The spirit of Elijah

Apostate Dale Tuggy responded to my post:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2018/04/unitarian-shortcuts.html

Steve, simplicity a desideratum - of course, not the only one - of theory-making in science, and really, just in common life. All other things being equal, we all prefer a simple explanation to a more complex one, e.g. in solving a crime. 

There are two kinds of simplicity: explanatory and ontological. 

It's a common error to confuse first principles or self-evident truths with truths known a priori (i.e. not on the basis of any experience, but only through conceptual analysis). 

The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy says "self-evident" is generally a synonym for "a priori" (p628). Philosophers like Carl Ginet and David W. Benfield operate with the same equivalence.   

The above truth is not one of those, of course, but is something an unbiased reader simply discerns in the NT texts. It's no harder than understanding that one character in a novel is supposed to be a different person (and so, being) than another character. 

But God is a very different kind of entity than finite human creatures. 

For that matter, reports of biolocation defy common sense appeals to numerical personal identity. 

As another example, Reid would say, when you are looking at apple right in front of you (in a well lit room, and your eyes are working, etc) that it is self-evident to you then that there is an apple right there. Notice the dependence on the visual experience. In my case, there is a dependence on reading, with basic comprehension.

The credibility of the first example (viewing the apple) is used to lend stolen credibility to unitarian hermeneutics, but that doesn't transfer because the two examples are so different.  

Steve, this is convoluted - you're typing too fast or something. Using "the spirit of X" to mean the power that was operative in X - that is wholly consistent with my point that the spirit of X isn't supposed to be someone in addition to X. That's just another usage, in addition to the common one I linked in the Psalms in the post, where you talk about "the spirit of X" meaning just, X himself, or inner part or aspect of him - again, not an additional self. 

That doesn't work in the passages I quoted, since you do have two different "selves": Elijah and Elisha or Elijah and John the Baptist, each of whom embodies "the spirit of Elijah". 

Yes, IF in that instance the "spirit" was meant to be a self. But often, it is a power or aspect of the one whose spirit it is. Admittedly, biblical spirit-talk is confusing to us. 

But now you're equivocating between two different definitions:

i) "spirit of X" synonymous with X himself

ii) "spirit of X" synonymous with "inner part or aspect" of X. 

And even in drawing that distinction, the Spirit is identical with the Father, or identical with the "inner part or aspect of him". On that definition, the Father and the Spirit are one and the same self. But that generates a dilemma when Dale simultaneously rejects adoration of the Spirit. But if the "Spirit of God" is synonymous with God or some aspect of God, then why isn't the Spirit a proper object of worship? 

As  unitarian, Dale wishes to deny that the Spirit of God is someone in addition to the Father/the one God, but in that event, the Spirit of God is a suitable object of worship inasmuch as the Spirit of God is interchangeable with God himself. Dale needs to pick one position and stick with it. 

The solution here is simple: God's spirit is being personified here, being spoken of as if it were a self. As with, e.g. God's wisdom in Pr 8 and elsewhere. If you think this "does make a lick of sense," I wonder why you think personification is so... senseless.

I anticipated that response. As I already pointed out, the problem with that simple solution is that if the Spirit is merely a personification of the Father, then the Father isn't giving/sending the Spirit; rather, he's sending himself. But that's nonsensical since the notion of sending involves a distinction between the sender and the sent. Why use that confusing circumlocution if it really refers to the Father alone? There's an explicit emphasis on "another", in contrast to Jesus. 

Again, to say the Spirit is just a personification for one "self" rather than two "selves," then God didn't reveal these things to us through the Spirit, the Spirit doesn't search the depths of God, since there aren't actually two parties to that transaction. Rather, the Father searches himself. Once again, why the confusing circumlocution? 

It's ironic that unitarians like Dale appeal to simple, face-value readings of Scripture, but then have to rewrite passages that conflict with their position. 

Steve, you throw quite a fit about "the holy spirit" never being an object of worship in the NT. But again, this is simple reading comprehension - and many have pointed this out, whatever their theological commitments. It is just an observable fact about the texts. Sure, you can deduce that the h.s. should be worshiped from his literally being a self, and his being a "fully divine" self - further dubious deductions from the texts. But it is a glaring fact that "he" or it is simply left out of the worship scenes and discussions of worship. What, overall, is the best explanation of that? It seems to us, that it is that early Christians thought this was not a self in addition to God and Jesus. 

The best explanation is that the Spirit empowers worship. Is the source of piety. 

So, it becomes evident upon simply reading the NT, with basic comprehension. Where does the h.s. speak to them... 

i) For one thing, Jesus speaks to the Father because Jesus is an embodied agent who uses speech to communicate with the Father (e.g. prayer). There's silent prayer and spoken prayer. Jesus prays aloud or addresses the Father in public for the benefit of onlookers. And sometimes the Father responds with an audible voice, for the benefit of onlookers. That's recorded in the Gospels for the benefit of readers. It illustrates communion and confirmation between Father and Son. 

But why would the Spirit use the spoken word to communicate to the Father and the Son? A discarnate agent would typically communicate telepathically. 

ii) In addition, the Spirit has a manward rather than Godward role to play in the economic of salvation. He speaks to and through humans. Works in humans.  

obey them?

From a Trinitarian perspective, why would the Holy Spirit be in a position to obey the Father or the Son? 

Why does it lack a proper name? 

Like what? "Joe"? "Hey, I'm the Holy Spirit. Just call me Joe". 

Where in Scripture does God have a proper name? Even "God" is a categorical designation rather than a proper name. God usually has titles that symbolize his attributes, actions, economic roles. One of the things that sets God apart from humans is the lack of a proper name like "Fred" or "Herb" or "Walt". God isn't that kind of entity. A being who is replicable.  

Where is it portrayed as literally cooperating with God and Jesus, in the way they are taught, e.g. in John, to be working as one?

Of course, Dale already has a tactic for discounting evidence by dismissing such portrayals are mere personifications. 

I think those passages you cite are about the closest anyone can come to challenging #19. If the spirit is literally an intermediary, he's got to be a literal self - only a self can do that. 

Notice, once again, how unitarians like Dale appeal to a simple, face-value reading of the text until it conflicts with unitarianism. So even though Rom 8:26-27 explicitly depicts the Spirit who mediates between the Father and Christians in prayer, Dale says we shouldn't take that literally. So where's the consistency in unitarian hermeneutics? 

1 Cor 2 passage compares God's spirit to ours - but clearly, "the spirit of Steve" is not someone in addition to Steve! It's just Steve, or an aspect or part of him, which is not literally a self.

Paul's analogy, like analogies generally, has limitations, but it's irreducibly personal. That's the immediate point. 

It is important, I think, not to cherry pick just these vivid personifying passages. 

If I present counterevidence or counterexamples to Dale's claim, that's cherry-picking passages. 

We must look at all the talk of God's "spirit" or "Spirit" in the NT, and much of it seems impersonal. 

What about impersonal depictions of God, as a rock, light, fire, tower, shield?

I explain this in the episode. It strikes me that we always, in all practical affairs, and basically in any context whatever outside of extreme sci-fi and trinitarian speculations, refuse to consider selves as combining. I don't claim to know this as a necessary truth, because I don't see that its falsehood is obviously impossible. But, I am claiming that we do (absent defeaters acquired by speculation or tradition) know this.

Now, I had in mind only parts-at-a-time. But yes, I think that as stated, this is contradicted by theories of personal identity on which, e.g. Steve is really composed of Steve-stages - thought of as selves existing each at a single moment on the timeline. This, in my view, is wrongheaded for so many reasons. But yes, some metaphysicians are willing to take such views seriously. But, and this is important, you should know going in that many philosophers will run roughshod over the truths of common sense - just look at Reid's list, various elements of which were contradicted by the speculations of people like Berkeley, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza.

Actually, I happen to agree with representational theories of perception. To that extent I disagree with Reid. 

Spinoza may well have been a closet atheist masquerading as a pantheist to maintain pious appearances, because it was politically hazardous to be an outspoken atheist back then. I don't know what in particular Dale objects to regarding Decsartes. Sure, I disagree with Berkley on idealism (and Leibniz on monadology). However, Berkeley was riffing off of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which is a legitimate distinction that's a part of modern science up to our own day. 

In general, "But some philosopher disagrees!" is not a good reason to reject what, otherwise, you have reason to think is a principle of common sense. Basically, for any seemingly obvious truth whatever, you can find, if you dig hard enough, some very smart and creative philosopher whose pet theories require that claim to be false. 

It exposes the fallacy of facile appeals to self-evidence. 

Steve, honestly, you don't have a developed, coherent position on the sameness of human selves through time. 

i) I wasn't attempting to make a full-blown case for my own position. Rather, I was skewering simplistic appeals to a particular view of personal identity. And I presented an argument–for which you offer no counterargument. Indeed, further up you conceded that some metaphysicians do distinguish between you-yesterday, you-today, you-tomorrow. And these are asymmetrical. My 50-year-old self is aware of my 5-year-old self, but not vice versa. 

ii) IMO, personal identity requires continuity from the same starting-point. All stages trace back to the same point of origin. A different person isn't in the same stream, but a different stream.