Tuesday, June 12, 2007

Southern Baptists and Calvinism Conference

This morning Tom Ascol announced an upcoming conference on Southern Baptists and Calvinism at Ridgecrest Conference Center in NC in November 26 - 28. (That is, I believe Tgiving weekend!). It's also 2 hours from my house, so I will plan to be there. I expect to see several bloggers in the SE there...maybe Steve "Cary Grant" Hays will grace us with his physical presence. I'm beginning to think he's one of the Final Five Cylons, a disembodied AI living on an ethereal plane, with a plan. Come on, Steve, what do you say? Come play with us at Ridgecrest in the mountains near Asheville!

I will do my best to drag Dustin Segers there with me! Centurion and Tad Thompson, his pastor, should hike from OK too. It's not like I'm going to hike out there anytime soon. I'd be willing to bet Les Puryear and Wade Burleson, and maybe even Marty Duren will come round for a visit. In fact, I'm hoping many of the Reformed and Baptist/SBC bloggers will come.

At any rate: Dr. Ascol writes:


Today at the Founders Breakfast in San Antonio, I announced an upcoming conference on "Building Bridges: Southern Baptists and Calvinism." The conference is being jointly sponsored by Founders Minstries and Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary. It is scheduled for November 26-28 at Ridgecrest Conference Center in North Carolina.

Details will be made public over the next few weeks. The reason for making the announcement now is to encourage people to hold the dates and begin making plans for what promises to be a historic gathering for Southern Baptists.

The purpose of this conference is to bring together Southern Baptists of various theological commitments in order to hear pointed presentations and dialogue about what is arguably the most important theological movement among us today. It is certainly one of the most controversial movements on the scene. Some people seem to despise those doctrines that have historically been denominated Calvinism. Others greatly fear them. Some caricature them beyond recognition.

Among the proponents of Calvinism there are some who seem to be more interested in winning theological debates than in advancing the Kingdom of God by preaching Jesus Christ. Others allow their commitment to God's sovereignty in salvation to excuse their lack of evangelistic passion or to justify a pugilistic spirit.

It is time for Southern Baptists to come together to discuss openly and honestly these particular doctrines of grace that once were the theological consensus among our forebears and is now becoming more prominent among us again. The organizers of this historic gathering envision sessions addressing the strengths and weaknesses of both Calvinistic and non-Calvinistic positions on salvation. The presentations will be exegetical, theological, apologetic, passionate and pastoral. Our desire is for the issues to be addressed in what I call a ruthlessly biblical manner. Such an approach will be neither rude nor superficial. Rather, if our goals are met, they will be energetic, thoughtful and humble and all who participate will walk away with a deeper respect for arguments both for and against the Reformed understanding of salvation. More importantly, we hope that all will recognize more clearly the glory of God displayed in the salvation that He has provided for sinners in the person and work of His Son. That is something which both Calvinists and non-Calvinists need in increasing supplies.

Please join me in praying that the Lord will use this opportunity to strengthen the fellowship and spiritual health of His people known as Southern Baptists. I believe that both are within reach.

Stay tuned for forthcoming details.

Perhaps this will give some individuals, like Dr. Ergun Caner and Johnny Hunt pause before making inflammatory comments in public, at least until then. Personally, it might be the right place for that debate between White/Ascol and Emir/Ergun Caner to take place. I'm impressed by the sponsor, Dr. Akin. He's been a voice of rationality. Of course he's 4 Point Calvinist/Amyraldian anyway, but he's also a thoughtful person, and I'm glad he and SEBTS are taking the time to do this. However, I also believe, at this point, that many a person in the pew, at least here in NC, if they even know there is a debate, if they are not in the thrall of anti-Calvinist theology already (we have a large number of IBFx types like Dave Hunt in NC, even in the SBC churches), who think this is just another preacher fight. On the other hand, it pleases me that this will occur so close to Montreat, which is just up the road, where a certain ex-Presbyterian, rC, Anglo-Catholic professor who cannot seem to abide Bapistery teaches. Perhaps he'll poke his head in the door and find out we aren't just bunch of rabid dogs.

You know, I might even live blog the conference!

In other news, Andrew Lindsey discusses some of the Pastor's Conference, over at Strange Baptist Fire. At the end, he notes:

I forgot to mention that while Dr. Hunt decried declining baptisms in the SBC, he did take note of one group in which baptisms have increased. This past year, SBC churches baptized more children from ages 1 to 5 than ever before. Dr. Hunt took this as evidence that Southern Baptist preachers are only reaching young children and that we need to focus on other age groups as well. I would point out that if the SBC is making a regular practice of baptizing children this young, the Convention is, in effect, becoming paedobaptist.

This is disturbing, because even Dr. Hunt notices it. Remember, this is a denomination that can't get half its people to darken the church on Sunday mornings. Dare I say that is worse than the PCA and OPC! This is what the dominant soteriology of the SBC breeds: sacramental prayers for toddlers and preschoolers to "ask Jesus into their hearts" to please Mommy, Daddy, their VBS or Sunday School teachers, and then the baptizing of unregenerate souls. The SBC would do well to remember that baptism was viewed by our forefathers as means of grace, and that it could harden those who were not baptized properly:

As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God, as the righteous judge, for former sin doth blind and harden; from them he not only withholdeth his grace, whereby they might have been enlightened in their understanding, and wrought upon their hearts; but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had, and exposeth them to such objects as their corruption makes occasion of sin; and withal, gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan, whereby it comes to pass that they harden themselves, under those means which God useth for the softening of others.


This is why we take baptism seriously as Baptists. This is why we decry confetti baptisteries with all the perks. Calvinism isn't killing the SBC, this sort of thing, and the thinking behind it is killing it. Over half its young people apostatize these days. Here's the reason why! Let us hope and pray that Tom Ascol's resolution on integrity in church membership passes and that there will be those @ Ridgecrest in November who will reconsider their soteriological practices, if not their theology.

Gospel According to Job

Crying Out for Vindication: The Gospel According to Job by David R. Jackson. Read the Table of Contents, Introduction, and Chapter 1 for free.

"At last a series on the Old Testament designed to provide reliable exposition, biblical theology, and a focus on Christ. These books should be like manna in the desert to pastors, preachers, teachers, and many individual Christians who struggle to come to terms with how to read the Old Testament." - Dr. Sinclair Ferguson, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Systematic Theology, Westminster Theological Seminary

Check out the other books in this series.

The Fairness Doctrine

As we head into the next presidential election, it’s worthwhile to discuss the difference between liberal and conservative values. For now I’ll focus on two fundamental points of difference.

I realize, of course, that the phrase “liberal values” is oxymoronic, but that’s another story.

1. The Fairness Doctrine

To a liberal, equality and fairness are synonymous. Hence, any inequality, regardless of source, is fundamentally unfair, and measures must be taken to even out the inequality.

If one man is richer than another man, that’s unfair. It doesn’t matter why one man is richer than another. It doesn’t matter if the rich man is industrious while the poor man is lazy.

For the liberal, there’s something fundamentally unfair about the mere fact of an economic disparity.

If Michael Jordan can shoot hoops better than I can, then that’s unfair, and the liberal solution is to take a baseball bat to his kneecaps.

Now, a conservative doesn’t deny that some inequalities may be unfair. But we don’t equate the two. We take cause and effect into consideration. We don’t merely look at the result, but at the source of the result.

It’s the liberal synonymity between equality and fairness that is driving liberal economics. You must punish financial success since it is unfair for anyone to be more successful than anyone else. The winners must recompense the losers.

This is driving liberal foreign policy, as well as the “war on terror.” It’s inherently unfair that American is more powerful than Iran or Syria. So we must have done something wrong to enrage the jihadis. It’s our fault. We’re to blame.

Suicide bombers are just trying to get even. To even the score.

Incidentally, this is what is driving the global warming scam. It isn’t about environmentalism. Rather, it’s envy of American success.

Liberals and foreigners who hate America want to sabotage the American economy. Cut us down to size. Bring us down to the level of a third-world country.

Mind you, liberals don’t have any problem with rich liberals. Only with rich conservatives.

2. Big Daddy

Liberals believe that the role of government is to function in loco parentis. They feel that you and I require adult supervision.

And they have assigned this role to the judiciary. Judges are the official grown-ups. It is the job of judges, and not the voters, through their elected representatives, to set social policy. Judges play the part of mom and dad, while we are lifelong minors, living under judicial curfew.

Notice that this prerogative was never assigned to the judiciary in the U.S. Constitution. It’s the judiciary that arrogated that authority to itself.

You can see this mentality in the debate over parental consent or even parental notification. Parents cannot be trusted to do the right thing for their pregnant daughter.

Only a judge, or his deputies (i.e. a social worker, or abortionist at Planned Parenthood), can be trusted to look out for the best interests of the girl.

You can see the same mentality at work in the liberal philosophy of taxation. The money you earn is not your own. Your wages are a form of allowance. It all belongs to Uncle Sam. But he will give you a weekly allowance to live on.

And there are also restrictions on how you are permitted to spend your allowance. For example, you’re not permitted to spend your allowance on junk food. On cigarettes or cheeseburgers with transfatty acid.

You’re only permitted to spend your allowance on “healthy” foods like soy burgers and tofu steak.

What's an atheist?

JON CURRY SAID:

"Steve once accused me of being an atheist, and when I replied that I wasn't he simply re-defined the word atheist to include Mormons, Muslims, etc."

The funny thing about this complaint is that Curry is an apostate. Assuming that he was an orthodox (albeit nominal) Christian once upon a time, I'm defining words the same way he used to define them—unless he was just as illogical back then as he is today.

An atheist denies the existence of God. There is only one true God. The true God is the God of Biblical theism.

If you deny the existence of the only God there is, then you're an atheist.

I'm sorry for Curry if he's too illogical to grasp this rather elementary point.

Monday, June 11, 2007

Evidentialism

I'll now wrap up the arguments I've been giving against T-stone's and Loftus's evidentialism, and I'll include some professional philosophers who know far more about this subject than any of us could ever hope to; trying to show that my concerns and arguments don't seem to fit with the claims Touchstone has made about people who hold this position [the one's I've been promulgating], and use these arguments, being ignorant.

John Loftus claimed: "Whatever we believe we should demand evidence for that belief, and historical evidence in the past simply isn't good enough. What we need is evidence."

Obviously reminiscent of Clifford's The Ethics of Belief: "To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

There's nothing new under the sun. Loftus was claiming what Clifford was.

This is expressed more clearly here:

"Evidentialism in epistemology is defined by the following thesis about epistemic justification:

(EVI) Person S is justified in believing proposition p at time t if and only if S’s evidence for p at t supports believing p.

As evidentialism is a thesis about epistemic justification, it is a thesis about what it takes for one to believe justifiably, or reasonably, in the sense thought to be necessary for knowledge. Particular versions of evidentialism can diverge in virtue of their providing different claims about what sorts of things count as evidence, what it is for one to have evidence, and what it is for one’s evidence to support believing a proposition. Thus, while (EVI) is often referred to as the theory of epistemic justification known as evidentialism, it is more accurately conceived as a kind of epistemic theory. In this light, (EVI) can be seen as the central, guiding thesis of evidentialism. All evidentialist theories conform to (EVI), but various divergent theories of evidentialism can be formulated."



And as Jaegwon Kim points out in ‘What is “Naturalized Epistemology”?’, "A strictly nonnormative concept of evidence is not our concept of evidence; it is something that we do not understand."

And therefore I have pointed out that John's and Touchstone's defense of their normative claim rests on the is implies ought fallacy.

Besides the many arguments I've leveled against evidentialism here, there are other plenty of other arguments too. Here's a few.


And people like Dr. Michael Sudduth have laid out the problems with evidentialism. See here, for example:

**********


I. Evidentialism and the Evidentialist Objection

Evidentialism is the view that rational beliefs or knowledge require the possession of evidence of some sort. Applied to religious belief, evidentialism is the view that religious beliefs are rational (or constitute knowledge) only if a person has adequate evidence in support of those beliefs. "Evidence" in this context refers to propositional evidence, i.e., other rational beliefs or known propositions. Evidentialism originated in early modern philosophy under the influence of philosophers such as John Locke. It became an integral part of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment critique of religious belief. The evidentialist objection to religious belief is the view that religious belief fails to be rational or justified because there is not sufficient evidence for such beliefs.

The evidentialist argument against religious belief can be stated as follows:

[E1] Religious belief is rational only if it is based on other rational beliefs that provide adequate evidential support it.

[E2] There are no rational beliefs that provide adequate evidential support for religious belief.

From which it follows that

[E3] Religious belief is not rational.

Not all evidentialists accept [E2]. Many of them argue that [E2] is false. It is important to distinguish the evidentialist challenge and the evidentialist objection to religious belief. The challenge is [E1], the demand that one's religious beliefs have evidence. The objection is [E3], which is based, not merely on [E1], but the conjunction of [E1] and [E2].

II. The Response to Evidentialism


A. Questioning Premise [E2]

It may be argued that [E2] is false, a matter to be investigated in the latter part of the course. Granted, it is not plausible to suppose that there is no conclusive evidence for God's existence, but there is hardly conclusive evidence for any of our beliefs. So that can't be the right sort of standard for adequate evidence. There are potentially plenty of rational starting points that provide support for God's existence: the existence of the Universe (cosmological argument), the orderly nature of the Universe and its fine-tuning (design argument), the existence of morality (moral argument), religious experience and miracles. Even if none of these arguments by itself provides adequate evidence, they might plausibly be construed as elements of a cumulative case argument. Of course these arguments are subject to objections, and the objections are subject to objections too. But one simply can't say "there is no evidence" or "there is no adequate" without at least engaging these arguments. Hence, the defense of the evidentialist objection would require a systematic and exhaustive analysis of theistic arguments.

B. It is not plausible the evidentialist requirement could be applicable to all beliefs, so why isolate religious beliefs and subject them to that requirement.

That the evidentialist requirement is not applicable to all beliefs can be argued as follows. Some beliefs must be rational or warranted in a way that does not depend on evidence (in the form of reasons or arguments); otherwise no belief can be rational or warranted. Clearly, if a belief C is supported by another belief B, where B is a reason for C, B must also be a good reason for C. But in that case, it seems like B must be a warranted belief. But if all warranted beliefs require reasons, then there must be evidence for B too. And the evidence for B must be supported by still further evidence. And so on ad infinitum. But since no human person can possess an infinite number of beliefs, it would follow that no belief is rational or warranted. Of course, maybe one's evidence eventually loops back to a previous belief at some point. B is evidence for A and C is evidence for B and A is evidence for C. But then one's reasoning is circular. (Furthermore, this would entail that A is evidence for itself, but self-evidence does not involve a belief being evidentially supported by another belief, so this is actually inconsistent with an evidentialist requirement). To avoid the dilemma of infinite regress or circularity, there must be some rational beliefs that do not require reasons. So it appears that some beliefs must be properly basic, rational (or warranted) but not held on the evidential basis of other beliefs. This is the basic thesis of foundationalism.

C. Plantinga claims that [E1] is rooted in classical foundationalism and deontologism (what he calls the classical package), but that these grounds for [E1] are inadequate.

Classical foundationalism maintains that an evidentialist requirement is appropriate for some beliefs, while other beliefs are properly basic. But the only beliefs that are properly basic are either self-evident (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4), about one's immediate mental states (e.g., I seem to see a tree), or evident to the senses (e.g., there is a tree outside). But since religious beliefs are neither self-evident, about one's immediate introspective experience, nor evident to the senses, they cannot be properly basic. Hence, the classical foundationalist has a criterion basis on which to apply an evidentialist requirement to religious belief but not all beliefs. Moreover, the evidentialist requirement for religious belief takes rationality to be deontological, a matter of being within one's intellectual rights. Hence, a belief is rational in this sense just if a person is within his intellectual rights in holding it. (See Handout II for discussion on deontologism). A belief is properly basic just if a person is within his intellectual rights in holding it in the absence of propositional evidence or reasons. The classical package then claims that a person would be violating some intellectual obligation if he held a religious belief without the appropriate propositional evidence. Such a belief would not be rational.

Plantinga cites the classical foundationalist principle as:

[CP] A person is justified in accepting a belief p if and only if either (1) p is properly basic for S (i.e., self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for S) or (2) S believes p on the evidential basis of propositions that are properly basic, and that evidentially support p deductively, inductively, or abductively.

["Induction" and "abduction" are being used to refer to two kinds of probabilistic reasoning.]


1. Plantinga argues that classical foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent. If [CP] is true then no one is justified in accepting [CP], for [CP] is neither properly basic nor properly nonbasic.


2. Plantinga argues that classical foundationalism's criteria for proper basicality are inconsistent with paradigmatic cases of properly basic beliefs. For instance, we hold many justified basic beliefs that do not satisfy CP's criteria for proper basicality. Belief in other minds, the existence of the past, and the external world are rarely held on the evidential basis of other beliefs, but neither are they self-evident or about one's own mental life, and probably not evident to the senses either.


3. Plantinga argues that religious belief is properly basic for many people (i.e., it is deontologically rational in the absence of propositional evidence). A person can hold religious beliefs without evidence and without violating any intellectual duties. If upon investigating arguments pro and con for religious belief, a person is not impressed with objections to religious belief or impressed with the arguments of theistic philosophers, what more can reasonably be expected of the person? It seems that such a person would be deontologically rational in continuing to hold religious belief."

**********

And so if it is true that there can be warranted beliefs of which we have positive epistemic status when holding them, then we "shouldn't" have to have evidence for them. I pointed this out this way: "Not all beliefs need propositional evidence in support of it to be warranted or justified or have proper status. Likewise, not every street requires me to go 25 MPH. On *this street* it would be “good” to and I “should” go 25. If I am on a street that doesn’t require 25, but, rather 45 MPH, then it is neither “bad” nor epistemically immoral for me to not go 25! So, no, if I can and do have positive epistemic status for beliefs without propositional evidence in its favor, then I deny the claim that I “should” have this evidence for all my beliefs. If I “should” not rape, then NO INSTANCE of rape is “good.” Therefore, if T-stone thinks this about beliefs then NO INSTANCE of beliefs without propositional evidence in their favor are “good” things. And thus we’re back at the regress.

The idea that we "should" have evidence (whatever *that* is, I've asked T-stone and Loftus to define what it is and how much is needed, but for some reason they've declined) is a throwback to a deontological view of justification. But this has fallen on hard times. We can see that Loftus and T-stone hold to deontological evidentialism by the very nature of their claim: "Whatever we believer we should demand evidence of that belief." I quote Dr. Sudduth again: "One prominent view of justification is the evidentialist view. A justified belief is one for which a person has adequate evidence of some sort. A second related notion is that one is justified in holding some belief only if one is intellectually entitled to hold the belief, i.e., within one's intellectual rights or not in violation of certain epistemic duties. The views are often combined in what we might call deontological evidentialism: one has an intellectual obligation to hold a belief only if one adequate evidence for the belief. Alternatively, a person ought not to hold a belief in the absence of sufficient evidence." Note his claim reconstruction is the same as theirs. If I *should* have evidence demanded of all my beliefs, then I "shouldn't" (Sudduth: "ought not") have no evidence. Likewise, if I "should" obey the laws, then I "shouldn't" break them. If I 'should" drive 10 mph on the street where an Elementary school sits, then I "shouldn't" drive 75! This is all clear and easy to follow. hence Loftus and T-stone hold to deontological evidentialism. As I said this has fallen on hard times, and I've argued against it, but so that the emotional baggage of having to admit that a T-blogger is right is removed, I quote Dr. Sudduth again:

***********

"Let's look at the idea that justification involves the possession of evidence for one's belief. In the popular 1970s TV program Columbo, the often absent-minded, seemingly incompetent detective Columbo gathers together various bits of information in the course of the show that point him in the direction of the murderer. On the basis of these bits of information, he forms the belief that so and so is likely the murderer. Although he relies heavily on confessions to convict, his own beliefs about the guilty person are formed on the basis of various facts he uncovers during his investigation. Similarly, a person working in an office without windows may come to hold the belief that it is raining outside on the basis of seeing customers walking in with damp raincoats and perhaps hearing the sound of thunder outside. Or take the case of Milo. On the basis of his beliefs that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, he believes that Socrates is mortal.

In these three cases, a person forms a true belief on the basis of reasons in the form of other beliefs or propositions. These reasons support the truth of their target belief in a particular way.2 Each person has what we might call propositional evidence for his belief. These cases involve instances of logical inference, and as the latter two examples demonstrate such inferences may be quite automatic, taking very little time and a minimal amount of cognitive effort. The support could be viewed as adequate by stipulating that the reasons in question are themselves justified beliefs and they either entail the target belief (as in the third example) or at least make the target belief probable (as in the first two cases). Moreover, it appears that in each of these cases the person grasps, or could come to see upon reflection, that their reasons do provide good indications that the target belief is true. Since the target belief is held on the basis of this evidence, we can say that it is inferentially held and inferentially justified.3

**********

Now, as I have stated a few times before, we should have evidence, and it is a good thing to have it, for *some* of our beliefs, like the ones above. I have pointed out, though, that this doesn't mean that we "should" for *all* of our beliefs. That's a hasty generalization, It's the fallacy that T-stone is committing, and his claim that it's an inductive argument doesn't matter since I've shown that this is a *normative* constraint. Furthermore, I've shown it by arguing that to deny that "all" beliefs "should" have evidence for them is to grant me my position. So, it must be a categorical claim. But, the evidentialist thesis is not necessary for knowledge. Says Sudduth:

**********

"The propositional evidence justification model (hereafter, PEJ model) seems to provide an accurate account of some cases of knowledge, such as the situations described in the above examples. But it seems implausible to suppose that propositional evidential justification is necessary for knowledge simpliciter. First, most of our putative knowledge states are not in fact evidentially grounded. While taking an afternoon walk, I believe that the sun is shining. I believe that there are other minds. I believe that the University of Cambridge is located in England. I believe that 2 + 2 = 4. At the moment, I believe that it seems to me that I am awake. These beliefs are not typically held on the basis of some kind of evidential inference, much less the result of some explicit argument. He we have sources such as sensory perception, introspection, intuition, and testimony. This suggests that either these sources of beliefs or modes of forming beliefs do not produce knowledge or the inferential evidential model is incorrect.4

Secondly, a propositional evidence requirement for knowledge would face a problem of infinite regress on the one hand or vicious circularity on the other. If knowledge (or justified belief) is defined in terms having adequate evidence, and adequate evidence is defined with reference to other beliefs that are justified, then before those beliefs could be adequate evidence for a given belief, they would have to have adequate evidence themselves. But then this latter evidence (if adequate) would also require adequate evidence, and so on ad infinitum. Justification would seem to require the possession of an infinite number of justified beliefs if a person is to be justified in holding any particular belief. But it is not psychologically possible for human persons to hold an infinite number of beliefs, so we could not be justified in any belief. But then justification evidentialism, coupled with an infinite regress and a limit to the number of beliefs a human person can have, entails that knowledge is not possible. But this conclusion certainly seems false. This conclusion could only be avoided if at some point the chain of evidence looped and returned back to a previous justified belief, so that A is evidence for B, C is evidence for A, D is evidence for C, and B is evidence for D. Of course this carries with it the implication that some proposition (B) is evidence for itself, at least if we assume that "being evidence for" is a transitive relation. But in that case B would be justified in a way independent of its evidential relations to other beliefs. This conclusion seems to be inconsistent with PEJ."

**********

Also, to base the belief in the evidentialist thesis on sense perception is problematic for more than a couple reasons, but I'll cite two. One is that I do not see how *the truth* of the *evidentialist thesis* has been *perceived* by the senses. Secondly, as I've brought up, this relies on memory. T-stone *remembers* having sensory evidence which he *believes* supports his original belief. Therefore, *this belief* needs to have evidence for it. And as Dr. Sudduth points out:

**********

"But in the case of beliefs formed on the basis of evidence of the senses, there is a clear distinction between the belief and the experiential evidence. I believe that there is a tree in front of me because I am appeared to a certain way, a tree in front of me sort of way. Although memory often involves phenomenal imagery, sometimes it doesn't and even when it does it hard to distinguish between the memorial experience and the belief allegedly formed on the basis of this experience. Something similar is also encountered in the case of a priori beliefs. I believe that all blue objects are colored and that 10 x 10 = 100. Etc etc It seems difficult to explain evidence for these beliefs in a way that would distinguish between the belief that is held and its truth. Similarly with introspective beliefs like I seem to see a tree.

So it appears that even a sufficient broadening of the idea of evidence will leave us with at least problematic cases in which beliefs are formed and knowledge had but where this is nothing in the way of grounds or evidence for the truth of the beliefs. If these beliefs are self-evident, then they are clearly not based on evidence, but carry their evidence with them so to speak. So evidence views of justification will stand in need of sufficient modification to give us what it takes to make he difference between true belief and knowledge. Evidentialism in its various forms does not seem to be necessary for knowledge, even some cases of knowledge involve evidence."

**********

Now to turn to their deontological evidentialism. Deontology in epistemology is defined as doing your epistemic duty. And therefore to say that we "should" have evidence for our beliefs implies that we have a "duty" to follow this constraint. To say that I "should" pay the plumber is to say that it is my "duty" to pay him. I am "obligated" to pay him. But there are problems here, I cite just two from Sudduth again:

**********

"3. Intellectual Duties not Necessary for Knowledge

Even so, couldn't a person flout his epistemic duties, be an epistemic villain of sorts, and still have knowledge? Suppose that I have an intellectual obligation to investigate the credibility of what people tell me on highly important matters. A colleague at work tells me that another colleague has been fired. If I had investigated, as I ought to have, I would have found reasons for not trusting his testimony, but in fact I do accept what he tells me. He is in fact reliable, so the belief I form on the basis of his testimony is true. It seems reasonable to suppose that in this case I also know that the colleague in question has been fired, but I have not followed my intellectual duties. But it looks like I have knowledge in this case.

4. The Insufficiency of Deontologism

This raises another perceived difficulty with deontologism. It seems to fall short of the natural way of construing the epistemic point of view.

According to Schmitt:

The idea that justified belief is belief that contributes to the end of true belief is most straightforwardly developed by identifying it reliable belief - belief of a sort that is generally true. . . .It is natural. . .to see justified belief as a means to true belief - or more exactly, as belie that results from a means to true belief. This view is most simply developed by reliabilism: justified true belief is reliably formed belief, or belief that results from the exercise of a reliable cognitive belief-forming process, a process that tends to yield true beliefs (in the actual or nearby counterfactual worlds.12

But surely a person can be within his intellectual rights in holding some belief without the belief being reliably produced.

Suppose a man is raised in some primitive community on an Island that has little contact with the rest of the world. He finds himself as a teenager with the belief that a certain dance will cause it to rain. This belief is widely accepted in his community; in fact it is an essential part of the community tradition. He accepts, without hesitation, the traditions of his community. These traditions play an important role in the life of the community, and the man has never encountered anyone who has questioned either these traditions or the belief about the rain dance. On a particular occasion, the man forms the belief that it will rain the next day on the sole basis of performing this ritual. In fact, it does rain. So his belief is true. What intellectual duty is the young man violating? He has thought reflectively about this practice to some extent, but he has found no reason to doubt its efficacy. In fact, it has often worked in the past. Has he not done all that can reasonably be expected of him? It would seem so. But he is not in a good position to acquire true beliefs on the matter at hand simply because his method of forming the belief is unreliable.

[...] we find here a true belief produced in a way that is not reliable (due to cognitive malfunction), and this leads us to doubt whether the case describes a case of knowledge. It is doubtful that beliefs acquired by sheer luck constitute knowledge, and this is exactly what we have in the above cases. But both individuals get a true belief by sheer luck without violating any intellectual duties in doing so. Therefore, deontological justification is not sufficient, along with true belief, for knowledge"

**********

And so not only have I offered arguments against Loftus and T-stone's views that have gone unanswered, we can now see the dubious assumptions that their position rests on. Indeed, their position seems so wrought with problems that they may as well curl up into an epistemic ball and throw an intellectual temper tantrum.

Furthermore, for guys like Loftus who profess atheism, the concept of norms in epistemology is a correct notion. But perhaps it should be construed as proper function rather than duty. But, the very verbiage used by Loftus actually presupposes theism as men like Dr. James Anderson have pointed out:

**********

So a third ingredient is needed for knowledge, an ingredient commonly labeled ‘justification’ or ‘warrant’. (For consistency’s sake, I will hereafter use the term ‘warrant’ to refer to this third ingredient.) Contemporary epistemologists have vigorously debated precisely what constitutes ‘warrant’, but fortunately there is no need to take sides in these debates in order to defend the point I want to make here. For there is a common intuition behind all analyses of warrant to the effect that a true belief must be formed or held in the right way, or in an appropriate way, in order to count as knowledge. A warranted belief cannot be formed or held in just any old fashion. There are right or appropriate ways and there are wrong or inappropriate ways. As an example, suppose I come to believe that it is raining outside; suppose further that it is, in fact, raining outside. If this belief is formed on the basis of perception (e.g., I can see and hear the rain through an open window), then the belief is very likely warranted; but if this belief is formed on the basis of a superstitious conviction that it always rains on the days I forget to bring my umbrella, then the belief will not be warranted. The difference is that in the former case the belief is formed in a fitting or appropriate manner, while in the latter case it is not.

Careful reflection on the concept of knowledge in general, and on paradigm cases of knowledge, make it clear that this notion of ‘epistemic rightness’ or ‘epistemic appropriateness’ is an essential feature of knowledge. But observe that this notion is clearly a normative one: it pertains to how beliefs ought to be formed or held (in order to count as knowledge), rather than how beliefs are formed or held. It is not a descriptive notion, but a prescriptive one. It implies that there are epistemic norms which determine (in part) whether or not one’s belief that p is actually knowledge that p.

That the concept of knowledge has an essentially normative aspect, and thus there are such things as epistemic norms (if there is such a thing as knowledge), is a point widely recognized by contemporary epistemologists. For example, Jaegwon Kim writes:

[Epistemic] justification manifestly is normative. If a belief is justified for us, then it is permissible and reasonable, from the epistemic point of view, for us to hold it, and it would be epistemically irresponsible to hold beliefs that contradict it. . . . Epistemology is a normative discipline as much as, and in the same sense as, normative ethics. (Kim, 1988, p. 383, emphasis original)

**********

And so,

**********

"As I noted above, only two of the various analyses of epistemic warrant considered earlier would appear to be live options (given the stated shortcomings of the other accounts): deontological epistemology (which would include quasi-deontological notions of epistemic norms) and teleological epistemology. According to these two approaches, epistemic normativity is cashed out either in terms of intellectual duty (or something in that conceptual neighborhood) or in terms of proper cognitive function (or proper cognitive ends).

It isn’t difficult to see that both of these analyses sit quite comfortably within a theistic framework. God’s character and commands are normative for us by virtue of the fact that we are his creatures and created to reflect the divine image. As Richard Taylor notes, it is natural to think that if there is a God then we are bound to him in an ethical sense: we have obligations toward him (including intellectual obligations). Similarly, certain human epistemic practices are virtuous because they accord with those goals and characteristics valued by God—truth-directedness, consistency, impartiality, prudence, etc.—and his general intentions for human existence. And the notion of cognitive proper function makes perfect sense on the view that humans (including our noetic faculties) have been created by God (whatever view one takes of the process of creation).

**********

Thus concluding....

**********

In conclusion, then, we have solid reasons for believing that if human knowledge is possible then there must be a God. Knowledge presupposes the existence of objective epistemic normativity, which in turn presupposes an ontology that can account for the existence of such normativity. Naturalism, as many of its contemporary advocates now acknowledge, has no place for objective epistemic normativity. And non-theistic non-naturalisms fall short on other grounds: by trying to ground epistemic normativity in the non-personal, or by failing to distinguish the normative from the normed, or by leaving unexplained the connection between the normative and the normed. Only theistic worldviews have the metaphysical resources to underwrite the most defensible analyses of epistemic warrant. In four words: if knowledge, then God.

***********

Thus not only have the epistemic wolves Loftus and T-stone huffed and puffed and blew their own epistemological homes made of straw and stick down, and failed to blow down the Christian theist's brick house, they have been unwitting participants in helping us prove the superiority of theism over anti-theism.

History and theology of Calvinism

Dr. Curt Daniel's "The History and Theology of Calvinism" is available on MP3 and PDF (3.3 MB).

HT: Tim Challies.

Letters of John Newton

The Letters of John Newton

A Day In the Life of Lonny McPherson

-i-

Lonny McPherson was sitting on a bench by the merry-go-round, watching his grandson go…well…go round and round.

Come to think of it, life was like a merry-go-round, he said to himself. The riders had their ups and downs. New riders took the place of old riders, but the merry-go-round kept going around.

Life on earth was one big merry-go-round. One generation cycling in as another generation was cycling out. The riders changed, but the merry-go-round remained the same. Same speed. Same direction.

Yes, life was like that. As if someone designed the merry-go-round, assembled the merry-go-round, plugged it in, switched in on, and then left it on. Forgot to turn it off. Drove away, never to return.

And the music, too. Yes, the music. The same tune played over and over again.

Indeed, there were many different tunes all playing at the very same time in the amusement park. Lights and motion and music in a constant swirl—going nowhere.

It wasn’t music you were meant to hear, exactly—much less listen to. It was meant to drown out the silence, or the screaming and shouting, or the mechanical racket.

A grandson! Where had all the years gone!

And this was probably the last time that Lonny would ever take his grandson to the amusement park.

Lonny had become a bit forgetful of late. His friends and family began to notice. They took him to the doctor. Sure enough, he was in the early stages of senile dementia.

Lonny could still take care of himself. Still get around pretty well. Some days were better than others.

But in a matter of months, he would be moving into a nursing home. And in a few more months, he would be beyond good and evil.

So he wanted to take his grandson on one last outing. Once last thing for his grandson to remember him by.

But the repetitious music and the repetitious motion made him a bit drowsy. He ought to keep his eye on that bobbing horse where his grandson was seated, but he kept nodding off.

-ii-

Next thing he knew, the amusement park was deserted. The merry-go-round, rollercoaster, and Ferris wheel were solitary, silent, and motionless. Maybe he was seeing things.

Then somebody spoke to him. He couldn’t quite make out the man’s appearance, for he stood in the shade at a distance from Lonny. Maybe he was hearing things. Auditions and hallucinations.

“Who are you?” Lonny asked?

“I go by many names,” the shadowy figure said. “Tenebrifer, Cocornifer, Hörnli, Hellhundt...”

“What do you want,” Lonny asked?

“A better question is, “what do you want? If you could relive one day of your life, what day would it be?”

Now that wasn’t an easy question for Lonny to answer. So many days to choose from.

Of course, every man was nostalgic about his youth. So it would have to be back when he was a teen or twenty-something.

He had a happy childhood, but he wouldn’t want to be a kid again. Or adolescent.

And, of course, every man was nostalgic about high school. Nothing quite like high school football. The intensity. The competition. The camaraderie. The cheerleaders.

He also enjoyed college. But he and his frat brothers drifted apart after graduation.

Just like high school graduation. The big build up to the Prom. Classmates scribbling sentiments of eternal friendship in one another’s yearbook.

And yet, after the dance music ended, and they returned their tuxedoes, they went their separate ways.

At first a few lunches and phone calls and greeting cards. But after a while, silence.

And, of course, every man is nostalgic about summer break. All those long, hot, carefree summers when school was out. If he had just one day to relive, it would have to be a summer day.

Sorry to be so predictable and cliché-ridden. But Lonny never aspired to be original.

Mind you, it’s not as if life came to an end when he left college, and married, and had a career, and kids, and a three-car garage.

But, somehow, he wasn’t as wistful about all that. For one thing, you can only come of age just once, once in a life time. Once you grow up, there’s a sameness to it all. You’re always an adult.

Mind you, there’s something special about being a father for the first time. But once you’ve raised one kid, there’s such a sameness to it all. Once a dad, always a dad.

For another thing, the thing about the past is that it’s…you know…past. You can’t go back. Even if you can go back in space, you can’t go back in time.

People are gone. Places are gone. Even pets are gone.

He still missed his dog. The dog he had as a boy.

Seems silly. Surely he should have outgrown that by now. Surely he would have outgrown it by now.

But he hadn’t. He didn’t. The sense of loss was still there, after all these years. Decades, really.

Was it just the dog, or the time of life?

And, of course, his grandparents were gone. His parents were gone. His aunts and uncles.

Certain people are irreplaceable. There are compensations. A wife and kids compensate for the loss of one’s parents and grandparents. But they can’t replace them—just as parents are no substitute for your own wife and kids.

Or the ex-wife—in his case.

Time was gaining on him. The losses were stacking up.

When he was young, he had a head start. Time was out of sight.

Then, as he got older, it popped up on the horizon. But far away. Just a speck in the distance.

But as he got even older, he felt like he was being tailgated. He tried to look ahead, keep his eyes on the road—but there was that grim reaper in the rear view mirror. Bearing down. Filling the rear view mirror. Beginning to pass.

He tried to outrun it. Floor the accelerator. But it was moving alongside. Slightly ahead.

It’s as if the odometer was running backwards. Instead of starting at zero and running into eternity, it’s as if the odometer was set at 100,000 miles, and running down to zero.

Instead of a ruler-straight road with no end in sight, like Nebraska or the Dakotas, the horizon seemed to curve up and around, like a concrete wall.

He wanted to turn around, but the backstretch was disappearing beneath him. He wanted to stop, but the accelerator was frozen in place. He wanted to slam on the brakes, but the fluid was gone. He was pumping air. He wanted to jump from the car, but the doors were locked.

So there he was, hurtling towards a concrete wall. With the grim reaper overtaking him.

Or so it seemed. More than ever.

Hellhundt was tapping his foot, impatiently. Lonny couldn’t think of just one day that had it all. One day with everyone and everything he ever cared about in one place and time.

So he’d have to compromise. Settled for one day that offered the most.

Maybe, if he scheduled things very carefully, he could meet most everyone he wanted to see again.

Maybe, if he chose a central location, he could drive most everywhere he wanted to go.

He settled on a summer day between his senior year in high school and his freshman year in college.

That summer he divided his time between his high school buddies, his high school sweetheart, and the frat brothers he befriended before the fall term began. Back when he was still living at home.

There’s a sense in which he could go backward in time, but never ahead. If he went back to high school, his frat brothers wouldn’t know him—but if he went back to college, his high school buddies would still know him.

Actually, he and his best friend from high school were also in the same fraternity. But that was when they began to drift apart.

When Lonny made new friends, he neglected his old friends. In hindsight, this was a mistake—because he lost both sets of friends. The old friends were offended that he dumped them for new friends. And he lost track of his new friends after college, when they moved away, and began a family of their own. Lonny was hoping that he would patch things up. Mend a few fences.

After Lonny and Hellhundt agreed on a day, Hellhundt disappeared. At first, nothing happened. He wandered around the deserted amusement park until he got hot and thirsty and tired. So he sat down again and took a nap.

-iii-

When he woke up, he was back in bed. Indeed, back in his old bedroom. It was a lovely summer morning.

He went to the bathroom and peered in the mirror. He hadn’t looked like that since high school.

He dressed and went downstairs for breakfast. His parents were there. He glanced at the newspaper. The date was the day that he and Hellhundt had agreed upon.

His mother began to make small talk and offered to prepare breakfast for him.

Now he was torn. There was so much to do, and just twenty-four hours to squeeze it all in. So he was in a hurry. A big hurry.

And yet, he hadn’t seen them for twenty years. And the last time he saw them alive, they were dying of old age. But here they were again.

How could he tear himself away? It was almost worse to see them just one more time, and lose them both a second time.

That’s how his entire day went. Torn between the need to rush and the longing to linger.

He was overwhelmed. The sense of separation was doubled, redoubled, tripled, quadrupled.

Before then, he had been able to pace his grief. People came and went at unexpected times, but it was spaced out over several years. But now it was as if everyone he ever cared about died all at once, on the very same day.

He had just enough time to renew his old feelings before the guillotine came down and swept them all away in one clean stroke.

-iv-

He went to bed, emotionally exhausted, and woke up the next day in the very same bed.

This took him by surprise. For that wasn’t a part of the original bargain. He was expecting to open his eyes and find himself seated at the amusement park, with his grandson on the merry-go-round.

Not that this turn of events was at odds with the deal he stuck. Indeed, it occurred to him that he hadn’t bothered to hammer out his bargain in any detail. Hadn’t asked Hellhundt any number of obvious questions—questions that were only now occurring to him.

How could he be so careless and impetuous? How could he agree to the offer without negotiating the finer points? Without reading the fine print?

Not that Lonny was necessarily disappointed by this outcome. He didn’t know quite what to make of it.

Was he going to repeat the same day ad infinitum? That could become awfully tedious.

On the other hand, this seemed to be a boon. Presumably he could take his time. He didn’t have to cram everything into just one day. If the same day kept repeating itself, then he could spread out his itinerary. Do one thing one day, and something else the next day—even though the next day was really the same day all over again.

A little confusing, I know. Every day was the day before as well as the day after. Yesterday, today, and tomorrow were the same day iterated until...until...there was no until. Unless there was. Who could say?

His first experiment was to go with the flow. Do as little as possible to alter the past—or, should I say, alter the present? Confusing, I know.

Not that he remembered how everything originally happened on that particular day. So maybe he would change it by doing as little as possible to change it. Confusing, I know.

But he tried to introduce as little dislocation as he could into the rhythm of things. Avoid interrupting the flow by responding to his parents rather than making some bold suggestion.

-v-

The next morning, he woke up in the same bed, on the say day.

Apparently, it was safe for him to change the routine as much as he wanted to, since the next day would always default to the original day. He could change the present, but not the future.

So he seized the opportunity to spend the entire day with one person at a time. Or go one place for the whole day.

At first this seemed like a wonderful chance to get better acquainted. Life is such a paradox. You only think to ask certain things after it’s too late to ask certain things.

It’s only after the opportunity is long gone that you’re aware of the lost opportunity, at which point you can no longer make up for the lost opportunity.

You have no sense of loss until you lose something. As long as you have it, you never miss it. So, in a way, you don’t know what you’re missing. You take it for granted.

Only after it’s gone beyond recall do you wish you’d said something else, done something else.

But now he was able to make up for lost time. Or was he?

The problem is that while he remembered what he learned from one day to the next, no one else did. They reverted to the same day. Their memories were frozen in the past.

So he could learn more and more about them, but they could never learn anything new about him. In a sense, then, he still had to jam everything into one day.

They could learn something new for that one day. But as soon as that day was over and done with, their memory was reset to their old memories.

This was deeply disappointing. There was a girl in high school he always wanted to know better. Always regretted that he didn’t get to know her better when he had the chance.

And now he hand the chance. Except that it only worked one way. He could find out more about her, but she might as well have senile dementia.

Now matter how much time they spent together the day before, the next day he was practically a stranger to her. He could never win her trust, must less her love.

There were only so many things she’d do with a boy she hardly knew. Even coaxing her to have lunch at the local cafe was a major achievement.

In the end, he gave up. In the end, he allowed that part of the program to lapse back into the default setting.

-vi-

At first, Lonny didn’t drive any further than he could travel in a round trip the same day. But then he began to experiment.

Suppose he didn’t make it back to his rendezvous point within twenty-four hours? Would he break the cycle? And if he did, what would happen?

Maybe this was dangerous. Maybe he would die if he traveled beyond the distance he could cover and backtrack in one day. Or maybe, just maybe, if he was caught one-foot outsider the spatiotemporal perimeter of his twenty-four hour ambit, he would wake up at the amusement park.

But he was bored. Bored to tears. Bored to death. The risk was worth it.

So he drove twenty-four hours straight. At first, nothing seemed to happen.

He kept driving past the twenty-four hour limit. Just to make sure.

The sun went down. The sun came up. And he kept on driving until he was too tired to drive any longer. Until he was falling asleep at the wheel.

And, indeed, nothing did happen. He parked his care at a cafe, and went inside. The date on the newspaper was—you got it!—the very same day.

So he was limited in time, but not in space. He could traverse the world. Circumnavigate the globe.

For a moment, he thought this would be cruel to his parents. They would wonder what became of him. There they’d get up, as usual, and he’d be gone!

But, of course, it then occurred to him that they wouldn’t remember his absence from one day to the next. If he were absent for just a day, which is all they’d remember, then they’d be curious, or at most concerned—but hardly distraught. It’s not as if they’d nail a missing person’s poster on every telephone pole up and down the block.

At least, he assumed that his absence would have that effect. That for every day he was gone, that part of the program would be missing—unless and until he came back home.

But then a more sinister thought occurred to him. So there was no spatial barrier to the twenty-four hour cycle. But there was a temporal barrier.

So suppose he was absent in space, but not in time? Suppose he was still at home?

In other words, what if that part of the program also reset while he was away. Perhaps he had a doppelgänger taking his place. And if he returned, he would merge with his doppelgänger?

Maybe no one would notice his absence because the program would continue running in spite of him. Continue running the “Lonny” part of the program.

What did it really mean to be “away” in this repeating timeloop? How could you be “away” from a closed, causal timewarp or timeloop—or whatever you call it?

He found this thought rather smothering, but he could do nothing to either prove it or disprove it.

-vii-

In the meantime, he went exploring. It was easy to lose track of time, for every day was the same day. He had no idea how many days had passed from one day to the next. For it was just one nonstop day. A run-on day, punctuated by “day” and “night,” dawn and dusk, but curling in on itself.

And yet, for a long time, he was able to fill the time. To go hiking. See all the great museums and cathedrals. Devour libraries. Visit every exotic, inaccessible corner of the world

Not that he did it all at once. He would fly back home from time to time. And, of course, everything was just the same. The same day, on that summer break between high school and college. Mom making the same breakfast, dad reading the same newspaper. The radio blaring the same music.

You might be wondering what he did for money. Well, it didn’t take him long to figure out that since nothing he did had any long-term consequences, he could act with impunity.

He could rob a bank and, the next day, all the money would be back in place. He could steal a Ferrari and, the next day, the Ferrari would be back in the parking lot. He could stay at the Ritz for ten years for the price of one day.

In principle, he could become a serial killer for all the difference that would make. Not that he had any inclination to become a serial killer.

Whatever he did, the next day would wipe the slate clean. Reposition the players on the chessboard.

At one level, this was extremely convenient. Nothing he did ever left an indelible mark. Not even a scratch. Every action was erasable.

No cost or consequence. Had he been able to push a little red bottom and watch the whole world go up in smoke, the mushroom cloud would dissipate, with fair skies the day after—along with city and town, tree, flower, and teddy bear intact.

But then there was the downside of permanent impermanency. He could never have a wife or child—or even a girlfriend.

It’s as if the whole world were in motion while he was standing in place. Or else the whole world was standing in place while he was in motion.

He would come back home every now and then—a walking encyclopedia and polyglot lexicon—but he couldn’t share his experience with anyone else.

For a time he contemplated suicide. But that’s before he was shot to death in a bank heist. Only to open his eyes the very next moment, and look over at his alarm clock. Same bed. Same bedroom. Same wallpaper. Same posters. Same fragrance from the kitchen below. The sun rising in exactly the same place along the horizon. The same paperboy on his bicycle. The same barking dog. The same neighbor walking his dog. The same neighbor mowing his lawn. The same ice cream truck wailing in the distance.

Yes, pop-goes-the-weasel was the story of his life. Trapped in a music box.

-viii-

Finally he paid a visit to the local amusement park. No, not that amusement park. That amusement park wouldn’t be built for another forty years.

But one amusement park was much like another. So he sat down in front of the merry-go-round—remembering that day, so many years ago, when he took his grandson to the circus.

For all he knew, his grandson was still riding the merry-go-round. Maybe time passed at a different rate in that dimension. Maybe time didn’t pass at all between one dimension to another, but only within each dimension. Maybe he was still sitting there, in that other dimension.

But in another sense, he was riding his own merry-go-round. Strapped onto that bobbing horse. Watching his fellow riders cling to the reins of their paint-chipped steed. Watching them move in place. Up and down. Round and round—without going anywhere. Same sorry tune over and over again.

They hung on for dear life. They might be bored to death with the merry-go-round, but they would rather be bored to death than have to face death. To dismount meant death. Once they got off the merry-go-round, there was no going back. Another rider took their place.

Except for the occasional soldier or suicide, no one would ever volunteer to leave his saddle. Rather, their fingers had to be pried free against their will. Kicking and screaming.

Tedium or oblivion. That was the choice.

Lonny felt the same way. At least, he used to feel that way.

Religion was bunk. That was his philosophy. For a time.

But as he traveled the globe and devoured whole libraries, life became more Biblical. A roadmap to reality.

It didn’t always seem so. Not in his youthful inexperience. Nor in his elderly ignorance.

But now he’d had a chance to take a second look. Or see things truly for the very first time.

In his solitude, when no one else remembered, God remembered. Forgotten by all but God. The only one who knew him from his former life. His silent companion in this sempiternal dimension. Far worse to live without God than to die with God.

And that is how he began to pray. It didn’t begin in formal prayer. But as a passing snatch of conversation. Something he would share with a traveling companion—if only he had a companion.

And then he became dimly aware that God was always been there. Had been his constant, quiet companion throughout the years. He simply took him for granted all those years because he had other hobbies and playmates.

And so, unconsciously and imperceptibly, he found himself talking to God. Confessing to God.

Like rekindling an old, childhood friendship from a far country. The instant recognition. The easy relapse into one’s ancestral dialect or mother tongue. Broken at first, but becoming fluent over time.

Yes, it was time to loosen his grip. Time to dismount. Time and let another, younger rider take his place.

Tedium or oblivion? No, that was not the proper choice.

Tedium or Te Deum. Now that was the real choice.

His closed his eyes and prayed to be released from his interminable circuit. He could hear the faint sound of music in the background.

-ix-

When he opened his eyes again he half-expected to see the heavenly choir. But what he saw was another merry-go-round.

It looked vaguely familiar. Where had he seen it before? Then he caught a glimpse of his grandson whizzing by.

Ah, yes, that merry-go-round. It seemed like ages. How long had it really been? A second or a century?

After the merry-go-round halted, he gently lifted his grandson from the steed, took him by the hand, led him to the car, and drove him home.

-x-

A few months later he moved into a nursing home. A few years later, he shut his eyes a final time. Once again, he thought he could hear the sound of music harkening in the distance. Faint at first, but growing louder. Only this time, it was not a merry-go-round.

A Response To Craig Allert's Recent Book On Scripture

D.H. Williams, a Baptist patristic scholar, has been editing a series of books entitled Evangelical Ressourcement. The first book came out in 2005, and the third in the series was published earlier this month. The first two books were written by Williams, and the third is authored by Craig Allert. That third volume is titled A High View Of Scripture? (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2007), and it primarily addresses the New Testament canon and Biblical inerrancy. On the back cover of the book, we read the following about the Evangelical Ressourcement series:

"The Evangelical Ressourcement series is grounded in the belief that there is a wealth of theological, exegetical, and spiritual resources from the patristic era that is relevant for the Christian church today and into the future. Amid the current resurgence in interest in the early church, this series aims to help church thinkers and leaders reappropriate these ancient understandings of Christian belief and practice and apply them to ministry in the twenty-first century."

I've read all three volumes in the series. Though I disagree with Williams and Allert on some of the issues they address, I agree with the general thrust of the series as outlined above, and I think that they make many good points along the way. Williams is correct, for example, in noting that justification through faith alone is found in some of the church fathers, a fact that's often denied or underestimated.

However, I have more disagreements with Allert's volume in the series than with either of the previous two. I think that the series has always had a problem with being too negative in its assessment of Evangelicalism and too positive in its assessment of patristic Christianity and groups such as Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Allert's book seems to me to take the series even further in that direction, partly because of its own content and partly because the series has now gotten into its third volume without having had much positive to say about Evangelicalism or much negative to say about the alternatives. Men like D.H. Williams and Craig Allert consider themselves Evangelicals, but the series hasn't yet done much to explain why they would remain Evangelicals in light of the criticisms they've brought against Evangelicalism.

There's a lot that's good about Evangelicalism, in addition to the many bad elements that do deserve criticism. If the level of scrutiny Craig Allert brings to common Evangelical beliefs about the canon and Biblical inerrancy were also brought to common patristic beliefs about the church or tradition, for example, or were brought to common Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox views on such subjects, what would be the result? I think that Evangelicalism can withstand such scrutiny better than a system like Roman Catholicism or Eastern Orthodoxy can, and the fact that men like Williams and Allert still consider themselves Evangelicals suggests to me that they've reached the same conclusion. But it isn't reflected in what they're writing as much as it ought to be. Michael Spencer has written a review of Allert's book that's more positive than my assessment of it, but at the end of the review he raises some issues similar to what I've discussed above.

Allert criticizes a lot of Evangelicals by name. He criticizes B.B. Warfield and Norman Geisler at length, for example. Perhaps some of the people he criticizes will respond, but that may not happen for months or years, if at all. In the meantime, I want to provide a relatively brief response that might be helpful to people thinking through these issues. I hope that some people who know the relevant issues better than I do will respond to Allert in more depth.

I hold a position on the early church's view of scripture similar to what Allert describes in the last full paragraph on page 107 as an "open canon" position. Thus, much of what Allert criticizes in Evangelical assessments of the canon isn't applicable to me. Allert frequently refers to how Evangelicals see references to scripture in the church fathers and "immediately and automatically view these passages as references to a closed sixty-six-book biblical canon" (p. 71). See also page 151, for example, where Allert criticizes the Living Bible for using the phrase "the whole Bible" in its rendering of 2 Timothy 3:16. He comments:

"The very document (2 Timothy) that includes this reference was not part of any canon when Paul wrote these words. This paraphrase is misleading here and could cause its readers to commit an anachronism by taking this to be a reference to the entire canon of Christian Scripture, including the New Testament."

How many Evangelicals would interpret the Living Bible's rendering of 2 Timothy 3:16 in the manner Allert suggests? And how many Evangelicals assume that a source like Polycarp or Augustine must have believed in their 66-book canon of scripture whenever they see any reference to a phrase like "scripture" in their writings? I don't deny that some Evangelicals would be so careless, but how representative of Evangelicalism as a whole are such people?

Allert makes much of Evangelical disagreements with sources like The Epistle Of Barnabas, Cyprian, and Athanasius regarding which books are to be classified as scripture (for example, pp. 47, 51, and 71-73). But Allert himself presumably accepts Athanasius' New Testament canon while rejecting his Old Testament canon, for example, and other Evangelicals could do the same for reasons similar to Allert's. If an Evangelical is following a canonical consensus, then no one person, such as Athanasius, would be determinative. And if an Evangelical believes that a Jewish canonical consensus is more relevant than a Christian consensus in arriving at an Old Testament canon, then Jewish sources would be more relevant than a source like Athanasius. When examining what Christian sources said about a New Testament canon, however, Athanasius would be more relevant. Similarly, The Epistle Of Barnabas' acceptance of the gospel of Matthew as scripture adds weight to the similar view of Matthew found in many other early sources, whereas The Epistle Of Barnabas' acceptance of 1 Enoch as scripture is contrary to the large amount of evidence we have from other sources leading to the conclusion that 1 Enoch shouldn't be part of the Old Testament canon. Allert is correct in suggesting that The Epistle Of Barnabas' credibility is diminished, for somebody who takes a canonical approach such as mine, by its acceptance of documents like 1 Enoch. But I doubt that many of the Evangelicals who cite The Epistle Of Barnabas to support something like the canonicity of Matthew would assume that The Epistle Of Barnabas is right about every issue related to the canon. Its diminished credibility still carries some weight.

Allert frequently argues that it's problematic for an Evangelical to cite a church father as agreeing with his view of Biblical inerrancy if that father held a different view of which books are scripture and which aren't (for example, p. 73). But we can agree with a source regarding inerrancy without agreeing with that same source on another issue, like the canon.

One reason why Allert tries to associate canonical issues with inerrancy might be because he doesn't have much of a basis otherwise for rejecting an Evangelical appeal to the church fathers to support inerrancy. The church fathers seem to have largely agreed with modern Evangelical views of the nature of scripture. They don't have to have held a view as detailed as what we find in the Chicago Statement On Biblical Inerrancy in order to have held a view that's similar in some significant ways or one that seems to imply something like the Chicago view if carried out to its logical end. We don't find the Chicago Statement in the writings of Augustine, but would anybody deny that Augustine's view is much closer to B.B. Warfield or R.C. Sproul than it is to Raymond Brown or John Spong (or even the more conservative opponents of inerrancy)? The patristic scholar J.N.D. Kelly commented:

"This attitude was fairly widespread, and although some of the fathers elaborated it more than others, their general view was that Scripture was not only exempt from error but contained nothing that was superfluous." (Early Christian Doctrines [New York: Continuum, 2003], p. 61)

Even if some Evangelicals have been wrong in claiming or suggesting more patristic support for their view than actually exists, the fact remains that there's at least widespread patristic support for a highly similar view, one that's more supportive of an inerrantist perspective than the perspective of an errantist.

Two of the most significant lines of evidence for Biblical inerrancy are the high view of scripture held by the ancient Jews and the high view of scripture held by the early post-apostolic Christians. Allert does little to undermine either argument. He briefly distinguishes between Philo of Alexandria's dictation view of inspiration and that of the apostle Paul (pp. 155-156), and he quotes Origen in a manner that suggests that Origen held a lower view of inspiration than what many Evangelicals hold (pp. 183-185), but he doesn't say much else about the ancient Jewish and Christian views of scripture relevant to inerrancy. I see nothing in Allert's book that would lead me to disagree with J.N.D. Kelly's summary quoted above.

Allert correctly notes that many patristic sources refer to some type of inspiration for sources other than the 66 books of the Evangelical Bible. They sometimes refer to how the Holy Spirit inspired them to write something they wrote, they sometimes apply the term translated as "God-breathed" in 2 Timothy 3 to entities other than scripture, etc. But don't modern Evangelicals sometimes do things that are similar (claiming that the Spirit led them to make a decision they made, etc.)? It's not as if such a manner of speaking is absent from Evangelicalism. But not all claims to Divine inspiration of some sort are of a publicly verifiable nature. And not all such claims are equally credible. The same patristic sources who refer to extra-Biblical inspiration in the manner Allert discusses also frequently refer to the unique authority of the apostles and the apostolic documents. Allert acknowledges some examples of what I'm referring to, such as in his discussion of Ignatius of Antioch's admission that he had less authority than the apostles (p. 62), but many more examples could be cited. I don't think that Allert gives enough attention to comments such as the following from Augustine, which are found often in the patristic sources:

"For I confess to your Charity that I have learned to yield this respect and honour only to the canonical books of Scripture: of these alone do I most firmly believe that the authors were completely free from error. And if in these writings I am perplexed by anything which appears to me opposed to truth, I do not hesitate to suppose that either the manuscript is faulty, or the translator has not caught the meaning of what was said, or I myself have failed to understand it. As to all other writings, in reading them, however great the superiority of the authors to myself in sanctity and learning, I do not accept their teaching as true on the mere ground of the opinion being held by them; but only because they have succeeded in convincing my judgment of its truth either by means of these canonical writings themselves, or by arguments addressed to my reason. I believe, my brother, that this is your own opinion as well as mine. I do not need to say that I do not suppose you to wish your books to be read like those of prophets or of apostles, concerning which it would be wrong to doubt that they are free from error." (Letter 82:1:3)

"As regards our writings, which are not a rule of faith or practice, but only a help to edification, we may suppose that they contain some things falling short of the truth in obscure and recondite matters, and that these mistakes may or may not be corrected in subsequent treatises. For we are of those of whom the apostle says: 'And if you be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you.' Such writings are read with the right of judgment, and without any obligation to believe. In order to leave room for such profitable discussions of difficult questions, there is a distinct boundary line separating all productions subsequent to apostolic times from the authoritative canonical books of the Old and New Testaments. The authority of these books has come down to us from the apostles through the successions of bishops and the extension of the Church, and, from a position of lofty supremacy, claims the submission of every faithful and pious mind. If we are perplexed by an apparent contradiction in Scripture, it is not allowable to say, The author of this book is mistaken; but either the manuscript is faulty, or the translation is wrong, or you have not understood. In the innumerable books that have been written latterly we may sometimes find the same truth as in Scripture, but there is not the same authority. Scripture has a sacredness peculiar to itself. In other books the reader may form his own opinion, and perhaps, from not understanding the writer, may differ from him, and may pronounce in favor of what pleases him, or against what he dislikes. In such cases, a man is at liberty to withhold his belief, unless there is some clear demonstration or some canonical authority to show that the doctrine or statement either must or may be true. But in consequence of the distinctive peculiarity of the sacred writings, we are bound to receive as true whatever the canon shows to have been said by even one prophet, or apostle, or evangelist." (Reply To Faustus The Manichaean, 11:5)

Again, I'm not suggesting that Allert has denied the existence of such passages in the fathers. He hasn't. But I think that his book gives too little attention to such passages while giving far more attention to less significant passages referring to some sort of inspiration behind extra-Biblical sources.

Much could be said about Allert's treatment of the Biblical evidence relevant to inerrancy, but I'll limit my comments here to one line of evidence that I think he's underestimated. He discusses John 10:34-35 as representative of a series of passages that Evangelicals often cite to support their view of inspiration. Allert distinguishes between Jesus' appeal to scriptural authority in passages like John 10 and how Jesus would have viewed the inspiration of scripture. He doesn't go into much detail about how he views the distinction between authority and inspiration. But as far as inerrancy is concerned, I wouldn't just cite a handful of passages like John 10. I would cite the overall pattern of dependence on the reliability of scripture, including in its details (Matthew 5:17-18, 1 Corinthians 9:9-10, etc.). It would still be possible that Jesus, the Biblical authors, and other relevant sources thought that other details in scripture could be in error, but the lengthy pattern of trust in the details of scripture, without any accompanying references to some errors in scripture, adds weight to the case for inerrancy.

Allert sometimes refers to how we should be concerned with how the first readers of scripture interpreted the documents (p. 86). He refers to the canon as a "patristic accomplishment", and he tells us that scripture should be interpreted through the lens of the church (p. 175). He refers to how the church has been "central" in bringing God's word to us (p. 176). But the early church consisted of more than the church fathers whose writings are extant. And the early Christians weren't the first people to read the writings of Moses or David's Psalms, for example. While the early post-apostolic Christians did have a large role in bringing us the Biblical documents and in helping us make canonical judgments, other sources have been part of the process as well (Jewish sources, the internal evidence of the Biblical documents themselves, ancient opponents of Christianity who corroborated some of the claims made by the early Christians, modern scholars who have helped discover, translate, and preserve some of the relevant documents, etc.). Allert often makes vague references to "the church", "tradition", etc., but such terms can be and have been defined in many different ways, as he sometimes acknowledges (for example, n. 44 on p. 80). As I said early in this review, if Allert applied the same level of scrutiny to concepts like "the church" and "tradition" that he applies to scripture, much of what Evangelicals have said about the uniqueness and authority of scripture would be vindicated.

And, as I also said near the beginning of this review, I think that Allert would agree with me. But since his book does so little to argue for Evangelicalism and so little to argue against alternatives such as Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, many readers probably will come away with impressions much like those of Michael Spencer in the review I linked to earlier. I think that D.H. Williams and Craig Allert are wrong on some of the issues they address, such as Biblical inerrancy. They're also right on many issues, but so far they've had too little to say about what's right with Evangelicalism and the many places where Evangelicals agree with patristic Christianity.

Sunday, June 10, 2007

Wilson v. Hitchens in the Octogon

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6

I, Robot

HENRY SAID:

“As I pointed out in another post, it is Steve Hays who tried to turn it into a contest of determining which view was more loving.”

To the contrary, one of Henry’ standard objections to Calvinism is that Calvinism is allegedly less loving than Arminianism.

This is, of course, a stock Arminian objection to Calvinism. So it’s not the only time I’ve dealt with it. But Henry is recycling this objection, so I’ll respond accordingly.

“Concerning what is most loving as I said before I do not know what is most loving in many cases and that is not the issue here.”

Not surprisingly, Henry would prefer to evade this issue. Disputants only want to debate the perceived strong points of their own system as well as perceived weak points of the opposing system. If allowed to, they will arbitrarily limit the scope of the discussion.

So, Henry wants to discuss what is more loving, but not what is most loving. Yet this is illogical.

If what is more loving is better than what is less loving, then what is most loving is better than what is more loving.

The fact that Henry can’t defend Arminian theology as the most loving option undercuts his appeal to Arminian theology as the more loving option. For if Arminianism is better than Calvinism because Arminianism is the more loving, then universalism is better than Arminianism because universalism is the most loving.

Henry would like to artificially confine this discussion to a debate between Arminianism and Calvinism rather than Arminianism and universalism, in part because it’s easier to fight on one front rather than two, and especially because universalism trumps Arminianism on its own grounds.

“If that is the way you are going to frame it: that our sinful actions (which would include the unbeliever rejecting the gospel message and the believer sinning) will LIMIT THE IMPACT OF GOD’S LOVE. Then this will be a ‘problem’ for both the noncalvinist and the Calvinist.”

It’s not problem for Calvinism, since God foreordained the fall. Both the sinful believer and the sinful unbeliever are doing precisely what God predestined them to do. And God’s love for the elect has exactly the effect that God intended for the elect.

“God’s nature is love and while we sense it less when we sin, His love nevertheless is always directed at us and coming at us.”

Several problems:

i) Love is not God’s only attribute.

ii) Divine attributes need to be defined in Scriptural terms.

iii) In Arminian theology, God’s love is “coming at us” and bouncing off us. It’s directed at us by God, and redirected away from us by our libertarian resistance.

“Again, if our sinful actions in some way lessen the **impact** of God’s love, then that occurs whether you are a noncalvinist or a Calvinist.”

It doesn’t lessen the impact of God’s redemptive love of the elect. God loves the elect, and his love for the elect results in their salvation.

“I am not convinced that we should talk about our actions as in some way limiting the exercise of a divine attribute.”

Meaning that when you back Henry into a corner with his own premise, he beings to complain.

“When we sin are we also limiting the exercise of divine sovereignty which is a divine attribute?”

If you’re an Arminian, yes; if you’re a Calvinist, no.

“And if not, then how is that we are able to limit the exercise of the attribute of divine love but not the attribute of divine sovereignty?”

Because an Arminian will give a different answer than a Calvinist. Sin doesn’t limit the exercise of divine sovereignty for a Calvinist since sin is, itself, an expression of divine sovereignty. The fall of Adam (and Lucifer), as well as every attendant consequence thereof, was decreed by God as a means to a greater good.

“In the context of a relationship, acts of love by one of the parties can make a lot of difference regardless of how the other party sometimes reacts or responds to these acts of love…And yet with persistent acts of love positive changes in the relationship were effected. The power of loving acts should never be underestimated, especially when those loving acts are flowing from a loving God.”

Observe that an Arminian can only speak of God’s grace in the optative or subjunctive rather than the indicative—unlike Calvinism.

Follow the weasel words: love “can” make a “lot” of difference. Love should not be “underestimated.”

Notice what he doesn’t say: the love of God makes all the difference.

Arminian grace is optative grace or subjunctive grace. Reformed grace is indicative grace.

“Looking at our own coming to the Lord, some will be able to tell a story of how God started reaching out to them in love and at first they ignored or rejected these overtures by the Lord. But with time their resistance broke down and they realized how much the Lord loved them.”

In Reformed theology, regeneration is irresistible. Regeneration is immediate grace.

But in Reformed theology, the means of grace, such as the preaching of the word, is resistible.

There is nothing in the “story” of conversion at odds with Reformed theology. And conversion is broader than regeneration.

“It is ironic that Hays once again completely misrepresents things here. Jesus himself even spoke in parables about how God sends out the invitations to the world. And in these parables it does not speak of the people being unable to even respond to the invitation because they were **corpses**. Instead it says they understood the invitation but rejected it and made excuses. The same thing sometimes happens when we evangelize. It is not that the person does not understand what we are saying (especially when the Spirit is working on them or has been working on them). Rather, they get the message, but then start making excuses as to why they are rejecting it. Corpses last time I checked cannot dialogue with you, nor can they give you reasons why they are rejecting Jesus.”

A seminary professor like Henry ought to have the minimal sophistication to realize that the Bible uses different metaphors to illustrate different truths. Henry is like the liberal who reduces the gospel to the Sermon on the Mount or the parable of the prodigal son.

Some metaphors speak of the unregenerate as dead in sin. They are dead in the sense that they require spiritual revival from an external agent to bring them back to life. A corpse is not self-resuscitating.

Other metaphors speak of the unregenerate as enslaved to sin. They are very much alive, but unable to free themselves from the shackles of sin.

“Steve Hays, like Gene Bridges, wants to have me saying or arguing that God always does the most loving thing for everyone always. I have never said this nor do I believe it yet they keep trying to put words in my mouth. Here is yet another attempt to force the creation of a straw man (not what I do say or believe but what they want me to say or believe so they can attack it).”

What Gene and I are doing is to take his position to its logical extreme. This is a traditional and perfectly respectable form of argumentation.

Because Henry lacks the intellectual honesty to accuratetly represent the implications of his own position, someone else will have to do it for him.

“Steve Hays brought up the issue of which is more loving Calvinism or noncalvinism. The concept of what is **most loving** was not the issue. I addressed the issue of what is more loving, arguing that noncalvinism is more loving than Calvinism. If the argument is which is **more loving** (Calvinism or noncalvinism) then I am under no burden or necessity to argue for what is **most loving**.”

Is Henry dense? “More loving” is a wedge issue. One may introduce the comparative to then leverage the superlative.

“Monergists because they believe in exhaustive determinism and deny the existence of free will, explain the coming of a person to faith in Jesus Christ as being TOTALLY AND UNILATERALLY A WORK OF GOD.”

Of course, Calvinism doesn’t deny freewill. It only denies libertarian freedom.

“Scripture seems to suggest that we are **saved** when we respond in faith and are regenerated.”

Two problems:

i) John Murray, Herman Ridderbos, and Tom Schreiner (among others) have argued for the priority of regeneration to faith. Henry ignores their argumentation.

ii) As Gene already pointed out, Henry has a sloppy habit of oscillating between colloquial and dogmatic usage.

“So in the monergistic scheme the person is saved first without any actions on his part, and then regeneration causes faith to occur.”

No, in a monergistic scheme the person is first regenerated, then regeneration results in faith.

“Consider the metaphor often invoked by Calvinists themselves. The monergist believes that God chooses to have a relationship with what is initially a corpse. The corpse being dead can in no way relate to God whatsoever. So the corpse must first be made alive, then a relationship can occur.”

True.

“(Calvinists often use the story of Lazarus being raised to support this notion).”

No, that’s being used as an illustration, not a prooftext.

“Steve Hays also admits that part of salvation is synergistic: ‘Sanctification has a cooperative aspect, although it’s not in the libertarian sense’.”

Henry suffers from reading incomprehension. I specifically denied synergism. “Cooperation” is not a synonym for “synergism.”

Henry, in his linguistic naiveté, doesn’t appreciate the difference between the etymology and meaning.

He seems to think that because words like “synergism” (or “cooperation”) are compound words, they simply mean what the root plus the prefix apparently means.

But words often have more than one meaning. And some words are technical terms with a specialized meaning.

“In Calvinism the “relationship” between God and his people is not a relationship involving freely performed actions by both parties.”

Notice that Henry is imposing his tendentious definition onto words like “freely.” There’s no argument, here. Just his question-begging assertions.

“In a freely chosen and loving relationship both parties make uncoerced nonconstrained choices which make the relationship a good and healthy one.”

Another one of Henry’s problems is that he doesn’t even know the meaning of English words. “Coercion” implies a point of resistance or psychological tension between the subject of the action and the object of the action.

A textbook example is acting at gunpoint. If you have a gun to your head, this forces you to do something that you would otherwise refrain from doing.

But there is no coercion in regeneration. Regeneration operates at a subliminal level. The object of regeneration is unconscious of the cause. He is only conscious of its effect.

Likewise, there’s nothing coercive about predestination. The object of predestination is unaware of what God has decreed him to do (in advance of the fact). So there’s no point of tension between what he does and what he was decreed to do. He cannot resist what he cannot know to resist.

“If everything is predetermined and free will and choices do not make up the relationship. Then the relationship between God and man (assuming that God predetermines everything, that free will does not exist, that we can never do otherwise than in fact we were predetermined to do in any and every set of affairs) is then like a puppet master and his puppet or a computer programmer and his computer.”

It’s obvious that Henry has never seen Bride of Chucky, or Colossus: The Forbin Project. Clearly there are some serious lacunae in the seminary curriculum wherever he happens to teach.

“If every action of a puppet is controlled by the puppet master, every aspect of the puppet’s being is controlled by the puppet master (which would include their consciousness, mental states, desires, beliefs, memories, thinking, deliberating, etc. Etc. Etc.”

But, of course, this is precisely where the analogy breaks down. At the critical point of comparison, since puppets, unlike humans, lack these mental properties. (Unless we make an exception for Chucky—in which case the analogy breaks down at another point)

“While these actions by the puppet would **not** properly be described as coerced, these actions are all constrained by the puppet master. The relationship is not one involving persons freely choosing their actions towards each other.”

Waiving his flawed analogy, it’s quite true that there’s a fundamental asymmetry between the creature and the Creator. This is not a relationship between peers. We don’t make God react in a certain way by how we act. God is not like a distraught lover who is waiting for the phone to ring: “Will she call back? Oh, dear, what should I do next?”

“Or it would be like a computer programmer who was able to preprogram a conscious and intelligent computer robot to do whatever the programmer had preprogrammed it to do. Again, the robot’s actions would not be coerced but they would be completely controlled and constrained by the programmer.”

Lt. Commander Data would deeply resent Henry’s speciesistic hate-speech.

Robots are people, too! Clearly they need to add I, Robot to the curriculum at Henry’s backwoods seminary.

Thankfully, Calvinism has never been susceptible to this cybernetic bigotry. Centuries before Asimov, Calvin wrote the textbook on robopsychology.

If Henry continues to defame his fellow, cybernetic citizens, he will be Terminated!

“In either case whether it is the conscious puppet or conscious robot completely controlled and predetermined, I would not consider these to be real relationships of freely chosen love and trust as is true in the saving relationship between God and human persons.”

Now he’s slandering the all-American gynoid next door. If the Stepford Wives bring a class action suit against his Arminian chauvinist piggery, he’ll only has himself to blame.

“Hays says that left to our own resources fallen sinners will reject God. But that is just the point, God does not leave us to ourselves.”

Ah, yes. He throws us a rope and then takes a lunch break.

“I define synergism as requiring the actions of both persons, monergism as requiring the actions of only one person.”

This is a simplistic, nonstandard definition.

“God nevertheless took the initiative in developing the relationship with us by sending Jesus to die for our sins before we ever had any relationship with Him.”

It’s so much better if God took the initiative in his empty gestures.

“Yes, we should do whatever we can to save people from life threatening circumstances involving suicide. I personally believe that if someone is seriously considering suicide that they are not in a rational state, are not in a right state of mind, but are ‘out of their minds’, so I would have no hesitation in intervening ‘against their will’ or without informed consent…In a situation where a person is in the act of suicide the context is different and informed consent may be suspended.”

Which is, of course, exactly how the Bible describes the mental state of the unregenerate (cf. Titus 3:3-5).

“God developing a saving relationship with us and intervening to prevent a person’s suicide are two very different contexts.”

It’s different in the sense that we’re arguing, at one level, from the lesser to the greater. If it’s right to unilaterally intervene in order to save someone from death, then why is it wrong to unilaterally intervene in order to save someone from damnation?

At another level, we’re arguing from the greater to the lesser. In the case of a suicidal man or woman, it may be necessary to take coercive measures.

By contrast, predestination and regeneration are not coercive. So if there are circumstances under which even coercive intervention is right, then why is unilateral intervention which falls short of coercion wrong?

“God does not coerce us or constrain or manipulate or trick or con us into a personal relationship with us.”

Once again, this is a tendentious distortion of the Reformed position.

At the same time, there are situations in which it’s right to trick or con someone. You may lie to a suicidal man to talk him down from the ledge. You do it for his own good.

“God does not speak about love so much because He is wimpy and sentimental but because He desires us to have quality relationships with Him and others.”

Actually, the Arminian God is like something out of a Harlequin romance. Our Fabio in heaven.

“Persons who are into love are into ‘informed consent’, persons who are into selfish control and power are into coercion. A coerced and forced relationship of love is an oxymoron.”

This is stock, Arminian rhetoric. I’d add that it’s also out of touch with the realities of sexual passion and infatuation, where—for better or worse—lovers are often overpowered by their feelings for each other and swept along by the heat of the moment.

How is it that Arminians know so little about human nature, especially in matters of the heart? Did Henry grow up within a Shaker community?

“In my analogy of the lifeguard since I am talking about salvation and God developing a loving relationship in such a context, informed consent is important and necessary.”

Even at a human level, this is utter nonsense. Take parents and children, or siblings. How they feel about one other is normally quite involuntary. For better or worse, they have precious little control over their feelings.

Is Henry a clone? Did he grow up inside a giant Petri dish? No human contact apart from rubber gloves? How is it that Henry, like other Arminians, is so obvious to social psychology? So clueless about the world around them?