicate (SP) discourse and abstract reference (AR).
SP: here are three SP modes of discourse which are examples of three different types of universals: property, kind, relation. I'll take them in that order
1. Socrates is courageous.
2. Plato is a human being.
3. Socrates is the teacher of Plato.
Sentences like these pick out, or refer to a particular and go on to say something about it-to describe or characterize it in some way, or to relate it to something else. Taking one, for example. We 'say of' Socrates that he is courageous. Does only Socrates play a referential role, this account is incomplete. Any satisfactory analysis of 1 will show the predicate term 'courageous' to have referential force, as well.
What if 1 is true? Pretty clearly, it's truth depends on two things: first, what one says and second, the way the world is. In other words, the truth of SP discourse is its linguistic structure and it corresponding to, or mirroring, some nonlinguistic structure of the world. So, to be true Socrates must correspond to some non-linguistic structure of the world. But this doesn't make the sentence true. To do that, courageous must also correspond to some non-linguistic truth about the world. At this we are quick to point out that 'courageous' can be applied to many different individuals, even at the same place and time. This is a very brief account of the problem. It gets very detailed.
AR: Metaphysical realists insist that we can give a satisfactory account of abstract reference. AR makes it's obvious appearance in what we call 'abstract singular terms.' Examples are: triangularity, wisdom, mankind, courage, etc. The AR is a devise which picks out a certain property or kind and the general term is an expression true of, or satisfied by, all and only those objects that exemplify that property or kind. Unless we take these terms, abstract singular, to be devices for referring to universals, we cannot provide a satisfactory account for sentences in which they appear. Examples:
4. Courage is a moral virtue.
5. Triangularity is a shape.
6. Hilary prefers red to blue.
Realists insist that if we are to provide an account of what these sentences say, we must hold that, as they occur in these sentences, abstract singular terms are functioning in precisely the way the intuitive account tells us they function: they are playing a referential role of a straightforward sort, not "a" straightforward, but actually *the* most straightforward sort; they are functioning as names of universals. But if they play this sort of role, the sentences in which they occur can only be true only if the universal they name actually exist. So, the metaphysical realist can provide an account for this while the nominalist can't. At least, that is the contention presently. The anti-realist can offer his analysis and, if he does, we'll see what kind of nominalist he is: austere, metalinguistic, trope theorist.
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JB: "It seems to me that this IS the way the world works. There is no such thing as "red" or "redness" "out there". The color does not exist outside of the rays of light that reflect a certain wavelength in a certain way."
PM: (i) we can discuss other examples such as propositions, relations, moral virtues, etc., that no one would even so much as try to reduce to wavelengths. So I could even grant your wavelength point without granting nominalism.
(ii) What accounts for (a) the exact sameness of two images of 'red' *in my mind* such that "reflected wavelength" doesn't even get to enter into the picture, and (b) (1) the sameness of two wavelengths, say, object x and y both reflect the same wavelength, (2) or the *tensity* of x and y are the *same* such that they lead to the same reflection, (3) object x *reflects* light at time t and y *reflect* at t2, what accounts for the sameness of "reflection. Etc.
(iii) Universals exist "out there" for *man*. Universals, abstracta, are ideas in the Divine mind, and that mind exists outside of us. So, humans are realists, God is a nominalist (or conceptualist).
See here:
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/mphil.pdf
JB: So, hasn't our knowledge of science taken us somewhat beyond the use of these "universals"?
PM: Science doesn't enter into the debate here. This is a metaphysical debate.
But, those who argue for nominalism wrt universals have a hard time with ethical realism. "Hasn't science takes us somewhat beyond the use of ethics and norms?"
What about the mind? Hasn't "science" shown we don't need that either?
Where do you draw the line and why? Or do you?
That's not the purpose of the book. Notice the subtitle: "Understanding the Classic Reformed Doctrine of Justification."
ReplyDeleteLOL :-) So, in other words, You're implicitely admitting to the un-Reformed status of the Fathers of the first 1,500 yrs of Christianity
Yet, You (or the author) also want(s) them a bit reformed as well.
So: which one is it? :-)
Thanks Paul. I must need the training wheels version.
ReplyDeleteStill, there are a few morsels I will take away and think about.
"we can discuss other examples such as propositions, relations, moral virtues, etc., that no one would even so much as try to reduce to wavelengths. So I could even grant your wavelength point without granting nominalism."
"So, humans are realists, God is a nominalist (or conceptualist)."
"Science doesn't enter into the debate here. This is a metaphysical debate."
"What about the mind? Hasn't "science" shown we don't need that either?"
"Where do you draw the line and why? Or do you?"
LVKA,
ReplyDeleteI SAID: That's not the purpose of the book. Notice the subtitle: "Understanding the Classic Reformed Doctrine of Justification."
YOU RESPONDED: LOL :-) So, in other words, You're implicitely admitting to the un-Reformed status of the Fathers of the first 1,500 yrs of Christianity
MY RESPONSE: That doesn't follow, at all. But, an explication and defense of "the classic Reformed doctrine of justification" involves *much* more than a discussion of what the early church Father's believed. So, are you suggesting that Fesko's book should have been 1,500 pages?
Here, perhaps this will help: Say you wrote a book on what the Patristics believed regarding doctrine X. I then come along and ask where the relevant exegesis is. You tell me that that is not the purpose of your book. According to your critique of me, I could say: "LOL :-) So, in other words, You're implicitely admitting to the UN-BIBLICAL status of the Fathers of the first 1,500 yrs of Christianity??"
YOU WROTE: "Yet, You (or the author) also want(s) them a bit reformed as well."
MY REPLY: Me nor the author "wants them a bit reformed." In fact, I gave his position on the matter, and it seems he was fair and honest about the state of the situation.
YOU WROTE: So: which one is it? :-)
MY REPLY: I reject your fallacious false dichotomy.
Orthodox books don't lack Biblical passages/quotations/references. I also don't recall Orthodox books which, while discussing either docrine or Church history, "skip" over 1,500 yrs of Christian history.
ReplyDeleteLVKA: Orthodox books don't lack Biblical passages/quotations/references.
ReplyDeletePAUL: That wasn't my point. I tested your argument by logical counter-example. Your failure to directly interact with my point is a tacit admission of defeat on your part.
LVKA: I also don't recall Orthodox books which, while discussing either docrine or Church history, "skip" over 1,500 yrs of Christian history.
PAUL: I don't feel history was "skipped" over. Your use of emotionally loaded language and question begging epithets indicate that you're aware of the unsubstantive nature of your "arguments."
Anyway, here's one:
One with God: Salvation As Deification and Justification, Liturgical Press (January 2005)
that is scant on history.
There's just a few pages there.
And, books on deification are notoriously scant on exegetical work, namely because there's hardly a verse that can even remotely be taken to teach such a thing.
But, to cement the point even more, here's another one:
Icons and Saints of the Eastern Orthodox Church (Guide to Imagery Series) by Alfredo Tradigo, Getty Publications (September 1, 2006)
that has no exegetical work.
So could I reply that the above is claiming that icons are are "UN-BIBLICAL"????
As my argument is unassailable, and since you are banned (and don't have the self-control or moral integrity to refrain from posting here), I will permenantly delete future comments of yours and not even read them.
Bye-bye now