The problematic problem of evil

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That said, however, I think there are problems of evil [not a singular "problem of evil"] that make the Christian belief that a good god exists improbable. While I am not so bold as to claim that these problems disprove the existence of any god or gods, I do contend that they place Christians in an awkward, defensive position in which they must adopt several ad hoc, and unconventional, beliefs in order to maintain their god's goodness.

That said, I will now present a few arguments that I believe are problematic for Christians. While none of them may be unanswerable, I believe that they force the Christian to accept answers that stretch the credibility of their openness to the "falsifibility" [forgive the word invention, I can't think of a better one] of their beliefs. In other words, I believe the "answers" that Christians invent for these problems demonstrate that their faith is not subject to falsifibility, and that their faith is, therefore, not subject to reason.

Argument #1:

P1: An omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-benevolent being would not commit an evil act.
P2: Ordering an army to kill non-combatant women, children, and infants is an evil act.
P3: The Christian God ordered an army to kill non-combatant women, children, and infants.
C: Therefore, the Christian God is not omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-benevolent.

I believe P1 is true by definition. If a being is all good, wise enough to know how to avoid evil acts, and powerful enough to accomplish his goals without evil acts, that being would not commit an evil act.

Christian theists often argue that P2 is true when applied to humans, but not to the Christian God. It is argued that humans are the Christian God's "property" and it is not, then, an evil act for him to destroy his own property.

This seems to me an ad hoc argument intended to save the Christian God from an obvious evil act (i.e. an act that would be obviously evil to most people who heard it). It also creates a problem for Christian moral philosophy.

Many of the same Christians who argue that a different morality applies to the Christian God justify human morality by reference to God's nature. They do this to avoid the horns of Euthyphro's dilemma. They do not want to say that morality is an arbitrary decision of God nor do they want to say that morality is external to God (because this would, presumably, make God subject to a standard outside of himself).

The defense, then, that P2 does not apply to the Christian God because of his position as "owner" of humanity is problematic because it implies a different moral standard for God and for humanity. If morality is determined by God's nature, however, and not his divine commands, then, there would not be two separate moral standards for God and for humanity. All morality would be unified by God's nature (i.e. if it is immoral to order an army to kill non-combatant women, children, and infants because of God's nature, then God's nature would not allow him to do so either).

Whether this defense is as problematic to those who do not maintain that morality is derived from God's nature is unclear to me. Perhaps, there is a way of justifying Christian moral belief that avoids both horns of Euthyphro's dilemma and avoids the problem of a morality derived from God's nature that does not apply to God himself. If there is such a justification, I do not know it.

http://notmanywise.blogspot.com/2006/07/problems-of-evil.html

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1.Exbrainer assumes the existence of evil. Does he believe in moral absolutes?

2.The Bible gives a reason for holy war (e.g. Deut 9:4; 20:18). Exbrainer never addresses the reason given in Scripture.

3. How is it necessarily ad hoc to deny a uniform code of conduct to God and man alike?

To take an example from human affairs, most of us believe in age-appropriate conduct. Not everything that’s proper for adults is proper for children.

Is that an ad hoc distinction?

4. I’ve blogged on the Euthyphro dilemma on several occasions. It’s an artificial dilemma.

5. God is not merely dealing with people qua creatures, but with people qua sinners.

6.The fact that holy war is indiscriminate doesn’t imply that God is exacting judgment on the sins of each individual victim.

Natural disasters are also indiscriminate. The righteous are swept away along with the wicked. But that’s not the end of the story.

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Argument #2 (general):

P1a: If the creator of this world were omniscient and omnipotent, then "he" could create a world in which all of his goals could be accomplished without pain and suffering.
P2a: If the creator of this world were omnibenevolent, then "he" would create a world in which all of his goals were accomplished without pain and suffering.

I believe P1a is true by definition. A being that is both omniscient and omnipotent would have both the wisdom and strength to accomplish his goals without inflicting (or allowing) pain and suffering.

It seems to me that P2a is also true by definition. Given a choice between accomplishing a goal with pain and suffering and accomplishing the same goal without it, a being that is all good would not inflict this pain and suffering because it would be unnecessary.

It seems to me that a possible defeator of this argument would be the claim that the Christian God could have had pain and suffering as a goal for humanity. In other words, while it might be true that an omnipotent and omniscient being could create a world in which many goals could be accomplished with or without pain and suffering, it might be the case that the particular goal of the Christian God in creating the world involved pain and suffering as its overall objective. Even an omniscient and omnipotent being could not accomplish a goal that included inflicting pain and suffering without pain and suffering.

This position, however, seems to create another problem. It seems to insist that the Christian God could not have chosen another goal for the world that did not involve pain and suffering. It seems to imply that the Christian God was not free to choose his own goals for the world; that he had to choose one that involved pain and suffering. This, however, seems to refute Christian doctrine of the Christian God's freedom, which leads into Argument #3.

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1. P1a is not true by definition. There can be second-order goods which are contingent on evil. Such second-order goods are unobtainable apart from evil.

2. In fact, we find this argument in Scripture (cf. Rom 9:22-23; 11:32; Gal 3:22).

Once again, we’re treated to the spectacle of apostates who don’t know their way around the Bible. They raise abstract objections to the faith as if the Bible had no answer to their objections.

Perhaps they’d object to the answers given in Scripture, but the initial problem is with their failure to even interact with the answers given in Scripture.

3. (1)-(2) invalidate P1a and P2a alike.

4. Pain and suffering are generally means rather than ends.

5. Some pain and suffering are intrinsic goods. Retributive justice is intrinsically good.

6. Not all possibilities are compossible. Omnipotence can instantiate any compossible state of affairs. But to assume that God can achieve any end apart from any means is illogical

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Argument #3:

P1a: If the creator of this world were omniscient, omnipotent, and free, then "he" could choose any goal for this world that he wanted.
P2a: If the creator of this world were omnibenevolent, then "he" would choose only those goals for this world that did not involve pain and suffering.

P1b: If the creator of this world is not omniscient, omnipotent, free, and omnibenevolent, then the Christian God is not the creator of this world.
P2b: The creator of this world is not omniscient, omnipotent, free, and omnibenevolent.
Cb: Therefore, the Christian God is not the creator of this world.

I believe P1a is true by definition. A free creator is not obligated to choose one goal over another. An omnipotent creator is not limited in his choices of goals by his power. An omniscient creator is not limited in his choices of goals by his ignorance of his options.

It seems that P2a is also true by definition. An omnibenevolent creator would limit himself to those goals that did not involve evil (viz. pain and suffering--see the justification of Argument #2, P2a for equating "pain and suffering" to "evil").

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1. P2a is not true by definition. It fails to distinguish between a lesser good for a greater number and a greater good for a lesser number.

2. God is, indeed, free to choose between respective scenarios, but difference scenarios carry respective trade-offs. As I said before, not all possibilities are compossible.

3. Exbrainer is tacitly assuming that there is one best of all possible worlds. But what if some goods are incommensurable?

Which is the best style of church architecture? Byzantine? Gothic? Romanesque?

You might be able to say which is the best example of Byzantine or Gothic or Romanesque architecture. But to say that one style is better than another is hardly true by definition.