Thursday, January 05, 2006

The Confutation of Atheism-12

How utterly senseless it would be toward his own evangelization purposes, IF he indeed stretched the truth to create more parallelsim than actually existed. I don't think Justin would be that stupid to step on his own toes.

Justin also grounds the parallels in the pre-Jesus activity of demons, who created the parallels retroactively through pagan poets, so when Jesus came along, he'd look no more special than any other god man. Such desperate excuse is quite appropriate for an apologist who cannot deny the parallels and must come up with some reason for why they exist.

In other words, you have no evidence of a supporting argument from Justin himself, so you invented it for him. You were asked to produce a supporting argument from Justin actually showing that the Christians borrowed their stories from those myths. All Justin offers is a theory of the origins of the Greek myths, but he also tells us exactly where the source of the Christian stories lays. You must set what Justin says in one place against what he says in another in order to assert your theory.

Common ground that includes specific parallels such as sons of gods being born in unique fashion, virgin births, resurrections and ascensions. Justin just isn't sufficiently stupid to create parallels where his Greek audience would know none exist. THIS is why you have to deal with the parallels he cites seriously, instead of just waving them off never thinking about how ridiculous Justin and his audience would be if in fact the parallels weren't as close as the ones he cited.


a. Justin states he is making them because Christians are being charged with atheism. Why would Justin cite these parallels as a defense against atheism if his audience had considered these parallels already and believed they were valid? Why would Justin have pointed out the parallels if he knew his audience was already making the connections? How does that make sense as an argument that Christians are not atheists?

b. Since Steve, Jason, and I, along with Metzger and Yamauchi are interacting with the content of those parallels and you have avoided doing so except to keep repeating Justin's statement, it is not we who have failed to take them seriously.

Also First, what do you mean by asking me whether I can find a statement of genealogical parallel between Jupiter and Christ in the New Testament? Did I ever say or imply that such COULD be found there? Did I not cite Justin as my sole source for these parallels so far?

What is the source of Justin's belief in the virgin birth? The New Testament and the Old Testament. His apology tells us this in detail. Thus you need to to find the genealogical parallel that Justin is supposedly alleging if you are going to allege a copycat theory which you claimed, adamantly, stands.

the similarlity requires some sort of genealogy (who borrowed from who), and
my proof that the Christians borrowed from the pagans is Justin's desperate
resort to retro-active demon activity to prime the world with tales of god men
like Jesus, before Jesus was born, the best example of which is (snip).
a. Justin is not arguing that Christians borrowed from these tales. That is an argument you are supplying for him. A statement that analogous parallels exist does not then translate into Christians borrowing from them.

b. The portion of the FA you cited goes on to say that those demons influenced those poets through their contact with Moses and the Old Testament. The theory being advanced, if we assume your naturalistic supposition and remove the references to demons, is that the common source for the pagan myths is the prophetic material in the OT. Justin's argument is that the pagan myths suffer from interpolation, but the NT does not, presumably because of spatial and cultural distance from the common source. The distance is longer between the pagan interpolation and the OT source; whereas the NT itself does not suffer from that distance. That is a common tenet of source criticism, so it isn't without warrant to employ it.

Why does Justin have to exegete scripture in order to justify his parallels-cites?
For the parallels and pertinent Scriptures respectively, what are the authors' background, audiences, narrative meaning, etc.? These all determine if the specific parallel cited fits the NT text and vice versa. A generic motif does not a genealogical parallel make.

Because the points of similarity are specific enough to require borrowing from one to the other, and hence are not outweighed by the differences. You can't just say it's mere coincidence that pre-Christian Greeks thought Perseus was born of a virgin. Do you agree that virgin-birth was nothing unique to Christianity, yes or no?
a. All you have is a gut feeling, no data. Your first statement is a description masquerading as explanation, an assertion with no evidence. In what ways are they similar enough to require borrowing? Where is your interaction with the contents of the myth of Danae?

b. You have cited no evidence pre-Christian Greeks believed Perseus was born of a virgin coming from Justin. Justin is pointing to this as a birth by divine means, not a virgin birth. He makes two allusions: first, that Perseus was born of a mortal, Danae, he does not say she was a virgin. He says that "Even if" we affirm He was born of a virgin, accept this in common with what you accept of Perseus." Where is there a record of them believing that Perseus was born of a virgin? This statement indicates that the point of disanalogy, not the point of analogy, by use of "Even if," is the virginal aspect of it. It fails genalogical parallel at the crtical point of comparision in Justin, much less the rest of the content. In other words, Justin is saying "From your generic idea of divinely accomplished births of heroes in your own religions, accept ours as a similar story, proving we are not teaching unheard of ideas, even though we affirm, unlike your heroes, that our Hero was born of a virgin." How does this select for a copycat theory?

c. We here do contend that the virgin-birth is unique to Christianity. Perseus was not born of a virgin, he was born of a woman impregnated by Zeus through having sex with her. The NT narrative specifically denies that God the Father had sex wiith Mary. The Holy Spirit overshadowed her and Jesus was conceived. One major parallel here is to the creation of Eve from Adam. In the birth narrative of Jesus, this is reversed, as Eve was made from Adam, yet still considered in the image of God, so the Second Adam (Jesus), with respect to his humanity, was made from Mary, with his divinity coming through the hypostatic union to the Son. There is no sexual union. This is a virgin birth as well as a divine birth.

Please read my posts again, I cited the place where I felt Justin cited the closest parallels. Decrying this with "they are just general statements" doesn't perform the service of apologetics, but instead the service of preaching.
Steve, Jason, and I are the ones interacting with the pagan parallels. Where is your examination of them? I see none.

The fact that Justin admits that there is no virgin-birth known in the race of Abraham is irrelevant to the cites of virgin-births coming from the race of the Greeks.
a. Justin cites them as evidence of divine-human interaction not unparalleled in the religions of his listeners who are saying that the Christians are teaching ideas never before heard.

b. Justin says the virgin-birth is unique, but they are not unheard of.

c. Justin does not cite them as virgin births. He cites them as generic parallels of divinely achieved births.

Irrelevant, the chances of two different savior gods being said to be born of virgins, by sheer chance and without any borrowing from one to the other, given Christianity's existence in the middle of such paganism, are almost zero. The parallels need explaining, where did the idea of virgin-birth come from? Hint, the tale of Perseus is older than the first century, as pointed out by Justin's desperate resort to retro-active word of demons in popularizing Christ-concepts before Jesus was born, to make him seem less great to the populace.

a. What savior gods were born of virgins?
b. What savior gods died by crucfifixion?
c. Was Perseus born of a virgin?
d. The antedating of the Perseus myth only shows its date, not that Christians borrowed from it. On the contrary, the NT narratives universe of discourse goes back to Isaiah and Moses, and what do we find in Justin's Apology, specific but a very lengthy and specific discourse to that effect.

What? Justin's sources for proving who Jesus was is irrelevant to the fact of
the parallels themselves, I dont' care if Justin gets Jesus out of the OT or out
of thin air, the Greeks believed Perseus was born of a virgin, this is then a
parallel to debate with you, why then are you bringing up Justin's choice of
sources on Christ? Who cares?
So on the one hand, you need Justin to for you copycat theory but deny what Justin says when he contradicts you.

Second, the whole idea of gods impregnating woman was known before Christianity, and therefore, whether God the Father became flesh and took away Mary's virginity so as to concieve Jesus, or some other way which left her viginity intact, god's impregnating woman were a common motif. Your attempts to water down the parallels to "general statements" doesn't work.
You said it yourself, it is a common motif. A common motif is not a genealogical parallel. A common motif does not self-select for a copy cat thesis. You need a supporting argument for that.

fallacious argument from silence. Also, remember Celsus? Apparantly people DID make these connections.
a. On the contrary, unless you can show a genealogical parallel, Dave, it is you who argue from silence.

b. It is not an argument from silence, since Justin tells us that that is why he is making the argument. He is defending against the charge of atheism, by stating that it isn't as if these ideas had not, in an inferior and distorted form, appeared previously. It does seem to me that he would not have needed to point that out if his hearers already understood that. It's one thing to be aware of your own pagan myths, quite another to make the connection to what Christians believed to what you already believed, quite another to move from that to rethinking your charge of atheism made against them. That's the whole point of the First Apology--to make those connections for the audience, for they had not made them.

if it is true, as apologists say, that the pagan stories mimicking Jesus only came AFTER Christianity.
No, they say the evidence argues that the borrowing came after Christianity and in the other direction, not that all the stories came after Christianity. They also point out that the hard evidence of the content of the texts of these myths postdates the Christian era.

I cited Justin who referred to myths predating the first-century (as seen from his appeal to demon activity in OT days to mimic Jesus before Jesus was born).
I asked for evidence of borrowing. That requires a geneological parallel and interaction with the content of a particular myth or myths as well as the pertinent NT texts.

The parallels are still pre-Christian in origin, telling us who borrowed from who.
a. Once again, you need a geneological parallel. If a comes before b, it does not immediately follow that b borrowed from a, particularly when the source you cite for the dating of a specifically denies that b borrowed from a, which Justin does. A pre-Christian origin of a text does not self-select for Christians having borrowed from it.

b. Parallels? Name them. You've cited one. I am aware of the myths Justin cites, but not of the argument he makes that the Christians borrowed from them for their own narratives.

c. Justin's theory is that the Greeks borrowed from Moses and the prophets, and these new constructions suffered from cultural and spatial distance and were distorted by the Greeks. His theory is exactly opposite to yours, so you cite Justin dogmatically when it suits you but deny what he says elsewhere because it doesn't fit your thesis.

Because Justin's Christian case that Jesus was predicted in the prophets, I find no evidence for, while his citation of parallels to Christ, in the context of his defense to the Greeks, would only make sense if his audience first accepted the parallels, so that they COULD view Jesus as at least equal with their other gods. if Justin was lying to them, they'd know his information was false, and he'd have to be supremely retarded to make his case by lying to those who would know the difference. I don't take Justin to be that stupid, do you? he would only cite information on pagan gods that he knew were already accepted by his Greek pagan audience, right?

a. You have provided no evidence against Justin's case on these issues. You're speculating on what the audience believed prior to the 2nd century and assuming they were aware of the parallel between the Christian stories and their own. It does not flow that what they accepted about the pagan gods in their day translated into recognition that the Christians employed similar motifs, nor does it follow that the presence of analogical motifs at the time of Justin or even before selects for a copycat theory in which the NT narratives borrowed from those motifs, viz. the specific myth(s) Justin or anybody else mentioned simply from Justin's statements.

b. His citation is made to defend against the charge of atheism on the basis that his audience had NOT accepted the parallels. If they had done so, they would not have charged the Christians with atheism. That's the point of this particular work.

I never said Justin ever talked about who came first. Quit putting words in my
mouth. I said he cited parallels period and then gave argument to show why he
meant that these greek stories with parallels to jesus existed before Jesus.
The very first thing I asked you to produce was a supporting argument from Justin that the Christians borrowed their stories from those myths. You pointed to Justin and you said that the parallels he cites are pre-Christian in origin and tell us who borrowed from who. Once again, we're on a sliding scale with your statements.

So? What then, was he just LYING when he mentioned parallels before?

This logic applies equally well to the rest of what Justin says that opposes your thesis.

After all the smoke, you now admit that the parallels to Jesus did indeed exist before the time of Jesus.
I never said the myths did or did not pre-exist Jesus. I said that Justin was not a authority on what people believed before that time, only what people believed at the time of his writing and that you need to find a geneological parallel that shows Christians borrowed from that myth if that is an argument you are going to make. Steve has outlined that process for you in his last response to you. I said that he offers his own theory of the origin of those parallels. If you can relegate his assertions about the OT origin of the NT narratives, based on your perception that there is no evidence, then, if pressed, I can say the same thing about the pre-existence of these myths. Based on the actual evidence, all we have here is an assertion that they existed, not what they necessarily believed about them, and where is the text containing those myths that predates Justin or the NT?

sure, that's Justin's view, but just because he uses the Christian concept of
Christ being predicted in the OT, doesn't mean Christ really was, and it is
actually just as ridiculous as his retro-active demon activity retort.Also,
Justin's speculation that the pre-Christian greeks borrowed ideas for their
pagan gods, is just that, pure speculation, and no history of greek mythology
will trace what they believe back to the OT writings.

Justin is merely trying to explain hard facts of parallels by resorting to dependence upon the
uniquely Christian belief that Jesus was indeed pre-figured in the OT.

The shadow was NOT made plain. The idea that Jesus fulfilled the OT is
nothing but unsupported assertion. They may as well insist Jesus wore a pink hat
every other Tuesday at 3 pm, as to insist that Jesus fulfilled the OT. Jesus
died on a cross. Whether that actually does institute a new covanent and make
the old one obsolete, is very far from being proved.
a. So now you agree that Justin is not arguing for borrowing between Christianity and paganism?

b. Where is your supporting argument for reading Justin in this manner and knowing his motives and that he was speculating on the origin. Why not simply divest his theory of the "mythological" aspect of demons and see a theory of literary dependency from the OT to the Greeks and another for the OT to the NT? That is in keeping with a naturalistic explanation too, isn't it? I'm only borrowing a page from your own rulebook. FYI, this is no more absurd than much of liberal source criticism, so it's not as if I'm not taking my cue without warrant.

c. If you really believe that, then I suggest you write a critique of the standard commentaries on Hebrews.

Jews wouldn't, Greeks would, go read the title of your text of Justin again.
The original question was about the text of the NT, not Justin. I asked about Matthew in particular. If Christians borrowed from Greek pagan writers, why would Matthew do such a thing. Why would his audience find it persuasive?

The title is The First Apology of Justin.

"And if we even affirm that He was born of a virgin, accept this in common with what you accept of Perseus." (Justin Martyr, First Apology) --- did Justin write that or not?
a. What did they believe about Perseus? Judging from what we know about the myth, it was that he was the son of Zeus, born by having sex with Danae, and thus not a virgin birth, but a birth by divine means.

b. What is said about Jesus? That he was the Son of God, born by a virginal conception, born of a virgin, Mary, a divine birth and a virgin birth.

c. Justin is merely appealing to the generic motif, not the specific parallel.

Celsus also says the virgin-birth of Christian stories they stole from the earlier legend about Danae:

"What an absurdity! Clearly the christians have used the myths of Danae and the Melanippe, or of the Auge and the Antiope in fabricating the story of Jesus' virgin birth." -- Celsus On the True Doctrine, translated by R. Joseph Hoffman, Oxford University Press, 1987, page 57.
a. And in the same document translated by the same individual, you also find Celsus discussing a competing theory from the Jews, so what we have here is Celsus attempting to refute the story with more than one theory.

Let us imagine what a Jew—let alone a philosopher—might put to Jesus:
“Is it not true, good sir, that you fabricated the story of your birth from a
virgin to quiet rumours about the true and unsavory circumstances of your
origins?…That she was pregnant by a Roman soldier named Panthera?…
Is it not so that you hired yourself out as a workman in Egypt,
learned magical
crafts…


b. Antiope is impregnated by Zeus coming as a satyr, isn't she? If so, the birth is the product of bestiality, not a virgin birth.

c. Danae-Perseus is not born of a virgin.

d. Celsus is merely making an assertion without grounds for the assertion. If the bias of the NT writers influenced them to distort the truth about Mary and write the virgin birth, why accept that Celsus, writing against Christianity was not distorting the truth for similar reasons?

I said I could cite parallels, I never said i could do more than any biblical scholar and figure out which myths the Christians used and which they didn't.
They are analogical not geneological. Don't come here and throw up the copy cat thesis if you are unable to defend it from the standard literature.
He doesn't, I infered that by comparing "virgin-birth" with "virgin-birth", and reasoning that these two things are very close parallels. Let me know if you require further clarification.
a. Of course, you never actually compared "virgin-birth" with "virgin-birth" it was Steve, Jason, and I who did that for you.

b. When we did that, we found that the parallels fail at the critical point of comparison. At most, the parallel is generic, not specific.

c. In order to maintain a pagan copycat thesis, you need a specific, genealogical parallel between the NT narrative and a particular pagan myth. The one you offered fails that test. An analogical parallel does not qualify as anything more than that, especially when cited as an ad homineum argument by a secondary source using it for a specific purpose.

No, I gave reasons and argument for accepting as historical true, his cites of parallels,
Your argument cites Justin as inferring that the myth precedes the Christian narrative, therefore the Christian narrative borrowed from it. Merely accusing him of speculation without evidence begs the question of evidence. Fair enough. However, that doesn't stop you from leaping from his citation of the existence of a parallel to the assertion that the Christians borrowed their own stories from that parallel. That requires evidence as well, which you have not supplied.

Go read justin again, he cites many parallels to Jesus from pre-Christian pagan myths. I have no reason to think he is lying or stretching truth, given that the parallels he digs out of Greek myths would have been known to be accurate by his uniquely Greek audience the First Apology was addressed to. How stupid for him to establish common ground by drawing parallels to Christ from Greek myths, IF in fact no Greek myth had ever furnished such information.

a. Where is Justin's argument that any of these is geneological. They are merely motifs, generic statements. Nothing more.

b. Still you refuse to do the work and go and look at these parallels in detail yourself. You're the one making the assertion we should take them seriously and examine them. As we have already said, it is precisely because we have examined them that we reject the copycat thesis. Where is your supporting argument that any of these are valid parallels beyond establishing a generic motif?

Wrong, I'm asking you how you know Matthew and Luke's account of Mary's virgin-birth is true, and you simply trust the accounts without reason. Sorry, but if somebody says their wife is prenant by God, and not because of her infidelity, I'm gonna need a hell of lot more proof than a mere two letters from two of her friends who solemnly testify in favor of her version of events. How about you?

Fallacy of false dilema; there is a third option, namely, the burden of proof is on me to show that Matthew and Luke do not constitute "evidence". Do you believe it every time a woman claims her pregnancy is from god and not normal sexual relations? Why not? You trust Mary's two friends Matthew and Luke, so it appears you don't need more than the least bit of assertion on the point to convince you, right?
a. Showing that Matt. and Luke do not constitute evidence would require an argument the texts are spurious. The copycat thesis is one such argument employed for that very purpose. There is no false dilemma here.

b. Jason and Steve have offered reasons to affirm that the text is true at NTRmin.org's boards. This is a group blog and we are willing to post Jason's responses if he chooses to respond, so only one of us need address you. I need construct no separate argument of my own when I agree with them already.

Well, that too, but for now, the problem with Matthew and Luke is that YOU don't accept other similar stories immediately, so you have no business accepting Matthew and Luke.
I don't accept Matt. and Luke immediately. You are assuming things about me about which you are in no position to know, since, strictly speaking you and I have not interacted on that particular issue.

Justin was writing his first apology to the Greeks not the Jews, genius.
a. Matthew was written by a Jew, genius. Luke was read by Greeks and Jews, genius. If you wish to allege a pagan copy cat theory, a theory you earlier asserted is valid, then that is where you need to address it, to the source material in the gospels. Why would a Jew writing to Jews find parallels from Greek mythology persuasive, and why would his readers find them persuasive? The Jews had a low view of Greek mythology, and Pharisaic Jews in particular were prone to becoming Christians.

b. Justin was writing is First Apology to the Romans, genius:

Emperor Titus Ælius Adrianus Antoninus Pius Augustus Cæsar, and to his son
Verissimus the Philosopher, and to Lucius the Philosopher, the natural son of
Cæsar, and the adopted son of Pius, a lover of learning, and to the sacred
Senate, with the whole People of the Romans,

on the contrary, I don't find that your general statements about the Jews having a low view of Greek mythology, suffices to establish the case.
This was said with respect to the NT itself, not Justin.

Is the Father and Holy Spirit ever separate from each other EVER? No. You don't appear to have a very clear grasp of trinitarian theology.
I am not a modalist. I have quite a clear grasp of Trinitarian theology. The Father and the Holy Spirit are of one essence, not one Person. The Father did not die for the sins of His people. The Son did that. The Father did not overshadow Mary and cause the conception. The Holy Spirit did that.

you are assuming the parallels have to be closer than they are, when in fact not even all god-men in the Greek myths were exactly the same, so I have the perfect right to based a copy-cat thesis on something less than mirror-image perfect copying.
a. No, Steve and I have offered Metzer and Yamauchi. There is a vast literature on comparative mythology in the NT to which you have been pointed. Do you ever bother to read it?

b. Once again, an analogical parallel is not a geneological parallel, so I have made no assumption at all. You need spatial and temporal information and you need the texts themselves. There's quite a lot you have to do before playing Pagan Day on the Aeropagus with Greek mythology and the NT myths. Of all the folks on this blog who are interacting with those myths, you are the one who has provided a sum total of zero interaction with them.

False, I proved that this principle of uniformity has no apparant flaws that would require one to be a naturalist before they would accept it, and I proved that even Christians like you accept it implicitly in your day-to-day life.
a. No you made an argument from assertion through facile question-begging.

b. All you "proved" about our use of the prinicple of uniformity is that we use it as a general descriptive principle, but you did not show we use it prescriptively at all. You are using it prescriptively and in a stipulative fashion. We include all the information, you use it to exclude testimony. You conclude essentially that a resurrection from the dead cannot happen, because it is a miracle and miracles are non-repeatible and untestable, therefore, you exclude that testimony or you find an alternative explanation for that testimony. That is stipulation. It uses a general principle to rule out particulars. Testimony of general regularity does not invalidate testimony to the contrary in a particular instance. You're the one claiming you'd discount 6000 people swearing about what they saw on a stack of Bibles."

miracle claims are not "liberty", they are "contrary to life experience", at least mine.
a. Not my experience, for me life itself is a miracle.

b. "Contingency" means we expect the unexpected. We do not use our life experience as a stipulative judge. If I never see x happen, it does not rule out that x happened.

c. Miracle claims fall under the principle of liberty under the rubric of personal causation, viz. providence, a distinction you continue to ignore.

Dave next tries to blunt the force of the claim that his rules of evidence have changed by parsing each statement. However, the point of the list was to show that he had changed his position over time.

Plausible, not possible. I would expect you, to know the difference.
I do, and that is exactly what an argument from probability infers.

Where does that quote of mine say that miracles are ruled out of history because they are low in probability? I was talking about refraining from rejecting them by citing other instances of concretely established cases, of which miracle-claimers never have any.
Which is a probability argument, and in this very thread, you go on to say, "False, the uniformity of history is what makes miracles of low probability, they then THEN fully flushed into the sewer by naturalistic explanations which account for the data. See how that works?" If you think a naturalistic explanation accounts for the Resurrection of Christ, then by all means construct an argument on your blog and let Steve, Jason, and I take a look at it.

I didn't here say that miracles are automatically excluded because they are low in probability. I merely said show me one definite case so I can stop seeing them as impossible. WHY I SEE THEM AS IMPOSSIBLE, is because of the evidential force of naturalistic explanations.
But above you said you view them as implausible, so now you say you view them as implausible because you view them as impossible? Or is it vice versa? You need to stake out a position and stick to it. You said, "If 6,000 people swore on a stack of bibles that they saw someone walking on water, I would rest upon the confirmed physical laws to laugh in their faces.”

Yes, the fact that something is improbable DOES influence me to first deny it until I can interview the claimers to have a better idea of the place the miracle-claim originated.

What if there is tremendous historical distance between you and those claimers?

Do you think the thousands of sworn witnesses who testify that Mary appeared in Fatima Portugal, interpreted the phenomena correctly? No. Why then do you dump all over my hesitation to accept eyewitness testimony to the miraculous when you don't even do it yourself? a.

a. All you're doing is parrotting yourself when others have addressed this with you already. This is getting repetitive, Dave. To begin with you are in no postion to say that I what I do or do not believe about Fatima, since you and I have not interacted on the subject, and I have not interacted with anyone else on it, so don't chastise me or others for arguments from silence while freely offering them yourself about what I do or do not affirm.

Jason has already addressed this: You need to get specific. Tell me what it is about the Fatima reports that convinces you that 1.) they're false and 2.) they're comparable to the accounts of Jesus' resurrection. Remember, as Steve has told you repeatedly, we as Christians have no need to dismiss all claims of the supernatural, and we need you to be specific when you cite alleged parallels to Christian miracle claims. Vague comments like the one quoted above won't do.

b. You only mentioned Fatima to change the subject away from denying multiple attestation to the Resurrection. Jason was objecting to this: That's exactly right. If 6,000 people swore on a stack of bibles that they saw someone walking on water, I would rest upon the confirmed physical laws to laugh in their faces.”

c. Christianity does not hinge on the veracity of miracles outside the NT, so appealing to Fatima is just a red herring. How would the validity or invalidity of Fatima help your case?

If somebody told you they taught a pig how to grow wings and fly like a
bird, would you just believe everything you hear, or would your tendancy
toward naturalist historiography rear it's ugly head?
Steve has already been over this with you, what 3, 4 times. One looses count. It won't help you to dredge it up with me. I have never argued we should believe in surd events. What would it take to show that pigs could grow wings and fly? A single documented case. I would not stipulate to the evidence before doing so. You, in contrast, have argued, "If 6,000 people swore on a stack of bibles that they saw someone walking on water, I would rest upon the confirmed physical laws to laugh in their faces.”

quit wasting my time with unsupported assertions. You only deny repeatability to the method of historiography because you know all your miracles in the bible will vaporize if you Do accept it. You will never quote any historian who doesn't subject history to repeatability tests, because they don't exist. Your single solitary reason for dumping all over repeatability and uniformity is because it would cause miracles to be most probably false, certainly not because you demonstrated that repeatability is somehow itself flawed as a tool of historical reconstruction
a. Au contrare, you have been pointed to a plethora of literature. There are any number of Christian historians and philosophers. It isn't up to me to do the work for you when no less than 3 of us have interacted with you on this already and all you keep doing is repeating the same assertions without advancing your argument. You're like a broken record, constantly hitting the same notes without advancing the album.

b. None of us ever said that historians don't use the priniciple of uniformity and repeatability nor have we denied its descriptive use, what we said is that there are historians who do not use it in a stipulative, prescriptive fashion, who place it under the principle of liberty and contingency.

The Berean Call "Responds" to John Piper

In the January issue of the Berean Call newsletter, the question-and-answer portion attempts to respond to John Piper’s concept of “Christian Hedonism.” It is obvious that whoever wrote this answer (by the style, I assume that it is Dave Hunt) has read very little of Piper and is basing his entire response upon one quote taken out of context.

***QUOTE***

Question: Have you heard of John Piper’s philosophy of “Christian Hedonism”? It is becoming more and more popular (especially among Christian youth) and I believe it to be very dangerous teaching. Is Piper’s philosophy biblical?

Answer: Piper writes, “Those who know me best know that I am a Christian Hedonist… my desire to be happy is a proper motive for everything I do. I do what I do because I think it will make me happier in the long run.” This is the ultimate selfishness and it contradicts the Bible!

***END-QUOTE***

Piper is very often misunderstood and misrepresented on this subject. Perhaps it is his utilization of the word “Hedonism.” Well, whether or not we call the principle of enjoying God “hedonism,” it is Biblical nonetheless. Therefore, those who are desiring to honestly and scholarly respond to Piper should not base their response upon a misunderstanding of his using the word “hedonism.”

So what is Piper saying in this paragraph? Well, first of all, he is alluding to the universal fact about human nature: we do what we want. Think this isn’t true? Try doing something that you do not want to do. It is impossible. I could hold a gun up to your head and tell you to do something that you previously did not want to do, but then you would do it. That would not be an example of your doing something that you did not want to do because your motive to save your life trumps your dislike of the action, and you therefore want to do the action in order to save your life. So it is a given fact that we do what pleases us. Piper’s philosophy is that if we find enjoyment in God, obedience to His commandments will follow. We know that Piper’s philosophy is Biblical for a few reasons:

1. God condemns obedience that does not have a heart of joy. Piper states, “It goes back to Moses, who wrote the first books of the Bible and threatened terrible things if we would not be happy: ‘Because you did not serve the Lord your God with joy and a glad heart…therefore you shall serve your enemies’ (Deuteronomy 28:47-48).” Similarly, David states, “Serve the Lord with gladness” (Psalm 43:4) and “Delight yourself in the Lord” (Psalm 37:4.

2. The Bible constantly compares the false pleasures of the world with the pleasures of Christ, stating that the second far exceeds the first. Why do you think the Biblical authors do this? Are they merely stating a fact? I believe that they are appealing to the desires of the readers, so that they call believers to find satisfaction in God. “You make known to me the path of life; in your presence there is fullness of joy; at your right hand are pleasures forevermore” (Psalm 16:11).

3. God offers a joyous award for obedience and service. Jesus stated, “Blessed are you when people insult you… Rejoice and be glad, for your reward in heaven is great” (Matthew 5:11-12).

We find this mentality in Church history as well. Jonathan Edwards stated, “The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God, by which also God is magnified and exalted.” Augustine said, “How sweet all at once it was for me to be rid of those fruitless joys which I had once feared to lose! …You drove them from me, you who are the true, the sovereign joy. You drove them from me and took their place, you who are sweeter than all pleasure.” Blaise Paschal wrote, “All men seek happiness. This is without exception. Whatever different means they employ, they all tend to this end…. The will never takes the least step but to this object. This is the motive of every action of every man, even of those who hang themselves.” So we find that this philosophy of Piper, though stated in new terms, is not at all foreign to the Bible or to Church history. Keeping in mind this and the principle that man only does what he wants to do, we can now look at the statements of the Berean Call:

***QUOTE***

Christ said: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and greatest commandment” (Mt. 22:37-38). If I love God because it will make me happy, that is not love at all. I must love God for who He is and because of His infinite love for me (”We love him, because he first loved us” - 1 Jn 4:19) in paying the penalty for my sins in the purchase of my redemption.

***END-QUOTE***

Why do you love God? From a Reformed perspective, God works that love in His elect, that God efficaciously changes the desires of man so that man then wants to love God. But we all know that the Berean Call is far from Reformed. So why do you love God? The universal principle is that you do what you want to do, and this can not be denied. Unless you first appreciate the cross, unless you first appreciate the fact that God loved us first, unless God first works in us to cause us to find pleasure in all of these things, you will not love God. You will not love God unless you want to love Him. This is very simple. Unless God first becomes our joy, we will not love Him.

***QUOTE***

Christ said we cannot be His disciples unless we deny ourselves, take up the Cross, and follow Him (Mt. 16:24-25). How can I deny myself to make myself happy? That is like Buddha, whose greatest desire was to escape desire. For Piper to say that our highest goal is to make ourselves happy undermines loving God and denying self.

***END-QUOTE***

This is simply ridiculous! I would hate to be this author; to not find enjoyment in denying yourself must be miserable! On what assumption does the Berean Call state that denying ourselves will not make us happy? To deny the self does not mean to deny pleasure. Rather, it means to deny the current desires of the flesh in order to embrace the desires of the Spirit. So to deny the self is to gain new desires; desires to glorify God by serving Him and enjoying Him.

***QUOTE***

Piper justifies his theory not from the Bible but from the Westminster catechism: “The chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever.” But the Bible never talks about “enjoying God,” much less that this is why man was created. Solomon says that to “fear God and keep his commandments…is the whole duty of man” (Ecc 12:13). Not a word about “enjoying God” being the “chief end of man.”

***END-QUOTE***

Ignoring for the moment that this author makes the ridiculous statement that “the Bible never talks about enjoying God” (we have already proven this wrong), let’s deal with the false distinction between obeying God and enjoying God. Piper writes on this subject:

They say things like, “Don’t pursue joy; pursue obedience.” But Christian Hedonism responds, “That’s like saying, ‘Don’t eat apples; eat fruit.’ ” Because joy is an act of obedience. We are commanded to rejoice in God. If obedience is doing what God commands, then joy is not merely the spin-off of obedience, it is obedience. This Bible tells us over and over again to pursue joy: “Be glad in the Lord and rejoice, you righteous ones; and shout for joy, all you who are upright in heart” (Psalm 32:11). “Let the nations be glad and sing for joy” (Psalm 67:4). “Delight yourself in the Lord” (Psalm 37:4). “Rejoice that your names are recorded in heaven” (Luke 10:20). “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I will say, rejoice!” (Philippians 4:4).

The Bible does not teach that we should treat delight as a mere by-product of duty. C. S. Lewis got it right when he wrote to a friend, “It is a Christian duty, as you know, for everyone to be as happy as he can.” Yes, that is risky and controversial. But it is strictly true. Maximum happiness, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is preciously what we are duty-bound to pursue. The Dangerous Duty of Delight, p. 13-14.

***QUOTE***

To replace loving God with pursuing one’s own joy as the the first and greatest commandment makes man more important than God and will ruin those who adopt this philosophy. It takes little knowledge of Scripture, and little common sense, to realize that anyone who makes his own joy his highest move will make the wrong choices in life!

Piper’s “Christian hedonism” won’t fit in Job’s “Though He slay me, yet will I trust in him” (Job 13:15). The Psalmist’s “As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God. My soul thirsteth for God…” (Ps 42:1-2) becomse rank selfishness if the legitimate reason for seeking God is personal happiness. “Christian hedonism” will not help those struggling with fleshly lusts that seem so much more desirable at the moment than any “joy” that might result from resisting temptation.

***END-QUOTE***

I’m curious about the reason why this particular author pursues God. Why do you pursue Him? Did you just initiate yourself to pursue Him? For the person with an accurate, Biblical perspective, the pursuit of God is initiated first by God and His working in the sinful heart of man. We pursue God because He has caused us to long for Him. Augustine stated, “Our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Thee.” We simply will not pursue God unless we first want to pursue Him.

In any case, the Berean Call very mistakenly blurs the line between sinful lusts and the pleasures of God. Based upon what has been previously noted, this is the same as blurring the line between obedience and disobedience.

Evan May.

Hara-kiri

“Presumably because mental constructs like blame and responsibility, indeed evil and good, are built into our brains by millennia of Darwinian evolution. Assigning blame and responsibility is an aspect of the useful fiction of intentional agents that we construct in our brains as a means of short-cutting a truer analysis of what is going on in the world in which we have to live.”

I posted the Dawkins’ piece without any commentary on my part because I thought it would be more fun, for a change, to let other commenters chew it to pieces. And, indeed, you’ll all done a swell job.

But before the piranhas have totally devoured his bloated remains, I want to have a final bite at the corpse.

One of the stock objections to Christianity is that a Christian must commit “intellectual suicide.” Not only is that a stock objection, but a stock phrase—parroted ad nauseum.

And a number of you have pointed out that, in fact, Dawkins, the doctrinaire atheist, is the one putting a bullet in his brain.

But it’s important to observe that there is a screwy logic to his position. Given his starting-point, his conclusion is inexorable.

If naturalistic evolution is true, then men are simply meat machines. There is no rational, incorporeal soul which is the seat of human personality.

Naturalistic evolution is a strictly physical process which operates on strictly physical organic and inorganic materials. That’s the whole point. We’re a sack of chemicals.

If so, then mental properties must be reducible to material properties.

If so, then consciousness is just an illusion.

It is easy to belittle dualism. Gilbert Ryle famously caricatured dualism as a “ghost in the machine,” while Daniel Dennett, his modern mouthpiece, caricatures dualism as a homunculus piloting the cockpit of the brain—as though there were a miniature person inside the skull looking out the windshield of the eyes. It reminds me of a scene from “Men In Black,” about a little alien using a synthetic body as a spaceship. And Antony Flew’s parable of the invisible gardener is in the very same vein.

Very cute. Very clever. Even if you can’t remember the argument, or never read the argument, the witty illustrations stick with you.

There’s only one problem with all of this. Once you deny the mind, you have nothing left with which to think or argue.

Dawkins speaks of the “useful fiction of intentional agents.” There is no real person behind the eyes—thinking, feeling, and intending. That’s a grand illusion or evolutionary construct. Our selfish genes have tricked us into believing that we are intentional agents.

But Dawkins’ problem is that he must assume dualism in order to mock it. Notice how he objectifies the situation, as if he could stand outside his neural programming and cast a backward glance with serene critical detachment.

Somehow he’s able to put enough distance between his fictitious self and his brain to detect his fictitious self. Somehow he’s privy to the magical tricks of the Blind Watchmaker.

Of course, you’re left to wonder what self there is to detect a fictitious self. Looks like the recessive image of a mirror within a mirror, within a mirror, ad infinitum.

So, in order to make his case for atheism, Dawkins must tacitly assume a God’s-eye view of “a truer analysis of what is going on in the world in which we have to live.”

And the value of this exercise is that the reasoning is reversible. If this is, indeed, an inevitable consequence of his evolutionary starting-point, and if that conduces the Darwinian into an argumentum ad absurdum, then if, contrariwise, our consciousness is, in fact, real, evolution must be false.

If you bash your brains out every time you step on the garden rake of evolution, then it’s time to turn the rake over, facing down.

The confutation of atheism-11

Dave continues to play the same broken record, so only a few comments are necessary:

***QUOTE***

Common ground that includes specific parallels such as sons of gods being born in unique fashion, virgin births, resurrections and ascensions. Justin just isn't sufficiently stupid to create parallels where his Greek audience would know none exist. THIS is why you have to deal with the parallels he cites seriously, instead of just waving them off never thinking about how ridiculous Justin and his audience would be if in fact the parallels weren't as close as the ones he cited.

Because the points of similarity are specific enough to require borrowing from one to the other, and hence are not outweighed by the differences. You can't just say it's mere coincidence that pre-Christian Greeks thought Perseus was born of a virgin. Do you agree that virgin-birth was nothing unique to Christianity, yes or no?

Irrelevant, the chances of two different savior gods being said to be born of virgins, by sheer chance and without any borrowing from one to the other, given Christianity's existence in the middle of such paganism, are almost zero. The parallels need explaining, where did the idea of virgin-birth come from? Hint, the tale of Perseus is older than the first century, as pointed out by Justin's desperate resort to retro-active word of demons in popularizing Christ-concepts before Jesus was born, to make him seem less great to the populace.

Second, the whole idea of gods impregnating woman was known before Christianity, and therefore, whether God the Father became flesh and took away Mary's virginity so as to concieve Jesus, or some other way which left her viginity intact, god's impregnating woman were a common motif. Your attempts to water down the parallels to "general statements" doesn't work.

All that need be established is that Jesus fits the motif and that at least SOME of the parallels to jesus, existed BEFORE Jesus did, which is what Justin does for us when he cites retro-active demon activity before Christ to explain why Christ, coming later, looks so much like them. He would hardly refer to the activity of demons BEFORE THE BIRTH OF JESUS, in creating those parallels, if it is true, as apologists say, that the pagan stories mimicking Jesus only came AFTER Christianity.

I cited Justin who referred to myths predating the first-century (as seen from his appeal to demon activity in OT days to mimic Jesus before Jesus was born).

Source it however you wish, but as i argued earlier, it's too stupid to suggest that Jesus was said, by sheer conicidence, to be born of a virgin, when that story originates in a place where the virgin-born men and other similar god-men are commonplace stories.

Celsus also says the virgin-birth of Christian stories they stole from the earlier legend about Danae.

The fact that the chances are too low that they came up with a virgin-born god-man with no borrowing from such motifs that were common in first century Palestine and Greece. If I come up with a truck that is a stick shift, what evidence do you have that I borrowed the concept? See how stupid that is?

***END-QUOTE***

1.Justin and Celsus are not authorities on what Greeks believed before the time of Christ. They are only authorities on what Greeks of their acquaintance believed in the 2C AD.

They are in no position to know when or where a given Greek myth arose.

What Dave needs to supply are primary source materials from the period in question which witness to the Greek belief before the time of Christ.

2.That is just one preliminary step. Another preliminary step is to establish a spatial coordinate alongside the temporal coordinate. He has to show that Matthew and Luke were in a position to be in contact with this tradition.

3.That is just one more preliminary step. A further preliminary step is to show that Matthew and Luke were actually influenced by this tradition.

For example, both Philo and Josephus are in contact with Greek ideas. But that does not cause them to import Greek mythology into their theology.

4.Dave hangs his whole case on a secondary source which, in turn, refers to a single Greek myth.

And the myth of Danae, the mother of Perseus, is not a virgin birth. The fact that Zeus assumes the form of a gold shower to gain access to her chamber does not mean that he impregnates her in that same form. He assumed that form because the chamber was otherwise inaccessible. But having chosen that modality to gain access to Danae, we would expect Zeus to reassume the normal form in which he deflowers young maidens.

At the very least, the account is completely ambiguous at precisely the point where we need it to be quite specific to establish a parallel.

5.In the meantime, Dave continues to disregard the OT precedents.

6.Dave also makes a vague reference to “resurrections” and ascensions.” No specifics are given.

Likewise, he refers in passing to “savior gods.” Again, no specifics are given.

I’d refer the reader back to the online materials by Metzger and Yamauchi which I’ve already cited.

7.The concept of divine sonship is already present in the OT. It is first employed as an adoptive metaphor for God’s election of Israel. From there it becomes a metaphor for God’s selection and coronation of David. Then the Davidic expectation receives further elaboration.

8.Dave tries to weasel out of the ad hominem nature of Justin’s appeal by pretending to wax indignant at the very suggestion.

Yet that doesn’t prevent Dave from referring to Justin’s “retroactive” explanation as a “desperate” expedient.

But if Justin was prepared to resort to desperate expedients to make his case, then what is so unreasonable about Gene and Jason and myself pointing out that Justin’s appeal to comparative mythology is an ad hominem argument?

9.We do have one demonstrably pre-Christian witness to a virgin birth. And that is the LXX rendering of Isa 7:14. This represents a pre-Christian Jewish understanding of that particular prophecy.

10.There are also, as Gene and I have pointed out, other Jewish heroes whose conception was attended by supernatural circumstances.

11.Yes, there are many examples in pagan literature of gods impregnating women. And none of these amounts to a virginal conception. So you have a “parallel” without a parallel to the specific feature of the virgin birth.

12.Dave also has a habit of padding his case by repeatedly speaking in the plural. But the only concrete example he gives is the myth of Danae. Dave is a one-trick pony with a busted limb.

***QUOTE***

Why does Justin have to exegete scripture in order to justify his parallels-cites?

***END-QUOTE***

Because, before you resort to generic parallels, you need to study the documents under comparison and see, in terms of literary allusions and the cultural background of the authors, what their sources, if any, would be.

***QUOTE***

Wrong, I'm asking you how you know Matthew and Luke's account of Mary's virgin-birth is true, and you simply trust the accounts without reason. Sorry, but if somebody says their wife is prenant by God, and not because of her infidelity, I'm gonna need a hell of lot more proof than a mere two letters from two of her friends who solemnly testify in favor of her version of events. How about you?

Fallacy of false dilema; there is a third option, namely, the burden of proof is on me to show that Matthew and Luke do not constitute "evidence". Do you believe it every time a woman claims her pregnancy is from god and not normal sexual relations? Why not? You trust Mary's two friends Matthew and Luke, so it appears you don't need more than the least bit of assertion on the point to convince you, right?

***END-QUOTE***

i) The accounts of the virgin birth represent the fulfillment of type and prophecy.

ii) But even apart from (i), faith in Scripture isn’t based on having specific and independent corroboration of everything Scripture says, anymore than faith in my best friend is based on having specific and independent corroboration of everything he says.

Just as my faith in my best friend is based on my knowledge of his general character, our faith in Scripture is, among other things, based on our knowledge of its general character.

***QUOTE***

False, I proved that this principle of uniformity has no apparant flaws that would require one to be a naturalist before they would accept it, and I proved that even Christians like you accept it implicitly in your day-to-day life.

***END-QUOTE***

No, he did nothing of the sort. All he’s done is to assert the principle of uniformity, which he shores up with circular arguments and disguised descriptions, as well as willfully disregarding the difference between uniformity and providence.

***QUOTE***

quit wasting my time with unsupported assertions. You only deny repeatability to the method of historiography because you know all your miracles in the bible will vaporize if you Do accept it. You will never quote any historian who doesn't subject history to repeatability tests, because they don't exist. Your single solitary reason for dumping all over repeatability and uniformity is because it would cause miracles to be most probably false, certainly not because you demonstrated that repeatability is somehow itself flawed as a tool of historical reconstruction.

***END-QUOTE***

i) If Dave thinks that we’re wasting his time, he’s more than welcome to go elsewhere. He was the one who chose to pick a fight over at one Christian blog, and then continue his fight over here.

ii) Dave is in no position to assign motives to Gene or Jason or me. Many Christians, myself included, are adult converts to the faith.

iii) This is the second time he’s appealed to historians, as well as scientists (see below). This appeal was stupid before, and is just as stupid on the second round since, as I’ve already pointed out, many distinguished scientists and historians (as well as philosophers) are Christian.

***QUOTE***

Strawman, I don't say miracles are unusal, I say the contradict scientific laws, because the laws wouldn't be "laws" if there possibility of suspending their effect on reality. When we see something that LOOKS like it suspends physical laws, do we automatically say "must be true miracle"? Or "probably something deceptive/false is going on here"?

If somebody told you they taught a pig how to grow wings and fly like a bird, would you just believe everything you hear, or would your tendancy toward naturalist historiography rear it's ugly head?

***END-QUOTE***

i) Like an ox hitched up to a rice mill, Dave can never see himself free of his circular rut. All he ever does is to plod around the same well-trodden groove.

ii) To take a mundane example, left to their own accord we expect rocks to roll downhill rather than uphill. But sometimes rocks roll uphill. That can happen in an earthquake or volcanic eruption, or when a team of men rolls a rock uphill.

All other things being equal, we expect dead men to stay dead. But Jesus was not an ordinary man. The Resurrection is not a freak event.

At the risk of stating the obvious, this is the framework within which the Resurrection occurs: Jesus is God Incarnate. Jesus becomes incarnate to redeem sinners from the power and penalty of sin. He comes in fulfillment of OT type and prophecy. Death is not a natural event, but a penal sanction. The atonement involves the vicarious death and resurrection of the Redeemer.

Within this framework we would not expect ordinary providence to obtain. To constantly compare it to flying pigs is hopelessly obtuse.

Wednesday, January 04, 2006

Secular enlightenment

RICHARD DAWKINS
Evolutionary Biologist, Charles Simonyi Professor For The Understanding Of Science, Oxford University; Author, The Ancestor's Tale


Let’s all stop beating Basil's car

Ask people why they support the death penalty or prolonged incarceration for serious crimes, and the reasons they give will usually involve retribution. There may be passing mention of deterrence or rehabilitation, but the surrounding rhetoric gives the game away. People want to kill a criminal as payback for the horrible things he did. Or they want to give "satisfaction' to the victims of the crime or their relatives. An especially warped and disgusting application of the flawed concept of retribution is Christian crucifixion as "atonement' for "sin'.

Retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with a scientific view of human behaviour. As scientists, we believe that human brains, though they may not work in the same way as man-made computers, are as surely governed by the laws of physics. When a computer malfunctions, we do not punish it. We track down the problem and fix it, usually by replacing a damaged component, either in hardware or software.

Basil Fawlty, British television's hotelier from hell created by the immortal John Cleese, was at the end of his tether when his car broke down and wouldn't start. He gave it fair warning, counted to three, gave it one more chance, and then acted. "Right! I warned you. You've had this coming to you!" He got out of the car, seized a tree branch and set about thrashing the car within an inch of its life. Of course we laugh at his irrationality. Instead of beating the car, we would investigate the problem. Is the carburettor flooded? Are the sparking plugs or distributor points damp? Has it simply run out of gas? Why do we not react in the same way to a defective man: a murderer, say, or a rapist? Why don't we laugh at a judge who punishes a criminal, just as heartily as we laugh at Basil Fawlty? Or at King Xerxes who, in 480 BC, sentenced the rough sea to 300 lashes for wrecking his bridge of ships? Isn't the murderer or the rapist just a machine with a defective component? Or a defective upbringing? Defective education? Defective genes?

Concepts like blame and responsibility are bandied about freely where human wrongdoers are concerned. When a child robs an old lady, should we blame the child himself or his parents? Or his school? Negligent social workers? In a court of law, feeble-mindedness is an accepted defence, as is insanity. Diminished responsibility is argued by the defence lawyer, who may also try to absolve his client of blame by pointing to his unhappy childhood, abuse by his father, or even unpropitious genes (not, so far as I am aware, unpropitious planetary conjunctions, though it wouldn’t surprise me).

But doesn’t a truly scientific, mechanistic view of the nervous system make nonsense of the very idea of responsibility, whether diminished or not? Any crime, however heinous, is in principle to be blamed on antecedent conditions acting through the accused's physiology, heredity and environment. Don’t judicial hearings to decide questions of blame or diminished responsibility make as little sense for a faulty man as for a Fawlty car?

Why is it that we humans find it almost impossible to accept such conclusions? Why do we vent such visceral hatred on child murderers, or on thuggish vandals, when we should simply regard them as faulty units that need fixing or replacing? Presumably because mental constructs like blame and responsibility, indeed evil and good, are built into our brains by millennia of Darwinian evolution. Assigning blame and responsibility is an aspect of the useful fiction of intentional agents that we construct in our brains as a means of short-cutting a truer analysis of what is going on in the world in which we have to live. My dangerous idea is that we shall eventually grow out of all this and even learn to laugh at it, just as we laugh at Basil Fawlty when he beats his car. But I fear it is unlikely that I shall ever reach that level of enlightenment.

http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins

The case for atheism

About ten years ago, Doug Jesseph and William Lane Craig debated the existence of God. In the opinion of the Secular Web, “Jesseph's performance in this debate is arguably one of the strongest recent performances by an atheist in an oral debate.”

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/doug_jesseph/jesseph-craig/index.shtml

Since this represents a high-water mark in the case for atheism, it is worth revisiting Jesseph’s side of the debate.

“As an atheist, I deny exist of all Gods: those of the Mayans, the Hindu, the Ancient Egyptians, and the God of the old and new testaments. If I am right, all of these are fictional constructs invented by clever humans for purposes, a variety of purposes, ranging from psychological comfort to entertainment.”

i) Can Jesseph put a date or address on this momentous event? When or where did clever humans first invent God?

ii) A variety of purposes? This is a very flexible standard of evidence. No matter what the particular motive, even if one motive is inconsistent with another, it is consistent with his theory. When a theory can absorb contradictory lines of evidence, it is clear that the theory has been put ahead of the evidence.

iii) Did Jesseph arrive at his theory by conducting a scientific survey of Christian opinion? How many people sat down one day and said to themselves: “I’m afraid to die. I’m going to invent God!”

iv) Needless to say, his theory could be applied as easily to unbelievers as it could to believers. Unbelievers deny the existence of God because that gives them sexual license. Unbelievers deny the existence of God because they’re afraid of divine judgment.

“A basic reason for denying God's existence is what I call the ‘Principle of Conservatism.’ According to this principle, we should, where possible, avoid accounts of the world which postulate unusual or hitherto unknown things in order to explain what can be explained in terms of more intelligible and well-understood things. The principle is one which, I think, nearly everyone here accepts.”

This seems to be another name for Occam’s razor or the principle of parsimony. It is, indeed, widely accepted.

Everyone can agree that an explanation should be as simple as the phenomenon it seeks to explain. But this doesn’t settle anything since it doesn’t tell us how simple or complex the phenomenon is. If we knew the answer to that question, we wouldn’t need the principle in the first place.

“Alright. What does this principle have to do with God? I claim that God qualifies as something mysterious, unintelligible and unfamiliar in the relevant sense. God is not visible, tangible or otherwise detectable by empirical means.”

How does the fact that something is invisible, intangible, or otherwise indetectible by empirical means render it unintelligible and unfamiliar?

Consider the very thought that God is invisible, intangible, or otherwise indetectible by empirical means. Is this particular thought visible, intangible, or otherwise detectable by empirical means? Can an outside observer see, feel, or otherwise detect by empirical means the mental act of Jesseph thinking his thought about God? Can Jesseph himself see, feel, or otherwise detect by empirical means his thought of God as invisible, intangible, or otherwise indetectible by empirical means? If we were to dissect his brain, or perform a brain scan, could we see or feel this particular thought? Even if we could see brain activity in a particular center of the brain, that is not at all the same thing as seeing the thought content of a particular thought.

And surely nothing is more familiar to human experience than our own thought-process. We know that more intimately and immediately than we do the external world.

“God is supposed to act in space and time, but without having a location in space and time.”

This is not an accurate statement. An eternal, incorporeal God acts upon the world, not by acting in the world, but by enacting the world.

“His essence is, according to the tradition itself, ungraspable and fully beyond the comprehension of finite human minds.”

I don’t know where he comes up with this claim. It is only true to the extreme apophatic tradition. The usual view is that God is a true object of knowledge, although exhaustive knowledge of God is impossible.

In addition, Jesseph himself began his opening statement with a definition of God. He said that God had “eight defining characteristics,” and he proceeded to “spell out” what each of these “meant.”

So Jesseph apparently does believe that he can have an intelligible concept of God for purposes of arguing against the existence of God.

“Everything observable is supposed to be created by God, but God Himself is uncreated.”

Is this supposed to be unfamiliar or unintelligible? Roger Penrose is a mathematical physicist who regards the mathematical patterns exemplified in nature as concrete property-instances of abstract exemplars. Cf. The Road to Reality (Random House 2004), chapter one.

Now, Jesseph may reject Platonic realism. But would he venture to say that this school of mathematics is simply unintelligible? A school of thought not only represented by Penrose, but Cantor, Gödel and Frege, to name a few. Surely this is a serious, respectable option.

The immediate point at issue is not whether this is correct, but whether it is intelligible.

“Furthermore, events in the observable world can generally be accounted for without introducing God as an explanation. Thunderstorms, earthquakes, plagues, eclipses, the variety of natural species, and even the origins of life itself all have detailed atheistic explanations, notwithstanding the fact that they were once thought to be the immediate work of God.”

i) These examples presuppose the existence of the world.

ii) Atheism does not have a “detailed” explanation for the origin of life. It has no recipe for cooking up life from non-life in the laboratory, or replicating macroevolution in the laboratory.

“We are told a great deal about Him, but never enough that claims that His existence can be put to the test. Imagine, for example, a farmer who prays to God for rain to help his drought-stricken crops. Suppose it then rains. Our happy farmer explains this as the act of God in response to a prayer. But suppose it doesn’t rain. The farmer explains this as God's having had other reasons for withholding rain. Either way, the God hypothesis seems to do no real explanatory work. It can be used to account for literally anything in exactly the same way.”

i) If prayer were the only reason or primary reason we were believers, then this appeal would lack explanatory value. But prayer is not an apologetic tool. It sometimes has an apologetic dimension, but that’s a secondary application. The purpose of prayer is not to prove the existence of God. Usually, a Christian has other reasons or additional reasons for believing in God. We pray because we believe in God; we don’t believe in God because we pray.

ii) Moreover, answered and unanswered prayer are not necessarily on an evidentiary par. Some answers to prayer are so miraculous that they demand a supernatural explanation. If I’m in a poker game, and every hand my opponent plays is a royal flush, I infer that the deck is stacked. The fact that in most games the sequence is random in no way cancels out my well-founded suspicion that, in this case, the player is in collusion with the casino. Indeed, it is precisely because a royal flush is so rare that I attribute such an extraordinary run of luck to the illicit dexterity of the dealer. And if God deals me a miraculous hand, that evidence is not diluted by however many cases of unanswered prayer.

“A second, but I think closely related reason for denying the existence of God arises from a demand for consistency on the part of the believer. Anyone who believes in the standard-issue God of western monotheism must also deny the reality of every other culture's God or Gods. Although they may not wish to admit it, believers must hold that all other deities are illusory, and that people who believe in them are in the grip of a massive error.”

I don’t see the force of this objection. If “believers must hold that all other deities are illusory, and that people who believe in them are in the grip of a massive error,” then “unbelievers must hold that all deities are illusory, and that people who believe in them are in the grip of a massive error.”

Moving along:

“I take it that the believer will argue that whatever appears to be explained by these alternative deities can, in fact, be accounted for by natural processes, or perhaps by the actions of his God, whom he takes to be something familiar and not in need of explanation.

Consider, in a slightly different context, the response that Christians typically make to such ‘new age’ doctrines as the healing power of crystals. Typically they will dismiss such claims for the mysterious powers of crystals as nonsense, and they will explain away in the supposed case of healing by crystals in terms familiar to medical science. In all such cases as this, the believer is using a double standard. He uses the Principle of Conservatism to debunk alternative Gods, but violates the principle when it comes to his own deity. But principles are not like taxi cabs. You can't just use them to get where you want to go and dismiss them.”

i) Jesseph appears to be ignorant of the traditional distinction between miracle and providence. This is not a distinction which was trumped up for apologetic purposes. The fact that Christians assign some events to ordinary providence (“natural processes”) and other events to extraordinary providence (miraculous intervention) has nothing to do with polemical theology, per se.

ii) Not all cures are equally miraculous.

iii) Is there any evidence that crystals have healing powers?

iv) There is nothing inconsistent with a Christian attributing the cure to ordinary providence or psychosomatic suggestion or even the dark side.

“The third reason for rejecting theism is the familiar problem of evil. Nobody will contest that there is a great deal of suffering in the world. Some of this is due to the action of humans, some of this is due to the forces of nature. Suffering itself is a bad thing.”

Why would an atheist say that suffering is evil? We’d expect an atheist to say that suffering is natural. By what ideal frame of reference is a secularist inny a position to say that suffering is evil? If the sensible world is all there is, then there can be no standard of comparison.

“The only justifications for intentionally inflicting suffering are either to bring about a greater good, or as just punishment for wrongdoing.”

And we have both justifications in Scripture. We have divine judgment, as well as the foreordination of the Fall and its evil consequences subserving a higher end (e.g. Jn 3:19-21; 9:3,39; Rom 9:17,22-23; 11:32; Gal 3:22; Eph 3:9-10).

“Before moving on to these arguments, I must take note of a very important point, however. Namely that no argument for God's existence can take for granted the truth of any particular body of sacred texts. This is because the very believability of scripture is an issue. Obviously, if you accepted scripture as truthful, you would believe in God, some God or other. But, then we must ask whether you have a rational basis for accepting the scripture.”

i) Which is why Christian apologetics as devoted a lot of time to making a case for the Bible.

ii) There is very little competition on this point. Buddhism is atheistic, so it has no room for inspired Scripture. Hinduism is pantheistic, so there is no personal God to inspire Scripture. Folk Hinduism and Folk Buddhism are polytheistic, but their gods are finite gods, finite in wisdom and power.

As to those persuasions which lay claim to the Bible, that comes down to a case of sound exegesis.

“The first argument that I wish to discuss is the cosmological argument. It asserts that everything which begins to exist must have a cause, that the universe began to exist, and therefore that the universe has a cause. This cause of the universe is then identified as God. There are several problems to mention here. First, even if the premises of the argument are granted, it does nothing to show that such a God has the attributes of benevolence, omnipotence, omniscience personhood, uniqueness, or concern with humans. It is therefore wholly inadequate to prove the existence of the God of western monotheism, at least on its own.”

i) It’s true that no one theistic proof gets you all the way from A to Z. But we have more than one theistic proof. So there’s the question of their cumulative force.

ii) There are, in addition, reasons for believing in the Bible. So arguments for God and Scripture are mutually supportive and supplementary.

“Furthermore, the premises themselves are not immune to challenge. Why, for example, should we think that universe began to exist?”

Both the Leibnizian version of the cosmological argument, from contingency and the principle of sufficient reason, as well as the Kalam cosmological argument, from the distinction between an actual and potential infinite, supply reasons for why we should think that the universe had a cause and/or began to exist.

“Even 'Big Bang' cosmology, which notoriously gives the universe a finite past, says that time itself has a beginning of the Big Bang, or at least can be interpreted this way. On that interpretation, the universe did not begin to exist, because there is no time at which it did not exist.”

That only pushes the question back a step. What accounts for the beginning of time?

“Asking for an event before the Big Bang is like asking for something north of the North Pole.”

A straw man argument since that is not the question.

“Further, the causal principle employed in this argument seems suspect. The only cause/effect relations we observe take place among physical events. But, if God is understood as essentially non-physical, it is very difficult to see how we can be justified in extending the causal principle beyond the bounds of space and time and onto the realm of God.”

This is a circular argument. By definition, the only cause/effect relations we “observe” are observable cause/effect relations. They must be physical to be observable.

But that doesn’t exhaust the only cause/effect relations we know. I will myself to raise my arm. My mental act effects a physical result. Nothing could be more familiar.

“Another traditional argument for God is that from design…This argument had its heyday in the 18th century as part of the process of natural theology. But its hypothesis of a divine designer is difficult to take seriously for several reasons.

First, if we are in a position to recognize the wonderful design of the world, we are also entitled to critique the design work. But, it is obvious that, say, the human body could be much better designed. Replaceable lung filters to prevent lung disease, Teflon lined arteries to avoid arterial blockage, an improvement on our absurdly inefficient digestive system, and so forth.”

If Jesseph thinks that he can design a better lung or digestive system, let him do so. Let him translate his words into a working model.

“Second, Darwinian biology and its theory of Natural Selection can account for all of the supposed evidence of design (at least on Earth) without supposing a designer.”

i) This disregards the many objections to evolution.

ii) It fails to account for the physical preconditions which make life on earth possible in the first place.

“Third, the argument gives absolutely no reason to think there is only one God. Indeed, if we reflect on the fact that nearly everything we know to have been designed is the product of a team effort, the design argument strongly favors the hypothesis of a less than perfect "design team." But this is inconsistent with the monotheistic doctrine the argument was intended to support.”

Now he suddenly abandons Occam’s razor, although this was his basic reason for denying the existence of God. He is now postulating more entities than are necessary to account for the effect.

What is worse, he must then posit some unifying principle which accounts for the degree of coordination between the various team players.

“Finally, the design argument can at best only provide evidence for natural powers or processes of the sort that we see about us in nature. To establish the existence of a literally supernatural God or Gods, much more is needed.”

i) Even if this were true, it once again ignores the cumulative force of all the theistic arguments.

ii) It also disregards the force of the Leibnizian argument. Of all the possible worlds, why was this possibility realized? So there’s more to keep track of than the bare minimum which is needed to explain our world. For the actual world stands in contrast to all of the other unexemplified possibilities.

“A third argument is the so-called moral argument for God's existence. According to it, atheism makes morality impossible, because we must ground our moral theory in a guarantee that virtue will be rewarded and evil punished.”

This is a completely inadequate statement of the moral argument. The point of the moral argument is the source and standard of moral norms.

Jesseph then discusses the argument from experience. I’ll skip over that, not because I think it’s unimportant, but because the argument from experience is, in the nature of the case, inaccessible to unbelievers or outsiders.

So much for his opening statement. In the course of his debate with Craig he does attempt to flesh out some of his initial arguments. In many instances he is simply repeating himself by paraphrasing what he said before and saying the same thing in more than one way. But in a few instances his supporting arguments do move the ball forward a tad.

“Given the current state of Big Bang cosmology, and particularly given the fact that theories rise and fall with the publication of each new issue of physics journals, it would be rash indeed to think that we are currently in possession of the truth about the origins of the universe.”

I’ll cede this point to Jesseph.

“The second point, much more significant, I think, is that present state of the universe is improbable only relative to the many ways that some universe or other might have come into existence. But, because we know that this is a universe where life exists, all we may justly conclude is that our cosmological theory must make it possible for the universe to support life.”

This sidesteps the whole question of why we inhabit a universe which is adapted to life.

“Thirdly, from the fact that initial probability is low, no conclusion at all follows about whether it is the result of a conscious choice. Take 10,000 coins. Toss them into the street. Any particular sequence of heads and tails you get will be absurdly improbable, but none of them arises from design.”

This is a very poor comparison. It takes for granted the many physical constants are already in place. And if we knew all the variables, we could predict the outcome.

“As for the question: why is there something rather than nothing? Well, there is a fairly simple explanation to that. How many ways are there for nothing? One. How many ways are there for there to be something? An infinite number. Even if an actual infinite, what are the odds? A bit of a joke argument, but I think you can see the point... Appealing to God as the explanation of the origin of the universe is, I claim, getting you essentially nowhere.”

i) Accounting for nothing and accounting for something are not equivalent. Existence demands an explanation in a way that nonexistence does not.

ii) In what or in whom do all these unexemplified possibilities inhere? What agent or agency makes them possible?

iii) What is possible presupposes something actual to actualize the possibility.

iv) What agent or agency selects for one possibility over another and instantiates that particular possibility?

“I claim that it is possible to look about in the world and competently judge this is good and that is bad.”

How? Is goodness or badness a visible, tangible, or otherwise empirically detectable property? What does goodness taste like? What does it sound like? What is the color of badness? How much does it weigh? What is its chemical composition? Is goodness round or square? Soft or prickly?

“And, now finally, to the question of whether God can be known. Is it possible, peering into one's own mind to find the still small voice that testifies to the existence of God?”

A straw man argument since that’s not the only way that God can be known.

“Moving on now, the claim is that we have, however, if I understood Dr. Craig, we have some kind of understanding of ourselves as non- physical creatures; our volitions are supposed to be a prime example of a non-physical event causing a physical event. A volition such as my desire to move my right arm, causing the raising of my right arm. I frankly find this incomprehensible. It seems perfectly evident that the raising of my right arm is a physical process. It seems perfectly evident that physical processes can have only physical causes. It seems perfectly evident that if we accept the broadly scientific view of the world, according to which energy is conserved, whatever it is that led to the lifting of my arm must itself be a physical process which is explicable in terms of the laws of chemistry...neurochemistry and physics if you trace it back to the brain which you will discover is, presumably, some neurochemical energy being discharged which then produces, right, the motion of the limb. In order to make it out that we have some clear conception of non-physical minds causing physical actions, what we have to do is overthrow the entire body of understood physical theory. We have to get rid essentially of the principle of conservation of energy and adopt a radically incoherent model in which minds are somehow non-physical things which interact somehow causally with physical things, nevertheless, preserving conservation of energy and all of the other lovely physical laws we know.”

i) What's the justification for presumptive materialism? Why should we begin with matter rather than mind? After all, we only perceive the sensible world by means of the mind. We only perceive the brain by means of the mind. We don’t see the mind because we see by means of the mind, just as we don’t see the window because we see through the window.

On the face of it, mental properties occupy a different domain from material properties. Mental properties are not visible or tangible. Why assume that this categorical difference is illusory?

ii) Has science in fact been able to trace mental events back to brain events? Can we read our thoughts off a brain scan?

iii) Are mental properties reducible to sensible properties? What translation key can Jesseph offer us to accomplish that feat?

Monday, January 02, 2006

The confutation of atheism-10

Jason has posted the following reply to Dave over at the Real Clear Theology Blog:


Pagan Parallels And The Church Fathers
Dave Wave continues posting at Steve Hays' blog, and his material continues to be of low quality. One of his latest arguments is to quote the following passage from Justin Martyr:

"And when we say also that the Word, who is the first-birth of God, was produced without sexual union, and that He, Jesus Christ, our Teacher, was crucified and died, and rose again, and ascended into heaven, we propound nothing different from what you believe regarding those whom you esteem sons of Jupiter. For you know how many sons your esteemed writers ascribed to Jupiter" (First Apology, 21)

Dave then repeatedly emphasized the phrase "nothing different", as if such vague similarities between pagan mythology and Christianity are significant evidence against Christianity. Regarding this sort of misuse of Justin Martyr, J.P. Holding writes:

"[Richard] Carrier appeals to Justin Martyr's retort that Christians 'propound nothing new or different' when they proclaim Jesus' resurrection, as reason to suppose a lack of distinction between resurrection and pagan ideas of rising again. Our answer to Tom Harpur recently, who abused this quote in the same way, is just as relevant here: Please note, as a reader of ours once said of this passage, that Justin Martyr is making these stretches to try to justify Christian belief by making it sound similar to what pagans (who ridicule it) believe in the first place. Strangely enough, it is the pagans themselves who don't appear to be recognising these similarities. This destroys any contention by Carrier of recognizable similarities. If the pagans didn't recognize it, and Justin had to perform these stretches of analogy to create parallels, how likely is it that they are genuine?"

In the same chapter Dave cited from Justin's First Apology, Justin goes on to mention some differences between Christianity and paganism:

"And what kind of deeds are recorded of each of these reputed sons of Jupiter, it is needless to tell to those who already know. This only shall be said, that they are written for the advantage and encouragement of youthful scholars; for all reckon it an honourable thing to imitate the gods. But far be such a thought concerning the gods from every well-conditioned soul, as to believe that Jupiter himself, the governor and creator of all things, was both a parricide and the son of a parricide, and that being overcome by the love of base and shameful pleasures, he came in to Ganymede and those many women whom he had violated and that his sons did like actions. But, as we said above, wicked devils perpetrated these things."

Yes, Justin says that Christianity and paganism are similar in that they both believe in some concept of sons of gods, for example. But that's a vague parallel without much significance, and Justin goes on to mention differences between Christianity and paganism. Dave's emphasis on Justin's phrase "nothing different" is misleading, since anybody reading the context can see that Justin was saying that there's no difference in one vague sense, whereas there are differences on other issues. Dave should explain to us how the fact that pagans believed in some type of sons of gods, for example, is significant evidence against Christianity.

Elsewhere, Justin comments on how pagans have difficulty accepting Christian concepts such as resurrection, and he contrasts the evidence offered for Christian claims with the lack of evidence for pagan claims (First Apology, 19-20). Justin's view might be summarized in this sentence:

"If, therefore, on some points we teach the same things as the poets and philosophers whom you honour, and on other points are fuller and more divine in our teaching, and if we alone afford proof of what we assert, why are we unjustly hated more than all others?" (First Apology, 20)

In another context, after noting some vague similarities between paganism and Christianity, Justin goes on to mention some differences:

"I confess that I both boast and with all my strength strive to be found a Christian; not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all respects similar, as neither are those of the others, Stoics, and poets, and historians. For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic word, seeing what was related to it. But they who contradict themselves on the more important points appear not to have possessed the heavenly wisdom, and the knowledge which cannot be spoken against. Whatever things were rightly said among all men, are the property of us Christians." (Second Apology, 13)

Are you having difficulty seeing how Justin Martyr significantly helps the case for somebody like Dave Wave? You're not alone. The concept that Christianity is significantly derived from pagan mythology is rightly rejected by the majority of modern scholarship.

Of course, Justin Martyr is just one early Christian source among others. The New Testament, which predates Justin, is highly Jewish and repeatedly condemns paganism, such as in Acts 17.

Concerning the church fathers in general, not just Justin Martyr, the New Testament scholar Craig Blomberg notes:

"A careful reading of the patristic evidence suggests that indeed the vast majority of early Christians did believe that the type of information the Gospel writers communicated was historical fact, even as they recognized the more superficial parallels with the mythology of other worldviews" (cited in Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2004], p. 327, n. 27)

Let's consider some of the comments of fathers other than Justin Martyr.

Aristides most likely was a contemporary of the apostles, and he wrote in the early second century. He didn't think much of pagan mythology:

"The Greeks, then, because they are more subtle than the Barbarians, have gone further astray than the Barbarians; inasmuch as they have introduced many fictitious gods, and have set up some of them as males and some as females; and in that some of their gods were found who were adulterers, and did murder, and were deluded, and envious, and wrathful and passionate, and parricides, and thieves, and robbers. And some of them, they say, were crippled and limped, and some were sorcerers, and some actually went mad, and some played on lyres, and some were given to roaming on the hills, and some even died, and some were struck dead by lightning, and some were made servants even to men, and some escaped by flight, and some were kidnapped by men, and some, indeed, were lamented and deplored by men....Thus, O King, have the Greeks put forward foulness, and absurdity, and folly about their gods and about themselves, in that they have called those that are of such a nature gods, who are no gods. And hence mankind have received incitements to commit adultery and fornication, and to steal and to practise all that is offensive and hated and abhorred." (Apology, 8)

Writing later in the second century, Tatian, like Justin Martyr, notices vague similarities between paganism and Christianity, yet draws distinctions at the same time:

"We do not act as fools, O Greeks, nor utter idle tales, when we announce that God was born in the form of a man. I call on you who reproach us to compare your mythical accounts with our narrations. Athene, as they say, took the form of Deïphobus for the sake of Hector, and the unshorn Phoebus for the sake of Admetus fed the trailing-footed oxen, and the spouse us came as an old woman to Semele. But, while you treat seriously such things, how can you deride us? Your Asclepios died, and he who ravished fifty virgins in one night at Thespiae lost his life by delivering himself to the devouring flame. Prometheus, fastened to Caucasus, suffered punishment for his good deeds to men. According to you, Zeus is envious, and hides the dream from men, wishing their destruction. Wherefore, looking at your own memorials, vouchsafe us your approval, though it were only as dealing in legends similar to your own. We, however, do not deal in folly, but your legends are only idle tales. If you speak of the origin of the gods, you also declare them to be mortal. For what reason is Hera now never pregnant? Has she grown old? or is there no one to give you information? Believe me now, O Greeks, and do not resolve your myths and gods into allegory....And Metrodorus of Lampsacus, in his treatise concerning Homer, has argued very foolishly, turning everything into allegory. For he says that neither Hera, nor Athene, nor Zeus are what those persons suppose who consecrate to them sacred enclosures and groves, but parts of nature and certain arrangements of the elements. Hector also, and Achilles, and Agamemnon, and all the Greeks in general, and the Barbarians with Helen and Paris, being of the same nature, you will of course say are introduced merely for the sake of the machinery of the poem, not one of these personages having really existed. But these things we have put forth only for argument's sake; for it is not allowable even to compare our notion of God with those who are wallowing in matter and mud." (Address To The Greeks, 21)

Tatian goes on in the next chapter to contrast pagan morals with Christian morals.

Those who have read the writings of Theophilus of Antioch should know that he often compares Christian beliefs to common themes of human life, such as the healing of the body, and he sometimes makes comparisons to pagan religious beliefs. But he also refers to differences between paganism and Christianity. For example, he contrasts the ability of the Christian scriptures to predict the future with the failure of prophets from other religions to produce anything comparable (To Autolycus, 2:33-34). At one point, Theophilus refers to the pagan authors as "wholly deceived" (To Autolycus, 2:6). Since Dave Wave keeps emphasizing Justin Martyr's use of the phrase "nothing different" (First Apology, 21) with regard to similarities between paganism and Christianity, should we keep emphasizing Theophilus' use of the phrase "wholly deceived" to supposedly prove that there weren't such similarities? Here's what Theophilus wrote in the passage I just cited:

"And why should I recount further the vast array of such names and genealogies? So that all the authors and poets, and those called philosophers, are wholly deceived; and so, too, are they who give heed to them. For they plentifully composed fables and foolish stories about their gods, and did not exhibit them as gods, but as men, and men, too, of whom some were drunken, and others fornicators and murderers. But also concerning the origin of the world, they uttered contradictory and absurd opinions."

Similarly, Athenagoras writes:

"Then, as to the other complaint, that we do not pray to and believe in the same gods as the cities, it is an exceedingly silly one. Why, the very men who charge us with atheism for not admitting the same gods as they acknowledge, are not agreed among themselves concerning the gods....When, therefore, they differ among themselves concerning their gods, why do they bring the charge against us of not agreeing with them? Then look at the practices prevailing among the Egyptians: are they not perfectly ridiculous? For in the temples at their solemn festivals they beat their breasts as for the dead, and sacrifice to the same beings as gods; and no wonder, when they look upon the brutes as gods, and shave themselves when they die, and bury them in temples, and make public lamentation. If, then, we are guilty of impiety because we do not practise a piety corresponding with theirs, then all cities and all nations are guilty of impiety, for they do not all acknowledge the same gods." (A Plea For The Christians, 14)

It doesn't seem that Athenagoras and the Christians and pagans he's referring to saw as many similarities among themselves as Dave Wave sees.

Tertullian contrasts the virgin birth of Jesus with the accounts of pagan gods:

"Accordingly, He appeared among us, whose coming to renovate and illuminate man's nature was pre-announced by God - I mean Christ, that Son of God. And so the supreme Head and Master of this grace and discipline, the Enlightener and Trainer of the human race, God's own Son, was announced among us, born - but not so born as to make Him ashamed of the name of Son or of His paternal origin. It was not His lot to have as His father, by incest with a sister, or by violation of a daughter or another's wife, a god in the shape of serpent, or ox, or bird, or lover, for his vile ends transmuting himself into the gold of Danaus. They are your divinities upon whom these base deeds of Jupiter were done." (Apology, 21)

And Tertullian, like other early Christians, often contrasted Christian moral standards with pagan moral standards (Apology, 46). Notice that Tertullian, like other early Christians, was both opposed to paganism and opposed by pagans. Both sides recognized that they had significant disagreements with one another. As we see reflected in Celsus, a second century pagan critic of Christianity, pagans considered the Christian concept of incarnation repulsive:

"This assertion [the incarnation], says Celsus, 'is most shameful and no lengthy argument is required to refute it' (c. Cels. 4.2). God is not the kind of being who can undergo mutation or alteration. He cannot change from the purity and perfection of divinity to the blemished and tarnished state of humans." (Robert Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984], p. 102)

Many other examples could be cited. But they shouldn't be necessary. Only people highly unfamiliar with the evidence and not critical enough in their thinking should be convinced by Dave Wave's vague references to pagan parallelism. The vague parallels that do exist aren't enough to compose a significant argument against Christianity.

posted by Jason Engwer at 11:05 AM

http://ntrminblog.blogspot.com/

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Behind the Eavesdropping Story, a Loud Silence

***QUOTE***

Behind the Eavesdropping Story, a Loud Silence
By BYRON CALAME

THE New York Times's explanation of its decision to report, after what it said was a one-year delay, that the National Security Agency is eavesdropping domestically without court-approved warrants was woefully inadequate. And I have had unusual difficulty getting a better explanation for readers, despite the paper's repeated pledges of greater transparency.

For the first time since I became public editor, the executive editor and the publisher have declined to respond to my requests for information about news-related decision-making. My queries concerned the timing of the exclusive Dec. 16 article about President Bush's secret decision in the months after 9/11 to authorize the warrantless eavesdropping on Americans in the United States.

I e-mailed a list of 28 questions to Bill Keller, the executive editor, on Dec. 19, three days after the article appeared. He promptly declined to respond to them. I then sent the same questions to Arthur Sulzberger Jr., the publisher, who also declined to respond. They held out no hope for a fuller explanation in the future.

Despite this stonewalling, my objectives today are to assess the flawed handling of the original explanation of the article's path into print, and to offer a few thoughts on some factors that could have affected the timing of the article.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/opinion/01publiceditor.html?ei=5090&en=73506e1ec61c1adb&ex=1293771600&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print

***END-QUOTE***