Theonomy under fire-2

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4. We should presume that Old Testament standing laws continue to be morally binding in the New Testament, unless they are rescinded or modified by further revelation.
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i) I disagree with Bahnsen on this point. It’s too aprioristic.

However, Bahnsen’s claim can be put on a firmer exegetical footing. For example, we’ve already seen how Paul cites the 6th commandment in Eph 6:2-3. The Shema (Deut 6:4) lies behind 1 Tim 2:5. The Mosaic laws on incest lie behind 1 Cor 5:1 (cf. Lev 18:8; Deut 22:30; 27:20)—even though this is legal technicality, since the liaison is between in-laws, not blood relations. The Decalogue is reproduced in 1 Tim 1:9-10. A central plank of the Holiness Code (Lev 19) is reproduced in James (2:1,9; 4:11; 5:4,9,12,20).

ii) In addition, one can hardly erect an electrified fence between the Decalogue and the case law, for the case law is merely an application of the general norms in the Decalogue to special cases.

And although some of the hypotheticals are culture-bound, it is easy to update others.

So although I decline his exegetical shortcut, one can arrive at the same destination by taking the long way around.

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6. God's revealed standing laws are a reflection of His immutable moral character and, as such, are absolute in the sense of being non-arbitrary, objective, universal, and established in advance of particular circumstances (thus applicable to general types of moral situations).
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i) Once again, I disagree with Bahnsen. The Decalogue and case-law is inapplicable to God himself.

The proper way of expressing his point is to say that God’s law is adapted to human nature, since God is the author alike of the moral law and human nature, his law is universal due to the universality of human nature.

ii) At this point we need to ground the Mosaic criminal code in the creation mandates of Gen 1. For just as the case-law is an application of the Decalogical norms to special cases, the Decalogue is a special application of the creation mandates to the nation of Israel.

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Let there be no misunderstanding of Bahnsen's position. In his ideal state "public" blasphemy, idolatry, sabbath-breaking, apostasy, witchcraft, sorcery, and false pretension to prophecy would be subject to civil penalties up to and including the death penalty.
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Here we need to draw a couple of distinctions:

i) In principle, we might decide that these particular laws pertain to the ceremonial law rather than the moral law. That would not invalidate the civil law in toto. Rather, it would just be an issue of classification.

ii) We much never back down just because we don’t like the consequences. If it was right back then to execute such offenders, we are in no position to act as though it’s intrinsically wrong to do so now.

God may be more merciful, but he is never less than just.

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Rushdoony's response is the most honest and straightforward. At the same time, however, it is also the most arrogant. He unflinchingly admits the contradiction and then accuses the Confession of "confusion" and "nonsense" and charges Calvin with uttering "heretical nonsense."
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It’s highly intemperate of Rushdoony to impute heresy to Calvin.

However, it’s not as if Waldron, as a Reformed Baptist, agrees with Calvin all the time.

In addition, there’s nothing arrogant in suggestion that the Confession might possibly be confused. The Confession was a consensus document. Rutherford, for one, was no fan of Cromwell.

And it’s my impression that the Scottish Divines tended to be more theocratic than some of their English counterparts.

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Is the Theonomic viewpoint the legitimate offspring of Reformed paedobaptism?
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No, I don’t think so.

i) I recall reading an interview with Rushdoony around the time of his death in which he explained that in Armenia, you had different ethnicities, and each ethnicity was governed by its own law code. The Armenian Christians were governed by Christian law, the Muslims by Muslim law, and so on. There was no notion of a secular state with a religiously neutral law code for all.

ii) In addition, Rushdoony, Bahnsen, and North are Van Tilians. Theonomy is simply the extension of Van Tilian presuppositionalism and antithesis to the sphere of social ethics. Just as Van Til contended that the Christian worldview supplies the preconditions of intelligibility, Rush, Bahnsen, and North contend that God’s law supplies the preconditions of morality. It’s a logical extension of the impossibility of the contrary from the sphere of ontology and epistemology to ethics.

iii) I’d add that theonomy is simply the extension of the Protestant rule of faith (sola Scriptura) to politics. Just as Scripture is the only rule of faith for personal ethics, it is the only rule of faith for social ethics.

Frankly, this ought not to be controversial among Bible-believing Protestants.

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Theonomists, however, are among the leading advocates in the recent Reformed movement for paedocommunion.
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I happen to agree that arguments for paedobaptism support paedocommunion. But that’s incidental to theonomy.

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The Nature of the Theocracy
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1.Here, Waldron goes on for pages and pages with what he clearly regards as the key issue, and what I regard as tangent.

To me, theocracy is not about polity (“civil order,” “civil structure”), it’s not about the ruler or the regime, but about the rule of law; in particular, what law should be the law of the land?

This is neutral with respect to the law-enforcement mechanism. Under the OT, for example, the Mosaic law could be implemented by either a monarchy or tribal oligarchy.

How you arrange the boxes in the organizational chart is irrelevant to the question of what law supplies the moral norm. Is it God’s preceptive will, revealed in Scripture, or something else?

BTW, this is not limited to the role of the Mosaic criminal code. It includes the creation mandates, proverbial wisdom, NT household codes, and so on. Basically all of the paraenetic material of Scripture is in play.

2.To comment on one specific claim--if I'm reading him correctly, it is simply bizarre that Waldron would relegate the Davidic covenant to the Old Covenant, superseded by the New. This is certainly not the standard amil position as I understand it, viz., O. P. Robertson.

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1. The Authority of the Gentile Kingdoms as Divine

Do the Gentile kingdoms possess a legitimate civil authority over the people of God? Is their power de jure as well as de facto? In the course of our examination of this subject we shall note in order the validity, responsibility, and perpetuity of their authority.

a. Its Validity

1) Nebuchadnezzar

2) Cyrus
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i) These are counterproductive examples for a Reformed Baptist to establish his point. The Jews were under the thumb of pagan powers (e.g., Assyrian, Babylon, Persia, Rome) because they were covenant-breakers, as a consequence of which they suffered the curse sanctions.

But Waldron is of the opinion that the curse-sanctions are indexed to the unique and temporary historical-redemptive status of Israel. So how does her subjugation to pagan powers due to breach of covenant establish the perpetual de jure validity of such governance?

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(5) The Central Importance of the Church for the Work of the Kingdom.
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This assumes a false dichotomy between the OT theocracy and the NT church, as if the OT theocracy was not central in the work of the kingdom.

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(2) Dictating religious belief and worship is not the task or function of the state. It is outside the sphere of the civil authorities.

(2) For a state to dictate religious belief or worship inevitably requires the State to rule the church or the church to rule the state.
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This fails to distinguish between the prescription of what is true and the proscription of what is false. The state has the right to do the latter, but not the former.

Even Rutherford drew this distinction. And that was operative under the OT theocracy.

For example, resident aliens were not compelled to participate in Israel’s religious life. To the contrary, they were forbidden to participate unless they freely converted to Judaism.

Moreover, even Jews were not compelled to profess the faith. Rather, they were, on the one hand, enjoined to observe certain rituals and forbidden, on the other hand, from openly opposing the covenant. But unbelieving Jews didn’t have to pretend to be true believers.

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3. The moral law revealed in the Old Covenant has already been revealed to every man because its demands are written in his heart by creation. Man, therefore, by nature has certain ideas about right and wrong. Cf. the following passages Rom. 2:14, 15.
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I prefer the interpretation offered by Augustine, Cranfield, and Wright that this refers, not to pagan Gentiles, but Christian Gentiles.