UFC: Exbrainer v. Van Til in the Octogon

Referee: Let's git it on!

Exbrainer: Just having “an answer” is not enough. It must be a good answer. Presuppositionalism doesn’t give a good answer.

Van Til: Define “presuppositionalism.”

Exbrainer: "Presuppositionalism: Assume all the most undemonstratable [sic.] and controversial aspects of our faith and we can answer all of the other questions by reference to these undemonstrable [sic.] and controversial aspects of our faith."

Van Til: Hmmm…sounds like a straw man argument to me. Suppose I were to defined secularism along the same lines:

"Assume all the most indemonstrable and controversial aspects of our secular fideism and we can answer all of the other questions by reference to these indemonstrable and controversial aspects of our secular fideism."

Exbrainer: Very well, then. You asked me to account for the laws of logic. What is your answer to this question?

Van Til: They are constituted by the infinite and timeless mind of God.

Exbrainer: But why should I believe a “god” exists?

Van Til: There are many reasons, but one reason is the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG). For an example of what I mean, consider the following exposition:

“If Knowledge, Then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga And Van Til.”

http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/papers/IfKnowledgeThenGod.pdf

Exbrainer: Gee, presupposing something so outside of my experience doesn't seem wise on my part.

Van Til: What makes you think that God is outside our experience? We can experience God in creation and providence, revelation and redemption, theophany, Incarnation, and saving grace.

Exbrainer: Define God.

Van Til: God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.

We can experience wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. We can experience an incorporeal substance, for our own finite minds are incorporeal.

Moreover, we can grasp some ideas for which we have no direct experience. We understand what is meant by an infinite number or a timeless number.

Exbrainer: Why should I believe the first premise that God is a precondition of logic or abstract objects generally?

Van Til: That depends on whether you want a short answer or a long answer. If you want a long answer, then I’d suggest that you brush up on modal metaphysics. If you’re up to it, you can read the following Christian treatments:

R. Davis, The Metaphysics of Theism & Modality (Peer Lang 2000).

W. Vallicella, A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated (Kluwer 2002).

A. Pruss, Possible Worlds: What They Are Good for and What They Are.

http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/PhilThesis.html

Greg Welty,

“An Examination of Theistic Conceptual Realism as an Alternative to Theistic Activism.”

http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/mphil.pdf

If you want even more, you can wait for Welty to post his doctoral dissertation or Brian Leftow to publish his book on Divine Ideas.

Given the material that’s already out there, as well as material in the pipeline, it would be quite dishonest to say that Christians have no answer to your question or never defend their operating premise.

Exbrainer: But referring to something undemonstratable [sic.] and controversial (like the non-corporal Christian God or the inerrancy of the Bible) doesn't seem like much of an “explanation.” I mean it doesn't hold a lot of power.

Van Til: Why are you changing the subject? What does the inerrancy of Scripture have to do with TAG?

As far as that’s concerned, there’s a vast body of literature in defense of Biblical inerrancy. But for you to introduce this issue in the middle of a debate over TAG is a diversionary tactic.

To say that God’s existence is “controversial” is not a salient objection to God’s existence.

To say that God existence is indemonstrable is tendentious when TAG is the very topic of conversation. Instead of scrutinizing TAG, you beg the question by merely reasserting that God’s existence is indemonstrable.

Exbrainer: Suppose Socrates and Euthyphro were having their dialogue when a bolt of lightening hit the tree beside them. Euthyphro says, “Aha, how do you explain lightening? My worldview says that Zeus throws those lightening bolts down from heaven. If you presuppose that Zeus exists, I have a worldview that accounts for lightening.” To this, Socrates responds, “I don't know how lightening works, but my worldview says the answer will somehow be something natural.” At the time, Euthyphro's worldview had more “explanatory power” than Socrates'. Would that make Euthyphro's worldview truer than Socrates'?

Van Til: That’s irrelevant to TAG. TAG is concerned with the source of global truth-conditions, not with the source local truth-claims like thunder and lightning.

Referee: And the winner is Van Til by submission.