***QUOTE***
At 3:27 PM, interlocutor said…
What [AFR] does is insist that both sides in the dispute agree that there is rational inference, but while one side is trying to explain the rational in terms of the non-rational, our side is not. --From your previous post on this argument.
It seems that there are two very different notions of "explain" at work in this question. Would I be correct in saying that your "explanation" of rational inference wouldn't entail much more than: "God imposed his reason on his creation"? [This sounds more snide than I mean it to sound, but I can't think of any other way to put it.]
What I'm trying to get at is that your "explanation" would not be an explanation of the exact process of how a God would create a rational universe, but rather, a reference to the possibility of a god-like being capable of doing so. Is this correct?
Contrast this with what would be involved in "explaining" rational inference for a materialist. It would involve describing the exact processes by which rationality could (or necessarily must) supervene on the purely physical.
This would be quite the project even if materialism was the case, don't you think? In fact, isn't it reasonable to conclude that if materialism were actually the case, answering this question would be one of the most difficult undertakings imaginable and that it would not be surprising to find that humans have not yet figured out how to explain it?
There seems to be an imbalance here in the request for an "explanation." I can't shake the feeling that it is just "unfair." It seems that both parties should be held to a similar burden.
If a theist wants a materialist to "explain" how rational inference is possible in terms of the exact processes by which the rational can supervene on the physical, then the theist should, in turn, be willing to "explain" the exact processes by which a God can create a rational universe.
Or, if a theist is allowed simply to say that rational inference is possible because a God imposes reason on the universe without having to explain the exact processes of his/her view, then the materialist should be allowed to simply respond that the rational supervenes on the physical without having to explain the exact processes of his/her view.
Does this make sense?
Please forgive me if I have given an insulting caricature of your "explanation" of the possibility of rational inference. I have not actually read your extended works on this argument. Perhaps, you have put a lot into your "explanation" that I am not aware of.
From other experiences with theists, however, I have seen this disparity between what is being asked for in any "explanation."
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The interlocutor is confusing the argument for dualism with dualism as an argument for God. But these are separate arguments. The argument for dualism (i.e., abstract objects, substance dualism) does not depend on the explanatory role of God. That's the next stage of the argument.
You would have a preliminary argument for the existence of abstract objects or substance dualism.
Indeed, this could well involve two different lines of evidence: (i) positive arguments for dualism, and (ii) counterarguments against physicalism.
This would establish THAT dualism is true. It would not establish HOW dualism can be true.
The how-question is where God would come into the picture.
So the interlocutor is committing a level-confusion.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteFor someone who spends so much time writing, it would only take two seconds of your time to copy & paste the URL of the comment (or even better, activate the hyperlink to it), and this would help me immensely in trying to follow a dialogue.
Interlocuter,
In other words, might it be possible that there is a way to "explain" rational inference in terms of the physical that is not yet known?
Yes.
And they will usually admit this, after saying, "Now you have faith in physicalism..."
Of course, since beliefs are justified by lots of evidence, and when the only "falsification" of physicalism is an undeveloped TAG, largely an appeal to ignorance, then belief in physicalism as cogent in all areas (even in transcendentals and the AFR) is not unjustified.
interlocutor said...
ReplyDelete"Isn't it possible that, at this stage of our scientific/philosophical development, humans do not know enough about the nature of matter to answer this question, but that some discovery (or a collection of them) would give that knowledge? In other words, might it be possible that there is a way to "explain" rational inference in terms of the physical that is not yet known?"
I'm not going to attempt an exposition of Reppert. I'll leave that to Reppert.
As to the above:
1.Appealing to an unknown hypothetical is hardly an argument.
2.A future scientific discovery would only solve the problem under the prior assumption that this is a scientific problem to begin with.
But standard arguments for dualism (e.g. privacy, intentionality, subjectivity) simply belong to a different domain.
That's been the problem all along. This categorical difference.
3. And the status of abstract objects is even more metaphysical. So invoking science (not even real science, but some pseudoscientific hypothetical) begs the question.
Anonymous said...
"Of course, since beliefs are justified by lots of evidence, and when the only 'falsification' of physicalism is an undeveloped TAG, largely an appeal to ignorance, then belief in physicalism as cogent in all areas (even in transcendentals and the AFR) is not unjustified."
TAG is by no means the only undercutter or defeater for physicalism.