According to Jon Curry:
“This point applies to Gene's comments regarding Richard Carrier. The book The Empty Tomb is not intended to show that in fact Jesus body was stolen, or in fact hallucinations occurred, or in fact the body was moved in accordance with Jewish law. It was intended to show that it is irrational to beleive the supernatural explanation. The authors don't have to agree on what actually did happen with regards to Jesus. They simply agree that a miracle did not occur. Carrier provides evidence for the stolen body hypothesis in an effort to raise that alternative to a level necessary to overcome the initial probability of belief that a miracle occurred. Since belief that a miracle occurred has such a low initial probability Carrier burden is very low. If there's even a one in a million shot, this makes Christianity irrational. So he doesn't raise this theory to a level of actual believability, but only to a very low possibility. So it makes perfect sense for him to on the one hand argue for theft as a very low possibility, but on the other hand actually believe that Jesus did not exist.”
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/09/does-vague-appeal-to-visions-overcome.html
This is a fascinating piece of special pleading.
1.Of what evidentiary value is the bare fact that the contributors all agree a miracle did not occur? That’s a statement of collective opinion—nothing more.
They were recruited for they’re unbelief, so of course they agree in that respect.
2.Does a miracle have a low initial probability? That’s a highly value-laden assertion.
3.How does a miscellany of contradictory opinions add up to a cumulative probability for a naturalistic explanation?
Shouldn’t it be the other way around? You have a bunch of mutually exclusive theories which cancel each other out?
Hence, the net result is the cumulative improbability of any (and all) alternative explanation(s).
At best, all that would remain is the itsy-bitsy residual of whatever, if anything, is left over after you subtract the evidence for one competing theory from the evidence for another.
The only thing which the contributors succeed in demonstrating is the exponentially escalating improbability of any naturalistic explanation.
Mounting improbabilities in lieu of mounting probabilities. Just the opposite of what the contributors need to prove their point.
BTW, take note of Gene’s documentation in the combox of the original thread (see above).
:::YAWN!!!:::
ReplyDelete“1.Of what evidentiary value is the bare fact that the contributors all agree a miracle did not occur?”
ReplyDeleteWhat evidentiary value? What do you mean? I’m simply saying that Gene’s is misguided to think that the contributors would agree on what actually happened with Jesus, or that the contributors should not be expected to offer a variety of opinions. The purpose of the book is not to show what actually happened with Jesus, but to show that in fact a miracle did not occur.
“2.Does a miracle have a low initial probability? That’s a highly value-laden assertion. “
I suppose it is. Do you disagree with assigning a low initial value? Do you agree that if someone claims they have ESP we should initially be skeptical, or should we assume that they probably do have it?
”3.How does a miscellany of contradictory opinions add up to a cumulative probability for a naturalistic explanation? “
Very easily. If I claim that I flew around today in a space ship there are many explanations for my claim that do not require that I actually flew in a space ship. Perhaps I’m lying, or I’m delusional, or someone put me up to it. These are all contradictory, but as we come up with more and more alternative explanations acceptance of my claim becomes less and less rational. That’s the way Bayes’ Theorem works.
”Shouldn’t it be the other way around? You have a bunch of mutually exclusive theories which cancel each other out?
Hence, the net result is the cumulative improbability of any (and all) alternative explanation(s).”
So it becomes more and more likely that I flew in a spaceship if you come up with a variety of plausible alternatives? Generally speaking you would expect the opposite to be the case.
Exactly, Jon. Very good counterpoints. The fact that proposed alternative explanations are different from each other (remember, they're merely being proposed) does not in any way argue against the plausibility of any of those proposed alternatives. Nor does it argue on behalf of the original claim. The apologist still has a truckload of heavy lifting to do. Watch him sweat!
ReplyDelete