Dumb luck

I'll respond to Jayman's comments on my post:

https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2019/09/the-wasteful-work-of-nature.html  

I don't think "luck" and "chance" are substances; they aren't things that exist in their own right. We label outcomes we can't fully explain as the result of "luck" or "chance" but we have to keep in mind these are not true causes. They are admissions of ignorance.

Take the proverbial coin toss. The coin did not land heads-up because a substance known as "luck" or "chance" caused it to land heads-up. It landed heads-up up because of a variety of factors (launch angle, spin rate, gravity) that are too complex for us to identify precisely each time a coin is tossed in the air.

Evolution did not progress because "luck" or "chance" intervened. It progressed because of specific selection pressures, specific mutations, specific acts of procreation, etc. Because we are not in the position to know all of these causes throughout history we may chalk it up to "luck" or "chance" but we have to keep in mind that we say this because we are ignorant of the precise causes, not because "luck" and "chance" are true causes.

All of this is to say that "luck" and "chance" should not be on the table as real causes for anything. The main question, I believe, is whether the causes we see operating point to a first cause or not.

i) There's some equivocation going on. I wonder if Thomist metaphysics is hovering bat-like in the background. But that's not my own metaphysical paradigm. So this may simply mean that Jayman's concept of chance/luck is inconsistent with mine. But that doesn't refute my own position since it doesn't directly engage my position. Rather, it judges my position by appeal to a different paradigm, which I reject.

ii) I agree with him that as I use the terms, chance and luck aren't substances or things that exist in their own right. Rather they represent the absence of certain conditions. 

iii) Whether they qualify as "true causes" depends on your concept of causality. David Lewis defines a cause as something that makes a difference to the outcome. On that definition, the lack of something is causal when it affects the outcome. In that sense, there's such a thing as negative causation. 

iv) "Chance" and "luck" have varied connotations. You could define them in epistemological terms, as Jayman does, where they're synonyms with admissions of ignorance. That, however, is by no means the only legitimate definition, so it can't be imposed on me to the exclusion of other definitions.

v) Some people use chance/luck and randomness as synonyms for indeterminacy. An indeterminate outcome. But that's not how I'm using the terms. In my usage, chance/luck and randomness are consistent with physical determinism. 

vi) They're often employed as synonyms for an unplanned outcome. To use Jayman's example, if the coin is fair, then whether it lands lands heads-up or tails-up is unplanned. Indeed, the outcome could not be planned since the coin-flipper lacks control over the outcome. That's a standard definition, and it's not equivalent to admissions of ignorance. True, we don't foreknow the result. If planning ensures the result, then that's incompatible with ignorance of the result. But an unplanned event is a distinct concept. 

For instance, suppose you have a gambler who's skilled at cheating. There's no direct evidence that he cheated. But there's indirect evidence because he consistently beats the odds. 

vii) A more technical definition is lack of correlation. If the coin is fair, then each toss is causally independent of the preceding and succeeding toss. So the coin-tosses aren't correlated with each other. Thus, you can't predict the outcome of the next coin toss from the previous coin toss. 

viii) An implication of (vi-vii) is that a random or chance outcome doesn't aim for a particular outcome. Suppose I win a prize if the coin lands heads-up five times in a row. If the coin is fair, that's naturally possible but statistically improbable. If it lands five times in a row, I got lucky because the process wasn't oriented for my convenience. The fact that the outcome was beneficial to me is sheer coincidence. 

If the coin consistently lands heads-up, then it's weighted in that direction. In that case, the outcome isn't random or coincidental. In that case, it wasn't coincidental that I'm the beneficiary of the process. 

Or, to revert to one of my own examples, if I don't know the combination, I could twirl the dial thousands of times without hitting on the right combination. If, however, I hit on the right combination after a few tries, that was dumb luck.

Likewise, it's statistically inevitable that randomly shuffled decks will on rare occasion yield a royal flush. If the deck is fair, and I get a royal flush, that's dumb luck. That's coincidence. If I went to the casino an hour sooner or an hour later, I wouldn't be dealt a royal flush. That's because, if the decks are randomly shuffled, then there's no correlation between the sequence in one deck and the sequence in another. If, however, the deck is stacked, then the outcome was discriminate rather than indiscriminate. 

These are essential distinctions. Meaningful distinctions. It's not a superstitious appeal to luck. It doesn't reify chance. 

This is easier said than done. The argument from evil is used as an argument against theism in general. A response to the argument from evil is likely to protect cults and false religions that are theistic.

That's a reply to a truncated version of what I said. I also said that we should avoid a principle so broad that it defends truth by immunizing error from rational scrutiny and refutation. 

It seems we are stuck making arguments from analogy in trying to answer what species feel pain. The closer a species is to us the more likely we are to think it feels pain like we do. But we can never get inside the mind of another creature so we don't really know.

True. In fact, even if we could get inside the mind (if it has a mind) of an animal, we might still be in the dark. Suppose I temporarily become a mouse, then revert to human. Do I remember what it's like to be a mouse? Maybe not. Maybe the psychology of a mouse is so alien to human psychology that I can't translate my experience as a mouse back into human impressions or concepts. 

YECs and OECs still face the problem of organisms that are disabled or deformed. I don't see how adding or removing macro-evolution from the picture strengthens or weakens the argument from evil.

i) To begin with, I wasn't responding to the problem of evil in that regard. I didn't say theistic evolution falls prey to the argument from evil. Rather, it casts doubt on the wisdom or competence of God to use such a blundering process if the creation of man is a primary goal. 

ii) With respect to genetic defects, it may well be the case that in a complex process with multiple variables, multiple points at which it could break down, many environmental factors that might interfere, occasional copy errors are inevitable. Even apart from the Fall, that will naturally happen in a physical process where there are so many opportunities for something to go awry.

In the case of humans, it requires special providence to forestall deformities and disabilities. In the case of animals, God might allow that even apart from the Fall. In an unfallen world, there's no expectation that animals enjoy the same providential protection as humans. 

YECs and OECs are also stuck with the seemingly clumsy, blundering methods of reproduction used by earth's lifeforms. If evolution is true then these same methods of reproduction are used but they just result in new species/kinds coming into existence over the ages.

i) That comparison subverts basic standards of rationality. The male and female reproductive systems are marvels of engineering prowess, and they're so successful that they lead to overpopulation absent disease and predation. The fact that sexual reproduction is successful so often is the result of design, not dumb luck. Indeed, sexual reproduction is so effective that it's led to the development of sophisticated chemical contraceptives to depress or suppress the success rate.  

That's hardly analogous to evolution, where the occasional hits are the result of relentless mindless repetition. Where the misses far outnumber the hits. 

Are we in a position to answer that question? Perhaps a very broad answer is all we're in the position to offer.

i) If you're not in a position to answer that question, then you're not justified in saying evolution is a goal-oriented process. At the very least you ought to withhold judgment.

ii) Moreover, if there's no evidence that evolution is a goal-oriented process, then there's a presumption against believing it to be so. Rather than suspending judgment, you should conclude that it is what it appears to be. If it doesn't seem to be a goal-oriented process, the simplest explanation is because it's not. Put another way, if it was a goal-oriented process, we'd expect to find some evidence to that effect.  

Whenever an atheist claims that evolution is directionless, purposeless, etc. he is no longer making a scientific claim, he is making a philosophical/atheological claim. The theistic evolutionist will also have to make philosophical/theological claims and arguments for his position. My position is that our ability to do science (of any kind, not just evolutionary science) is best accounted for if God exists.

i) It's true that dysteleology requires a norm, an ideal standard of comparison. How does naturalism derive and justify that? 

ii) But it doesn't follow that interpreting a process to be directionless is a philosophical claim rather than a scientific claim. To use Jayman's own example, is it unscientific to say coin-tossing is directionless? 

Surely it's important that science have the ability to differentiate aimless outcomes from goal-oriented outcomes. Take the difference between murder, suicide, and accidental death. We'd be in quite a pickle if forensic science could never rule out death by accidental causes.