If, on the one hand you think that God is (necessarily?) logical, while, on the other hand, you think the source of logic is not God, but is independent of God, then that makes divine rationality contingent on something that's not God, that's independent of God, and more ultimate than God. If God isn't the source of things like logic, numbers, and possible worlds, then that's a smaller God, a less impressive God. Not the greatest conceivable being.
Suppose God is the source of logic. Then he is the source of the laws of logic. In particular, he is the source of the fact that a contradiction (i.e., any statement of the form P & ~P) cannot be true. But God is omnipotent. An omnipotent being can alter whatever he is the source of. Thus, if God is the source of logic, then he can alter the truth value of the law of non-contradiction (i.e., he can alter the truth value of ~(P & ~P). If God is the source of logic, he can make any statement of the form P & ~P true. In particular, he can make the statement 'God is weak and God is not weak' true.
ReplyDeleteSo, if God is the source of logic, then it is possible that God makes 'God is weak and God is not weak' true. Thus, there is some possible world in which 'God is weak and God is not weak' is true. It follows from 'God is weak and God is not weak' that God is weak (that is, 'God is weak and God is not weak' implies 'God is weak). Thus, if God is the source of logic, then there is some possible world in which God is weak. But there is no world in which the greatest conceivable being is weak. Thus, if God is the source of logic, then God is not the greatest conceivable being.
Depends on the sense in which God is the source of logic. If you mean universal possibilism or theistic activism (e.g. Descartes, Morris/Menzel, Gould/Davis, Leftow), then that's vulnerable to your strictures.
DeleteIf, however, you mean theistic conceptual realism (Welty/Anderson), then that doesn't follow. On that view, God doesn't create logic. Rather, logic is constituted by God's necessary cognition. Like a divine attribute: God doesn't create his own attributes.
That's just simple-minded and does not take into account the view (e.g. of Anderson and Welty as Steve has noted) that logic is grounded in God's being and constitutes His necessary thoughts, where laws of logic are necessarily true thoughts, true in every possible world, and thus exist in every possible world.
DeleteHence, on this view, there is no possible world where P & ~P obtains.
I don't see why the fact (if it is one) that God does not create his own attributes is helpful here. Surely, in this context, what matters is whether God has the power to change his attributes and/or change the things he thinks about.
DeleteSuppose you think that God has necessary thoughts, i.e., that there are thoughts that God has in every possible world. The question would be, in virtue of what are these thoughts necessary? Suppose that the thoughts are necessary in virtue of their content. In that case, God must think these thoughts in virtue of the content of these thoughts. On such a view, if logical truths are God's necessary thoughts, then God must think these thoughts (whose content involves logical truths) in virtue of the content of the thoughts. God must think them in virtue of the thoughts that they are. But then, it would not be God who is the source of the authority of logic, but the content of the logical truths themselves.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the thoughts are necessary in virtue of God's nature. That is, God thinks these thoughts in every possible world in virtue of the fact that God has a certain nature and it is the same nature in every possible world. In this case, God's thoughts would be limited by his own nature. But if he can change his nature, then he can think different thoughts. Thus, if logic is constituted by God's necessary cognition, and God's cognition is limited only by his own nature, then if God can change his nature, the laws of logic can change as well. In particular, if God can change his nature, then he can change his nature such that he thinks the thought 'P & ~P.'
A being that has the power to change its own nature has greater power than a being that does not have the power to change its own nature. Thus, if God cannot change his own nature, then he is not the greatest conceivable being.
God is the greatest conceivable being *within reality*. Reality is logical not because God arbitrarily defined the laws of logic but because God - the ultimate reality - is ontologically logical. Logic is an attribute of God like omnipotence. God can't stop being logical, because this is an ontological impossibility, that would imply the suspension of reality as it is.
DeleteA being that has the power to change its own nature violates the laws of logic so he is a fictional being not a real being - within reality - so he is not a conceivable being.
"I don't see why the fact (if it is one) that God does not create his own attributes is helpful here."
DeleteIt's a comparison.
"Surely, in this context, what matters is whether God has the power to change his attributes…"
He doesn't. That's the point of the comparison.
"and/or change the things he thinks about."
How could an omniscient being change the things he things about?
"Suppose you think that God has necessary thoughts, i.e., that there are thoughts that God has in every possible world. The question would be, in virtue of what are these thoughts necessary? Suppose that the thoughts are necessary in virtue of their content. In that case, God must think these thoughts in virtue of the content of these thoughts. On such a view, if logical truths are God's necessary thoughts, then God must think these thoughts (whose content involves logical truths) in virtue of the content of the thoughts. God must think them in virtue of the thoughts that they are. But then, it would not be God who is the source of the authority of logic, but the content of the logical truths themselves."
i) Thoughts are a broader category than logic. Take thoughts about contingent states and events.
ii) Logical truths are interrelated by chains of mutual entailment to form a network. There's a relational quality to logical necessity.
iii) The rational structure of God's mind is the exemplar of logic. It's not their "content" in contrast to God's mind, as if they exist independently of God.
"But if he can change his nature, then he can think different thoughts."
God's nature is immutable.
"A being that has the power to change its own nature has greater power than a being that does not have the power to change its own nature. Thus, if God cannot change his own nature, then he is not the greatest conceivable being."
i) Change, or the possibility of change, is a feature of contingent entities. That's not the greatest conceivable being.
ii) Power is only applicable to contingencies. Logic is not an object of power. Or numbers.
'Surely... what matters is whether God has the power to change his attributes and/or the things he thinks about.'
Delete1. That's incoherent. On Christianity, God's attributes or 'properties' (with Berkhof) are not subject to change. He possesses these attributes necessarily and immutably.
2. What would it mean for an omniscient God to change the things He thinks about?
'Suppose... God has necessary thoughts... there are thoughts that God has in every possible world... in virtue of what are these thoughts necessary?'
In virtue of His natural knowledge which He knows by His essence. God's natural knowledge of all metaphysically necessary truths, such as logical and mathematical truths/certainties, are known through His necessary essence. God can no more bring about a world in which P & ~P obtains than He can a world in which 1+1=3 obtains.
'Suppose, on the other hand, that the thoughts are necessary in virtue of God's nature... In this case, God's thoughts would be limited by his own nature.'
1. Limited in what sense? Sure, God is bound by His very essence and attributes, but this is not 'limiting' in some deficient, restricting or negative sense. God has parameters through which absurdities cannot penetrate. How exactly is this 'limiting' or 'restrictive'?
2. On (1), How would God's possessing knowkedge of all metaphysically necessary truths, such as all possibilities, be a 'limiting' thing? I'd like to see something resembling an argument here. Logic and laws of logic exist within the wider context of God's thoughts as a whole.
3 On (2), possessing perfect knowledge of all metaphysically necessary truths including an infinite number of propositions (in the form of possibilities) and all true propositions, far from constituting a 'limit' on God, rather would be exemplary of God's unlimited knowledge. Being unable to bring about logical contradictions is not 'limiting' but rather indicative of the contrary.
'A being that has the power to change its own nature has greater power than a being [who does not]... Thus, if God cannot change his own nature then he is not the greatest conceivable being.'
Where's the argument? It is not a 'conceivably great' thing to be able to change one's own nature as a non-contingent/necessary being. That 'conceivable being' is itself contradictory, unstable, quite prossibly schizophrenic, unworthy of trust, and it requires cosmic councelling at once. Perhaps Zeus has a number he can pass on to this unfortunate and conceivably mundane being.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteYou say, "God's nature is immutable."
In virtue of what?
"Power is only applicable to contingencies. Logic is not an object of power. Or numbers."
In virtue of what? This makes sense if logic and numbers are independent of God. But if an all-powerful being is the source of logic, then I do not see that logic is not subject to power.
Everything isn't the case in virtue of something else being the case. That reasoning leads to an infinite regress. To say some things must be grounded in more fundamental things, or be constituents of something larger, doesn't mean each and everything must be grounded in something else, ad infinitum.
DeleteYou have an idiosyncratic definition of omnipotence. In philosophical theology, the definition of omnipotence is never unqualified. It's always subject to restrictions.
Divine omnipotence is not self-referential. It's not about what God can do to himself, but God's ability to cause contingent stages and events.
I have not offered a definition of 'omnipotence' so I do not understand the basis of your claim that I have an idiosyncratic definition of the term.
DeleteRegardless, if God is the source of all that is and God is a free agent, then all that is is subject to God's free choices.
You say that omnipotence is subject to restrictions. I am asking about the nature of those restrictions. Either God is restricted by things external to him or else it is not the case that God is restricted by things external to him. If God is restricted by things external to him, then God is not the source of those restrictions. Thus, there are sources of restrictions that are external to God.
If it is not the case that God is restricted by things external to him, then it seems to follow that God is not restricted. After all, if it is not the case that God is restricted by things external to him, then God can only be restricted by things internal to him. But God can do anything that it is logically possible to do. And, on the view we are considering, logical restrictions must be internal to God. But why couldn't God change features that are internal to him? What could prevent an all-powerful being from changing features that are internal to him? I don't see how to make sense of the idea that, given that there are no restriction external to this being, it is impossible for an all-powerful being to change features internal to himself. If you can make sense of this, please let me know.
So, if it is not the case that God is restricted by things external to him, then God is not restricted in any sense.
You say,
"Divine omnipotence is not self-referential. It's not about what God can do to himself, but God's ability to cause contingent stages and events."
But I do not know how to draw the necessary/contingent distinction if there are no external restrictions on God. If God is not constrained by logic, then in virtue of what is it necessarily true that ~(P & ~P)?
I think that ~(P & ~P) is true in every possible world. But I also think that it is true independent of God. If God is the source of the fact that ~(P & ~P) is true, then in virtue of what is ~(P &~P) true in all possible worlds? As I understand it, you want to say that it is true in all possible worlds in virtue of the fact that God thinks it in all possible worlds (that is, it is a necessary cognition of God). [Correct me if I am wrong.] But why should we think that God has this thought in every possible world? Why should we think that there is no world in which God thinks ~~(P & ~P)? What would prevent him from thinking this? Nothing, as far as I can tell. That is, nothing so long as we think that there are no external constraints on God.
"I have not offered a definition of 'omnipotence' so I do not understand the basis of your claim that I have an idiosyncratic definition of the term."
DeleteDon't be coy. You're laboring to impute a highly eccentric concept of omniscience to God.
"if God is the source of all that is and God is a free agent, then all that is is subject to God's free choices."
In mainstream Christian philosophical theology, God's free agency is never defined in terms of God's ability to change himself. His choices have reference to which possible worlds to instantiate. He's the same in every possible world.
"After all, if it is not the case that God is restricted by things external to him, then God can only be restricted by things internal to him."
"But God can do anything that it is logically possible to do."
Possibility has reference to contingent states and events, not to God himself–inasmuch as God is not a contingent being.
"But why couldn't God change features that are internal to him? What could prevent an all-powerful being from changing features that are internal to him?"
Once again, you're operating with an idiosyncratic notion of omnipotence.
"it is impossible for an all-powerful being to change features internal to himself."
Divine omnipotence is not an autonomous property that operates independent of God or contrary to God. Rather, the exercise of omnipotence must be consistent with all that God is. A coherence of attributes.
"If you can make sense of this, please let me know."
Satisfying you was never by aim or standard of comparison.
"But I do not know how to draw the necessary/contingent distinction if there are no external restrictions on God. If God is not constrained by logic…"
I never said God is not constrained by logic. God is constrained (as it were) by the fact that he's God, and cannot be other than God.
"As I understand it, you want to say that it is true in all possible worlds in virtue of the fact that God thinks it in all possible worlds (that is, it is a necessary cognition of God)."
Both logic and possible worlds have their source in God.
BTW, you duck my point that your reasoning is regressive.
This objection is so dull, laboured and repetitive in the face of perfectly coherent and easy to understand responses that one almost feels the urge to hack one's own head off with an axe. The objection now seems utterly contrived and insincere.
DeleteThe only sense in which God could possibly think ~~(P & ~P) would be to acknowledge its absurdity. Laws of logic, while being *metaphysically dependent* on God, are not contingent or labile. The internal consistency of God's attributes (e.g., His rationality, His holiness, His goodness, His supremacy) and their unwavering coherence is a necessary feature of His very essense and being; it's what makes God God; some might even say this is indicative of the greatest conceivable being.
God must be eternally bummed by such impenetrable consistency and impliability.
Let me note that neither Steve nor Danny has suggested an answer to the question that I asked, namely, why should we think that there is no world in which God thinks ~~(P & ~P)? What would prevent him from thinking this?
ReplyDeleteDanny insists that the laws of logic are not contingent. About this he is absolutely correct, the laws of logic are not contingent. But I doubt that the view that logic are the necessary thoughts of God can accommodate this obvious fact. And the reason is simple: if the laws of logic are the necessary thoughts of an omnipotent being, then since an omnipotent being's thoughts are not constrained, he can have any thought whatsoever, including ~~(P & ~P). To block this inference, we need some reason to think that God cannot think ~~(P & ~P). But, on Danny's view, there appears to be no such reason; and nobody has offered any such reason on this thread. (Oh, and Danny also indicates that he is bored with the issue. But that is not an answer to my question.)
In his most recent comment, Steve's most helpful suggestion is that God is constrained by the fact that he is God. The problem with this suggestion is that it gives us no reason to think that God cannot be a being that thinks ~~(P & ~P). So, the suggestion is a non-starter as an answer to my question.
I'm not responsible for Thibodeau's persistent incomprehension.
DeleteThis is astounding. Thibodeau constantly labours under the misapprehension that he has something profound or interesting to say. As is his habit, he does not pay attention to the perfectly coherent and acceptable answers given and constantly repeats his mind-numbing and decidedly superficial and uninteresting objections.
DeleteOnce again Thibodeau's own sense of self-importance has led him to misrepresent or 'miss' what has been said. I have indeed suggested that God is bound (or constrained) by His own attributes, including His necessary knowledge. This is part of what it means to be the 'greatest conceivable being' and worthy of worship and trust. I have also suggested a sense in which God could think ~~(P & ~P), i.e., He'd be aware of its absurdity (God's rationality means He knows what's irrational and absurd! His goodness means He knows what's evil, and so on).
Thibodeau has not addressed any subatantive points other than to plead ignorance and reassert his mind-numbing objection. His ignorance and inability to comprehend is not a refutation. His attempt to rig the debate (if God's thoughts are unconstrained I win! If God's thoughts are constrained I win!) is utterly transparent. He ignores numerous responses given, pleads ignorance when he does deign to mention a response, and my 'boredom' is not with the 'issue' but with Thibodeau's dull and laboured repetitiveness. There's no real issue to speak of. One can only marvel at such a misplaced sense of self-importance.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteIf we believe that our interlocutor has been laboring under a misapprehension or has failed to understand a point, then, if we are interested in the truth and in helping others discover the truth, we can patiently attempt to identify the source of the problem.
Danny,
You say, in your recent comment, that God is constrained by his own attributes. I thought that I had addressed this suggestion in an earlier comment, in which I said:
"After all, if it is not the case that God is restricted by things external to him, then God can only be restricted by things internal to him. But God can do anything that it is logically possible to do. And, on the view we are considering, logical restrictions must be internal to God. But why couldn't God change features that are internal to him? What could prevent an all-powerful being from changing features that are internal to him? I don't see how to make sense of the idea that, given that there are no restriction external to this being, it is impossible for an all-powerful being to change features internal to himself. If you can make sense of this, please let me know."
I saw no response from you that explained how, given that there are no restrictions external to an omnipotent being, it is impossible for this being to change features internal to himself. If I missed it, then I apologize and ask that you redirect me to your answer.
But let me try to make my point in a different way. You say that God is constrained by his own attributes. I want to know how to make sense of this. Remember that we are working here under the idea that God is the source of logic, and I have been understanding this to imply that God is the source of logic laws such as the law of non-contradiction. [If you disagree with either of these claims, then please let me know.] So, given that God is the source of logic, how are we to make sense of the claim that God is constrained by his own attributes?
Here is an idea that, if it works, would fully address my concern: To say that God is constrained by his own attributes is just to say that God cannot do anything that is inconsistent with his attributes.
Unfortunately, this suggestion does not work. The sense of "inconsistent" here can only be logical inconsistency. The suggestion would then be that God cannot do what is not logically consistent with his attributes. The problem is that we are here assuming (but only for the sake of understanding the position) that God is the source of logic. In particular, we are assuming that logical truths are the necessary cognitions of God. On this view, for something to be logically inconsistent is for it to be . . . what? Two thoughts present themselves: (a) to be logically inconsistent is to be a thought that God does not have in any possible world. (b) to be logically inconsistent is to be a thought that God believes is absurd.
Suppose we take the first option. Then we face a question: In virtue of what does God not have some thought (e.g., the thought that ~~(P & ~P))? What accounts for the fact that he does not have this thought? We cannot say that what accounts for it is the fact that it is a logically inconsistent thought because the fact that it is a logically inconsistent thought is precisely the fact that we are trying to account for. So, option (a) seems unhelpful.
Suppose we take option (b). Then we face a question: In virtue of what does God believe that some thought is absurd (e.g., in virtue of what does God believe that the thought ~~(P & ~P) is absurd)? We cannot say that what accounts for it is the fact that it is logically inconsistent because that the thought is logically inconsistent is precisely what we are trying to account for. So, option (b) does not seem helpful either.
Jason, you're not a truth-seeker, you're a militant atheist. You do your best not to understand.
DeleteI'm not writing for your benefit. Persuading you was never my aim or obligation.
Jason, you just illustrated everything I said in my last two posts. Remarkable. Constantly drawing attention to your ignorance/inability to make sense of things is not my problem.
DeleteJason, the things Steve and Danny have been saying are part of the basics of mainstream Christian philosophical theology, which are themselves based on the Bible. There are some things the *CHRISTIAN* God cannot do. There's the popular rhyme that says "God cannot, lie, die or deny Himself." Those are just three examples among others.
ReplyDeleteGod cannot Lie:
in the hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised long ages ago,- Titus 1:2 NASB
so that by two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we who have fled for refuge might have strong encouragement to hold fast to the hope set before us.- Heb. 6:18 ESV
God is not man, that he should lie, or a son of man, that he should change his mind. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it?- Num. 23:19 ESV
[cf. 1 Sam. 15:29]
God cannot Die:
To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God, be honor and glory forever and ever. Amen.- 1 Tim. 1:17
15 which he will display at the proper time---he who is the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords,
16 who alone has immortality, who dwells in unapproachable light, whom no one has ever seen or can see. To him be honor and eternal dominion. Amen.- 1 Tim. 6:15-16 ESV
who has become a priest, not on the basis of a legal requirement concerning bodily descent, but by the power of an indestructible life.- Heb. 7:16
God cannot Deny or Contradict Himself, being Immutable and a Promise Keeper
if we are faithless, He remains faithful, for He cannot deny Himself.- 2 Tim. 2:13 ESV
"For I the LORD do not change; therefore you, O children of Jacob, are not consumed.- Mal. 3:6 ESV
Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change.- James 1:17 ESV
...Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it?- Num. 23:19 ESV
Then the LORD said to me, "You have seen well, for I am watching over my word to perform it."- Jer. 1:12 ESV
Know therefore that the LORD your God is God, the faithful God who keeps covenant and steadfast love with those who love him and keep his commandments, to a thousand generations,- Deut. 7:9 ESV
[cf. Neh. 1:5; 9:32; Dan. 9:4]
It is often the case that when critics of Christianity try to use the omni-attributes to argue against the Christian conception(s) of God, they do so in ways contrary to what the Christian Scriptures actually teach and what Christian philosophical theologians and apologists have argued for and defended. Christian theologians have disagreements among themselves about the particulars, but critics of Christianity need to target real Christian positions and conceptions of God. Rather than strawman representations not attenuated by Biblical data.