Loaded dice-2

***QUOTE***

As to epistemology, I am not sure as to what the problem is supposed to be. I grant that in cases of say Descartes' evil demon, the god of Calvinism (is there a difference?) or other covert controllers of exceeding power that the subject in question either can’t or probably can’t, find out that their alternative possibilities have been counter-factually and covertly eliminated. So what? The only thing of significance that appears to follow is that the agent doesn’t know what they took themselves to know and that is hardly a big deal. What we need is an argument to show that such a situation is analogous to the situation we are fact in and this is an argument that Hays doesn’t suggest let alone give.

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As to whether the God of Calvinism is an evil demon, I can think of a much better example of the demonic myself. And that is when a lost sinner, in his prideful defiance and humanistic conceit, presumes to spit in the face of sovereign grace.

The big deal is that if the argument from experience is a leading argument for LFW, and if, in fact, the “experience of freedom” is consistent with the lack of freedom, then that undermines the case for LFW.

To say that “what we need is an argument to show that such a situation is analogous to the situation we are fact in,” completely misses the point: there very nature of the thought-experiment is such that no evidence (argument from experience) could either prove or disprove that we find ourselves in an analogous situation.

***QUOTE***

Furthermore, even if we were in such a case and all our actions were predetermined by God, how would say a professing Calvinist be in a position to know that they were elect or had genuine faith? To appeal to self authentication or an inner witness bakes no bread since one could be determined to think that they had the experience of self authenticating faith or an inner witness without in fact having it. How could the professing Calvinist tell the difference? How could they find out if God had determined them to have genuine or spurious faith and hence a reprobate?

***END-QUOTE***

To begin with, if this is a problem, it is not a problem distinctive to Calvinism. Except for outright antinomians (e.g., Ryrie, Kendall, Hodges), most theological traditions do admit a distinction between true and nominal believers. Hence, it is possible under almost alternative to Calvinism for a nominal believer to be spiritually self-deluded and nurse a false assurance of salvation.

Secondly, the God of Biblical Calvinism is the same God who has also revealed Biblical grounds for the assurance of salvation. God is not conferring the same experience on elect and reprobate alike.

For a practical discussion of assurance, cf. P Helm, The Beginnings (Banner of Truth 1986).

Thirdly, the argument for predestination and providence, unlike the argument for LFW, is not an argument from experience, but an argument from revelation. Hence, the two positions do not enjoy epistemic parity.

***QUOTE***

As to who has to show what in the theological realm the burden seems born by the Calvinist just as equally as the Libertarian. I admit that if there is such a controlling deity then it is hard to see how there could be any epistemological basis for thinking that we had libertarian freedom. But is there such a deity? Has Hays shown that there is? Moreover, as to what could serve as theological evidence for Libertarian freedom I think there is a strong case to be made from the Biblical corpus for it. In a nutshell God has libertarian freedom and we are made in God’s image and therefore enjoy a measure of his kind of freedom. The same language that is employed concerning God’s choices is generally employed with respect to human and angelic choices plausibly giving us grounds for thinking that the freedom is at least of the same kind even if not of the same measure or degree. To deny that such language implies libertarian freedom to humans by the same token denies it to God contradicting every major Christian theological traditon, Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox.

***END-QUOTE***

To begin with, the exegetical case for Calvinism has been made repeatedly. There’s a lot of material on that subject at Triablogue itself.

In addition, Perry’s argument for LFW is a classic illustration of all that’s wrong with his theological method. He seizes on a Biblical category (the imago Dei), but doesn’t make any effort to exegete the Biblical category in context. Instead, he uses the Biblical category as a cipher to plug in a totally extraneous concept.

Why appeal to Scripture in the first place unless you allow Scripture to define its own usage? If Scripture is a source of knowledge, then when you appeal to a Biblical category, you need to exegete the category so that it means what it meant in the original source.

Here’s an example of the right and wrong way to interpret the key term:

***QUOTE***

There is a long history of efforts to understand “the image of God” as an aspect or function in humans that sets them off from other creatures and in terms of which they are “like God.” Depending on philosophical and theological predispositions, the image was seen in such things as human ‘reason” or, by the Reformers, in “true righteousness and holiness.”

According to Clines, however, humanity is [God’s] representative and agent here on earth. The expression “likeness” guarantees that humans will be a faithful and adequate representative of God on earth. Humans, thus, embody “God’s lordship over the lower orders of creation.”

Gen 1;26b expresses the purpose or goal of creating humans in the image of God…The meaning of the image, thus, does not lie in the mere terms used, but in Israel’s, or more precisely, the priestly tradition’s, understanding of representative kingship.

New International Dictionary of OT Theology & Exegesis, 4:644-45.

***END-QUOTE***

Moving ahead:

***QUOTE***

Moreover, the Libertarian seems to be able to argue that since determinism would render any knowledge claim, let alone a claim about having freedom so problematic, that it is a reason to think that determinism is false since the knowledge we have isn’t that problematic to attain.

***END-QUOTE***

Needless to say, it doesn’t render “any” knowledge claim problematic, but only a knowledge claim for LFW based on the argument from experience.

***QUOTE***

Hays then moves to construct something like an argument against Libertarianism by claiming that Libertarianism implies the same kinds of absurdities as “retrocausation.” Without reproducing Hays comments here I don’t think he is right. Libertarians can and do quite easily agree with the majority of philosophers today that time travel is impossible and that the past is fixed and hence accidentally necessary. (For a helpful discussion of accidental necessity see http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/anld.htm ) Since the past is fixed time travel is impossible.

***END-QUOTE***

Frankly, this objection is pretty obtuse. After all, my argument was explicitly predicated on the impossibility of time-travel. This is what I said:

***QUOTE***

Finally, I’d like to raise another objection to LFW. Since we’ve all grown up on SF, we’re all familiar with the paradoxes of time-travel. And this is one reason to believe that time travel and retrocausation are impossible.

***END-QUOTE***

And I was extending that impossibility to render LFW equally impossible. Perry acts as though the impossibility of time-travel is inconsistent with my argument when, in fact, it’s a presupposition of my argument. And I’m the one who’s confused?

***QUOTE***

Second, on Libertarianism it is false that if you replayed the past you would alter the future. On Libertarianism it is possible to alter the future but it is not necessary that given the same past circumstances an agent will do otherwise but only that they could do otherwise or at least will to do otherwise. It is important to keep in mind that Libertarians are minimally committed to the idea that the agent could will to do otherwise regardless of the success of those volitional acts, that is regardless of whether I do in fact do otherwise. It doesn’t follow that because an agent is free to do otherwise given the same past circumstances prior to some volition that they will do otherwise. So it is possible that if we could replay the past a million times prior to Jones choosing A as opposed to B that for every time that Jones chooses A. This doesn’t imply that the past determines Jones choosing A but only that the past isn’t causally sufficient to explain Jones’ choice. It might be that Jones always has good reasons to choose A and never has (because say, there aren’t any) good reasons to choose B. Hays seems to be confusing “could have done otherwise” with “would have done otherwise” and conceptually these are not identical. It is possible that Jones could have chosen B some of the times but it doesn’t follow that since Jones had the power to do otherwise that as Hays writes, “If LFW were true, and you kept replicating the past, then, of necessity, the same agent would do otherwise in the same situation. If he really could do otherwise, and you keep giving him enough chances to do otherwise, he would do otherwise—sooner or later.” If Jones has libertarian freedom, he doesn’t do anything, A or otherwise “of necessity.” Hays has adeptly created a strawman.

***END-QUOTE***

Yes, you might say that it is just barely possible that if you replay the scenario a million times, a libertarian agent will make the very same choice a million times. It is also just barely possible that a million or a million-million libertarian agents will make the very same choice given a million replays.

Likewise, it is possible that the die will come up sixes a million times in a row. Likewise, it is possible that a royal flush will be dealt a million times in a row. Likewise, it is possible that a million different gamblers will be dealt a royal flush a millions times in a row.

But if beginner’s luck were to turn into a winning streak a million times in a row, and if Perry were the proprietor of the Casino, I don’t think that Perry would be very impressed if the gambler were to appeal to the freedom of future contingents. The casino would go broke in a hurry of the proprietor shared the libertarian sentiments of the gambler.

A form of indeterminism which invariably yields the very same result looks suspiciously like a “hidden variables” theory of indeterminism to me.