Monday, January 02, 2006

The confutation of atheism-9

For one who alleges he possesses the ability to reason well, Dave Wave's reading comprehension seems low. My name is not Jason Engwer. This does not bode well for him. If one cannot get the name of his opponent correct, what hope does one have for continuing the dialogue? Allow me to introduce myself. My name is Gene Bridges.

First, I would like to thank Dave Wave, empiricist, skepticdude or whatever alias he is using today for joining the dialogue. Given the length of his responses, however, I would like to encourage him to use his blogger ID and create his own blog to respond. This is not to limit discussion on this blog, but for our readers ease and mutual ease in responding to Dave. The comments section is not intended to be a discussion board and it will be easier to follow what he says, particularly for those reading the comments section, who have complained that his work is formatted poorly and difficult to follow as a result. However, we are accustomed to others posting on their own blogs when writing at length. This will aid our discussion greatly. You can then email any of us here with a link to your blog for us to respond if we choose.

I have a rather large writing project this week, so this will probably be the only time I get to respond to our Village Atheist until later this week or even next. I leave my friend Steve to deal with Dave Wave until then. When I return, I will actually introduce myself for the benefit of those who may be wondering who I am, since I am one of the new contributors here.

Much has already been said by Jason and Steve, so there really isn't much more to say.

Apparantly you’d rather water down Justin’s specification that what the Christians believe about Jesus is no different than what they believe about their gods, instead of taking Justin seriously, and a case in point would be.


Actually, I have the text of the First Apology in front me as I write this. The way I see it, you're the one not taking Justin seriously.

You allege the parallels he cites should be taken as evidence that Christians borrowed from them. Where is the supporting argument that Justin makes for that leap of logic on your part?

Justin goes on to state that what the Christians believe about Jesus is very different from what his audience believes about their gods. Have you read entire text of the First Apology? He takes points of comparison and shows where they are alike, so as not be considered atheists, but where they are disanalogous. His simply adapting to his audience by noting common ground.

Where is the evidence that he is affirming a genealogical parallel between the sons of Jupiter and Christ? Where can you find that in the text of the New Testament? Where does Justin use this to exegete Scripture? You're willing to cite the points of analogy, but why not the points of disanalogy? You keep telling us to cite specific miracles for evaluation. Why not cite specific pagan parallels instead of noting Justin's general statements?

Justin is using this as an apologetic tactic to refute the charge of atheism. He says this in the first portion of the Apology and begins by alluding to some points of common agreement. He is attempting to meet his audience on their own grounds and show that the Christian faith is rational according to the standards of his own audience, so as to refute the charge of atheism. The point that Justin is making is comparison by way of contrast. In fact he says elsewhere, "Now it is evident to all, that in the race of Abraham according to the flesh no one has been born of a virgin, or is said to have been born of a virgin, save this our Christ." (Dialogue With Trypho, 66). In the First Apology, he says that the crucifixion is unique to Christ. Those in the other parallels died, but not such a death as Christ. His argument isn't simply that Christ is not inferior, but that Christ is superior in every way. Justin also tells us where the narratives about Christ are sourced; and he also presents us with his idea of where the Greco-Roman myths are sourced.


But Justin Martyr was about 1900 years closer to the sources than are you “moder comparative mythologists”. Until you have some serious evidence to dispute Justin’s argument from parallels, the pagan-copy-cat-thesis stands. “NOTHING DIFFERENT”, remember?


A. The pagan-copy-cat thesis is not drawn from Justin Martyr or by Justin Martyr. It is drawn by modern comparative mythologists on your side of the aisle based on alleged, specific parallels who abuse Justin. Why should we accept what Richard Carrier, for example says, since he is 1900 years away from the sources he cites?

B. What does Justin say about the source of the information about Christ himself in the document you cited? Answer: Moses, Micah, Isaiah, et.al., not Greek myths. Justin provides his own explanations, and it contradicts your abuse of the words "nothing different." The question here is what Justin means by "nothing different." It means "nothing different" with respect to certain principles. In Greek myths, Zeus physically impregnated some women. In the New Testament, Mary is impregnated by the Holy Spirit. How does it follow that the latter was borrowed from the former? Where does Justin infer this? He doesn't. He simply notes that it is absurd for his audience to believe in the one and not the other. His hearers didn't seem to be making these connections, so Justin makes them to show that the Christians are not atheists or proposing anything nearly as preposterous as the poets had proposed given the nature of the God that Christians worship. If you believe the poets already, he argues, is it really such a stretch to believe the gospel narratives?

All that need be established is that Jesus fits the motif and that at least SOME of the parallels to jesus, existed BEFORE Jesus did, which is what Justin does for us when he cites retro-active demon activity before Christ to explain why Christ, coming later, looks so much like them. He would hardly refer to the activity of demons BEFORE THE BIRTH OF JESUS, in creating those parallels, if it is true, as apologists say, that the pagan stories mimicking Jesus only came AFTER Christianity.


Justin cites them from his present frame of reference. If you wish to make these parallels stick, then go and find them and make a case. Where is your evidence that the NT writers borrowed from 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th century versions of myths, and which myths and what exact parallels exist between those prior to the 1st century and how does the NT show evidence that the NT writers borrowed from them? What does Justin say is the source of the retroactive demon activity before Christ? In other words, what is the source of the material that was used in those parallels he cites? Is it uniquely Greek according to Justin, or does it have another possible origin?

Either way, Justin’s “we propound nothing different” qualification on his own parallels regarding son so Jupiter makes this a whole lot more serious case of borrowing than simply continuity of Greek thought a hundred years later....I’ll wait to see how you handle “we propound nothing different” first.


Well, let's see what Justin says, shall we.

A. Justin is attempting to refute the charge of atheism, that, because they did not worship the Greek gods, they worshipped no god at all. The pagans he addresses found the concept of God becoming incarnate repulsive and rejected the idea that Christ was fully god and fully man. He is simply asserting, against the charge of atheism, that the Christians are not atheists, that their concept of divinity is no less divine than the concept advanced by Greco-Roman religion of previous times. In fact, Christ is more worthy of being considered divine. In XXII he goes on to say that his point is to show Christ superior. His entire thesis involving these analogies is an attempt to say to his audience that they believe these other stories, so the charge of atheism is false, for how can they believe the lesser, inferior, and false, and not the superior, true, and greater?

B. Where in this does Justin allege a genealogical parallel or intend to allege such a parallel? Analogous parallels are not genealogical parallels. You need a genealogical, not an analogical parallel to make the copy-cat theory stick. You're making the claim. Now, find the parallels and make them.

C. Justin says that what has been taught to us by Christ and by the prophets who preceded Him are alone true and are older than all the writers who have existed, Moses in particular, "not because we say the same things they said, but because we say true things..." (First Apology XXXIII). After this, Justin lists several items of disanalogy. Then, Justin tells us exactly where the universe of discourse for the testimony of Jesus Christ lays. In the Hebrew prophets (XXXI); Moses (XXXII); the OT predictions of His birth (XXXIII, IV, V); the modes of prophecy (XXXVI). He writes extensively on each. Why accept the veracity of what Justin says about the pagan parallels but not what he says, very explicitly at that, about these actual universe of discourse from which the testimony about Christ Himself actually originates? You're the one asserting that he alleges a copying from the Greco-Roman myths, but Justin explicitly says otherwise. Justin discusses the origin of heathen mythology as well in the same apology, and he notes how disanalogous those myths are.

D. It's true that Justin has no grasp of historical chronology and does not purport to be an expert on the origins of the Greco-Roman myths, but he doesn't simply attribute them to demonic activity without further explanation; he also discusses them in such a way that it appears that he thinks that the Greeks borrowed from the Jews, not vice versa. Justin uses the formula that when they (the demons) heard about the prophecies of Christ in the Jewish Scriptures (Moses in particular), they then influenced the Greeks to copy ideas from those texts to make men, when Christ was come, think that His story was only one among many. Using your own naturalistic yardstick and discounting the statements about demons themselves, Justin is affirming that the Greeks built some of their myths on what they learned from the Jews. This accounts for the parallels. If you believe he is inferring the gospel narratives depend upon and copy from these myths, then you advance the very thesis that Justin repudiates, not one that he advances.

So, does Justin argue that the Christians borrowed from the Greeks? No. His argument infers that the Greeks in his audience should now listen to the Jews again and see that Christ is the fulfillment of those Jewish texts from which the Greeks in ages past borrowed, and this should inform them of the veracity of the gospel itself, for, if their own predecessors listened to the Jews and venerated them enough to borrow and copy from them in ages past, then how much more should they do so now that those prophecies which their ancestors venerated through copying into their own religion have come to clear, plain fulfillment in Christ. This is, ironically, much the same argument that the author of Hebrews makes to the Jews in his audience, that Christ is the culmination of the covenant with Israel at Sinai, which their fathers confirmed. How much more should they now confirm the New Covenant, the shadow having been made plain. This is exactly contrary to the pagan copy cat theory, but it fits exactly what conservative scholarship has been saying all along, that the pagans borrowed from the Christians. The pagan myths, according to Justin, which is the standard to which you have appealed, are very likely derived from Greek interaction with the Jews, not vice versa, so, if you wish to press "we propound nothing different" in a particular manner, then why not the rest of what Justin has to say? The other option is that they were written independently, but that still doesn't mean that the Christians or Jews borrowed from them, unless you want to reject what Justin says in Sections 31 - 39. For that you need evidence of geneaological parallel.

This is a general statement, which cannot be logically used to refute a specific statement, and Justin cites numerous specific parallels which merit closer inspection than just saying humans have a tendency to think the same way about stuff all over the world."


A. It is precisely because they have been subjected to close scrutiny that these parallels have been rejected.

B. And which of them is genealogical? What specific parallels does he cite in such a way that he affirms Christians borrowed from them? On the contrary, he infers later in the First Apology that those parallels are parallel because they borrowed from Jewish literature, the same universe of literature that prophesied Christ. If there is a common source in Justin's thinking, the source is the Jewish Scriptures, not the Greco-Roman myths; and that source applies to both the gospel narratives and the Greco-Roman myths. Justin clearly views the former as being directly related to the Jewish Scriptures while the latter is indirectly related and more oblique. Why accept what he says about the existence of analogical parallels but reject his denial of genealogical parallels and his opinion that the common source for the Greco-Roman myths is the perversion of the Hebrew writings? For Justin, the pagan parallels are oblique and analogical only, the result of perversions of the source material in Moses and elsewhere. On the other hand,according to Justin, the gospel narratives are plain and directly rely on the Hebrew Scriptures without perverting them.

I already explained that. Justin was citing the parallels to show that Jesus should be believed by the Greeks, if their criteria for a true god-man was virgin-birth, miracles, resurrection, ascension, etc. If that was the case, Justin is arguing that that Jesus is "in no way inferior" to them. Yet while he uses the close parallels in a different way for a different audience, that doesn't erase a single one of them.

A. Notice the original question was "Why would a Jew, whom the pagans of the 2nd century tell us were renown for their separatism, find a myth constructed from Greco-Roman pagan myths persuasive?"

B. The Village Atheist's cites the criteriion of a virgin birth, but the parallels Justin cites, as Celsus cites, are not virgin births. The Village Atheist cites the resurrection. Which of these Greco-Roman myths involved an actual resurrection from the dead and which one(s) did the Christians use in composing the resurrection narratives and virgin birth narratives?

C. Where does Justin say these are "close" parallels?

D. Apparently, the Village Atheist has selected parts of Justin but not the whole. Justin argues against the charge of atheism. He employs these allusions to pagan mythology to show that the philosophical content of what they teach has some general points of agreement, but the comparison is by way of contrast. To further refute the charge of atheism, he notes analogical parallels in certain other myths, but notes these are lesser and different mytdisanalogous also disanalgous. His point is that the Christians cannot be faulted for atheism for believing in Christ, who is superior to those in these inferior stories. He then explicates a classic Christian defense of the validity of the gospel and specifically sources Christ in the universe of the Jewish Scriptures, not Greco-Roman myths (exactly contrary to copycat theorists' assertions).

He then discusses the origin of the pagan myths, and asserts that it was either demonic influence alone or demonic influence working through Greek interaction with those same Jewish sources that was accreted into the Greco-Roman myths. He appears to use this to infer that his audience should remember then that some of what they believed was copied from the Jews and changed for their own culture. Their forefathers listened to the Jewish Scriptures enough to do this, how much more should they now listen to the Jewish Scriptures again, not their own myths. Thus the "close parallels", in Justin's view, are the result of Greeks having borrowed from Jews in centuries past, not vice versa, and Christians, he says, did not base their accounts on the Greek myths, but on the Jewish Scriptures, the truth of which antedates the Greek myths.

First, you don’t have any evidence that Mary WAS a virgin after she conceived Jesus. The mere fact that Matthew and Luke insist she was, doesn’t suddenly mean there’s no borrowing from pagan sources. God appeared as a man many times in the Old Testament, so the only thing going for the “she was still a virgin after conception” is the question begging reliance on Matthew and Luke, who records in this case are the very question at issue.


A. I have the text of the New Testament, so I do have evidence. You simply dismiss it out of hand. The burden of proof is on you to show the text is incorrect or spurious. This is no more question-begging than your naturalism. All you have so far is an assertion that virgin births can't happen because miracles can't happen, which is made on a stipulative use of the principle of uniformity. I have seen no argument against the veracity of Luke in any of your writing. Jason has already addressed this with you multiple times.

B. If you think they were borrowing from pagan sources, the burden of proof is on you to show that they did so. What sources were used? Why would a Jew writing to Jews find parallels from Greek mythology persuasive, and why would his readers find them persuasive? The Jews had a low view of Greek mythology. The NT was written during a time when observance of the Law was a major issue within the churches. How did these observant Jews, who worshipped in the Temple with the other Jews and preached in the synagogues come to accept Greek mythology so quickly and easily?

C. God appeared as an angel in the OT and was perceived as a grown man. The Father does not impregnate Mary. For somebody that says he was a Bible-thumping Calvinist, you don't have a very clear grasp of the narratives.

Second, you should realize that failure to be an exact parallel doesn't suddenly mean there was no borrowing. The very fact that Jews, as you said, wished to be seen as unique, would argue that the Christian Jews would also, if they did indeed borrow, make sure that Jesus wasn't a perfect mirror image of the pagans.


That's not an assertion made on evidence that you possess that there was such borrowing. So much for your empiricism. Where is the specific, empirical evidence for such borrowing in the Lukan and Matthean narratives? What you have now is an unfalsifiable assertion.

The failure that there isn't an exact parallel and there is analogical one likewise doesn't prove their was borrowing. It is made even less likely if you view the NT narratives through Second Temple Judaism, which is the proper lens through which to view it. You have to justify why they would borrow at all, and if you assert they did borrow, you need to be able to show how, where, when, what they borrowed, etc. None of those arguments hold water.

I fail to see how any of this refutes my "present is key to past" principle. Your professor wouldn't even be able to compile his notes for that lecture nor could you even know what college you are supposed to be attending let alone what class you should be sitting in, if you reject "the present is the key to the past." Sounds like pretty solid criteria to me.


The present is the key to past, but sometimes a different key is needed to unlock the door. You need a supporting argument that naturalism is essential in order to hold the principle of uniformity. Why can't uniformity be placed under the principle of liberty and contingency? Jason and Steve have already shown you that a Christian can hold to the principle of uniformity under the rubric of providence, and it's not as if one has to be a theist or a Christian theist to hold to the principle of liberty and contingency. This has been discussed with you already, but, like a poor marksman, you keep missing the target when responding.

Straw-man, I never said low probability DID rule them out. What I think rules them out is the fact that naturalistic explanations for your miracle-data have more evidential force.
You have argued, "my own experience in life is my ultimate criteria through which I test the personal experiences claimed by others, and it must necessarily be in that order." You have most certainly argued that possibility, not "evidential weight" is the issue.

Here was your first claim:

To be plausible, he would have to have been resurrected, which I don't think is plausible, since historical reconstruction cannot occur unless one uses the present to interpret the past (principle of uniformity), which rule of historiography automatically excludes all allegations that would require suspensions of the known physical laws.


Here is another:

On the contrary, the absence of any concretely established parallel event is the very reason one would say that something in a report is false/impossible...and so the opposite is true as well, namely, that the existence of many concretely established cases of X, is what gives you confidence that X is not impossible


and another:

Do you have any non-controversial established cases of resurrection from the dead, so that I might stop seeing Jesus' resurrection as impossible and at least grant that it was within the realm of possibility?"


and another:

Yes, the fact that something is improbable DOES influence me to first deny it until I can interview the claimers to have a better idea of the place the miracle-claim originated.


Now you say you look case-by-case and do not need an established pattern. So at first, you appeal to the priniciple of uniformity as stipulative and rendering the miraculous impossible and are justified in rejecting a claim to the supernatural even there are thousands of witnesses. You explicitly make an argument from probability. Now you're making one on "evidential weight." Dave reminds me of certain contributors at Prometheus Books who compile books purporting to refute Christianity while their contributors contradict each other's theses every other chapter, with what one says is untrue being true several times over. We're on a sliding scale with his rules of evidence. My objection stands, for that is the reason the principle ofprinciple of contingency operates, it looks at the merits of all the evidence without subjecting history to a general principle of repeatability that is used as a stipulative tool to rule out evidence because of a particular metaphysical blik.

The priniciple of uniformity is not stipulative in the examination of history and testimony. History does not depend on stipulative universality and repeatability. Those who try to make such assertions have consistently found themselves being charged with obscuring, not illuminating history.

The testimony of regularity in general is in no way a testimony against an unusual event in particular. The prinicple of uniformity in history is, itself, a general principle, and miracles, by definition, would be irregularites and particularities; so, by your own yardstick, your appeal to the principle of uniformity in history cannot be used logically to refute a particular event. I need only borrow a page from your own rulebook to establish this, for earlier you said, with reference to critiquing pagan parallels that "This is a general statement, which cannot be logically used to refute a specific statement" and that we need to evaluate each one on its own merits. Yet you are using the priniciple of uniformity in exactly that manner to rule out specific events said to be miraculous for no other reason than your naturalistic blik.

The confutation of atheism-8

Jason Engwer has responded to Dave's latest salvo:

You've attributed comments to me that I didn't write, your responses are once again highly unreasonable, and you keep making claims that warrant documentation without giving us that documentation. When you quote Justin Martyr, for example, it isn't sufficient to give "Justin Martyr" as your source. You've done this sort of thing repeatedly, here and elsewhere. You don't have much familiarity with the original sources or modern scholarship, and you repeatedly present your side of an argument without apparently having given any other perspective much thought.

I've read everything Justin Martyr wrote. Have you? I know what sort of parallels he cites in pagan mythology, and the similarities are far too vague to carry the weight you're claiming for them. We know what content these mythologies had. We're not dependent on Justin Martyr for all of our information. If Justin thinks one similarity or another is significant, we can make judgments case-by-case about whether we agree. You need to be specific rather than just quoting general comments made by Justin Martyr. Tell us what specific parallels you have in mind and what specific significance you think they have.

From my reading of Justin Martyr, I would agree with J.P. Holding's assessment:

"[Richard] Carrier appeals to Justin Martyr's retort that Christians 'propound nothing new or different' when they proclaim Jesus' resurrection, as reason to suppose a lack of distinction between resurrection and pagan ideas of rising again. Our answer to Tom Harpur recently, who abused this quote in the same way, is just as relevant here: Please note, as a reader of ours once said of this passage, that Justin Martyr is making these stretches to try to justify Christian belief by making it sound similar to what pagans (who ridicule it) believe in the first place. Strangely enough, it is the pagans themselves who don't appear to be recognising these similarities. This destroys any contention by Carrier of recognizable similarities. If the pagans didn't recognize it, and Justin had to perform these stretches of analogy to create parallels, how likely is it that they are genuine?" (http://www.tektonics.org/lp/nwjcarr3.html )

Though Dave didn't give us a source for the quote of Justin Martyr in his latest post here, I know what he's citing. It's chapter 21 of Justin's First Apology. In that same chapter, Justin goes on to mention some differences between Christianity and paganism:

"And what kind of deeds are recorded of each of these reputed sons of Jupiter, it is needless to tell to those who already know. This only shall be said, that they are written for the advantage and encouragement of youthful scholars; for all reckon it an honourable thing to imitate the gods. But far be such a thought concerning the gods from every well-conditioned soul, as to believe that Jupiter himself, the governor and creator of all things, was both a parricide and the son of a parricide, and that being overcome by the love of base and shameful pleasures, he came in to Ganymede and those many women whom he had violated and that his sons did like actions. But, as we said above, wicked devils perpetrated these things."

Yes, Justin says that Christianity and paganism are similar in that they both believe in some concept of sons of gods. But that's a vague parallel without much significance, and Justin goes on to mention differences between Christianity and paganism. Your emphasis on Justin's phrase "no difference" is misleading, since anybody reading the context can see that Justin was saying that there's no difference in one vague sense, whereas there are differences on other issues. Would you explain to us how the fact that pagans believed in some form of sons of the gods, for example, is significant evidence against Christianity?

Elsewhere, after noting some vague similarities between paganism and Christianity, Justin goes on to mention some differences:

"I confess that I both boast and with all my strength strive to be found a Christian; not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all respects similar, as neither are those of the others, Stoics, and poets, and historians. For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic word, seeing what was related to it. But they who contradict themselves on the more important points appear not to have possessed the heavenly wisdom, and the knowledge which cannot be spoken against. Whatever things were rightly said among all men, are the property of us Christians." (Second Apology, 13)

I don't see how any of this does anything significant to help your argument, Dave.

You go on to say:

"God appeared as a man many times in the Old Testament"

He did appear sometimes, but only briefly, as a grown man, and without people having expected it. N.T. Wright comments that “no second-Temple Jews known to us were expecting the one god to appear in human form” (The Resurrection of the Son of God [Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 2003], p. 573).

Richard Swinburne writes:

“It is indisputable that there was no Jewish expectation that God would become incarnate. Pagans believed that their ‘gods’ had taken human form from time to time; but their ‘gods’ were lesser gods with limited powers, not God, omnipotent and omniscient. There simply was no precedent, Jewish or pagan, for expecting an incarnation: God almighty truly taking a human nature. And that again is reason for supposing that the first Christians were not reading back into history something which they expected to occur.” (The Resurrection of God Incarnate [New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], p. 115)

Furthermore, not only were Gentiles not expecting God incarnate, but the concept even repulsed them. This is seen, for example, in Celsus, a second century pagan critic of Christianity:



"This assertion [the incarnation], says Celsus, 'is most shameful and no lengthy argument is required to refute it' (c. Cels. 4.2). God is not the kind of being who can undergo mutation or alteration. He cannot change from the purity and perfection of divinity to the blemished and tarnished state of humans." (Robert Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984], p. 102)

Dave goes on to say:

"the only thing going for the 'she was still a virgin after conception' is the question begging reliance on Matthew and Luke, who records in this case are the very question at issue."

I've already given you, on the NTRM boards, a large amount of evidence for the reliability of Matthew and Luke. At one point, you argued against the significance of Luke's historical accuracy by saying that he may have taken notes as he traveled with Paul. But I fail to see how such a scenario does anything other than hurting your case. If Luke was so careful to take notes, then we have good reason to trust him, and we know that at least one of the people he met was a member of Jesus' immediate family (Acts 21:18). Luke would have had access to reliable information on Jesus' childhood. I don't know of any Christian who claims that we can prove the virgin birth in the same manner in which we can prove something like Jesus' resurrection, but testimony from a reliable source like Luke, who was in contact with Jesus' immediate family, is significant.

Dave continues:

"Second, you should realize that failure to be an exact parallel doesn’t suddenly mean there’s no borrowing. The very fact that Jews, as you said, wished to be seen as unique, would argue that the Christian Jews would also, if they did indeed borrow, make sure that Jesus wasn’t a perfect mirror image of the pagans."

In other words, your argument is unfalsifiable.

But why should we think that the Jews merely wanted to "be seen" as different? They were different before they came into contact with these pagan mythologies, and they continued to be different afterward. It wasn't just an appearance. They were actually different, and they had a low view of paganism. It's not as if they thought highly of pagan mythology.

Dave goes on:

"I see no evidence that Jesus fulfilled the OT or was ever predicted for that matter, in the OT."

Well, let's start with two of the most basic Messianic expectations. The Messiah would be a son of David, and the Messiah would have great influence over Gentile nations, including Gentile rulers, despite being Jewish. Regarding Jesus' Davidic descent, Craig Keener writes:

“there is little doubt that Jesus’ family historically stemmed from Davidic lineage. All clear early Christian sources attest it (e.g., Rom 1:3); Hegesippus reports a Palestinian tradition in which Roman authorities interrogated Jesus’ brother’s grandsons for Davidic descent (Euseb. H.E. 3.20); Julius Africanus attests Jesus’ relatives claiming Davidic descent (Letter to Aristides); and, probably more significantly, non-Christian Jewish polemicists never bothered to try to refute it (Jeremias 1969: 291). Jesus’ relatives known in the early church seem to have raised no objection to the claim of their family’s background (Brown 1977: 507)….B. Sanh. 43a, bar., may preserve a [non-Christian Jewish] tradition that Jesus was of royal lineage (unless it suggests connections with the Herodian or Roman rulers, or that he was about to take control of the people; both views are unlikely).” (A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], p. 75 and n. 9 on p. 75)

We know that genealogical records were kept (D.A. Carson, The Expositor's Bible Commentary: Matthew, Chapters 1 Through 12 [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1995], p. 63).

Concerning Jesus' influence over the Gentile world, do you deny that many hundreds of millions of people in the world today are Gentiles who profess to be Christian, and that many Gentile nations have had Christian leaders?

If you're going to claim that Jesus didn't fulfill any Old Testament prophecies, let's begin with these two and see what case you have.

Dave continues:

"I fail to see how any of this refutes my 'present is key to past' principle. Your professor wouldn’t even be able to compile his notes for that lecture nor could you even know what college you are supposed to be attending let alone what class you should be sitting in, if you reject 'the present is the key to the past'. Sounds like pretty solid criteria to me."

As we've told you already, believing that the supernatural is possible doesn't require a rejection of physical laws. God can intervene in a world that operates with physical laws, much like we as humans can intervene when an apple is falling from a tree by reaching out our hand and catching it. We prevent gravity from bringing the apple to the ground, even though it would fall to the ground if left to itself. You're burning a straw man, as you often do.

Dave continues:

"What I think rules them out is the fact that naturalistic explanations for your miracle-data have more evidential force."

Here we have another example of Dave's self-contradictions. Earlier, in another thread, Dave said that a naturalistic explanation only needs to be possible. He said that he's justified in rejecting a claim of something he considers supernatural even if there are thousands of witnesses to it. But now, instead of appealing to mere possibility, he says that the naturalistic explanation would have to "have more evidential force". This is one of the difficulties in interacting with Dave. Which of his contradictory positions do you interact with, and how do you figure out just what argument he'll use from moment to moment?

Dave says:

"Again, cite one biblical example and I’ll show you why."

Tell us what naturalistic explanation of the resurrection appearances of 1 Corinthians 15 is better than the Christian explanation. Remember, if you appeal to hallucinations or some other psychological disorder, you must document that the data we have is consistent with what we know about that psychological disorder, and you have to explain why your naturalistic theory is preferable.

Dave goes on:

"Yes, the fact that something is improbable DOES influence me to first deny it until I can interview the claimers to have a better idea of the place the miracle-claim originated."

That's not what you argued earlier. You didn't just say that you wanted evidence before believing something. You repeatedly said that you automatically reject all miracle claims, that we have to have a prior resurrection before we believe any resurrection account, etc. You aren't being consistent. But you act as though your latest revisions are what you've been saying all along.

Dave continues:

"I accept naturalistic explanations because I find them to be 'NOT BAD', thus 'GOOD', not simply because they are 'POSSIBLE'."

First of all, why should we accept an explanation just because it's "not bad"? That doesn't make sense. What we look for is the best explanation, not just one that's "not bad". And here's what you said earlier:

"If 6,000 people swore on a stack of bibles that they saw someone walking on water, I would rest upon the confirmed physical laws to laugh in their faces. Am I wrong for using uniformity of physical laws to discount thousands of eyewitnesses to a single event which they further interpret as a miracle?...I've never seen a bad naturalistic explanation for any alleged miracle, that's why I refuse to include miracles as part of true history. When you come up with the kind of miracle evidence that I cannot find a naturalistic explanation for, NOW you are talking the possibility of miracles."

You said that you only needed "a naturalistic explanation", and you gave us an example of "6,000 people" experiencing hallucinations or other psychological disorders. You said that you would "laugh in their faces" on the basis of nothing more than what you know of physical laws. Yet, now you claim to be doing research into each miracle, accepting naturalistic theories only if they better explain the data. Again, as I told you on the NTRM boards, you're either a really poor communicator or you aren't being consistent, if not both.

Dave said:

"You have thousands of eyewitnesses to the appearance of Mary in Fatima Portugal, and you don’t believe ONE of them because you say they have seriously misinterpreted the evidence."

You need to get specific. Tell me what it is about the Fatima reports that convinces you that 1.) they're false and 2.) they're comparable to the accounts of Jesus' resurrection. Remember, as Steve has told you repeatedly, we as Christians have no need to dismiss all claims of the supernatural, and we need you to be specific when you cite alleged parallels to Christian miracle claims. Vague comments like the one quoted above won't do.

Dave writes:

"And yes, videotapes don’t count, because rising from the dead could be easily faked outside of rigously controlled scientific conditions that make the natural explanations impossible."

Would you explain how a faking of Jesus' resurrection would be done? Remember, your naturalistic explanation must account for the empty tomb, the wounds in Jesus' resurrection body, His ability to walk through walls and perform other supernatural actions in that body, the conversion of the apostle Paul, etc. And you have to tell us how your naturalistic theory better explains the facts than does the Christian view.

Dave writes:

"Indeed, now that you mention videotapes, how WOULD a video 'prove' that somebody resurrected from death after being dead for most of three days? What, somebody climbing out of grave captured on video?"

I said that the resurrection was on tape, not just somebody walking out of a grave. We could extend it to having people video tape everything, from the moments before His death to the resurrection itself. Even if all of that happened, with thousands of witnesses and no detectable altering of the tapes, you could still offer a possible naturalistic explanation. The issue should be what explanation is best, not whether a naturalistic explanation is possible. But, in this latest post of yours, you seem to have acknowledged that fact. You've changed your position again.

What we're now waiting for is for you to stop making vague references to mass hallucinations and other psychological disorders and to start addressing the specific historical data and the specific relevant psychological data. My guess is that you aren't prepared to do it. You're largely making these things up as you go along, hoping that vague references to Justin Martyr's comments on paganism, Marian apparitions, etc. will mislead us into thinking that you're more knowledgeable than you actually are.

Dave concludes:

"The readers should know, also, that Jason E’s latest arguments in this thread are largely repetitions of what he argued earlier. He was refuted in the earlier discussions, but he keeps repeating himself over and over. Convinced? I didn’t think so."

You've repeatedly responded to us in that manner, but you're overlooking the fact that different people have different degrees of credibility. The fact that we say something doesn't mean that it would be equally credible coming from your keyboard.

# posted by Jason Engwer : 1/02/2006 9:12 AM
 

Dave Wave writes:

"Straw-man, I don’t argue that miracles don’t happen simply because I’ve never seen them. Go back and read my arguments. I said that their true occurance as reported has lower probability than do the naturalistic explanations of the same."

That's your latest argument, and you probably got it from reading my citations of William Craig. But you weren't using that argument earlier. Here's what you wrote on the NTRM boards a few days ago:

"to be plausible, he [Jesus] would have to have been resurrected, which I don't think is plausible, since historical reconstruction cannot occur unless one uses the present to interpret the past (principle of uniformity), which rule of historiography automatically excludes all allegations that would require suspensions of the known physical laws." (http://p102.ezboard.com/fntrmindiscussionboardfrm9.showMessage?topicID=1472.topic&index=3 )

"Do you have any non-controversial established cases of resurrection from the dead, so that I might stop seeing Jesus' resurrection as impossible and at least grant that it was within the realm of possibility?" (http://p102.ezboard.com/fntrmindiscussionboardfrm9.showMessage?topicID=1472.topic&index=3 )

But now you're telling us that we don't need any prior resurrections, that you examine miracle claims case-by-case, and that any naturalistic explanation must better explain the historical data. You began by ruling out all miracle claims with philosophical presuppositions. Now you've changed your approach. What will your approach be the next time you post? Who could possibly know?

Dave goes on to repeatedly miss Steve's point and misrepresent what Steve said. For example, Steve said:

"Fifth, you continue to the absence of evidence as if that were positive evidence for the impossibility of a given phenomenon. That is a completely invalid leap of logic."

And Dave replies:

"You now just contradicted your own statement from before in which you said: 'Lack of evidence for the existence of something is sufficient reason to disbelieve in its existence.' Well, does lack of evidence justify a denial, yes or no?"

So, Steve makes a comment about impossibility, and Dave responds by equating impossibility with lack of belief. But you can think that there's insufficient evidence for something without considering it impossible. Dave has ignored the context, in which Steve was replying to Dave's earlier comments about the alleged non-existence and impossibility of miracles. When Steve says that he would want evidence for something before believing it, Dave equates that comment with his own comment about concluding that miracles never happen. But the two aren't equivalent.

Then there's Dave's misrepresentation of sola scriptura:

"Could it be that your belief about the bible being totally sufficient for all things in life, left you very little reason to pursue other ancient religious miracle-claims?"

Who ever defined sola scriptura in such a way that "all things in life", including the truthfulness of "ancient religious miracle-claims", are completely addressed in scripture?

Then Dave goes on to make many other false arguments, including a repetition of the claim that pagan mythology involves virgin births, even when it's been explained to him that the pagan myths involve sexual intercourse and other significant differences from the Christian account.

Dave doesn't know much about the issues he's discussing. But he keeps writing anyway.

Before finishing this post of his that I'm responding to, Dave once again changes his standards in mid-discussion:

"I don’t care if the whole world swears that the true god is a flying pig who gives birth to talking crayons, the natural laws and their uniformity put the lie to it safely and automatically."

If natural laws disprove a miracle report "safely and automatically", then why has Dave claimed at other points that he doesn't reject miracle reports automatically, and that he accepts naturalistic explanations only if they better explain the historical data from case to case? If what Dave means is that naturalism is always the best explanation, regardless of the historical evidence cited for a miracle claim, then what's the significance of saying that he looks for the best explanation of the historical data? He's already decided, before examining the historical evidence, that naturalism offers the best explanation. Apparently, all that Dave is doing is assuming naturalism at the start, then defining his terms in such a way that only a naturalistic explanation of an event can be considered the best explanation.

# posted by Jason Engwer : 1/02/2006 10:16 AM

*****************************************************************************
 

The confutation of atheism-7

“Straw-man, I don’t argue that miracles don’t happen simply because I’ve never seen them.”

Now you’re moving the goal-post. You’ve repeatedly appealed to your personal experience as a reference-point for judging miracle claims. In fact, you yourself repeat that claim in the course of this very thread:

“Did you forget that I use ‘the present is the key to the past’? my own experience in life is my ultimate criteria through which I test the personal experiences claimed by others, and it must necessarily be in that order.”

Moving along:

“Look back on the dark ages with your precious hind-sight, and imagine the very likely scenario of a theologian asking an atheist-doctor to explain why that man over there is throwing himself on the ground, frothing at the mouth, and screaming at people. The theologian says “demons!”, the atheist says ’current medical science cannot provide a naturalistic explanation for that phenomena.’

Do you agree now that your ‘god-of-the-gaps’ reasoning is fallacious? Or, do you consider the existence of bi-polar epileptics too improbable to worry about?”

False dichotomy. Martyn Lloyd-Jones, who was a distinguished physician before he went into the ministry, has laid down criteria in which he differentiates the symptoms of ordinary mental illness from symptoms of possession. Cf. Healing & the Scriptures (T. Nelson, 1988), chap. 10.

“Steve said:
It might be a coincidence. It might also be an instance of what we call God’s uncovenanted mercies.

empiricism202:
You are avoiding the point.”

No, I’m not avoiding the point. I’m answering the point from my theological viewpoint.

“Why? Jesus said ‘with god all things are possible’ (Matthew 19:26).”

Irrelevant since God doesn’t will all possibilities and we can only act on God’s preceptive will.

“The uniformity of your life experience is a beautiful thing, isn’t it? I’m happy to see that although god might actually give the dealer several royal flushes in a row, you’ll still side with David Hume and say the deck is more than likely stacked.”

It’s a pity that you’re incapable of absorbing the basic distinction between miracle and providence no matter how often that distinction is explained to you.

Instead of discussing Christian theology on its own terms, you simply recast Christian categories into your own secular terms. Your arrows keep whizzing past the target.

“But you cannot fully discount the absence of god as a way to explain miracles. If I pray to the corner-of-the-coffee-table god, for more coffee in my cup right now, and my coffee cup doesn’t fill up, am I wrong to conclude that my prayer went unanswered because the god I prayed to didn’t actually exist in the first place?”

You evidently know nothing about the theology of prayer. In Scripture, prayer has certain conditions. This is not Aladdin’s lamp.

“Thanks for the info, but you now appear to be leaning on “that’s the way I see things” more so than in actually discrediting my arguments for coincidence. I realize that as a Christian you don’t view anything as mere coincidence, however, do you have anything more than this to refute my naturalistic interpretation of your miracle-claims?”

This goes to the question of competing worldviews, of which see more below.

“Straw-man fallacy, you know perfectly well that should I give you an anecdote from my personal life such as ‘my friend Billy came up with an irrefutable argument against god’s existence’ you would NOT suddenly stop being a Christian (i.e., give up your world-view) on the basis of anecdotal evidence alone, amen?”

The point at issue is the question of cumulative anecdotal evidence on the nature of historical causation.

“I’ve never seen evidence for god that couldn’t be explained naturalistically, so I guess you thus approve of my atheism? “

Those that turn their back to the sun cannot see the light.

“Sure, the miracle could nevertheless be true, but that’s irrelevant to people living 2000 years after the fact who have nothing but ancient religious propaganda to substantiate their claim.”

This is a very solipsistic standard of evidence. Witnesses from the distant past are no more or less reliable than your own contemporaries. What you’ve done is to give is a recipe for doubting everyone, past or present.

“I was a church-going bible-believing Calvinist for 20 years up until 1998.”

Ah, that explains a lot. An apostate brings a particular animosity to the debate.

“Do you say they are imaginary because of your reliance upon your uniform consistent experience of life from the past? Or because you can read my mind?”

Now you’re playing dumb. Flying elephants are just a variant on the old adage: “If pigs could fly.”

“I realize everybody has different experiences. What I would say is that you have mis-interpreted your experiences. If you handing me three uncheckable cases of alleged miracles from your personal family history over the internet says anything about what you think constitutes “evidence” for something, then I think this confirms my theory that your experience with the paranormal involved you in concluding something was supernatural LONG before the naturalistic explanations were found insufficient.”

I don’t object to naturalistic (read: providential) explanations when they make better sense of the data. But sometimes a supernaturalistic explanation makes better sense of the data.

“You now just contradicted your own statement from before in which you said: ‘Lack of evidence for the existence of something is sufficient reason to disbelieve in its existence.’

Well, does lack of evidence justify a denial, yes or no?”

No contradiction: lack of evidence is just that: the absence of evidence; zero evidence. It is not at all the same thing as positive evidence that something does not or cannot exist.

“If you had to choose, whose version of the Holocaust would you accept, Hitler’s or the Jews’?”

You persist in your studied equivocation over the meaning of “propaganda.”

“The fact that apologists have had no problems before in citing the extra-biblical miracle-claims they believe and don’t believe, in answer to my question, makes me wonder how exactly you think that extra-biblical miracle claims in ancient religious literature is a “rabbit trail”. Do you even KNOW of any? If so, why not just list one or two and tell me why you don’t or don’t accept it? Wouldn’t your views on specific ancient miracle-claims outside of the bible, function as a major test of your objectivity?”

To begin with, this is just a diversionary tactic on your part. If you want to give me a specific example of what you mean, I’m prepared to comment on it. But I’m not prepared to get into a long winding detour which is irrelevant to the veracity of Scripture.

And, as I’ve said before, an authentic report of an extra-Scriptural miracle does nothing to invalidate the claims of Scripture.

“So why exactly do you deny the existence of flying pigs, if it’s not due to your own experience of life, which you condemn atheists for using to deny stuff?”

One of your tactics is to present a simplistic version of the opposing position. I’ve explained my position on several occasions. Your comeback is always to drop my detailed qualifications.

“Go ahead and assume god doesn’t exist for the moment, and then tell why an atheist who does the above experiment should, if she is consistent with her atheism, think 'there’s no good reason to believe that the past will resemble the present.' In this case of dropping a ball.”

Once again you disregard the distinction between providence and miracle, along with treating the principle of uniformity as if it were synonymous with the resemblance between past and present, although that difference has been explained to you repeatedly.

“Do you think ‘our infinitesimal sampling on planet earth amounts to the tenth part of nothing,’ is nevertheless fully sufficient beyond reasonable doubt to deny the existence of flying elephants, yes or no? And don’t call my analogy here silly unless you have a good reason for why you believe flying elephants are silly.”

I’ve answered these questions time and again. Your problem is that you don’t want to listen because a qualified answer doesn’t serve your purpose.

“But you said I failed to distinguish personal causation from impersonal causation, and I still fail to see how failing to do this refutes the uniformity of nature that I observe. Uniformity is uniformity, regardless of whether it is a human being needing water to live, or leaves falling off trees, right? Why then say I need to distinguish between the different types?”

This whole debate is about miracles, which turns on supernatural agents.

“And WHY do you believe God’s ordinary providence obtains? Obviously the only reason you trust the bible’s statement to this effect is because you find that the real world operates exactly the way the bible says it does, right? Isn’t that a Calvinist relying on the uniformity of history to conclude that the bible’s world-view is correct?”

First of all, there are many different reasons for believing in Scripture, as I’ve already stated.

Second, I do see the real world operating exactly the way the Bible says it does. What I don’t see the real world operating exactly the way you say it does.

“I don’t understand why you are now quoting the bible, when not very long ago, you were trying to show objective rational and logical reasons to discount one’s full acceptance of the uniformity of historical causation and natural law. Have you switched the subject to simply telling me what you believe?”

Since God has not spoken to me the way he spoke to, say, Moses, announcing a miracle to come, I have no expectation that ordinary providence does not obtain in my particular case.

There are times when belief in ordinary providence is warranted as well as times when belief in extraordinary providence is warranted. It all depends on the personal and particular epistemic situation in which we find ourselves.

“If a ball hits the floor when it falls off a table, what more is causing the ball to travel toward the earth, other than the law of gravity?”

This is a disguised description, not a genuine explanation. The attractive force of gravity has no more explanatory value than the dormative power of sleeping pills. It’s just a label, like “instinct,” which we slap on a phenomenon for ease of reference. By itself it explains nothing.

“No scientists deny gravity…”

Again, you’re equivocating. No scientist denies the phenomenon, the effect. But to say that gravity is the cause is just a form of words with nothing to back it up.

“We haven’t gotten to god yet, we are still at the miracle level and trying to figure out whether atheist naturalism makes best use of historical evidence or whether some other world-view does.”

Even at a hypothetic level it is quite pertinent to compare and contrast the implications of a theistic and atheistic worldview as that bears on the character of historical causation.

“And your denial of the existence of talking crayons probably arises from your life experience (past), which never gave you a reason to believe they actually exist (present), right?”

We’ve been over this same ground many times before. Reread my qualified answer. Try to keep more than one idea in your head at a time.

“I’m rather waiting for you to mention just ONE miracle-claim in such literature (say, the 1st thru the 3rd centuries), and then tell me why you either do or don’t trust it.”

What’s the point?

“What’s wrong with having a dogmatic commitment to a world view which precludes one from ever accepting a certain explanation as a cause? Does your dogmatic world-view preclude you from ever accepting that atheism is best explained as the most logical and rational world view?”

This comes down to our respective reasons.

“I’ve got about 50,000 more witnesses to Mary appearing at Fatima Portugal…”

Now you’re changing the subject from your original denial of multiple-attestation to the Resurrection to the quantity of attestation.

“By the way, doesn’t your rebuttal of my methodology call the scientific method into question? If I drop a ball 500 times, and it falls to the ground 500 times, am I a fool for thinking it will do likewise on drop # 501?”

I have a better idea: try writing “providence” on the blackboard 500 hundred times. Once you learn to appreciate the concept you’ll be able to stop reiterating the straw man argument of equating providence with uniformity.

“Of course the burden of proof is on you. I’m asking why you have this extremely high view of bible inerrancy, which you flatly refuse to accord to any book in the world outside the bible. I ask “why” because I know the real reason, but I want you to actually admit it, because if you do so, you will then supply me with justification for part of my world-view, since you obviously don’t dare condemn me for what you yourself do.”

This is a non sequitur. To say that Scripture is inspired, and thus inerrant, does not imply that uninspired writings can never speak the truth.

“Let me know if you need further clarification.”

How about a specific example?

“I wasn’t asking you about biblical miracle reports. I was asking you your view on NON-biblical (read: extra-biblical) reports of miracles, in ancient literature.”

No, you were asking me why I have more faith in Scripture than in extra-biblical reports. That’s the question I’m answering.

“Sorry, the many instances of rank unbelief in the Israelites not only during but after their miraculous exodus from Egypt, makes them appear more than a bit too stupid for real life.”

Oh, I’d never underestimate the stupidity of unbelief. I see it on display on a daily basis.

“Since I’m not asking you what a spirit is NOT, all negative definitions are by definition irrelevant to the question.)

Perhaps we should back up and ask you to sustain your more general thesis that matter and energy aren’t the only things that exist? If that’s what you believe, what evidence did you base your belief in them on? Choose any specific example you currently believe in.”

I don’t need a negative definition. How about the mind and mental properties, which are irreducible to tangible properties? How about abstract objects like numbers?

“Please try to refrain from giving me bibliographies, and instead actually support your statements with specific evidence or arguments. Referral to books that support your viewpoint doesn’t a rebuttal make.”

You are not the only reader of this blog. And referring a reader to literature in which a detailed case has been made for a particular position is an accepted short-cut. Scholars do it all the time. That’s what footnotes are for.

“None of which qualifies as evidence…”

Citing case-studies which document the paranormal, contrary to the principle of uniformity, certainly qualify as prima facie evidence. That doesn’t cinch the argument, but it’s a legitimate starting-point by supplying the raw materials for further discussion.

The confutation of atheism-6

“Apparantly you’d rather water down Justin’s specification that what the Christians believe about Jesus is no different than what they believe about their gods, instead of taking Justin seriously…”

The fact that Justin may be a reliable source for what 2C Christians believed does not necessarily make him a reliable source for what 1C Christians believed. The NT is a 1C document.

Justin is also an authority on what 2C Jews of his acquaintance believed. That doesn’t make him an authority on what 1C Jews believed.

“But Justin Martyr was about 1900 years closer to the sources than are you ‘moder comparative mythologists’. Until you have some serious evidence to dispute Justin’s argument from parallels, the pagan-copy-cat-thesis stands. ‘NOTHING DIFFERENT’, remember?”

Justin is writing as an apologist, not an exegete. Justin is not an authority on Second Temple Judaism—the intellectual milieu within which the NT was composed. Justin is not an authority on the original intent of the Gospel writers.

As an apologist, Justin is seeking a point of common ground with pagans. That is known as audience adaptation. His accommodation has nothing to do with exegesis. It is simply an apologetic strategy for reaching his audience. And it comes naturally to him since he was raised as a pagan rather than a Jew.

“All that need be established is that Jesus fits the motif and that at least SOME of the parallels to jesus, existed BEFORE Jesus did, which is what Justin does for us when he cites retro-active demon activity before Christ to explain why Christ, coming later, looks so much like them. He would hardly refer to the activity of demons BEFORE THE BIRTH OF JESUS, in creating those parallels, if it is true, as apologists say, that the pagan stories mimicking Jesus only came AFTER Christianity.”

Justin is no authority on the history of Greco-Roman mythology. He is only an authority on Greco-Roman mythology as it was disseminated in his own time and place. Ancient writers had a very shaky grasp of historical chronology. Justin is no expert on when or where a given Greek or Roman myth originated.

Modern scholars often have a much better grasp of historical chronology and cultural diffusion than do ancient writers.

“I already explained that. Justin was citing the parallels to show that Jesus should be believed by the Greeks, if their criteria for a true god-man was virgin-birth, miracles, resurrection, ascension, etc. If that was the case, Justin is arguing that that Jesus is “in no way inferior” to them. Yet while he uses the close parallels in a different way for a different audience, that doesn’t erase a single one of them.”

Which bears out my point about audience adaptation and apologetic strategy.

“God appeared as a man many times in the Old Testament, so the only thing going for the “she was still a virgin after conception” is the question begging reliance on Matthew and Luke, who records in this case are the very question at issue.”

No, God appears as an angel in the OT. And in the NT accounts of the virgin birth it is the Holy Spirit who comes upon Mary.

“This is a general statement, which cannot be logically used to refute a specific statement, and Justin cites numerous specific parallels which merit closer inspection than just saying humans have a tendency to think the same way about stuff all over the world.”

True, and conservative scholar has subjected the alleged parallels to minute scrutiny and found them entirely wanting.

“I fail to see how any of this refutes my ‘present is key to past’ principle. Your professor wouldn’t even be able to compile his notes for that lecture nor could you even know what college you are supposed to be attending let alone what class you should be sitting in, if you reject ‘the present is the key to the past’. Sounds like pretty solid criteria to me.”

Dave continues to indulge in his bait-and-switch tactic. I don’t think any of us would deny that the past resembles the present. But that is not interchangeable with a closed causal continuum. As Jason and I have pointed out on more than one occasion, a Christian can well believe that God continues to perform miracles.

The fact that Dave constantly blurs this elementary distinction shows what a weak hand he has.

“If one of my friends said they won the Lottory for 10 million, I’d call him a liar to his face until he showed me a ridiculously sized bank account in his name.”

This says a lot about his choice of friends. With an attitude like that it’s surprising that he has any friends left.

Despite the odds, people do win the lottery. Despite the odds, it’s inevitable that someone will win the lottery—sooner or later. For Dave’s initial reaction to be the accusation that his friend is a liar until proven otherwise shows just how deeply irrational his atheism truly is.

“You have thousands of eyewitnesses to the appearance of Mary in Fatima Portugal, and you don’t believe ONE of them because you say they have seriously misinterpreted the evidence. So YOU are your own worst enemy when it comes to having thousands of eyewitness reports of a miracle.”

Let’s remember that Jason was responding to the following statement:

“That's exactly right. If 6,000 people swore on a stack of bibles that they saw someone walking on water, I would rest upon the confirmed physical laws to laugh in their faces.”

So Jason was responding to the knee-jerk assertion that eyewitness testimony can never, under any circumstances, overthrow Dave’s commitment to the principle of uniformity.

Jason’s position is not that we should always believe eyewitness testimony. There are additional considerations, to be weighed on a case-by-case basis. What I think Jason is objecting to is the preemptory dismissal of eyewitness testimony, however great the quality or quantity.

The confirmation of a physical law is, itself, dependent on human observation over time.

“The readers should know, also, that Jason E’s latest arguments in this thread are largely repetitions of what he argued earlier.”

Even if this were true, it is often necessary to repeat oneself when your opponent has raised an objection which you’ve answered, and he ignores your answer.

But, beyond that, Jason has, in fact, brought in a good deal of additional supporting material to substantiate his original arguments:

The Christian philosopher William Craig, who specializes in the study of Jesus' resurrection, has written some good responses to the sort of reasoning we're seeing from Dave Wave:

"The problem here can best be understood, I think, as a disagreement over what sort of explanations constitute live options for a best explanation of the facts. According to the pattern of inductive reasoning known as inference to the best explanation, in explaining a body of data, we first assemble a pool of live options and then pick from the pool, on the basis of certain criteria, that explanation which, if true, would best explain the data. The problem at hand is that scientific naturalists will not permit supernatural explanations even to be in the pool of live options. By contrast, I am open to scientific naturalistic explanations in the sense that I include naturalistic explanations in the pool of live options, for I assess such a explanations using the standard criteria for being a best explanation rather than dismiss such hypotheses out of hand. But [atheistic scholar Gerd] Lüdemann is so sure that supernatural explanations are wrong that he thinks himself justified in no longer being open to them: they cannot even be permitted into the pool of live options. But, of course, if only naturalistic explanations are permitted into the pool of live options, then the claim or proof that the Hallucination Hypothesis is the best explanation is hollow. For I could happily admit that of all the naturalistic explanations on tap, the best naturalistic explanation is the Hallucination Hypothesis. But, of course, the question is not whether the Hallucination Hypothesis is the best naturalistic explanation, but whether it is true. After all, we are interested in veracity, not orthodoxy (whether naturalistic or supernaturalistic). So in order to be sure that he is not excluding the true theory from even being considered, Lüdemann had better have pretty good reasons for limiting the pool of live options to naturalistic explanations. So what justification does Dr. Lüdemann give for this crucial presupposition of the inadmissibility of miracles? All he offers is a couple of one–sentence allusions to Hume and Kant….Now Lüdemann's procedure here of merely dropping names of famous philosophers is sadly all too typical of theologians….Hume’s argument against miracles was already refuted in the 18th century by Paley, Less, and Campbell, and most contemporary philosophers also reject it as fallacious, including such prominent philosophers of science as Richard Swinburne and John Earman and analytic philosophers such as George Mavrodes and William Alston. Even the atheist philosopher Antony Flew, himself a Hume scholar, admits that Hume’s argument is defective as it stands. As for philosophical realism, this is in fact the dominant view among philosophers today, at least in the analytic tradition. So if Lüdemann wants to reject the historicity of miracles on the basis of Hume and Kant, then he’s got a lot of explaining to do. Otherwise, his rejection of the resurrection hypothesis is based on a groundless presupposition. Reject that presupposition, and it’s pretty hard to deny that the resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation of the facts." ("Visions of Jesus")

"Contrary to [Michael] Goulder, it is not the case that a supernatural explanation should be considered only 'when totally at a loss for a natural one' (p. 102), for, after all, any explanation has some explanatory scope, explanatory power, plausibility, etc. To say that one must be totally at a loss is a subterfuge for saying that we should never consider a supernatural explanation. Rather, as [Stephen] Davis suggests, one may adopt a supernatural explanation just in case all natural explanations fail to meet as successfully the criteria for a best explanation as a supernatural one. Davis goes on to explain that a proper understanding of the concept of miracle involves neither a violation of natural laws nor denial of the scientific method (pp. 74-75; cf. p. 105). Davis rightly recognizes that at root the question of miracles is whether supernaturalism is tenable, or a live option (p. 76)." (in Paul Copan and Ronald Tacelli, editors, Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment? [Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000], p. 203)

Regarding alleged pagan parallels to the virgin birth account, Craig Keener has written:

"Yet most alleged parallels to the virgin birth (see Allen 1977: 19; Soares Prabhu 1976: 5-6; cf. Grant 1986: 64) are hopelessly distant, at best representing supernatural births of some kind (Barrett 1966: 6-10; Brown 1977: 522-23; Davies and Allison 1988: 214-15; Hagner 1993: 17; even further are ancient biological views, e.g., Arist. Gen. An. 3.6.5; Ep. Arist. 165). Certainly pagan stories of divine impregnation, which typically involve seduction (e.g., Ovid Metam. 3.260-61) or rape (Ovid Metam. 3.1-2), bear no resemblance to a virgin birth. Even most proposed Jewish parallels (Daube 1973: 6-9; cf. also 2 Enoch 71; Gen. Rab. 53:6) are too late or on closer examination have little merit (cf. Brown 1977: 523-24); Philo’s claims that God supernaturally opened wombs (Schweizer 1975: 33; cf. Vermes 1973: 220) probably simply imply that only God can provide conception (cf. Gen 30:2; cf. Meier 1991a: 221-22)." (A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], pp. 83-84)

Ben Witherington comments that "most scholars" think that the infancy narratives are more like Jewish infancy narratives than pagan birth legends (in Joel B. Green, et al., editors, Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels [Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1992], p. 60). Darrell Bock writes that there’s a "consensus" among scholars to reject the view that the virgin birth was derived from pagan mythology (Luke, Volume 1, 1:1-9:50 [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1994], n. 4 on p. 103).

And if Dave Wave wants to cite Justin Martyr, he ought to include what Justin said elsewhere about the uniqueness of the virgin birth account:

"Now it is evident to all, that in the race of Abraham according to the flesh no one has been born of a virgin, or is said to have been born of a virgin, save this our Christ." (Dialogue With Trypho, 66)

As Craig Blomberg explains:

"A careful reading of the patristic evidence suggests that indeed the vast majority of early Christians did believe that the type of information the Gospel writers communicated was historical fact, even as they recognized the more superficial parallels with the mythology of other worldviews" (cited in Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2004], p. 327, n. 27)

Sunday, January 01, 2006

The confutation of atheism-5

“When Justin appeals to the retroactive demon-activity who imitated Jesus' attribute before Jesus was born, this is a very desperate attempt to try and justify why the greek gods look and sound so much like Jesus, and in this way he pretty much seals the coffin lid on top of modern apologetic claims that the parallels between Jesus and earlier greek gods are not significant enough to merit serious consideration.”

Justin offers them as examples of false records, myths of demons not as equal parallels. He does not offer them to say “Look, this is why you should believe in Christ,” as if Jupiter is a type of the biblical God, he offers them saying, “We acknowledge that there a some parallels, but they are demonic in origin and denigrate the truth.” As such the argument is comparison by way of contrast.

There is a difference in the way Justin cites them and the way you cite them. There is also a difference in the way Celsus, for example, cites them. He engages in comparative mythology at some points himself. The tendency of the early pagan critics was to cite them as disanalogous, not analogous, and the Christians that cited them as falsely analogical; they did not cite them as geneaological. They are cited as comparisons for the sake of contrast.

In contrast, modern comparative mythologists allege not that they are analogical but that they are genealogical. In order for a parallel to be valid, it has to genealogical, not simply analogical.

From Metzger: “Even when the parallels are actual and not imaginary, their significance for purposes of comparison will depend upon whether they are genealogical and not merely analogical parallels. That is to say, one must inquire whether the similarities have arisen from more or less equal religious experience, due to equality of what may be called psychic pitch and equality of outward conditions, or whether they are due to borrowing one from the other. Interesting as the parallels are which Sir James G. Frazercollected from the four corners of the earth in his monumental work, The Golden Bough, by no means all of them are to be regarded as the result of demonstrable borrowing. In seeking connections it is not enough (as F. C.Conybeare pointed out) “for one agent or institution or belief merely to remind us of another. Before we assert literary or traditional connection
between similar elements in story and myth, we must satisfy ourselves that such communication was possible.”

It is a fact that in various spheres close similarities even in phraseology have been discovered which are related to each other by nothing more direct than analogy. For example, in a letter published in The (London) Times at the end of July, 1938, the late Professor Harold Temperley pointed out two quite remarkable parallels between speeches made by Canning in 1823 and 1826 and their modem counterparts in Neville Chamberlain’s utterances on July 26, 1938. In a subsequent letter, the Prime Minister disclaimed having previously read either of Canning’s speeches, and concluded that the parallels “indicate simply the continuity of English thought in somewhat similar circumstances, even after an interval of more than a hundred years.”

Or, to take an example from ancient times, a close parallel to the docetism expressed in the apocryphal Acts of John has been discovered in Ovid’s Fasti. It would be vain, however, to imagine that Greek Christian writers were indebted to Ovid for their docetic interpretation of Christ’s sufferings. So too, as Toynbee points out in his Study of History, the uniformity of human nature sometimes produces strikingly similar results in similar situations where there can be no suspicion of any historical bridge by which the tradition could have been mediated from one culture to the other.

Even if the parallels are genealogical, you have to be able to prove they moved in a particular direction. You need to prove, not assume, that Christians borrowed from the pagans and not vice versa, and you need to come up with a reasonable argument that Jews would be easily persuaded to borrow from those pagan myths, when the evidence is to the contrary. Why would a Jew, whom the pagans of the 2nd century tell us were renown for their separatism, find a myth constructed from Greco-Roman pagan myths persuasive?

See Metzger, M. “Methodology in the Study of the Mystery Religions and Christianity,” Historical & Literary Studies: Pagan, Jewish, & Christian
(Eerdmans 1968), 1-24

Celsus himself cited the myths of Danae and Antiope is parallels from which he alleges the Christians copied their virgin birth story. Yet in both of those, Zeus impregnates the ladies through sex, so we do not have a virgin birth, because the women who give birth are not virgins. So, Celsus has made an invalid parallel.

Those who pilfer the pagan myths for such parallels need to look to the most obvious place first: the Old Testament. They would save themselves much time. Of course, this might mean actually dealing with the text of the Bible fairly. God forbid you make that attempt. The virgin birth is the climax of several types: Seth, Isaac, Moses, Samson, Samuel, John the Baptist. That is the universe of discourse in which the narrative of the virgin birth moves.

Additionally, basing your assertions on the priniciple of uniformity in historiography requires a supporting argument.

You are basing your use of the principle on highly disputed grounds. Historiography is a highly fragmented discipline.

Structural determinism is only one principle in historiography. There is another: liberty and contingency, the idea that it is uniformly true that we should expect the unexpected. I have a decree in history, and I still remember my professors'lectures on this idea. The classic charge is that structural determinism tends to make for error laden explanation, particularly at the macro-level, a tendency toward single factor explanations, and a tendency toward ignoring the multiplicity of possible pathways by which an explanation may be reached. These obscure and do not illuminate the events under study.

This is not a position held exclusively by Christians or theists. A Christian can argue his position on the basis of this principle of contingency without appeal to his own worldview and as means to justify his inclusion of the miraculous. One need simply hold the principle of contingency over the principle of uniformity, look over the textual data, the character of the witnesses, et. al., and judge the material reliable.

Low probability does not rule out contingent explanations. I believe it was Whaley that argued that if we make the principle of uniformity stipulative we end up excluding many historical events including those surrounding Napolean. History does not depend on repeatability. It depends on testimony.

The odds of being dealt a 13-card suit in Bridge is 1 in 159,000,000,000; if we have several witnesses of high character who record this event at the level of the resurrection, should it be believed or rejected on the basis of probability? It happened. Probability is not a reason to reject it having happened if the testimony is reliable.

# posted by GeneMBridges : 1/01/2006 2:28 PM

The readers should recognize by now that Dave Wave is a poor writer, and that he often is incoherent and inconsistent. If you show him to be wrong on a subject, he'll change his argument in the middle of the discussion or say that he accepts your refutation, but only for the sake of argument. He'll claim at one point that he needs evidence for a resurrection other than Jesus' resurrection before he can consider the possibility that Jesus rose from the dead. But when you explain to Dave that we would never be able to prove the first resurrection if every resurrection claim needs a prior example before being considered, he changes his approach. He doesn't admit that he was wrong. Instead, he claims that he's willing to accept your approach, but only for the sake of argument. Or he'll act as if his new position is what he's been arguing all along. In other words, instead of admitting that he was wrong, he adopts his opponent's position and claims that he's only doing it for the sake of argument, or he changes his argument without admitting the change.

Despite the incoherence and inconsistency of so much of what Dave writes, he does occasionally say something that's clear and so easily refuted as to not allow him much room for revision. In his reply to Steve Hays in this thread, Dave wrote:

"I've never seen a bad naturalistic explanation for any alleged miracle, that's why I refuse to include miracles as part of true history. When you come up with the kind of miracle evidence that I cannot find a naturalistic explanation for, NOW you are talking the possibility of miracles."

Notice the multiple flaws in Dave's reasoning. The fact that a naturalistic explanation is possible doesn't make it the best explanation. According to Dave's logic, we would still be justified in rejecting the resurrection of Jesus even if we had multiple video tapes of the event and thousands of eyewitness accounts. After all, it's possible to come up with naturalistic explanations of such evidence. Maybe all of the video tapes were altered by some means that we don't know how to detect. And maybe all of the eyewitnesses were hallucinating. Therefore, since a naturalistic explanation is possible, we're justified in dismissing multiple video tapes and thousands of eyewitnesses.

The readers should know, also, that Dave Wave's latest arguments in this thread are largely repetitions of what he argued earlier. He was refuted in the earlier discussions, but he keeps repeating himself over and over.

# posted by Jason Engwer : 1/01/2006 3:58 PM

*************************************************************

The confutation of atheism-4

“Second, will you accept my own testimony that miracles can't happen, or will you insist that evaluation of my claim calls for looking at more evidence than simply my personal testimony?”

These are hardly symmetrical claims. The fact that folks living along the equator have never seen snow doesn’t prove that snow can’t happen. And it doesn’t cancel out the experience of those living in snowy regions of the globe. The local absence of evidence for x does not negate the positive evidence for x elsewhere.

“THird, I think it's extremely stupid for modern medical science to assume that they know everything about the natural possibilities of the human body. How about you? As such, I am NOT prepared to rule out a natural cause merely because current medical science cannot figure out how the human body healed itself. Now, do you have evidence that modern medical science has plumbed the absolute limitations of the body's natural ability to heal itself? Or does there exist the possibility that the human body can do things naturally that modern medical science cannot currently explain?”

Many things are possible. But bare possibility is a very poor rule of evidence. In the nature of the case, there is no evidence for an unknown ability, while there is evidence of the existence of a prayer-answering God.

“I hoped to find a $20 bill on the ground one day last year when i was without work and hungry. Lo and behold....I found a $20 bill that very same day in the parking lot of the labor union downtown.

Do you conclude that the atheist mind has the ability to create material objects via sheer wishful thinking? Or are you slow to discount the possibility of conicidence?”

It might be a coincidence. It might also be an instance of what we call God’s uncovenanted mercies.

“My proof that your #2 miracle was only coincidence then, would be to ask you how many times you prayed for something and DIDN'T get it.”

Once again, these are hardly symmetrical claims. Some answers to prayer are so counterintutive that they demand a supernatural explanation. If I’m in a poker game, and every hand my opponent plays is a royal flush, I infer that the deck is stacked. The fact that in most games the sequence is random in no way cancels out my well-founded suspicion that, in this case, the player is in collusion with the casino. Indeed, it is precisely because a royal flush is so rare that I attribute such an extraordinary run of luck to the illicit dexterity of the dealer. And if God deals me a miraculous hand, that evidence is not diluted by however many cases of unanswered prayer.

“Yeah, i'd like to see you argue against it being a conicidence. Surely you agree that life is full of coincidences which have no deeper significance that statistical certainty?”

As a Calvinist, I don’t believe that anything is merely coincidental.

“Maybe because no self-respecting investigator will accept anecdotal evidence as successfuly refuting his personal world-view?”

This is a self-defeating statement from someone who believes in the possibility of reconstructing history. Most of our historical knowledge is anecdotal.

“Whether I ‘like’ the evidence or not, is irrelevant. Unless you are willing to say that you too reject evidence that you don't ‘like’? If so, then your response is pointless, EVERYBODY rejects evidence that they don't ‘like, in the sense that you will admit you do.”

Whether you like it or not is quite relevant when you stake your claim on a specious consequentialist argument.

“You yourself, in your hasty rejection of my "talking-crayon" analogy, contradict your above response, since by denying the possibility of talking crayons, you have denied all possibility of them ever being proved to you at any time, and this means you think historical causation is too uniform to allow the possibility of such things. Are you therefore subjecting yourself now to the very criticism of being "self-serving" which you throw at me? As a skeptic, I doubt it.”

One doesn’t have to be a signatory to the principle of uniformity to disbelieve in the existence of something. Lack of evidence for the existence of something is sufficient reason to disbelieve in its existence.

“I committ no special pleading, I depend primarily on my own personal experience of life to decide whether some report of an event is more probably true or more likely false.”

To extrapolate from your provincial experience to categorical claims about the uniformity of cause and effect throughout time and space would be an embarrassment to any self-respecting empiricist.

I’d had that if you spent more time around more Christians, your experience might be quite different.

“Silly? Artificial? Sure sounds like you only label my pink elephant analogy with those words because you are relying on the uniform absence of such monsters from your personal past experience of life. If not, then how exactly did you come to know that such things as flying elephants are indeed safely presumed to be ‘silly’ and ‘artificial’?”

To begin with, you are using them because you yourself regard them as silly, and you then try to tar the Biblical miracles with the same brush ofguilt by association.

Second, I don’t have to believe in the principle of uniformity to say that flying elephants are artificial. I know where they come from. They are imaginary counterexamples introduced into the discussion for no other reason than to construct a ridiculous argument from analogy.

Third, my personal experience is not the same as yours. My experience includes more than one brush with the supernatural or paranormal.

Fourth, I have never made my personal experience the gold standard of what is possible or impossible.

Fifth, you continue to the absence of evidence as if that were positive evidence for the impossibility of a given phenomenon. That is a completely invalid leap of logic.

Sixth, is it possible for God to levitate an elephant? Yes, but I have no reason to believe that he has done so.

“What then have you proven I did wrong, since you agree that the gospels are promoting the cause of Jesus (i.e., propadanda)? Just because I also doubt their veracity doesn't mean I'm wrong to refer to them as promoting the cause of Jesus.”

You are treating promotion and propaganda as synonymous, which they are not. Their semantic domain may overlap, but it does not coincide.

“Propaganda” can either have a neutral meaning or, more commonly, in popular usage, a pejorative meaning. You are deliberately trading on this ambiguity to insinuate that the Gospels are propaganda in the pejorative sense, which doesn’t follow from the mere fact that they promote the cause of Christ.

“How does my question ask you to generalize? You surely think the NT miracle reports are reliable, do you thus think that the question "do you accept miracle reports in the New Testament as reliable" thus is asking you to generalize?”

Now you’re quoting me out of context. If you ask me about the NT, you are posing a specific question. If you ask me about unspecified “extra-biblical reports,” I have no comment since your question is too vague to be answerable. Moreover, there’s no burden on me to comment on extra-biblical reports” since their truth or falsity is independent of the Bible’s veracity.

I’m under no obligation to go down a rabbit trail just because you order me to play fetch the ball. I have my own priorities.

“Again, you call flying pigs "ridiculous". Is this because of your prior committment to the uniformity of historical causation, which you are keeping secret from us? Or do you deny the existence of flying pigs only because you've never seen evidence of them? If because you never saw evidence of them, and you think you are thus justified to disbelieve on the basis of a lack of evidence, then you are hypocritical IF you say atheists are not justified to disbelieve in God merely via lack of evidence. You disbelieve all sorts of claims because of a lack of evidence, therefore don't expect from us more than you expect of yourself.”

I don’t say that atheists are not justified to disbelieve in God for lack of evidence. Rather, they are not justified because they disbelieve despite the evidence.

“Gee Steve, judging by your slanted rules of evidence without giving us evidence for your rules is not a rational way for you to make a case for your own position or to oppose mine,now is it?”

My rules of evidence are very straightforward. Our methodology should be adapted to the object of knowledge. If you want to design an effective fishnet, it’s a good idea to study a few fish before you string the net.

“For the same reason you'd expect atheist to guess that YOU would agree that the cogency of a historical rule is independent of it's theistic ramifications.”

No, I don’t agree that historiography is a value-free discipline, sealed away from the nature of the world—be it theistic or atheistic.

The existence or nonexistence of God makes a world of difference regarding what, if anything, is possible. And apart from divine providence, there’s no good reason to believe that the past will resemble the present.

“What evidence would you accept that history is indeed uniform, so that I will know what exactly will convince you?”

In the nature of the case, the only evidence for uniformity is uniform evidence. Hence, uniformity will always be, at best, underdetermined by the evidence. There can be no evidence for uniformity short of observing uniformity throughout time and space, of which our infinitesimal sampling on planet earth amounts to the tenth part of nothing.

By contrast, you only need one well-established exception to disprove uniformity.

“I fail to see how my failure to distinguish personal causation from impersonal causation, somehow refutes my general observation of seeing the same result over and over. I don't care if a tree falls off a mountain because the wind blew it off (cyclical process of nature, impersonal causation) or because you cut it off (personal causation), the distinction between personal causation and impersonal causation doesn't threaten my reliance upon the uniformity of the applicable natural law (i.e., gravity still exerts a force on the tree after it, for whatever reason, detaches from the mountain.”

The flaw in your comparison is that both the tree and the lumberjack are subject to gravity. God, however, is not subject to gravity. His personal agency can suspend gravity or any other “natural law.”

“By the way, since I can never tell the universe what to do, and it is in fact an open system (according to you), and thus not guaranteed to work the same way as it has in the past, what are the chances that you will stand under that brick while I let it go, in order to show everybody on the street how utterly fallacious the atheist version of the principle of uniformity really is?

Naw, you are just as confident in the uniformity of natural law as any atheist, at least when it comes to standing under bricks that people are releasing above your head. You live by that principle everyday and only choose to controvert it in philosophical discourse because it actually can be used to threaten the very book and faith you have staked you whole life and entire reputation on.”

You seem to suffer from a mental block when it comes to thinking outside your own conceptual box. To be an effective critic you need to cultivate critical detachment—the ability to appreciate the implications of the opposing position.

All other things being equal, I believe that God’s ordinary providence obtains. Absent a reason to the contrary, I assume that if I release a brick it will fall to the ground.

That is not based on belief in some ironclad system of natural law. Rather, that is based on belief in the ordinary providence of God.

But all other things are not always equal. In Scripture, God tells certain men that he’s going to perform a miracle, and he does so. If you had good reason to believe that ordinary providence was not in place, then you’d have good reason to depart from standard operating procedure.

“...your distinction between prescriptive and descriptive is necessarily false, since it would be logically impossible to have a natural law that is only descriptive and not prescriptive. For example, how can the natural law "gravity affects al material objects on the face of the earth" be ONLY descripive, without such description logically necessitating a PREscription (i.e., it always works that way, or, no material object is an exception)?”

There are a number of things wrong with this claim. You reify natural laws as if a natural law were making things happen. A natural law is simply a relation. No one has ever seen gravity. Gravity is an unobservable. All we perceive is a certain effect. We then postulate a hidden mechanism to account for the correlation.

Newton had one theory. Einstein had another. But then there’s the problem of quantum gravity.

You are also confounding different types of necessity, as if natural necessity (assuming there is such a thing) is interchangeable with logical necessity.

More to the point, this is irrelevant to the case for miracles. Natural laws are only binding on the creature, not the Creator. They are no barrier to God’s field of action.

“Does your use of my exact same reasoning then suggest that you don't really think that the excuse 'there's no evidence' is really that fallacious after all? Or did you screw up royally just now?”

My reasoning is not the same as yours. There is evidence for miracles. There is no evidence for talking crayons.

“You are talking to an atheist, who is absolutely against miracles as you know from our previous exchanges, and you don't understand how I can equate Jesus' resurrection with something that is "silly"?

Since you obviously know that I would claim the resurrection of Jesus is silly AND befect of all evidence, you are obviously talking more to the Christian readers than you are to the person whose presuppositions you should be able to anticipate.”

This is another example of your incapacity for critical detachment. Even if you don’t believe in the Resurrection, yet considered as a hypothetical proposition, it is a purposeful event in a way that a talking crayon is not.

“Well gee, infidels.org is just a mouseclick away, so why should I re-invent the wheel with you? Do you ever show up on atheist message forums?”

As a matter of fact, I knew Jeff Lowder long before he founded the Secular Web.

“It is not our duty to do a believer’s reading and research for him. If a believer can study conservative attacks on the non-inerrancy of Scripture, he can just as well study the many essays, articles, commentaries, and monographs which rebut the non-inerrancy attacks on Scripture.”

As a rule, believers read unbelievers, but unbelievers never read believers. Just compare the author index of a liberal and conservative introduction to the Bible.

The confutation of atheism-3

“My point was your rejection of certain miracle claims in ancient literature, and had nothing to do with how closely the details of the Christian virgin-birth story parallel other divine-birth stories.”

I have neither affirmed nor denied the miracle claims in ancient literature. That is only a question I could answer on a case-by-case basis. There is no uniform answer to such a vacuous question.

“In spite of this irrelevancy, you also commit the no-true-scottsman fallacy, by trying to get rid of the similarities via the citation of different details. By your logic, if two trucks have different sets of tires, are colored differently, one is stick, the other automatic, one is 4x4, the other not, and one has tinted windows, while the other doesn't, then they must not be the same make and model. ridiculous. We learn from your mistake then that the general similarities require explanation if we allege that both items are originate from entirely different points, and that citation of differences in various details does NOT ‘outweigh’ the similarities.”

The problem is not with superficial differences in detail. The problem is with the differing and diverse background conditions. If you are going to indulge in comparative mythology, and if you are trying to establish a relation of literary dependence, then the fact that literary allusions ground the accounts of the virgin birth in OT motifs should tell you that those accounts are literarily dependent on the OT rather than Greco-Roman mythology. If there are any genealogical parallels, that’s where to look. Your extraneous illustration of two trucks is irrelevant to responsible literary analysis.

Citing Justin Martyr does nothing to change the fact that the life of Christ is modeled on various OT paradigms.

The NT is a Jewish book. You need to read the NT through Jewish eyes. Justin was a Gentile, not a Jew. He assumes a Greco-Roman point of reference because that represents his intellectual background. To confound his intellectual background with the background of the NT writers is a pretty serious blunder.

Justin is doing the best he can with the intellectual resources at his disposal, but he reflects the limitations of his cultural conditioning. Second Temple Judaism is the proper point of reference.

For some good online material concerning comparative mythology, cf.

http://www.frontline-apologetics.com/mystery_religions_early_christianity.htm

http://www.leaderu.com/everystudent/easter/articles/yama.htm
“What's wrong with making sure that my eyes haven't decieved me, except that such a test makes it harder on miracle-workers to dazzle me?”

Nothing wrong with that except that your dogmatic commitment to methodological naturalism precludes you from ever accepting a supernatural cause, as when you say, just a few lines below, that “even if you were to come up with a modern-day miracle report that I couldn't explain away naturalistically, that STILL doesn't suddenly mean that miracles are true or possible.”

For you, it isn’t a question of the quality or quantity of evidence.

“I guess you only offer unsupported assertions because you said that in a form that Jason E said was primarily for the benefit of Christians.”

The fact that Jesus is not a dead man amoldering in the grave, but is a living, risen Savior, is asserted or assumed throughout the NT. That’s multiple-attestation.

“Perhaps that benefits the believers to talk like that, but all you are doing for me is reminding me that you forgot how I prioritize the uniformity of the physical laws over eyewitness testimony.”

Without eyewitness testimony you have no evidence for the uniformity of physical laws. And, unfortunately for you, that same database includes testimony to the miraculous.

“That's exactly right. If 6,000 people swore on a stack of bibles that they saw someone walking on water, I would rest upon the confirmed physical laws to laugh in their faces.”

Which bears out my point that, for you, it isn’t a question of the quality or quantity of evidence.

“Am I wrong for using uniformity of physical laws to discount thousands of eyewitnesses to a single event which they further interpret as a miracle? Why? Isn't eyewitness testimony more prone to false reporting and prone to complex problems such as group-think and cognitive dissonance, than is, say, the unanimous consent of the scientific community that earth's gravity affects all material objects? WHo among the two groups, has more probability of being wrong?”

All you’ve done is to arbitrarily privilege one set of observers over another. Scientists are just as subject to groupthink and cognitive dissonance as anyone else.

In addition, many scientists also believe in miracles.

“Should we also look through history to see how many times the scientific method has resulted in incorrect results and how many times people misinterpreted some event as a miracle?”

This question is too vague to be answerable—a favorite tactic of yours.

“No historian on earth automatically believes everything he sees written in an ancient religious propaganda, outside the bible.”

And just as many scientists believe in miracles, so do many historians.

Now you’re resorting to a straw man argument. This isn’t a choice between universal scepticism and universal credulity.

“Therefore, you either need to argue that the bible deserves to be trusted far more so than other similar religious docuents…”

Yes, it does deserve to be trusted for more since there are many reasons for believing the Bible that do not carry over to other religious documents.

“Or you need to admit that you are cornered when asked to produce a single example of extra-biblical religious propaganda which you trust to tell the facts only, no embellishments or errors. You dance around my request that you name this extra-biblical source you trust like the bible, because the fact is that you dismiss the full facticity of ALL non-biblical ancient religious propaganda, which then makes your acceptance of the bible look like a child's game of playing favorites, also known special pleading.”

I don’t produce a single example because the burden of proof is not on me to produce a single example. I’m not trying to prove “extra-biblical religious propaganda,” and the veracity of the Bible is independent of that question.

All you’ve done is to pose a trick question. I am not privy to what you have in mind by “extra-biblical religious propaganda.” The onus is not on me to divine what examples you may have in mind.

If you want a specific answer, pose a specific question.

“That will stand against you until the day you decide to actually provide evidence that people should trust the bible more than the non-biblical ancient religious literature which you summarily reject from the "report-the-facts-only" category.

Again, what evidence do you use to support your premise that the New Testament, for example, is completely historically trustworthy, while you deny this high trust to every other non-biblical ancient religious document? Can you answer that directly by actually giving said evidence? I'm betting you can't. Prove me wrong.”

Once again you’ve rigged the question by assuming that the case for the veracity of Scripture can only be made in comparison and contrast to the case for “extra-biblical religious propaganda,” whatever that means.

These are two logically distinct and separable questions.

In addition, there’s a difference between proof and persuasion. Persuasion is person-variable. There’s no uniform answer to what different men will find persuasive since different men are impressed by different types of evidence.

Some men are more empirical, others more philosophical, still others more existential. There are many possible reasons for believing in the Bible.

Existential readers are impressed by its psychological realism, by the way in which the men and women depicted in Scripture act just like you’d expect real men and women to act in real life situations.

They are also impressed by the way in which they can find themselves in Scripture, by the “shock of recognition” as it offers an uncannily accurate diagnosis of their own condition. As they identify with the spiritual experience of David or Paul.

Likewise, they are impressed by the work of grace in the lives of the saints, who model their lives on Scripture.

Empirical readers are more impressed by patterns of prophetic and typological fulfillment as seemingly divergent OT motifs suddenly converge in the NT on the person and work of Christ.

They are also impressed by the way in which Bible history coincides in time and place with extra-Biblical history, as borne out by Biblical archeology and the like.

Or, to take a couple of detailed examples, the synoptic problem affords us an independent check on how Matthew and Luke react one of their sources (assuming Markan priority). We can see for ourselves how extremely conscientious and conservative they are in the minor changes they make to Mark.

Or, for another example, Andreas Köstenberger has an excursus on “Johannine Asides” in his Encountering John (Baker 2003), 250-52.

Now, if John were just making up scenes and speeches as he went along, he would not include these parenthetical comments. Rather, he would incorporate the interpretation directly into the narrative.

These editorial asides only make sense if the composition of the Fourth Gospel is a two-stage process in which he first records what was actually said and done, as he saw it and heard it, and then glosses the record for the benefit of readers who weren’t there and wouldn’t be privy to the explanatory context.

Philosophical readers are more impressed by the explanatory power of Scripture in its philosophy of history.

“But you haven't demonstrated how my belief that the causal system is closed, is any less warranted by the evidence, than is your automatic rejection of talking crayons from the causal system.”

That’s a short question with a long answer--which would involve us in the theistic proofs, a la the alethic, ontological, cosmological, teleological, axiological, and transcendental arguments, &c.

“Ok, so Christians can define the uniformity of the past in a way that they wish, and thus may choose to admit to believing in ‘uniformity’, without necessarily telling the hearers that their sort is quite different from atheist uniformity. Big Deal! How does that threaten the atheist version in the least?”

It means that your version ceases to be the standard of reference.

“Yes, that's because any such idea as ‘outside the universe’ sounds like utter nonsense to me. Don't you mean "everything that exists" when you say "universe"? If so, then logically there CAN't be anything outside the realm of existing things to enter that box. But if not, where is your proof that ‘universe’ doesn't refer to all existing things? What then.....will you tell me you believe that certain things exist outside the realm of all existing things? Please justify your seemingly arbitrary limitation upon a word that is supposed to refer to ALL because it starts with ‘UNI’. I've got space, matter, time and energy, and it's the universe. If you got something more than these things, please give your evidence of it.”

The “universe” denotes the physical universe. That doesn’t encompass the whole of reality by a long shot. The universe concretely exemplifies abstract universals, properties, propositions, numbers, possible worlds, consciousness, qualia, minds, souls, spirits, &c.

That’s another reason you can’t reduce the universe as a closed system.

There’s an extensive body of literature on this various aspects of this subject, such as: R. Adams, “God, Possibility, & Kant,” Faith and Philosophy 17/4 (October 2000), 425-440; Davis, B. The Metaphysics of Theism & Modality (Peter Lang 2001; B. Hale, Abstract Objects (Oxford 1987); J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism (MIT Press, 1998);
B. Leftow, Divine Ideas (Cornell, forthcoming); A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford 1974); G. Welty, An Examination of Theistic Conceptual Realism as an Alternative to Theistic Activism (MPhil thesis, Oxford 2000 [http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/]); Theistic Conceptual Realism: The Case For Identifying Abstract Objects With Divine Ideas (DPhil diss., Oxford, forthcoming); C. Wright, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen 1983).
http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/PhilThesis.html

As well as: J. Byl, The Divine Challenge (Banner of Truth 2004); R. Chisholm, “Mind,” H. Burkhardt & B. Smith, eds. Handbook of Metaphysics & Ontology (Philosophia Verlag 1991), 2:553-557; J. Cooper, Body, Soul, & Life Everlasting (Regent 1995); J. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (Springer-Verlag Telos 1994); J. Foster, The Immaterial Self (Routledge 1996); H. Lewis, The Elusive Mind (Allen & Uwin 1969); R. Paterson, Philosophy and the Belief in a Life After Death (Macmillan 1995); R. Penrose, The Road to Reality (Knopf 2004); J. Schwartz & S. Begley, The Mind & the Brain (Regan 2003); J. Smythies, The Wall of Plato’s Cave (Avebury 1994); J. Smythies & J. Beloff, The Case for Dualism (U. of Virginia 1989); C. Taliaferro, Consciousness & the Mind of God (Cambridge 1994); P. Unger, All the Power in the World (Oxford 2005); http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/soul.htm

“First, what is your advice to people who ask you whether they should believe a miracle report from a personal family situation reported by somebody else to them over the internet?”

I am simply playing by your own rules. A little below this you said: “our own life experience also tells us what is more likely true and what is more likely false. Whether it's always right or not is irrelevant to my point that past testimony from those who went before us is NOT the only source of information we have on the subject of uniformity of natural law. “

As well as: “I depend primarily on my own personal experience of life to decide whether some report of an event is more probably true or more likely false.”

So if personal experience can supply evidence that miracles don’t happen, then personal experience can also supply evidence that miracles do happen. Or do you take exception when I borrow a page from your own playbook?

If so, there’s also an extensive body of literature documenting the occurrence of events which defy the laws of physics, such as: D. Bartholomew, Uncertain Belief (Clarendon 1996); F. Goodman, How About Demons (Indiana University Press 1988); G. Habermas & J. Moreland, Beyond Death (Crossway Books 1998); K. Koch, Christian Counseling & Occultism (Kregel 1972); H. Montefiore, The Paranormal: A Bishop Investigates (Upfront 2002); J. Montgomery, Demon Possession (Bethany 1976); Principalities & Powers (Dimension Books 1975); J. Richards, But Deliver Us From Evil (Seabury 1974); M. Saborn, Light & Death (Zondervan 1998); R. Sheldrake, Seven Experiments That Could Change the World (Riverhead Books 1995); M. Unger, The Haunting of Bishop Pike (Tyndale 1971).
http://www.equip.org/free/DD282-1.htm
http://www.equip.org/free/DD282-2.htm
http://www.sheldrake.org/

As well as: G. Bennett, Alas, Poor Ghost! Traditions of Belief in Story & Discourse (Utah State University Press 1999); S. Braude, Immortal Remains (Rowman & Littlefield 2003); G. Doore, ed. What Survives? (Jeremy Tracher 1990); A. Jaffé, Apparitions (Spring Publications 1979); R. Kastenbaum, ed., Between Life & Death (Springer 1979); D. Klass et al. eds., Continuing Bonds (Taylor & Grancis 1996); L. LaGrand, After Death Communication (Llewellyn 1997); B. Schoenberg et al. eds., Bereavement (Columbia 1975); http://www.beyondreligion.com.