Many (both non-Christian and Christian) thinkers have claimed that no one takes the basic ideas of presuppositionalism seriously, or presuppositionalism qua apologetic methodology, seriously.
Some have commented that presuppositionalism's invocations of circular argumentation is not respectable, and thus constitute a reason to reject presuppositionalism. Here are two comments by non-presuppositionalists. One is an atheist, the other a Christian.
"Circularity: A sequence of reasoning is circular if one of the premises depends on, or is even equivalent to, the conclusion. Circularity is not always fallacious, but can be a defect in an argument where the conclusion is doubtful and the premises are supposed to be a less doubtful basis for proving the conclusion." (Douglas Walton, Oxford Companion To Philosophy, p. 135.)
"This argument has a certain appeal, and I must grant that it has a valid point. The point is that any explicit justification of my belief that God is good will be circular. But that point can be happily conceded. Circularity need not be vicious, and the kind of circularity involved here is not in any way peculiar to my position. Indeed, any theory that posits objective values will face the same problem, which is essentially a sceptical one. Some sceptical challenges are fair and others are not, and we will clarify the distinction by the use of a couple of examples." (Steve Lovell, Lewis and the Euthyphro Dilemma, SOURCE.)
Another objection is that no non-presuppositionalist apologist respects the argumentation presuppositionalists employ. Presuppositionalism is excluded as a contender in contemporary apologetic literature, it is claimed.
A new apologetic book, Reason for the Hope Within, is endorsed by many of the "big names" in Christian apologetics. In an article of Postmodernism, non-presuppositionalist Michael J. Murray states in a footnote that that he has,
"to add here that this is where many Christians just misunderstand what is valuable in so-called postmodern philosophy. Almost without exception evangelical theologians who accept the deliverances of postmodernism do so because they confuse two points. They think that being a relativist about best-ness of theoretical explanations commits one to relativism about truth. But this is just mistaken. So, there is a lesson to be learned from postmodernism, but it is not the lesson they think. Let me add further that it is at junctures like this that we can see just where so-called 'presuppositionalists' have apologetics right. That is, it is right that both Christian and unbeliever have certain presuppositions in place when they engage each other intellectually. And it is right that there is no way to decisively argue unbelievers out of their unbelief because of these very presuppositions. In this way, one might think, the insights of Cornelius Van Til are quite useful for apologetics, and what he has to say already embodies anything useful postmodernism has to teach us. It is unfortunate, however, just how poorly contemporary defenders of presuppositionalism do in making its insights clear. In part, the trouble is that they themselves are just not clear about which of the insights are valuable and which are not." (Murray, Reason for the Hope, p.17, n.3.)
Now, I agree with much of what he says in his last two sentences. I would add that there is a lot of talent that is already here, and/or coming down the pike, that should serve to fill that gap. My point is a simple one, though. It's not a full claim to vindication, but I think I have pointed out that at least one concern regarding presuppositionalist thought - circular argumentation at the ultimate level - is respected by those outside the camp. And, another concern regarding the apparent shunning presuppositionalists receive in the contemporary, non-presuppositionalist apologetic literature has been shown to be without merit as well.