This will consist of a two-part reply to Jnorm888. In the first part I’ll reply to what he said to me. In the second part I’ll relate that to some comments of his which Jason Engwer posted.
JNORM888 SAID:
“In order for your argument to be correct, everyone who sat at the Apostles feet had to get them wrong.”
That’s’ scarcely necessary for my argument to be correct. To the contrary, you’re the one who’s backing down from your original argument. So the real question is what it would take for your argument to be incorrect—not what it would take for my argument to be correct. Remember, I was merely responding to you on your own grounds.
You originally made sweeping, unqualified claims like the following:
“Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity.”
“You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles.”
“If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
“To say that it's wrong is to say that the Apostles were in error.”
“So there are no ‘basic exegetical errors’ when the very people that came from Saint John held to that view.”
“They never sat of Saint John's feet. They never heard him speak. They never were part of the Ancient church. They don't know what was passed down. “
“So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters.”
Now, however, you’re scaling back the scope of your original claim in light of my counterexamples. Your original argument amounted to this:
Version A:
i) Steve is in error because his view of the Trinity is at odds with the early church.
ii) Due to apostolic succession, the view of the early church is traceable to the view of the apostles.
iii) If an apostle was right, then his successor is right.
iv) Conversely, if his successor is wrong, then an apostle was wrong.
(Defining “successor” as someone who knew an apostle, heard him preach and teach.)
This version of the argument is predicated on a *one-to-one* correspondence between the views an apostle and the views of his successors, from his immediate successors to distant successors—extending out hundreds of years after his death.
By this logic, if *any* successor is wrong, then the apostle he succeeded (directly or indirectly) is wrong.
By this logic, if any successor is wrong, then the appeal to apostolic succession is fallacious.
And this argument isn’t predicated on the apostles generally, but the apostles individually—for you could hear one apostle, but not another. The fact that you sat at the feet of John doesn’t mean you sat at the feet of Paul, or vice versa.
But one of the problems with Jnorm888’s argument is that he overlooked some obvious counterexamples in NT church history itself. There were false teachers who, at one time, did belong to Apostolic churches. False teachers who, at one time, did sit at the feet of one or more Apostles. Knew them, heard them. But that association didn’t prevent them from subsequently inculcating false doctrine.
So now Jnorm888 proposes a radically different argument:
Version B:
i) Steve is in error because his view of the Trinity is at odds with the early church.
ii) Due to apostolic succession, the view of the early church is *sometimes* traceable to the view of the apostles.
iii) If an apostle was right, then his successor might or might *not* be right.
iv) Conversely, even if his *successor* is wrong, an *apostle* could still be right.
This version of the argument is predicated on a *partial* correspondence between the views of the apostles and the views of their successors.
By this logic, if *every* successor is wrong, then, and only then, is the appeal to apostolic succession fallacious.
Jnorm888 has actually conceded my original argument. If succeeding an apostle doesn’t guarantee, or even presume, that a successor’s teaching is apostolic, then Jnorm888 can’t invoke apostolic succession to shoot down my position.
“The Apostles spoke to groups, so anyone who said something different.....like ‘Hymenaeus and Philetus’, would automatically stick out like a sore thumb.”
i) Even if that’s the case, you’re retreating from your original argument, viz. “If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
Now you’ve gone from “the very people” who sat an Apostle’s feat to *some* of the people who sat at his feet.
ii) And your revised argument overlooks another fact: False teachers in the NT church did have a following. Even though they were speaking to churches planted by apostles, even though the members had heard one or more Apostles teach and preach, some of them were still succumbing to false doctrine.
So, unfortunately, the false teachers didn’t “stick out like a sore thumb.” They were winning converts to their false doctrine from churches planted by the Apostles. From church members who sat at the feet of one or more Apostles.
This is a problem when guys like Jnorm888 begin with their preconception of what the church is supposed to be like, instead of actually studying the NT church.
“You don't know what I read. Unlike many calvinists on this blog, I actually read the primary accounts.”
And how do you interpret the primary sources? Do you interpret the church fathers allegorically, or you do use the grammatico-historical method? Why not apply the same method to Scripture which you apply to the church fathers?
“I 100%ly affirm the council of Chalcedon.”
As you understand it. But Robinson operates at a more academic level than you do, and when Robinson gets into an argument with Protestants over Chalcedonian Christology, he refers us to the latest technical monograph on the subject.
Have you read everything he’s read? And even if you have, what about the average Orthodox layman? What level of historical understanding does it take to “profess” the Chalcedonian creed? Short of being a patrologist (and there are disputes between one patrologist and another), how do you know that your profession corresponds to the original intent of the framers?
For example, are you a Greek scholar? Do you read the primary sources in the original language? Even if you have a smattering of Greek, is your command of Patristic Greek right up there with G. W. H. Lampe?
“I'm admitting that your view of ‘scripture alone’ is wrong.”
So you deny that scripture alone teaches a high Christology. Is Scripture neutral on the difference between Arian Christology and Orthodox Christology?
Does this mean that Orthodox Christology is extrabiblical? That it goes beyond what God has actually revealed?
“For it is easy to have a false interpretation of scripture.”
Why is that easy? Is it easy (according to you) because Scripture alone doesn’t teach a high Christology?
Or do you admit that Scripture alone does teach a high Christology? In so, then how would a misinterpretation invalidate sola Scriptura? The correct Christology would still have to come from Scripture.
“He only changed his mind when other protestants fought him on the issue. It wasn't scripture that changed his mind. It was other protestants that changed his mind.”
That’s a false dichotomy. They challenged his interpretation with better exegesis.
Anyway, did I ever deny the value of Bible teachers? Of Bible scholars and commentators? God has gifted some Christian to teach the Bible.
That isn’t at odds with Protestant ecclesiology. But a Bible teacher can’t simply invoke tradition to defend his interpretation. He must defend his interpretation through responsible, transparent exegesis.
“My point was that Scripture is one source that the Church has in her Possesion.”
Yet you apparently think it’s an inadequate source for Orthodox Christology. So is Scripture noncommittal on Arian Christology? Is Arian Christology compatible with Scripture? Must an extrascriptural source take up the slack?
Thus far Jnorm888’s response to me. However, in his comments on premillennialism, he’s mooted his response to me. Here is what he said:
"Only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom....You also mentioned Justin, but like I said before. HE was from the same region, and he later moved west, and spread that form of eschatology to other parts of the christian world. the same is true with Saint Irenaeus....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with....If you are going to mention Historic PM then you are going to have to use the Church as being the final authority. It was the Church at a euceminical council that took a stand on the issue....You have to use the standard of the time. And at that time, the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul.”
“So yeah, it's a heresy, but it's not a bad bad heresy. There are different levels of heresies/sins/error.....ect....What we don't see in scripture is error from followers of the Apostles who miss heard what they said. The Apostles spoke to the masses, so in order for their followers to get them wrong is for everyone to miss understand them"
Compare this, once more, with Jnorm888’s original reply to me:
“Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity.”
“You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles.”
“If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
“To say that it's wrong is to say that the Apostles were in error.”
“So there are no ‘basic exegetical errors’ when the very people that came from Saint John held to that view.”
“They never sat of Saint John's feet. They never heard him speak. They never were part of the Ancient church. They don't know what was passed down. “
“So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters.”
His original argument took the form that early church tradition was true because it went back to various apostles via their successors.
After I challenged him, he then amended his argument to claim that apostolic succession was reliable as long as *every *successor* wasn’t mistaken.
Now, however, we have yet another argument—or two:
Version C: Apostolic succession is reliable as long as *every apostle* wasn’t mistaken.
Or:
Version D: Apostles could be wrong, but ecumenical councils trump apostles.
This represents a complete reversal of his initial position. Now he takes the position that even Apostolic doctrine could be wrong.
Not just wrong, but heretical. Apostolic succession can be heretical. An apostle may be a heresiarch.
But that’s okay because an apostle is not the final authority. An ecumenical council is the final authority.
This raises several issues:
i) Jnorm888 has given us a multiple-choice argument. So which one of his arguments is the operative argument?
ii) Why can one apostle be wrong, but two apostles can’t be wrong? Or does it take three or four apostles? What’s the numerical threshold for inerrancy to kick in?
Why would an apostle teach heresy? Because he’s uninspired? But in that event, why assume that one apostle is uninspired while two apostles are inspired? Or three or four?
iii) If an ecumenical council can trump an apostle, does this mean that bishops enjoy a higher claim to inspiration than apostles? Could every apostle be wrong, but every bishop could not be wrong?
If an ecumenical council can trump an apostle, does this mean that every apostle could be wrong, but that’s okay because the episcopate is the safety-net?
iv) What does apostolic succession amount to when bishops can trump apostles? Isn’t the standard view of apostolic succession that bishops *preserve* apostolic tradition rather than opposing and supplanting apostolic tradition? Isn’t apostolic succession defined by *continuity* between apostolic doctrine and episcopal or ecclesial doctrine?
v) On this view, my interpretation of Johannine or Pauline theology could be flawless, yet my theology could still be heretical because Johannine or Pauline theology could be heretical. An inerrant interpretation of an errant teaching is still errant.
“I don't see a problem with it. The Circumcision group were trumped at the very first Church council. And they were fighting for the customs of Moses.”
Several problems:
i) Even if this were a correct interpretation of Acts 15, it still destroys any appeal to apostolic succession. You’ve gone from an appeal to isometric continuity to an allowance for a high degree of discontinuity.
ii) Why assume that Acts 15 is a reliable record of the proceedings? After all, if an apostle can be a heretic, why assume that Luke is reliable? After all, Luke is a partisan of Paul.
iii) Were some of the apostles Judaizers?
iv) Did Judaizers participate in the Council of Jerusalem?
The councilmen were debating the position of the Judaizers. But what evidence is there that any of the councilmen were Judaizers?
Acts 15 records four speakers (Peter, Paul, Barnabas, and James). Not one of them is a spokesman for the Judaizers.
iv) What was the point under dispute? Were the councilmen debating the validity of sola fide? Or were the debating the best way to promulgate sola fide without giving unnecessary offense to the Jews? Cf. Acts 15:21.
Sunday, July 20, 2008
"Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence!"
This is a Humean rule of evidence which was popularized by Carl Sagan. A variant on this slogan is that “extraordinary events demand extraordinary evidence.”
It’s since been picked up by atheists generally to quash any and all reported miracles. But what does this slogan mean, and is it a sound rule of evidence?
1.What makes a claim an “extraordinary” claim? Does that simply mean the event in question is exceptional, out of the ordinary, or unusual?
But unbelievers think that many natural events are extraordinary in that weak sense. Likewise, they think that many human events or historical events are extraordinary in that weak sense. And they don’t demand extraordinary evidence (whatever that means) for such events. So they must have something stronger in mind.
2.They often appeal to the uniformity of nature. So do they define “extraordinary” in the sense that miracles don’t happen, inasmuch as that would run counter to the uniformity of nature?
But, of course, that definition begs the question. Whether miracles do or don’t happen is the very point at issue. You can’t very well presume that miracles never happen without begging the question.
Hence, reported miracles don’t have to overcome the presumption that miracles never happen. For that would assume the very thing the unbeliever must prove.
3.Perhaps, though, the unbeliever thinks the onus is on the believer. Since the believer is asserting that miracles happen, the believer assumes the burden of proof.
However, the unbeliever is asserting that miracles don’t happen, so he—in turn—shoulders a commensurate burden of proof.
4.Frequently, the uniformity of nature is underwritten by appeal to the laws of nature. Here we have a strong claim: miracles don’t happen because miracles can’t happen.
And why can’t they happen? Because that would violate the laws of nature.
Extraordinary events don’t demand extraordinary evidence as long as they’re the right kind of event—natural events, consistent with natural law. A miracle is the wrong kind of extraordinary event for ordinary evidence to suffice.
But there are several problems with this claim:
5.An unbeliever can’t very well presume that the laws of nature preclude miracles. For he’s making a very ambitious claim. A claim about the state of the world.
That’s something he needs to defend. He can’t merely stipulate that his view of the world is right. He must argue for his view of natural law. Therefore, it’s not as if reported miracles must overcome the presumption that natural law precludes their occurrence.
Even if natural law did preclude the miraculous, that, of itself, is a claim which demands a supporting argument.
6.Keep in mind that a natural “law” is just an anthropomorphic metaphor. Literally speaking, there are no “laws” of nature. That’s a figure of speech which is borrowed from human affairs and then projected onto nature.
7.Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we formulate the possibility of miracles within a natural law framework, what would be extraordinary about an event that “violated” the laws of nature?
That would only be extraordinary under the assumption that natural laws are the ultimate factors governing reality. An absolute limiting condition. They demarcate what is possible and impossible.
But, of course, the unbeliever cannot very well presume such a grandiose position. He needs to argue for it.
8.To see the problem with (7), ask yourself the following question: “Is there something extraordinary about the idea that God would do something contrary to the laws of nature?”
On the face of it, there’s nothing extraordinary about such an idea. If God is more ultimate than nature, then God is more ultimate than natural law. So God isn’t bound by nature law. Rather, the laws of nature depend on God.
On the face of it, there’s no presumption that God would never do something contrary to the laws of nature. That would only follow if the laws of nature are ultimate and autonomous.
9. Of course, at this point, the unbeliever will object to the introduction of God into the equation. After all, the unbeliever doesn’t believe in God.
But why doesn’t he believe in God? Does he take the position that God’s existence is an extraordinary claim demanding extraordinary evidence?
But why is God’s existence extraordinary? After all, many theologians argue that God is a necessary being. And if God is a necessary being, then it would be extraordinary if he didn’t exist. Indeed, his nonexistence would be impossible. So his existence is not extraordinary: rather, it’s inevitable.
10. Of course, an unbeliever will deny that God is a necessary being. But if a theologian must argue that God is a necessary being, then an atheologian must argue that God is not a necessary being. An atheist or agnostic can’t merely presume that God is not a necessary being. His own denial is a belief. A belief with its own burden of proof.
On the basis of 1-10, there’s no prima facie assumption that a reported miracle amounts to an extraordinary claim. If an unbeliever is going to classify a reported miracle as an extraordinary claim, then he must mount an argument for his category. It’s not something he’s entitled to take for granted.
He is making a claim about the state of the world. That’s not something he can merely stipulate to be the case—especially when his claim is controversial.
11.What about extraordinary evidence? What an unbeliever really means is that, practically speaking, no evidence will ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
But that, of itself, is a very ambitious claim. It’s an extraordinary claim to claim that, practically speaking, no evidence can ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
Indeed, it begs the question. It really boils down to supposition that since miracles either don’t occur or can’t occur, then there is no possible evidence for miracles. But that’s tendentious.
It’s since been picked up by atheists generally to quash any and all reported miracles. But what does this slogan mean, and is it a sound rule of evidence?
1.What makes a claim an “extraordinary” claim? Does that simply mean the event in question is exceptional, out of the ordinary, or unusual?
But unbelievers think that many natural events are extraordinary in that weak sense. Likewise, they think that many human events or historical events are extraordinary in that weak sense. And they don’t demand extraordinary evidence (whatever that means) for such events. So they must have something stronger in mind.
2.They often appeal to the uniformity of nature. So do they define “extraordinary” in the sense that miracles don’t happen, inasmuch as that would run counter to the uniformity of nature?
But, of course, that definition begs the question. Whether miracles do or don’t happen is the very point at issue. You can’t very well presume that miracles never happen without begging the question.
Hence, reported miracles don’t have to overcome the presumption that miracles never happen. For that would assume the very thing the unbeliever must prove.
3.Perhaps, though, the unbeliever thinks the onus is on the believer. Since the believer is asserting that miracles happen, the believer assumes the burden of proof.
However, the unbeliever is asserting that miracles don’t happen, so he—in turn—shoulders a commensurate burden of proof.
4.Frequently, the uniformity of nature is underwritten by appeal to the laws of nature. Here we have a strong claim: miracles don’t happen because miracles can’t happen.
And why can’t they happen? Because that would violate the laws of nature.
Extraordinary events don’t demand extraordinary evidence as long as they’re the right kind of event—natural events, consistent with natural law. A miracle is the wrong kind of extraordinary event for ordinary evidence to suffice.
But there are several problems with this claim:
5.An unbeliever can’t very well presume that the laws of nature preclude miracles. For he’s making a very ambitious claim. A claim about the state of the world.
That’s something he needs to defend. He can’t merely stipulate that his view of the world is right. He must argue for his view of natural law. Therefore, it’s not as if reported miracles must overcome the presumption that natural law precludes their occurrence.
Even if natural law did preclude the miraculous, that, of itself, is a claim which demands a supporting argument.
6.Keep in mind that a natural “law” is just an anthropomorphic metaphor. Literally speaking, there are no “laws” of nature. That’s a figure of speech which is borrowed from human affairs and then projected onto nature.
7.Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we formulate the possibility of miracles within a natural law framework, what would be extraordinary about an event that “violated” the laws of nature?
That would only be extraordinary under the assumption that natural laws are the ultimate factors governing reality. An absolute limiting condition. They demarcate what is possible and impossible.
But, of course, the unbeliever cannot very well presume such a grandiose position. He needs to argue for it.
8.To see the problem with (7), ask yourself the following question: “Is there something extraordinary about the idea that God would do something contrary to the laws of nature?”
On the face of it, there’s nothing extraordinary about such an idea. If God is more ultimate than nature, then God is more ultimate than natural law. So God isn’t bound by nature law. Rather, the laws of nature depend on God.
On the face of it, there’s no presumption that God would never do something contrary to the laws of nature. That would only follow if the laws of nature are ultimate and autonomous.
9. Of course, at this point, the unbeliever will object to the introduction of God into the equation. After all, the unbeliever doesn’t believe in God.
But why doesn’t he believe in God? Does he take the position that God’s existence is an extraordinary claim demanding extraordinary evidence?
But why is God’s existence extraordinary? After all, many theologians argue that God is a necessary being. And if God is a necessary being, then it would be extraordinary if he didn’t exist. Indeed, his nonexistence would be impossible. So his existence is not extraordinary: rather, it’s inevitable.
10. Of course, an unbeliever will deny that God is a necessary being. But if a theologian must argue that God is a necessary being, then an atheologian must argue that God is not a necessary being. An atheist or agnostic can’t merely presume that God is not a necessary being. His own denial is a belief. A belief with its own burden of proof.
On the basis of 1-10, there’s no prima facie assumption that a reported miracle amounts to an extraordinary claim. If an unbeliever is going to classify a reported miracle as an extraordinary claim, then he must mount an argument for his category. It’s not something he’s entitled to take for granted.
He is making a claim about the state of the world. That’s not something he can merely stipulate to be the case—especially when his claim is controversial.
11.What about extraordinary evidence? What an unbeliever really means is that, practically speaking, no evidence will ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
But that, of itself, is a very ambitious claim. It’s an extraordinary claim to claim that, practically speaking, no evidence can ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
Indeed, it begs the question. It really boils down to supposition that since miracles either don’t occur or can’t occur, then there is no possible evidence for miracles. But that’s tendentious.
An Eastern Orthodox Clarification Of Church History
In another thread, Jnorm888, an Eastern Orthodox, writes:
"But I already handled some of your arguments when dealing with a Supra - full-preterist Prespyterian."
Here's part of what Jnorm888 writes in the two articles he links us to, regarding premillennialism (here and here):
"only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom....You also mentioned Justin, but like I said before. HE was from the same region, and he later moved west, and spread that form of eschatology to other parts of the christian world. the same is true with Saint Irenaeus....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with....If you are going to mention Historic PM then you are going to have to use the Church as being the final authority. It was the Church at a euceminical council that took a stand on the issue....You have to use the standard of the time. And at that time, the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul. The Christians in Ashia minor had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight, just like they lost the fight some centuries earlyier at the council of Nicea, in regards to Pascha observance. The christians in Ashia minor were at one time called ' quartodecimans' (because they observed Pascha on the same day the Jews observed Passover, which was Nisan 14) This custom came from John, so the christians in his region did what he did. But they lost the fight at the council of Nicea, because the other Apostles (in other regions) did it differently. So they were trumped. I don't see a problem with it. The Circumcision group were trumped at the very first Church council. And they were fighting for the customs of Moses. This is what happens King Neb, and you shouldn't see a problem with it. Certain customs & beliefs/interpretations get trumped by other customs & beliefs/interpretations.....that are also ancient....Everything in ancient PM was not declared heretical. Only the literal 1,000 earthly year riegn of Christ, and their carnal view of Paradise in that 1,000 year riegn...You had two competing views. One group from Ashia minor that believed in a literal 1,000 year reign and embraced the book of Revelations. And those who either rejected Revelations, or just didn't embrace it. And these were the christians that did not believe in a literal 1,000 earthly reign of Christ....But alot of modern PMers don't know that PM was declared heretical in the 6th century, so for the most part it's a view held in ignorance. I know when I was PM, I didn't know it was heretical until some years ago....My Godfather is a PMer(ancient PM. He picked it up from some of the early fathers & nonfathers). He is not suppose to be, because he's ORthodox. But as long as he's not dogmatic about his PMism, and as long as he doesn't try to spread it to others then he is still allowed to partake of cummunion. So yeah, it's a heresy, but it's not a bad bad heresy. There are different levels of heresies/sins/error.....ect....What we don't see in scripture is error from followers of the Apostles who miss heard what they said. The Apostles spoke to the masses, so in order for their followers to get them wrong is for everyone to miss understand them"
Apparently, then, without offering much supporting argumentation or documentation, Jnorm888 wants us to believe that:
- The apostle John taught premillennialism, but he was wrong. The Christians in Asia Minor "had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight". Apparently, they were mistaken because they accepted the "details" John gave them. The apostle led them astray.
- The book of Revelation, which the large majority of professing Christians today accept as canonical, was rejected as uncanonical by most of the earliest Christians, and the book taught a false view of eschatology. It can be reinterpreted in an orthodox manner, but the book was initially written with the intention of conveying false eschatology.
- The reason why men like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus advocated premillennialism and spoke of it as if it was the mainstream Christian view when they were outside of Asia Minor is because they were at the forefront of spreading the belief to other regions. Apparently, men like Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Cyprian accepted premillennialism under the influence of men like Justin and Irenaeus. We aren't told why premillennialism would be so widely accepted outside of Asia Minor if it had initially been rejected in such places. We aren't told how Jnorm888 allegedly knows that the doctrine was spread in the manner he suggests.
- Premillennilaism is a heresy condemned by an ecumenical council, but "not a bad bad heresy", and it's acceptable for individuals to hold that heresy, as long as they "aren't dogmatic about it" and don't try to spread it, for example.
Etc.
"But I already handled some of your arguments when dealing with a Supra - full-preterist Prespyterian."
Here's part of what Jnorm888 writes in the two articles he links us to, regarding premillennialism (here and here):
"only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom....You also mentioned Justin, but like I said before. HE was from the same region, and he later moved west, and spread that form of eschatology to other parts of the christian world. the same is true with Saint Irenaeus....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with....If you are going to mention Historic PM then you are going to have to use the Church as being the final authority. It was the Church at a euceminical council that took a stand on the issue....You have to use the standard of the time. And at that time, the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul. The Christians in Ashia minor had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight, just like they lost the fight some centuries earlyier at the council of Nicea, in regards to Pascha observance. The christians in Ashia minor were at one time called ' quartodecimans' (because they observed Pascha on the same day the Jews observed Passover, which was Nisan 14) This custom came from John, so the christians in his region did what he did. But they lost the fight at the council of Nicea, because the other Apostles (in other regions) did it differently. So they were trumped. I don't see a problem with it. The Circumcision group were trumped at the very first Church council. And they were fighting for the customs of Moses. This is what happens King Neb, and you shouldn't see a problem with it. Certain customs & beliefs/interpretations get trumped by other customs & beliefs/interpretations.....that are also ancient....Everything in ancient PM was not declared heretical. Only the literal 1,000 earthly year riegn of Christ, and their carnal view of Paradise in that 1,000 year riegn...You had two competing views. One group from Ashia minor that believed in a literal 1,000 year reign and embraced the book of Revelations. And those who either rejected Revelations, or just didn't embrace it. And these were the christians that did not believe in a literal 1,000 earthly reign of Christ....But alot of modern PMers don't know that PM was declared heretical in the 6th century, so for the most part it's a view held in ignorance. I know when I was PM, I didn't know it was heretical until some years ago....My Godfather is a PMer(ancient PM. He picked it up from some of the early fathers & nonfathers). He is not suppose to be, because he's ORthodox. But as long as he's not dogmatic about his PMism, and as long as he doesn't try to spread it to others then he is still allowed to partake of cummunion. So yeah, it's a heresy, but it's not a bad bad heresy. There are different levels of heresies/sins/error.....ect....What we don't see in scripture is error from followers of the Apostles who miss heard what they said. The Apostles spoke to the masses, so in order for their followers to get them wrong is for everyone to miss understand them"
Apparently, then, without offering much supporting argumentation or documentation, Jnorm888 wants us to believe that:
- The apostle John taught premillennialism, but he was wrong. The Christians in Asia Minor "had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight". Apparently, they were mistaken because they accepted the "details" John gave them. The apostle led them astray.
- The book of Revelation, which the large majority of professing Christians today accept as canonical, was rejected as uncanonical by most of the earliest Christians, and the book taught a false view of eschatology. It can be reinterpreted in an orthodox manner, but the book was initially written with the intention of conveying false eschatology.
- The reason why men like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus advocated premillennialism and spoke of it as if it was the mainstream Christian view when they were outside of Asia Minor is because they were at the forefront of spreading the belief to other regions. Apparently, men like Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Cyprian accepted premillennialism under the influence of men like Justin and Irenaeus. We aren't told why premillennialism would be so widely accepted outside of Asia Minor if it had initially been rejected in such places. We aren't told how Jnorm888 allegedly knows that the doctrine was spread in the manner he suggests.
- Premillennilaism is a heresy condemned by an ecumenical council, but "not a bad bad heresy", and it's acceptable for individuals to hold that heresy, as long as they "aren't dogmatic about it" and don't try to spread it, for example.
Etc.
Saturday, July 19, 2008
Weighing The Church Fathers
Jnorm888, an Eastern Orthodox, said:
"Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity. They held to the Asiety of the Father. So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters....You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles....If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong."
Papias was a premillennialist, and he apparently was a disciple of the apostle John. Are you a premillenialist? And if one generation must have the same beliefs as the one that came before it, then why don't you assume that later Roman Catholic beliefs you disagree with, for example, must have existed in the previous generations? How could one generation of Roman Christians contradict the previous generation?
There was widespread opposition to the veneration of images among the early patristic Christians. And they don't seem to have believed in praying to the deceased. Why does Eastern Orthodoxy venerate images and pray to the deceased? The early patristic Christians widely interpreted scripture as teaching a young earth (see here and here). They also widely held that Mary was a sinner in her behavior, for example. Why doesn't Eastern Orthodoxy require its followers to hold such positions?
The beliefs of post-apostolic Christians aren't as significant as you're making them out to be. They are significant, but they're only one line of evidence among others. You can't ignore arguments from the Biblical documents or evidence from non-Christian sources (what Josephus wrote about Christianity, what Celsus wrote, etc.), for example. And the relationship of the early post-apostolic Christians to the New Testament is more significant than their relationship to the Old Testament. It's not as if Papias was a disciple of Moses or Polycarp was a disciple of Isaiah. They may have heard an apostle comment on a passage from Deuteronomy or Isaiah that they discuss, but not necessarily, and they probably didn't hear apostolic commentary on every Old Testament passage.
And it's not as though post-apostolic Christians are the only Christian sources we could go to in order to get reassurance that our interpretation of an apostolic document is correct. If we want reassurance that we're interpreting Paul's view of justification correctly, for example, we don't have to go to what Clement of Rome, Hermas, or Cyprian said about the subject. We can consult Paul's companion Luke. Or his companion Mark. Or his fellow apostle John. Etc. The idea that we might be wrong in our interpretation of Paul and Luke and Mark and John, etc. is more dubious than the suggestion that we might be wrong in our interpretation of Paul alone. (And one Pauline document can give us reassurance of our view of another Pauline document.) Once we get to the early post-apostolic Christians, we've already gotten multiple lines of reassurance of our interpretation. If you're going to claim that we should keep looking for more reassurances until we get to a source you agree with, then why couldn't Roman Catholics, for example, do the same with regard to early Western sources you disagree with? If we want to know what the earliest Roman Christians believed, maybe we should keep looking for confirmation of our interpretations until we get to the earliest Roman Christians who agreed with Roman Catholicism.
You write:
"AND CALVINISTS are called CALVINISTS because they follow? end of story. Your view of scripture comes from Calvin & friends."
Why are Catholics called "Catholics"? Why does the Church of Christ call itself the "Church of Christ"? Groups don't always name themselves after the earliest source of their beliefs. Sometimes using the name of a later source, not the earliest one, allows them to better distinguish themselves from another group, for example. What if every group that considers itself Christian just called itself "Christian", with no further clarification?
"Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity. They held to the Asiety of the Father. So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters....You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles....If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong."
Papias was a premillennialist, and he apparently was a disciple of the apostle John. Are you a premillenialist? And if one generation must have the same beliefs as the one that came before it, then why don't you assume that later Roman Catholic beliefs you disagree with, for example, must have existed in the previous generations? How could one generation of Roman Christians contradict the previous generation?
There was widespread opposition to the veneration of images among the early patristic Christians. And they don't seem to have believed in praying to the deceased. Why does Eastern Orthodoxy venerate images and pray to the deceased? The early patristic Christians widely interpreted scripture as teaching a young earth (see here and here). They also widely held that Mary was a sinner in her behavior, for example. Why doesn't Eastern Orthodoxy require its followers to hold such positions?
The beliefs of post-apostolic Christians aren't as significant as you're making them out to be. They are significant, but they're only one line of evidence among others. You can't ignore arguments from the Biblical documents or evidence from non-Christian sources (what Josephus wrote about Christianity, what Celsus wrote, etc.), for example. And the relationship of the early post-apostolic Christians to the New Testament is more significant than their relationship to the Old Testament. It's not as if Papias was a disciple of Moses or Polycarp was a disciple of Isaiah. They may have heard an apostle comment on a passage from Deuteronomy or Isaiah that they discuss, but not necessarily, and they probably didn't hear apostolic commentary on every Old Testament passage.
And it's not as though post-apostolic Christians are the only Christian sources we could go to in order to get reassurance that our interpretation of an apostolic document is correct. If we want reassurance that we're interpreting Paul's view of justification correctly, for example, we don't have to go to what Clement of Rome, Hermas, or Cyprian said about the subject. We can consult Paul's companion Luke. Or his companion Mark. Or his fellow apostle John. Etc. The idea that we might be wrong in our interpretation of Paul and Luke and Mark and John, etc. is more dubious than the suggestion that we might be wrong in our interpretation of Paul alone. (And one Pauline document can give us reassurance of our view of another Pauline document.) Once we get to the early post-apostolic Christians, we've already gotten multiple lines of reassurance of our interpretation. If you're going to claim that we should keep looking for more reassurances until we get to a source you agree with, then why couldn't Roman Catholics, for example, do the same with regard to early Western sources you disagree with? If we want to know what the earliest Roman Christians believed, maybe we should keep looking for confirmation of our interpretations until we get to the earliest Roman Christians who agreed with Roman Catholicism.
You write:
"AND CALVINISTS are called CALVINISTS because they follow? end of story. Your view of scripture comes from Calvin & friends."
Why are Catholics called "Catholics"? Why does the Church of Christ call itself the "Church of Christ"? Groups don't always name themselves after the earliest source of their beliefs. Sometimes using the name of a later source, not the earliest one, allows them to better distinguish themselves from another group, for example. What if every group that considers itself Christian just called itself "Christian", with no further clarification?
Friday, July 18, 2008
The Grounds For Rationality
In comments on an earlier post, I made the point that theism holds the grounds to rationality. Paul C disagreed, and after giving links to some of the various posts I’ve written on logic (especially this one), I asked him to provide an atheistic backing for rationality. Paul’s response was:
It is impossible for us to know that things actually are as we perceive them to be. All we have is our perceptions. We do not have access to an unfiltered reality. That is, no matter what the objective universe is, we only perceive it filtered through the lens of our perceptions. So what Paul’s first premise boils down to is a simple faith statement. He believes that reality is generally how it is perceived.
Now I should point out that I agree with this premise. However, I have a reason for agreeing with it—a reason that Paul cannot have. My reason for agreeing with it is because God created the universe and He likewise created us to experience that universe, therefore He created us with the ability to perceive the universe as it actually is. Only because of sin do we sometimes err in our perceptions (and by this I include such things as degenerative eyesight and hearing, which would not have occurred without sin, not simply hallucinations brought about by such diseases as schizophrenia, etc.). But while this would also be an interesting path to go down, Paul inadvertently leads us directly back to the argument I made in the blog post I referenced earlier. Paul’s first premise, you see, is based on perception.
In the blog post I wrote (and referenced for Paul, but which I suspect he didn’t read), I stated:
Furthermore, (as I wrote in my original post), this leads to other important facts about existence. As I wrote then:
Thus, as soon as Paul uses his first premise, he is granting to the theist that God really does exist.
Now that I’ve demonstrated this for Paul once again, I would be happy to allow him to try again at demonstrating how rationality can occur without the existence of some kind of diety…
1. Things are generally as I perceive them.There are several problems with this (I won’t be too nitpicky since Paul probably hasn’t taken much time to work on this, seeing as how it was a quick response in a comment field). Let us just examine his first premise.
2. At my level of perception, the universe appears orderly.
3. If the universe is sufficiently orderly, then rationality is a useful tool.
It is impossible for us to know that things actually are as we perceive them to be. All we have is our perceptions. We do not have access to an unfiltered reality. That is, no matter what the objective universe is, we only perceive it filtered through the lens of our perceptions. So what Paul’s first premise boils down to is a simple faith statement. He believes that reality is generally how it is perceived.
Now I should point out that I agree with this premise. However, I have a reason for agreeing with it—a reason that Paul cannot have. My reason for agreeing with it is because God created the universe and He likewise created us to experience that universe, therefore He created us with the ability to perceive the universe as it actually is. Only because of sin do we sometimes err in our perceptions (and by this I include such things as degenerative eyesight and hearing, which would not have occurred without sin, not simply hallucinations brought about by such diseases as schizophrenia, etc.). But while this would also be an interesting path to go down, Paul inadvertently leads us directly back to the argument I made in the blog post I referenced earlier. Paul’s first premise, you see, is based on perception.
In the blog post I wrote (and referenced for Paul, but which I suspect he didn’t read), I stated:
I perceive, therefore I am. Even if I am nothing but a brain-in-a-vat—or even if I have no “brain” at all, it’s all simply mental hallucinations with no actual physical reality—I cannot doubt that I exist. I perceive things. Regardless of whether these things are real or not, perception occurs. Something perceives, and therefore there must be a “perceiving being.” Since these perceptions are “owned” by me, I am this perceiving being (by definition). I exist.So you see that both Paul and I start with perception; however, Paul’s argument requires us to accept our perceptions as valid, whereas my argument is correct regardless of whether our perceptions are valid.
Now this doesn’t tell me that I exist physically, or that anything I perceive is real or not; but it does tell me that I do, actually, without a doubt, exist. I am whatever I am (as yet, undefined). I have identity. A is A (or in this case, I am me).
And if I exist, then it is the case that I do exist and do not non-exist at the same time and in the same relationship. If I exist (in whatever form I exist), I really do exist (in whatever form that may be), and the contradiction of this is not the case. Thus, my bare existence alone requires the law of Non-Contradiction.
Since I exist, logic must be valid.
Furthermore, (as I wrote in my original post), this leads to other important facts about existence. As I wrote then:
And since logic is valid, we can use logic to probe some other questions. For instance, have I always been here? It is possible that I am the only being that has ever existed, despite my perception of other beings. I do not have the self-awareness with these other beings that I do with my self; therefore, I cannot “prove” they exist in the same manner that I can “prove” I exist. So it is possible they do not exist at all and I am the only thing that exists.Now all of this follows regardless of whether we agree that our perceptions are valid. This means that even if we grant the entirety of Paul’s first premise and agree that our perceptions really do accurately represent reality, then the above follows. That is, the existence of anything necessitates the existence of something that is self-existent, eternal, omnipresent, etc. In other words, all the attributes that we commonly ascribe to God.
But it is also possible that I have come from something else. After all, I perceive a world that functions in a specific manner, and if my perceptions are accurate then this means that I have come from my parents.
But where did they come from? Perhaps they’ve always been here; perhaps they had parents too. And if they had parents, their parents may have had parents too. This chain can go back for a very long time.
But it cannot be infinite. At some point, something must have existed without being derived from previous existence—otherwise, we are stuck in an infinite regress with no chance of ever escaping to begin logic in the first place. Thus, the fact that I exist demands that somewhere there must be a self-existent being.
I might be that self-existent being, of course. So, too, could my parents, etc. But whatever the case may be, logic requires that whatever or whoever the self-existent being is must be the cause of my own being. If it were not the cause of my own being, my being would never existed (for we would be back to the infinite regress).
So, the fact that I exit proves the necessity of some object with self-existence that caused my existence. This object could not have been created by anything else (for the same reasons of the infinite regress). The "first" object to ever exist must be self-existent.
If an object is self-existent, it is a necessary object. It holds the power of its own existence, and therefore nothing can keep it from existing. If nothing can keep it from existing, then it always has existed.
Some problems arise when we include time. After all, time is measured by physical objects that move. Thus, one pendulum swing on a clock = one second. One rotation of the Earth = 1 day. Etc. These physical processes define the length of time.
But we’ve already shown that a necessary, self-existent object must always exist. If this is the case and if that object is physical, then we have an actual infinite of time. If time extends an eternity backwards, it would take an eternity for the past to have gotten here. Thus we must conclude that time isn’t eternal, but instead it must have begun at some point.
So how do we reconcile this apparent tension of an eternal self-existent object in a temporal time frame? Logically, this is satisfied by either jettisoning our definition of time (in which case we have no meaningful way to speak of time) or by acknowledging that the self-existent necessary object is immaterial. Since time is measured by physical objects, an immaterial object would not cause time to exist co-eternally with itself. This immaterial object must still exist in such a way as to provide the basis for my own existence, however. (After all, remember that the self-existent object is a logically necessary requirement due to my own existence.) Thus, in order to stay rational, we must acknowledge an immaterial self-existent necessary object that can cause my own existence.
It is important to note that due to the necessity of the immaterial aspect of this object, it is impossible for secular science to speak meaningfully about this object. If science is limited to the physical world only, then science cannot speak to this. As such, we have demonstrated a necessary being that extends beyond the limits of science. Thus, the fact of my existence proves that science cannot answer the questions of something that necessarily must be true!
Other attributes can be logically deduced from this same being. For instance, omnipresence (all existence derived from this self-existent source must come from this self-existent source, so the source must be omnipresent--there is no existence outside of the existence of this self-existent [object]); omnipotence (all power is derived from existence, so all power flows from the self-existent source—without that source, there is no power); and immutability (since logic is immutable, the source of logic must be unchanging as well).
Thus far, the only real difference between this object and God Himself is that we’ve yet to prove any kind of consciousness in this object. But that too is simple enough to deduce. After all, this entire time we’ve been using logic. Logic works because existence is based on laws, and laws imply a law giver.
Why is it that “nature” acts the way it does? We can give a list of reasons, but these reasons are likewise subject to the same question: Why do these reasons act the way they do? Once more, we cannot engage in an infinite regress here. At some point we must reach the level where we are left saying, “That’s simply the way it is.”
And at that level, laws will still exist. And again, laws imply law givers, so the very aspect of the “law-giving” (i.e. the consciousness) must be necessarily basic to this object as well. This law giver must be the same self-existent, immutable, omnipresent, omnipotent, atemporal being I have already demonstrated must exist. This being fits the definition of “God.”
But even if someone does not like the above, we can always turn the tables and use some empirical evidence (which, following induction, cannot be known for “certain”). Assuming that our perceptions are valid, that we see the world as it really exists, etc. we know the following. All consciousness we have ever observed has come from previous consciousness. There is no evidence that consciousness can come from non-consciousness. Since I am conscious, whatever the source of my being is would logically be conscious as well, for we have no warrant to believe consciousness could have ever come from non-consciousness--there is no proof, no evidence, no observation of this ever.
Thus, as soon as Paul uses his first premise, he is granting to the theist that God really does exist.
Now that I’ve demonstrated this for Paul once again, I would be happy to allow him to try again at demonstrating how rationality can occur without the existence of some kind of diety…
Thursday, July 17, 2008
The delusive hope that God will save everyone
“Gregory MacDonald” has done a 4-part response to something I wrote. I already replied to part 1. This is just a mopping up operation.
I waited for him to complete his miniseries, as well as waiting for commenters to weigh in.
http://evangelicaluniversalist.blogspot.com/
MacDonald said that I had leveled an exceptionally serious charge against him.
I pointed out that “there are no exceptionally serious charges in universalism. Universalism trivializes every evil. If universalism is true, I could flay you alive with a penknife, say three Hail Marys after I die, or do 1000 hours of postmortem community service, then head for heaven. In universalism, all is forgiven since all are forgiven.”
MacDonald’s comeback is to say:
“My view is that there is no forgiveness except through the atoning death of Christ and heart-felt repentance and faith on the part of the sinner. This forgiveness comes at the cost of Christ's death on the cross. There is no trivializing of evil in that. The sinner is ashamed at what they have done and repudiates it. There is no sense in which their evil ‘doesn't really matter’."
But, of course, that misses the point. If no matter what I say or do in this life, I’m heavenbound, then there are no serious charges. There’s no danger in my saying or doing anything whatsoever. Hence, universalism trivializes evil.
MacDonald’s comeback is irrelevant since it fails to address the question of what would constitute an “exceptionally serious charge” given the outcome.
Rachel said...
“What I am getting from his arugement here is that forgiveness pre-mortem is called ‘grace’ and forgiveness post-portem is called ‘trivializing evil’."
You can always count on Rachel to pipe in with some clueless comment. Rachel doesn’t follow the logic of the argument or pay attention what people mean. She simply reacts.
The point at issue is what would qualify as an “exceptionally serious charge” given the outcome. Invoking universal postmortem salvation underscores my point, not hers.
I also don’t have any considered position on “post-portem” forgiveness. Is that a tertiary type of forgiveness in-between postmortem forgiveness and postpartum forgiveness?
“I think the bigger problem here, though, is that he seems to be in fact trivializing Christ's work on the cross. If there is some subset of people that absolutely have to suffer for their sins, then does he think Christ's sacrifice wasn't enough to take away the sins of the world?”
Once again, Rachel is incapable of accurately representing the opposing position. Is Hell predicated on the assumption that some people “absolutely have to” suffer for their sins? No.
Rather, it’s predicated on the fact that every sinner deserves damnation, and God gives some people what they deserve to illustrate the gratuity of grace.
And, of course, it would be asking too much of Rachel to actually study the connotations of “kosmos” in Johannine usage.
Back to MacDonald:
“I must confess to being somewhat surprised that Steve, who does not know me at all, feels so confident in his analysis of my inner life as to be able to make such claims.”
My observation wasn’t based on his inner life, but on his public statements.
“The revelation of God as triune - Father, Son and Spirit - is far more fundamental to my faith than universalism was, is, or ever will be. It is the heart of my Christianity and I would surrender universalist theology any day before surrendering trinitarian theology…I hope that helps.”
No, it doesn’t help. As MacDonald made clear in the first chapter of his book, if God consigned any sinners to everlasting judgment, such a God would be unworthy of worship. Therefore, if the Trinity were to consign some sinners to everlasting judgment, then MacDonald would deem the Trinity to be unworthy of his worship.
Jason Pratt said...
“Ah; I see that Steve has upgraded to calling you (in effect) an intentional murderer who by accident fails to murder.”
One can count on Jason Pratt to misrepresents his opponents. Pratt is a philanthropic universalist on paper, but in real life he resorts to underhanded tactics when dealing with his opponents. Abstract love for everyone combined allied with selective love in action.
What I did was to present an argument from analogy. Pratt pretends that analogy is identity. Pratt knows better, but he says it anyway.
Pratt espouses his back-patting brand of universalism because that’s so much nicer than the “Satanic” doctrine of everlasting punishment, but, in practice, Pratt’s commitment to nicety is purely theoretical—to be suspended whenever he must deal with somebody who doesn’t endorse universalism.
Josh said...
“I'm beginning to wonder if a Christian Universalist beat up Steve on the playground in grade school.”
I take it that Josh is still on the playground in grade school since he can’t muster an actual argument for his position.
Anonymous said...
“Bobby. While I probably stand somewhere between your position and Gregory´s on the trinity, I think Steve are nonetheless wrong to assume that universalism always or logically comes with other heresies (like anti-trinitarianism), and I understand why Gregory can be orthodox on some points and "heretical" on others.”
Of course, I never took the position that Lundström imputes to me. Apparently, Lundström relies on the filtered version of my position he sees on MacDonald’s blog it rather than mousing over to Tblog to see what I actually wrote.
Back to MacDonald:
“A doctrine of the unity/integrity of God's attributes: God is a unity in perfect harmony with himself. Consequently God's justice must be compatible with his love. All God's actions are loving and just. His love is a just love. His justice is a loving justice. So I claim that all God's acts of just punishment of sinners - including Hell - must be compatible with his love. And God's merciful treatment of his people - inclusing forgiveness and salvation - must be compatible with his justice.”
Of course, I already addressed this argument in my initial review of his book. MacDonald doesn’t believe in the unity of God’s attributes. Rather, he ranks them. He treats them as asymmetrical. He begins with his definition of love, then subordinates the other attributes to the priority of love.
“I suspect that this is where Steve and I disagree. It seems to me that any doctrine of Hell that is incompatible with God's love for the ones punished falls foul of the theology of divine integrity. I imagine that Steve solves that problem by arguing that God does not love those in Hell (except in the weaker sense of having shown them common grace in this life). But my problem with this move is that it is, to my mind, fundamentally problematic (see my post on ‘Calvinism, the Trinity, and God's Universal Love’).”
To begin with, there’s such a thing as exclusive love. The monogamous ideal of marital love is a paradigm-case. And that analogy is used in Scripture for God’s redemptive love.
Moreover, to love good is to hate evil. Therefore, God’s love for sinners, any sinners, is unexpected. It’s not something we can simply infer or deduce from the attribute of love.
Furthermore, love is not the only consideration. Justice is a divine attribute as well. Indeed, the exercise of justice is necessary in a way that the exercise of mercy is not.
(Yes, MacDonald tries to get around that, but I’ve addressed that move in my review.)
“It would be very interesting to hear Steve himself answer your argument about God´s unity. To me, this is one of the strongest arguments for universalism.”
I already did—in my initial review. Once again, Lundstöm acts as if MacDonald’s blog is the only source of information about my position.
I waited for him to complete his miniseries, as well as waiting for commenters to weigh in.
http://evangelicaluniversalist.blogspot.com/
MacDonald said that I had leveled an exceptionally serious charge against him.
I pointed out that “there are no exceptionally serious charges in universalism. Universalism trivializes every evil. If universalism is true, I could flay you alive with a penknife, say three Hail Marys after I die, or do 1000 hours of postmortem community service, then head for heaven. In universalism, all is forgiven since all are forgiven.”
MacDonald’s comeback is to say:
“My view is that there is no forgiveness except through the atoning death of Christ and heart-felt repentance and faith on the part of the sinner. This forgiveness comes at the cost of Christ's death on the cross. There is no trivializing of evil in that. The sinner is ashamed at what they have done and repudiates it. There is no sense in which their evil ‘doesn't really matter’."
But, of course, that misses the point. If no matter what I say or do in this life, I’m heavenbound, then there are no serious charges. There’s no danger in my saying or doing anything whatsoever. Hence, universalism trivializes evil.
MacDonald’s comeback is irrelevant since it fails to address the question of what would constitute an “exceptionally serious charge” given the outcome.
Rachel said...
“What I am getting from his arugement here is that forgiveness pre-mortem is called ‘grace’ and forgiveness post-portem is called ‘trivializing evil’."
You can always count on Rachel to pipe in with some clueless comment. Rachel doesn’t follow the logic of the argument or pay attention what people mean. She simply reacts.
The point at issue is what would qualify as an “exceptionally serious charge” given the outcome. Invoking universal postmortem salvation underscores my point, not hers.
I also don’t have any considered position on “post-portem” forgiveness. Is that a tertiary type of forgiveness in-between postmortem forgiveness and postpartum forgiveness?
“I think the bigger problem here, though, is that he seems to be in fact trivializing Christ's work on the cross. If there is some subset of people that absolutely have to suffer for their sins, then does he think Christ's sacrifice wasn't enough to take away the sins of the world?”
Once again, Rachel is incapable of accurately representing the opposing position. Is Hell predicated on the assumption that some people “absolutely have to” suffer for their sins? No.
Rather, it’s predicated on the fact that every sinner deserves damnation, and God gives some people what they deserve to illustrate the gratuity of grace.
And, of course, it would be asking too much of Rachel to actually study the connotations of “kosmos” in Johannine usage.
Back to MacDonald:
“I must confess to being somewhat surprised that Steve, who does not know me at all, feels so confident in his analysis of my inner life as to be able to make such claims.”
My observation wasn’t based on his inner life, but on his public statements.
“The revelation of God as triune - Father, Son and Spirit - is far more fundamental to my faith than universalism was, is, or ever will be. It is the heart of my Christianity and I would surrender universalist theology any day before surrendering trinitarian theology…I hope that helps.”
No, it doesn’t help. As MacDonald made clear in the first chapter of his book, if God consigned any sinners to everlasting judgment, such a God would be unworthy of worship. Therefore, if the Trinity were to consign some sinners to everlasting judgment, then MacDonald would deem the Trinity to be unworthy of his worship.
Jason Pratt said...
“Ah; I see that Steve has upgraded to calling you (in effect) an intentional murderer who by accident fails to murder.”
One can count on Jason Pratt to misrepresents his opponents. Pratt is a philanthropic universalist on paper, but in real life he resorts to underhanded tactics when dealing with his opponents. Abstract love for everyone combined allied with selective love in action.
What I did was to present an argument from analogy. Pratt pretends that analogy is identity. Pratt knows better, but he says it anyway.
Pratt espouses his back-patting brand of universalism because that’s so much nicer than the “Satanic” doctrine of everlasting punishment, but, in practice, Pratt’s commitment to nicety is purely theoretical—to be suspended whenever he must deal with somebody who doesn’t endorse universalism.
Josh said...
“I'm beginning to wonder if a Christian Universalist beat up Steve on the playground in grade school.”
I take it that Josh is still on the playground in grade school since he can’t muster an actual argument for his position.
Anonymous said...
“Bobby. While I probably stand somewhere between your position and Gregory´s on the trinity, I think Steve are nonetheless wrong to assume that universalism always or logically comes with other heresies (like anti-trinitarianism), and I understand why Gregory can be orthodox on some points and "heretical" on others.”
Of course, I never took the position that Lundström imputes to me. Apparently, Lundström relies on the filtered version of my position he sees on MacDonald’s blog it rather than mousing over to Tblog to see what I actually wrote.
Back to MacDonald:
“A doctrine of the unity/integrity of God's attributes: God is a unity in perfect harmony with himself. Consequently God's justice must be compatible with his love. All God's actions are loving and just. His love is a just love. His justice is a loving justice. So I claim that all God's acts of just punishment of sinners - including Hell - must be compatible with his love. And God's merciful treatment of his people - inclusing forgiveness and salvation - must be compatible with his justice.”
Of course, I already addressed this argument in my initial review of his book. MacDonald doesn’t believe in the unity of God’s attributes. Rather, he ranks them. He treats them as asymmetrical. He begins with his definition of love, then subordinates the other attributes to the priority of love.
“I suspect that this is where Steve and I disagree. It seems to me that any doctrine of Hell that is incompatible with God's love for the ones punished falls foul of the theology of divine integrity. I imagine that Steve solves that problem by arguing that God does not love those in Hell (except in the weaker sense of having shown them common grace in this life). But my problem with this move is that it is, to my mind, fundamentally problematic (see my post on ‘Calvinism, the Trinity, and God's Universal Love’).”
To begin with, there’s such a thing as exclusive love. The monogamous ideal of marital love is a paradigm-case. And that analogy is used in Scripture for God’s redemptive love.
Moreover, to love good is to hate evil. Therefore, God’s love for sinners, any sinners, is unexpected. It’s not something we can simply infer or deduce from the attribute of love.
Furthermore, love is not the only consideration. Justice is a divine attribute as well. Indeed, the exercise of justice is necessary in a way that the exercise of mercy is not.
(Yes, MacDonald tries to get around that, but I’ve addressed that move in my review.)
“It would be very interesting to hear Steve himself answer your argument about God´s unity. To me, this is one of the strongest arguments for universalism.”
I already did—in my initial review. Once again, Lundstöm acts as if MacDonald’s blog is the only source of information about my position.
Trinitarianism
“Further, it too often seems to be the case that these models always appeal to some kind of apostasy and yet the church seemed to do an adequate job with issues much more sophisticated as with Christology and the Trinity. Therefore isn’t this an a forteriori reason for thinking that the church was reliable in ‘word of mouth’ teaching during the same period?”
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2008/06/21/the-naked-book/
Did the early church do an adequate job on these issues? Is there no room for improvement?
Certain aspects of so-called Nicene Orthodoxy haven’t gone unchallenged by some Reformed theologians, beginning with Calvin. Calvin initiated a corrective when he defended the autotheos of the Father, Son, and Spirit alike.
Some Reformed theologians have followed his lead and taken his seminal insights to their logical conclusion.
John Frame, The Doctrine of God, 707-19.
Paul Helm, Calvin’s Ideas, 41-57.
Benjamin Warfield, Works 5:189-284.
Traditional (i.e. patristic, scholastic) formulations of the Trinity tend to be prejudicial to the Spirit.
They begin with the Father. Indeed, they regard the Father as the fons deitas. He is the “first” person of the Trinity in a strong sense.
You then have the Father/Son relationship. Because fatherhood and sonship are correlative, the binary relationship seems to be fundamental.
Since, by contrast, “spirit” isn’t correlative, the Spirit seems to be tacked onto God. But that’s is a consequence of how patristic theology has framed the doctrine.
And that also gave rise to the famous controversy over the filioque. The Latin formulation is just a modification of the Greek formulation. It’s operating with the same framework.
Yet, in application to God, fatherhood and sonship are metaphors. Of course, they stand for something—something eternal.
But we still need to unpack the metaphors. For example, both fatherhood and sonship are multifaceted metaphors, and we need to determine, from Scripture, what elements are analogous or disanalogous with the divine nature.
In human affairs, as Scripture depicts it, underage sons are subordinate to their fathers. But adult sons are not (especially when they start a family of their own), although grown children retain a lifelong obligation to honor their parents.
Among other aspects of the paternal/filial metaphor which Scripture applies to the Father/Son relation, we have notions of mutual honor and affection, as well as hereditary authority.
Those are not distinctively divine traits, although the Trinity is the exemplar of the human exempla.
And, of course, the “Son of God” is a divine title in the NT. One might ask why that is. I suppose it plays on the natural inference that fathers and sons are two of a kind. That would dovetail with the notion of consubstantiality.
Metaphysically speaking, there is no “first,” “second,” or “third” person of the Trinity. We can retain that convention as a convenient way of denoting the persons, but it’s not as if the Trinity is actually structured in a numerical series.
Metaphysically speaking, there’s no reason to begin with the Father, or begin with the Father/Son relation, and then try to integrate a “third” person (the Spirit) into that binary relation.
The Father is no more primary than the Son or the Spirit. You could just as well begin with the Son and the Spirit, and then relate the Father to that twosome.
I think that patristic theology makes two or three related mistakes.
i) It’s concerned with preserving the unity of the Godhead. And that’s a valid concern.
But it treats the Father as the unifying principle. And it grounds the unity of the Trinity in the Father by treating the Father as the fountainhead of the deity. As Timothy Ware puts it, summarizing the Cappadocians, there is one God because there is one Father. The “monarchy” of the Father.
But that’s implicitly unitarian.
ii) It underwrites (i) by seizing on the wrong aspect of the paternal/filial metaphor. “Generation” is a sexual metaphor—a metaphor for sexual reproduction.
Of course, the church fathers don’t apply this literally to the Godhead. But they do focus on that aspect of the paternal/filial metaphor, and simply try to reapply it more abstractly to the Godhead. The Father is the source and origin of the Son. And they analogize from that to the Spirit.
Latin theology modifies this model by claiming that the Father is the source of person, but not the nature, of the Son and the Spirit. But it’s moving within the same framework. Both sides reify metaphors.
iii) It’s also a mistake to treat the names of the Trinitarian persons as if that were our only or primary source of information about them, and then erect a whole edifice atop that slender foundation. The names are significant, and they’re a source of information. But most of our information should come from what the Bible ascribes to God in general, and the persons in particular. Not just what it calls them, but the attributes and actions it ascribes to them.
For example, traditional theology treats “spiration” as a distinctive property of the Holy Spirit. Yet not only does this substitute a paraphrastic description for a genuine explanation, but I hardly think the Bible calls him a “spirit” because that’s his distinctive property. All three persons of the Godhead are spirits; what is more, there are creaturely spirits as well as divine spirits.
The early church did a pretty good job on the Trinity. But it also made some missteps along the way. Some midcourse corrections are in order.
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2008/06/21/the-naked-book/
Did the early church do an adequate job on these issues? Is there no room for improvement?
Certain aspects of so-called Nicene Orthodoxy haven’t gone unchallenged by some Reformed theologians, beginning with Calvin. Calvin initiated a corrective when he defended the autotheos of the Father, Son, and Spirit alike.
Some Reformed theologians have followed his lead and taken his seminal insights to their logical conclusion.
John Frame, The Doctrine of God, 707-19.
Paul Helm, Calvin’s Ideas, 41-57.
Benjamin Warfield, Works 5:189-284.
Traditional (i.e. patristic, scholastic) formulations of the Trinity tend to be prejudicial to the Spirit.
They begin with the Father. Indeed, they regard the Father as the fons deitas. He is the “first” person of the Trinity in a strong sense.
You then have the Father/Son relationship. Because fatherhood and sonship are correlative, the binary relationship seems to be fundamental.
Since, by contrast, “spirit” isn’t correlative, the Spirit seems to be tacked onto God. But that’s is a consequence of how patristic theology has framed the doctrine.
And that also gave rise to the famous controversy over the filioque. The Latin formulation is just a modification of the Greek formulation. It’s operating with the same framework.
Yet, in application to God, fatherhood and sonship are metaphors. Of course, they stand for something—something eternal.
But we still need to unpack the metaphors. For example, both fatherhood and sonship are multifaceted metaphors, and we need to determine, from Scripture, what elements are analogous or disanalogous with the divine nature.
In human affairs, as Scripture depicts it, underage sons are subordinate to their fathers. But adult sons are not (especially when they start a family of their own), although grown children retain a lifelong obligation to honor their parents.
Among other aspects of the paternal/filial metaphor which Scripture applies to the Father/Son relation, we have notions of mutual honor and affection, as well as hereditary authority.
Those are not distinctively divine traits, although the Trinity is the exemplar of the human exempla.
And, of course, the “Son of God” is a divine title in the NT. One might ask why that is. I suppose it plays on the natural inference that fathers and sons are two of a kind. That would dovetail with the notion of consubstantiality.
Metaphysically speaking, there is no “first,” “second,” or “third” person of the Trinity. We can retain that convention as a convenient way of denoting the persons, but it’s not as if the Trinity is actually structured in a numerical series.
Metaphysically speaking, there’s no reason to begin with the Father, or begin with the Father/Son relation, and then try to integrate a “third” person (the Spirit) into that binary relation.
The Father is no more primary than the Son or the Spirit. You could just as well begin with the Son and the Spirit, and then relate the Father to that twosome.
I think that patristic theology makes two or three related mistakes.
i) It’s concerned with preserving the unity of the Godhead. And that’s a valid concern.
But it treats the Father as the unifying principle. And it grounds the unity of the Trinity in the Father by treating the Father as the fountainhead of the deity. As Timothy Ware puts it, summarizing the Cappadocians, there is one God because there is one Father. The “monarchy” of the Father.
But that’s implicitly unitarian.
ii) It underwrites (i) by seizing on the wrong aspect of the paternal/filial metaphor. “Generation” is a sexual metaphor—a metaphor for sexual reproduction.
Of course, the church fathers don’t apply this literally to the Godhead. But they do focus on that aspect of the paternal/filial metaphor, and simply try to reapply it more abstractly to the Godhead. The Father is the source and origin of the Son. And they analogize from that to the Spirit.
Latin theology modifies this model by claiming that the Father is the source of person, but not the nature, of the Son and the Spirit. But it’s moving within the same framework. Both sides reify metaphors.
iii) It’s also a mistake to treat the names of the Trinitarian persons as if that were our only or primary source of information about them, and then erect a whole edifice atop that slender foundation. The names are significant, and they’re a source of information. But most of our information should come from what the Bible ascribes to God in general, and the persons in particular. Not just what it calls them, but the attributes and actions it ascribes to them.
For example, traditional theology treats “spiration” as a distinctive property of the Holy Spirit. Yet not only does this substitute a paraphrastic description for a genuine explanation, but I hardly think the Bible calls him a “spirit” because that’s his distinctive property. All three persons of the Godhead are spirits; what is more, there are creaturely spirits as well as divine spirits.
The early church did a pretty good job on the Trinity. But it also made some missteps along the way. Some midcourse corrections are in order.
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Holy Moses!
(Posted on behalf of Steve Hays.)
Hector Avalos tries to repair the many blunders he made in his first response.1 This is in answer to my initial reply.2
But for other readers not as gullible as Avalos, how did my post on the Sargon legend offer something short of "solid" information? In three (#'s 2,5-6) of my six points, I cited two well-credentialed scholars. On point #1 I drew attention to intertextual parallels between Noah and Moses. That's easily documented in the standard exegetical literature. On point #3, I pointed out that Egypt and Mesopotamia are both riverine cultures (a point also made by Alan Millard). And, on point #4, I mentioned papyrus was a natural Egyptian building material for rafts—which I can also document.
What I did, rather, was to point out that his dismissive elitism disqualified the very audience he was targeting. Loftus posted his response at DC. But since I daresay the average reader of DC doesn't know Hebrew or Sumerian or Akkadian, then the average reader of DC is in no position to independently verify information from secondary sources, including Hector's own response.
It says something about Hector's grasp of logic, or lack thereof, that he can't follow the implications of his own argument, and—even worse—that after you have to point it out to him, he still fails to register the point.
By his own, modest admission, Avalos has every advantage in this debate. If he maunders so despite his superior expertise, what does that say about his position?
This is his conundrum: on the one hand, he wants to disqualify Triablogue from debating the issue. But, on the other hand, he doesn't want to disqualify the readers for DC from following the debate. So he lurches back and forth between two contradictory standards: one standard for Triablogue, and another standard for DC.
But a double standard is a double-edged sword. That's his problem. And having backed himself into that dilemma, there's no face-saving exit.
It had a little something to do with the fact that Avalos himself was the culprit who singled out that particular title of his. Funny how I get blamed for following his lead. Oh, well, life unfair.
Humiliated by the fact that I merely drew attention to the publisher of his book, Avalos then proceeds to cite a number of other, tonier titles in an effort to bleach out the stigma of this particular title.
I empathize with his acute embarrassment. Common humanity demands no less. Indeed, it was out of compassionate concern for his reputation that I only mentioned one such title.
Since, however, he repays my discreet loving-kindness with this resentful outburst, I'm now compelled to divulge the further fact that he's published no fewer than three—count 'em, three!—titles with Prometheus Books! Oh the shame!
Whether the stain-remover of his other literary associations is strong enough to wash away the indelible odium of this association remains to be seen. Only the cleaners can say for sure.
If that doesn't work, I'm happy to lend him a pair of wraparound shades to conceal his true identity whenever he has to go outside.
ii) In the meantime, he disregards an obvious feature of Exodus. The narrative isn't driven by legalities. To the contrary, it's driven by illegalities.
Jochebed is breaking the law. And the princess is also breaking the law. Both of them are violating Pharaoh's infanticidal edict. So this is countercultural.
But Avalos isn't attempting to read the account on its own terms. Rather, he's trying to impose an extraneous framework on the account. Understanding the account on its own, in terms of intertextuality and narrative flow, would undermine Hector's infidelic agenda.
This is how it works, Hector: you give an example; I comment on your example. Try to remember that for future reference. Since, however, he broaches the issue, readers might like to see exactly what all the fuss is about. Here's a standard translation of the Sargon legend:
Subsequent scholars have refined the translation, rendering enitum as priestess, viz, "My mother was a priestess."
Real life events don't require literary parallels. Indeed, every historical event is, in some degree, unique.
Moreover, the behavior of Moses' mother and Pharaoh's daughter is extralegal and, indeed, illegal. Subversive. Seditious. So why would we even expect to find a parallel in Egyptian law?
Once again, Avalos isn't actually reading the text before him. Rather, he's comparing one text to another text under the facile assumption of literary dependence.
The princess didn't seek out a wet-nurse for the foundling because Egyptian law mandated that she do so. Quite the opposite, she was breaking the law by trying to spare a Jewish foundling. Avalos isn't even attempting to read the account in context.
She wants the founding to survive because she takes pity on it. Her maternal instincts kick in. And a foundling can't survive without a wet-nurse.
Avalos is also blind to the dramatic irony of the situation. Pharaoh tries to implement a policy of infanticide against Jewish man-children. Pharaoh's daughter rescues a Jewish man-child, and not just any Jewish man-child, but one who will grow up to one day challenge Pharaonic oppression. That's the providential motif.
Extrabiblical literary precedent isn't driving this story. Rather, the circumstances are driving the story. But Avalos can't be bothered with exegesis since that would scuttle his infidelic agenda.
At best, that assumption would only follow if you presume that Exod 2 never happened. Is that logical? No.
9/11 doesn't require a legal or literary parallel. Even if it happened to have a legal or literary parallel, that would be incidental to the event, which can stand on its own.
Really? What alternative sequence would be available to the narrator? Suppose we reverse the sequence:
I. Accomplishment of the hero
II. Discovery and Adoption
III. Nurse in an unusual manner
IV. Exposure
V. Preparation for exposure
VI. Noble birth
VII. Explanation of abandonment
Is that a viable sequence? No. That would be a thoroughly anachronistic sequence. For that would put later events before earlier events.
Let's try a different sequence:
I. Accomplishment of the hero
II. Noble birth
III. Discovery and Adoption
IV. Nurse in an unusual manner
V. Exposure
VI. Preparation for exposure
VII. Explanation of abandonment
Is that a viable sequence? Only if this is a legend about the hero’s prenatal accomplishments.
Let’s try another sequence:
I. Explanation of abandonment
II. Noble birth
IV. Exposure
III. Preparation for exposure
V. Nurse in an unusual manner
VI. Discovery and Adoption
VII. Accomplishment of the hero
Is that a viable sequence? Does it make sense for the exposure to take place before the preparation for exposure? Only if Exod 2 is literarily dependent on Through the Looking Glass.
Let’s try yet another sequence:
I. Explanation of abandonment
II. Nurse in an unusual manner
III. Noble birth
IV. Preparation for exposure
V. Exposure
VI. Discovery and Adoption
VII. Accomplishment of the hero
Does it make sense that the hero was suckled before he was born? No.
We can keep ringing the changes on the order of events. But even assuming that the parallels are exact, the reason they follow a certain order is because the sequence in question is a realistic sequence. If this were a real series of events, then that's the chronological order in which they would occur.
It says something about Hector's deficient powers of logic that he's oblivious to this obvious consideration.
I. Explanation of abandonment
II. Noble birth
III. Preparation for exposure
IV. Exposure
V. Nurse in an unusual manner
VI. Discovery and Adoption
VII. Accomplishment of the hero
What about I? Here Hector is confusing a narrative sequence with a chronological sequence. I doesn't come first because it's the first event in a chronological series. Rather, it comes first because the narrator is explaining to the audience what triggered these events.
Is there something unusual about the Pentateuchal narrator explaining an event before describing an event? Does that point to literary dependence?
No. The Pentateuchal narrator often explains an event before describing an event. He's prepping the reader for what follows.
What about II? Was Moses of noble birth? No. So another parallel bites the dust.
What about III-IV? Why do you suppose the preparation for exposure precedes the actual exposure? Is this due to literary dependence? Or is this due to elementary logic?
What about IV? Did Jochebed "expose" her child? No. "Exposure" means that you abandon an unwanted infant to die. To die from heat or cold, starvation, dehydration, or predation.
If she wanted to kill her child, she'd just throw him on a trash heap or toss him into the river, to drown and be carried away by the current.
Instead, she puts in him a waterproof basket. Why bother if she's exposing him?
And she hides the basket in the bulrushes, out of sight and away from the current. And she assigns his big sister to watch over him. Indeed, it's quite clear from Exod 2:3ff. that she's trying to protect him.
We can speculate on why she employed this method. Maybe she felt that this was a way of getting him out of the house, which would be subject to inspection by the authorities, while keeping the child as safe and accessible as possible.
But given the narrative flow, another explanation is that she placed him there because she knew that's where the princess liked to bathe, and she was hoping the princess would find him and take pity on him. Only royalty could get away with flouting the law.
What about V? Moses was returned to his mother. Is there something unusual about a mother nursing her child? If Avalos thinks there's something unusual about that, a lot of nursing mothers would beg to differ. But maybe he was bottle-fed.
And, as Avalos is forced to admit, there is no parallel between this event and the legend of Sargon.
What about VI? But that's the narrative solution to the narrative problem. It's explicable, not by literary dependence, but by the inner logic of the narrative. He was meant to be discovered and adopted—whether by Jochebed's design or God's. That's how he escapes infanticide.
What about VII? Did Moses become a king? No. In fact, we have a double reversal of fortunes in Exod 2. He's spared infanticide. And he's moving up the social ladder. But then he becomes a fugitive. Moreover, Moses is even denied an opportunity to enter the Promised Land.
All Avalos has done is to trump up a series of specious parallels. He doesn't make any effort to examine his alleged parallels. And that's because, as militant apostate, Avalos has an ax to grind.
Where, exactly, is the parallel? Sunshine is a luminous phenomenon. Starlight and moonlight are luminous phenomenon. A torch is a luminous phenomenon. A campfire is a luminous phenomenon. This is a good example of parallelomania.
The fact that Avalos is reduced to this sloppy, last-ditch exercise in parallelomania to prove his point merely disproves his point.
In the meantime, he studiously disregards a genuine literary parallel, because that undercuts his thesis of literary dependence on a legend of Sargon. But as one scholar observes:
Jimmy Carter
Born in the 20C
Born in the South
Southern Baptist
Southern Democrat
College graduate
Southern Governor
U. S. President
Time Magazine Person of the Year
Bill Clinton
Born in the 20C
Born in the South
Southern Baptist
Southern Democrat
College graduate
Southern Governor
U.S. President
Time Magazine Person of the Year
What's the statistical probability of two different people having so much in common—including some very rare distinctions? Oh, and here's the kicker: the Jimmy Carter Legend is demonstrably earlier than the Bill Clinton Saga. Obviously, the Bill Clinton Saga is a fictitious account, indebted to the Jimmy Carter Legend.
Second, I don't need to reinvent the wheel for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, or subsections thereof. Conservative commentaries, monographs, reference articles, and OT introductions have done that.
And the authenticity of Exod 2 or the Pentateuch generally doesn't depend on the inauthenticity of the Sargon legend. That's one of Hector's diversionary tactics.
Is Avalos just as sceptical of Tacitus as he is of Moses? Why doesn't he lay his cards on the table? Is he sceptical of Exodus because our MSS are late? Or is he sceptical of Exodus because he doesn't believe in the supernatural?
As such, we can never hope to reach the historical Avalos, assuming he ever existed. We must content ourselves with the literary Avalos, making due allowance for legendary embellishment.
If you take a liberal view of Scripture, then you regard the composition of Scripture as an open-ended affair. First, there's a stage of oral development, followed by an initial commitment to writing which—in turn—undergoes multiple redaction. On that theory, the objective of textual criticism is to recover the final text. So the notion of an Urtext is only outdated on a liberal view of Scripture.
Of course, some books of the Bible are admittedly of composite authorship, viz. Psalms, Proverbs. But that doesn't invalidate the concept of an Urtext—only the application of the Urtext to anthologies like Psalms or Proverbs.
Hence, all Avalos has done is to beg the question in favor of his liberal views on Scripture.
And, yes, it's useful for readers to know where he's coming from. It's not as if he rejects the historicity of Exodus on purely textual or archeological grounds. No, it goes much deeper than that. He doesn't believe that those things could happen.
Avalos has already admitted that the legend of Sargon underwent internal development over time. It's therefore illicit to simply infer that a particular motif in a later MS can be trace back to a much earlier stage in the evolution the legend. Given the internal development of the legend, according to Avalos, we know that such an inference is fallacious. That Avalos keeps repeating the same fallacies doesn't bode well for his critical discernment.
Avalos also quotes Millard out of context. Indeed, it's striking that Avalos would presume to misrepresent Millard position when his article is available online for all to see. This is what Millard actually said about the disputed issues:
As to Hebrews living in Babylon, that's an allusion to the Documentary Hypothesis, a theory which even a secular Jew like Cyrus Gordon didn't take seriously. So Avalos is simply propping up one bad argument with another bad argument.
But his argument is worthless on two grounds: he doesn't establish the truth of the premise, and even if the premise were true, literary priority doesn't entail literary influence. The poor guy is too logically challenged to think straight.
If, however, you take the Mosaic Urtext as your point of reference, then any major, creative deviation from the Urtext would be equivalent to the Comma Johanneum, the Pericope Adulterae, or the Long Ending of Mark. Avalos can keep drilling this dry hole until he's committed to a nursing home, but it won't get him anywhere with folks who don't already share his far left views of Scripture.
Since imitation is the highest form of flattery, I appreciate the compliment, but I also claim the right to point out that I'm the real deal, and Avalos the impersonator.
Once again, did I ever deny the existence of Sargon I? No. Was my position ever predicated on his nonexistence? No.
And Avalos builds on this straw man argument to insinuate another fallacy. General evidence for the historicity of Sargon I is completely irrelevant to whether Exod 2 is indebted to the legend of Sargon.
In some ways, Avalos is still a faith-healer at heart. He's now an apostate, but he continues to play on the credulity and stupidity of his nullafidian audience in the very same way as health-n-wealth scammers.
Why assume that extrabiblical records are more reliable than biblical records? Why not reverse the burden of proof?
The only reason is that Avalos is a militant atheist, so he doesn't believe the Pentateuch could possibly be true.
1 http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2008/07/dr-avalos-v-triablogue-moses-is-basket.html
2 http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/07/debunking-dr-avalos.html
3 http://www.uncommondescent.com/evolution/and-hector-avalos-deserves-tenure-at-isu/
4 J. Prichard, ed. The Ancient Near East (Princeton 1973), 1:85-86.
5 J. Currid, Ancient Egypt and the Old Testament (Baker 2001), 114.
6 Pp. 164ff.
7 http://cojs.org/cojswiki/How_Reliable_Is_Exodus%3F_Alan_R._Millard%2C_BAR_26:04%2C_Jul/Aug_2000.
Hector Avalos tries to repair the many blunders he made in his first response.1 This is in answer to my initial reply.2
First, Triabloguers admit they really do not have the knowledge to judge which scholar is correct about anything they discuss.I made no such admission. I simply responded to his Avalos on his own grounds by pointing out that his elitism was self-refuting—given the popular constituency of his target audience (readers of DC).
Triablogue's main defense is that it is addressing a lay crowd.Wrong again. I pointed out that DC is addressing a lay crowd, and that Avalos is addressing a lay crowd when he has Loftus post his response at DC. Hence, his elitism is self-refuting.
However, the authors should at least be honest and up-front with readers about the tentative nature of their conclusions and the level of their expertise in making judgments.I'd suggest that Hector redirect his strictures at Evan, a blogger at DC who initiated this debate.
Yet, Triablogue repeatedly issues pontifications that do not warrant the level of certainty that they offer to readers. Thus, they mislead readers into thinking they are offering solid information.I'm sorry that Hector feels so easily duped. I clearly overestimated my opponent.
But for other readers not as gullible as Avalos, how did my post on the Sargon legend offer something short of "solid" information? In three (#'s 2,5-6) of my six points, I cited two well-credentialed scholars. On point #1 I drew attention to intertextual parallels between Noah and Moses. That's easily documented in the standard exegetical literature. On point #3, I pointed out that Egypt and Mesopotamia are both riverine cultures (a point also made by Alan Millard). And, on point #4, I mentioned papyrus was a natural Egyptian building material for rafts—which I can also document.
Their next defense was that the bloggers on Debunking Christianity are vulnerable to the same charge of lack of expertise to judge my arguments.Wrong again. Notice what a poor reader Avalos is. This doesn't inspire confidence in his mastery of ancient texts.
What I did, rather, was to point out that his dismissive elitism disqualified the very audience he was targeting. Loftus posted his response at DC. But since I daresay the average reader of DC doesn't know Hebrew or Sumerian or Akkadian, then the average reader of DC is in no position to independently verify information from secondary sources, including Hector's own response.
This is a bad argument because the fact that others also are vulnerable to my objection does not invalidate the objection itself against Triablogue.To the contrary, it's a perfectly good argument when I'm responding to Avalos on his very own grounds. That's how he himself chose to frame the debate. When I respond to him on his own terms, that's a good argument, not a bad argument.
It says something about Hector's grasp of logic, or lack thereof, that he can't follow the implications of his own argument, and—even worse—that after you have to point it out to him, he still fails to register the point.
And there is one BIG difference between DC and Triablogue. DC knows and is humble about its limits, while Triablogue is not.Let's remember that Triablogue didn't initiate this debate. DC did. In particular, Evan is the one who started this debate, and continued to defend his position. Obviously Evan isn't "humble" about the "limits of his expertise."
If Triablogue were as wise, they might have Dr. Hoffmeier to guest post on their behalf.At some point I might well email a few OT professors I know. But for the time being I think it's useful for readers to see how badly an expert fares in a match up with a layman.
By his own, modest admission, Avalos has every advantage in this debate. If he maunders so despite his superior expertise, what does that say about his position?
It is important to show that one is able make expert judgments about the issue under discussion.Which instantly disqualifies the target audience for Hector's two responses.
My arguments are not meant to be arguments from authority. None of my arguments are of the form "because I say so."So is Avalos now conceding that one doesn't have to be an "expert" to evaluate the quality of his arguments, or the secondary sources he refers the reader to?
If Triabloguers had read The End of Biblical Studies, they would realize that some arguments are based on simple logic, and they don't require more than a good logical mind to examine them. No other expertise is always required.Avalos is trying to ride two horses at once. And they're galloping in different directions.
This is his conundrum: on the one hand, he wants to disqualify Triablogue from debating the issue. But, on the other hand, he doesn't want to disqualify the readers for DC from following the debate. So he lurches back and forth between two contradictory standards: one standard for Triablogue, and another standard for DC.
But a double standard is a double-edged sword. That's his problem. And having backed himself into that dilemma, there's no face-saving exit.
Triablogue makes it appear as though I have one book ("the book") that is relevant.Whatever possessed me to single out that particular title? Hmm. Let me think about that for a moment. Ah, yes, now it's coming back to me now.
It had a little something to do with the fact that Avalos himself was the culprit who singled out that particular title of his. Funny how I get blamed for following his lead. Oh, well, life unfair.
Humiliated by the fact that I merely drew attention to the publisher of his book, Avalos then proceeds to cite a number of other, tonier titles in an effort to bleach out the stigma of this particular title.
I empathize with his acute embarrassment. Common humanity demands no less. Indeed, it was out of compassionate concern for his reputation that I only mentioned one such title.
Since, however, he repays my discreet loving-kindness with this resentful outburst, I'm now compelled to divulge the further fact that he's published no fewer than three—count 'em, three!—titles with Prometheus Books! Oh the shame!
Whether the stain-remover of his other literary associations is strong enough to wash away the indelible odium of this association remains to be seen. Only the cleaners can say for sure.
If that doesn't work, I'm happy to lend him a pair of wraparound shades to conceal his true identity whenever he has to go outside.
I don't see anything comparable from the authors of Triablogue.True, I've never had a title of mine published by Prometheus Books, much less three titles by Prometheus Books. But perhaps he can put in a good word for me so that when I submit a defense of the Resurrection to Prometheus Books, they'll accept it for publication.
Apparently, they disregard the fact that I have also published my views on Intelligent Design in a very respected astronomical journal—"Heavenly Conflicts: The Bible and Astronomy," Mercury: The Journal of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific (1998).And there's less to that than meets the eye.3
I also have a formal degree and graduate work in anthropology, which is the center for the study of human evolution. Intelligent Design and evolutionary theory are the issue.I see. So if a tenure track position opened up at MIT or Caltech to teach evolutionary biology, and Avalos listed his BA in anthropology on the application form, he'd be a shoe in for the job, right?
In fact, I have written extensively on science and religion.So has Ken Ham.
Since Triablogue cannot win the credentials game, then it should focus on refuting the actual evidence I presented (again, none of it has to be accepted on my authority—they can check my sources if they can read them).And the same standard applies to the scholars I've cited as well.
In deciding whether an Egyptian or a Mesopotamian origin for the Moses wet-nurse was more likely, I cited a parallel with the Sumerian-Akkadian ana ittishu legal texts. The parallels are:Actually, there is no parallel since Moses never had a wet-nurse. His mother nursed him, both before and after the incident in question. This is just one example of how careless Avalos is. And he's careless because his comparisons are driven by his infidelic agenda.
1. A foundling
2. Raised by a wet-nurse
3. Until weaned
The fact is that one need not treat foundlings the same way in all cultures.I never said otherwise.
Thus, it is clear that the Triablogue authors have no experience in analyzing the complexities and diverse options available in ancient Near Eastern law.i) To the contrary, I merely answered Avalos on his own grounds. He gave an example, and I commented on his example. Now he's trying to do a patch-up on job on his prior performance.
ii) In the meantime, he disregards an obvious feature of Exodus. The narrative isn't driven by legalities. To the contrary, it's driven by illegalities.
Jochebed is breaking the law. And the princess is also breaking the law. Both of them are violating Pharaoh's infanticidal edict. So this is countercultural.
But Avalos isn't attempting to read the account on its own terms. Rather, he's trying to impose an extraneous framework on the account. Understanding the account on its own, in terms of intertextuality and narrative flow, would undermine Hector's infidelic agenda.
In fact, they show that they have not read the Legend of Sargon carefully at all. In the Sargon legend, Sargon is not given over to a wet nurse but he is adopted.I didn't affirm or deny that. I merely answered Avalos on his own grounds. Apparently, that's a novel experience for him.
This is how it works, Hector: you give an example; I comment on your example. Try to remember that for future reference. Since, however, he broaches the issue, readers might like to see exactly what all the fuss is about. Here's a standard translation of the Sargon legend:
Sargon, the mighty king, king of Agade, am I.And that's it, folks!
My mother was a changeling, my father I knew not.
The brother(s) of my father loved the hills.
My city is Azupiranu, which is situated on the banks of the Euphrates.
My changeling mother conceived me, in secret she bore me.
She set me in a basket of rushes, with bitumen she sealed my lid.
She cast me into the river which rose not (over) me.
The river bore me up and carried me to Akki, the drawer of water.
Akki, the drawer of water lifted me out as he dipped his e[w]er.
Akki, the drawer of water, [took me] as his son (and) reared me.
Akki, the drawer of water, appointed me as his gardener.
While I was a gardener, Ishtar granted me (her) love,
And for four and […] yeas I exercised kingship.
The black-headed [people] I ruled, I gov[erned];
Mighty [moun]tains with chip-axes of bronze I conquered,
The upper ranges I scaled,
The lower ranges I [trav]ersed,
The sea [lan]ds three times I circled.
Dilmun my [hand] cap[tured],
[To] the great Der I [went up], I […],
[…] I altered and [..].
Whatever king may come up after me,
[…],
Let him r[ule, let him govern] the black-headed [peo]ple;
[Let him conquer] mighty [mountains] with chip-axe]s of bronze],
[Let] him scale the upper ranges,
[Let him traverse the lower ranges],
Let him circle the sea [lan]ds three times!
[Dilmun let his hand capture],
Let him go up [to] the great Der and […]!
[…] from my city, Aga[de…]!4
Subsequent scholars have refined the translation, rendering enitum as priestess, viz, "My mother was a priestess."
However, there are also other parallels in adoption that show that the Sargon legend was related to laws of the ana ittishu series. So, it is the fact that BOTH the Moses and Sargon stories take different options that are both found in the ana ittishu legal series that is a good argument for a Mesopotamian, rather than Egyptian, parallel here.Notice the facile assumption: Exod 2 must have a parallel somewhere—the only question is whether it's Egyptian or Mesopotamian. But Avalos never bothers to justify his operating assumption.
Real life events don't require literary parallels. Indeed, every historical event is, in some degree, unique.
Moreover, the behavior of Moses' mother and Pharaoh's daughter is extralegal and, indeed, illegal. Subversive. Seditious. So why would we even expect to find a parallel in Egyptian law?
Once again, Avalos isn't actually reading the text before him. Rather, he's comparing one text to another text under the facile assumption of literary dependence.
The princess didn't seek out a wet-nurse for the foundling because Egyptian law mandated that she do so. Quite the opposite, she was breaking the law by trying to spare a Jewish foundling. Avalos isn't even attempting to read the account in context.
She wants the founding to survive because she takes pity on it. Her maternal instincts kick in. And a foundling can't survive without a wet-nurse.
Avalos is also blind to the dramatic irony of the situation. Pharaoh tries to implement a policy of infanticide against Jewish man-children. Pharaoh's daughter rescues a Jewish man-child, and not just any Jewish man-child, but one who will grow up to one day challenge Pharaonic oppression. That's the providential motif.
Extrabiblical literary precedent isn't driving this story. Rather, the circumstances are driving the story. But Avalos can't be bothered with exegesis since that would scuttle his infidelic agenda.
Hypothetical legal situations do not lessen literary parallels between those laws and some later text. Rather, it is the FORM and CONTENT of laws that are more important in establishing literary dependence.Once again, he misses the point, although I already explained it to him. Real world events don't require literary parallels. To the contrary, literary or legal parallels, if there are any, tend to be dependent on real world events. To the degree that history repeats itself (the infinite variety), that—in turn—gives rise, both to case laws and stock plot motifs.
Thus, Hammurabi's laws about an eye for an eye are quite verbally similar to those in Exodus 21:22. Many scholars doubt whether Hammurabi's laws were applied in real life, but the form and content of Hammurabi's laws are so similar to some in Exodus that most scholars do see some literary relationship.Is Avalos claiming that the lex talionis didn't apply in real life? For example, was no one ever executed for murder, either under the Mosaic law code or Hammaribi's law code? Is that Hector's position? If not, then what becomes of his argument?
Otherwise, Triablogue offers nothing but rhetoric to dispute the parallel between Moses and the ana ittishu laws. They could not find a better Egyptian parallel for all their boasted knowledge of Hoffmeier's writings. The reason, of course, is that Hoffmeier also does not have a better parallel.Notice that Avalos can never think outside his box. He keeps assuming that there must be a literary or legal parallel somewhere, and if no one can't unearth an Egyptian parallel, then we default to a Mesopotamian parallel.
At best, that assumption would only follow if you presume that Exod 2 never happened. Is that logical? No.
9/11 doesn't require a legal or literary parallel. Even if it happened to have a legal or literary parallel, that would be incidental to the event, which can stand on its own.
Whether the Moses story is historical or not will not detract from the fact that the Moses story matches some directives found in those Sumerian-Akkadian laws.Disingenuous since the point of alleging these parallels is to cast doubt on the historicity of "the Moses story."
In judging literary dependence, one must address these parallels listed by Lewis (The Sargon Legend, p. 255):Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that this is accurate. Avalos takes the position that if Exod 2 were independent of the Sargon Legend, the sequence would be different.
I. Explanation of abandonment
II. Noble birth
III. Preparation for exposure
IV. Exposure
V. Nurse in an unusual manner
VI. Discovery and Adoption
VII. Accomplishment of the hero
Really? What alternative sequence would be available to the narrator? Suppose we reverse the sequence:
I. Accomplishment of the hero
II. Discovery and Adoption
III. Nurse in an unusual manner
IV. Exposure
V. Preparation for exposure
VI. Noble birth
VII. Explanation of abandonment
Is that a viable sequence? No. That would be a thoroughly anachronistic sequence. For that would put later events before earlier events.
Let's try a different sequence:
I. Accomplishment of the hero
II. Noble birth
III. Discovery and Adoption
IV. Nurse in an unusual manner
V. Exposure
VI. Preparation for exposure
VII. Explanation of abandonment
Is that a viable sequence? Only if this is a legend about the hero’s prenatal accomplishments.
Let’s try another sequence:
I. Explanation of abandonment
II. Noble birth
IV. Exposure
III. Preparation for exposure
V. Nurse in an unusual manner
VI. Discovery and Adoption
VII. Accomplishment of the hero
Is that a viable sequence? Does it make sense for the exposure to take place before the preparation for exposure? Only if Exod 2 is literarily dependent on Through the Looking Glass.
Let’s try yet another sequence:
I. Explanation of abandonment
II. Nurse in an unusual manner
III. Noble birth
IV. Preparation for exposure
V. Exposure
VI. Discovery and Adoption
VII. Accomplishment of the hero
Does it make sense that the hero was suckled before he was born? No.
We can keep ringing the changes on the order of events. But even assuming that the parallels are exact, the reason they follow a certain order is because the sequence in question is a realistic sequence. If this were a real series of events, then that's the chronological order in which they would occur.
It says something about Hector's deficient powers of logic that he's oblivious to this obvious consideration.
The Sargon and Moses story share ALL elements except number V (Sargon legend lacks this). Of course, there are differences, but one must ask the likelihood that two people independently would experience 6 of 7 events in this sequence. One could say it was coincidence, but this is statistically improbable.Thus far, I was assuming, for the sake of argument, that the parallels are accurate. But is that the case? Is V the only exception? Let's go back through the alleged parallels:
I. Explanation of abandonment
II. Noble birth
III. Preparation for exposure
IV. Exposure
V. Nurse in an unusual manner
VI. Discovery and Adoption
VII. Accomplishment of the hero
What about I? Here Hector is confusing a narrative sequence with a chronological sequence. I doesn't come first because it's the first event in a chronological series. Rather, it comes first because the narrator is explaining to the audience what triggered these events.
Is there something unusual about the Pentateuchal narrator explaining an event before describing an event? Does that point to literary dependence?
No. The Pentateuchal narrator often explains an event before describing an event. He's prepping the reader for what follows.
What about II? Was Moses of noble birth? No. So another parallel bites the dust.
What about III-IV? Why do you suppose the preparation for exposure precedes the actual exposure? Is this due to literary dependence? Or is this due to elementary logic?
What about IV? Did Jochebed "expose" her child? No. "Exposure" means that you abandon an unwanted infant to die. To die from heat or cold, starvation, dehydration, or predation.
If she wanted to kill her child, she'd just throw him on a trash heap or toss him into the river, to drown and be carried away by the current.
Instead, she puts in him a waterproof basket. Why bother if she's exposing him?
And she hides the basket in the bulrushes, out of sight and away from the current. And she assigns his big sister to watch over him. Indeed, it's quite clear from Exod 2:3ff. that she's trying to protect him.
We can speculate on why she employed this method. Maybe she felt that this was a way of getting him out of the house, which would be subject to inspection by the authorities, while keeping the child as safe and accessible as possible.
But given the narrative flow, another explanation is that she placed him there because she knew that's where the princess liked to bathe, and she was hoping the princess would find him and take pity on him. Only royalty could get away with flouting the law.
What about V? Moses was returned to his mother. Is there something unusual about a mother nursing her child? If Avalos thinks there's something unusual about that, a lot of nursing mothers would beg to differ. But maybe he was bottle-fed.
And, as Avalos is forced to admit, there is no parallel between this event and the legend of Sargon.
What about VI? But that's the narrative solution to the narrative problem. It's explicable, not by literary dependence, but by the inner logic of the narrative. He was meant to be discovered and adopted—whether by Jochebed's design or God's. That's how he escapes infanticide.
What about VII? Did Moses become a king? No. In fact, we have a double reversal of fortunes in Exod 2. He's spared infanticide. And he's moving up the social ladder. But then he becomes a fugitive. Moreover, Moses is even denied an opportunity to enter the Promised Land.
All Avalos has done is to trump up a series of specious parallels. He doesn't make any effort to examine his alleged parallels. And that's because, as militant apostate, Avalos has an ax to grind.
And there are more parallels between Sargon and Moses that are found in other types of documents mentioning Sargon. One document is a liver omen text from the Old Babylonian period (ca. 2000-1600 BCE, though variant parameters exist). The omen is reproduced by Lewis (p. The Sargon Legend, p. 136), and reads:Does Exod 3 say the angelophany took place at night? No. Does the liver omen describe the "luminous phenomenon" as a burning bush or angelophany? No....omen of Sargon who made an incursion during darkness and saw a luminous phenomenon.
Where, exactly, is the parallel? Sunshine is a luminous phenomenon. Starlight and moonlight are luminous phenomenon. A torch is a luminous phenomenon. A campfire is a luminous phenomenon. This is a good example of parallelomania.
It is also noteworthy that one of Sargon's achievements is to climb mountains, and Moses also climbed a famous mountain (Sinai).Is that noteworthy? Is the life of Sir Edmund Hillary literarily dependent on the legend of Sargon? After all, they were both mountain climbers, and Everest is a famous mountain.
The fact that Avalos is reduced to this sloppy, last-ditch exercise in parallelomania to prove his point merely disproves his point.
In the meantime, he studiously disregards a genuine literary parallel, because that undercuts his thesis of literary dependence on a legend of Sargon. But as one scholar observes:
The water ordeal Moses underwent is reminiscent of the redemption of Noah in Genesis 6-8. After the birth of Moses, his Mother Jochebed could not hide him for more than three months, so she placed him in a gome' tebah ("wicker basket"; Exod 2:3). The first term, gome' is an Egyptian word that means "papyrus." Tebah, an Egyptian word which means "chest, coffin," is also used in reference to Noah's ark. One should observe as well that in Exodus 2:3 Jochebed covers the wicker basket with "tar and pitch" as Noah did the ark (Gen 6:14). The deliverance of Noah can be viewed as a re-creation because God directs the cultural mandate of Genesis 2:18 to Noah and his offspring: "And God blessed Noah and his sons and said to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth;" (Gen 9:1). That command is the same decree that the Hebrews were fulfilling in Exodus 1 as they multiplied and increased in Egypt. So the deliverance of Israel out of Egypt is being cast by the Biblical writer as a re-creation.5Suppose we applied Hector's analysis to the Jimmy Carter Legend:
Jimmy Carter
Born in the 20C
Born in the South
Southern Baptist
Southern Democrat
College graduate
Southern Governor
U. S. President
Time Magazine Person of the Year
Bill Clinton
Born in the 20C
Born in the South
Southern Baptist
Southern Democrat
College graduate
Southern Governor
U.S. President
Time Magazine Person of the Year
What's the statistical probability of two different people having so much in common—including some very rare distinctions? Oh, and here's the kicker: the Jimmy Carter Legend is demonstrably earlier than the Bill Clinton Saga. Obviously, the Bill Clinton Saga is a fictitious account, indebted to the Jimmy Carter Legend.
But where do they get the idea that Exodus and Deuteronomy are from Moses' lifetime? Apparently, being set in Moses' lifetime is the only evidence they need to conclude that the books about Moses are from his lifetime.First of all, I didn't say Exodus "and" Deuteronomy, but Exodus "through" Deuteronomy (see the dash).
Second, I don't need to reinvent the wheel for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, or subsections thereof. Conservative commentaries, monographs, reference articles, and OT introductions have done that.
By this logic, therefore, The Story of Sargon, must also be from Sargon's lifetime, since the text is set in his lifetime and it is portrayed as autobiographical. Yes, this is what passes for historical reasoning by the Triabloguers.If the arguments were comparable—which I don't concede.
And the authenticity of Exod 2 or the Pentateuch generally doesn't depend on the inauthenticity of the Sargon legend. That's one of Hector's diversionary tactics.
Indeed, with Sargon it is MUCH different because we have actual archaeological artifacts with his name from his supposed lifetime. And then we have references to Sargon in subsequent centuries and all the way down to the existing copies of his story in the seventh century BCE.This is a bait-and-switch tactic. General evidence for the historical Sargon doesn't translate into evidence for any given tradition, absent specific evidence for any given tradition. Avalos is trying to muddy the waters.
Nothing like that for Moses. If I am wrong, let Triablogue give us a document or artifact mentioning Moses that actually comes from around 1400 BCE, 1300 BCE, or 1200 BCE. The fact is Hoffmeier can't do it. Triablogue can't do it.This is special pleading. Let's take a comparison. To my knowledge, our earliest copy of books 1-6 from the Annals of Tacitus dates to the 9C. And books 11-16 date to an 11C MS.
Is Avalos just as sceptical of Tacitus as he is of Moses? Why doesn't he lay his cards on the table? Is he sceptical of Exodus because our MSS are late? Or is he sceptical of Exodus because he doesn't believe in the supernatural?
Again, the fact is that all we have are stories of Moses extant in manuscripts from the 1-3 centuries BCE, and that alone cannot tell you that those stories were there in 1400 BCE or even in the 7th century BCE.As I've pointed out before, but Avalos is too obtuse to absorb the point, questioning the fidelity of our MSS does nothing to help his case for literary dependency. For example, it's possible that the long ending of Mark is literarily indebted to a 2-3C scribe, who was—in turn—literarily indebted to bits and pieces of Matthew, Luke, John, and Acts. But since the pericope is spurious, who cares?
Triablogue deploys another standard apologetic technique (arguing against something a scholar did not say)…But, I did not say that textual criticism cannot help us reach "earlier" compositions.Here's a verbatim quote of Hector's original disclaimer:
We can talk all day long about textual or literary criticism supposedly helps us reach earlier or to 'original' compositions…Of course, given Hector's position on the "outdated" notion of the Urtext, perhaps the statement I quoted is not an original composition which goes all the way back to Avalos. Maybe it's been redacted by some pseudonymous editor.
As such, we can never hope to reach the historical Avalos, assuming he ever existed. We must content ourselves with the literary Avalos, making due allowance for legendary embellishment.
Triablogue is still dealing with an increasingly outdated notion that textual criticism is only about finding the "original." Triabloguers apparently think themselves as sophisticated by using the term Urtext, without realizing how increasingly outdated this concept is for biblical materials…Since the concept of an Urtext is eroding, textual criticism is focusing increasingly on textual histories (earlier compositions and relationships are included, even if "originals" are not.).Actually, Emanuel Tov has a lengthy discussion of this "outmoded" concept in his standard monograph on the Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible.6
If you take a liberal view of Scripture, then you regard the composition of Scripture as an open-ended affair. First, there's a stage of oral development, followed by an initial commitment to writing which—in turn—undergoes multiple redaction. On that theory, the objective of textual criticism is to recover the final text. So the notion of an Urtext is only outdated on a liberal view of Scripture.
Of course, some books of the Bible are admittedly of composite authorship, viz. Psalms, Proverbs. But that doesn't invalidate the concept of an Urtext—only the application of the Urtext to anthologies like Psalms or Proverbs.
Hence, all Avalos has done is to beg the question in favor of his liberal views on Scripture.
This brings me to another FACTUAL ERROR made in Triablogue in this statement…Lewis DOES NOT SAY THIS, and no direct quote is presented for evidence.I can understand why Avalos would be so easily befuddled. Just as he can't read Exodus in context, he can't read my own comment in context. I was summarizing a statement which Alan Millard made with reference to Lewis. So his argument is with Millard, not me.
Notice also how Triablogue uses an ad hominem argument to dismiss my conclusions (they call me an "apostate" as though that invalidates my arguments for parallels between Moses and Sargon).To begin with, Avalos doesn't hesitate to characterize where opposing scholars range along the theological spectrum. In his initial reply to me, he said:
Such as those found in Hoffmeier, Hess, and other conservative scholars. I know the work of these conservative scholars well.And in his rejoinder he says:
Alan Millard, who is a rather conservative Christian Near Eastern scholar…So why is Avalos so hypersensitive when someone measures him by his own yardstick?
And, yes, it's useful for readers to know where he's coming from. It's not as if he rejects the historicity of Exodus on purely textual or archeological grounds. No, it goes much deeper than that. He doesn't believe that those things could happen.
Yet, as Evan has so insightfully pointed out, Alan Millard, who is a rather conservative Christian Near Eastern scholar, also thinks that the Sargon traditions were in circulation about a thousand years prior to the 7th century manuscripts.This is another example of Hector's bait-and-switch tactic. The fact that some Sargon traditions antedate the 7C MSS by however long is no evidence whatsoever that any particular tradition antedated the 7C by any particular amount of time. Indeed, Millard's point is based on documented traditions that antedated the 7C MSS.
Avalos has already admitted that the legend of Sargon underwent internal development over time. It's therefore illicit to simply infer that a particular motif in a later MS can be trace back to a much earlier stage in the evolution the legend. Given the internal development of the legend, according to Avalos, we know that such an inference is fallacious. That Avalos keeps repeating the same fallacies doesn't bode well for his critical discernment.
Avalos also quotes Millard out of context. Indeed, it's striking that Avalos would presume to misrepresent Millard position when his article is available online for all to see. This is what Millard actually said about the disputed issues:
Some scholars suggested that the story was written to glorify him. Indeed, a few scholars still maintain this position…Gaston Maspero supposed that the Legend of Sargon projects the deeds of Sargon II into a remote past and says nothing about an earlier king (The Dawn of Civilisation [London: SPCK, 1885]), p. 599. See Lewis, Sargon Legend, pp. 101–107, for a similar view.It makes you wonder how trustworthy Avalos is in reproducing positions not readily available to the general public.
However, the absence of Aramaic, Persian or Greek influence in grammar and vocabulary of the sort visible in the books that are dated by obvious criteria after the Babylonian Exile (sixth century B.C.) makes it likely that the Exodus text is earlier.
What of the birth legend of Sargon? It is hardly likely that documentation of this will appear. The story is one common in various forms in folklore and is obviously comparable to the story of Moses in the bulrushes. Before we dismiss either or both as fiction, however, we should note that Babylonia and Egypt are both riverine cultures and that putting the baby in a waterproof basket might be a slightly more satisfactory way to dispose of an infant than throwing it on the rubbish heap, which was more usual. Today unwanted babies are frequently dumped on hospital doorsteps or in other public places in the hope that they will be rescued. The story of the foundling rising to eminence may be a motif of folklore, but that is surely because it is a story that occurs repeatedly in real life.7
In an apparent attempt to fend off the flood of evidence that cuneiform literature was present in Palestine…I have no problem with such evidence. I do have a problem with Hector's diversionary tactics.
In establishing the direction of literary influence…Observe, as usual, how Avalos assumes what he needs to prove. He takes literary influence for granted. It's just a question of establishing the direction of literary influence.
That does mean that scribes in Palestine could be familiar with the Epic of Gilgamesh and other Mesopotamian stories.We already knew that OT writers were conversant with pagan mythology. After all, a fair amount of the OT is explicitly directed against pagan mythology.
In contrast, we have ZERO biblical Hebrew texts in Mesopotamia from the equivalent periods.That would only be germane on the gratuitous assumption that one borrowed from the other, and it's just a question of establishing the direction of literary dependency.
This alone shows that cuneiform literature was established BEFORE Hebrew literature, even in Palestine.Given the fact that Canaan was occupied by Canaanites before Israelites took possession of the Promised Land, this is another one of Hector's trite observations that he tries to repackage as a devastating discovery.
And why should the Sargon legend be different? If Gilgamesh was known in Palestine, what is so difficult about hypothesizing that the Sargon legend became known in Palestine or among Hebrews living in Babylon?"Hypothesizing." That's his case in a nutshell, all right.
As to Hebrews living in Babylon, that's an allusion to the Documentary Hypothesis, a theory which even a secular Jew like Cyrus Gordon didn't take seriously. So Avalos is simply propping up one bad argument with another bad argument.
I am not arguing that the Moses legend is copied directly from the Sargon legend. However, the similarities are too many to posit that two people experienced so many similar things independently.Like Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton.
We have one reasonable explanation, and that is that there was some literary relationship, even if indirect, between these stories.Just as the only reasonable explanation for the parallels between Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton is a literary relationship. After all, their stories couldn't both be true. And maybe both of them are false.
If we were to assign a literary priority, we would have to start with what we actually have.Notice that Avalos can never break free from his Pavlovian conditioning. If we were to assign literary priority…
But his argument is worthless on two grounds: he doesn't establish the truth of the premise, and even if the premise were true, literary priority doesn't entail literary influence. The poor guy is too logically challenged to think straight.
I. There is no actual evidence that a Moses river-story was present in the seventh century BCE.That would only be pertinent if you assume a liberal view of Scripture, according to which the final text was the end-product of centuries of oral development and subsequent redaction. In that case, it would be a problem if the final text of Exod 2 were an imaginary retelling of a story about someone else at another time and place.
If, however, you take the Mosaic Urtext as your point of reference, then any major, creative deviation from the Urtext would be equivalent to the Comma Johanneum, the Pericope Adulterae, or the Long Ending of Mark. Avalos can keep drilling this dry hole until he's committed to a nursing home, but it won't get him anywhere with folks who don't already share his far left views of Scripture.
II. There is plenty of evidence that the Sargon river-story was present in the seventh century BCE.Notice that Avalos has a habit of plagiarizing my argument as if this were his argument, then acting as if that argument were detrimental to my position when I was the one who brought it up in the first place. Just remember that I'm the one who originally had to inform Evan about the actual date of his source material. So it's amusing to see Avalos try to co-opt my argument and then pretend that he's scored some sort of coup.
Since imitation is the highest form of flattery, I appreciate the compliment, but I also claim the right to point out that I'm the real deal, and Avalos the impersonator.
III. Sargon's presence in actual documents can be attested from the late third millennium BCE and far into the first millennium BCE.This is another decoy on his part. He keeps resorting to the same sophistries.
Once again, did I ever deny the existence of Sargon I? No. Was my position ever predicated on his nonexistence? No.
And Avalos builds on this straw man argument to insinuate another fallacy. General evidence for the historicity of Sargon I is completely irrelevant to whether Exod 2 is indebted to the legend of Sargon.
In some ways, Avalos is still a faith-healer at heart. He's now an apostate, but he continues to play on the credulity and stupidity of his nullafidian audience in the very same way as health-n-wealth scammers.
IV. Moses' presence cannot be found in any extra-biblical record before around 1-3 centuries BCE.So what? Corroboration is nice, but to demand corroboration is viciously circular or viciously regressive. For you must assume that the corroborative evidence is reliable. And what corroborates the corroborative evidence?
Why assume that extrabiblical records are more reliable than biblical records? Why not reverse the burden of proof?
The only reason is that Avalos is a militant atheist, so he doesn't believe the Pentateuch could possibly be true.
1 http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2008/07/dr-avalos-v-triablogue-moses-is-basket.html
2 http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/07/debunking-dr-avalos.html
3 http://www.uncommondescent.com/evolution/and-hector-avalos-deserves-tenure-at-isu/
4 J. Prichard, ed. The Ancient Near East (Princeton 1973), 1:85-86.
5 J. Currid, Ancient Egypt and the Old Testament (Baker 2001), 114.
6 Pp. 164ff.
7 http://cojs.org/cojswiki/How_Reliable_Is_Exodus%3F_Alan_R._Millard%2C_BAR_26:04%2C_Jul/Aug_2000.
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