tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post6561008648021780625..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: A Question on Fesko's Book and Early Church HistoryRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-14129770347218298862008-10-07T21:50:00.000-04:002008-10-07T21:50:00.000-04:00LVKA: Orthodox books don't lack Biblical passages/...LVKA: Orthodox books don't lack Biblical passages/quotations/references.<BR/><BR/>PAUL: That wasn't my point. I tested your argument by logical counter-example. Your failure to directly interact with my point is a tacit admission of defeat on your part.<BR/><BR/>LVKA: I also don't recall Orthodox books which, while discussing either docrine or Church history, "skip" over 1,500 yrs of Christian history.<BR/><BR/>PAUL: I don't feel history was "skipped" over. Your use of emotionally loaded language and question begging epithets indicate that you're aware of the unsubstantive nature of your "arguments."<BR/><BR/>Anyway, here's one: <BR/><BR/>One with God: Salvation As Deification and Justification, Liturgical Press (January 2005)<BR/><BR/>that is scant on history. <BR/><BR/>There's just a few pages there.<BR/><BR/>And, books on deification are notoriously scant on exegetical work, namely because there's hardly a verse that can even remotely be taken to teach such a thing.<BR/><BR/>But, to cement the point even more, here's another one:<BR/><BR/>Icons and Saints of the Eastern Orthodox Church (Guide to Imagery Series) by Alfredo Tradigo, Getty Publications (September 1, 2006)<BR/><BR/>that has no exegetical work.<BR/><BR/>So could I reply that the above is claiming that icons are are "UN-BIBLICAL"????<BR/><BR/>As my argument is unassailable, and since you are banned (and don't have the self-control or moral integrity to refrain from posting here), I will permenantly delete future comments of yours and not even read them. <BR/><BR/>Bye-bye nowErrorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-87464079080018974022008-10-07T21:28:00.000-04:002008-10-07T21:28:00.000-04:00Orthodox books don't lack Biblical passages/quotat...Orthodox books don't lack Biblical passages/quotations/references. I also don't recall Orthodox books which, while discussing either docrine or Church history, "skip" over 1,500 yrs of Christian history.The Blogger Formerly Known As Lvkahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09663692507774640889noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-53686003064344276912008-10-07T20:20:00.000-04:002008-10-07T20:20:00.000-04:00LVKA,I SAID: That's not the purpose of the book. N...LVKA,<BR/><BR/>I SAID: That's not the purpose of the book. Notice the subtitle: "Understanding the Classic Reformed Doctrine of Justification."<BR/><BR/>YOU RESPONDED: LOL :-) So, in other words, You're implicitely admitting to the un-Reformed status of the Fathers of the first 1,500 yrs of Christianity<BR/><BR/>MY RESPONSE: That doesn't follow, at all. But, an explication and defense of "the classic Reformed doctrine of justification" involves *much* more than a discussion of what the early church Father's believed. So, are you suggesting that Fesko's book should have been 1,500 pages? <BR/><BR/>Here, perhaps this will help: Say you wrote a book on what the Patristics believed regarding doctrine X. I then come along and ask where the relevant exegesis is. You tell me that that is not the purpose of your book. According to your critique of me, I could say: "LOL :-) So, in other words, You're implicitely admitting to the UN-BIBLICAL status of the Fathers of the first 1,500 yrs of Christianity??"<BR/><BR/>YOU WROTE: "Yet, You (or the author) also want(s) them a bit reformed as well."<BR/><BR/>MY REPLY: Me nor the author "wants them a bit reformed." In fact, I gave his position on the matter, and it seems he was fair and honest about the state of the situation.<BR/><BR/>YOU WROTE: So: which one is it? :-)<BR/><BR/>MY REPLY: I reject your fallacious false dichotomy.Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-78341328487092700092008-10-07T19:18:00.001-04:002008-10-07T19:18:00.001-04:00Thanks Paul. I must need the training wheels versi...Thanks Paul. I must need the training wheels version. <BR/><BR/>Still, there are a few morsels I will take away and think about.<BR/><BR/>"we can discuss other examples such as propositions, relations, moral virtues, etc., that no one would even so much as try to reduce to wavelengths. So I could even grant your wavelength point without granting nominalism."<BR/><BR/>"So, humans are realists, God is a nominalist (or conceptualist)."<BR/><BR/>"Science doesn't enter into the debate here. This is a metaphysical debate."<BR/><BR/>"What about the mind? Hasn't "science" shown we don't need that either?"<BR/><BR/>"Where do you draw the line and why? Or do you?"John Bugayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17728044301053738095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-22179152366582015752008-10-07T19:18:00.000-04:002008-10-07T19:18:00.000-04:00That's not the purpose of the book. Notice the sub...<I>That's not the purpose of the book. Notice the subtitle: "Understanding the Classic <B>Reformed</B> Doctrine of Justification.</I>"<BR/><BR/>LOL :-) So, in other words, You're implicitely admitting to the un-Reformed status of the Fathers of the first 1,500 yrs of Christianity<BR/><BR/>Yet, You (or the author) also want(s) them a bit reformed as well. <BR/><BR/>So: which one is it? :-)The Blogger Formerly Known As Lvkahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09663692507774640889noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-42002957410432634292008-10-07T18:47:00.000-04:002008-10-07T18:47:00.000-04:00John,Here's some of my notes from Loux's book:////...John,<BR/><BR/>Here's some of my notes from Loux's book:<BR/><BR/>//////////////<BR/><BR/>There are things which agree in attributes: this tomato and that fire truck are the same shade of red, this coin and that ring are circular, this brown animal and this grey animal are elephants, etc. There are objective similarities among things. Suppose it to be a fact that certain objects agree in attribute, they are all, say, 'north of' America. Is there some basic fact more basic than this fact such that because the more fundamental fact holds of these objects that they are all 'north of?' What accounts for attribute agreement?<BR/><BR/>So, the question all have to answer is: a has the attribute f iff Q. Now, we need to fill in Q. How does a nominalist do so? The realist will reply that: a has the attribute f iff a exemplified f-ness. The general schema we use tells that where a number of objects, a...n, agree in attribute, there is a thing *, and a relation, R, such that each of a...n bears R to *, and, the claim is that it is in virtue of standing to R to * that a...n agree in attribute by being all 'north of,' just,' 'courageous,' whatever.<BR/><BR/>Metaphysical realists insist that an adequate account of attribute agreement presuppose a distinction between two types of categories of objects: particulars and universals. What is peculiar to a particular is that each occupy a given spatiotemporal at the same time. Universals are, by contrast, repeatable, or, multiply exemplifiable entities.<BR/><BR/>I'll now look at subject-predicate (SP) discourse and abstract reference (AR).<BR/><BR/>SP: here are three SP modes of discourse which are examples of three different types of universals: property, kind, relation. I'll take them in that order<BR/><BR/>1. Socrates is courageous.<BR/>2. Plato is a human being.<BR/>3. Socrates is the teacher of Plato.<BR/><BR/>Sentences like these pick out, or refer to a particular and go on to say something about it-to describe or characterize it in some way, or to relate it to something else. Taking one, for example. We 'say of' Socrates that he is courageous. Does only Socrates play a referential role, this account is incomplete. Any satisfactory analysis of 1 will show the predicate term 'courageous' to have referential force, as well.<BR/><BR/>What if 1 is true? Pretty clearly, it's truth depends on two things: first, what one says and second, the way the world is. In other words, the truth of SP discourse is its linguistic structure and it corresponding to, or mirroring, some nonlinguistic structure of the world. So, to be true Socrates must correspond to some non-linguistic structure of the world. But this doesn't make the sentence true. To do that, courageous must also correspond to some non-linguistic truth about the world. At this we are quick to point out that 'courageous' can be applied to many different individuals, even at the same place and time. This is a very brief account of the problem. It gets very detailed. <BR/><BR/>AR: Metaphysical realists insist that we can give a satisfactory account of abstract reference. AR makes it's obvious appearance in what we call 'abstract singular terms.' Examples are: triangularity, wisdom, mankind, courage, etc. The AR is a devise which picks out a certain property or kind and the general term is an expression true of, or satisfied by, all and only those objects that exemplify that property or kind. Unless we take these terms, abstract singular, to be devices for referring to universals, we cannot provide a satisfactory account for sentences in which they appear. Examples:<BR/><BR/>4. Courage is a moral virtue.<BR/>5. Triangularity is a shape.<BR/>6. Hilary prefers red to blue.<BR/><BR/>Realists insist that if we are to provide an account of what these sentences say, we must hold that, as they occur in these sentences, abstract singular terms are functioning in precisely the way the intuitive account tells us they function: they are playing a referential role of a straightforward sort, not "a" straightforward, but actually *the* most straightforward sort; they are functioning as names of universals. But if they play this sort of role, the sentences in which they occur can only be true only if the universal they name actually exist. So, the metaphysical realist can provide an account for this while the nominalist can't. At least, that is the contention presently. The anti-realist can offer his analysis and, if he does, we'll see what kind of nominalist he is: austere, metalinguistic, trope theorist. <BR/><BR/>/////////////////<BR/><BR/>JB: "It seems to me that this IS the way the world works. There is no such thing as "red" or "redness" "out there". The color does not exist outside of the rays of light that reflect a certain wavelength in a certain way."<BR/><BR/>PM: (i) we can discuss other examples such as propositions, relations, moral virtues, etc., that no one would even so much as try to reduce to wavelengths. So I could even grant your wavelength point without granting nominalism.<BR/><BR/>(ii) What accounts for (a) the exact sameness of two images of 'red' *in my mind* such that "reflected wavelength" doesn't even get to enter into the picture, and (b) (1) the sameness of two wavelengths, say, object x and y both reflect the same wavelength, (2) or the *tensity* of x and y are the *same* such that they lead to the same reflection, (3) object x *reflects* light at time t and y *reflect* at t2, what accounts for the sameness of "reflection. Etc.<BR/><BR/>(iii) Universals exist "out there" for *man*. Universals, abstracta, are ideas in the Divine mind, and that mind exists outside of us. So, humans are realists, God is a nominalist (or conceptualist).<BR/><BR/>See here:<BR/><BR/>http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/mphil.pdf<BR/><BR/>JB: So, hasn't our knowledge of science taken us somewhat beyond the use of these "universals"? <BR/><BR/>PM: Science doesn't enter into the debate here. This is a metaphysical debate.<BR/><BR/>But, those who argue for nominalism wrt universals have a hard time with ethical realism. "Hasn't science takes us somewhat beyond the use of ethics and norms?"<BR/><BR/>What about the mind? Hasn't "science" shown we don't need that either?<BR/><BR/>Where do you draw the line and why? Or do you?Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1918644096988450522008-10-07T18:01:00.000-04:002008-10-07T18:01:00.000-04:00Paul, I look at the nominalism/realism as descript...Paul, I look at the nominalism/realism as descriptions of real life. (I really know very little about any of this; I'm just trying to orient the discussion against something I know). <BR/><BR/>I mentioned the case of databases used in marketing. Of course, data exists just as 1's and 0's in a chart, or bunch of charts. With data mining software, these 1's and 0's are scoped out, and individuals (people) for example, who may have 1's and 0's "clustered" around several variables may be said to have common characteristics. (Age, income, other demographic info). <BR/><BR/>For certain "clusters" or groupings of this data, the characteristics are similar enough, that a label may be given to them.<BR/><BR/>This is where the phrase "soccer mom" came from, for example. "Married" "women" "in a certain age range," "with children," "living in certain zip codes,' all get 1's and 0's in similar patterns. To this pattern, the name is given, "soccer mom." No doubt you can think of other categories.<BR/><BR/>But my point in asking is, even though this is data, this is the way the real world works. There is no "soccer mom" as a reality; it is just a handle given for the purpose of description.<BR/><BR/>It seems to me that this IS the way the world works. There is no such thing as "red" or "redness" "out there". The color does not exist outside of the rays of light that reflect a certain wavelength in a certain way. <BR/><BR/>So, hasn't our knowledge of science taken us somewhat beyond the use of these "universals"? <BR/><BR/>(And if I may take a step further, I know that the Catholic Church relies on philosophical realism as a way of understanding itself as "the bride of Christ," and uses that as a doctrinal way of saying, "the Church is holy," -- and by that I mean, they say "the visible Catholic Church is holy, and in no need of apologizing for anything, except that John Paul was willing to say, "the Church apologizes for the sins of the children of the church." But no pope will ever say, "I apologize for the sins of the Church". <BR/><BR/>That's a long train of thought, probably fraught with weak links, but I'll turn my radio off now and just listen to your response.John Bugayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17728044301053738095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-35217000301660215862008-10-07T17:43:00.000-04:002008-10-07T17:43:00.000-04:00John,As I am a metaphysical realist, I don't think...John,<BR/><BR/>As I am a metaphysical realist, I don't think realism is a farce.<BR/><BR/>I hold to the real and extra-mental (outside the mind of man, that is) existence of what is known as "universals" or "abstracta."<BR/><BR/>Honestly, I think nominalism is philosophically absurd.<BR/><BR/>But, wrt the justification debate, Fesko's point was that the rise of nominalism changed the philosophical air enough that there was a turn away from ontology in that nature of justification such that the foresnsic view could be developed over and against a view that took justification to be ( at least partly) a real or actual transformation in the sinner. Thus the sinner's righteousness in justification was the imputed righteousness of Jesus. Righteous works are now able to be relegated to sanctification. So Fesko points out that a turn towards nominalism "opened the door" for these Reformed expressions, but he wasn't offering whole-sale endorsement of nominalism.Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-12606063822584690692008-10-07T17:25:00.000-04:002008-10-07T17:25:00.000-04:00LVKA,"13 pages out of some 450 covering the first ...LVKA,<BR/><BR/><I>"13 pages out of some 450 covering the first 1,500 yrs; and then the rest 400+ covering maybe some 500 yrs. Wow! How very impressive! ;-)"</I><BR/><BR/>That's not the purpose of the book. Notice the subtitle: "Understanding the Classic <I>Reformed</I> Doctrine of Justification."<BR/><BR/>It's not about "covering years," either. Frankly, what should matter is if the exegesis of the relevant texts is correct or not and if the Reformed doctrine best summarizes the teaching of Scripture.<BR/><BR/>Scoffing at books for not living up to some standard they didn't set for themselves is ignorant. I suspect you complain that your Betty Crocker cook book doesn't have a section on how to cook meth!Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-64287721721920998892008-10-07T17:06:00.000-04:002008-10-07T17:06:00.000-04:00Paul: This is probably a bit off topic, but ...Aug...Paul: This is probably a bit off topic, but ...<BR/><BR/><I>Augustine ... had his own problems and jumbled justification and sanctification together, mainly due to his realism.<BR/><BR/>After 600: He then finds this problem, ... due to nominalism and 5 other features.</I><BR/><BR/>I have seen some philosophers address nominalism/realism as if somehow nominalism in Protestant thought is responsible for all the evils in the world.<BR/><BR/>However, if you have any knowledge of database marketing, "nominalism" is exactly how things work, with names and labels applied to clusters of data (however tightly you need them to be arranged).<BR/><BR/>I look at the world, especially through this lens, and I think, "philosophical realism is just a farce." <BR/><BR/>Any thoughts on this?John Bugayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17728044301053738095noreply@blogger.com