As should be clear, what is particularly troubling for the libertarian concerned with the Mind argument is that the weakest link of the argument appears to be its reliance on rule Beta. The Mind argument is valid if and only if rule Beta is, but of course it is the validity of rule Beta that the libertarian appeals to in offering the Consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. The libertarian is thus faced with the following difficulty. The Consequence argument is sound only if rule Beta is valid. But if rule Beta is valid then, while the Consequence argument seems to show that free will and determinism are incompatible, the Mind argument seems to show that free will is also incompatible with indeterminism. If free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, however, then there is no such thing as free will and libertarianism is false. The libertarian thus seems forced to choose between abandoning the Consequence argument (the libertarian's strongest argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism) and abandoning free will entirely. -Finch and Warfield, Oxford Journals, Mind Volume 107, Number 427 Pp. 515-528(Note: I know Warfield and Finch try to salvage a version of the consequence argument. I don't think they succeed (as has been pointed out, among other places, in Sean Choi's dissertation). But the point here is to show that Reppert's adherence to van Inwagen's consequence argument (Reppert mentioned the consequence argument PvI gave "back when") should lead him to reject his indeterminism.)
Thursday, May 15, 2008
Since Reppert has said that he accepts van Inwagen's consequence argument, then it appears he must give up libertarian free will too.